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

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AN HISTORICAL SKETCH
OF
THE REPUBLIC

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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VENICE

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF

THE REPUBLIC

BY

HORATIO F. BROWN

AUTHOR OF "LIFE ON THE LAGOONS"

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OMNIBUS CENZIANIS
QUORUM HAUD MINIMA PARS

T. W. A, H. F. B.

AMICUS AMICIS

D. D.

PREFACE

IN this volume I proposed to write a biography of Venice, and if it had seemed advisable I should have prefixed that title to my book. Believing that a State is an organic whole, and that such an organism can be more easily studied in a City- than in a Territorial- State, it appeared to me that the Venetian Republic presented one of the most striking examples of the inception, birth, adolescence, decline, and death of a Community which history has to offer for our observation.

Throughout her career the personality of the Republic overshadows the personality of even her most distinguished citizens. No State, except Athens, has ever presented, at the very core of her life, the idea of herself with such sumptuous personification in art. Athene in the Parthenon, Venezia in the Ducal Palace, offer the two most illustrious examples of a nation's self-portraiture through painting and through sculpture.

With this conception in view, I have attempted to note the generation and gestation of the race; to display the operation of extrinsic circumstances, such as geographical and natural position, in the formation of its character; to trace the procedure of those intrinsic qualities, such as commercial spirit, scepticism, seamanship, which led the nation to pursue its peculiar line of development; and to

demonstrate the action of external forces in urging the State to commit errors, for which she paid the penalty with her life. My endeavour has been to state facts, and then to suggest causes and consequences.

I am aware that such a method is exposed to a serious danger; it may induce the writer to strain facts in order to suit a theory, may lead him to construct what Ferrari styled *Storia ideale*, of which his own book is a luminous specimen. I have done my best, however, to avoid this patent danger by clinging close to facts, and I present my reading of causes and consequences as nothing more than suggestions, which I state strongly because they are the best I am able to offer. A closer acquaintance with facts, an acuter perception of cause, may lead my readers to different conclusions.

Without the continual assistance of Romanin's *Storia documentata di Venezia*, an invaluable mine of information, I could not have written this book. I have made use of many other authorities, however, and their names will be found in a short bibliography, which I trust may prove of service to those who desire to pursue the study of Venice further than I have been able to conduct them.

My sincerest thanks are due to Mr. J. A. Symonds, who, in the course of reading the proofs, which he most kindly undertook to do; made many and various suggestions of the highest value for the construction of the work.

HORATIO F. BROWN.

CA' TORRESELLA, VENICE,
December, 1892.

NOTE
TO THE SECOND EDITION

IN preparing this new edition for the press I have preserved the general structure of the book, as I found that without a considerable increase in the size of the volume it would be impossible to carry out the expansion which some of my critics suggested as desirable. I have availed myself of corrections indicated by my reviewers and by private friends; I have made a few additions to the Bibliography, and some slight alterations in the maps, which I hope will add to the value of both.

HORATIO F. BROWN.

CA' TORRESELLA, VENICE,
May, 1895.

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| 40. | Orio Malipiero | 1178 |
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| 45. | Renier Zeno | 1253 |
| 46. | Lorenzo Tiepolo | 1268 |
| 47. | Jacopo Contarini | 1275 |
| 48. | Giovanni Dandolo | 1280 |
| 49. | Pietro Gradenigo | 1289 |
| 50. | Marin Zorzi | 1311 |
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| 52. | Francesco Dandolo | 1329 |
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| 54. | Andrea Dandolo | 1343 |
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| 57. | Giovanni Dolfin | 1356 |
| 58. | Lorenzo Celsi | 1361 |
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| 61. | Michele Morosini | 1382 |
| 62. | Antonio Venier | 1382 |
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| 71. | Andrea Vendramin | 1476 |
| 72. | Giovanni Mocenigo | 1478 |
| 73. | Marco Barbarigo | 1485 |
| 74. | Agostino Barbarigo | 1486 |
| 75. | Leonardo Loredan | 1501 |
| 76. | Antonio Grimani | 1521 |
| 77. | Andrea Gritti | 1523 |

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| 81. Francesco Venier | 1554 |
| 82. Lorenzo Priuli | 1556 |
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| 85. Alvise Mocenigo | 1570 |
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| 110. Alvise Mocenigo | 1700 |
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| 112. Alvise Mocenigo | 1722 |
| 113. Carlo Ruzzini | 1732 |
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| 118. Alvise Mocenigo | 1763 |
| 119. Paolo Renier | 1779 |
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* I recommend this edition because of the notes, and Ranke's "Essay on the Spanish Conspiracy."

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CHAPTER I

Physical features of the Venetian lagoon—The twelve lagoon townships—The lagoon population—The official date of the foundation of Venice—The Paduan Consuls—The invasion of Attila—The election of Tribunes—Cause of this election—Nature of Tribunes' power—The advent of the East—Belisarius in Italy—His siege of Ravenna—Narses in Italy—The Paduans appeal to him—The Lombard invasion—Induces the mainlanders to settle finally in the lagoon—Legends of the flight from the mainland: their meaning—Condition of the earliest lagoon population—Early churches, San Jacopo di Rialto, S. Theodore, S. Geminiano—The ruined mainland cities furnish material—Houses—Cassiodorus's letter to the Tribunes—The growth of population produces a revision of the constitution—Longinus in Italy—The Venetians assert their independence—The first Imperial diploma—Relations with the Lombards; and with the Eastern Empire—The dangers to which Venice was exposed—Internal jealousy—Election of a doge, *Paolo Lucio Anafesto*.

It is unlikely that the physical aspects of the Venetian estuary have changed very much between the unknown period at which it received its first fisher population and the present day. The lagoons of Venice are a large sheet of salt water, in form like a bent bow, the curve of the bow following the line of the mainland, while the string is represented by a number of long, low, narrow islands, called *Lidi*, partly mud and partly sand, which are the most important characteristic of their formation. The *Lidi* serve as a barrier which prevents the sea from sweeping over the lagoons, and make it possible for man to build upon the island mudbanks; but they do not separate the basin thus created entirely from the sea, they do not convert the lagoons into a lake; for the *Lidi* are pierced at several points by openings, which admit the tide from the Adriatic, and give egress and ingress to the inhabitants. At certain points inside the

lagoon, where the muddy bottom is more solid, small islands, formed partly by nature and partly by man, rise above the water-level. At first these islands were nothing more than barren banks of clay or mud; yet upon such dubious foundations the hardy fishermen of the estuary were destined to raise one of the most powerful and most beautiful cities that the world has ever seen.


Though it is unlikely that the lagoons have altered very much within the period of their known history, it is probable that their surface was at one time of greater extent, that more of the mainland was under water than at present. For the twelve island-townships, enumerated in the chronicle of John the Deacon (Sagornino), one of the oldest Venetian chronicles which we possess, can all be identified to this day, though some of them are no longer, strictly speaking, cities of the lagoon. These twelve townships play such an important part in the early history of Venice, and we shall have to refer so frequently to most of them, that it will be as well here to give their names; they are Grado, Bibiones, Caprulæ (Caorle), Heraclea, Jesolo (Cavallino), Torcello, Murano, Rialto, Metamaucus (Malamocco), Pupillia (Poveglia), Clugies Minor, destroyed in the Genoese war, and Clugies Major (Chioggia). The Chronicler adds that there are besides these *quamplurimæ insulæ habitabiles*, very many more habitable islands. The account of the Venetian district generally, which we can gather from Livy and Strabo, shows physical conditions and habits of life similar to those which exist to-day. "The whole region," says Strabo, speaking of the country between the Julian Alps and the Adriatic, "abounds in swamps and rivers, and is partially covered by the sea. That is the only portion which is affected by tides like the ocean, and there the larger part of the plain is transformed into a salt-water marsh. As in lower Egypt, the water is directed hither and thither by ditches and dykes. Some of the island-cities are completely surrounded by water, others are washed on certain sides only." "All commerce is carried on by boats; and these boats are built with flat bottoms to enable them to pass over the shoals."



THE LAGOON OF VENICE

500 to 800 A. D.

Scale of Eng. Miles





It is clear from these passages that the shores of the estuary were already inhabited at the beginning of the Christian era. Upon this point Martial's famous lines in praise of the villas at Venetian Altino, comparing them with the villas of Neapolitan Baiæ, leave no doubt. Whether the lagoon-islands were also peopled is not so certain, but there is reasonable presumption that they were. The direct route between corn-growing Pannonia and Rome, lay through Aquileia to Ravenna by the waters of Venice; and those intricate channels must have required pilots who could only have been lagoon-dwellers, intimately acquainted with the region in which they were born and bred.

But though the islands of the estuary were probably inhabited, it is not to be supposed that their population was large, or in any sense independent. The lagoons were under the jurisdiction of the great Roman cities on the mainland, Aquileia, Opitergium (Oderzo), and Padua. It is not till we reach the period of barbarian invasion that we can begin to reckon the separate history of Venice. Those repeated incursions of the hungry hordes from beyond the Alps exerted a double action on the development of the lagoons: first, they drove the mainlanders for refuge to the islands; and, secondly, they gradually weakened, and then destroyed, the great mainland cities, and thereby left the island population virtually independent, though still bearing the impress of the Roman civilisation which characterised the cities from which it drew its origin.

But this process of disintegration on the mainland and of regermination in the lagoons, was a slow one. The various peoples drawn from the cities of the continent, who, under stress of danger, were to be eventually fused into the state which we call Venice, did not emigrate to the lagoon-islands suddenly. As each wave of barbarian invasion passed over North-eastern Italy and rolled away southward, or was repulsed beyond the Alps, the refugees from the mainland returned to their homes from their temporary asylum in the lagoon. Neither the invasion of the Marcomanni and Quadi in 170, nor that of the Goths in 378, nor that of Alaric in 400, was sufficient to convince the fugitives

that their only sure dwelling was upon the impenetrable waters of the Venetian estuary. Some deposit of population, some residue of each of those emigrations, no doubt remained behind in the lagoon-islands, and helped to prepare the way for the final acceptance of their water-home by the mainlanders; but the majority, with that persistent love of the hearthstone, continued to rebuild their shattered houses and temples after each incursion, living in the incorrigible hope that the last attack would really be the last. Two more terrible invasions, the invasion of the Huns and the invasion of the Lombards, were required before the lesson was completely learned, and the refugees settled down finally on those barren mud-banks which they were destined to make so famous in history.

The Venetian official account always assigned the 25th of March 421 as the day on which Venice was born. Such precision is both misleading and ⁴²¹ futile. But it is based upon a document well known to Venetian historians, the famous commission of the three Consuls who were sent from Padua to superintend the building of a city at Rialto, where they might concentrate the population and the commerce of the lagoons. "On the 25th of March, about mid-day, was the foundation-stone laid." There is little doubt that the document, as we have it, is a forgery; though it is highly probable that its substance is true to fact; and if it cannot be taken as establishing the date of the foundation of Venice, it is instructive for various reasons. It shows us that the lagoon-islands were inhabited, and that one of them, Rialto, lay on the course of the river Brenta through the estuary, and really commanded the sea-trade of Padua. It further shows that the Paduans wished to establish a commercial centre at Rialto, partly for safety, partly for convenience of traffic; and, finally, it proves that the lagoons around Rialto, the lagoons through which the Brenta passed, were at that time under the control of Padua; a fact which the people of Venice strenuously denied when they became stronger than the Paduans.

It is the year 452, however, which has generally been accepted as the birth-date of Venice. That is the 452. year of Attila's invasion, in which Aquileia fell, and the North Italian cities, Altino, Concordia, Opitergium, Padua, were sacked by the Huns. Although the year 452 has no more claim than the year 421 to be reckoned as the precise date for the foundation of Venice, yet it undoubtedly marks the first great point in the development of the lagoon population into a separate state. For the Hunnish invasion, with its ruthless barbarity and its merciless destruction of the mainland cities, did more than any of its predecessors to people the islands of the estuary, and also had a stronger effect than any other barbarian incursion in convincing the mainlanders that they would be wise to remain in the lagoons.

The result of Attila's invasion was demonstrated fourteen years later, in 466, when the island-townships took the first step indicative of their independence, and laid 466. the foundation of Venetian constitutional history by calling an assembly at Grado, and electing officers, with the title of Tribunes, to govern the affairs of each island. The important aspect of this election is, that here, for the first time, the lagoon communities act independently. There is no question of their receiving magistrates from Padua, from Oderzo, or from Aquileia; the lagoon population proceeds to elect its own magistrates. And so, if any precise date is to be indicated as the commencement of Venetian history, none would have a better claim than this of 466, the year in which the inhabitants of the lagoon chose their first officers for themselves.

But this election of Tribunes at Grado is not merely a proof that the domination of the mainland over the estuary was declining, that the population of the islands was increasing in numbers and in power; it is also a sign of internal activity on the part of the lagoon-dwellers and the beginning of a movement whose course we shall have to trace till it leads us to the next great step in Venetian history, the creation of the first Doge. For with the increase of population came rivalries and jealousies among

the neighbouring townships. Whatever hatred and enmity had existed between the great cities of the mainland, was intensified now that their fugitive populations were confined, side by side, in the narrow circumference of the lagoons. Municipal rivalry on the mainland led to brawling and violence among the refugees of the estuary; and the meeting at Grado, which elected the Tribunes, was rendered necessary chiefly by the desire which the people had to put an official restraint upon their political passions. This political antagonism between the component parts of the lagoon population, is the most important factor in the early development of the Venetian state. It had to be absorbed and eliminated before Venice could be considered as a political unit. The creation of the Tribunes was the first step towards such a solution.

The paucity and meagreness of the authorities for this obscure period of Venetian history, render it difficult to define the nature and powers of the Tribunate. In all probability it was an office borrowed from the Roman Municipal Government of the mainland cities; that is to say, in its first intention it was a military office, but subsequently, as sometimes happened, implying civil functions as well. Whatever may have been the precise powers of the Tribunes in the lagoon, or *Tribuni marittimi*, as they were called, it is certain that, from the date of their creation, they were the chief magistrates among the island population; and we shall presently find the Pretorian prefect, Cassiodorus, applying to the maritime Tribunes when he wished to secure the assistance of Venetians for the transport of oil and wine from Istria.

The horrors of the Hunnish invasion, however, were not sufficient to induce the mainlanders to remain permanently in the lagoons after the storm was over. It was difficult for the refugees, who were largely agriculturists, to adapt themselves to the new conditions of life on the waters, where fishing was the principal source of livelihood, and where they, doubtless, missed the luxury of their mainland towns. They returned in large numbers to their ruined cities.

476 466. The fall of Rome, in 476, had little effect on the Venetian provinces; and the Venetians, under the excellent rule of Theodoric, enjoyed a tranquillity which enabled those refugees who had remained in the lagoon to become acquainted with their new home, and indulged those refugees who had returned to the mainland, in the belief that they would not be disturbed again.

The death of Theodoric and the regency of Amalasunta tempted the Eastern Emperor to contemplate the conquest of the Italian peninsula. Justinian, with that object in view, sent Belisarius to Italy in 535. The war spread over the whole of the northern provinces, and was carried on with great barbarity. The result was that the lagoon-islands became once more an asylum from the horrors of the mainland.

Belisarius moved northward, and eventually arrived before Ravenna, to which he laid siege. And here, for the first time, we find the Venetians of the lagoons recognised as an important body, and called upon to take a part in the general movement of history. For Belisarius, 539- while engaged in this siege, sent Vitalius to secure the assistance of the maritime Venetians, whose ports would serve to harbour any Greek ships which might come from Constantinople with reinforcements for his army; and also to beg the Venetians to support him with their light boats in completing the blockade of Ravenna, and in conveying provisions to his troops. Ravenna fell, and with it the Gothic kingdom in Italy came to an end. The Eastern Emperors remained masters of the peninsula.

The siege and capture of Ravenna is of moment in the history of Venice. It not only proves that the lagoon-dwellers were growing in power and importance; that their fleet of light boats was worth the attention of the imperial general; that their harbours might, under certain conditions, prove of great value to the belligerent who held them; but more than all this, the establishment of the Eastern Empire in Italy, which resulted from this siege, was an event of the highest moment in the internal history of the lagoon, and had a decided bearing upon the evolution of the

Venetian State. For, as we shall soon have occasion to note, the question presently arose as to the exact relation of Venice to Constantinople; were the lagoons to be considered a part of the Eastern Empire, or were they independent? In short, one of the claimants to supremacy, whose aggression Venice was compelled to withstand if she were ever to achieve independence, had now appeared on the scene. The other claimant did not emerge till thirty years later, when Alboin and his Lombards poured down upon Italy. 539-

After the fall of Ravenna, Belisarius was recalled by the jealousy of the Emperor. But before long, his services were again required to suppress a rising of the Goths under Totila. Belisarius came to Italy insufficiently supplied with men and money. His campaign proved a failure. He was disgraced and superseded by Narses, the eunuch. Narses massed his troops at Salona, near Spalato, on the Dalmatian coast. He wished to reach Ravenna; but he was deficient in transport ships; he accordingly abandoned the sea route. The interior mainland route was blocked by the Franks, a collision with whom he desired to avoid. Narses, therefore, determined to follow the coast route, which had been left open in the belief that it was impracticable for an army. This choice led the Imperial general to the shore of the lagoons, at Grado, where he and his troops embarked on board Venetian transports, and were conveyed to Brondolo, at the south-western corner of the estuary, and thence to Ravenna. Narses was eventually victorious, and assumed the government of Italy, with the title of Duke. His conduct awakened suspicion at Constantinople. He was threatened with recall, and was presently superseded by Longinus, but not before he had invited the Lombards, many of whom had served under him, to bring their whole race sweeping down on Italy, thereby avenging what he held to be his unjust treatment by the Imperial Court.

• The importance of Narses's campaign in the history of Venice lies in this, that the general passed through the lagoons, and, as he himself reported to his successor

Longinus, was amazed at the vigour and prosperity of their inhabitants. Proof of this power is to be found not
539 only in the fact that the Venetians were equal to the task of transporting Narses's army across their waters, but it is even more strikingly illustrated by an appeal which the Paduans made to the Imperial general. The ambassadors of the mainland city complained that the Venetians of the lagoon had not only absorbed all the navigation on the rivers Brenta and Bacchiglione, but had made themselves masters of the mouths of the two streams, and had fortified them with a view to preventing any but Venetians from using those waters. The Paduans implored Narses to reinstate them in their ancient rights. The Venetian reply shows their determination to be free. It is based upon the right of the creator to his creation. It was they who had made the lagoon-islands inhabitable, the lagoon-canals navigable, the place an asylum for the mainlanders in time of trouble. The islands belonged to those who had always lived on them, the waters to those who knew how to defend them. That Narses did not give judgment in the case, but contented himself with urging both parties to reconciliation, shows his conviction that the lagoon-dwellers had the power, and the will, to keep what they had acquired, in spite of any decision on his part.

The year 568 is the second great landmark in the early history of the lagoons; in that year Alboin and his
568 Lombards invaded Italy from Pannonia. The mainland north of Venice was put to fire and sword. Once again the inhabitants of the ruined city sought refuge in the estuary. This time they resolved to remain there. Partly, they were at last convinced that the mainland was no longer safe for them; partly, too, the lagoon-islands presented a less forbidding aspect than on the many previous occasions when they had offered an asylum to the fugitives. The population had increased, houses had been built, some semblance of a settled government now existed. There were fewer reasons why the refugees should return to their ancient homes. What

Attila began, Alboin completed. Venetian history is the history of the people who, under stress of repeated invasion between the years 452 and 568, were thus gathered together in the lagoons. 568.

The chronicles relate at length the legend of this last flight from the mainland, and chiefly how the people of Altino came to settle at Torcello. The Lombards, "those cruellest of pagans," were sweeping down upon Friuli, and the people of Altino resolved to fly. Some went to Ravenna, some to Istria, some to the Pentapolis; some, however, remained behind, in sore doubt whither they should turn to seek a home. These people made a three days' fast and prayer to God that He would shew them where they might find a dwelling-place. Then a voice was heard, as though in thunder, saying to them, "Climb ye up to the tower and look at the stars. Then the Bishop Paul climbed the tower, and looking up to the heavens, he saw the stars arranged as it were like islands in the lagoon. Thus guided, the people of Altino moved to Torcello, leaving their home to be burned by the Lombards when they found it empty. The fugitives called their new abode Torcello, in memory of many-towered Altino, which they had left behind. Their first care was to build a church to the honour of Mary, the Virgin. It was beautiful in form, and very fair; its pavement was made in circles of precious marbles. Then to Mauro, the priest, who was also from Altino, were shown by miracle the places where other churches should be built. "First," he says, "Saint Erasmus and Saint Hermes showed me the plan of a church to be raised to them. Then, as I was walking along another lido, I saw a wonderful sight: a large white cloud, and out of it issued two rays of the sun, of a glorious clarity, which fell upon me; and a liquid voice said to me, 'I am the Saviour and Lord of all the earth. The ground whereon thou standest I give to thee, thereon to build a church in My name.' Then came another most delicious voice which said, 'I am Mary, mother of the Lord Jesus Christ; I bid you build another church to me.' Then I came to a third lido, and I saw the whole place filled with a diverse

multitude of people, and many bulls and cows, with calves.

568. And when I drew near, lo ! an old man sitting on the ground, and he spoke to me, while nigh unto him stood a younger man. The old man said unto me, 'I am Peter, prince and apostle, the pastor of the flock. I charge you honour me, and build me a church that there, on my nativity, all the people of Torcello may gather together.' Then the younger said unto me, 'I am the servant of God, Antolinus. I suffered for the name of Christ; I bid you build a little church for me, hard by the Master's church. Be instant day and night in memory of me; and whatsoever you ask of me shall be given unto you.' Then I came to a fourth little lido, and I saw that it was all full of heavy-clustered vineyards; and the vines bore the whitest grapes. Then came upon me the desire to eat, but I did not; and as I walked by the sea a white cloud appeared unto me; in the middle thereof was seated a little maid, fair of form, who spoke to me thus, 'I am Giustina, who suffered in Padua city for Christ's sake; I beg you, priest of God, build me a little church in my honour.' In the fifth place I came to, I met a girl of tender years. A great and splendid cloud, as though it were the sun, illumined her, and it drew nigh unto me. Then I looked within and saw a glorious man of noble mien, standing above the sphere of the sun, and he said unto me, 'I am John the Baptist, the forerunner of our Lord; I beg thee in this place build me the church I now show thee.' Then he showed me all the outside of the church, and gave me the blessing of God on my bishopric of Torcello, and encircled me with the ring, which he placed upon my finger. Then I awoke from the great sleep. The writing was found in my hand, the ring upon my finger."

Under the quaint imagery of this apocalyptic vision vouchsafed to Mauro, priest of Torcello, we can discover two great facts which were the outcome of the Lombard invasion. The people of the lagoons, newcomers as well as old, turn their attention to building, and thereby prove their determination to take up their abode in the lagoons. Their first care and greatest efforts were bestowed upon

their churches, which sprang up not only on Torcello, but upon many other islands of the estuary, some of which, as for example the island of vineyards—*le vignole*—⁵⁶⁸ and St. Erasmo, can be distinguished in the vision of priest Mauro. The second point is that the Lombard invasion gave the lagoon-dwellers a free and independent priesthood of their own. The church moved along with the people from the mainland to the lagoons. The Bishop of Altino led his flock to Torcello; the Bishop of Padua moved to Malamocco; the Bishop of Oderzo to Heraclea; the Bishop of Concordia to Caorle. And just as the refugees resolved to remain in the lagoons, so the bishops declined to return to their sees, which were now in the hands of Arian Lombards. At the period about which we are writing, the resignation of the church to exile in the lagoons was hardly less important than the resolution of the refugees to remain in their asylum.

As the Lombard invasion was the cause of the last great influx of fugitives from the mainland, and as the original population out of which Venice subsequently grew may be considered as completed at this epoch, it will not be inopportune to pause here a moment, and to endeavour, as far as our scanty material will allow us, to realise the physical and social conditions at which the Venetians had arrived.

The peopling of the lagoons produced, as we have already indicated, a great activity in church-building. As early as 421, the date of the reputed appointment of consuls from Padua, we hear that the first church of the lagoon, San Jacopo di Rialto, was built after a great fire had destroyed many of the wooden houses which covered that island. The church occupied the site of a shipbuilder's yard, where the fire broke out. Later still, about the year 552, Narses, while on his way through the lagoons, vowed to build two churches, one to S. Theodore and one to S. Geminiano, if victorious against the Goths. He was victorious, and he kept his vow. He built the Church of S. Theodore, on part of the site now occupied by S. Mark's, and the Church of S. Geminiano, which no longer exists. This

he adorned with columns and precious stones; the cupola he
568. caused to be decorated with inscriptions in honour of
himself and of the Bishop of Olivolo, in whose time
the church was founded. The columns of marble and the
precious stones which figure so largely in the accounts of
these earliest Venetian churches, came, no doubt, from the
older buildings of the mainland, which, when deserted by
their inhabitants, served as quarries for the growing cities
of the lagoon.

The houses of these early lagoon-dwellers appear to
have been, for the most part, of one story only. On the
ground-floor was an open courtyard and staircase mounting
to the first floor, where were the dwelling and sleeping rooms.
On the roof was an open loggia, used for drying clothes, called
liago (from *heliacou, solarium*). The ground upon which
these houses were built was made solid, and protected
against the corrosion of the water, by posts driven into
the mud at intervals, and bound together by wattle-work.
Between the houses and the water ran a narrow strip of
land, a sort of footway, called then as now a *fondamenta*.
Cassiodorus, secretary to Theodoric the Great, in his famous
letter to the maritime Tribunes, becomes so enthusiastic
upon the subject of Venice as he knew it, that he forgets
the immediate subject of his communication, and bursts into
a description of Venice to the Venetians. "There lie your
houses," he says, "built like sea-birds' nests, half on sea and
half on land, or, as it were, like the Cyclades spread over
the surface of the water; made not by Nature but created
by the industry of man. For the solidity of the earth is
secured only by wattle-work; and yet you fear not to place
so frail a barrier between yourselves and the sea. Your
inhabitants have fish in abundance. There is no distinction
between rich and poor; the same food for all; the houses
all alike; and so envy, that vice which rules the world, is
absent there. All your activity is devoted to the salt-works,
whence comes your wealth. Upon your industry all other
productions depend; for there may be those who seek not
gold, but there never yet lived the man who desires not salt.
From your gains you repair your boats which, like horses,

you keep tied up at your house doors." So an able and observant contemporary describes the condition of the early Venetians. Fishing was the means of livelihood, salt the industry, democratic equality the social note, of these primitive lagoon-dwellers. 568.

• Other demonstrations of the growth of Venice are to be found in the internal history of the lagoons, where the process of political condensation was steadily advancing. The democratic government by Tribunes elected from among the inhabitants of each island, was established in 466; but the increase of population caused by the Lombard invasion, and by the resolve of the refugees to remain in the lagoons, induced the Venetians to extend the nature of their Tribunitian constitution. A revision of the existing government took place. "The island people, seeing that the islands grew more and more populous every day, resolved to create a second Tribune for each of the twelve communities, in addition to the one already in existence." These new Tribunes were superior to the older Tribunes, and were called *Tribuni Majores*. When they addressed letters, they used this style, "We, the Tribunes of the maritime islands, appointed by the whole body of them." This episode seems to indicate the creation of a sort of central committee; the original Tribune elected by each island for itself, was left to the administration of that island's affairs; but the whole body of lagoon-dwellers now elected twelve other Tribunes, one from each island, to manage the common concerns of the entire lagoon. 584.

It is only after the changes produced by the Lombard invasion that we meet with the Venetians as a formed and completed people, ready now to run their race through the centuries. Down to the year 568 the history of Venice had been the history of the various stages by which the lagoons acquired their population, and received that distinct group of people whom we call Venetians. After 568 the Venetians were made. They became conscious of themselves as a unit, and soon gave proof of their consciousness.

Longinus, as we have seen, was sent as Exarch, to supersede Narses, the eunuch. He found himself opposed to the

new barbarian invasion of the Lombards. He endeavoured
584- to treat diplomatically with Alboin, urging him to
make a formal submission to the Eastern Emperor,
but without success. Before quitting Italy for Constantinople,
Longinus desired to secure the allegiance and co-operation
of the Venetians, whose growing power rendered them
valuable allies against the barbarian floods on the main-
land. He went to Venice, and was received with great
acclaim by the people, to "the sound of bells, and flutes,
and cytherns, and other instruments, so that you could not
have heard the thunder of heaven," says the chronicler.
Longinus begged the Venetians to convey him to Con-
stantinople, which they promised to do. But their answer
to his demand that they should declare themselves subjects
of the Eastern Empire, shows that the inhabitants of the
lagoons possessed a very clear conception of their practical
independence, and a vigorous resolve to maintain it. They
affirm to Longinus, as they had already affirmed to Narses,
that they themselves had made the lagoon-islands; that
they had withstood the incursions of Attila, the Heruli, the
Goths, and the Lombards, "And God, who is our help and
protection, has saved us in order that we may dwell upon
these watery marshes. This second Venice, which we have
raised in the lagoons, is a mighty habitation for us. No
power of Emperor or Prince can reach us save by the sea
alone, and of them we have no fear." The note which runs
through the whole speech bears the conviction of the intimate
relation between the people and the place, the islands which
they had made, and the waters which rendered them impreg-
nable. Longinus, in his rejoinder, practically admits their
claim. "Truly," he says, "as I heard from others, so I found
ye; a great people with a mighty habitation. Dwelling in this
security, you have to fear no Emperor, nor no Prince. But
I say unto you that, if ye will obey the Emperor, I will beg
him to grant any petition you may make unto him." And
further to facilitate a formal act of submission, Longinus
declared that he would not exact it on oath. Thereupon
the Venetians consented. An embassy from Venice accom-
panied Longinus to the Imperial Court, where it was well

received, and secured the first diploma granted to the Venetian people as a separate body.

But it was not possible that Venice should remain ⁵⁸⁴⁻ in diplomatic relations with the East alone. She found herself inevitably brought into contact with the power which possessed the mainland of Italy. As the Lombards gradually consolidated their sway, the Venetians were obliged to enter into relations with them also, for the purposes of commerce. And so we find the new-born state of Venice, eager for her own liberty, determined to achieve complete independence, placed in a middle position between the Eastern Empire and the kingdom of Italy, both of which claimed a suzerainty, and to both of which Venice made formal acknowledgment of such superiority.

It is the difficulties and dangers of this position which animate and govern the history of Venice during the next two hundred and thirty years; forcing her to struggle for her very life, and thereby training her to a knowledge of her own strength. The superiority of the East or of the West was never at any time a superiority *de facto*; the lagoons was never held by Eastern Emperor or Western King; but the claim of each was ever present as a standing threat to Venetian liberty. What the Venetians desired was commercial privileges and protection from both East and West; what they dreaded was absorption into the empire or the kingdom. The famous question of the original independence of Venice may, we think, be resolved thus: the lagoons and their inhabitants were first of all dependent on the cities of the mainland. Those bonds became loosened, and finally disappeared under the ruin wrought by barbarian invasions. The lagoon-dwellers then elected their own magistrates and were virtually independent. Their commercial enterprise and their geographical position, however, brought them into prominence again, and they were forced to seek a protectorate from the East and from the West, with the result that the question of suzerainty was raised once more, and grew in importance as Venice became more and more powerful. Fortunately for the Venetians, it was only at rare intervals that they were prominent enough to attract the serious

attention of the Imperial Court. For the most part, in the
584. great mass of the Roman Empire, that little corner
of the lagoons escaped entirely unobserved; and
this happy insignificance allowed the Venetians slowly to
become a nation apart.

No sooner had Venice acquired the amount of coherence and force which we have endeavoured to represent as arising from the various barbarian invasions, than she was instantly compelled to struggle for her very existence. She was exposed to two kinds of danger, one internal, the other external. The people of Venice had hitherto encountered a hard fight with Nature in the course of their endeavour to convert their compulsory asylum into a habitable dwelling. They were now to affront still graver difficulties in their effort to exist as a State. Venice overcame both obstacles; and in the process she acquired that vigour which kept her alive for so many centuries.

Externally the Venetians had to contend with two serious foes, one by sea, the other by land. The Slav population along the banks of the Danube and the Save, obeying one of those migratory impulses which were then so common, descended upon the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. The broken nature of that shore, its many islands, its gulfs and difficult navigation, seemed almost to suggest to the newcomers the line of life they ought to pursue. They became pirates, as most inhabitants of that coast had been before them, and pirates they remained, a constant source of trouble to Venice for centuries. On the mainland, too, the Lombard Dukes of Friuli were continually harassing the lagoon-dwellers, attacking and pillaging cities like Grado, on the borders of the lagoon, though they never succeeded in penetrating the lagoon itself. These attacks, by sea and by land, compelled the Venetians to fortify the mouths of their ports, and to build towers of refuge at various points along the lagoon shore. But more than this, they trained the Venetians to the use of arms. The growing State soon ceased to be content with merely defending itself; it began to make reprisals, by incursions on the mainland, and by skirmishes at sea with the Dalmatian pirates; and thus

the people became more and more intimate with the waters on which they lived, and laid the foundation of that naval supremacy which they afterwards acquired. 584

Inside the lagoons the tribunitian constitution, established in 466, and revised about 584, continued to exist. But the rapid growth and the great activity of the youthful State, tended to emphasise those rivalries and jealousies between island and island which were their ancient heritage from the mainland cities whence they had drawn their population. The development of this internal struggle is not recorded; but the crisis was reached when Christopher, Patriarch of Grado, found it necessary to call a general assembly of the lagoon people at Heraclea. He pointed out to them that these internal jealousies were imperilling their very life and liberty, by rendering the community weak in the face of enemies. He proposed as a remedy that the Venetians should choose one man as head of the State, instead of twelve as heretofore. This advice was accepted, and, in 697, the Venetians elected Paolo Lucio Anafesto as their first Doge. 697.

The example of Rome, Genoa, and Naples, at that time governed by Dukes, no doubt influenced the Venetians in the choice of the title which they bestowed upon the new chief of the State. The objects for which the Dukedom was created, the defence of the lagoons against external foes, and the appeasement of internal jealousies, were so obvious to the people at the time of election, that it did not occur to them to define precisely the position, the powers, the dignities, which should belong to the supreme magistrate. It was only in the course of years and by the slow process of evolution that the ducal position became fixed. In its origin the Dukedom was a democratic, or at least a constitutional magistracy. But its real character altered with the qualities of the individual who occupied the ducal chair. If a man of strong personality, the Doge endeavoured to render himself absolute, and his office dynastic; if weak, he remained the slave of faction. A large part of early Venetian history is concerned with the problem of the Doge, with the endeavour to curb and circumscribe his power.

Some attributes of the ducal position, however, would seem to have been defined at the outset. The Tribunes
697. were preserved, but only as subordinate magistrates, appointed by the Doge, who could punish or remove them. The Doge had the right of summoning the *Concio*, or General Assembly; he also dealt with foreign powers. The conclusion of peace or the declaration of war required the sanction of the General Assembly, whose voice was necessary also for the ratification of a treaty and for the election of a Doge. To the Doge belonged considerable authority in ecclesiastical matters, especially in the election and investiture of bishops; he possessed a quasi-religious character, for on solemn occasions it was part of his duty to bless the people whom he ruled.

The election of Anafesto closes the first period of Venetian history, a period which falls into three main divisions. The first covers the years down to the invasion of Attila in 452, during which the lagoons were inhabited by a few fishermen, and were dependent on the cities of the mainland. The second extends to the Lombard invasion, when the double process was going on which freed the lagoons from their servitude to the mainland, and at the same time gave them a population. The third includes the years from the Lombard invasion to the election of the first Doge, when the people thus gathered together began to develop themselves internally, and to take their place externally as a separate State.

CHAPTER II

The problem for Venice: To achieve external independence and internal unity—Factors in the problem: Byzantine Empire, Kingdom of Italy, the Church—Aristocratic and democratic elements in lagoon population—Treaty with Liudprand—Defines Venetian territory on mainland shore—Quarrels between Heraclea and Jesolo—Battle of the pine-wood—Malamocco supports Jesolo—Death of Anafesto—*Marcello Tegaliano*, Doge—Church history—The See of Grado—Elias of Grado, Metropolitan of lagoons and Istria—Aquileia Arian; Grado Orthodox—Sereno of Aquileia attacks Grado—The Lateran Council declares the separation of the Sees—*Orso Ipato*, Doge—Leo the iconoclast—Venice drawn into the quarrel—The Pope appeals to Liudprand—He seizes the Exarchate—The Exarch, Paul, takes refuge in Venice—Venice restores the Exarch, and obtains commercial privileges—Civil war in Venice; the Doge killed—The Dukedom abolished in favour of the *Magister Miles*—Civil war—Dukedom restored—*Deodato*, Doge—A modification in favour of Malamocco—The advent of the Franks—The Pope, hostile to the Emperor, and to the Lombard King, appeals to Pepin—Pepin in Italy—His donation to the Pope—The attitude of Venice—Her commercial activity—Civil wars—The Obelerii and Barbaromani—*Galla Gaulo*, Doge—*Domenico Monegario*, Doge—Supremacy of Malamocco—Appointment of two ducal assessors—*Maurizio Galbaio*, Doge—Charlemagne in Italy—He orders the Pope to expel the Venetians from Ravenna—The See of Olivolo—*Giovanni Galbaio*, Doge Consort—His policy—*Maurizio Galbaio II.*, Doge Consort—The Galbairi attack the Patriarch of Grado, an adherent of the Franks, and kill him—Fortunatus, Patriarch of Grado; his Frankish policy—The Galbairi expelled—*Obelerio*, Doge—Treaty between Charlemagne and Nicephorus—Destruction of Heraclea and Jesolo—Their absorption in Malamocco—The Obelerii visit Charlemagne—Pepin's attack and defeat—Rialto capital of the lagoons.

By the year 697 the lagoon communities were so far constructed as a State that they had created a constitution and elected a chief; while, in their foreign relations, they had secured a virtual independence, though forming, nominally, a part of the Eastern Empire, and paying tribute

for commercial privileges to the Lombard Kings on the main-
land. But much had yet to be done before the
697. community could be considered as fully developed.
Externally, the virtual independence had to be assured, and
internally the fusion of the discordant elements which com-
posed the lagoon population was not yet complete. Both these
objects demanded achievement before Venice could assume
her place as a full-grown State; and both were achieved
contemporaneously. The external factors in the formation of
Venice were the Byzantine Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, and
the Church. The internal factors were two strongly marked
and antagonistic political tendencies, which characterise and
divide the lagoon townships. It is not easy to indicate the
original source of this division, but it probably took its rise
from ancient claims of superiority, advanced by some of the
mainland municipalities over their neighbours. The one
element, or political current, was represented by Heraclea, and
this we will call aristocratic, because its strongest features
were a leaning towards the Eastern Empire and a tendency
towards dynastic sovereignty; the other was led by Jesolo
and Malamocco, and this we may call the democratic element,
because it more or less represented the general aspiration of
the Venetian lagoon community for that political liberty
and independence which it subsequently accomplished. The
resolution of both problems was achieved when the islands
of Rialto—the islands on which Venice now stands—were
chosen as the capital of the lagoons; and the history of the
emergence of Rialto is the subject of this chapter.

Paolo Lucio Anafesto, the first Doge of Venice, was a
native of Heraclea, a city which, for some reason not
quite clear—perhaps because it was nearer the mainland,
sheltered more mainland refugees, and numbered fewer of
the original fisher population—had become the abode of the
aristocratic families among the fugitives. And this election
is a proof that Heraclea was the leading township of the
lagoons at that time. Anafesto was at once brought into
conflict with the double problem of early Venetian history—
how to maintain and increase the national independence
between the Eastern Empire and the Lombard Kingdom,

and how to complete the amalgamation of the State's component parts.

A revolution in Ravenna compelled the Emperor 697. Justinus II. to send the Imperial fleet into the Adriatic; and the presence of the Patrician Theodorus no doubt served to remind the Venetians that their nominal dependence on the Emperor of the East still existed. On the Italian mainland the Lombards were governed by a powerful and able prince, Liudprand. The Venetians who were engaged in traffic on the mainland, and those who owned pastures along the shores of the lagoon, could not remain isolated from their neighbours. They were inevitably brought into contact. The most important event of Anafesto's reign was the commercial treaty which he concluded with Liudprand. By the terms of this treaty—the earliest Venetian treaty of which we have detailed information—the boundaries of Heraclean territory were defined and marked off by dykes and ditches; security of pasturage was guaranteed; the right to trade on the continent and the right to cut wood in the forests of Tessera, Campalto, and Bottenigo were acquired. In return for these concessions the Venetians agreed to pay an annual tribute.

On the other hand, the internal difficulties of the lagoon population were by no means accommodated. The first Doge had been elected with a view to appeasing the jealousy between rival townships and their Tribunes. But such a consummation could not be reached at one step. The fact that Heraclea had taken the lead in the person of the Doge Anafesto, aroused the jealousy of her neighbour Jesolo, supported by Malamocco. Through the obscurity of the chronicles we see the traces of a fierce battle, fought in the pine forests (*Pineto*), which at that time covered the *Lidi*. Heraclea was victorious, though most of the combatants on both sides perished. This fratricidal war was considered so abominable by the rest of the lagoon population, that they resolved not to remove the traces of the battle, but to leave, as a mark of their indignation, the corpses to be devoured by birds and beasts. The inhabitants of the *Pineto* refused to occupy any longer so accursed a spot. They and the

inhabitants of Jesolo moved farther towards the mainland, and there they built a new town. To people it
697. they offered free entry to all those who opposed Heraclea. In this action they were supported by the people of Malamocco, who encouraged the inhabitants of the new Jesolo to set up a separate tribunitian court, independent of the Doge, and in opposition to his will. The Doge Anafesto and his native town Heraclea had been victorious in the battle of the pine-wood; but their victory produced a schism, and massed against them the rest of the lagoon townships, who were resolved that no one of their number should become suprema. Against this combination the Doge was powerless, and the independent jurisdiction assumed by the new townships threatened the whole community with a disastrous rupture.

One of the chronicles, the *Allinate*, represents Jesolo and Malamocco as attacking Heraclea in revenge for the battle of the pine-wood, and records that in this attack the Doge and all his family, except one cleric, fell in battle. It is more probable that Anafesto died peacefully in 717, leaving to his successor the difficult task of conducting Venice through her many complications.

We have already stated that Venetian independence was worked out between three factors, the Eastern
717. Empire, the Lombard Kingdom, and the Church. The reign of Tegaliano, who succeeded Anafesto, is chiefly remarkable for the development of Church history. Venetian relations with both the Empire and the Lombard Kingdom were quiet; but round the See of Grado a vigorous conflict began to rage. And the position of Grado is of such importance in the history of Venice that we must follow the steps of this struggle, out of which that episcopate emerged victorious, the patriarchal See of the lagoon population.

When Aquileia was destroyed by Attila and his Huns, the Patriarch, followed by his people, sought an asylum at Grado. After the return to Aquileia, a bishop was left in the lagoon city, whose flock was continually increased, partly by the schism of the Three Chapters which divided the mainland Church, and partly by the refugees from the repeated barbarian

invasions. Elias, Bishop of Grado in 579, obtained from Pope Pelagius II. a decree which erected his See into the Metropolitan Church of the lagoons and of Istria. After the Lombard invasion the mainland bishoprics, under Lombard protection, became Arian and heretical. Then the Bishop of Grado claimed that his See, which remained orthodox, was the real patriarchal See of the lagoons, in opposition to Aquileia, which had followed the course of the other mainland Bishoprics. But the erection of Grado into the patriarchal See of the lagoons and Istria, was tolerated rather than confirmed by Rome; and the Patriarch of Aquileia still had grounds for disputing the pretensions of his neighbour. As the population of the lagoons grew in wealth and importance, so the See of Grado grew; and this prosperity fed the hatred which inspired the Patriarchs of Aquileia. At last, in the reign of the Doge Tegaliano, Sereno, Patriarch of Aquileia, with the help of the Lombards, who were always ready to extend their territory, besieged, captured, and sacked the city of Grado. The Bishop naturally sought protection from the Doge, the civil chief of the lagoons, and an orthodox Christian, not an Arian. But though the claim for aid was a legitimate one, questions of self-interest prevented the Doge and the Venetians from moving on behalf of the captured township. They were afraid that if they came into collision with the Lombards, who were supporting Sereno, they would forfeit the commercial privileges which they had acquired under Anafesto. The Doge contented himself with appealing to Pope Gregory II. on behalf of Grado. It was certain that the papal authority would support the Orthodox Patriarch Donato, not the Arian Patriarch Sereno; and Pope Gregory did in fact write to Sereno in vigorous terms, forbidding him to enter his neighbour's territory. But it was equally certain that if the Doge refused to take overt steps, the Pope possessed no physical force by which he could compel obedience to his orders. The quarrel continued to rage till, in 732, the Lateran Council formally declared the separation of the two jurisdictions, assigning to Aquileia the mainland from the Mincio eastward to the Alps, to Grado the Venetian lagoons and Istria. The result of this long struggle, of

nearly two hundred years, was that Venice made a further step towards her completion as a State. She acquired for
717. herself a patriarchal See, whose independence was recognised at Rome, though it was not till 1445 that the seat of the Patriarch, as well as his title, was changed from Grado to the capital.

On the death of the Doge Tegaliano in 726, the people,—
726. assembled still at Heraclea as the head township of the lagoons,—elected their third Doge, Orso, whose reign brings us to a crisis in the history of the lagoon cities. The Venetians were called upon to take a very active part between the Empire, the Lombard Kingdom, and the Pope. For the first time they became the principal actors in a war on the mainland; while internally a great step was made towards the ultimate fusion of the discordant elements in the lagoon population.

The election of Orso was exactly synchronous with the famous edict by which Leo, the Isaurian Emperor, began his attack upon the worship of images. The consequences of this crusade were soon felt in Italy, and had an important bearing on Venetian history. Leo wrote to Gregory II. urging him to condemn images, and to the Exarch Paul in Ravenna ordering him to destroy them in that city. The Pope endeavoured to dissuade Leo from his imperious attitude towards Italy, but without success; and when he found that his own life was threatened in Rome itself, he turned to seek support and protection from Liudprand, the Lombard King, who gladly united himself with the Pope against the Emperor, not from any love of the Church, but because he saw his opportunity to extend his own kingdom. This he very soon accomplished by seizing the whole of the Exarchate, and by driving Paul to seek refuge in that one secure asylum for all Italy—the Venetian lagoon. In spite of Leo's overbearing conduct the Empire was unable to support its own officer; and Paul was compelled to appeal for help to the Venetians, among whom he found himself an exile. He urged upon them that the advance of the Lombards in the Exarchate would certainly be followed by an attack on the lagoons; whereas, if the

Venetians would expel the invaders, he promised them large commercial privileges in Ravenna and the whole Pentapolis. Under these circumstances the Venetians followed the policy which was inevitable for a race that was aiming at complete independence, the policy of attacking the stronger and supporting the weaker of two enemies. They were not iconoclasts, and they had much to lose by an open rupture with Luidprand; they had nothing to fear from Leo if they remained neutral. But Leo was far away, and so obviously weak that he could not send a single ship in support of his Exarch, Paul; while Luidprand was hard by, powerful and steadily advancing. The question, now posed for the first time, "Which will you Venetians choose, East or West?" met with the answer which it continued to receive, on each new demand, during the next eighty-four years. The Venetians decided to support the weaker of the two competitors; they agreed to restore the Exarch Paul. 726.

The Doge appears to have been the prime instigator of this decision; and he found support from an unexpected quarter. The Pope, who no less than the Venetians, dreaded the aggrandisement of Luidprand, was alarmed at the fall of the Exarchate and the Pentapolis, and found himself forced against his will to make common cause with the Venetians in favour of his enemy, the iconoclastic Emperor. A letter from Gregory gave weight to the Doge's advice. The Venetians armed a fleet, attacked Ravenna, captured it, slew the commander Paradeo, Duke of Vicenza, and made prisoner Liudprand's nephew, Hildebrand. Paul the Exarch was restored, but he was unable to maintain himself in the midst of the tumults roused by his attempt to enforce the edict against images. He was killed the same year. 728.

The part which Venice took in the restoration of the Exarch to his government was most honourable to the growing State. In the case of Narses, one hundred and twenty-five years earlier, the lagoon-dwellers had assisted the Imperial forces in a desultory and guerrilla fashion. But now the Venetians single-handed, with an armament all their own,

under their own leaders, appear as the sole combatants in support of the mighty Roman Empire, attacked in the person of one of its highest officials. And the assistance rendered to the Empire procured for Venice substantial advantages. The Venetians obtained special commercial rights in the city of Ravenna, and the Doge was honoured by the Byzantine title of Hypatos or Consul.

We should have expected that the Venetians would have been satisfied with their achievement, and contented with their Doge. Yet the very reverse was the case. The Doge had hardly returned from Ravenna when civil war broke out in the lagoons. The ancient jealousy between Heraclea and Jesolo flamed up again at the fresh glory acquired by the Heracleian Doge. The pretext lay ready to hand. The Doge was accused of wishing to lead the State into complete subjection to Constantinople, in order that he might receive the sovereignty of it from the Emperor. The proof of the accusation was the title which the Doge accepted from the Imperial Court. Blood flowed on both sides, and in the tumults the Doge was slain. The Venetian people were will-

ing that their Doge should support the Empire which was weak, and attack the Lombards who were strong; that he should draw all the profit that he could for Venice out of such seeming loyalty. But they were fully resolved that he should neither lead them under Byzantine yoke, nor make himself supreme. The full meaning of this popular outburst was explained immediately after the murder of the Doge. The Tribunes summoned the people to the election of a new Doge. But tradition reports that the people refused to elect. "We desire not," they said, "to choose a lord, as the Doges have shown that they wish to be. Why did our ancestors seek these islands except to live in freedom? Had they wished to be slaves, there were many better dwelling-places where they might have settled." The people were dissatisfied with their first experiment in elective monarchy. They thought that an appointment for life led the chief of the State to impose his own views too violently, in the fear that time would fail him for their ultimate accomplishment. They resolved to try whether the substitution

of an annual magistracy for the Dukedom would meet the case. The new chief of the State was called the *Mastro Miles*, the Master Soldier, and he held his office for one year only. 737.

This experimental constitution did not last more than six years. There were signs that the murder of Orso and the expulsion of his family had not really put a check upon the Eastern policy which that Doge was accused of exaggerating. For we find that Deodato, the fourth master of soldiery, was a son of the murdered Orso; that the fifth received the title of Hypatos, which had given so much offence, and that the sixth, and last, was a native of Heraclea, the very township whose citizens had proved so distasteful, as Doges, to the rest of the community. This last election caused the civil war to break out once more. After a fierce battle between the people of Jesolo and Heraclea, the master of the soldiery, Giovanni Fabriaco, was captured and, in accordance with the barbarous Greek custom, which became common in Venice, his eyes were put out by being exposed over a brazier of live coal.

The population grew weary of these disastrous civil wars, which the new constitution, no less than the old, seemed powerless to curb. A general assembly was summoned, not at Heraclea but at Malamocco, and Deodato, son of the last Doge, was chosen the fourth Doge of Venice. 742.

The election of Deodato closes an important period in the early history of the lagoon communities. The position of Venice in relation to other powers, had been greatly improved by the expedition to Ravenna. Internally the advance was even more striking. The growing State had made trial of a constitutional elective monarchy under the first Doges; had discovered the dangers inherent in such a system; had abolished the Dukedom, and tried a yearly presidency under the Master Soldiers; had found this magistracy inadequate, and had returned again to the government by Doges, but with a difference. The Doge is a Heracleian, it is true; he is elected, however, no longer at Heraclea but at Malamocco, and reigns there. A step has

been taken in the direction of consolidating and fusing the various hostile elements which composed the lagoon population. The Venetians had completed their first series of experiments in state-making; but the problem of unification was far from solved. The tendency displayed by the summons to meet at Malamocco, not at Heraclea, is continued throughout the ensuing years, till Malamocco emerges as the chief township of the lagoons, and the Malamocchini take the lead among the lagoon population, thereby suppressing the powerful Heraclea, and paving the way for the final amalgamation at Rialto.

The course of general history was about to produce, in the reign of the Doge Deodato, an event of the highest moment in the history of Venice, the advent of the Franks. The hostility between the Papacy and Leo the Isaurian still continued. The Lateran Council of 732 excommunicated iconoclasts. The Pope and the Emperor were completely estranged. On the other hand, the Pope was embroiled with the Lombard Kingdom, on account of the protection he had extended to the rebellious Duke of Spoleto. The attitude of the Lombards was menacing. The King had already seized several towns in Roman territory. The Pope was obliged to cast about for some defence against the threatened storm. At this moment the victory of Charles Martel over the Saracens at Tours drew the attention of the whole world to the Franks. It was to the Franks that the Pope turned for support in his isolation. Zacharia upheld Pepin in his rape of the crown from the Merovingians. Stephen, his successor, went in person to France, where he solicited Pepin's aid in Italy, and crowned the usurper in Paris. Pepin descended on Italy, compelled the Lombards to restore the cities they had seized in the Ducato Romano and in the Pentapolis. On his return to France he made a gift of these new acquisitions to his ally the Pope, retaining a feudal superiority over the Pentapolis and Ravenna. Thus the cities which were serious rivals to Venice in the trade of the Adriatic passed from the Greek Empire, nominally into the hands of the Franks, really under the dominion of the Pope.

The policy of the Venetians at this point is not easily explained. On previous occasions when Ravenna had been wrested from Greek control, the Venetians 742. took an active part in helping to restore it to the Empire. Now they showed themselves hostile to Constantinople. Their merchants in the Levant learned that the Emperor intended to recover Ravenna and the Pentapolis. Instantly the news was conveyed to the Archbishop of Ravenna, and thence to the Pope. The attitude of Venice may perhaps be accounted for on two grounds. The Venetians were unwilling to see the Lombards in possession of Ravenna; their presence in that city was a constant menace to the lagoons. But there was no such objection to the presence of a Pope, without an army and without a fleet. Secondly, the party inside the lagoons which was represented by Malamocco, had now come to power; it was distinctly an anti-imperial party, in opposition to the strong imperial tendencies of Heraclea, and, by consequence, was favourable to the Pope, the enemy of the Emperor.

The blow inflicted on the Lombards by the Frankish invasion, had so reduced the power of their kingdom that Deodato was able to renew the commercial treaty which the Venetians had enjoyed under Liudprand, and to restore those friendly relations which had been disturbed at the time when the lagoon population supported the Exarch Paul.

Under these favourable conditions Venetian commerce grew apace. We find Venetians trading as far east as Constantinople, the Black Sea, and Syria; while on the mainland they were to be found in the markets of Pavia, and even of Rome. Their commercial activity took the form which it ever after retained. The Venetians became great importers and distributors; they were not then, nor ever, an industrial people, to any great extent. This development of the carrying trade led naturally to a rapid increase in shipbuilding, which now took its place as one of the chief resources of the population.

But, as happened before, in the reign of Orso, this prosperity only served to rekindle the latent fires of jealousy between rival communities. A prominent family in the

rising township of Malamocco, the Obelerii, came to open

742. rupture with the Barbaromani, a leading family in the declining township of Heraclea. The Doge, though elected and reigning at Malamocco, was still a Heraclean, and lent, or was accused of lending, his support to those of his native town. While he was engaged in fortifying Brondolo, at the mouth of the Brenta, near Chioggia, he was treacherously seized by Galla Gaulo, a native of Jesolo, the implacable foe of Heraclea, and instantly blinded in the usual barbarous fashion. Without giving the people time to assemble, Galla proceeded straight to Malamocco, as the centre of lagoon political life, made himself master of it, and

755. proclaimed himself Doge. This act was a *coup de main*, and decidedly unconstitutional. The people resolved to resist it. Galla was besieged in Malamocco, captured and blinded after a reign of one year. The Venetians then elected Domenico Monegario, a native of Malamocco, as their sixth Doge.

The election of Monegario produced another change in the constitution, a further experiment in state-making. 756. Malamocco, as we have seen, was the rising township in the lagoon. It had become the seat of the Government; but it had not hitherto succeeded in creating one of its own citizens Doge of Venice. Now, however, in the person of Monegario, Malamocco assumes the absolute supremacy. And the democratic nature of this election is shown by the anxiety of the Malamocchini to preserve the Dukedom from any tendency to become despotic; an anxiety which they displayed in the appointment of two Tribunes, elected annually, who were to act as controllers of the Doge. The early chronicles which deal with this alteration in the constitution, assign two various causes. Sagornino, in high aristocratic vein, declares the change to be due to the instability of the popular mind, which is always trying new experiments. Lorenzo de Monacis affirms that the Tribunes were elected owing to the intolerable haughtiness of the previous Doges. The remedy proved worse than the evil. The Doge found that his assessors attempted to overrule him, and to usurp his authority. He showed

himself less and less willing to accept the annual election of the Tribunes. His opposition cost him his throne, his eyesight, and his life. He was killed in 764.

We do not gather from our authorities whether the people of Heraclea had any part in the deposition and the murder of Monegario. But it is not improbable that they took their share in that event. For in the person of the next Doge, Maurizio Galbaio, we find a revival of Heracleian influence in the lagoons. The new Doge was a native of Heraclea, but he continued to reign in democratic Malamocco.

The reigns of Maurizio and his son and successor Giovanni, bring us to the most important period of Venetian history that we have traversed as yet. The lagoon community was exposed to the greatest dangers it had hitherto faced; and the pressure which was then brought to bear upon it, achieved its unification, and caused it to emerge as a full-grown independent State.

Desiderio, the last King of the Lombards, threatened to attack Ravenna. The Archbishop Leo, who held it for the Pope, appealed for assistance to Rome, and Rome, following a policy which had now become traditional, begged the Franks to descend once more to its aid. Charles the Great complied willingly. In 773 he crossed the Alps, and by the following year he had destroyed the Lombard Kingdom, and established the Franks in its place.

The difference between Frank and Lombard, as far as Venice was concerned, did not make itself immediately apparent. One barbarian lord of the mainland had taken the place of another; that was all. Venetian commerce on the continent continued, we know, and "to the fair at Pavia came the Venetians, bringing with them from over seas all the riches of the Orient." But Charles was a very different neighbour from Liudprand, Desiderio, or Astolf. He was fully aware that the Venetians, face to face with the masters of the mainland, had always declared themselves and shown themselves faithful allies of Constantinople. He had no intention that such a hostile

element should remain undisturbed on the very borders of his new kingdom. The opportunity for carrying out
764 his design was not far to seek. On his arrival in Italy, Charles had confirmed the donation of Pepin, his father, to the Pope; this donation included Ravenna and the Pentapolis, in which the Venetians had large commercial
784 interests. Charles gave orders to the Pope—and such the Pope admitted them to be—that all the Venetians should be expelled from Ravenna and the five cities. It is possible that a pretext for this summary action may be found in the royal edict against slavery, a traffic which the Venetians then exercised. However that may be, the Pope, in writing to Charles, announced that he had given orders to the Archbishop of Ravenna to carry out his ally's wishes, and the Venetians were thus forewarned as to the attitude which the Frankish sovereign would adopt towards them.

Inside the lagoons, under the wise rule of Maurizio Galbaio, the State continued to increase in population. We find a proof of this growth in the creation of the new See of Olivolo, the modern Castello. Hitherto the one Bishopric of Malamocco had been sufficient for the spiritual needs of the island townships. A synod of the whole Patriarchate of Grado was summoned in 774, at which were present the Patriarch, the bishops of the province, the clergy, the Doge, the nobles, and the people; and Obelerio of Malamocco was elected first Bishop of the new See, invested by the Doge and consecrated by the Patriarch.

The Venetians were well satisfied with the able rule of Galbaio; but in the course of his long reign the cares of State began to weigh too heavily upon him. With the permission of the people, he took his son, Giovanni, as his colleague. This innovation was likely to prove dangerous in a growing State, where the position of the chief was not yet rigidly defined, nor his powers circumscribed. It left a door open towards the conversion of the Dukedom into an hereditary monarchy, a conversion which more than one subsequent Doge endeavoured to carry out. But before this policy had had time to rouse the suspicion of the

Venetians, Maurizio, the elder Doge, died and left his son Giovanni sole Duke.

Under the rule of this younger and more im- 784.
petuous Galbaio, the policy of the lagoon-dwellers became defined. The Doge himself was a native of Hera- 787.
clea; he inherited the Eastern proclivities of his township and his family, and if any scheme for making the Dukedom hereditary was present to his mind, this also would have tended to confirm him in supporting the weak and distant Emperor against the near and powerful Frank. On the other hand, a party favourable to the Franks had grown up inside Venice—a party which urged that hostility to the new master of the mainland meant loss of commercial privileges, destruction to trade, and the possible annihilation of Venetian independence. The close alliance between the Franks and the Church made the Patriarch of Grado the natural head of this new faction in the lagoons; though, strictly speaking, the party can hardly be called a new one. It was in reality the party of opposition to the Empire, the old democratic faction, whose centre had been Jesolo and now was Malamocco. Only we must note this difference, that the advent of a churchman as leader made it not impossible for this party to act some day disloyally to the independence of the lagoon communities, in obedience to that larger allegiance which churchmen have always owned to a power outside and above their native country. This Frankish party naturally gathered to itself the enemies of the Doge, and all those who dreaded the attack on lagoon freedom implied in the passage of the Dukedom from father to son—an innovation which Giovanni showed a desire to make customary, by associating his own son Maurizio with himself in the Dogeship.

A pretext for the explosion of this pent-up hostility was soon offered, when the new See of Olivolo fell vacant. The Doge Giovanni appointed a Greek, named 797.
Christopher, to the Bishopric; but the party opposed to the Galbairi induced the Patriarch to refuse consecration. The Doge, however, resolved to be master. He resorted to violence. He manned a fleet, and sent his son and colleague Maurizio to

Grado. The chronicler Dandolo says: "Maurizio attacked the city with fury; in the onslaught the Patriarch
797. was captured by the Venetians, and then hurled from the highest tower of his palace and killed." This act of sacrilegious violence only served to accentuate party hatreds, and raised an impassable barrier between the two factions in the lagoons.

The murder of the Patriarch Giovanni did not alter the policy of the See of Grado. His nephew and successor, Fortunatus, a man of restless energy, of great ability, and indomitable determination, soon proved himself as strong a partisan as ever his uncle had been. In concert with certain families of Malamocco, among whom the Obelerii took the lead, he matured a plot against the Doges. This plot was discovered before it could be put into execution. Fortunatus and his fellow-conspirators were obliged to fly from Venice. The fugitive Patriarch sought refuge at the Court of Charles, where he did all that in him lay to influence the mind of the Emperor against the Venetians, by dwelling on the murder of his predecessor, slain because he was a friend to the Franks, and by pointing out to Charles that the Venetians, who formed a part of what ought to be his kingdom of Italy, were entirely devoted to the Eastern Empire. Obelerio and the other refugees remained at Treviso, a city of the Frankish kingdom, only twelve miles distant from the shores of the estuary. They kept up relations with members of their own party in Malamocco; and, after some slight delay, a successful rising against the Doges was the result. Giovanni and Maurizio, in their turn, were expelled from the lagoons. Obelerio returned to Malamocco, and was elected Doge.

Five years previous to this event Charles had been crowned
803. Roman Emperor by the Pope, and had entered into negotiations of marriage with Irene, Empress of the East. If this marriage had been carried out Venetian independence would have been crushed, if not for ever, at least for many years to come. But the proclamation of Charles as Emperor, and his proposal to wed Irene, produced such indignation in Constantinople that the Empress was deposed,

and Nicephorus took her place. When Charles's ambassadors arrived they were well received, and Nicephorus showed a disposition to treat amicably with the new Roman Emperor. The result of these negotiations was a contract between Charles and Nicephorus, concluded at Salz. The treaty determined the respective dominions of the two Empires, where they were conterminous. What position was assigned to Venice in this compact is not absolutely clear. The Venetian chronicler Dandolo says: "In this treaty it was expressly stated that the Venetian cities and the maritime cities of Dalmatia which had remained unshaken in their allegiance to the Empire, should in no way be molested, invaded, or minished; and that the Venetians should enjoy in peace the possessions, liberties, and immunities which they had been accustomed to hold in the kingdom of Italy." Eginhard says that Charles took "Istria, Liburnia, and Dalmatia, except the maritime cities." The statement of Eginhard, who is a contemporary, is less definite than that of Dandolo. But we may take it that Venice of the lagoons was really declared by this treaty to form a part of the Eastern Empire.

The reign of the two Galbairi had been marked by a strong tendency towards Constantinople, and by an equally strong anti-Frank policy. The inevitable reaction had placed Obelerio on the throne. But the triumph of the Frankish democratic Church party had been achieved with so much difficulty, that Obelerio did not dare to display too openly his own political proclivities. This hesitation is shown by the fact that although the revolution designed by Fortunatus had been successful, he was not invited to return and to fill his See of Grado. The Doge felt that the presence of so pronounced a Frankophil would endanger his own authority. The attitude of the Venetian population, face to face with the Franks on the mainland, was one of highly nervous excitement. They seem to have felt that the crisis in their history was approaching, and that upon the turn which events now took, depended their success or their failure to secure the liberty they desired, and to make themselves a State.

The triumph of Malamocco in the person of Obelerio did not fail to produce its wonted result upon Heraclea.

804. The inhabitants of that township, under the command of one of the Barbaromani, attacked their neighbour Jesolo, and worsted its citizens. These fled to Malamocco, and implored the aid of the Doge against Heraclea. Obelerio departed in person for the scene of the contest. He summoned a meeting of the Tribunes and people of the lagoons on the shores of the Pineto; and there by common accord it was resolved that the inhabitants of the two hostile townships should be removed to Malamocco, in whose population it was hoped that they would be absorbed, and so forget their ancient enmity. Thus the penultimate step towards a complete fusion of the lagoon population was brought about. Fortunatus, the banished Patriarch, and with him Christopher, the Bishop of Olivolo, though refused admission to the lagoons, still continued to haunt their borders; plotting to maintain the Frankish party in activity, and endeavouring to recover their respective Sees. The Bishopric of Olivolo had during this time been illegally occupied by a certain John the Deacon. One day Fortunatus captured the Deacon, and locked him up in Mestre; "but," says the chronicle, "while Fortunatus was considering what to do with him, the Deacon escaped by night, and went straight to the Doge" to demand redress. This accident compelled Fortunatus to retire from Venice once more. He went to Istria, where, by the favour of Charles, he was made Bishop of Pola. But his exile did not last long. We presently find him relieved from his outlawry, and restored to his patriarchal See.

This return of Fortunatus marks the crowning point of the Frankish faction in the lagoons. The result was

805. soon shown in the visit which Obelerio and his brother Beato paid to Charles, from whom they submissively received orders as to the government of the State. It is not surprising that the Doge was accused of a distinct plot to hand over the lagoons to Charles, with a view to their being absorbed in the Italian kingdom. The party hostile to the Frankophil Doge at once informed Nicephorus of what was

going forward; and in a short time the Imperial fleet, under Nicetas, appeared in the Adriatic. His presence compelled the Doge to simulate submission to Constantinople; and Fortunatus, who was too deeply dyed in Frankish colours, fled once more. Nicetas concluded a truce with Pepin, son of Charles, and returned to Constantinople, taking with him hostages for the good behaviour of the Venetians. 805.

The conclusion of this long struggle for unity and freedom, which had been carried on through so many years, was not far off now. Pepin, King of Italy, resolved to make his kingdom a fact, not merely a name. One of the first quarters to which he turned his attention was that little corner of North Italy which had shown itself so independent, the lagoon of Venice. He collected his armament at Ravenna, and prepared his attack. The assault from the sea side was not difficult. Pepin soon made himself master of Cavarzere, Brondolo, Chioggia. From Chioggia to Malamocco the operations were more complicated, owing to the various sea openings which divided the Lido, along which Pepin had to pass before he could strike at Malamocco, the seat of the Government. Near one of these ports, Albiola, now Porto Secco, the Venetians made a stand. But Malamocco was so seriously menaced that the women, children, and goods of the inhabitants were removed to the midmost island of the lagoons, Rialto, the present city of Venice. For many months the resistance continued. The lagoon channels were impassable for Pepin's heavy vessels. The light boats of the Venetians never ceased to harass the Franks. At last in despair, Pepin, so tradition represents, cried to the stubborn islanders, "Own yourselves my subjects, for you come from lands that are mine"; to which came the answer, "We are resolved to be the Roman Emperor's men, not yours." The great heats came on: the feverish shores of the Lidi proved fatal to the Frankish chivalry: rumours, too, of the advent of a Greek fleet all warned Pepin that he had failed. He withdrew from the lagoons, after promising to recognise every Venetian right and privilege on the main land, and to restore the islands he had captured; in return for which the lagoon population

consented to a tribute such as they had formerly paid to the

Lombard Kings.

805. The repulse of Pepin is by far the most important event in early Venetian history. It is not

810. surprising that Venetian pride and patriotism should have gathered round this central point a large accumulation of legend, under which the plain facts have become obscured. This triumph over the Franks meant that, externally, the Venetians had demonstrated their right to exist. They had known how to preserve their freedom and to repel a foe. Internally, it signified that the long period of amalgamation was at an end; that the hostile elements in the original lagoon population were now fused and made one under stress of foreign invasion. Rialto, the new capital of the lagoons, rose into pre-eminence upon the ruins of Heraclea and of Malamocco, and stood there as an outward and visible sign of reconciliation effected in face of a common danger. But the choice of Rialto as capital was not merely a monument to political compromise; it was also the result of a long process of natural selection. The invasions of Huns, Goths, and Lombards had demonstrated the perils of the mainland as a place of habitation. The attack of Pepin proved the insecurity of the seaboard. After much suffering and many disasters, the Venetians chose that middle group of islands, half-way between seaboard and mainland, then known as Rialto, which political no less than geographical necessity indicated as the true home of that city State whose history we have now to follow.

CHAPTER III

The hereditary tendency in the Dukedom—The growth of Venetian commerce—*Agnello Particiaco*, Doge—The growth and embellishment of Rialto—Venice excluded from the Frankish Empire—Plot against the Doge—Relations with the East—The Saracens—*Giovanni Particiaco*, Doge Consort—Quarrel in the Doge's family—*Giustiniano Particiaco*, Doge—War with the Saracens—Aquileia and Grado—The translation of S. Mark's body—*Giovanni Particiaco*, Doge—Last efforts of the Frankish party—The Dogeship almost hereditary—The Particiachi expelled—*Pietro Tradonico*, Doge—The Slav pirates and the Saracens—The expedition to Taranto a failure—Saracens threaten the lagoons—The pirates threaten the lagoons—Defences of the lagoon entrances—Treaty with Lothair, oldest diplomatic document—Feuds between noble families—Murder of the Doge—*Orso Particiaco I.*, Doge—Aquileia and Grado—The quarrel between the Doge and Patriarch of Grado about presentation to Torcello—Erastian attitude of Venice—Quarrel with Aquileia—*Giovanni Particiaco II.*, Doge—War of Comacchio—*Orso Particiaco*, Doge Consort—*Pietro Candiano I.*, Doge—War with Dalmatian pirates—*Pietro Tribuno*, Doge—The diploma of the Emperor Guy—Hungarian invasion—Fortification of Venice—*Orso Particiaco*, Doge—The diploma of the Emperor Rudolph—Venetian right to coin money—*Pietro Candiano II.*, Doge—Alliance with Istria against pirates—Quarrel with Wintker—*Pietro Particiaco*, Doge—*Pietro Candiano III.*, Doge—Lupo, Patriarch of Aquileia, reduced—*Pietro Candiano IV.*, Doge—Meaning of his election—Relations with Otho II., and with Zimices—Ambition of Candiano—His death—*Pietro Orseolo I.*, Doge—Taxation of Venice to pay Hwalderada's dowry—Rebuilding of the Palace and S. Mark's—Flight of the Doge—*Vitale Candiano*, Doge—*Tribuno Memo*, Doge—Family feuds—Caloprini and Morosini—Death of Otho—The Doge deposed.

THE period we are now about to enter is marked by two broad characteristics, which we shall find displaying themselves in the course of this narration. First, there is a tendency to render the Dukedom hereditary in some one powerful family—a tendency which was always checked by the instinct of the people, who, as they had already declared

did not come to the lagoons "to live under a lord." The
 810. constant efforts of a few great families to secure
 the Dogeship for themselves, and the equally constant
 opposition on the part of the people, produced
 frequent riots in the city; but during this process the
 ducal position gradually assumed the shape it was to retain
 throughout Venetian history.

Secondly, the Republic achieved a large extension
 of her commerce, partly by diplomacy, partly by arms.
 Venice went to school, as it were, and learned the use of
 those weapons by which she was to acquire her singular
 position in European history. At the same time she trained
 herself in that egotistical policy which is usually characteristic
 of a commercial race; her conduct was guided, and
 inevitably guided, by a consideration of her own sole
 interests. Frank, Saracen, or Greek, believer or infidel,
 were alike indifferent to her, except in so far as they affected
 for the moment her own prospects of aggrandisement.

After the repulse of Pepin, and the defeat of the
 Frankish party in the lagoons, the people assembled
 811. and elected as their first Doge in the township of
 Rialto, Agnello Particiaco,¹ a noble of Heracleian descent,
 whose family had given Tribunes to that group of islands.

Agnello's first care was directed to the erection of
 Rialto into a city worthy to be the capital of the whole
 lagoon community. The Venetians had always been forced
 to fight, not merely against men for their existence as a
 State, but also against Nature for the very ground on which
 they stood. And fighting had to be done now, before Rialto
 could be made large enough and sufficiently secure to receive
 its rapidly growing population. The Doge appointed a
 commission of three to superintend the necessary works.
 Pietro Tradonico was charged with the direction of all new
 structures, Lorenzo with the excavation of canals and
 the formation of building sites, while to Nicolo Ardisonio
 was entrusted the conservation of the *Lidi* against the
 perpetual corrosion of the sea.

A dwelling for the Government was also required; and

¹ I follow Sagoronino in the spelling of this name.

Agnello began to build a ducal palace, "close by the church of S. Theodore," that is, on part of the site occupied by the present ducal palace, though time and fires have left us no traces of this earliest home of the Venetian Doges. 811.

Agnello was fortunate in his foreign relations; he reaped the benefit of Pepin's repulse. Charles the Great, when renewing his treaties with the Eastern Empire, reaffirmed the agreement between himself and Nicephorus, by distinctly excluding Venice from the bounds of his own dominions; though he allowed the Venetians to retain all their possessions within the West. But the party of the Frankophils, under their able though restless leader, Fortunatus, was not yet completely crushed. Fortunatus incurred suspicion of having taken a chief part in a serious conspiracy against the life of the Doge. The plot was discovered, and two of its leaders were executed; a third fled to Lothair, then King of Italy.

Fortunatus was expelled from his See, and compelled to seek an asylum in France. But peace and quiet were not in his nature. His passion for plotting remained uncooled. He became involved in other conspiracies, was denounced at Rome, summoned to the eternal city by the Pope, and died on his way there. The banishment and death of Fortunatus were a great relief to the Doge, and a fatal blow to the Frankish party, which, as we shall see, made only one more effort to disturb the State of Venice before disappearing for ever from the scene.

Agnello's relations with the Eastern Empire were more cordial. He was a Heracleian by descent, and therefore he entertained a natural leaning towards the East. He sent his son, Giustiniano, to congratulate Leo on his accession to the throne; and his grandson, Angelo, to fulfil a similar mission in the case of Michel the Stammerer. The former received the honorary title of Hypatos, and from Constantinople came the present of many precious relics of saints. But there were other and more urgent reasons which drew Venice and the East together. The decay of the Frankish authority on the mainland produced such confusion, that it was almost impossible for the Venetians

to enter into practical political relations with their immediate neighbours. Compared with the Kingdom of Italy, the Empire of the East was a firm and stable institution. On the other hand, a naval power had begun to make itself felt in the Mediterranean. The Saracens were arousing the serious alarm of the Greeks. It was of the highest importance that friendly relations between Constantinople and Venice should be maintained; for even at this early date, Venice was the only State which could man a fleet capable of coping with the new power. We shall have frequent occasion throughout this chapter to observe how extremely weighty in the development of Venice this advent of the Saracens proved; for it compelled the young Republic to try its weapons, and tempted it to bolder adventures than any it had dared as yet.

Early in his reign Agnello begged and obtained leave to renew the pernicious custom of creating the Doge's son, Doge Consort. His elder son, Giustiniano, was then in Constantinople, and Giovanni, the younger, assumed the ducal dignity. When Giustiniano returned home he complained loudly of the honour done to his younger brother, who had deserved nothing of the State. He refused to live with his father in the palace, and retired, accompanied by his wife, to a house near the church of San Servero. Agnello, wishing to pacify his elder son, deposed Giovanni, and raised Giustiniano to the coveted post. Giovanni became so troublesome that he was expelled to Zara; thence he escaped to Bergamo, and appealed to the Emperor Lewis. On learning this, his father and brother begged the Emperor to hand over the fugitive to them; the Emperor consented, and Giovanni was dismissed to Constantinople, where he remained quiet. This family quarrel in the Doge's household forms a fitting prelude to the many more serious complications which were produced by the system of the Doge Consort.

Agnello died and left his son Giustiniano, the Doge Consort, in sole authority. The Emperor of the East, 827. Michel, was, at that time, engaged in endeavouring to save Sicily from the Saracens. On two occasions the Imperial

fleet received reinforcements from Venice. On neither occasion did the Venetians distinguish themselves, and the whole expedition proved a failure, ending with the fall of Messina in 831. But the event is important as being the first occasion on which the Venetians faced the Saracens, whose more intimate acquaintance they were presently to make. 827.

Giustiniano's short reign of two years was marked by two events of interest. The first was the attack made by Maxentius, Patriarch of Aquileia, on the Patriarch of Grado. Maxentius found support from the Frankish sovereign, Lothair; and, in a Council held at Mantua, he obtained a decree which declared that the See of Aquileia was Metropolitan of Istria. This was clearly in direct opposition to the decree of the Lateran Council of 732, which had established the separation of the two jurisdictions. The death of the Pope, however, to whom Venerius, Patriarch of Grado, had appealed, left the question undecided, though Venice was again reminded that her interest lay in maintaining the See of Grado against Aquileia, which, as a mainland city, was liable to be influenced by the masters of the Italian kingdom.

The second and more picturesque event of Giustiniano's reign was the translation of the body of S. Mark, the *aureus lucifer*, as Dandolo calls him, from Alexandria to Venice. Whatever the historical authenticity of this episode may be, it signifies, in a way, coming as it did so soon after the concentration at Rialto, the religious dedication of the new State. S. Mark became the patron and protector of the new Venice at Rialto. And Venice felt a peculiar interest in the Apostle of the Lion; he is said to have preached in Aquileia—to have been, as it were, the founder of that see; the Bishopric of Grado was derived in direct descent from the See of Aquileia; some of the apostle's glory, therefore, environed the Patriarchate of the lagoons, and gave the Venetians a certain right to consider their patriarchal See as not so very inferior to that of Rome itself; for S. Mark, the Evangelist and Apostle, was at least as honourable as S. Peter the denier. And this conception, though one of fancy, was not without its influence on the 828.

attitude which the Republic of Venice habitually adopted towards Rome in matters ecclesiastical.

828.

The fact of the translation of a body from Alexandria to Venice is tolerably certain. The details are, no doubt, mythical. But the account given by Martin da Canal, the most vivid and picturesque of early Venetian chroniclers, will serve as well as any other. "Truth it is," says he, "that in those days there was a ship of Venice in the port of Alexandria, and in that city was the precious body of Monsignore S. Mark, whom the infidels had slain. Now on board the ship of Venice were three brave men, Rustico of Torcello, Buono of Malamocco, and Stauraco. In these three men so strong was the hope and so great their desire to carry Monsignore S. Mark to Venice, that they went cunningly about him who was guardian of the body, and became friends to him. Then it came to pass that they said unto him, 'Sir, an you will with us to Venice, we may carry away the body of S. Mark, and we shall make you very rich.' But when the good man—Theodore he was called—heard this he said, 'Silence, sirs, speak not such words. This thing can never be. For the pagans hold him above all price; and, should they suspect your desire, not all the riches of the world would save you from being cut to bits. So I beg you say not such words.' Then said one of them, 'Well, we will wait till the Evangelist himself shall bid you come with us!' And so they said no more that time. But presently it came to pass, that into the heart of that good man came the desire to take the body of S. Mark from thence, and to go with him to Venice; and he said to those brave men, 'Sirs, how shall we lift the holy body, and no one be the wiser?' And one replied, 'We will do it right cunningly.' Then they went to the tomb with all speed, and lifted the body of S. Mark from where it lay, and put it in a basket, and covered it with cabbages and pork. And they took another body and dressed it in the vesture they had stripped from the body of S. Mark, and laid it in the tomb, and sealed the tomb as it was sealed before. Then those brave men took S. Mark and carried him in the basket aboard their ship, and they placed the body

between two quarters of pork, and hung them to the mast. Now at the very moment when they were opening the tomb, an odour spread through the city, so sweet 828. that had all the spice shops of the world been in Alexandria it would not have been enough to scent it so. Then the pagans said, 'Mark is moving'; for once each year they were wont to smell this odour. All the same they went to the tomb, and opened it, and saw the body wrapped in the vesture of S. Mark, and were content. But some of the pagans came to the ship, and searched her through; for they thought that the Venetians were carrying off S. Mark. But when they saw the pork hanging from the mast they began to cry, 'hanzir, hanzir,'¹ and fled from the vessel. The wind was fresh and fair. They set their canvas to the wind and passed out into the open sea. On the third day they came to Roumania. It was night. They were under full sail, and all asleep, so that they bore right down upon an island. But the precious Evangelist roused the master and said, 'Lower your sails, or we go on shore.' Then the master roused the crew and lowered the sail; and so that ship came into Venice." The body of S. Mark was received with every honour. The Doge assigned a piece of land near the chapel of S. Theodore, on which he began to build a church in honour of the Evangelist, who from that time forward usurped the place of S. Theodore as patron of the lagoon city.

The Doge Giustiniano died and was succeeded by his brother Giovanni, whom he had ousted from the position of Doge Consort in the reign of their father, 829. Agnello. Giovanni had hardly ascended the throne when the Frankish party made its final effort to recover its position in the lagoons. Obelerio, the exiled Doge, returned to the borders of the estuary, and opened negotiations with the people of his native township, Malamocco. The Doge, Giovanni, summoned the militia, and proceeded to attack the town on the mainland where Obelerio had taken up his abode. But the Malamoccan portion of his troops rebelled and declared themselves for Obelerio. The Doge acted with great promptitude and severity. He abandoned, for the moment, his attack on

¹ Khanzir, Arabic for "Pig."

Obelerio, and went straight to Malamocco. He put the town to fire and sword. Then returning to
829. Obelerio's stronghold, he captured it and the ex-Doge. Obelerio was decapitated, and his head sent to Malamocco first, as a warning, and then back again to the mainland, where it was planted on a stake as a defiance to the Frankish power. With the death of Obelerio the hopes of the Frankophils died away, and that element of disturbance was erased from lagoon history.

But the Doge's action throughout had been too high-handed to satisfy the Venetian population, which was still suspicious of its ruler's conduct. A further ground for alarm was offered by the fact that the ducal dignity had now become all but hereditary in the family of Particiaco. A certain Pietro Caroso, a man of ambitious rather than of patriotic temperament, found little difficulty in forming a party so strong that the Doge was compelled to seek safety in flight. Caroso was elected to fill the vacant throne, but only by his own followers; nor had he the power to maintain his position for more than six months. At the end of that period the faction of the Particiachi succeeded in causing a revolution against him, in the course of which he was seized and blinded, while the exiled Doge was restored to the throne. But the movement set on foot by Caroso was too powerful and too deeply rooted in the popular instinct to be easily snuffed out. Though the Venetians resented the usurpation by Caroso, they had not forgiven the sack of Malamocco, nor forgotten that Giovanni was the third Particiaco who had held the ducal chair in succession. On S. Peter's Day, as the Doge was returning from the church of that saint at Castello, he was violently seized in the street; his beard was shaved, his crown tonsured, and he was compelled to retire to a monastery in Grado, where he presently died.

The strength of the popular movement against the
836. dynastic tendency of the Particiaco family made itself plainly visible at the next election, when the people chose Pietro Tradonico, not merely no relation to the Particiachi, but a man whose ancestors came from

Jesolo, the ancient rival of Heraclea, the original home of the last Doge's family. No sooner was Tradonico seated on the throne, however, and had won the confidence of the people, than he induced them to forget one of the chief reasons which had led to his own election. At his request they gave him leave to raise his son to the position of Doge Consort. Such persistence in the habit of creating a Doge Consort would almost lead us to suppose that there existed a party in the State which considered such an office to be constitutionally a necessity. 836.

The reign of Tradonico is of high importance in the history of Venice. During this stormy quarter of a century the Republic was exposed to two great external dangers, one from the Slav pirates of the Dalmatian coast, the other from the Saracens; her commercial position on the mainland of Italy was greatly strengthened by her friendly relations with Lothair, while internally, she suffered from the violence of those family feuds which tore the State asunder.

The broken coast-line of Dalmatia, with its numerous islands lying parallel to the shore, with its deep gulfs, its narrow channels, rapid currents and sunken rocks, had long offered a fitting shelter for the hordes of Slavs who, settling upon those shores, took to piracy as a profession. These nests of freebooters were a perpetual menace to Venetian trade, and as early as the last reign, the Dalmatian pirates had begun to seize Venetian merchantmen while beating their way up the Adriatic, and making for Venice. One of the first acts of Tradonico was to attack the corsairs on two occasions. The earlier expedition proved successful. But a lawless race, such as the Dalmatian pirates, was not to be bound by treaties of peace, and the Doge had no sooner turned his back than depredations began again. The second expedition was unsuccessful, and Venetian trade remained exposed to the dangers of freebooters till the glorious expedition of Pietro Orseolo II. curbed the audacity of the Dalmatians for a time.

A still more formidable foe was about to claim the attention of the young Republic. The Emperor Theophilus sent to request the help of the Venetian fleet against the Saracens,

who, in 831, had made themselves masters of Messina.

836. The Venetians, after some hesitation caused by the dread of provoking an enemy so able to injure their trade, resolved to throw themselves vigorously into the war. The size of the fleet which they sent towards Taranto proves how powerful the Republic had become. It consisted of sixty vessels, manned by two hundred men apiece. The expedition failed utterly. The Saracens were victorious and sailed up the Adriatic, devastating Bari and Ancona. They reached the port of Adria, at no great distance from Brondolo and the lagoons. Venice lay defenceless, as far as her fleet was concerned. But when the Saracens saw prospect of but little booty, and great difficulty in obtaining that, they withdrew. On the open sea and all down the Adriatic they were masters. But the intricate waters of the lagoon again defied invasion, and the singular nature of their home once more saved the Venetians from certain ruin. The Saracens were masters of the Adriatic, and the Venetians were compelled, in self-defence, to try yet again the fortune of war against their enemy, this time in the Quarnero, and again they suffered defeat.

The disastrous effects of these reverses were soon displayed in the descent which the Sclavonian pirates 842. made upon the borders of the lagoon. They took and sacked Caorle. The Sclavs of Dalmatia were bold and skilful navigators, not likely to shrink, as the Saracens had done, from attempting to penetrate the lagoon. So pressing was the danger, and so enfeebled were the Venetians at sea, that the Republic was compelled to turn its attention to the immediate defences of the channels which led into the home waters. The Doge constructed two guardships, of a size at that time unprecedented, and these were stationed along the shore to protect the breaks in the line of the *Lidi*.

In the midst of these misfortunes the Doge devoted his energies to consolidating Venetian relations with the mainland. The Saracens and the Slav pirates were foes against whom all were ready to join. The Doge, therefore, found no difficulty in obtaining a very advantageous treaty from the Emperor Lothair. The document still exists, and is

the oldest monument of Venetian diplomacy which has been preserved to us in the original. The terms of the treaty provide that (1) all molestation of Venetians ^{842.} on the continent is to cease; (2) fugitives from Venice shall not receive asylum; (3) subjects of the Empire are forbidden to buy or to trade in Venetian subjects as slaves; (4) murderers are to be extradited by both parties; (5) ambassadors shall enjoy immunity; (6) the confines continue to be those designed by the treaty with Liudprand; (7) Italians are pledged to remain neutral in any attack on Venice, and to take the offensive against pirates; (8) the Venetians shall enjoy freedom of trade on land, and the subjects of the Empire the like by sea. The friendly spirit which animates this accord between Venice and the Western Empire continued for many years; and a seal was set to it, as it were, by the visit which the Emperor Lewis II., Lothair's successor, paid to the lagoons in the year 856.

During the reign of Tradonico, as far as external relations were concerned, the Venetians had been brought into collision with two powerful enemies, the Slav pirates and the Saracens. They had been put to a severe trial, and had emerged from it unsuccessful on the whole. But they had acquired a knowledge of themselves. They had proved their ability to make and to man a large fleet; they had been forced to fortify the lagoon entrances, which they now knew to be a weak point in their natural defences. On the other hand, in the face of common dangers, their relations with East and West had been strengthened, and they found themselves sought for as allies by both Empires.

Inside Venice the city was rent by the quarrels of many noble families, who seem to have gathered round them the unappeased malignity of more ancient feuds. In these internecine struggles the Giustiniani, the Baseggi, and the Polani on the one hand, the Istolii, Silvi, and Barbolani on the other, stood out as champions. It was impossible for the Doge and the Government to remain indifferent spectators of the bloody brawls and savage vendettas which tore the city into two hostile camps. They took vigorous steps;

and the families who attached themselves to the Istolii were expelled. The exiles went at once to the Emperor 842. Lewis, and by his intercession they were restored, but under obligation to live on the island of the Giudecca, where it was hoped that the wide stretch of water between them and the neighbouring islands would help to keep them at peace. No sooner had they returned to Venice, however, than they began to plot against the chief of the State, and successfully. As the Doge was leaving the church of San Zaccaria, he was assaulted and murdered. His body lay on the threshold of the church till night came down, when the nuns gave it decent sepulture in the courtyard of their convent. The city fell a prey to civil war for many days after the Doge's assassination. His partisans withdrew into the ducal palace, fortified it, and refused to give it up. A commission was at last appointed to compose matters. The Doge's murderers were tried, and some banished. The palace was then surrendered by Tradonico's followers, and the election of a new Doge restored quiet for a time.

With the election of Orso Particiaco the ducal dignity 864. was once more conferred on the family which had held it after the seat of Government had been removed to Rialto. The reign of Tradonico was merely an episode, though a long and important episode, in the history of the Particiaco dynasty.

The chief events of Orso's reign centre round the two patriarchal Sees of Grado and Aquileia; with both of them Particiaco came into collision. The Doges of Venice claimed, among their other rights, the nomination and the investiture of bishops. Orso named to the See of Torcello a certain Domenico Caloprini, member of one of the most powerful families in the city. The Patriarch of Grado, however, refused to accept the nomination, on the ground that Domenico had rendered himself incompetent in canon law. The quarrel continued for many years. The Patriarch retired to Istria, and thence to Rome. The Pope endeavoured to interfere, and summoned the bishops of the lagoon Sees to his presence. They ignored the summons. He sent his legate, who held a Council in Ravenna, at which

no Venetian bishops presented themselves. Finally, the Doge and the Patriarch arrived at a compromise by themselves. Caloprini was to reside at Torcello and to 864- enjoy the revenues of the See, but was not to be consecrated as long as the Patriarch was alive. The Patriarch died, and the Doge extracted from his successor a promise that he would consecrate whomsoever should be presented to the vacant See of Torcello. The Doge at once presented Caloprini, and so won his point. The importance of the episode lies in this, that here we find the Doge asserting and maintaining that Erastian attitude towards the Church which always characterised Venetian ecclesiastical policy. The Doge ignores the interference of Rome, and exacts obedience from the clergy of the State, as from any other subject. The victory, in fact, remained with Venice, though the Church of Rome would not allow a practical defeat to constitute an establishment of rights.

The brush with the Patriarch of Aquileia was of a different nature, though it was hardly less important. That Patriarch was in no sense a subject of the Doge, but he had been and was a declared enemy of the lagoon Patriarchate, which the Doge considered himself bound to protect, while exacting obedience. Walpert, the Patriarch of Aquileia, had shown his hostility by incursions into the territory of Grado, and by annoying the Venetian traders in their markets and factories on the mainland. In order to reduce the Patriarch to terms the Doge employed, not arms as heretofore, but another weapon, used now for the first time, though frequently adopted in later years. He closed the ports at the mouths of the rivers which flow through the territory of Aquileia, and forbade all exports to that city. So important had the lagoons become as a depot of supplies for the mainland, that the Patriarch almost immediately found himself compelled to yield to the blockade, and to implore for peace.

Orso, after reigning for seventeen years, was succeeded by his son Giovanni, who had already been associated with him as Doge Consort. Venetian commerce 881. had been steadily growing, in spite of Saracens and Slavs,

as the successful blockade of Aquileia demonstrated. The

881. Venetian war-fleet had been increasing in power, thanks to the ever-present danger from these same Saracens and Sclavs. It was impossible that Venetian commercial interests should remain untainted by jealousy of their neighbours. It was equally impossible that the Venetians should not use their fleet to crush their rivals.

The first war inspired by the desire for commercial aggrandisement was that which the Doge Giovanni undertook against Comacchio, a port in the lagoons of Ravenna, under the immediate tutelage of the Marquises of Este and the more remote protection of the Emperor. On an excuse of no validity, the Doge sailed to Comacchio, took and sacked it, returning home laden with booty. The protectors of Comacchio were either unwilling or unable to resent this high-handed act. Charles the Fat, King of Italy, even renewed the usual pact with the Venetians. The most noticeable addition to the treaty was a clause against the murder of the Doge; though the penalty of banishment and a fine of one hundred pounds of gold, does not seem to be a very powerful bridle for such violent political passions as at that time swayed the Venetians.

Giovanni, the Doge, fell ill and abdicated in favour of his younger brother Pietro, who, however, died almost at once. Giovanni then returned to power with Orso II., his brother, as Doge Consort. But neither endured the strain of office for long. Both insisted on abdicating, and the people elected Pietro Candiano as their new chief. Pietro was presented to Giovanni at the ducal palace, and received from his hands the sceptre, sword, and ducal chair.

Candiano, a man of vigorous and warlike character, determined to signalise his reign by the suppression of
887. the Dalmatian pirates, who were still the pest of the Adriatic. He seems to have treated the task too lightly. His first expedition was a failure. He then manned twelve vessels, and sailed, in command himself, towards Zara. On the first assault the Sclavs fled; but when hard pressed, they made a stand, and in the conflict Pietro Candiano was slain, after holding the ducal chair for five months. His

body was recovered from the enemy and buried in Grado, where they still show his tomb.

The Venetians were divided upon the question of 887.
the new Doge. In order to avoid a civil war, they invited Giovanni Particiaco to leave his home once more, and to assume the supreme office until a successor could be peacefully and legally elected. Giovanni consented; and shortly afterwards the votes of the Venetians were concentrated on Pietro Tribuno.

Two events of importance mark the reign of Pietro Tribuno. One of his first acts was to secure the 888.
renewal of the Imperial diplomas from the Emperor Guy. The growing importance, influence, and power of Venice may be very clearly traced in the steady expansion of the rights and privileges which are demanded, and usually conceded, on the renewal of these diplomas. In the present instance we meet for the first time a most notable enlargement in the capitulations. It is declared in Guy's diploma that "in all parts of our kingdom any Venetian shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Doge." As we have already noticed, extradition was provided for by the diploma of Lothair, and so such a provision as this in the diploma of Guy was possible; and the knowledge that contracts would be upheld and civil suits adjudged according to Venetian practice, must have offered a strong inducement to Venetian merchants to embark their capital and their energies in mainland traffic, and to open shops and factories in Italian cities.

The second notable occurrence of Tribuno's reign was the invasion of the Hungarians, which exposed 900.
Venice to extreme danger. Thanks to her natural position, she emerged stronger, more self-confident, firmer than before. The Hungarians, after defeating Berenger, King of Italy, on the Brenta, were masters of the whole Venetian plain. The dread of their presence compelled the Venetians to look to their fortifications. The mainland shores of the lagoons had already been protected by walled fortresses or towers at Cavarzere, Bebbe, Brondolo, and Grado, built at various periods of danger. But the capital,

Venice itself, was quite unprotected. Tribuno now directed his attention to remedying this defect. A strong 900. castle was built at Olivolo, the eastern extremity, near the arsenal, and gave its name to the quarter of Castello. From Castello to the Piazza a wall ran along the line of the present Riva degli Schiavoni. The Piazza itself was surrounded by a wall. A great chain was stretched across the mouth of the Grand Canal. Preparations were made for removing the posts which marked out the deep channels from the shoal waters. Large vessels, filled with stones, were sunk in the deeper waters to block them against any hostile fleet. Then the Venetians awaited the attack, in some trepidation, but still confident in the singular strength of their lagoon home. ✓

The Hungarians arrived at the south-west corner of the lagoon, and, following the same line as that selected by Pepin for his attack, they seized Brondolo and Chioggia. They pushed on as far as Albiola, the point reached by Pepin in 810. There, on the feast of S. Peter and S. Paul, the Venetians gave battle to the enemy, and defeated them so thoroughly that they ceased to be a danger to the Republic. Thus, for the third time, an attack on the lagoons demonstrated to the Venetians the impregnable nature of their sea-girt city, which neither Frank, nor Saracen, nor Hungarian had been able to violate.

Pietro Tribuno died, and was buried in S. Zaccaria. The popular choice fell once more on a member of the 912. Particiaco family, Orso II. After the dread of the Hungarian invasion had rolled away, Venice enjoyed a period of greater peace than she had known for many years. It is worth recording that Orso was nicknamed *Pavureta*, the timid. Whether it was owing to the Doge's timidity that Venice enjoyed this quiet, or whether the unwonted quiet led the people to believe that their Doge was timid, is uncertain. But they had no cause to regret such a fruitful growing-time. Venetian commerce steadily extended upon the mainland. The Imperial diploma was renewed by Rudolph, and it contains one highly interesting testimony to the spread of this commerce in the clause which conceded to

Venice the right to coin money. No doubt the Venetians had possessed a mint in much earlier periods of their history; in the reign of Charles, we hear that the State bound itself to pay a tribute in Venetian currency; and the diploma of Rudolph itself speaks of the ancient right by which the Doges struck their own coins. What the clause in this diploma really did, was to give legal currency to Venetian money in the markets of Italy. ^{925.}

The Doge, Orso II., after a peaceful reign of twenty years, followed the example set by his relatives and predecessors, Giovanni and Orso; he abdicated and retired into a monastery. His successor was Pietro Candiano II., son of the Pietro Candiano who was slain while fighting the pirates near Zara. ^{932.}

The people of Istria desired to enter on an alliance with the Venetians against their common enemy, the Dalmatian pirates. Their ambassadors arrived in Venice, to conclude a treaty; and as petitioners for a favour, they virtually admitted, in return, Venetian supremacy over the coast cities of Istria, by promising to pay a yearly tribute of one hundred amphoræ of their excellent Istrian wine. These beginnings of Venetian lordship in Istria alarmed and irritated the Marquis Wintker, representative of the King of Italy in those parts. He confiscated all Venetian goods seized all Venetian shipping, and forbade the Istrians to trade with the Republic. This would have entailed a serious war had the Doge not learned from his predecessors that Venetian commerce was so essential to all her neighbours, as to place at the disposal of the Republic a weapon, less costly and more efficient than an army or a fleet. The Doge retaliated on Wintker by declaring the isolation of the Istrian ports, and so rapid was the action of the blockade that Wintker was instantly obliged to beg the Patriarch of Grado to mediate between himself and the Doge. The Marquis was compelled to sign a treaty by which he gave the fullest satisfaction to Venice, and secured her in all her demands as regards Istria, where the Republic now became a factor of prime importance, and thus took her first step towards the establishment of her supremacy in the Adriatic.

Two reigns of no great moment covered the years from the death of Pietro Candiano in 939 to 959.

939. Pietro, the last Doge of the Particiaco family, was succeeded in 942 by Pietro Candiano III., who was able, for the third time, to prove the efficacy of a
942. blockade, when he reduced Lupo, Patriarch of Aquileia, to own himself "a wicked man," and to swear that he would never more molest his neighbour of
944. Grado.

The close of Pietro Candiano's reign was embittered by the conduct of his son Pietro, whom he had associated with himself in the Dukedom. Pietro broke into open rebellion, the mob seized him, and his life was only spared at the intercession of his aged father. Pietro was banished; and the whole Venetian population bound themselves by a solemn oath never at any time to elect him as Doge. But

959. no sooner had Pietro III. died than we find the outlawed son elected in his place, and recalled to govern the State he had been doing his utmost to ruin by piracy on the Adriatic. There is some difficulty in understanding the meaning of the whole of this episode of Pietro's rebellion, expulsion, and sudden return to favour. It is possible, however, that Pietro IV. was the people's candidate; that in his recall, upon which they insisted, and in his election, which was their work, we see an effort on the part of the Venetian populace to assert itself in the choice of their chief magistrate. No doubt the populace of Venice had been growing in numbers and in power; and the people was beginning to perceive that unless it insisted upon its rights, political power in the State would become stereotyped in the hands of a few leading families. And the recall and election of Pietro were the first indications of that struggle between the people and the aristocracy, which was inevitable before Venice could assume the rigidly oligarchical form which characterises her constitution.

Pietro Candiano's foreign policy with West and East was fortunate in the one case and prudent in the other. Otho II. was maturing his plans for the reduction of all Italy to his own crown. He desired the

assistance of Venice for this purpose, and, in order to render the Venetians friendly, he renewed the Imperial diploma, and made it perpetual. On the other hand, Candiano came into relations with a powerful ruler in Constantinople. It is instructive to note the result of this upon the history of Venice. Venice had only existed as an independent State, thanks to the weakness of the Eastern Empire, under the nominal protection of which she was enabled to develop upon her own lines. But the moment a powerful Emperor occupied the throne, the inherent weakness of the young State became apparent to itself. Venice was following the career of a purely commercial State, and therefore was indifferent to any considerations other than those of interest. Her instinct was to trade with peoples, not to fight with them. Accordingly she willingly entered into commercial rather than hostile relations with the Saracens. But the Emperor of the East, John Zimiskes, who had recently restored the Imperial prestige by his defeat of the Bulgars, was contemplating an attack upon the Saracens. He was a powerful man; a soldier with an army, and intended to be obeyed. His ambassador at Venice complained of the traffic which the Republic maintained with the enemies of Christendom, to whom they supplied arms and even ships. He ordered that this trade should cease, and threatened, if disobeyed, to burn every Venetian ship he captured, cargo, crew and all. The Republic recognised that it was prudent to yield, and bound itself by oath to abandon its trade with the Paynim. 967. 971.

The end of Pietro's life was a stormy one: he began his career by rebellion against his father: he ended by wrecking his life through his own ambition. His conduct led the Venetians to believe that he was aiming at absolute sovereignty in the State. He repudiated his wife in order to make a wealthier and more conspicuous marriage with Hwalderada, sister of the Marquis of Tuscany, who brought him a large dower of lands in Friuli, the Trevisan marches, and the Ferrarese. He undertook wars, employing the forces of the State, in order to protect these

private acquisitions. He filled the ducal palace with hired foreigners as guards. The accumulation of popular
971. suspicion broke out at last. The palace was surrounded, but the besiegers were unable to force an entrance, owing to the resistance of the foreign garrison. Then some one in the crowd suggested that the wooden houses near the palace should be filled with pitch and set on fire. This was done. The flames soon spread to the palace. The Doge, unable to resist the heat and the smoke, endeavoured to escape by the door which led into S. Mark's Church. But he found the exit guarded by some Venetian nobles, his own relations; to them he cried, "And ye too, my brothers, are ye too united against me for my destruction?" But they rushed on him, felled him with axes, and "the soul of the Duke, leaving this prison-house of the body, sought the threshold of the realms above." The Doge's child was slain in his nurse's arms. The bodies of father and son were thrown into a boat, and taken to the common slaughter-house, to be given to the dogs, had not one of the Gradenigo family rescued the remains and secured for them decent burial in the monastery of Sant' Ilario, near Fusina.

The violent outburst which ended in the death of
976. Pietro Candiano led to a quiet reign under his successor, Pietro Orseolo I. Hwalderada, widow of the murdered Doge, had sought the protection of the Emperor, Otho II. He supported her claim for the restitution of her dowry, and Orseolo thought it wise to comply. But the sum was a large one; and in order to meet this outlay the Doge summoned an assembly, which imposed a tax of one-tenth upon all incomes—an event worthy of note as the earliest recorded instance in Venetian history of a direct tax levied upon every citizen, implying an assessment of all property in the State, which, unfortunately, has not come down to us.

But the revolution which overthrew Pietro Candiano involved the Republic in expenses other than those entailed by the settlement of Hwalderada's claims. The fire which burned out Candiano and his guards, destroyed not only the ducal palace and S. Mark's Church, but also three

hundred houses which stood between the Piazza and S. Maria Zobenigo. The Doge turned his attention to the restoration of these buildings. He brought 976. workmen from Constantinople to carry out his designs. He devoted most of his private fortune to the new Basilica, for the protection and maintenance of which he created the first Procurators of S. Mark, an office which eventually became the most honourable in the State after the Dukedom itself.

The faction of the Candiani was not content, however, to see the Dogeship remain out of its possession. Plots menaced the Doge's life, and there grew daily in him a desire to withdraw into monastic life. This desire was fostered, and came to a climax when a certain Fra Guarino arrived from Aquitaine. The Doge resolved to quit the world, but he dreaded the opposition of his people. He resolved to escape secretly. On the night of 1st September, 976, he left his palace, passed the lagoon to Fusina, found horses at Sant' Ilario, rode rapidly through North Italy, and reached the monastery of S. Michele di Cusano in the Pyrenees, where twenty-nine years of pious life and religious exercises procured him the honours of canonisation.

The faction of the Candiani triumphed in the election of Vitale, brother of the murdered Pietro. But 978. upon him too, as upon so many wearers of the ducal bonnet, there fell the disgust of life. After only fourteen months' reign Vitale retired to the monastery of Sant' Ilario, where he shortly died.

In the reign of his successor, Tribuno Memo, we reach a crisis in Venetian internal history, and close a 979. period of her natural growth. It was in Memo's reign that family feuds burned up to their fiercest, and ended in an explosion which cleared the air and left the city comparatively free for the future.

The rivalry of the Candiani and the Orseoli, a family which was desirous of making itself dynastic, as the Particiachi and the Candiani had all but done, divided at least the wealthier and nobler families in Venice. Marriage connections bound the Doge to the Candiani, whose faction

was championed by the family of Caloprini, while the opposite party was led by the family of Morosini.

979- The Caloprini resolved on the destruction of the whole Morosini clan. They arranged their murderous design for a certain day. They armed their relations, servants, dependants. But the Morosini were warned in time, and saved themselves by flight, all but one, Domenico Morosini, who was met by Stefano Caloprini in the square of S. Pietro di Castello, and stabbed so cruelly, that he almost instantly died of his wounds. Thus the blood feud began, and it was not extinguished till the close of Tribuno Memo's reign. The murder of Domenico Morosini rendered Venice an insecure dwelling for all of the Caloprini faction; the Morosini were sworn to vendetta. Stefano Caloprini, the author of the crime, and his more powerful followers, betook themselves to the Court of Otho II., who was then in no friendly mood towards Venice, on account of the assistance which the Republic had given to the Greeks in South Italy, thereby retarding his schemes for making his Italian kingdom actual and complete. Stefano was favourably received. He proposed that the Emperor should restore him and his party to Venice, and should make him Doge; in return for which Stefano promised to bring the Republic into feudal submission to the Empire. Otho listened willingly to the proposal, which coincided with his own schemes in Italy. By his orders Venice was isolated from the mainland; communications were stopped. Stefano Caloprini and his traitorous companions undertook, from Padua, Mestre, the Adige, and Ravenna, to make the blockade effectual. The friends of the Caloprini, still in Venice, were incited to revolt; and Cavarzere did submit to the Emperor. The Bishop of Belluno invaded the territory of Grado and Caorle. Otho himself prepared a fleet to assault the lagoons, or at least to complete the blockade by sea. The danger was extreme. Neither the invasion of Pepin nor of the Hungarians had threatened so seriously the existence of Venice. For among her enemies now were some of her own children—men who knew the secrets of the lagoons, and whose influence

inside the city might, at any moment, create a treacherous rising against the Government. Under the exasperation of this danger the Venetians attacked and 979- razed to the ground the houses of the Caloprini, and held the women and children as hostages. It is needless to conjecture what would have been the issue of the attack. It never took place. Otho died at Rome in December 983. The Caloprini suddenly saw themselves 983- deprived of their sole support. They lost heart, and abandoned the attempt to return to Venice by force. They presented themselves before the Empress Adelaide at Pavia, and implored her intercession on their behalf. Adelaide consented to recommend the Caloprini to the Doge's clemency. She sent an embassy to Venice for this purpose, and the Doge, though unwilling and doubtful of the result, allowed the Caloprini to return to the lagoons. His suspicions were justified. The sight of the Caloprini recalled to the minds of all the Morosini clan the unavenged murder of Domenico. It was inevitable that more blood should be shed. One day, as three of the Caloprini were leaving the ducal palace and were about to enter their boat in order to go home, they were attacked and killed by some of the Morosini. Their bodies were recovered by a faithful servant, and sent, as a bloody cry for vengeance, to their various families. It seemed as though a war of extermination between the two families must immediately break out. But the Venetians were weary of this private quarrel, which had proved so perilous and so exhausting to the community. Rightly or wrongly, they held the Doge to be responsible. They deposed him, and compelled him to take the monk's cowl in the monastery of S. Zaccaria. A great man, Pietro Orseolo II., was called on to assume the guidance of the State. Under his rule a broader tract of Venetian history opens to our view, and the murmur of these small but deadly private feuds is lost in the noise of a larger political conflict.

CHAPTER IV

Expansion of Venice under *Pietro Orseolo II.*, Doge—Chrysobol of the Emperor Basil—Venetian fleet—Commercial relations with Italy ; with the Saracens—Aquileia and Grado—The claims of the Bishops of Belluno and Treviso—Venice opens factories along the Sile and Piave—Commercial policy of Orseolo—War with Dalmatian pirates—Duke of Dalmatia—The importance of Venetian supremacy in Dalmatia—The Commemorative ceremony of the *Sposalizio del Mar*—Otho III. visits Venice—Venice assists the Greeks besieged in Bari—Orseolo's son marries a niece of the Emperor Basil—The Plague in Venice—Death of Orseolo—*Otho Orseolo*, Doge—Opposition to the dynastic tendency of the Orseoli—Orso Orseolo of Grado and Poppo of Aquileia—Flight of the Doge and his brother Orso—Loss of Grado—The Doge recalled ; recovers Grado ; deposed—*Pietro Centranico*, Doge, Faction feuds—Dalmatia renounces allegiance—Poppo of Aquileia—The Doge deposed—*Domenico Flabianico*, Doge—The end of the dynastic tendency in the Dogeship—The Orseoli ostracised—Limitations to the power of the Doge—The *Consiglieri Ducali*—The beginnings of the *Pregadi* or Senate—*Domenico Contarini*, Doge—His quiet reign—The Patriarch of Grado removes to Venice—*Domenico Selvo*, Doge—Ceremony of election—Venice and the Normans—Siege of Durazzo—Growth of luxury—Decoration of S. Mark's—*Vitale Falier*, Doge—Naval resources of Venice—Death of Robert of Normandy—Privileges from the Emperor Alexius—Ascendency in Constantinople—Rediscovery of S. Mark's tomb.

DANGER and confusion characterise the period from which Venice had just emerged. Three times the lagoons
983. were threatened by invasion—once by the Saracens, once by the Hungarians, and once by the treacherous Caloprini, supported by the Emperor Otho. This season of attack from outside was also the epoch of burning family feuds at home. But now both dangers were safely overcome ; and the confidence and vigour acquired in the struggle made themselves felt in the great expansion of the Republic, which took place in the reign of *Pietro Orseolo II.*

The Doge's attention was at once drawn to questions of commercial policy. The inherent commercial instinct of the Venetians asserted itself the moment 991. it was free to choose its own course. The Chrysobol, or Golden Bull, granted by the Emperor Basil, contained privileges for Venetian merchants far in excess of any they had hitherto enjoyed in the East. By the terms of the Bull, Venetian traders were admitted to a customs tariff more favourable than that imposed upon other merchants; it was stipulated, however, that they were not to carry as Venetian goods the property of Lombards, Amalfitans, or Jews; their cargoes were to be *bond fide* Venetian cargoes. Subjects of the Doge were placed directly under the jurisdiction of the logothetes or Secretary of Finance, and were thus freed from the vexatious delays and annoyances of the inferior local courts, and brought into direct relations with the Emperor himself; for, from the days of Leo the Isaurian, the Emperors had virtually been their own finance ministers, and the logothetes, under whose supervision the Venetians were now placed, was one of the most prominent officers of the Imperial household. In return for these privileges the Venetian fleet was to be held at the disposition of the Emperor for the transport of troops. It was the power and excellence of her fleet which gave to Venice that commanding position which she was rapidly acquiring, and enabled her to secure commercial advantages to which no other maritime state could pretend.

On the Italian mainland commercial policy presented a somewhat different problem for the Doge. The power of an Emperor who was not only a foreigner but continually absent, could never be very great. At this moment, moreover, the Emperor, Otho III., was a minor. For all practical purposes Orseolo found himself obliged to deal directly with the small semi-independent princes, feudatories of the Empire. This he did. He concluded separate treaties with each of these, though he did not omit to secure from the Emperor the ratification of the treaties by a diploma, which was signed at Mülhausen in 992.

Nor did the commercial activity of the Doge cease with

these operations in the East and West. The trading instinct of the people he governed overrode considerations 991. of religion, and the requirements of Imperial policy in either East or West. The foes of the two Empires were not necessarily the foes of the Venetians. They had learned by experience that a possible Saracenic invasion of the lagoons was not a very serious danger; whereas the Saracens, if enemies on the open sea, were able materially to injure Venetian commerce; more could be gained by trading with them than by fighting them. The menace from the Paynim, great to the Eastern Empire and to Italy, was of small moment to Venice; while friendly commercial relations with the Saracens opened up an immense field for trade in Egypt, on the coast of Africa, in Spain, and in Sicily. Accordingly the Doge put the coping-stone to his commercial policy by concluding a treaty with the Moslem foes of East and West.

It seemed as though Venice was now about to enter on a period of undisturbed prosperity. That, however, was not to be. She soon found herself called upon to face new difficulties and complications; though out of these she succeeded in drawing aliment for her major impulse, the development of herself as an independent and purely commercial State.

Ecclesiastical jealousy of the new Patriarchate of Grado was always ready to burst out at any moment, when the mainland suffragans of the older See of Aquileia found support from an Emperor or his representatives. During the period of Otho II.'s hostility to Venice, the Bishops of Belluno and Treviso had seized certain territories on the mainland, over which the Venetians claimed superiority. The Bishops refused to withdraw. The Doge appealed to Otho III., who sent a commissioner to settle the dispute. He did so in favour of the Republic. The Ecclesiastics ignored his decision. The Doge then summoned a general assembly, and decreed the commercial isolation of the whole See of Belluno. This meant that the Bellunese were no longer able to draw their supplies from the seaport nearest to their home, and that they were deprived of the best market for their meat, their butter, and their wood. Meantime Otho himself had entered Italy. He at once showed his strong sympathy with Venice;

and the Bishops of Belluno and Treviso, confronted by this combination of a ruinous blockade with Imperial disfavour, submitted. But the Doge exacted not merely the restitution of the stolen territory; he demanded, and obtained through the Imperial support, the right to erect Venetian warehouses for goods, and to open Venetian markets on the continent, upon the banks of the rivers Sile and Piave, whose waters gave easy access to Venetian vessels. Continuing this policy of extending Venetian influence on the Italian mainland, and laying, though perhaps unconsciously, the foundations of the Venetian land empire, by means of Venetian factories and marts, the Doge rented from the Bishop of Ceneda a castle on the river Livenza, and thereby brought the Venetian merchants into immediate connection with the German traders who came down into Italy by the Ampezzo route. Somewhat later, in the year 1001, a further extension of privileges was obtained from the Bishop of Ceneda. The Venetians opened another factory in that See; they were exempt from all dues upon imports passing through the diocese, and they were relieved from all taxation on salt. In the same year the Doge undertook to farm a third of the revenues which belonged to the Bishopric of Treviso.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Orseolo's commercial policy. In him the spirit of Venice speaks out. We seem to see the young State, now for the first time in its life, giving signs of a conscious purpose and tendency of its own. And concessions of such moment, wrung from hostile neighbours, are a proof that Venice had the power, no less than the will, to achieve her aim, and to make her object of desire an accomplished fact. Free commercial intercourse with Venice was rapidly becoming an absolute necessity for the mainlanders. She was at once the emporium and the market of all the neighbouring cities, and therefore held them virtually at discretion. She steadily extended her commercial influences in Italy, absorbing the trade of the continent, and planting her merchants first where her arms were presently to follow.

These bloodless triumphs were not the sole glory of

Orseolo's reign. The Dalmatian pirates continued to be a source of unmitigated annoyance to Venetian commerce. Venice had never succeeded in subduing, nor even in curbing, their licence. She had, in fact, attempted to buy them off by paying blackmail in the form of a yearly tribute. Orseolo, however, believed himself strong enough now to face the evil. He suspended the annual tribute. The pirates renewed their molestations. An expedition was sent to the

996. 998. Dalmatian coast, which took and destroyed the town of Lissa, but left the head quarters of the pirates, the mouth of the Narenta, uninjured. When the Venetian squadron withdrew, the Narentines vented their fury on the defenceless population of the Dalmatian shore. These, in despair of obtaining any help from their superior, the Eastern Emperor, turned to seek the protection of the only neighbour powerful enough to afford it. The Doge summoned his council; that is to say, in all probability, not the *Concio*, or general assembly of the whole population, but those more prominent citizens whom, as we shall presently see, the Chief of the State was in the habit of inviting to assist him in important deliberations. The result was that the Doge resolved to undertake the absolute suppression of the Narentines. And Venice prepared for the first great war on which she embarked as an independent State on her own account.

Every care was taken to make the expedition a powerful one, and to ensure success. When all was ready, 1000. on 6th May, Ascension Day, 1000,¹ the Doge and his officers went to hear mass in the church of San Pietro di Castello. The Bishop of Olivolo presented to the Duke a consecrated standard; and the same day, with a fair west wind, the whole fleet set sail, and passing out by the Lido port, came that evening to Grado. The Patriarch, in solemn procession, surrounded by his clergy, moved down to meet the Doge, who was then conducted into the cathedral, where he received a second standard from the Metropolitan. Leaving Grado the fleet sailed to Istria, touching at Parenzo, and thence passed down the coast to Zara. At Zara negotiations with the Narentines were commenced. Certain terms, among

¹ *Chronache Antichissime*, edit. Monticolo, p. 156, n. 1.

them the cessation of the annual tribute and a pledge not to infest the Adriatic, were accepted by the enemy; the object of the expedition seemed to be accomplished. But the Doge had no sooner set his course towards Venice, than the pirates took up arms again. Then Orseolo resolved to strike a decisive blow. Leaving his moorings at Zara Vecchia, he made himself master of Curzola, and advanced towards the great stronghold of Lagosta, which was thought to be impregnable. The Narentines seemed inclined to yield; but when they learned that the Venetians, if victorious, intended to raze the city to the ground, they prepared for resistance to the death. The assault was given. The Venetians and friendly Dalmatians swarmed up the precipitous rocks on which the city walls were built. Many were hurled back. Some succeeded in reaching and mastering a tower by breaching its base. Through the opening thus caused in the defences, the Venetians poured into the city; the inhabitants were put to the sword, and in a short time the pirates' most formidable stronghold was levelled to the ground.

The Doge's return home was a triumphal progress. The Dalmatian coast towns recognised him as Duke of Dalmatia. He left their civic constitutions undisturbed, exacting merely a nominal tribute in token of Venetian supremacy. Venice received Orseolo with every demonstration of joy. In a general assembly of his people, the Doge explained his conduct, gave an account of his operations, and received a popular confirmation of his new title, "Duke of Dalmatia."

Apart from the suppression of piracy, the Dalmatian war of Pietro Orseolo II. was an event of prime importance in the history of Venice. Though Dalmatia did not at once become a part of Venetian territory, yet its towns now acknowledged Venetian lordship; and a most important step had been taken towards the supremacy of the Republic in the Adriatic. More than this, Venetian merchants were now able to open warehouses in the Dalmatian seaports, such as Zara, where they could store all the merchandise that came from the interior, the valleys of the Save and the Drave. The danger that the city of Venice might be starved into a surrender was considerably reduced. The seaboard of Dalmatia

could always supply food material which was lacking
1000. in the lagoons; all that Venice had to do was to
keep open the sea-route between the lagoons and the
Dalmatian coast. Finally, the possession of Curzola, so richly
wooded, freed the Venetians from dependence on the forests
of the mainland for their house- and ship-building timber.

It is not surprising that the Venetians should have
resolved to commemorate the day on which Orseolo sailed
upon this glorious expedition. The form which this
commemoration took was that of a solemn procession
from Venice out into the open sea by the Lido port. The
ceremony was one of supplication and placation; the formula
in earliest use consisted in the prayer, "Grant, O Lord, that
for us, and for all who sail thereon, the sea may be calm and
quiet; this is our prayer. Lord, hear us." After which the
Doge and his suite were aspersed, and the rest of the water
was poured into the sea, while the priests chanted the words,
"Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean." Such was the
ceremony in its primitive form. In later years it developed
into the magnificent function, so famous and so well known
as the *Sposalizio del Mar*. In all probability there was a
double meaning in the observance. The Venetians desired
to assert solemnly the result of their past experience, that
they and the sea on which they lived were inseparably one;
and secondly, by a purification of themselves and the
rejection of their sins, symbolised by the aspersion and by
the reversion of the water into the sea, they desired to
render that element propitious.

The successes of the Dalmatian expedition were soon
followed by another proof of Venetian growth. The
1001. Emperor, Otho III., desired to make the acquaintance
of the man who had read such a lesson to the Narentine
pirates. For this purpose he seized the occasion when he
found himself at the great abbey of Pomposa, near Comacchio,
to plead an excuse, and to reach Venice almost-incognito. He
met the Doge at San Servolo, and passed thence into the city.
He was lodged in the eastern tower of the ducal palace. He
visited the monuments of Venice, and acted as godfather
to one of the Doge's children. But this mysterious visit of

the Emperor was not a visit of mere curiosity. There is little doubt that he desired to enlist the sympathy of the Republic for his ambitious designs in Italy, and his presence in the lagoon city must be taken as a tribute to the position which Venice had now acquired. 1001.

From the East, too, came other demonstrations of the same high reputation. The Doge was invited to assist the Greek Governor, who was confined by the Saracens in the city of Bari. He manned a fleet and sailed to the relief of the besieged city. In a very short time he succeeded in raising the blockade of the port, and introduced a copious supply of provisions. The Doge then organised a sortie. The battle lasted for three days; but during the night of the third day the Saracens silently struck camp and withdrew, leaving the city of Bari, whose gratitude to Orseolo knew no bounds, uncaptured and free. Nor was the joy at Constantinople inferior. The Doge was invited to send his son, Giovanni, to the capital. There he was received with almost royal honours. He was created Patrician, and wedded to the niece of the Emperor Basil. On his return to Venice, Giovanni and his bride were again the object of popular demonstrations, which were renewed on the birth of a son. Fortune seemed to smile on the family of Orseolo. But the rapidly growing traffic with the East brought in its train one of the curses which the East has never failed to send westward. The plague appeared in Venice. It wrought the greatest havoc, carrying off the Doge's son, his daughter-in-law, and grandson, besides a vast number of the people. Nor was this all. Famine followed the plague. Yet so attached were the Venetians to their Doge, so mindful of the glory and the prosperity which he had secured, that, far from laying the blame for their misfortunes at his door, as they certainly would have done had he been unpopular, they endeavoured to console him by electing another son as Doge Consort. But the Doge was inconsolable; the loss of his son and his grandson dealt too severe a blow. Though quite a young man, only forty-eight years old, he was already broken by the activities, the campaigns, the diplomatic

burdens, the losses of his reign. No doubt he had a tinge
of that religious spirit which drove his predecessor
1002. and relation, Pietro Orseolo I., to seek the shelter of
a monastery in distant Aquitaine; he took less and less part
in the direction of affairs; he prepared his will; he separated
himself from his wife and led a claustral existence within
the ducal palace. But not for long. He died in 1008,
1008. after eighteen and a half years of the most splendid
and successful Dogeship that Venice had yet seen.

Pietro Orseolo II. was succeeded by his son Otho, who
was married to a daughter of the King of Hungary, and was
godson of the Emperor Otho. The family of the Orseoli
now held by far the most prominent position in the
Republic. The Doge, the Patriarch of Grado, the Bishop of
Torcello, all belonged to the same race. This preponderance
of one house aroused the old dread of dynastic policy
on the part of the Doge, and led to the downfall of the
Orseoli, and a modification in the ducal position. The
crisis was brought about by no imprudence of the Doge
himself. He, indeed, maintained the prestige of Venice,
which his father had done so much to create. He reduced
1017. the Bishop of Adria when that prelate endeavoured
to usurp the territories of Loreo and Fossone, and
compelled him to sue in person for peace. He was successful
against the Croats, whom he was obliged to attack in fulfilment
of his duties as protector of Dalmatia. But no
successes could check the inevitable course of popular
feeling against the Orseolo family. The opposition grew
daily in strength and in audacity. That a change was
imminent the Doge himself was well aware. It was only
a question how the blow would fall.

Orso Orseolo, brother of the Doge, was Patriarch of
Grado. His neighbour of Aquileia was a German, Poppo;
a man of warlike instincts, more a soldier than a priest.
Poppo determined to reopen the question of the rights of
Aquileia over the See of Grado. It is probable that he was
supported by the anti-Orseolo faction in Venice. However
that may be, both the Doge and his brother the Patriarch
saw such serious cause for alarm that they left Venice and

fled to Istria. Poppo, under pretence of protecting the vacant See, begged leave to enter Grado with his troops, promising that the occupation should be ^{1017.} peaceful. But he was no sooner in possession of the town than he surrendered it to the violence of his soldiers. He seized the treasure and the more precious relics, and returned with them to Aquileia, after placing a garrison in the half-ruined city.

The loss of Grado was a blow which Venice could not patiently endure. From the ecclesiastical point of view it was absolutely necessary for the Republic that she should have a Patriarch of her own, independent of the rulers of the mainland. The submission of Grado to Aquileia violated the strongest instinct of the lagoon population, their determination to be independent. The party of the Orseoli pointed to the fall of Grado as the result of hostility to the Doge. The fugitive Duke was recalled from Istria, entered Venice, and immediately placed himself at the head of an expedition which recovered and refortified Grado.

But the episode of Grado did not check the general current of feeling in Venice, that still ran counter to the dynastic tendency which the Orseoli were supposed to represent. The attitude of the Venetians was still the same as it had always been. They would not brook foreign interference, nor would they endure domestic sovereignty. A fresh pretext was soon offered, when Doge Otho insisted on nominating to the See of Olivolo, a young lad, a Grad-enigo, still in his teens. The Doge was seized, his beard shaved, and himself banished to Constantinople.

The reign of Otho Orseolo had been a long one, and not inglorious; but the party opposed to his family and to its dynastic tendency, had gained the upper hand. ^{1026.} On the expulsion of the Orseoli, Pietro Centranico became Doge. The Orseoli, however, still had friends in the city, and the Republic was soon made to feel that the recent successes of the State had been due, in a very large degree, to the ability and personal prestige of the race it had expelled. Faction feuds inside the city broke out once more, and weakened the power of Venice. The Dalmatian cities renounced their

allegiance, which was of service only so long as Venice remained strong. The Western Emperor, Conrad 1026. the Salic, refused to confirm the Imperial diploma. The Eastern Emperor was a relation of the Orseoli, and therefore hostile. Poppo of Aquileia obtained from the Pope a declaration that the See of Grado was subject to his Patriarchate. Such a series of disasters alienated the sympathy of the whole population. A violent, though brief, reaction in favour of the Orseoli took place. Centranico was deposed, shaved, and sent to Constantinople as a pledge of sincerity, along with the embassy which the Republic commissioned to invite Otho Orseolo to return. But Otho was dead. Orso, his brother, held the regency for fourteen months, at the close of which period the popular choice fell upon Domenico Flabianico.

With the elevation of Flabianico to the ducal throne 1032. came the final triumph of the anti-dynastic principle in the development of the Dogeship. Like every important stage in the growth of the Venetian constitution, the result was reached only after a long series of experiments, entailing, as we have seen, constant revolutions inside the State. From the foundation of the Dukedom down to the year 1032, family after family had endeavoured to establish an hereditary claim to the throne. This tendency is visible even before the capital of the lagoons was removed to Rialto. It is apparent in the family of Galbaio, for example. But after Pepin's repulse and the concentration at Rialto, the tendency becomes more and more obvious, and forms one of the chief threads in Venetian history. We find the Particiachi, the Candiani, the Orseoli, all attempting to create a dynasty in their own families; and all of them defeated by that passionate instinct in the Venetian people which found expression in the phrase, "We did not come here to live under a lord."

In the general survey of this struggle to construct a dynastic Dogeship, one point is worthy of special notice. It is a point which distinguishes Venetian history from that of most other Italian cities. Why, it may be asked, did no one of these ambitious families succeed in establishing itself on the throne by the help of some extraneous power? The attempt

was, in fact, made twice in Venetian history. Once when Obelerio admitted the suzerainty of Charles the Great, and received his orders as to the government ^{1032.} of the lagoons; and again, when the Caloprini, in exile, offered, as the price of their restoration, to hold Venice for the Emperor Otho. But there was one insuperable difficulty in the way; the lagoons were impregnable. The Venetian people were resolved to be free: and before an army favourable to a dynastic pretender could have reached the heart of the lagoons they would have risen and deposed or slain the Doge who should have dared to violate the tacit agreement that Venice was never to be made subject to any lord; the foreigner, on his arrival, if he ever could have arrived, would have found no one to support. In short, the lagoons saved Venice from domination by any foreign master; and they also materially assisted to prevent any Venetian from making himself supreme through foreign aid; while the instinct of the Venetians precluded him from founding a dynasty in any other way.

The reign of Domenico Flabianico is important chiefly from the constitutional side. His election marked the climax of reaction against the Orseoli and the dynastic tendency. The whole of that family was ostracised, debarred in perpetuity from holding any office in the State. The democratic movement, which was represented by the new Doge, proceeded still farther. Two laws, tending to limit the powers of the Doge, and to define his position, were proposed and adopted. The first rendered the election of a Doge Consort illegal. But the Doge, single-handed, was unable to cope with all the affairs of the growing State. And this consideration led to the second proposal, in which we find the germ of two most important departments in the machinery of the Venetian constitution. Two *Consiglieri Ducali*, or privy councillors, were now appointed to assist the supreme magistrate in the discharge of his duties; and the Doge was obliged, not merely recommended, to invite (*pregare*) the more prominent citizens to lend him their aid in discussing momentous affairs of State, thereby laying the foundations of that branch of the legislature which was subsequently known as the *Pregadi*, or Senate.

Flabianico was succeeded by Domenico Contarini, whose
1043. long reign of twenty-eight years has left no im-
portant trace upon Venetian history. Perhaps the
State was settling down and enjoying its repose after the
exciting and stormy period of the Orseoli. At all events,
the Venetians took no part in the affairs of Italy nor of the
East. The Doge was compelled once to assert Venetian
supremacy over Dalmatia; but for the rest, even such a
stirring event as the Norman invasion left Venice undis-
turbed. The point of most moment for the Republic was
the fact that the perpetual incursions and ravages of the
restless Patriarch Poppo had so destroyed the city of
Grado that, in spite of Pope Benedict's confirmation of its
independence, the Patriarch could no longer live there.
He removed his palace, though not his title, from Grado
to Venice.

A contemporary account of the election of Domenico
1071. Selvo, who followed Contarini on the throne, shows
that the ceremony was a popular one, that the choice
of the chief magistrate was still the work of the whole
Venetian people. The entire population of Venice assembled
in their boats near the church of S. Pietro di Castello. The
Bishop of Olivolo, surrounded by his clergy, offered up
prayers for the safety of the State, and for guidance in the
choice of a ruler. Then the people began to shout the
name of their favourite, "It is Domenico Selvo we desire
and approve." The choice in this case seems to have been
unanimous, and the new Doge was seized and carried on the
shoulders of the crowd down to the boats. Selvo at once
took off his stockings, in sign of humility, and was rowed to
the Piazza, while the *Te Deum* was chanted by the clergy.
He entered the church of S. Mark, barefooted, and, prostrat-
ing himself on the ground, he returned thanks. He then
received the baton of office, and passed into the courtyard
of the ducal palace, where the people tendered to him the
oath of allegiance.

During the reign of Selvo the Republic once more took
a part in the general current of history. The Venetians
became involved in the struggles between the Normans and

the Eastern Empire. Robert Guiscard had passed over from Italy to the eastern shores of the Adriatic, and had laid siege to Durazzo. Alexius, the Emperor, in 1071, alarm, turned at once to Venice. He begged the Republic to send a fleet to the succour of Durazzo; he made offers of abundant recompense in case of success; and in any event, he guaranteed to the Venetians the cost of the expedition. The Republic accepted the terms. The Doge himself conducted a large and powerful armament to Durazzo, which under the guidance of George Paleologus, was making a stout resistance. When the Venetians appeared on the scene, Robert Guiscard endeavoured to induce them to abandon Alexius. But the Republic held firm by its ancient alliance and to its traditional policy of supporting the Eastern Emperor, distant and weak.

The battle in the harbour proved favourable to the Venetians, thanks to their able tactics and skilled seamanship; thanks also to the device of great weights, rove up to the yardarms and then let go suddenly as the enemy's ships closed in, a weapon which sent many of the Norman vessels to the bottom. Durazzo was relieved on the sea side and provisioned. The land side was still held by the enemy. But the imprudence of Alexius cancelled the advantage gained by the Doge. The Emperor arrived with an army, and, in spite of warning, insisted on offering battle. A ruinous defeat was the result. The Venetians and the Greeks suffered alike. The Normans closed round the city once more, and it presently fell into their hands. The alliance with Alexius proved still more disastrous to the Republic. A second attempt to master the Normans led to a crushing defeat at Casopo. The Doge found his policy repudiated by Venice, and he was deposed.

But though Selvo left behind him no reputation for success, his reign made an indelible impression upon the manners of the Venetians. Selvo had married a Greek wife, whose luxury, if we are to believe the chroniclers, gave great offence to the hardy, and probably uncivilised, people among whom her lot was cast: *artificiosa voluptate se mulcebat*, they say of her; they tell of her scents and

perfumes, her baths of dew, her odoriferous gloves and dresses; they charge her with using a fork at meals; 1071. they like to ascribe her loathsome death to her inordinate effeminacy. No doubt there is great exaggeration in the whole narrative. But it certainly indicates the first appearance of Eastern refinements and luxury among a people who had hitherto retained the primitive habits of their fisher ancestry. The same sumptuous tendency manifested itself in Selvo's great operations upon the church of S. Mark. "He began," says a chronicler, "to work in mosaic. He sent to all parts to seek out marbles and precious stones, and to find master-masons to carry out his large and marvellous designs in masonry." Every ship that returned from the East was ordered to bring its share of the material required to make the Basilica of S. Mark worthy of the saint and the Republic he protected.

Domenico Selvo was succeeded by Vitale Falier, while Venice was still smarting under the defeat inflicted 1085. upon her by Robert of Normandy. The new Doge turned his attention to retrieving this disgrace. It is a proof of the vast naval resources of the Republic that, within so short a time of such a crushing disaster, she was able to equip as powerful a fleet as that which Falier commanded, when he sailed to meet the Normans. In this campaign the Venetians were not acting without the consent and approval of Alexius. Indeed, it would seem that the terms of remuneration, in case of victory, had been settled before the Venetians put to sea. They met Robert in the waters of Corfu, and obtained a victory, though not a decisive one. But they were saved from further encounters with the Normans by the death of the King in the year 1085. Whatever may have been the precise value of their victory, Alexius acknowledged his obligation to pay the stipulated price. His Golden Bull bestowed upon the Doge the title of Proto-sebastos; the Venetians were to enjoy free access to all harbours of the Empire, were to be exempt from customs, and, most important of all, they acquired certain lands, factories, and warehouses in Constantinople itself, round

which they formed a Venetian quarter and a Venetian colony. The Emperor imposed upon all the Amalfitani who traded in the Imperial city, a tribute to be paid towards the building of S. Mark's. This provision of the Golden Bull is noteworthy, for it shows that the Venetians were beginning to take the place of one great maritime town of Italy, Amalfi, which might have proved a serious rival in Eastern commerce. But precisely at the moment when this competitor received so palpable a check, the rumour of sanguinary battles between Pisa and Genoa presaged that more formidable rivalry, that crueller and more costly struggle, which was to accomplish the ruin of two among the great Italian maritime republics. 1085.

Falier's reign was closed by an event which gave sincere satisfaction to the Venetians. The sepulchre of their patron, S. Mark, whose body had been brought to Venice in the reign of Agnello Particiaco, was no longer known. The great fire in the reign of Candiano IV., and the continual alteration of the Basilica, had completely obliterated all traces of the saint's resting-place. The Doge ordered a solemn triduan fast and prayer. Then, as all the people knelt in silence, S. Mark made known his tomb by thrusting forth his arm from a pillar in whose shaft he had been hid, and by filling the church with a most delicious odour. The sacred body was deposited afresh in the crypt of the Basilica. The religious sentiment of the Venetians was satisfied, while their pockets felt the benefit from the vast numbers of visitors who flocked from the mainland in pilgrimage to the miraculous sepulchre. 1094.

The Doge died in 1096, and was buried in S. Mark, where his sarcophagus may still be seen.

CHAPTER V.

The development of Venice as a State—Independence secured by the lagoons—No feudal system—Results of this—Commerce—Few industries—Exchange mart—Carrying trade—Shipbuilding—Navy—Constitution, democratic—Judicial system.

WE have reached the period at which Venice was about to be drawn into the great current of history by the part she was called on to play in crusades.

1096. The previous course of events had been surely preparing this rôle for her. The display of her naval resources, which the Norman wars had evoked, called the attention of the Pope, of both Emperors, of all Europe, to that corner of the Adriatic, to that small city of the lagoons, which was able to put upon the sea two such fleets as the one which was crushed at Casopo, and the one which was victorious at Corfu.

It is convenient at this moment to consider how Venice was equipped to take part in those events which were to launch her on her career as a great maritime and commercial power.

Thanks to the advantages of her geographical position, to the impregnability of the lagoons, to the hardy valour of the Venetian people, and to the weakness of both Eastern and Western Empire, Venice succeeded in remaining a virgin city. She had never fallen into the hands of any master. As far as external interruptions were concerned, Venice was, therefore, permitted to pursue her own course independently. The Venetians were able, by experiment, to discover the line of development which was marked out for them by their own inherent qualities. Their evolution, as

a State, was never crossed by the compulsion of a foreign master, pursuing his own ends regardless of the desires and aims of those subjected to him. 1096.

On the other hand, internally, this impregnability of the lagoons saved Venice from the violence done to the cities of the mainland. No feudal system, with its arbitrary division of classes, breaking the city up into sections which were generically different, was ever imposed upon Venice. She did not suffer the misfortune of finding her population more bitterly divided against itself than unitedly hostile to external foes. In spite of all internal ferment, Venice remained homogeneous. Patriotism was possible. The course of her development naturally produced struggles between the component parts of the community; but these were always family quarrels, the growing pains of the youthful State. The result was accepted by all. No Venetian ceased to be a Venetian because his party suffered defeat. Except in the case of the Caloprini, Venice was not exposed to the danger, so common in other Italian States, of seeing a mass of exiled citizens, hanging round her borders, ready to return and to tear down a hated government. It is this fact which enabled the Republic to achieve a stable constitution, while the rest of Italy was in the throes of continual revolution. Thanks to this happy disposition, Venetian history, from the opening of the fourteenth century onwards, presents that singular immunity from internal rebellion which made her constitution the wonder and the envy of every Italian Republic. Moreover, this radical difference renders any attempt at comparison, any deduction from analogy, between Venice and other Italian States difficult and even misleading. Venice, in short, was not Italian, she was unique.

As a result of this life-giving independence, Venice steadily developed her commercial importance, her naval power, and her domestic constitution.

Her commercial growth already showed the lines upon which it was destined to continue. Industries were small and unimportant, consisting chiefly in the making of salt, the salting of fish, the manufacture of wooden cups, ladles, spoons, saucers, such as may be met with any day in the

streets of modern Venice, where they are now brought from the Alps beyond Belluno. Her main branches of commercial activity were already, as always afterwards, her exchange mart and her carrying trade. Venice had become the great emporium, where the produce of many lands was stored, and whence it was redistributed throughout the continent. Wine and grain came from Apulia; wood from Dalmatia; gems and drugs from Asia; metal-work, silk, and cloth of gold from Constantinople and Greece. We hear of Venetian merchants carrying this varied merchandise, this *de transmarinis partibus orientalium divitiarum*, to the fairs at Pavia, and to the markets of Ravenna and of Rome. We have already noted the wide sweep of Venetian commerce; how upon the mainland the merchants opened factories and warehouses along the rivers which come down from the Alps, and by the side of the great roads which led into Germany; how they spread down the coast of Dalmatia, with stores at Zara, and Venetian officers to protect Venetian interests; how they obtained from the Emperor Alexius a quarter, with shops and market-place, in Constantinople itself.

To feed this great emporium a large fleet of merchantmen was constantly employed. These ships freighted, not merely for Venetians; they carried cargoes for Jews, Lombards, Amalfitani. And with the spread of the carrying trade came the need for a strong navy to guard the merchant vessels from piracy, though no doubt the merchant crews and ships were themselves capable of fighting when required. The Dalmatian and Apulian expeditions of Orseolo, the Norman wars of Domenico Selvo and Vitale Falier, not only gave the Venetians experience in the rapid armament of a fleet, but, as in the case of the battle of Durazzo, trained them in naval tactics, and inspired them with confidence in their resources.

The constitution also had been slowly growing and taking shape; though much still remained to be done before it assumed that rigid form which characterises it after the year 1296. It was still essentially a democratic constitution. Upon the invitation of the Doge the people assembled, either in the open air or in S. Mark's, to approve

a law, to confirm a nomination, to decide on peace or war. The popular voice was essential to the choice of a Doge, and long and tenaciously did the people claim their right. Not till after many struggles were they finally excluded from all participation in the election of the chief magistrate. 1100.

Besides the General Assembly we find the rudiments of two important members of the Venetian constitution already displayed—the *Consiglieri Ducali* or Privy Council, and the *Pregadi* or Senate, which had its origin in the invitation sent by the Doge to the more prominent citizens requesting their advice in important matters.

The position and powers of the Doge were also in process of formation. The Venetians learned that the two great dangers inherent in the Dukedom were the possibility that it might be converted into a tyranny, and the risk of its becoming hereditary. They took summary measures to prevent the former danger by deposing, blinding, or killing many of their earlier rulers. The latter danger was met by a direct law, forbidding the creation of a Doge Consort.

In no department of the constitution was the native independence of the State more clearly demonstrated than in the judicial system. While the mainland of Italy was subjected to the legal codes imposed by various foreign conquerors, Venice still retained the Roman law under which her refugee founders had always lived, as the basis of her jurisprudence. The courts consisted of the *Giudici del Comun*, who in public, before the Doge and the people, heard and decided cases, usually in the open air; and the Doge's representatives went on circuit for the administration of justice among the islands of the lagoon. Subsequently we find the institution of a Court of Appeal, called the *Magistrato del Proprio*; before this court came cases of intestacy, wardship, wills, probate, and all matters referring to the disposition of estates.

A document of the year 934 gives us a genuine and curious picture of the administration of justice at that time. It begins by setting out a case of disputed boundary between the Abbot Marino and the Bishop of Altino, that is,

of Torcello. The Abbot presented himself before the court, which was assembled in the public palace. There
1100. were present the Doge, surrounded by the leading men of the city, and many of the people. Marino stated his case, and complained of injury; the bystanders confirmed his statement. A warrant was then issued summoning the Bishop to appear. When both parties were before the court, each put in his proofs—his deeds, maps, etc. These were examined, and judgment given in favour of the Abbot.

This, so far as our scanty material permits us to understand it, was the condition of Venice at the close of the eleventh century. We find a people displaying all the marks of a free State; making wars on its own account; coining its own money; legislating for itself; young and vigorous in the midst of decrepitude; free in the midst of slavery; ready to take its place among the great forces of Europe which the Crusades were presently to call forth in action.

CHAPTER VI

Vitale Michiel, Doge—The Crusades—Venice chosen as the port of embarkation—The Doge recommends the Crusade to the Venetians—The resentment of the Eastern Emperor—He stirs the Pisans to attack the Venetians at Rhodes—Siege of Haifa—The body of S. Nicolò stolen and brought to Venice—A Venetian colony in Ferrara—*Ordelafo Falier*, Doge—The Venetians in Sidon—The need to keep the seas open brings Venice into collision with pirates—Line of communications weak—Attack by King of Hungary on Dalmatia—Defeat of Venice—Loss of Dalmatia—*Domenico Michiel*, Doge—Baldwin implores help from Venice: granted—The Venetian fleet begins to plunder Corfu, Chios, Lesbos, Rhodes—Defeat of the Saracens off Jaffa—Venetians in Acre—The terms they demanded for attacking Tyre—Siege of Tyre—Fall of Tyre—The Michiel bezants—The Venetian colony in Tyre: how governed—Brilliant results of this expedition—*Pietro Polani*, Doge—The Venetians protect Fano—And fight Padua for altering the course of the Brenta—First use of mercenaries—*Domenico Morosini*, Doge—The Normans—Battle of Maleo—Siege of Corfu—Venetians and Greeks quarrel—Treaty with the Normans—Frederick Barbarossa—The spirit of municipal freedom in North Italy—Frederick in Italy—*Vitale Michiel II.*, Doge—Diet of Roncaglia—Schism in the Church—Alexander III.—Venice compelled to join the Lombard League—The neighbours of Venice attack her—Venice seeks support from the Emperor Manuel—His seizure of all Venetian goods in Constantinople—Venice declares war—The exhaustion of the Venetian treasury—Taxation by *sestieri*—Issue of government stock—Disastrous expedition against Manuel—The Doge killed—Constitutional reforms—The *Maggior Consiglio*—The *Pregadi*—*Consiglieri Ducali*.

THE movement of the Crusades brings Venice to the very forefront of European history. Her previous development had been slowly preparing the way for her ^{1096.} emergence. The Council held at Clermont in 1095, resolved that the armament should leave Europe early in the following year. The Pope and the leaders of the Crusades were obliged to turn their attention to the question of

transport for the vast and amorphous mob, which, without discipline, with no distinction of ranks, with no discrimination between soldier and monk, between merchant and peasant, between master and man, was now bent on reaching the Holy Land, almost as eager to die there as to achieve the object of their mission, the recovery of the Sepulchre.

1096. The three maritime states of Italy—Genoa, Pisa, and Venice—were each ready to offer their services. Each was jealous of the other, and each determined to prevent the other from reaping any signal commercial advantage from the religious enthusiasm of Europe. Venice was not only the most powerful, but also the most eastern, of the three competitors. It was natural that the choice should fall on her. When the Pope's invitation to assist in the Crusade reached the city, however, it seems that the Government did not at once embrace the cause officially in the name of the whole Republic. There was, at first, a tendency to leave the business of transport to private enterprise. But on receipt of the news that Jerusalem had fallen, the Venetian Government began to take active steps in the matter. The Doge summoned the General Assembly, and laid the situation before the people. He recommended the official acceptance of the Crusade upon the grounds of religion and of commercial utility; he pointed out that Pisa and Genoa were already well established in the East, and that Venice could not afford to sit quietly by and see her rivals increasing their importance in the Levant.

The Crusade was accepted with enthusiasm. The whole city engaged in preparing a fleet which should be worthy of the Republic. Then, after a solemn mass in S. Mark's, at which the standard of the Cross and the standard of the Republic were presented to the leaders, the soldiers of the Cross embarked on the fleet, which numbered two hundred ships, and set sail down the Adriatic, making for Rhodes, where they were to winter.

At Rhodes two incidents of great significance in Venetian history took place. The Eastern Emperors had never viewed with favour the incursions of the Crusaders. The creation of

the kingdom of Jerusalem was really a usurpation of Imperial territory. Alexius I. now endeavoured to persuade the Venetians to withdraw from the enterprise. In 1096. this he failed; Venice remained true to the Cross, and to her commercial interests. It is at this point that we find the beginnings of that divergence between Constantinople and the Republic, which eventually declared itself in open hostility, and led up to the sack of Constantinople in the fourth Crusade. Alexius, finding that the Venetians were not inclined to obey him, resolved to punish them. An instrument was ready to his hand. The Pisans saw with disfavour the advent of their commercial rivals in Eastern waters. They were willing to hoist the Imperial standard as opposed to the crusading Cross, and to sail down upon the Venetians at Rhodes. They were defeated. The Venetians released all the prisoners except thirty of the more prominent among them, who were detained as hostages. The first fruits of the Crusade, as far as Venice was concerned, were the creation of two powerful enemies, the Emperor and the Pisans.

The Venetians reached Jaffa in spring; and the siege of the fortified city of Haifa, at the foot of Mount Carmel, was assigned to them. They attacked the city with large catapults, from which they hurled stones; they built a lofty tower whose summit was on a level with the top of the city walls, so that the men on the tower and the men on the walls were able to fight hand to hand. Tancred attacked the city from the other side, and in short time Haifa fell. The Venetians returned home. They seem to have been satisfied with the result of their expedition, perhaps because they were able to show to their fellow-citizens the body of San Nicolò, which they had stolen on their way to Jaffa. But as a matter of fact the Venetians' share in the first Crusade was neither glorious nor profitable; and their satisfaction at having obtained the body of San Nicolò has merely a symbolical significance. Patron of sailors, the possession of his body seemed to promise the Republic a sure superiority over her rivals on the sea. This sentiment found expression in the exclamation of delight with which the relics were welcomed—"O happy people of Venice! Ye who

have the lion of Mark, the Evangelist, to give you victory in battle, and who now possess the high-priest of sailors, the Saint who lays the raging of the sea.”

1100.

The movement of expansion in the East, which was prompted by the Crusade, found a counterpart on the mainland of Italy, where the influence of the growing Republic took its first step forwards. Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, with the help of Venice and Ravenna, succeeded in recovering Ferrara for the Church. In return for this aid the Republic was allowed to establish a consulate in that city; and gradually a colony of Venetian merchants, whose houses and shops clustered round the church of S. Mark, sprang up and absorbed the commerce of the Ferrarese, as Venetians were apt to do wherever they went.

But this movement of expansion brought with it its own difficulties and drawbacks. The reign of the

1102.

next Doge, Ordelafo Falier, revealed one of the serious dangers to which the Republic exposed itself by taking part in the Crusades. Two years after the accession of Falier, the Venetians, on the invitation of Baldwin, King of Jerusalem, sent a fleet of one hundred ships to his assistance. The city of Sidon fell, and the Venetians received as a recompense for their aid, a church, a street, a market-place, the right to use their own weights and measures, as well as jurisdiction over their own subjects in Sidon; in fact, the nucleus of a colony of merchants living under special treaty capitulations. And this concession of Baldwin served as a type of the many privileges which the Venetians subsequently acquired in the Levant. The establishment of this and other colonies, entailed upon the Venetians the necessity of keeping open their connections between the mother city and its offshoots. This imposed on them the task of clearing the pirates from the sea—an operation as useful to themselves as it was to the Crusaders. But the claims of the colony and of distant service in the Holy Land laid bare the weak point in the line of communication between Venice and the Levant. During the nine years from 1096

1105.

to 1105, Venice had placed upon the sea three hundred ships of war. This could not be done without

exhausting her resources ; and there was an enemy ready at hand to take advantage of her weakness. The sea-shore cities of Dalmatia had always been an object of ^{1105.} desire to the kings of Hungary. At the same time the possession of them was absolutely essential to the Republic, not merely as sources of food, of wood, and of tribute, but also as a guarantee for the free passage of the Adriatic. Caloman, King of Hungary, saw his opportunity now, and determined to profit by the weakened condition of Venice. In violation of previous treaties he made a descent on the Dalmatian coast, and became master of many of its towns. At the moment the Venetians were powerless to retaliate ; their fleet was absent ; and even if it could have been recalled, that would have left an open field for the Pisans and the Genoese to pursue their commercial advancement in the Levant. Operations for the reduction of Dalmatia were postponed till 1116, when the Doge succeeded ^{1116.} in recovering the allegiance of Zara, Trau, Sebenico. But the success was merely temporary ; no sooner had he returned to Venice than the Hungarians again descended upon the coast-line. The Doge was obliged to set out once more. He gave battle to the Hungarians at Zara, and, in ^{1118.} spite of his personal valour, he was defeated and killed. The rout of the Venetians was complete.

The defeat of Falier at Zara was so crushing that the new Doge, Domenico Michiel, abandoned all thought of reprisals. He concluded a truce of five years with King Stephen II. of Hungary. No doubt one reason for this conduct is to be found in the affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Baldwin II., in his straits, had sent both to the Pope and to the Republic, imploring aid. The Pope urged Venice to grant Baldwin's request. The General Assembly was convoked in S. Mark's ; the Doge, the Patriarch, the Bishops, clergy, and the whole population, were present at the solemn mass which opened the proceedings. After mass the Patriarch read aloud the Pope's letter. The Doge then warmly advocated the cause of the Crusade. Under the guise of a religious enthusiasm he did not fail to indicate the material advantages which would be derived from the

expedition. There was an opposition, however, in the assembly. A strong party insisted that the Venetians should not forget the lesson taught them by the loss of Dalmatia, which was entirely due to the strain on the resources of the Republic, caused by the despatch of such large armaments to the East, and by the defenceless condition in which Venice and the Adriatic were thereby left. As an additional argument against the expedition, they pointed to the hostility of the new Emperor, John Comnene, who had already declined to renew the ancient trading concessions. The Doge's proposal was carried, however, and the fleet prepared. It consisted of seventy-two sail, and a contemporary describes the splendid spectacle which it presented: the beaked vessels of great size, larger than galleys, rowed by a hundred oarsmen each; they, and all the fleet, painted in brilliant colours that caught the sunlight—*splendore ameno prospectantes*.

As on former occasions, so now, the expedition began by plundering. The Venetians were aware of the hostility of the Imperial Court; they knew that at Constantinople they were hated. They determined to treat all Greek possessions as fair prey. At Corfu, where they wintered, the city was dealt with as though it belonged to a foe. They sailed in spring for Chios, Lesbos, and Rhodes, sacking the towns at which they touched. They moved on to Jaffa, and there had news that the Saracen fleet was putting out to sea from Egypt. The Doge determined to give battle. He had full confidence in the strength of his armament and in the courage of his men. He adopted a ruse. The fleet was divided into two portions; the larger remained out of sight, upon the open sea, the smaller pushed forward to feel for the enemy. The Saracens were discovered; and the Venetians, feigning terror, drew off, gradually luring the foe out into the open. All through the night the manœuvre was continued, the Saracens pursuing, the Venetians yielding ground, till suddenly, at dawn, the pagans found themselves face to face with the whole mass of the Venetian fleet. The Doge himself gave the attack at once, and with such violence that he all but sank the enemy's flag-ship. The Venetian victory could

not have been more complete; many of the Saracens' ships were burned, and, laden with booty, the Venetians sailed into Acre, where the Doge presently received the congratulations of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and whence, in company with many barons of the Christian host, he went to Jerusalem to discharge a vow made before leaving Venice. 1118.

The Crusaders referred the question of subsequent military operations to a council of war. Opinions were divided. The people of Damascus and Jerusalem desired to attack Ascalon; those of the seaboard urged the reduction of Tyre. The dispute became heated, and was only resolved by an appeal to chance. In an urn, placed upon an altar, lay two slips of paper, one bearing the name of Tyre, the other the word Ascalon. A child put his hand into the urn and drew out the paper with the name of Tyre. The attack was to be made on that city. But nothing could be done without the assistance of the Venetian fleet. The Venetians were absolute masters of the situation; they knew it, and proceeded to turn the circumstances to their own account. In Acre, in the church of the Holy Cross, 1123. the Patriarch and the barons of Jerusalem took a solemn oath that throughout their kingdom the Venetians should enjoy a free quarter, a market, a bath, and a bakery; that the Doge's subjects should be exempt from taxation, and should use their own weights and measures; that they should be under the jurisdiction of their own magistrates; that the property of a Venetian dying intestate should be committed to the tutelage of Venetians. The King of Jerusalem and the barons pledged themselves to pay a yearly tribute of three hundred bezants; they confirmed the concessions granted to the Doge Falier; and, finally, they promised that, if Tyre and Ascalon fell into the hands of the Franks, the Venetians should receive a third part of each of those cities.

These capitulations implied a most important gain for the commerce of Venice; but their value depended entirely upon the stability of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and that kingdom was doomed to extinction after a brief and precarious existence. The nature of the concessions, however, shows the

power of Venice, and displays her real object in undertaking the Crusades; that was the extension of her commercial relations in the Levant.

1123.

When these terms had been concluded the siege of Tyre began at once. The Venetians blockaded the port; the Crusaders drew lines round the city on the land side. The assailing towers were built to the level of the wall-top; the catapults and engines placed in position. But the siege proved a long operation. The people of Ascalon had time to prepare, and to attempt, a diversion in favour of Tyre by making a sudden assault on Jerusalem, which had been left almost ungarrisoned; the movement was not successful. Meantime in the besiegers' camp signs of discord were not wanting. The Venetians, partly owing to their growing importance, partly on account of their undisguised policy of commercial aggrandisement, roused the suspicion and dislike of their allies. It was rumoured in the camp that the Doge would withdraw if the siege were protracted. Michiel realised the danger of allowing such a belief to take root; the prizes awaiting him in Tyre and Ascalon were too valuable to be jeopardised by tolerating such a misconception. He took a striking and picturesque method of silencing the slanderers. By his orders the sails, masts, and rudders of the Venetian ships were carried to the French camp, and solemnly deposited there, as proof positive that the Venetians did not intend to abandon their allies.

Tyre was unable to hold out against the long blockade. It surrendered on honourable terms. The flags of Jerusalem, Tripoli, and S. Mark were hoisted on the walls, and the division of the city according to agreement took place. The Venetians at once proceeded to settle their newly acquired possessions. They built three churches, dedicated to S. Mark, to S. James, and to S. Nicolas. The safety of the quarter was entrusted to a viscount, the administration of justice to a bailie (*bailo*). The officials of the kingdom of Jerusalem were bound by oath to assist the viscount and the bailie; and the inhabitants of the Venetian quarter took an oath of allegiance to the Doge.

One remarkable episode of the siege of Tyre, though

related by many Venetian chroniclers, is not to be found in the most accredited; probably, however, the legend condenses a fact. It is said that the Doge, finding his money running short, caused bits of leather to be issued, promising that they should be cashed for coin on the return of the expedition to Venice. In memory of this event the Michiel family to this day bear bezants on their shield.

The event was, indeed, one of the highest moment in the history of the Republic, because here, at the siege and capture of Tyre, we reach the beginning of that greater Venice, that large commercial empire which was destined to spring from the first small gathering of fishermen's huts, huddled together upon the inhospitable mud-banks of the lagoon. For the Venetian quarter in Tyre was an integral part of Venice, as no other Venetian settlement had hitherto been. At Constantinople the Venetians possessed a district of their own in the city; but they were under Imperial jurisdiction, and there could be no pretence of absolute independence in the very capital of the Empire. At Tyre, however, the Venetian quarter was independent of the kingdom of Jerusalem, which in its turn owed no allegiance to the Empire, and this was a fact which the Emperors of the East did not forget in their subsequent dealings with the Republic.

But though Venice had gained enormously by this expedition to the East, the warning of those who, in the basilica of S. Mark, had opposed the Doge's policy was now to be verified. Stephen II. of Hungary, in the absence of the Doge, had seized the coast towns of Dalmatia, and the Greek Emperor continued to harass the Venetians in Constantinople. Michiel with his victorious fleet sailed as soon as possible for the Adriatic. He recovered the Dalmatian towns, and then, by way of reprisals against John Comnene, he laid siege to Cephalonia. This brought the Emperor to terms, and a lame treaty of peace was concluded, by which the Venetians, nominally at least, reacquired all their privileges in the East.

The Doge returned in triumph to Venice, bringing with him for all Venetians a sense of the power and importance

of the Republic, such as they had never before known, a wealth of oriental spoils, and of no less valuable sacred relics, such as had never yet been unladen along the Riva degli Schiavoni. By the operations in the Levant, the growing Republic achieved a second movement of expansion, no less important than that which signalled the reign of Pietro Orseolo II. The civilizing results of this prosperity are shown in the ameliorated conditions of life in the city; the Doge closed the eleven brilliant years of his reign by a pious and a useful provision. At all the street corners little tabernacles, such as exist to-day, were placed against the walls. During the day the saint protected the passers-by, and received their offerings in a little wooden box; at night the lamp, which was lighted in his honour, served as a safeguard against robbery and murder. These shrines, which in the history of Venice must ever be associated with the siege and capture of Tyre, were entrusted to the care of the *capi contrada*, the heads of the various quarters—a body of men elected by the inhabitants, recognised by the Government, and held responsible for the good order of their respective districts.

Domenico Michiel retired to the convent of S. Giorgio Maggiore, and was succeeded by Pietro Polani. Venice found herself exhausted by the long wars in the East and in Dalmatia. She had made a show of naval resources and power such as no other State at that time could have displayed. These efforts had been richly productive. She had added to her sphere of commercial operations a whole region in the Levant. She had planted colonies, though they were still young and required nursing. The State was in need of a breathing space to recruit her powers and to absorb her gains. Pietro Polani's long Dogeship of eighteen years was favourable for this purpose. Venice enjoyed a period of repose, for which she was indebted to the many dangers which were menacing all those powers which might have proved hostile to her. The affairs of Italy were in confusion between Lothair of Saxony and Conrad of Hohenstaufen, between Innocent II. and Anacletus I. The country was torn by civil wars. The misery of all the

mainland cities must have made every Venetian feel a deep debt of gratitude to the lagoons which kept his island home free, quiet, and prosperous, and entirely separated from the destructive turmoil of the continent. The Eastern Emperor, on the other hand, though he had not forgiven the Venetians for their violation of his dominion, was compelled, in face of the growing power of Roger, King of Sicily, to treat the Republic with respect, as it was highly probable that he would require Venetian aid against the Normans. 1130.

Two events, slight in themselves but symptomatic in the history of the Republic, marked the reign of Pietro Polani. The first demonstrates the reputation which Venice had acquired at the siege of Tyre, and illustrates the way in which she turned every circumstance to her own profit, and to the establishment of herself as arbiter of the Adriatic. The people of Fano were molested by their neighbours of Ravenna, Pesaro, and Sinigallia. They appealed to the Doge for assistance. The Venetians exacted terms which were embodied in the first treaty which the Republic made with an Italian city. The Venetians were to enjoy absolute freedom in Fano, to be considered as citizens of that city; suits by a Venetian against a Fanese were to be heard before the representative of Venice. Fano promised a tribute, which was dedicated to the illumination of S. Mark's, and bound itself to assist Venice if she were at war in the Adriatic. The Fanesi, further, declared themselves subject allies of the Republic in everything which did not traverse their feudal obligations to the Empire. In return Venice granted reciprocal rights of trading in their city, and pledged herself to protect Fano if attacked.

The second point of interest in the reign of Polani was another little war, not on sea but on the mainland against the Paduans, who had cut the banks of the Brenta, and thereby sent down a dangerous discharge of soil into the lagoons at Fusina. The Venetians were fully alive to the fact that their very existence depended upon the integrity of the lagoons; their own history had demonstrated this to them

over and over again; they were prepared, and rightly, to make any tampering with the water system of the 1143. estuary a *casus belli*. But the Venetians were a sea folk; they had never before been called upon to undertake a land war. One of their own historians has summed up the situation in these words: "This was the first land war which Venice undertook; and as the Venetians were not accustomed to this mode of campaign they were compelled to make use of foreign captains. What was imposed by necessity at first was continued through policy; for a military leader is naturally surrounded by a brilliant staff and a large suite; and this would have induced a citizen-general to exceed those limits which, for the conservation of liberty, must be preserved in a republic." Whether Venice was as self-conscious as Paolo Morosini depicts her may be doubted. She was driven on this occasion to make use of mercenaries, because they were the lesser of two evils. But we shall have occasion to show that they were usually a source of weakness, and often a cause of alarm, to the Republic. The Paduan war was of short duration. One battle sufficed to compel the mainlanders to come to terms, and to remedy the damage they had done.

Other events were in preparation which were destined to draw Venice once more into the circle of Eastern 1148. politics, and to embark her anew upon a great naval campaign. The growing power of the Normans under Roger II. was a constant threat to the Emperor Manuel. The jealousy which Venice naturally felt for so powerful a naval rival, threw the Republic and the Emperor again together, though the alliance was not cordial. Manuel agreed to confirm and enlarge the ancient privileges of the Venetians in Constantinople, while the Republic in return placed a large fleet upon the sea and joined the Greek squadron against the Normans. A battle was fought at Maleo, where, in spite of desertion by their Greek allies, the Venetians defeated Roger's fleet and captured forty ships. They then took part in the siege of Corfu, though the Venetian feeling against the Greeks ran so high that it was found necessary

to place the two forces in separate cantonments. But the precaution was useless; the men could not meet without fighting, and matters reached such a pitch ^{1148.} that the armies eventually engaged in open battle. Axouchos, the commander of the Greeks, was obliged to charge the Venetians, and drove them to take refuge in their ships. They at once set sail to attack a detachment of Greek ships lying between Cephalonia and Ithaca. They captured the Imperial galley, dressed a negro slave in the Imperial ensigns, placed him under a canopy, and paraded him before the Greek camp at Corfu, making mock obeisance to him in scorn and insult. Corfu fell at last; but the Doge took the first opportunity for retiring. He made terms with the Normans, by which all Venetian territory north of Ragusa was guaranteed immunity from Norman incursions, thereby securing still further the position of Venice in the Adriatic.

The episode of the Norman war ended here for the present. But the Emperor Manuel did not forget the insult he had received in the person of the negro slave, nor did he lay aside his hostility. He was presently enabled to satisfy his desire for revenge, and thereby brought Venice for the first time into an open and declared rupture with the Eastern Empire. Such an issue had become inevitable, from the moment when the Venetians allied themselves with the western races in the Crusades. That alliance implied a policy which was hostile to the Eastern Empire, for it was animated by a spirit of commercial aggrandisement at the expense of the decaying Empire, from whose disintegration Venice thought to draw profit. But, in the meantime, the important events which were taking place on the mainland of Italy, now called the attention of every Italian State to the danger which threatened their liberties from the ambitious policy of the new Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa. Even Venice, separated and isolated as she was, could not escape being drawn into the current of Italian politics for a time, though her action proves once again how much more vital was her connection with the Eastern Empire than with Italy.

When Frederick Barbarossa came to the throne and

turned his attention to the affairs of his Italian Kingdom, he

1148. found a strong spirit of municipal independence hostile to the Empire swaying the northern towns of the peninsula. The slow break-up of the old Roman Empire released the desire for individual freedom in each commune, which the new Empire, founded by Charles the Great, had never been strong enough to crush. We have seen this spirit manifesting itself in the formation of Venice; but there, thanks to the isolation of the lagoons, it was comparatively unhampered. The Republic was able to pursue her own course undisturbed by extraneous pressure, and therefore she succeeded in developing a constitution which, being in its final form the expression of the whole national will, was not liable to attack from inside. The mainland cities were not so fortunate. They were inspired by the same desire for freedom as animated Venice, but they were constantly subject to the oppressive interruption of the stranger. They suffered under the yoke of foreign codes and of the feudal system, with its arbitrary cleavage of the State into castes. But in spite of all Imperial efforts to mould them, the North Italian towns retained their individuality and their resolution to be virtually free. During the long struggle about the question of investitures, when the Empire was especially weak, this spirit had been carefully encouraged by the Church as a valuable weapon against the Emperor. It was this spirit of independence which Frederick Barbarossa resolved to crush. The quarrels of Milan, the most powerful champion of liberty, with its neighbours of Lodi, Como, and other cities, gave the Emperor his opportunity. He came into Italy on purpose to chastise the

1154. Milanese. He summoned the North Italians to meet him at Roncaglia, near Piacenza, and Venice sent her representative with a view to obtaining the renewal of the diplomas she had been in the habit of receiving from the masters of Italy. The Emperor found that he had underrated the strength of the Lombard communities. He

1155. proceeded to Rome for his coronation, and then retired into Germany to raise a fresh and more powerful army.

A new Doge, Vitale Michiel II., was called upon to guide

the Republic through the dangers which were closing round the young and growing State. In the year 1158 Frederick was again in Italy, and Milan was obliged ^{1158.} to make submission. The Emperor thought to settle the affairs of North Italy by a diet at Roncaglia. When it was found, however, that the cities would no longer be allowed to elect their own consuls, every one of them instantly became hostile to Frederick once more. An opportunity for displaying this hostility soon offered itself. In the year 1159 the papal throne fell vacant. The Imperialists elected Pope Victor IV.; the Guelf party, the party of the Church and the communes as against the Empire, elected Alexander III. Victor was certainly an antipope; moreover, he was the nominee of Frederick, who was menacing Italian liberty. There could be no doubt which side the cities of North Italy would take. They all declared for Alexander. Venice found that she could not stand aloof. She was alarmed at the masterful designs of the Emperor, and threw in her lot with the other cities of Lombardy. Frederick instantly retaliated. He knew where he could strike the Republic with effect. Padua, Verona, and Ferrara were too glad of an opportunity to injure their powerful and haughty neighbour of the lagoons, whose position had been so greatly strengthened by the siege and fall of Tyre. The Emperor could count on their support. So serious was the attack that one lagoon township, Cavarzere, was actually seized and held in the Emperor's name. Again, to the north-east the Patriarch of Aquileia served as another weapon by which Frederick could wound the Republic. The Patriarch Ulric, encouraged by the Emperor, attacked Grado, and expelled the Patriarch Dandolo. But Venice, in the interests of her own independent development, could not allow the lagoon Patriarchate to be crushed by its mainland neighbour. The Doge manned a fleet, and in his turn attacked, defeated, and captured the Patriarch of Aquileia, who was brought a prisoner to Venice; nor did he recover his liberty until he had pledged himself and his successors to send a yearly tribute of twelve pigs, in scornful allusion to the number of his cathedral chapter, as a sign of submission to the Doge.

But, this success notwithstanding, Venice was still threatened by the open hostility of Frederick. 1158. There was no doubt that he would attack her on the first opportunity. The reappearance of a powerful Emperor on the mainland of Italy, a sight which had not disturbed the Venetians for many years, produced a return to the ancient policy of the Republic in similar circumstances. The Venetians endeavoured to take advantage of their theoretical and nominal dependence on the Eastern Empire; they appealed to Manuel for assistance, and attempted, in addition, to form a defensive alliance with the Normans of Sicily, both of whom viewed the progress of Frederick with jealousy. But the Emperor of Constantinople was so much occupied with his campaigns on his northern frontier as to be almost powerless in the West; and, moreover, he was still hostile to Venice, while the Normans were never friendly towards their maritime rivals in the Adriatic. The Republic therefore, by the force of circumstances, was obliged in self-defence to enter into league with the towns of North Italy. Venice had already been a member of other combinations hostile to Frederick; but now, on 1st December 1167, she joined the great confederation which included almost all the Lombard cities. Being unable to 1167. contribute a land force, she pledged herself to put her fleet at the disposal of the league; she also bound herself to share any subsidies which she might receive from Constantinople; to engage in no war on her own account; to conclude no peace without the consent of her allies.

But just at this moment, when Venice was becoming absorbed in the politics of North Italy, her attention was suddenly claimed by the action of Manuel, the Emperor of the East. Manuel had never forgotten the insult offered by the Venetian sailors at Corfu, nor the subsequent refusal of the Republic to assist him against the Normans, with whom the Venetians had formed an alliance very distasteful to the Greeks. The Venetians were thoroughly unpopular in Constantinople, it is said on account of their haughtiness, more probably because they were gradually absorbing all the wealth and commerce of the city. Their

numbers were very great ; as many as 200,000 are said to have lived in the Venetian quarter. They owned land outside the city, and they frequently married into the great Greek families. They proved quarrelsome neighbours, however, and we constantly hear of faction fights between the Venetian and the Lombard residents. It was not difficult for Manuel to make their turbulence an excuse, when he wished to annoy them. His whole attitude had been hostile to Venice. He paid no attention to Venetian appeals for aid against Frederick ; and the Venetians of Constantinople were not without their suspicions that the Emperor meditated some treachery. Two of their number sought an audience and said to Manuel, " We have heard, though we do not believe it, that you intend much ill to the Venetians." Manuel reassured them, and even published an edict ordering any one who insulted a Venetian to be hanged. But he continued to mass troops in the city, till suddenly, on the 7th March, 1171, all Venetians in the Empire were arrested, and their property seized and confiscated. When the news reached Venice the popular fury broke out in cries of " War! war!" It was impossible to stem the tide of indignation, and the Government was forced to prepare for a great naval campaign against the Eastern Empire, their ancient suzerain. All considerations of their duty to the Lombard League, of their solemn oath not to embark on any other war, were thrown to the winds in their rage at seeing their commercial possessions in the East jeopardised by the hostility and treachery of Manuel.

The armament required was a large one, and the strain upon the resources of the Republic, which had lately manned so many fleets, brought to light the fact that the treasury was exhausted. Signs of financial embarrassment had not been wanting. As far back as 1164 the Government had found itself compelled to borrow money from some of its wealthier citizens. It amortised the debt by surrendering the revenues of the market at Rialto for sixteen years. But now, in view of the war with Manuel, the Republic was obliged to exact a forced loan from all her inhabitants. For this purpose the city was divided, for the first time, into six

districts, or *sestieri*, which still exist—Castello, San Marco, Cannaregio, Santa Croce, San Polo, Dorsoduro. The
1171. population was taxed at the rate of one per cent on the net income. To assess this tax commissioners were appointed to examine the incomes of all Venetians. This inquisition, always odious, was especially unpopular with the merchant class. But the city had cried "War! war!" and they were obliged to submit. The money raised by this forced loan bore interest at the rate of four per cent per annum, payable half-yearly; and in order to carry out the operation with regularity, a chamber of loans was instituted. The bonds were issued by the chamber; the security was the whole revenue of the Republic. The bonds could be bequeathed, mortgaged, or sold; and so we find in this forced loan the earliest instance of government stock, certainly in the history of Venice, perhaps in the history of Europe.

Besides raising money, the Government was also compelled to face the difficulty of finding men for the fleet. All Venetians were recalled from abroad. They were expected though not compelled to serve. The Republic drew her sailors from three sources, and apparently at this time all were volunteers, though later on the oarsmen in the great galleys were partly supplied by condemned criminals. The *ordinary* source was the population of Venice itself; the *subsidiary* source was the allied or tributary lands; the *extraordinary* source was the foreign ports where Venetians traded, and where they could raise mercenaries by the promise of large pay and the prospect of unlimited booty.

Thanks to these vigorous measures, the Doge was able, in 100 days, to man a fleet of 120 sail. In September of 1171, with the usual ceremony of the blessing of the banner, Vitale Michiel sailed away southward to attack the Empire of the East. At Chalcis, in Eubœa, ambassadors from Manuel arrived; they declared that the Emperor had no desire for war; rather he invited the Venetians to send their representatives to Constantinople where they might treat of peace. The Venetians fell into the trap. Ambassadors,

among them Enrico Dandolo, were despatched ; they wasted their time fruitlessly in the capital, while the fleet retired to winter quarters in Chioa. There, in ^{1171.} idleness, discipline became relaxed ; the crowded ships grew filthy and unhealthy ; plague broke out, more probably the result of dirt than of poison ; thousands died. At length the Venetians could endure no more. The crews mutinied, and set sail for Venice. So complete was the collapse of the Venetian armament, so sweeping the mortality, that, as legend declares, the whole Giustiniani family, with one exception, perished ; it was only restored by the efforts of the sole survivor, a young monk, Nicol Giustinian, whom the Pope absolved from his vows. He married the Doge's daughter, renewed his race, and retired once more to his convent on the Lido. The disaster was complete. The shattered remnants of this splendid Venetian armament, created by generous sacrifices and bearing the hopes of the Republic, returned to the Lido in the spring of 1172. Instead of booty, it brought the plague ; in place of victory, death. The Doge, with magnificent courage, summoned the General Assembly, and sought to exculpate himself. But the rage and mortification of the people rendered them deaf ; they only saw before them the man responsible for this crushing defeat ; the Doge divined that he was lost ; he endeavoured to fly, was overtaken, struck down, and killed near the church of San Zaccaria.

The position of Venice was now very grave. Enemies surrounded her ; she had no allies. In Italy she was openly at war with the Emperor Frederick, and she still remained a member of the Lombard League. In the East she had just been thrown back, not by the arms but by the diplomacy of her bitter enemy, Manuel. At home she was a prey to anarchy and revolution, which had ended in the murder of the Doge.

Alarm at this situation caused the Venetians to examine the working of their constitution. Rightly or wrongly, they seemed to have considered that the fault lay there. And so the defeat of Vitale Michiel led up to the most serious constitutional reforms that we have met with

as yet in the course of Venetian history. These reforms indicate the lines upon which the constitution of the Republic was about to stereotype itself; and in them we find the germ of that particular construction which the Venetian oligarchy eventually displayed.

Hitherto the political machinery of the Republic had consisted of a Doge, elected in the General Assembly of all Venetian people, with two councillors to assist him, and with power to invite assistance from other prominent citizens if he saw fit. With the Doge lay the right to convoke this General Assembly, whose voice was necessary, however, in such important matters as the election of the supreme magistrate, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace.

It appeared now to the Venetians, in considering their constitution, that reforms were necessary for two reasons: first, because the position of the Doge was too independent, thanks to his discretionary powers in summoning the General Assembly, and in inviting the advice of prominent citizens, and also because the two ducal councillors had never succeeded in acquiring any real weight in the management of affairs; secondly, the constitution required revision, because the people were too free and unruly when they met in the General Assembly. Owing to the rapid growth of the population and the consequent enlargement of that body, it was impossible to say what rash resolution might not be adopted. This danger had just been demonstrated by the recklessness which hurried the Republic into a war with the Emperor of the East. It seemed, therefore, that some middle term was desirable, and that reform must proceed upon the following lines: the construction of a deliberative assembly, which entailed as a corollary, the determination of the exact place in the constitution to be occupied by the mass of the people; and the definition and limitation of the Doge's authority. The evolution of these two ideas forms the problem of Venetian constitutional history for the next 124 years, till the solution arrived at became stereotyped by the closing of the Great Council in the year 1296.

An interregnum of six months between the murder of

Vitale Michiel and the election of his successor Ziani produced the following reforms:—

(1) With a view to creating an efficient de-^{1171.} liberative assembly, each *sestiere* was ordered to elect two representatives; these six groups of deputies each nominated forty members, from among the more prominent inhabitants of their respective *sestiere*; thus an assembly of 480 members was created. They held office for one year; at the end of that period the assembly itself named the two new electors for each *sestiere*. The functions of this assembly were to appoint the officials of the Republic, which was done by vote, and to prepare all matter which had to be submitted to the General Assembly of the whole population. Here then we find the germ of the *Maggior Consiglio*, the Great Council, the basis of the Venetian oligarchical constitution. It had its original in the necessity for limiting the electorate in a rapidly growing State. Its prime function of appointing to office was given to it from the very first. In its source it was a democratic body; it was the result of an election by the whole population as represented by their twelve deputies, and may be said, therefore, to have expressed the will of the people. But it already contained the element of a close oligarchy in the provision whereby the assembly itself named all subsequent twelve electors.

(2) The next step was to strengthen the *Pregadi*, the *invited*, who hitherto had assisted the Doge when he chose to request their advice, though nothing was done to make this body permanent till the reforms under Tiepolo between the years 1229 and 1249.

(3) The most important step taken, at present, in the direction of curbing the Doge's authority, was the creation of four more ducal councillors, raising the whole number to six. Their duty was to check the Doge in any attempt at personal aggrandisement; above all they were to see that he did not introduce into treaties with foreign powers any clause which secured special commercial advantages for himself or his family.

(4) The compensations offered to the Doge for these

restrictions, indicate, even thus early, the lines which the Venetians intended to follow in their treatment ^{1171.} of the Dukedom. The ceremony surrounding the Doge was increased; a guard of honour accompanied him when he went out; at his election he was carried in a chair of state round the Piazza.

In fact, these reforms of the year 1172 breathe the very spirit of the Venetian constitution. It was intended to extrude the people from their ancient rights; to render the Council a close body, an oligarchy; to reduce the Doge to a mere figure-head in the State. The intention is clearly marked; and Venetian Constitutional history turns upon the way in which that programme was carried out.

But the people were not disfranchised at a single blow. We have seen that part of the duties of the new Council of 480 was to prepare matter for submission to the General Assembly, and one of the popular rights was a voice in the election of the Doge. When the Republic proceeded to the choice of a chief magistrate in the place of the murdered Doge Michiel, an attempt was at once made to deprive the people of this right. The Council appointed eleven electors to nominate the new Doge and to present him to the people, not for election but for confirmation. When the eleven appeared before the General Assembly, however, they were met by outcries against the tyrants who were usurping the people's rights. The eleven were in serious danger of their lives, and quiet was only restored by the adoption of a formula—"This is your Doge, an it please you,"—which seemed to preserve to the people their voice in the election.

Thus the young oligarchy took its first step towards one of its objects, the extrusion of the people. The right of election was really lost, though the ghost of it still remained to trouble the State for more than a hundred years.

CHAPTER VII

Sebastian Ziani, Doge—Financial distress—Venice suspends payment—Ambassadors sent to Manuel—*Enrico Dandolo*, his blindness—Affairs of the Lombard League—Meeting between Frederick and Alexander proposed—Venice suggested—The Congress of Venice—Venice makes special terms—The *Sposalizio del Mar*—Aquileia and Grado settled—Venetian gain from the Congress—Growth of the city—Loggia of the Palace—Columns of the Piazzetta—Ponte di Rialto—Ziani's political testament—*Orio Malipiero*, Doge—Venetian relations with Constantinople—Death of Manuel—Usurpation and atrocities of Andronicus—Isaac Comnene, Emperor—His friendly relations with Venice—Betrothal of Henry of Hohenstaufen to Constance of Sicily—Consequences for Venice—Treaty between Isaac and Venice—Siege of Zara—Third Crusade unprofitable for Venice—The *Quarantia*, supreme court of Venice—*Magistrato del Proprio*—*Del Forestier*—*Avogadori di Comun*—*Enrico Dandolo*, Doge—His character and views—Genoa and Pisa—The fourth Crusade—Venice contracts for the transport of Crusaders—Ambassadors from the Crusaders in Venice—Assembly in S. Mark's—Innocent confirms the contract—The destination of the Crusade—Venice fulfils her contract—The Crusaders not ready to sail—The Doge proposes to attack Zara—Arrival of Pietro Capuano—The Venetians take the Cross—The sailing of the fleet—Siege of Zara: it falls—Second diversion of the fourth Crusade—Causes of this diversion—The agreement of Philip, Boniface, and Dandolo—The Venetian terms in the Convention of Zara—The fleet sails to Constantinople—Siege of the city—Dandolo's bravery—The flag of S. Mark on the walls—Panic of Alexius the elder—Isaac replaced on the throne—The Crusaders demand fulfilment of the Zara convention—The revolution of Ducas—An attack on Constantinople designed—Partition Treaty—Capture and sack of the city—Division of the spoil—The result to Venice.

THE choice of the eleven electors fell upon Sebastian Ziani. The new Doge's attention was almost immediately called to the question of finance. The expense ^{1172.} of the armament which had met with such disastrous fortunes, and the large subsidies paid towards the funds of

the Lombard League, had so exhausted the exchequer that money was not forthcoming to meet the interest ^{1172.} due to the State bonds. In these circumstances the Doge, by the advice of the Pregadi, proposed and carried the suspension of payment on the national debt until the State should be in a sounder financial condition.

The State was virtually bankrupt; but as all its creditors were Venetians, the appeal made to their patriotism was not made in vain. These financial difficulties, however, obliged the State to abandon all thought of further war with Manuel, and compelled Venice to sue humbly for terms of peace, and an indemnity, if possible, for loss suffered by expulsion from Constantinople.

The first ambassadors, Enrico Dandolo and Filippo Greco, had already left Venice before Ziani was elected. They experienced anything but a kindly reception from Manuel, and one widely-accepted story says that Dandolo was blinded, or partially blinded, by order of the Emperor. Another account represents Dandolo as escaping in time to save his eyes. On the whole, it would not appear that Dandolo was stone blind, but rather defective of vision, as his descendant, Andrea Dandolo, describes him *visu aliquantulum obtenebratus*. Such a theory comports better with his conduct during the siege of Constantinople, his leaping from his ship and his scaling the walls, than does the supposition of his total blindness. However that may be, Dandolo's mission failed. But he brought back with him from the East two things which proved of great moment subsequently—a knowledge of Constantinople, and a deep hatred for its rulers. Later missions likewise came to nothing, and Venice was compelled to seek alliances elsewhere. In the year 1175 she concluded a treaty with William of Sicily, whereby Venetian supremacy in the Adriatic north of Ragusa was recognised.

But while matters were in this unsatisfactory position in the East, the affairs of Italy and the conduct of the ^{1176.} Emperor Frederick Barbarossa again claimed all the attention of the Republic. We have seen that Venice was drawn away from co-operation with the Lombard League by her struggle with Manuel in the East. She took no share in

the battle of Legnano (19th May), which forced the Emperor to abandon his schemes for subduing the Lombard communes, and compelled him to come to terms both ^{1176.} with the League and with the Pope. For this purpose a meeting between the Emperor and Pope was desired; it was difficult, however, to find any place quite suitable for this object. Both Emperor and Pope were too suspicious of each other to risk themselves in any city which they believed to be decidedly a partisan of either. The accidental neutrality of Venice during this war, and the fact that she was essentially different from other Italian cities, being in many respects not an Italian town at all, indicated the capital of the lagoons as the city best suited for the meeting of the spiritual and temporal sovereigns.

On the part of the Emperor there had been a *rapprochement* towards Venice, after the Republic in its fury against Manuel had assisted Archbishop Christian of Mainz, Frederick's chancellor, to attack Ancona; while, on the other hand, the important part played by Venice in the formation of the Verona League, out of which the Lombard League emerged, and the prompt recognition of Alexander III. as opposed to Victor IV., made the Republic acceptable to the Pope.

The Leaguers, however, resenting the defection of Venice, her assistance given to Frederick against Ancona, and her absence from the battle of Legnano, insisted on considering her as a city of Imperial leanings, and refused to accept her as the place of congress. Bologna was suggested, but declined by the Emperor. Finally, after much discussion, and after the Pope had openly declared in favour of the lagoon city, Venice was chosen as the scene of the meeting, but not until the Doge had bound himself by oath to refuse the Emperor admittance within Venetian territory except by the Pope's consent.

On the 9th of May 1177 the Pope left Ferrara, and reached San Nicolo del Lido on the 10th. Thence he ^{1177.} was conducted with great pomp to S. Mark's. The ambassadors of the Lombard League were for the most part already assembled. The Emperor was represented by his chancellor, Christian of Mainz. There seemed to be small prospect of settling the questions in dispute between the Emperor and the Lombards. And while negotiations were

in progress, Frederick reached Chioggia on 13th July. The Lombard representatives took alarm and withdrew
1177. to Treviso. The Pope and his cardinals were in terror, until assured by the Sicilian ambassador that the four Sicilian galleys were at their disposal. Whatever intentions the Emperor may have had, he saw at once that nothing could be gained now by a *coup de main*. He accordingly informed the cardinals that he was ready to swear the peace, and charged Heinrich von Dietz to take the preliminary oath on his behalf. The cardinals and the Lombard ambassadors returned to Venice; and on the 22nd July, Heinrich von Dietz, in the presence of the Pope, the cardinals, the Lombard and Italian ambassadors, swore that the Emperor would conclude a truce of six years with the Lombards, and of fifteen with the King of Sicily. The Pope then gave formal permission to the Doge to invite Frederick to Venice.

The Doge sent his son to Chioggia with six galleys. They brought Frederick and his suite to San Nicolo del Lido on the 23rd July. That was on Sunday evening. On Monday morning early, the Pope, surrounded by the whole clergy, the ambassadors of Sicily, and the rectors of the Lombard League, went to the church of S. Mark, before whose main portal a splendid throne had been erected.

Meantime representatives of the Pope had been sent to the Emperor at San Nicolo. To these the Emperor declared that he abjured the schism; his suite did the same. The bishops of Ostia, Porto, and Palestrina then absolved the Imperial party, and received them once more into the bosom of the Church. On learning the conclusion of this ceremony, the Pope requested the Doge and the Patriarch, the bishops and nobles, to conduct the Emperor to his presence. Frederick took his place in the ducal gondola; between the Doge and the Patriarch of Grado; and, in procession, he was conducted across the lagoon to the Molo of S. Mark. There he landed, and passed up the Piazzetta till he came in front of the basilica, where the Pope was waiting him, seated on his throne. At the sight of Alexander, Frederick removed his cloak, humbly approached the Pope, and, bending down, kissed his foot. Alexander raised the Emperor, and bestowed

on him the kiss of peace. Then to the sound of the *Te Deum* Frederick and the Doge led the Pope to the high altar. There the Emperor placed his offerings, received once more the papal benediction, and retired with his suite to the ducal palace. ^{1177.}

The following day, the feast of S. James, the Pope himself celebrated mass, while Frederick served as his acolyte. After the Gospel, Alexander preached a sermon to the Emperor; but perceiving from his countenance that he did not thoroughly grasp the drift of the discourse, the Pope ordered the Patriarch of Aquileia to translate his remarks into German. At the close of this trying ceremony the Emperor and his nobles bent the knee once more to Alexander, kissed his foot, and conducted him to the door of the church. There Frederick held the stirrup of the papal mule while Alexander mounted, and was about to lead him towards the Molo; but the Pope, satiated no doubt with his triumph, dispensed the Emperor from this further humiliation, and dismissed him with his blessing.

On the 1st August the official ratification of the fifteen years' peace with Sicily, and the six years' truce with the Lombard League, took place in the Patriarch's palace; and the Congress of Venice was formally closed upon the 14th of the same month.

The Emperor and Pope continued their sojourn in the city for some time longer. The Venetians employed the occasion to conclude special treaties with both. From the Emperor they obtained confirmation of all previous diplomas granted by Emperors of the West. The Venetians were to enjoy free passage and safe conduct throughout the empire; the subjects of the Empire were to enjoy similar privileges "as far as Venice and no farther"—words which Venetian historians are disposed to interpret as recognising Venetian supremacy in the Adriatic.

From the Pope they secured such advantages as he was able to bestow—indulgences in various churches. A sacramental complexion was given to the ancient ceremony of Ascension Day. Instead of a placatory or expiatory function, it became nuptial. Henceforth the Doge every year dropped a

consecrated ring into the sea, and with the words *Desponsamus te, mare*, declared that Venice and the sea were
1177. indissolubly one.

The most important advantage which the Republic derived from the Congress of Venice was the final settlement of the interminable disputes between the patriarchal Sees of Grado and Aquileia. The Patriarch of Grado abandoned all claim on the relics, treasures, etc., stolen by Patriarch Poppo in 1016. On the other hand, the Patriarch of Aquileia consented to a delimitation of his jurisdiction, which excluded the lagoons, Istria, and Dalmatia; and thus a ganging plea of many centuries was finally adjudicated. The Emperor left Venice on the 18th September, and the Pope on the 16th October.

The gain which Venice had derived from the recent Congress had been chiefly a gain of parade. The eyes of Western Europe were directed to the city of the lagoons as the meeting-place of the two great powers, spiritual and temporal; the Doge of Venice appeared as the friend and host of both Pope and Emperor; he had borne himself well in that exalted company. The Venetians saw every reason to be satisfied. The presence of the Congress in their city had caused a great influx of strangers—a circumstance which Venice, for obvious considerations, has always extremely enjoyed. Their national vanity had been flattered, and they had not let their guests depart without leaving something behind them. It was a lucky accident rather than deliberate policy which placed Venice in this felicitous position. The attack upon her factories in Constantinople had diverted her whole attention from her duties to the Lombard League, and gave her conduct an appearance of sufficient neutrality to satisfy the Emperor; while her share in creating the Verona League, which was the basis of municipal resistance to Frederick, had assured the Pope and the Lombards that she was not at heart an Imperial city. She understood how to utilise her advantage. She arranged her own affairs with Pope and Emperor while they were still with her, still satisfied with the result of the Congress to which Venice had materially assisted. The subsequent proceedings of all parties had no further interest for the

Republic, and she was not even represented at the peace of Constance in 1183.

Venice had passed with success through a period ¹¹⁷⁷ of great difficulty. Her constitution had become more solid; her importance in general history had been enormously increased. The outward appearance of the city itself reflected this advance. To Ziani is attributed that beautiful loggia of larch beams, once open, which is now encased behind the upper colonnade on the west side of the ducal palace. To him, too, is due the first pavement of the Piazza, and the erection of those two immortal columns with which the pictorial aspect of the city is for ever associated. They were raised into position by one Nicolo Barattiere, from the place where they had lain ever since they were brought from the East, in the time of Michiel II. Barattiere demanded as his recompense permission to keep gambling-tables between their shafts. This was granted; but the benefit and the evil were quickly neutralised by the choice of that very spot for the execution of criminals. The same Nicolo is also credited with the construction of the first Ponte di Rialto, a wooden bridge, probably not unlike that which is represented in Carpaccio's picture of the healing of a lunatic in the Academy.

The Doge was seventy-six years old. He had guided Venice through a dangerous but brilliant period. He desired to withdraw from public life, and obtained leave to do so. But before retiring he indited a most interesting and valuable political testament. He himself was the first Doge elected under a new regime. He had enjoyed the opportunity of watching the young constitution at work. It was impossible that this constitution should not display its inherent quality in the slow division of classes in the State. The creation of a council inevitably marked off those who were inside from those who were not. The State of Venice was already face to face with the oligarchy and the people as its two great factors. That Ziani should have realised the situation so soon is a testimony to his political acumen. His advice was summed up thus, "Leave a career of honour and office open to the more powerful citizens": that is virtually a plea for

extension, for elasticity in the young oligarchy, a hint that the time had not yet come for making the oligarchy rigid; and, secondly, "Take care that the people never suffer famine": a warning that contented masses were the only medium in which the State could achieve its oligarchic tendency, without the danger of an open rupture. He also suggested a modification in the method of electing the Doge. It appeared to him that eleven electors formed too small a body to represent fairly the mass of the Council, which was now virtually the constituency. He therefore proposed that the Council should elect four members, who in their turn should appoint forty, each one of whom required three out of the four votes. These forty should then proceed to elect the new Doge by a majority.

The new process resulted in the choice of Orio Malipiero, whose reign was chiefly occupied with oriental affairs. Towards the close of the previous reign there had been a *rapprochement* between Venice and Constantinople, brought about by Manuel's dislike of seeing Venice and the Normans in such close alliance. In order to weaken this combination Manuel had reinstated the Venetians in all their privileges at Constantinople, and had restored the property confiscated in 1171; moreover, as an indemnity for damage suffered, he promised 1500 pounds weight of gold. Manuel died in 1180 and was succeeded by his young son Alexius II., who was quickly deposed by his relation Andronicus. In the process of seizing Constantinople Andronicus's Paphlagonian troops committed atrocities upon the Latin population. They fled to the various courts of Europe seeking vengeance on the tyrant. A favourable reception awaited them from William of Sicily, who manned a fleet and sailed with his allies the Venetians to attack Andronicus. Durazzo and Salonica fell, and the Normans were pushing on towards Constantinople when a revolution in that city drove Andronicus from the throne. Isaac Comnene took his place. The Normans, however, still pressed forward. No doubt they were only half pleased at a revolution which had deprived them of any plausible excuse for sacking

the richest city in the world. They were defeated and retired.

Immediately afterwards we find the Venetians ^{1185.} concluding a most friendly treaty with the new Emperor. The causes for this sudden warmth are not far to seek. The betrothal of Henry, heir of the Hohenstaufens, to Constance, heiress of Sicily, was absolutely opposed to Venetian interests. The union of the kingdom of Sicily and the Empire in one and the same hands would have constituted a serious danger for the Republic. Hitherto the Emperor had been homeless in Italy, the mere personification of an idea, disembodied and powerless, except in so far as he was able to create combinations favourable to his purposes. Thanks to the feudal system of military service, his foreign troops could not be maintained for long in the peninsula, and Italians cared nothing for his aims unless they were able to use his power against a hated neighbour. But if the Emperor once became not merely the nominal overlord of Italy, but actually a reigning prince in Italy, the case would wear quite another aspect. The menace of a powerful Western Emperor reproduced in Venice the policy which had become traditional. The Republic drew towards the Empire of the East, and the result was seen in the treaty concluded with Isaac ^{1185.} in 1187. Venice bound herself to furnish from 40 to 100 galleys when called on. The Emperor would supply the money; Venice the officers; the men were to be raised at the rate of three men out of every four from among the Venetian population of the Eastern dominions. As each galley required 140 rowers, this would imply that the male Venetian population of the Empire serviceable for war exceeded 18,000 men. The Venetians were to receive in return a quarter in every city conquered by the fleet. The Emperor bound himself to protect Venetian property wherever attacked, and swore to accept no peace from which Venice was excluded.

The good accord with Isaac left Venice free to turn her attention to the reduction of Zara, which was in its normal state of rebellion. But the exchequer was exhausted. A new loan was raised, redeemable in twelve years, secured

upon the salt monopoly, and under a guarantee that no further debt would be incurred for two years to
 1187. come. The Government, following, it would seem, the advice given by Ziani never to allow the people to suffer hunger, preferred to raise loans from wealthy inhabitants rather than to replenish the exchequer by direct taxation. That was a system which might be pursued as long as the revenue was steadily growing, as it must have been at this period of Venetian history. But Zara was not to be subdued this time. The siege proved tedious. The Venetians grew tired of it, and seized the pretext of the papal appeal for a new Crusade to retire altogether.

The Venetians took part in the disastrous third Crusade with little glory and less profit to themselves. The Doge signalled his reign rather by a reform of the judicial system than by feats of arms. It is under Malipiero that we find the establishment of that Council of Forty which eventually became the high court of the Venetian forum. The Senate, or *Pregadi*, as we know, had not yet been erected into a permanent body; and the Council of Forty was intended, originally, to supply the place of a consultative assembly, subsequently occupied by the Senate. When the Senate was permanently established the Forty still remained, but entirely as a judicial body.

The court of the *Magistrato del Proprio* was relieved of some of its duties by the creation of a new court called *del Forestier*, whose formation is a proof of the rapid development of population, resident and temporary, in the lagoon city; for the new court was especially designed to try cases between foreigners, whereas litigation between Venetian citizens was left to the more ancient magistracy. Originally the Doge had appointed the judges of the *Magistrato del Proprio*; now appointments to both benches were made in the Great Council. Causes in which the revenue was concerned, were heard before the *Avogadori di Comun*, or Procurators of the Republic—a bench of the highest importance, which eventually performed, among other functions, that of Heralds' College.

The reign of Malipiero's successor, Enrico Dandolo, is

the most memorable that we have reached as yet in the course of this history. Venice was once more called on to play a part, and that the most prominent part, in European history. She committed a great crime, and thereby sowed the seeds of a lifelong punishment. Throughout the story of the fourth Crusade the Republic displays herself in her true colours—able, self-reliant, astute, single-minded, selfish, practical, and, as sometimes happens in the history of a nation, she was led by a man who was completely identified with the spirit of his race. Venice expressed herself in Enrico Dandolo; the Doge was the personification of the community which he ruled.

When he came to the throne Dandolo was already an old man, and partially blind. He had served the State as ambassador to Constantinople, where he acquired his hatred of the Greeks, and lost his sight. His whole career shows him to have been a man of most determined will, and of great personal courage—"de bien gran cœur," says Villehardouin. His country had suffered at the hands of Manuel; his own person had suffered. Venetian commercial supremacy in the East was threatened by the hostility of the Imperial Court. Public and private reasons combined to fill him with a desire for revenge, and a determination to restore his nation to her former superiority. The history of the fourth Crusade is very largely the history of the way in which Dandolo pursued and accomplished his end.

Venetian commerce in the East was threatened by two great rivals—Pisa and Genoa. Down to the middle of the twelfth century Venice had succeeded in preserving what was virtually a monopoly of Levantine trade. The Amalfitani had been crushed in 1126. But with the accession of Manuel in 1143, a change of policy took place. The Emperor, partly from a desire to benefit his dominions, partly in order to check the excessive commercial development of the Venetians, partly too in resentment against Venice for the share she was taking in the Crusades and their spoils, began to favour the two other trading States, Pisa and Genoa. From this time forward there was a continual struggle between Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese to gain the

upper hand in Constantinople. The desire to secure such a superiority for Venice was one of the main elements of Dandolo's conduct throughout the fourth Crusade.

1193.

Other causes of friction between the maritime communities were not wanting. Dandolo attempted to recover Zara, which was still in a state of rebellion. The people of Zara appealed to the Pisans for help. A Pisan fleet sailed up the Adriatic and captured Pola, which was soon after recovered. Again, in 1201 news reached Venice that the usurper Alexius III. was in treaty with Genoa for the concession of ampler trading rights. Everything, therefore, conspired to prepare the Republic, and the man who ruled it, for an attack on the capital of the Eastern Empire.

While matters were at this point, circumstances placed within the reach of Venice a weapon for the accomplishment of her purpose.

The preaching of the fourth Crusade began in 1197. When Pope Innocent III. ascended the throne in the following year he devoted his great energy to carrying on the work. The Crusade became his chief delight. He found his preacher in Fulk of Neuilly. By the year 1200, matters were so far advanced that it was time to charter a fleet for transport of the host and to select a place of departure. A meeting held at Soissons resolved to send six messengers to Venice in order to conclude a bargain with the great maritime Republic. Probably no other State could have furnished the necessary ships; and the Crusaders had no choice but to select Venice. That choice, however, proved disastrous to the Crusade, and also to Europe.

The six ambassadors, among whom was Geoffrey de

1201.

Villehardouin, Marshal of Champagne and historian of the Crusade, arrived in Venice in February, 1201. Four days later they had an audience of the Doge in Council, at the ducal palace, which they describe as "right rich and fair." They presented their credentials, and announced that they had been sent by the noble Barons of France, who had taken the Cross, to beg Venice to have pity on the "Land of *Outremer*," and to provide ships of war and transport.

The Doge demanded time to consider the request. At the end of a week the ambassadors were summoned to the palace, and the Doge said, "Sirs, we will give ^{1201.} you transports for 4,500 horses, 9,000 esquires, 4,500 knights, and 20,000 foot, together with provisions for one year from the day of sailing on the service of God and of Christendom, in whatsoever place it may be. For this you shall pay us 85,000 marks of silver, Cologne weight. Further, for the honour of God, we will send 50 galleys, on condition that, of all conquests by sea and land, half shall be ours and half yours."

The ambassadors replied the following day, signifying their readiness to conclude the bargain. The Doge said that he must first consult his Council of Forty, and would then submit the proposal to a general assembly. Mass was celebrated in S. Mark's, and Villehardouin, in the name of the Barons of France, formally asked the Venetian people to assist in the enterprise for the Holy Land. The answer came back in a great shout of "We agree."

A formal contract was drawn up and signed early in April. The date on which the ships were to be ready was fixed for the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul; the amount and quality of provisions were determined. The Crusaders bound themselves to pay the 85,000 marks in rates—15,000 on the 1st August; 10,000 on All Saints; 10,000 on the Purification, and the remainder by the end of April 1202.

Innocent confirmed the contract, but with distrust. He knew the temper of the Venetians. He would have preferred a treaty with Genoa and Pisa. But that was impossible. He did his best to guard the Crusade from the danger he already suspected, by stipulating that there should be no attack made on a Christian power, and that a Legate should accompany the fleet. But in judging the subsequent conduct of Venice we must bear in mind that she had made her bargain with the Crusaders, not with the Pope; that the papal conditions were not in the bond which she had signed; that, from a purely commercial point of view—the only view recognised by Venice as yet—she was in no way fettered by the wishes of the Pope. She

had made a strictly business contract; religious sentiment held no place in it. She had not pledged herself to become a Crusader; she merely promised so much for so much. As long as she fulfilled her side of the bargain she could not be in the wrong, and the French Barons, at least, neither asked nor expected more.

It has been said that from the very first there was a secret understanding between the leaders of the Crusade that Egypt should be their destination, though the decision was kept secret from the army, which was told that it was to go to the Land *Outremer*. Such an agreement may have existed. Alexandria offered a good base of operations; previous Crusades had shown how a great army might be wasted away in the long march through Asia Minor; sea communications were more easily maintained than those on land, especially with the Venetian navy as an ally; Egypt, moreover, was a particularly easy prey at this moment, owing to a famine caused by five years of a low Nile. But there is no proof that the Venetians had any cognisance of such a secret resolve. As yet, they were hardly concerned in the destination of the fleet; they had merely bound themselves to supply ships; the Doge had used the phrase "for the service of God, in whatsoever place it may be." Their contingent of fifty galleys was not about to sail for love of the Cross, but in the buccaneering spirit of seizing half of any conquests that might be made by the host. It is necessary to say this, because the fact that the fleet never reached Egypt at all has been laid at the door of Dandolo, who is accused of having, from the very first, resolved that the Crusaders should not touch Alexandria; the reason assigned for this resolve being that he had already concluded an advantageous treaty with the Sultan of Egypt, Malek-Adel (July, 1202). But Venice was free to make a treaty with the Sultan if she chose. The Crusaders publicly said they were going to the Holy Land; the Venetians contracted to take them there. This contract could not be a bar to any commercial treaties which Venice was able to secure. The Pope was right in thinking that the Venetians were not fit persons to carry

the Crusaders. But they cannot be accused of treachery unless they broke their contract, which they did not. 1202.

But here, in this question of the diversion of the fourth Crusade, we are in the presence of one of those historical problems the solution of which is still under discussion. In the following account we shall avoid controversy as far as possible, and confine ourselves to a narrative of events. The facts about the first diversion of the Crusade to Zara are plain enough. They are these:—The Venetians fulfilled their part of the bargain to the letter. By the appointed day the appointed number of ships with their provisions were ready and waiting for their passengers. But the Crusaders were not equally prompt to fulfil their obligations. When, in June, 1202, the General Assembly of the Crusaders was reviewed on the Lido of San Nicolo, where they had been lodged, it was found that not nearly the whole number of passengers had reached Venice. Out of the 4500 knights only 1000 were prepared to sail. Meanwhile, the Venetian ships lay there, all ready; never was a finer fleet seen upon those waters; but the men to fill it were wanting. The strangers who had reached Venice, moreover, had been relieved of most of their money during their long journey across Lombardy. When the Doge came to ask for payment, as agreed on, it was found that the utmost exertion of the Crusaders still left a deficit of 34,000 marks.

The Venetians, who had always looked upon their part of the business as a commercial transaction, declined to set sail. According to one account the Doge is reported to have said to the signatories of the contract, "If you do not pay you shall not move from the Lido." That remark expresses the Venetian view of the case. The French Barons and their men were virtually prisoners to the Republic, which intended to lead them and use them as best suited its own purposes. Villehardouin lays the blame for this situation upon those Crusaders who had failed to come to Venice as commanded, and who had taken ship in other ports.

When it became quite clear that no more money was

forthcoming, Dandolo suggested a compromise. The great object of the crusading chiefs was to set sail. The ^{1202.} Doge offered to postpone the receipt of the 34,000 marks until their first success should place the Crusaders in funds, and promised to sail at once, on condition that the armament stopped on its way to reduce Zara. A division of opinion immediately made itself felt. Those who were tired of the expedition, and they were not a few, declared it an impiety to turn the Crusade against a Christian city, in possession of a king who had himself taken the Cross. The leaders and the majority accepted the proposal as the only way out of the difficulty. The most that can be urged against Venice in her conduct of the whole affair, so far, is that she stood hard by her bargain, and when the other party failed, she made the most she could out of the situation.

In July, Peter Capuano, Cardinal and Papal Legate, arrived with orders to oppose the diversion of the fleet to Zara. He cleared out the idlers, the sick, and the loose women from the crusading camp on the Lido. The Venetians gave the Cardinal to understand that they did not consider themselves bound by the wishes of the Pope, who was no party to their contract; if the Legate chose to accompany the Crusade as a preacher, well and good; if he proposed to take any part in the direction of affairs, he had better stay at home. In the face of this determined and cynical attitude, Peter Capuano was also driven to give his consent to the attack on Zara. He made one condition, that the Venetians should not merely transport the army, but should themselves join the Crusaders. The Government consented, and on the 25th August, at mass in S. Mark's, Dandolo publicly asked his people whether they were content that he should take the Cross. The reply was a strong affirmative. The Doge was led to the high altar, and the holy symbol was affixed to his bonnet.

This is a most important episode; for it proves that the Venetians, up to this point, were not Crusaders, were under none of the obligations implied in the Crusaders' vow, and in no way to blame for their strictly business-like behaviour.

But, further, the assumption of the Cross was, from the Venetian point of view, a serious error; it entirely altered their position. After that, the Republic could no longer act as a free agent; she placed herself under obligations and duties which clashed with her proposed objects. She sacrificed her obligations to her desires. In taking the Crusaders' vow Venice was insincere. That deed was intended by the Venetians to facilitate the sailing of the fleet, to overcome the Legatine objections, to hasten the desired reduction of Zara. The policy is typical of Venice. It displays her supreme egotism, her single-eyed consideration of her own interests. But the act was a fraud. The genuine Crusaders, the Pope and the Pope's Legate, all indulged in a hope that, by inducing Venice to assume the Cross, they could cajole her out of the steady pursuit of her own ends; could nullify the unholy effect of their contract with her about Zara. They persuaded themselves that the vow would bind Venice as it bound them. Venice never intended that it should.

But the way was now opened for the sailing of the fleet. The Crusaders, who had been imprisoned for so many months on the feverish Lido, were overjoyed at the prospect. The Venetians were impatient to attack Zara. By October everything was ready.

The fleet presented a most imposing spectacle. Towering above the rest rode the three great galleys, the *Eagle*, the *Pilgrim*, and the *Paradise*, surrounded by more than three hundred other ships. The display of heraldry, with all the brilliant hues that distinguish armorial bearings, must have been superb. The Venetian galleys bore the golden lion of S. Mark upon a crimson ground. Each noble Baron unfurled his ensign to the breeze. The Doge's own galley was painted vermilion; the others were all bedecked with shields, placed in rows along the bulwarks. So to the sound of trumpets and the chant of the *Veni Creator*, the fourth Crusade set sail.

The Doge made a triumphal entry into Trieste. Thence he passed on down the Dalmatian coast, till he arrived off Zara and laid siege to it. The city was panic-stricken, and ready to yield. It sent ambassadors into the Crusaders'

camp to negotiate. But here the purely crusading party, the religious devotees, made themselves felt. In 1202. spite of their distinct understanding with Venice that they would assist in reducing Zara, they told the embassy that if the Zarentines chose to resist, the city need fear no attack from the French portion of the armament.

This was a flagrant breach of faith. It proved most disastrous to the people of Zara. In spite of letters from the Pope excommunicating all and any who should attack the town; in spite of Simon de Montfort's resistance; in spite of the opposition raised by the Abbot of Vaux, who sprang to his feet in the Doge's tent, and cried, "I forbid you to attack this city. It is a city of Christian men, and ye are Crusaders"; Dandolo proceeded to assault the town. It fell in five days. Zara was entered and plundered by both Venetians and Crusaders; and the season being far advanced the fleet resolved to winter there.

As yet, the destination of the armament was still the Land *Outremer*, the land of the infidel. But events now occurred which produced the second diversion of the fourth Crusade from its proper object.

In the year 1195, Isaac Comnene had been driven from the throne by his kinsman Alexius. Isaac was blinded, and along with his son, Alexius the young, was confined in prison. In the spring of 1201, the lad Alexius escaped from Constantinople on board a Pisan ship. His object was to secure assistance and to recover the throne for his father. The person to whom he turned first was Philip of Swabia, his brother-in-law, who had married a daughter of Isaac. Young Alexius found Philip at Warzburg, and stayed there till the end of the year. At the Court he met Boniface of Montferrat, the destined leader of the fourth Crusade. It is said that Philip promised Alexius to restore him to his country, and contemplated using the Crusade for this purpose. Two reasons urged Philip to favour Alexius. By diverting the Crusade from the Holy Land he would ruin Innocent's dearest object in life. This Philip was anxious to do, because the Pope was supporting his rival Otto of Brunswick,

and had placed Philip himself under excommunication. And secondly, Philip had dreams of uniting in his own person the Empires of West and East, to which he^{1202.} constructed a fanciful claim through his wife. Philip, then, was prepared to divert the Crusade. He found its leader, Boniface, willing to help him. Boniface had private reasons for desiring to go to Constantinople. Through his brother, Conrad, he claimed the kingdom of Salonica, and thought he might endeavour to recover his crown by the help of the Cross. Accordingly Philip and Boniface agreed that, if possible, the fourth Crusade should be diverted from the Holy Land to the capital of the East. Foreseeing that Innocent would raise violent objections to such a proceeding, Philip sent young Alexius to Rome in the hope of obtaining the Pope's consent, by holding out the prospect of a union between the Churches of East and West. But the Pope refused to fall into the trap. He expressly forbade the Crusaders to attack the Roman Empire.

The Crusaders were still before Zara when messengers arrived from Philip to recommend Alexius and his cause. In the young man's name, Philip promised that if the Crusaders restored Alexius to his father's throne, the lad, when Emperor, would unite the Churches under Rome; would supply 200,000 marks of silver; would send 10,000 men with them into the Holy Land; and would, for the rest of his life, maintain a guard of 500 knights in Jerusalem.

For reasons already explained, Philip and Boniface found in Dandolo a willing adherent to their plan for attacking Constantinople. The Venetians offered no objections. But to make assurance doubly sure, the proposals of Alexius contained special clauses in favour of Venice. The hire of the fleet was to be continued for another year, and the Republic was to receive 100,000 marks.

The most vigorous opposition to these proposals was offered by the genuine Crusaders. But the influence of Dandolo and Boniface prevailed. The terms were accepted. The fleet left Zara, after demolishing its walls, and reached Corfu. Here it was joined by young Alexius. He solemnly

ratified the Convention of Zara, concluded in his name. The genuine Crusaders made a last attempt to prevent the iniquity of a consecrated army being turned away from the sacred Sepulchre to attack the capital of Christendom; but the tears of Dandolo and Boniface, which represented 100,000 marks and a year's pay in the one case, and 100,000 marks and the crown of Salonica in the other, overcame the devotees. The whole armament sailed from Corfu, and made a sort of imperial progress with young Alexius as their centre, receiving homage as he went. On the 23rd June they cast anchor twelve miles from Constantinople, near the abbey of San Stefano.

From San Stefano the fleet moved across the Sea of Marmora to Chalcedon, and thence to Scutari, on the Asiatic shore, just opposite the walls, the palaces, the towers of the Imperial city. Alexius the elder, alarmed at this demonstration, sent to enquire what were the objects of the Crusaders, and to offer assistance if they would leave his territory. The answer was that the territory belonged to young Alexius, for whom they demanded a surrender of the city.

The leaders of the Crusade then placed Alexius on board a galley, and accompanied by the whole fleet they crossed the Bosphorus, until they were right under the city walls, which were thronged by a curious crowd. They proclaimed Alexius as the rightful heir; but those on the ramparts merely laughed in scorn, "Who is he? we do not know him."

An attack on the city was designed. The undertaking seemed desperate. Constantinople enjoyed the reputation of being impregnable; and it had frequently proved its claim to be so considered. But nothing could daunt the confidence and self-reliance of Dandolo, the master spirit of the siege. The mouth of the Golden Horn was guarded by a great chain, one end of which was in the city itself, the other protected by a tower in Galata. Dandolo at once determined to assault the tower which commanded the Galata end of the chain. He was successful. The Greek garrison of the tower made a sortie, was repulsed, and the Crusaders entered the tower with those who were trying to regain its

shelter. The chain was slipped from its Galata end, sank, and the Venetian fleet sailed into the Golden Horn. They instantly charged the Imperial galleys, captured some, 1203. rammed others, and at one blow had gained a position opposite the weakest walls of the city, those which lined the shores that look towards Pera.

The Crusaders resolved to follow up their first success by a general assault. This was to be given by the Venetians from the sea; by the Crusaders from land. The land army passed on from Galata round the top of the Golden Horn, by the Sweet Waters, which were undefended, and took up their position opposite the palace of Blachernæ.

On the 17th July all was ready. The Crusaders delivered their attack in four divisions, under the command of Baldwin. Their scaling apparatus was placed against the walls, and for a moment the Flemings gained and held a footing. But the Danish and English guard, together with the Pisans, steadily drove the Flemings back; and the first attack on the land side failed.

The assault by sea was more successful. The galleys were covered with raw skins to resist the terrible Greek fire. Gangways of poles and hides were placed on the tops, and from these the soldiery passed on to the walls, or fought their defenders hand to hand. With indomitable energy Dandolo, standing under the banner of S. Mark, directed the operations and inspired the courage of his men. He ordered the crew of his own ship to draw closer in. He seized the banner of the patron saint, and, under a rain of bolts and stones, he sprang ashore, on the narrow strip between the sea and the walls. The Venetians followed their Doge. A battering-ram was brought into play. The assault from the gangways was redoubled. Then suddenly the standard of the lion was seen flying from a tower. The defenders fled, and, in a few minutes, twenty-five towers were in the possession of the invader. A dangerous rally of Imperial troops was effectually checked by the Doge's followers, who set fire to the houses inside the walls and drove the enemy back. But the Venetians were not able to maintain their position. News of the failure on the land

side called Dandolo away to the support of the Crusaders.

1203. The Emperor Alexius made a sortie in force, but lacked the courage to attack. After some ineffectual manœuvres, which were watched by the ladies from the city walls, he withdrew into Constantinople.

The attack had virtually failed. But events occurred inside the city which altered the whole aspect of affairs. Alexius the elder, after his feeble sortie, seems to have been panic-stricken. He fled. Isaac, the blind deposed Emperor, was led from his prison and placed once more on the throne.

This was a turn of events little pleasing to Boniface and Dandolo, whose objects were by no means fulfilled through the restoration of Isaac. Yet this restoration left the Crusaders little excuse for continuing the siege. The rightful owner, the deposed Emperor, was once more on the throne. The satisfaction of his claims seemed to include all that Alexius, his heir, had a right to demand.

There was one excuse, however, which might still serve to keep the army before Constantinople, and to assist Boniface and Dandolo in achieving their respective aims. The Zara Convention, accepted by Alexius, had to be ratified by Isaac, and its terms fulfilled. Dandolo and Boniface both wanted their money. Isaac complained that the terms were excessively onerous. But he was grateful for the services which had placed him on his throne once more, and agreed to recognise his son's obligations as his own. Young Alexius entered Constantinople, and was crowned as Emperor along with his father.

The exhaustion of the Imperial treasury, however, did not permit Alexius to jeopardise his throne by excessive taxation in order to satisfy the greedy horde outside the walls. As a matter of fact he did pay a large part of the sum stipulated, as much as 100,000 marks, of which half went to the Venetians, besides the 34,000 marks due to them for the remainder of their first year's hire. But the whole amount was not forthcoming, and the Crusaders refused to take less. Then followed a long period of delays. The city was in a continual state of brawling between Latins and Greeks; fires

were frequent. The Crusaders pressed for payment, even venturing to insult the Emperor in his palace. Isaac ¹²⁰⁴ was old and blind and feeble: Alexis had taken to ~~3024~~ toping with his faired-haired protectors: he let them snatch his Imperial bonnet from his head and replace it with their own rough caps; he lost all hold over the respect and allegiance of the Greeks. Popular feeling rose steadily higher and higher. It was guided by Alexis Ducas, and took final shape in January 1204. In his alarm at an expected revolution Alexis invited Boniface to garrison the palace. This act of treason to the Greeks precipitated matters. Alexis Ducas struck his blow. He seized Alexis the young, imprisoned, and probably poisoned him. Isaac died of grief, and Ducas became Emperor.

The revolution in the city came opportunely for Boniface and Dandolo. They had, at last, a good excuse for attacking Constantinople. Negotiations between Dandolo and Alexis Ducas failed, as they were doubtless intended to fail. The besiegers resolved to assault the city; they made a prospective division of the prey. It was agreed that six Venetians and six Crusaders should meet and choose an Emperor; that the Patriarch should be elected from the nation which had not secured the throne. The whole spoils were to be quartered. One quarter was to become the property of the Emperor, the other three quarters were to be divided between the Franks and the Venetians, who would thus be lords of a quarter and half a quarter of the new Rome—a title the Doges subsequently bore for many years. A joint committee was appointed to divide the Empire into fiefs, and to determine the nature of their tenure.

The assault was given on 8th April, this time from the sea only. It failed, probably because the line of attack was too extended. The second assault, with a more concentrated attack, was delivered on the 12th. The operation proved successful. For the first time in its history Constantinople succumbed to a besieger.

The city was given over to the Crusaders, whose atrocities may be explained, though not palliated, by their

prolonged abstinence. The army of the Cross became a scourge more terrible than any pagan host had ever
1204. been. "Instead of defending the tomb of Christ, you have outraged His faithful. You have used Christians worse than even the Arabs did," so said an eye-witness in his indignation. On the other hand, another eye-witness, the Marshal of Champagne, remarks with satisfaction, "Never since the creation of the world was there so much booty gained in one city." One was the robbed, the other the robber.

On the fall of Constantinople the victorious leaders proceeded to elect an Emperor. The electors, as agreed, were six Venetians and six Crusaders. The candidates were three—Boniface the leader, Dandolo the hero, and Baldwin the noble. The Doge, however, gave it to be understood that he would not accept election. He knew Venice well enough to be convinced that the Republic would never tolerate such a step. But by this renunciation Dandolo became the most important factor in the choice of an Emperor. The Doge had virtually to weigh the claims of Boniface and of Baldwin. He knew Boniface well. He had been associated with the Marquis in the intricate direction of the Crusade; his daughter is even said to have been wife of the Lord of Montferrat. But he also knew that Boniface was ambitious, was an Italian prince, was a close ally of the Emperor Philip. His election would be dangerous for Venice. Baldwin was younger, less experienced, less energetic, and his domains more distant. The Doge declared for Baldwin. He was elected, and was crowned on 16th May, 1204.

Thus ended the fourth Crusade, which had set forth to free the Sepulchre of Christ, and ended by overthrowing the Eastern Empire, and sacking the virgin city of Constantinople. Throughout the Crusade the Venetians, in the person of their Doge, played the leading rôle. The result to them may be summed up as follows. They had made a great display of independence and strength. They had successfully defied the Pope, and ignored his ecclesiastical weapons. Innocent, while deploring the sack of Constantinople, forgave the other Crusaders; the Venetians he

could not pardon. He threw the whole blame on them—"It is you who have led the army of the Lord into a wicked path." 1204.

On the other hand, the Republic had reaped a great reward in material aggrandisement. She was now absolute mistress of the Mediterranean. She acquired a vast increase in actual wealth from her share of the spoils. The Venetians bought Boniface's rights over Crete and Salonica, and obtained leave from the new Emperor for private individuals to occupy, as fiefs of the Empire, any of the Ægean islands not already held by the Republic, thereby securing to themselves the trade and commerce of the whole Levant.

But nevertheless the attack on Constantinople was a crime. It helped to bring its own punishment years afterwards. Through the blow now dealt at the Eastern Empire the way was prepared for the occupation of that city by the Turks. Their establishment in Constantinople, facilitated by the present action of the Republic, left Venice subsequently exposed to a long series of wars, which she heroically sustained, it is true, but which broke her power, exhausted her strength, and materially contributed to her ultimate ruin.

CHAPTER VIII

The Republic grants fiefs in the Levant—*Pietro Ziani*, Doge—The Consequences of the destruction of the Greek Empire—Question of communications with the Levant—Genoese pirates—Colonisation of Crete—The Venetians of Constantinople—Threatened split—Suggested abandonment of Venice—*Jacopo Tiepolo*, Doge—Curtailment of ducal authority—*Promissione Ducale*—Frederick II.—Venetian Podestàs in Italian towns—Eccelino da Romano; his attack on Venice—League of Gregory IX., Genoa, Pisa, and Venice—War of Ferrara—The *Statuto* of Tiepolo—*Marino Morosini*, Doge—Form of Election to the Dogeship—The Inquisition in Venice: its position—The Inquisitor's *exequatur*—The *Savii all' heresia*—*Renier Zeno*, Doge—Further exclusion of the people from a voice in the election of a Doge—Crusade against Eccelino: his death at Vimercate—Rivalry of Genoa in the East—Question of S. Saba in Acre—Lorenzo Tiepolo's victory—The porphyry drum and the two square pillars—War again—Venetian victory—Alexander IV. insists on a peace—Baldwin in difficulties—Michel Paleologus restores the Greek Empire—Paleologus favours Genoa—Struggle between Genoa and Venice—Venice victorious—Result at Constantinople—Result in Venice—Embellishment of the city—Public ceremonies—Death of the Doge.

THE fall of Constantinople and the partition of the Empire
1204. left Venice a large inheritance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Her share included the Cyclades and Sporades, the islands on the east coast of Dalmatia, the maritime cities of Thessaly; and she bought Crete from the Marquis of Montferrat. She thus acquired an unbroken line of ports from Constantinople to the capital, and laid the foundation of her commercial supremacy in the Levant. But the partition required to be made actual, and the Republic was unable to face, at once, the conquest and the defence of all these scattered possessions; she therefore adopted a device, borrowed from feudalism, and granted fiefs

of the islands to those of her greater citizens who would undertake the task of subduing them: thus Andros went to the Dandolo; the Querini took Lampsacus; Barozzi, Santorin; the Sanudo became Dukes of the Archipelago. ^{1204.}

The Venetians, however, were very soon to learn the full significance of the sack of Constantinople, and what was implied by the destruction of the Byzantine Empire. The death of Enrico Dandolo took place in 1205. He was buried with great pomp in S. Sophia in Constantinople, and at Venice his successor, Pietro Ziani, was elected by the new method of forty electors.

The difficulties to which Venice was exposed by the destruction of the Greek Empire became abundantly manifest in the reign of Ziani. The Venetians had hardly realized that the security of their Eastern possessions depended to a very large extent upon the strength and stability of the Eastern Empire. They had assisted the Crusaders to destroy a government which, if not invariably powerful, was well established and enjoyed a great prestige. They had been instrumental in replacing that government by one of the weakest and most vacillating empires the world has ever seen. They forgot that the extension of their dominions, while it raised them to the rank of a European power, roused the jealousy of their maritime rivals in Italy. They did not perceive that, as theirs were the largest interests in the East, the rest of Europe would leave them to defend those interests single-handed. In short, by the sack of Constantinople Venice had created an Eastern Question, the difficulty and insolubility of which were to haunt her throughout the rest of her career. ^{1205.}

With the extension of Venetian possessions and Venetian commerce in the Levant, the question of the communications between the mother-city and her colonies acquired a growing importance. The jealousy which this expansion inspired pointed out to Genoa this weak spot in her rival's position. The seas between Corfu and Crete became infested with Genoese pirates, and one of the earliest operations of the new Doge was to sweep the corsairs

from those waters. The Venetian admirals were successful
1205. *s'en aloient parmi la mer prenant lor enemis com vont
li faucons prenant les oisais*, as the picturesque
chronicler, Martin da Canal, puts it. These operations in
1208. the Levant, whose object was to establish free com-
munications between Venice and her new possessions,
led to the settlement of Candia and the appointment of the
first Governor, or Duke, of Crete. The island was colonised
by Venetian noble families, whose relation to the mother-
country eventually proved the cause of serious trouble to
the Republic. But at first, the obligations of the colonists
were to defend the island, to furnish a contingent to the
Venetian armament in time of war, to assist Venetian com-
merce, to pray for the Doge on Christmas, Easter, the Feast
of S. Mark, and the Feast of S. Titus.

A more serious question even than that of communica-
tions between mother-city and colonies was raised by the
fall of Constantinople. Enrico Dandolo before his death
had made arrangements for the proper government of the
Venetians in the Imperial city. At the head of the
administration was a Podestà, assisted by five judges,
three councillors, a treasurer, procurators, a constable as
the chief of the militia, and a captain-general sent from
Venice.

On the death of Dandolo the first signs of a diffi-
culty appeared. The Venetians of Constantinople, without
waiting for permission from Venice, proceeded to elect
Marin Zeno their Podestà, with the title of lord of the
fourth and a half of a fourth of the Roman Empire;
he also adopted the red and the white stockings. Both the
title and the dress were attributes of the Doge of Venice,
and their assumption by the Venetian Podestà of Con-
stantinople seems to indicate a tendency to break away
from the mother-city in the lagoons. The Venetians of
Venice were alarmed. They sent to inform their brothers
in Constantinople that, for this time only, the election of
the Podestà would be recognised, but that for the future he
must always be chosen in Venice. It was not at Constan-
tinople alone, however, that the idea of change had taken

root. The growth of Venetian possessions in the East, the weakness of the new Empire, the distance of Venice from her colonies, all tended to encourage the belief that it would be not merely possible but even expedient to abandon Venice and to remove the seat of the government to the Imperial city. One of Ziani's first acts was to send an envoy to treat with the Podestà Zeno, almost as with an equal or a rival, for the maintenance of the loyal relations between the Venetians of Constantinople and those of the lagoon. But the growing weakness of the Latin Empire became so serious that, as tradition reports, the Doge himself formally made the proposal to remove from Venice to the Eastern capital. Though the speeches which preceded the famous *Vote of Providence*, whereby the proposal was rejected on a majority of one, are in all likelihood apocryphal, yet it is not uninteresting to recount their substance as showing what was the feeling of the Venetians upon this momentous question. On the one hand it was urged that Venetian interests were now entirely Eastern; that the centre of government was too far away from its possessions; that the city of Venice was exposed to constant danger from earthquake and flood; on the other hand, the patriotic sentiment of the Venetians was summoned to reject the proposed desertion of those kind islands in the lagoon, which had sheltered their forefathers, and which even now rendered Venice secure from all attack; the patriots pointed out that Constantinople would not be easy to hold, and that if it were lost the Venetian race was lost; whereas if they remained in the lagoons, they were unassailable. The motion is said to have found 320 supporters and 321 in opposition, and hence the episode has received the name of the *Voto della Provvidenza* from those who wished to mark their sense of the danger they had escaped.

No doubt there had been a momentary danger that Venice might be abandoned. But it was nothing more than a passing thought. The Venetians were already a distinct nationality, a race apart, with interests which, though largely, were not entirely Eastern. Venice retained

her semi-Western position. The next reign, that of Jacopo Tiepolo, is hardly concerned with Eastern affairs
1208. at all.

Pietro Ziani abdicated, and was succeeded by Jacopo Tiepolo. At his election the forty votes had been equally
1229. divided between Tiepolo and Marino Dandolo, thereby indicating a flaw in the constitution. The issue was reached by lot.

Three points of special significance distinguish the reign of Tiepolo—a further curtailment of the ducal authority; the action of Venice in connection with the Lombard League; and the codification of the Venetian laws; all three of them possessing important bearings on the development of Venetian history.

We have seen that one of the problems in the constitutional history of the Republic, one of the main objects of the growing aristocracy—which had now received a great accession of wealth and influence from the spoils of the fourth Crusade, and, as a consequence, had begun to emerge in prominence above the level of the whole community—was the reduction of the Dukedom to a merely ornamental position in the State. A principal means by which this end could be attained was the gradual extension of the restrictive clauses in the *Promissione* or coronation oath, which each Doge at his accession was called upon to swear. The *Promissione* was prepared by three officials during the interval between the death of one Doge and the election of another, and the new Doge had no voice in the construction of its terms, which he was bound to accept. Moreover, other constitutional machinery was devised to assist the aristocracy in reducing the power of the Doge. Tiepolo's reign saw the addition of two important magistracies to the public offices of the State—the *Correttori della Promissione ducale* and the *Inquisitori sopra il Doge defunto*. The *Correttori* were five nobles appointed to discuss, to amend, and to add to the *Promissione ducale*; the alterations were made on the report of the *Inquisitori*, whose duty it was to examine the life and actions of the deceased Doge, and to note carefully any

signs of independent or autocratic conduct, so that such might be rendered impossible for the future.

The *Promissione* of Jacopo Tiepolo not only¹²²⁹ served as a basis for all future coronation oaths, but it contained the most important modifications of the ducal authority that we have met with as yet. Apart from the ordinary clauses as to the administration of justice and the observation of the laws, the Doge swore to renounce any claim whatsoever upon the revenues of the Republic beyond his own salary and his share in the apples from Lombardy, and the crayfish and cherries from Treviso. He was bound to contribute his quota to public loans; he was forbidden to correspond with the Pope or the Emperor or any other prince, unless he had obtained the consent of his councillors; nor might he open letters from foreign powers except in the presence of his Council. His income from the revenue was established at 2800 lire a year, payable every three months, and this sum was considerably augmented by his share in the tribute offered by Veglia, Cherso, and other Istrian or Dalmatian townships. His household was to consist of twenty servants, including the cooks.

The imperative tone of these various clauses show that the Venetian aristocracy fully understood the value of the *Promissione* as an instrument for curbing their Doge; they continued to make an ever-extending use of that engine, until they succeeded in achieving the object which they had in view.

Though ruin was threatening the Latin Empire in the East, the affairs of Constantinople, as we have already remarked, did not greatly occupy the attention of the Venetians during the reign of Jacopo Tiepolo. The movement of events on the Italian mainland plays a larger part in Venetian history. The Emperor Frederick II. was still pursuing the Imperial policy of attempting to destroy the independence, and to break the spirit, of the Lombard cities which had so successfully withstood his father Barbarossa. Internal jealousy and family feuds, the private ambition of the great houses in each mainland city, made it dangerous for the burghers to entrust the defence of their commune to

any one of their own citizens ; and hence arose the custom of calling to the direction of municipal affairs, as
1229. Podestà, a citizen of some neighbouring town, a man who had no personal stake in the township he was invited to govern. The prestige which Venice had acquired from the fourth Crusade, and the fact that her interests were, as yet, so little involved on the Italian mainland, led to the result that her citizens were in great request as Podestàs. We find a Tiepolo at Treviso, and later at Milan, a Badoer at Padua, a Morosini at Faenza. This fact eventually produced an open rupture between the Republic and the Emperor. Venice was not professedly a member of the existing Lombard League, but the progress of Frederick and his lieutenant, Eccelino da Romano, caused her sympathies to be strongly engaged on the side of the Lombard cities. She acted as banker for a part of the funds of the League, and her citizens, as Podestàs, defended with valour Treviso and Padua against the Imperial arms ; Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's son, was taken prisoner along with many soldiers of the League at the disastrous battle of Cortenuovo. Eccelino, in the interests of the Emperor, was determined to read the Republic a lesson. He pushed his troops to the border of the lagoons at Mestre ; he took the convent of Sant' Ilario, near Fusina, and slew Giovanni Tiepolo, a member of the Doge's family. Venice found herself forced into open war with the Emperor, but this she was unable to undertake single-handed. The successes of the Imperial party, however, supplied her with an ally. The Pope, Gregory IX., could not fail to be alarmed at the threatened destruction of the Lombard cities. He formed an alliance between himself, the Genoese, the Pisans, and Venice. A diversion was to be created by a naval demonstration against the Imperial dominions in Sicily. In return for their assistance Venice was promised the city of Bari, and the right to establish consulates in Sicily, in Apulia, and in Calabria.

Among the other operations of this war the Pope was endeavouring to recover Ferrara, which was then
1240. held by Salinguerra for the Emperor. Venetian commercial interests in Ferrara were great ; and the Republic,

being now in open hostility with the Emperor, desired nothing better than to see Ferrara in the hands of her ally the Pope. She accordingly consented to join in ¹²⁴⁰ the siege of the city, which she was mainly instrumental in recovering. Salinguerra was conveyed to Venice, where he presently died, and was buried at S. Nicolo del Lido. Venice recovered all her ancient privileges in the mainland city, privileges and interests which were destined eventually to entangle her in the complications of mainland politics, and to induce her to take that first step towards a land empire which proved so disastrous to her career.

But the real glory of Tiepolo's reign, and a striking proof of the rapid strides which Venice was making towards her completion as a full-grown State, is the great digest of Venetian law compiled by the Doge's order. This was not the earliest digest of the Venetian code; we have traces of a similar compilation published in 1195 by Enrico Dandolo; but the Tiepoline *Statuto* is by far the most complete, reasoned, and extensive which had existed hitherto. Tiepolo appointed a commission of four, to whom the digest was entrusted. The Commissioners were Pantaleone Giustinian, Tomaso Centranico, Giovanni Michiel, and Stefano Badoer. The work of these men begins with two prefaces, in which are laid down the principles of law: the written law holds the first place; where that fails, cases are to be judged by parallel cases, by equity, and common sense. After the prefaces come the statutes, divided into five books.

The first book deals with ecclesiastical questions, church property, and monasteries. This is followed by an excursus on procedure, the method of pursuit and defence, the nature of evidence, the sentence and its execution; the book closes with the laws relating to dowries and jointures. The second book deals with wards and minors; the third with contracts; the fourth with wills, probate, and succession—in the case of intestacy, succession was in favour of the male; the fifth and last book treats of succession outside Venice.

The criminal law was codified in the work known as the *Promissione de Maleficio*. It is interesting to note that the first law is one in defence of shipwrecked mariners'

property; chapter xxix., the last of the code, provides that all crimes not already contemplated shall be tried and sentenced at the discretion of the judges.

1240.

Even more interesting than the civil and criminal codes are the voluminous regulations for the mercantile marine. They display a singularly advanced conception of the importance of the merchant service, and the need to protect and encourage it by legislation. Besides regulations for the proper construction of ships, for the quantity and the proper lading of the cargo in the hold and on deck, for the due equipment of anchors, cables, etc., the statutes provided that every ship of 200,000 pounds burthen should carry a crew of twenty men, and the crew was to be increased by one for every additional 10,000 pounds capacity. Every ship of 200,000 pounds burthen and upwards was obliged to carry two supercargoes. In case of shipwreck the crew was bound to remain on the spot for fifteen days to effect the salvage, for which the men were recompensed at the rate of three per cent. Every ship possessed its own music, two trumpets, and the bigger ones a drum and two kettle-drums as well. The crew took their own mattresses and chest for their kit, a keg of wine, and a small cask of water. Officers were appointed to measure the capacity of each ship, and to see that the vessel did not leave port overladen, thus anticipating by many centuries Mr. Plimsoll's beneficent legislation.

Jacopo Tiepolo's long reign of twenty years was fruitful of much that proved of prime importance in the internal development of Venice. The Republic made great strides towards that completeness which was to be achieved by the close of the century. Tiepolo abdicated, and was

1249.

succeeded by Marin Morosini. In Morosini's election we find the method of choosing a Doge gradually taking shape and acquiring that form which it finally assumed. The case of Tiepolo's election had shown that the forty electors might be equally divided; to avoid that difficulty their number was now raised to forty-one. A further innovation was made by the opportunity offered to any one who chose for attacking the character or conduct of

each candidate as his name was taken out of the urn, and the permission granted to his friends and relations to reply in his defence. 1249.

Morosini's brief reign of three years was marked by one event of importance, the introduction of the Inquisition into Venice. It is necessary to dwell at some length upon this point for two reasons: first, the action of Venice in the matter allows us to see clearly the independent attitude which the Republic adopted towards the Church of Rome from the very first; and, in the second place, the terms now concluded between the Church and the Republic, and the form now given to the Inquisition, have important bearings upon the issue of many subsequent difficulties and quarrels with Rome.

This was the epoch of the Albigensian and Paterinian heresies. Everywhere the Pope was endeavouring to establish "the dogs of God," the Dominican Inquisition, for the extirpation of the new creeds. Venice had hitherto resisted the papal claims; but now the Doge Morosini found it expedient to admit the Inquisition in a modified form. The Government undertook the search for heretics, whom they handed over to the Church for examination and declaration of fact only; the Church was restricted to the simple statement whether such and such a prisoner was or was not a heretic. The secular power reserved to itself the right of punishment, which consisted in one form only, death by fire. This concession did not satisfy the Court of Rome, which desired the establishment of the full Inquisition. The question remained open till 1289, when, on the 4th August, the Holy Office, though still in a modified form, was finally admitted into the machinery of the Venetian State. The Inquisitor was named by the Pope, but he required the *exequatur* of the Doge before he could act. A board of three Venetian nobles, called the *Savi all' heresia*, was appointed to sit as assessors to the Holy Office. Their duty was to protect the rights of Venetian citizens against any ecclesiastical usurpations, and without their presence and assent no act of the sacred tribunal was valid in Venice. This constitution of the Holy Office continued

down to the year 1551, when the friction between the

Republic and the Curia reached a burning point.

1249.

Doge Morosini died in 1253, and the election of his successor, Renier Zeno, gave an opportunity to the

1253.

growing aristocracy to pursue another branch of its political programme. This time it was not the

ducal prerogatives which were curtailed, it was the popular rights which suffered diminution from the progress of the oligarchical principle. It was now provided that, before the publication of the new Doge's name by the forty-one electors, the whole population should swear to accept the man whom the electors announced to have been chosen in conformity with the existing regulations. The people consented. They seem to have been unaware that they were abdicating their constitutional liberties, were being slowly but surely extruded from all share in the government, which was deliberately being concentrated in the hands of the nascent aristocracy; they did not perceive in this new provision a preparation for the final act of disfranchisement.

When Renier Zeno came to the throne the North of Italy was in a state of confusion and of terrible suffering. Frederick II. had closed in gloom, at Fiorentino, the last days of his brilliant career. But his lieutenant, Eccelino, still survived to ravage, burn, and torture; to accumulate round his person those terrible legends which still render his name a terror to the superstitious *contadini* of the Bassanese. The Pope, moved by the dreadful sufferings of the North Italian provinces, launched a crusade against the Ghibelline leader. Two Venetians, Marco Querini and Marco Badoer, took a prominent part in the struggle which ended in the defeat of the tyrant at the bridge of Cassano, and his death, from his wounds, at Vimercate in 1259. In the midst of all this turmoil, though her individual citizens were taking an active part in it, Venice herself remained undisturbed in her lagoons. But not for long. A double source of trouble was preparing in the Levant. Venice was about to be brought into violent collision with her formidable rival Genoa; and the final collapse of the Latin Empire was destined to raise once more

the question of the Venetian people's attitude towards Constantinople.

It was inevitable that the Genoese and the ¹²⁵³⁻ Venetians, both occupying neighbouring quarters in the Levantine cities, each there in order to obtain a monopoly of Eastern commerce, should come to open quarrels, especially when the local authority was as weak as it had become under the rulers of the Latin Empire.

The scene of the struggle was the Levant. At Acre the Venetians and Genoese came to blows over the possession of the church and quarter of S. Saba. This was but the pretext for the opening of a long and deadly struggle for commercial supremacy, a struggle whose various phases we shall have to follow from time to time, till it reaches its climax in the war of Chioggia in 1380.

In the question of S. Saba the Venetians conceived that they had been insulted. Their Bailo reported to the Doge, who sent an embassy to Genoa to demand satisfaction. This was refused. Venice prepared for war. Lorenzo Tiepolo sailed for Acre, and arrived just in time to save the Bailo Giustinian from being driven out of the city. Tiepolo forced his way into the port, breaking the chain which protected its entrance. He burned the Genoese shipping, landed his men, and sacked the Genoese quarter. This was enough for the Genoese, who demanded a truce for two months. Tiepolo returned to Venice in triumph, and is said to have brought with him as trophies of his victory, the drum of a porphyry column, which now stands at the south-west corner of S. Mark's, and the two square pillars near the Porta della Carta of the ducal palace.

But such a truce could only be temporary. It was inevitable that Genoa would endeavour to wipe out the stain, and to recover her position in Acre. Very soon news reached Venice that a large fleet, under the command of Rosso dalla Turca, had sailed from Genoa for the Levant. Instantly thirty ships were despatched from Venice to join the fleet under Tiepolo. This reinforcement brought the Venetian squadron up to thirty-nine ships of war. An engagement was imminent. It was forced on by the Genoese

commander. On the 24th August, 1258, the hostile fleets were in sight of each other. Both leaders knew the importance of the coming struggle. Tiepolo addressed his captains, recommending strict discipline and coolness in the conflict; he reminded them that the fortunes of Venice were in their hands. He was answered by a shout of "Long live S. Mark, patron of the Venetian dominions." The battle proved stern and bloody, but victory declared for the Venetians. Twenty-five Genoese galleys were taken, and the Genoese quarter in Acre was sacked and utterly destroyed. The Pope, however, Alexander IV., viewed with disfavour this internecine war. He made use of all his authority to compel the Genoese, the Pisans, and the Venetians to come to his presence. Terms of a truce were drawn up and accepted. But its duration was brief.

Another event of the highest importance called for Venetian attention in the East, and brought them once more into collision with Genoa. Baldwin, the Latin Emperor, was desperately endeavouring to maintain himself upon the throne of Constantine. His funds were failing him. He had sold his paternal fief of Courtnay; he had pawned the crown of thorns—it had been used once before as security for a loan of 7000 ducats borrowed from the Morosini family; he had given his own son as a guarantee for money raised from the Capello of Venice. An able and unscrupulous man, Michel Paleologus, conceived the idea of restoring the Greek Empire in Constantinople. He was guardian to the young Greek Emperor, John, the nephew of the Emperor Vatace. Popular favour soon raised Michel to share the throne of his ward, and the Greeks resolved to recapture the Imperial city. Instantly Venice was brought face to face with the difficulty which she herself had been so largely instrumental in raising, by her action in the fourth Crusade. Her commercial interests rendered it impossible for her to be indifferent to this Eastern Question which she had created; to her it was of vital importance that she should be on good terms with the ruler of Constantinople. But now Michel Paleologus, a Greek, imbued with all the Greek hatred for the Latins, and above all for the

Venetians, was threatening to expel the enfeebled Baldwin and to become master of the capital. The Venetians hardly dared to abandon Baldwin, and yet they knew quite well that Europe would leave them to support him single-handed, as being the European power most vitally interested in his preservation. The Republic supplied ships and money to the Emperor, but not in sufficient quantities. It soon became obvious that nothing could save the Latin throne. In the beginning of the year 1261, while the Venetian fleet was absent on an expedition against Daphnusia, a city on the Black Sea, Michel's general, Strategopoulos, under cover of night approached the Imperial city. The Golden Gate was seized, the guards slain, and to the cry of "Long live the Emperors John and Michel," the Greek troops poured into the town. The Latin quarters were destroyed; the Emperor Baldwin, the Venetian Bailo, and the Venetian Patriarch, barely escaped with their lives on board a boat which took them out to sea. The fleet of Venice, meanwhile, was returning from its ineffectual attempt on Daphnusia; as the Venetians entered the Bosphorus they saw the flames of the ruined city staining the air. On approaching they found the shores thronged with their fellow-countrymen, who implored them for the shelter of the fleet. As many as could be safely received were taken on board, and the galleys sailed for Venice, leaving Michel Paleologus complete master of Constantinople, and the Latin Empire destroyed for ever.

The Genoese had not failed to make use of this check to Venetian commerce in the Levant. Even before the fall of Constantinople they had come to terms with Paleologus, to whom, as the foe of Venice, they were favourably inclined. When Paleologus became master of Constantinople, though he did not weigh very heavily on the Venetians who chose to remain behind, yet he naturally encouraged and supported his allies the Genoese. He gave them the palace of the Venetian Bailo, and generally placed them in a commanding position in face of their rivals.

The blow to their commerce and the success of their foes was a bitter morsel to the Venetians. They resolved,

if possible, to retrieve their position. They appealed to Europe for help, urging that the recovery of Constantinople and the restoration of the Latin Empire was a sacred obligation upon those who had created it; that was their pretext, but their real reason was the desire to expel the Genoese by the help of European arms. Europe understood the situation and refused assistance.

Venice was thus left alone to continue her struggle for supremacy in the Levant, single-handed against the Genoese supported by the Greeks. Europe looked on indifferent; Paleologus leaned towards Genoa, but in reality he was merely waiting to see what turn events would take. Though the two years' campaign, 1262 to 1264, did not decide the issue of the struggle between the rival republics, yet it might have done so at any moment. Both Genoa and Venice proved that they were aware of the situation by the great efforts they made to place large armaments on the sea. Martino da Canal, a contemporary, has left us a picturesque account of one of the many engagements which took place off the coast of Nauplia. "Messer Giberto Dandolo," he says, "set sail from Venice with the fleet I have described, and urged his course with sail and oar, till he reached Romania, where he went searching for the Genoese, here and there. He put into an island called the Seven Wells to ask for news of them. While lying in this port, a pinnace hove in sight: he thought it was a friendly boat from Venice or from the Prince of the Morea, or from Messer Lorenzo Tiepolo. But suddenly the pinnace put about and fled, and when Messer Giberto saw that he sent out two galleys to spy what was going on at sea. They followed the pinnace till suddenly they came in sight of thirty-nine Genoese galleys and ten pinnaces, towards the island of Porcaria; and you must know that they had had news of Messer Giberto, but he had had no news of them. The Venetian galleys signalled to their commander; and when he saw the signal Messer Giberto, the noble captain of Venice, made no long delay. He sailed out with but thirty-one galleys, nor when he saw the might of the Genoese ships did he quail at all; but like a lion, proud

and secure, he cleared his decks for action, and gave orders that no captain was to bear down upon the enemy before himself. The Genoese came on in close order; each squadron of ten ships had its admiral. Ah, sirs, had ye been there, ye would have seen the Venetians on flame, full of great prowess and daring. When Messer Giberto saw the moment come he cried, 'Now God be with us, and S. Mark of Venice. Up with the anchors and at them.' He charged down on the Genoese and his fleet followed him. Many Venetians leaped on board the Genoese admiral and cut down his flag-staff. One Genoese admiral was slain, and one fled in a boat, after the Venetians had boarded and taken his ship and cut down his flag-staff. Both flag-staffs you must know were firmly chained to their ships. When the other Genoese admirals saw the standards fall they fled. And so the Venetians right well avenged the ruin of their men in Constantinople." A series of such engagements, with varying fortune, led up to a great battle at Trapani, off the coast of Sicily, in which Venice was victorious. That engagement decided the issue of the campaign.

The result of the victory was seen at once in Constantinople. Paleologus had been slowly discovering that the Genoese whom he protected in the Imperial city were troublesome inhabitants. Their insolence led to their being removed from Stamboul, the city, to Galata, the suburb. When the news of the battle of Trapani reached the Emperor he resolved to abandon the Genoese, and to endeavour to enter into treaty with Venice. But at Venice the question did not present itself quite simply. Genoa, for the moment, was no longer formidable. It seemed to one party of Venetian statesman that the proper course for the Republic was a return to its old policy, initiated after the fourth Crusade, of endeavouring to recover Constantinople and to restore the Latin Empire; they urged that Venetian honour required this step. On the other hand, the opposite party pertinently asked who was to hold Constantinople when it was taken; Venice could not single-handed, and Europe would not help her.

The debate resulted in the despatch of ambassadors to the eastern capital, who, after lengthy negotiations, concluded a truce for five years between the Republic and the Emperor. By the terms of this treaty Venice virtually reacquired her old position in the Imperial city, and became once more the chief commercial power in the Greek Empire.

This episode brought to a close the long and brilliant reign of Renier Zeno. The prosperity of Venice was reflected in the amplification of her buildings: the Piazza was surrounded by the Procuratie; the façade of the Basilica had already been adorned with mosaics, relating the story of the translation of S. Mark's body from Alexandria to Venice; the great church of the Frari was begun. Not only the buildings but also the ceremonies of the Republic bore witness to her growing magnificence. The State processions of the Doge more or less resembled one another; and the following description, taken from the chronicle of that picturesque eye-witness, Martino da Canal, may serve as a specimen:—

“So long have I lived,” he says, “in beautiful Venice, that I have seen the processions which Monsignor the Doge makes upon high festivals, and which he would not, for all the world, omit to make each year. On Easter Day, then, the Doge descends from his palace; before him go eight men bearing eight silken banners blazoned with the image of S. Mark, and on each staff are the eagles of the Empire. After the standards come two lads who carry, one the faldstool the other the cushion of the Doge; then six trumpeters who blow through silver trumpets, followed by two with cymbals, also of silver. Comes next a clerk who holds a great cross all beautiful with gold, silver, and precious stones; a second clerk carries the Gospels, and a third a silver censer, and all three are dressed in damask of gold. Then follow the twenty-two canons of S. Mark in their robes, chanting. Behind the canons walks Monsignor the Doge, under the umbrella which Monsignor the Apostle (the Pope) gave him; the umbrella is of cloth of gold, and a lad bears it in his hands. By the Doge's side is the Primiciero of S. Mark's, who wears a bishop's mitre; on his

other side, the priest who shall chaunt the mass. Monsignor the Doge wears a crown of gold and precious stones, and is draped in cloth of gold. Hard by the Doge walks a gentleman who bears a sword of exquisite workmanship; then follow the gentlemen of Venice. In such order Monsignor the Doge comes into the Piazza of S. Mark, which is a stone's-throw long; he walks as far as the church of San Gimignano, and returns thence in the same order. The Doge bears a white wax candle in his hands. They halt in the middle of the Piazza, and three of the ducal chaplains advance before the Doge and chaunt to him the beautiful versicles and responses. Then all enter the church of S. Mark; three chaplains move forward to the altar rails, and say in loud voice, 'Let Christ be victorious, let Christ rule, let Christ reign; to our Lord Renier Zeno, by the grace of God illustrious Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia, conqueror of a fourth part and of half a fourth part of all the Roman Empire, salvation, honour, life and victory, let Christ be victorious, let Christ rule, let Christ reign.' Then the three chaplains say, 'Holy Mary,' and all respond, 'Help thou him.' The Primiciero removes his mitre and begins the mass. Then the Doge shows himself to the people from the loggia and afterwards enters his palace, where he finds the table spread; he dines there, and with him all the chaplains of S. Mark."

The Doge Zeno died on 7th July, 1268, and was buried with great splendour in the church of SS. Giovanni and Paolo, where a part of his tomb is still preserved.

CHAPTER IX

Reform in method of electing the Doge—Rise of wealthy families, result of Levant trade—Method of election—*Lorenzo Tiepolo*, Doge—Famine—Venice cannot feed herself—Jealousy of her neighbours—Venice claims to tax mainland goods in her port—War with Bologna—Lewis IX. : his Crusade ; his contract with Venice—Size, crew, and cost of Venetian ships—*Jacopo Contarini*, Doge—Reduction of the ducal authority—Jail-delivery—Venetian claim to be mistress of the Adriatic—War with Ancona—Venice worsted—*Giovanni Dandolo*, Doge—Further proposals to restore the Latin Empire—Sicilian Vespers—Interdict—Period of misfortunes for Venice—Death and funeral of Doge—The people claim to have a voice in election of his successor—The new aristocracy : its views—*Pietro Gradenigo*, Doge : his character—Genoa and Venice—Affairs of the Latin Empire—Fall of Tripoli, and of St. Jean d'Acre—Venice makes terms with the Mussulman power—Genoa tries to exclude Venice from the Black Sea—Preparations for war—Battle of Ayas—Defeat of Venice—Result in Constantinople—Venetians in the city attacked and pillaged—Great preparations in Venice—*Andrea Dandolo* in command—Battle of Curzola—Defeat of Venice—*Matteo Visconti* mediates—Constitutional reforms—Creation of the oligarchy—Closing of the Great Council.

IN the preceding chapter we have seen Venetian history following two main lines. First, the development of
1268. the State internally by the codification of its laws, the amplification of the city, the initiation of that taste for sumptuous display which remained so marked a characteristic of the Republic ; above all, by a steady pursuit of its constitutional evolution through the curtailment of ducal authority and the abridgment of popular rights. Secondly, Venice was occupied with the solution of the Eastern problem created by the fourth Crusade, which involved her in a struggle with Genoa. This chapter will show how the Republic brought to a close the question of her strictly constitutional growth, and how the form of government became stereotyped as that

rigid oligarchy which remained the admiration and the despair of less fortunate Italian states. The solution of the second problem, the Eastern question, and the commercial position of the Republic, is not reached till more than a century later.

The first of the changes in the constitution which characterise this period, was that by which the method of election to the Dukedom received its final form. The various modifications in that method have been noted from time to time. But now, upon the death of the Doge Zeno, the question was taken into consideration once more. The reason which led the Venetians to adopt this reform seems to have been this. The great influx of wealth, produced by the opening up of Levantine commerce, had caused certain families to emerge above the level of their compeers. This gave rise to jealousies and rivalries between these distinguished houses; and the partisanship of the citizens for a Tiepolo or a Dandolo became so keen, that in order to avoid civic brawling the Great Council passed a law forbidding any Venetian, *parvus vel magnus*, to display upon his house or person, the arms or badge of a Venetian family, and those which then existed were to be erased within fifteen days. There was imminent danger that this spirit of rivalry would spread to the candidature for the Dukedom, and breed corruption. Accordingly, on the death of Zeno, that extraordinarily complicated system of election was introduced which subsisted down to the fall of the Republic.

This system will be most easily grasped in a tabulated form, thus:—

| | | |
|---------------------------------|----|----------------------------------|
| The Great Council by lot choose | 30 | |
| The 30 reduced by lot to | 9 | |
| The 9 vote for | 40 | } with at least 7 votes each. |
| The 40 reduced by lot to | 12 | |
| The 12 vote for | 25 | } with at least 9 votes each. |
| The 25 reduced by lot to | 9 | |
| The 9 vote for | 45 | } with at least 7 votes each. |
| The 45 reduced by lot to | 11 | |

The 11 vote for 41 } with at least
 The 41 elect, by a minimum of twenty-five votes, } 9 votes each.
 The Doge.

1268. When the day for the election of a Doge arrived, it was the duty of the youngest councillor to enter S. Mark's and there to pray fervently; on rising from his knees, he was bound to take the first lad he met, and to conduct him into the ducal palace. The lad was called the *ballotino*, or ballot-boy, and it was his function to take round the ballot-box, and to draw out the slips of paper from the urn when an election by lot, or by ballot, was in progress. The final stage in the election of a Doge was as follows. When the forty-one electors had been chosen, they went in a body to hear mass; they then took an oath that they would act to the best of their ability. A president and two secretaries were appointed, and then each elector, as his name was called out, approached the urn and placed in it a slip of paper with the name of the man he wished to create Doge. The secretaries opened the slips, and drew up a list of all the names which appeared on them; the slips were replaced in another urn, and one was drawn; if the man whose name appeared upon it was present he was bound to retire, and the electors proceeded to discuss his merits and demerits; he was allowed to reply, and then he was balloted for. If he obtained twenty-five ballots in his favour he was declared Doge; if not, a second name was drawn from the urn and the process was resumed.

When the new Doge had been finally elected he was solemnly conducted into the ducal palace, and thence into S. Mark's, where he mounted the large porphyry pulpit and was shown to the people. He then heard mass and swore his coronation oath, after which he received the standard of S. Mark and the ducal mantle from the *Primiciero*. He was then carried round the Piazza in a chair called the *Pozzetto*, or little well; and finally, on his return to the palace, at the head of the Giant's Stairs the senior councillor placed the ducal bonnet, or *cornio*, on his head, and the ceremony of his election was complete. The evening closed with a banquet to the forty-one electors.

The first Doge chosen by this elaborate process was Lorenzo Tiepolo, son of the Doge Jacopo. The beginning of Tiepolo's reign was disturbed by a serious famine, which brought to light two noteworthy points in the position of Venice: first, her inability to feed herself, her dependence upon the importation of grain; and secondly, the deadly jealousy of her neighbours on the Italian mainland; both of them points to be borne in mind when we come to discuss the wisdom or the necessity of that policy which led Venice to create a dominion on the continent. The Republic in her straits appealed to the cities of the Padovano and of the Trevisan marches for corn. She reminded them of the assistance they had received from her during the bloody times of Eccelino. But past favours could not annihilate living jealousy. Venice met with a general refusal to her request for grain. Her reprisals were prompt and showed that she was conscious where her power lay; she imposed heavy dues on all goods consigned to mainland merchants, which arrived in the port of Venice. She endeavoured to renew an ancient provision that all ships carrying such goods should unlade at Venice only, and she appointed officers at the ports along the Adriatic to carry out that order. Such claims were excessive and beyond the power of Venice, at that time, to enforce. She became embroiled in a war with Bologna, in which she was worsted. Peace was concluded. Venice was forced to admit the right of the Bolognese to import corn through Ancona and the cities of the Romagna, though she succeeded in imposing a limit upon the amount which might pass through those ports each year, and established superintendents there to see that the amount was not exceeded.

At this time Lewis IX. of France was preparing for his disastrous Crusade. In the year 1268 he opened negotiations with Venice for the conveyance of his army to Africa. Though the bargain was never concluded, the Republic tabulated a contract which is valuable as showing us the transport power of the Venetian fleet, and the price which they asked for their services.

The crews of the Venetian warships at this period were

free citizens ; Venice did not use condemned criminals till much later. Two reasons may account for this fact. 1268. First, the city was not large, nor was it as yet corrupted by wealth and by idle classes ; it therefore could not furnish many galley slaves to serve at the oar. But secondly, even had there been a sufficient number of criminals to man the fleet, it is doubtful whether the Venetians would have employed them at that time. As long as the tactics of naval warfare included boarding operations as a most important feature, it is obvious that condemned criminals could not be employed, for it would be dangerous to entrust them with arms. Later on, when, to some extent, ramming took the place of boarding, the galley slave, chained to his bench, which he was not required to leave, could be employed precisely as we employ machinery.

When crews were required for a naval expedition orders were given to the head of each district to enrol all males between twenty and sixty years of age, in groups of twelve each. One man was chosen by lot out of each group of twelve, and was obliged to serve in the first draft ; if more men were called for, a fresh lot was cast, and so on. The man on service received five lire a month from the State, and one lire a month from each of the remaining members of his group of twelve who did not go on service. This pay amounted to about two francs a day of our current money ; besides this he was supplied with food. Exemptions were permitted on payment of six lire a month in addition to the quota which fell to each man's share as member of a group of twelve.

On this occasion the fleet contracted for was to consist of—

1. The *Santa Maria*, 108 feet long and 38 feet wide, deck measurement ; and 70 feet long and $9\frac{1}{2}$ feet wide, keel measurement : depth of hold $15\frac{1}{2}$ feet. The hire of the ship with its crew of 110 men and all her fittings complete was to cost 1400 silver marks, or 70,000 francs.

2. The *Roccaforte*, 110 feet long and 40 feet wide, deck measurement ; and 70 feet long and $9\frac{1}{2}$ feet wide, keel measurement ; depth of hold 21 feet. The hire of the ship with its crew of 110 men and all fittings complete was to cost 1400 silver marks, or 70,000 francs.

3. The *San Nicolo*, 100 feet long and 25 feet wide, deck measurement ; and 75 feet long and 9 feet wide, keel measurement ; depth of hold 23 feet. The hire of the ship with a crew of 1268. 86 was to cost 1100 marks, or 55,000 francs.

4. Seven new ships, each of them 80 feet long and 38 feet wide, deck measurement ; and 58 feet long and 8 feet wide, keel measurement ; depth of hold $18\frac{1}{2}$ feet. The hire of each ship with its crew of 50 complete to cost 700 marks or 35,000 francs ; a total of 245,000 francs.

5. Five old ships, belonging to Venetian merchants, of the same build and price as the preceding seven, 175,000 francs.

6. The King wished to know how much space each knight, with two servants, one horse, and one groom, would occupy. The agents of the Doge inquire how much bread, wine, meat, cheese, and provender the King intends to allow for each knight and his equipage ; how long the passage will last, and what allowance of water each will have ; how much oats and hay he intends to put on board for each horse, and how much water the horse will consume per diem.

7. The reply is that each man will require a quart of corn in bread and flour, a quart and a half of wine, and the same of water, and salt meat, cheese, oil, and vegetables.

8. Each horse will require 4 quarts of corn ; a bundle of hay, 5 feet by 9 ; and 15 quarts of water per diem.

The contract was for a year. The troops to be conveyed were 4000 horses and 10,000 men. Besides the ships above mentioned the Venetians would supply a transport, on board of which the following fares were to be charged :—

For a knight, his two servants, his groom, and his horse, $8\frac{1}{2}$ marks.

For a knight alone for a place abaft the main-mast, $2\frac{1}{2}$ marks.

For a squire, a place on deck, 7 ounces of silver.

For a groom and horse, $4\frac{1}{2}$ marks.

For any pilgrim, including food, $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mark.

The Doge engaged to supply firewood for cooking. The fleet was to be ready in June.

Supposing Romanin to be correct in his estimate of the mark as worth 50 francs, we find that the Venetians asked 24,600 pounds sterling for the use of fifteen ships and one transport for a year ; and that these vessels between them carried an average of 252 horses and 625 men, besides the crews. When we consider the amount of provisions for men and horses which must have been required, it remains

an insoluble problem how ships of the burthen described above, could have been equal to the task. Lewis,^{1268.} however, declined the terms demanded by Venice, It was a Genoese fleet which conveyed him and the chivalry of France to their death on the African coast.

^{1275.} The Doge, Lorenzo Tiepolo, died in 1275, and was succeeded by Jacopo Contarini. The coronation oath of the new Doge proves once more how determined the aristocracy were to use this instrument for the reduction of the ducal power. Contarini was called upon to swear that neither he nor his sons nor his nephews would accept fiefs from foreign princes, nor raise loans for their private use, nor marry a foreigner, without the consent of the Council. He pledged himself to pay all his debts within eight days. Every two months the memory of his duties was to be refreshed by reading his coronation oath. His sons were debarred from holding the post of governor, but they might command a ship, and might serve as ambassadors. The coronation oath, however, was not concerned entirely with the personal position of the Doge and his family; it contained from time to time excellent provisions for the better government of the State. In the present instance we find perhaps the earliest instance of a jail-delivery rendered obligatory by law; the Doge swore that he would "cause every prisoner who is detained in our prisons to be examined by our officers within a month of his arrest. We will, further, send our notary once a month to draw up a list of all prisoners, both in the upper and in the lower prisons, and will cause our judges to discharge their cases, absolving or condemning according to the nature of the offence."

It was inevitable that the growing importance of the Republic, her commanding position in the Adriatic, should rouse the jealousy of other seaboard towns. Already, at the Council of Lyons, the people of Ancona had made complaints against the absolute authority which Venice claimed in the Gulf. Venice defended her position on three grounds—ancient usage, infeudation by Pope Alexander III., and services rendered in suppressing piracy and keeping the Saracens out of those waters. The truth seems to be that Venice had

no right *de jure* to supremacy over the Adriatic, but *de facto* she was the greatest power in that sea; and that position she endeavoured to maintain by force of arms. 1275.

War broke out between Venice and Ancona; it proved disastrous to the Republic. Her first fleet was wrecked, and reinforcements, despatched before news of the misfortune could reach Venice, ran right into the arms of the enemy. The situation was still further complicated by the fact that the Emperor Rudolph had recently made a donation of the Romagna, including Ancona, to Pope Nicolas III., and the Republic thus became not merely engaged in an unprosperous war with her 1278.

rival but embroiled with the Pope as well. The difficulties which surrounded the Venetians gave an opportunity to the townships of Istria and to the islanders of Crete to rise in revolt, and these accumulated misfortunes led to the enforced abdication of the Doge, grown now too old to govern the State with vigour. His successor, Giovanni Dandolo, brought the war with Ancona to a conclusion; but it is noticeable that in the treaty of peace not a 1280. word is said about the supremacy of the Gulf, which was thus left an open question to be the fruitful source of annoyance to the Republic.

Western Europe, though it had shown itself indifferent as long as it saw Venice bearing all the burden of an attempt to recover Constantinople and to restore the Latin Empire, was not, when Venice ceased her efforts, content to leave the Greeks in undisputed possession of the Imperial city. Charles of Anjou and Philip of France continually urged the Republic to join them in an expedition against Paleologus. Venice was willing, for she believed that the restitution of the Latin Empire through her means would secure for her a leading position in the Levant. Accordingly, in 1281, the terms of a treaty were agreed upon. The Venetian fleet and the French army were to meet at Brindisi in 1283. But the whole design was frustrated by the explosion which followed the Sicilian Vespers. Charles of Anjou had lost his importance; Venice had neither will nor power to attack Constantinople alone; and, in 1285,

she signed a new truce with Andronicus Paleologus, and
1280. forbade the clergy of Venice, the Patriarch of Grado,
and the Bishop of Castello, to preach the Crusade
against her new ally. This action brought down upon the
Republic the wrath of the Church, and she was placed
under an interdict.

The period was one of humiliation and of suffering for
the State. Her small wars were unsuccessful; the
1285. interdict weighed upon her conscience; an earth-
quake and inundation ruined many buildings. So great was
the distress that the Government found itself obliged to
undertake the sale of grain at a loss, and to order a forced
subsidy to the monasteries, which at that time acted as
relieving officers for the poor.

But this period of depression was soon to be succeeded
by one of extraordinary interest and activity. The reign of
the next Doge, Pietro Gradenigo, will display to us the
Republic of Venice, internally arriving at the full maturity
of her constitutional growth; while, on the other hand,
externally she suffered a disastrous and almost a fatal defeat
at the hands of Genoa, her great rival in the Levant.

At the funeral ceremony of the Doge Dandolo the
people endeavoured, almost for the last time, to make
their voice heard in the choice of his successor. The
name which found favour with the crowd was that of
Jacopo Tiepolo, son of the Doge Lorenzo, and grandson of
the great Doge Jacopo. It is not improbable that this
preference indicated a desire to protest against the growing
power of the younger commercial aristocracy, represented
by such families as those of Dandolo and Gradenigo—
the aristocracy which was called into existence by the
increase of commercial prosperity consequent upon the fall
of Constantinople, the work, to a large extent, of Enrico Dan-
dolo, a member of the rising faction. It was this aristocracy
whose political views were becoming dominant in the State;
whose oligarchical bias was effectuating itself through the
slow suppression of the Doge and the steady extrusion of the
people from all share in the machinery of the Government.
The people were at length aware, though now too late, that

they had allowed their rights to be stolen from them little by little; and so their cry was for a Tiepolo, a member of a family not only privately hostile to the Dandolo, but representing a different current in Venetian politics. They were not to have their way, however. There was an objection to Tiepolo too obvious for his enemies to miss; he was the son and the grandson of a Doge; to elect him would be a dangerous return to that dynastic tendency which it had been one of the chief endeavours of Venetian domestic policy to eradicate. Pressure was brought to bear upon Tiepolo. He was informed that if he persisted in his candidature he risked plunging the State into civil war. Tiepolo's patriotism forbade him to run that risk; he yielded, and retired to his country villa beyond Mestre. Pietro Gradenigo, a member of the new aristocracy, and married to Morosina Morosini, was elected. The people received the announcement in sullen silence. Their previous clamour and their present gloom presaged the storm which was to burst in the conspiracy of Bajamonte Tiepolo.

Gradenigo at the time of his election was a young man, only thirty-eight years old. He was already unpopular, as his nickname of *Pierazzo* (hulking Peter) shows. But he possessed great ability and experience, and was endowed with courage and an iron will. His reign afforded him ample opportunity for the display of these qualities. The news of his election to the Dukedom reached him in Capo d'Istria, whence he was brought with an escort of ten galleys to Venice.

Gradenigo found himself face to face with two great questions in Venetian history—her struggle with Genoa, and her constitutional development; and these two lines we shall follow separately.

After the defeat of Genoa at the battle of Trapani in 1264, and the treaty with Michel Paleologus in 1268, renewed with his successor, Andronicus, in 1285, Venice had to a certain extent recovered her position in Constantinople, which had been so seriously shaken by the expulsion of Baldwin and the fall of the Latin Empire. But the blow had been too severe to be remedied with rapidity. Venice no longer enjoyed that preponderating influence, as

against the Genoese, which she once possessed and still desired. The unhappy Latin Empire, established by the Crusades after such toil and so much pains, lay now in its death agony. Constantinople had fallen; but the remains of the Christian dominion still lingered in Tripoli and Palestine. No exhortation of Pope or Emperor or King, however, could raise Europe once again to arm in defence of the Cross. Venice, who had most at stake in the East, made some spasmodic efforts to save Tripoli, in Syria, but the city fell to the Mussulmans in April, 1289; and this disaster was followed by the final blow to the Christians in the East, when St. Jean d'Acre capitulated in 1291.

1291. Venice was not long in deciding on her course of action. She came to terms with the new power, though infidel. In 1299 the Republic signed a treaty

1299. with the Sultan Nasser Mohammed, by which she acquired extensive commercial privileges in Palestine, with liberty to visit the holy sepulchre under safe conduct, thereby combining business and religion in a way which the Crusades had never achieved. The Venetians rapidly began to develop their advantages, and we find them trading in "goods forbidden to the Christians"—that is to say, in slaves, in arms, and wood for shipbuilding, merchandise which the Popes had strictly prohibited Christians from furnishing to pagans. But the Genoese, who were strong in the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, did not intend to allow the Venetians an undisturbed enjoyment of their advantages. The fall of the Christian dominion in the East really left the traffic of the Levant open to the strongest arm. Genoa and Venice were about to come into collision over the prize. The Genoese began by attempting to exclude the Venetians from the Black Sea. The Republic considered this a *casus belli*. Great preparations for war were made in Venice. Not only were the citizens enrolled by the method of groups of twelve, but a committee was appointed to draw up a list of the more wealthy nobles, and to impose upon them the duty of arming one, two, or three galleys, in proportion to their wealth.

The fleet sailed in October, 1294, and came up with

the Genoese at Ayas, in the Gulf of Iskenderun, the extreme corner of the Mediterranean towards Asia Minor. The Genoese commander won a decided victory by ¹²⁹⁴ superior tactics. Seeing that he was defective in numbers, he adopted the device of binding all his vessels together and bridging with planks from one to another. The Venetians, confident of success, would not listen to the wiser counsel which urged them to break up this strong formation by means of fire-ships, before attacking. They had a fair wind, and bore down on the Genoese, only to find their front impregnable. The sailors of the Genoese fleet—thanks to the bridges between their ships—were able to concentrate at any point which was especially menaced. The Venetians were utterly defeated, with a loss of twenty-five galleys.

The result of this defeat soon made itself felt at Constantinople, where the Emperor Paleologus bestowed all his favour and support upon the Genoese, encouraging them in their constant acts of hostility to the Venetians. These brawls ended in a set attack upon the Venetian quarter; many were slain, their ships destroyed, and the Emperor even imprisoned the Venetian Bailo, Marco Bembo. These misfortunes set Venice in a blaze. The whole city lent itself to the preparation of a fleet which was placed under the command of Ruggiero Morosini. He sailed through the Dardanelles, seized and burned the shipping which he found, pushed on to the walls of Constantinople, and cast anchor opposite the Imperial palace. He demanded satisfaction; it was refused. He brought his Greek prisoners upon deck, and in sight of their townsmen and their Emperor he caused them to be scourged. Finally, Andronicus was forced to purchase the departure of Morosini at an exorbitant price, with which the victor returned to Venice.

But the Venetian triumph was short-lived. In 1298, on 8th September, the Admiral of the Republic, Andrea Dandolo, ¹²⁹⁸ cruising in the Adriatic with a fleet of ninety-five sail, met the Genoese commander, Lamba Doria, in the waters of Curzola. Doria's tactics were superior. He detached a squadron of fifteen galleys with instructions to remain out of

sight, but to sail down upon the enemy when the battle was half over. The conflict began early in the morning, 1298. and Doria succeeded in placing the rising sun at his back; he bore down upon the Venetians, who had not merely the morning breeze against them, but the sun in their eyes. In spite of these disadvantages, however, and thanks chiefly to the splendid fighting of the Chioggiotti, the Venetians were winning, when the fifteen galleys in ambush suddenly appeared upon the scene of conflict, and altered the whole aspect of the fight. The Venetians, taken in the flank, fell into confusion; the Genoese recovered their spirit; the battle ended in the utter defeat of Venice. Andrea Dandolo refused to survive his disgrace; in the night he dashed his brains out against the side of his galley. Among the many prisoners captured and taken to Genoa was Marco Polo, the traveller. To his loss of liberty at Curzola we doubtless owe the possession of his incomparable book of travels, which he dictated in his Genoese prison, to wile away the time.

Victorious though Genoa had been at Curzola, it was not a cheap victory; her losses were little if at all inferior to those of Venice. The long struggle had told severely on both Republics; although Venice immediately took steps to fit out a new fleet. Finally, in 1299, Matteo Visconti, the lord of Milan, succeeded in acting as mediator. A peace was stipulated. The terms were honourable to both parties, and show no traces of the fact that Venice was concluding it after a defeat. The peace was to be perpetual. If Venice attacked the Greek Empire and Genoa defended it, that was not to constitute a breach of treaty. If Genoa went to war with Pisa, Venice was not to interfere. The captains of Genoese and Venetian vessels were to respect each other's flag. In fact the treaty constituted an obligation upon both Republics to abstain from any molestation or interference one with the other, and closed, though only for a short time, one period of this long struggle between Genoa and Venice.

To turn now to the second group of events which distinguished the reign of Pietro Gradenigo, the final stages in the constitutional growth of Venice. We have seen from time to

time how the aristocracy, which was emerging, thanks to its commercial wealth, had been steadily pursuing its two objects of reducing the Doge and extruding the people from all share in the Government; but it had not yet succeeded in becoming an oligarchy strictly speaking, a close caste in the State. From the date of the creation of the first Great Council in 1172, the tendency had undoubtedly been in that direction. The Great Council was still nominally chosen from among the wealthier as well as from the poorer citizens; but by a natural process we find certain families gradually gaining a preponderance—for example, in the year 1293 there were eighteen Contarini, eleven Morosini, and ten Foscari in the Council. By the famous measure, known as the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, or closing of the Great Council, this tendency was on the point of being confirmed. The oligarchy, which had been slowly forming itself during the last century and a quarter, was about to become suddenly rigid, and Venice to acquire, at one stroke, that peculiar constitution which distinguished her throughout the rest of her career.

But the closing of the Great Council was in no sense a *coup d'état*; it was rather the last and the inevitable step in a long process. As far back as 1286, in the reign of Giovanni Dandolo, a motion had been introduced to provide that only those whose paternal ancestors had sat in the Great Council should be eligible to that Council for the future. We have no record of the debate upon this momentous proposal; but here for the first time we find a programme, a declaration, that there was a party in the State desirous of rendering the basis of the Venetian constitution a close oligarchy. The measure was thrown out by 82 votes against 48, with 10 neutrals. Ten years later, on 6th March, 1296, the Doge Gradenigo, a strong partisan of the rising aristocracy and its policy, reopened the question, but his proposals were rejected. Then, with that determination and strength of will for which he was remarkable, Gradenigo set himself to override opposition, and to carry to a conclusion the political aspirations of the party to which he belonged.

On the last day of February, 1297, the following law was proposed and passed:—

1. That the Council of Forty are to ballot, one by one, the names of all those who during the last four years have had a seat in the Great Council. Those who receive twelve votes and upwards are to belong to the Great Council.

2. On return from absence abroad, a fresh ballot is required.

3. Three electors shall be chosen to submit names of fresh candidates for the Great Council, on the authority and approval of the Doge. The three electors hold office for one year.

4. The present law may not be revoked except with the consent of 5 out of 6 ducal Councillors, 25 of the Council of Forty, and two-thirds of the Great Council.

The first clause of this law at once created a special caste in the State, those who had during the last four years enjoyed a seat in the Great Council. The Great Council, the basis of the whole constitution and the sole source of office in the State, was thus closed to all but this privileged class. The third clause, however, provided a slight opening through which it was still possible for a Venetian citizen, who did not belong to the favoured class, to save himself from disenfranchisement, and to retain his rights in the State. The three electors had the faculty of submitting names for ballot to the Council of Forty. They, however, obeying the spirit which was animating the whole of this reform, very soon laid down a rule for their own guidance in the choice of names to be submitted to the Forty; they declared that only those who could prove that a paternal ancestor had sat in the Great Council, after its creation in 1176, should now be eligible as members of the present Great Council. It is in this provision that we find the essence of the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*. By it the State was arbitrarily divided into three classes—(1) those who had never in their own person, nor in that of their parents, enjoyed a seat in the Great Council. These, the vast majority of Venetians, were disfranchised, declared ineligible, rendered voiceless for ever in the government of their country: (2) those whose ancestors had sat in the Great Council; these were eligible, and as a matter of fact were gradually admitted to the Great Council. It is noteworthy that the numbers of the Great

Council rose rapidly after the *Serrata*; in 1295 it reckoned 260 members; in 1296, 210; in 1311, 1017; in 1340, 1212: (3) finally, those who were already ¹²⁹⁷ inside the Council, that is those who had held a seat in the Council during the four-years preceding 1297.

Such was the famous *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, which gave to the Republic of Venice its peculiar oligarchical character. The *Serrata* derived its importance from the fact that the Great Council was the root of Venetian political life, the source of all office, the basis of the constitutional pyramid. Exclusion from it meant political annihilation. And now, by this act, the majority of Venetians were excluded; the minority had succeeded in establishing a monopoly in the government. The work was not completed at one stroke; various minor developments, rounding off the design of the triumphant oligarchy, required to be introduced. Election by the grace of the Doge and the vote of the Forty was rendered more and more difficult, thereby closing even that port through which some slight stream of popular blood might flow in to reanimate the governing caste. In 1315 a list of all those who were eligible for election was compiled. The scrutiny of this catalogue was entrusted to the *Avogadori di Comun*, and became continually more and more severe. To ensure the purity of the blood they opened a register of marriages and births. Illegitimate children, or those legitimated after wedlock, or those born in wedlock of a patrician father and a non-patrician mother, were rigidly excluded. Thus the aristocracy proceeded to construct itself more and more upon a purely oligarchical basis. A consideration of the results produced by this great constitutional change, which led up to the one serious internal revolution in Venice, the conspiracy of Bajamonte Tiepolo, will form the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER X

Difference between Venice and other Italian City-States—Strength and weakness of the Oligarchy—Opposition to the closing of the Council—Marin Bocconio—War of Ferrara—First step on the mainland of Italy—Quarrel with the Pope—Interdict—Results—Division in the city—Venetian garrison in Ferrara killed—Party feuds in Venice—The beginnings of the Tiepoline conspiracy—Bajamonte sent for: his advice—Details of the plot: its execution and failure—Fate of the conspirators—The Council of Ten: temporary at first; continued in office from year to year: made permanent—Nature of the Ten—Method of election—The Capi: their duties—Meeting-place—Composition of the tribunal: its procedure—View of the Venetian constitution.

THOUGH we have frequently had occasion to remark that Venice, as yet, belonged in no way to the Italian peninsula, that her constitutional history is not to be judged or studied by a comparison between the lines of evolution pursued in other Italian City-States; yet, just at this most important moment of her political life, a glance at what was taking place in the rest of North Italy will not be un instructive. For in a certain sense the spirit which was governing the development of the mainland cities penetrated into the quieter waters of the lagoon.

It was precisely at this epoch that the despots, the Signori, began to emerge in almost every Italian city. The outcome of a reaction against the long and exhausting wars of Guelf and Ghibelline, that struggle between the natural municipal instinct of the Italians and the idea of feudalism imposed upon Italy by foreign domination, which had torn each Italian commune in sunder, these Signori came to their sovereignty through diplomacy rather than through blood; they crushed the few families that might rival them, it is true, and they indulged in bloody caprices, but they left

the mass of the citizens so free and so peaceful that they hardly knew that they were being ruled. 1297. The government of the Signori was, on the whole, humane. Their title was to be found in the consent of a population wearied with excessive bloodshed, longing for the quiet which they now enjoyed. Accordingly we find the Visconti emerging in Milan, the Scalas in Verona, the Carraresi in Padua, and so on in almost every important commune in North Italy. A somewhat similar movement had been taking place in Venice; but the issue, as we shall see, was widely different. Venice had been subject to a process of preparation very unlike to that which had formed the mainland cities; she had not come under the donation of Pepin and the pact of Charles the Great; she therefore was influenced very slightly by the dualism between Pope and Emperor, which was of such vast moment in the history of other Italian townships; she had never passed under the yoke of the feudal system, and therefore there were no arbitrary divisions in the State, no dominant principle running counter to the national instinct. She had been enabled, by the fortunate accident of her position, to pursue her own natural line of political evolution from her democratic germ, undisturbed by extraneous influences. And so when other Italian cities emerged from the crisis with an individual despot as lord of the State, Venice achieved her constitutional maturity with a close oligarchy as master of her destinies. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of this fact in the history of the Republic. To this, no doubt, she owed her great longevity. An individual despot, however beneficent, was exposed to a thousand dangers; his family might become exhausted or might die out; the assassin's dagger was always near him; under no circumstances could he escape the jealousy and the ambition of his neighbours. But the oligarchy was immortal; the assassin's dagger is powerless against a corporation; in a multitude of councillors there is thought to be safety; the people of Venice were cajoled into acquiescence; and the members of the ruling class, when once their order became a close caste,

were one and all interested in the maintenance of that order. Venice achieved a constitution, which in comparison with the constitutions of the mainland States, was as iron to a reed. But this very strength and solidity concealed a latent danger. For when the mainland despots fell one by one, it was inevitable that Venice, the only permanent power in their neighbourhood, should seize their territory and thereby create that land Empire which embroiled her in European politics, altered the whole course of her history, and ultimately contributed to her ruin.

That result, however, no Venetian could have foreseen or, foreseeing, have avoided. In the meantime Venice, by the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, completed the period of her constitutional growth, and took her place among European nations as the State with the maturest and the most powerful political mechanism.

The oligarchy was formally created by the *Serrata*, and was more coherent in its essential structure than any of its neighbour despotisms. But the despot had one signal advantage over the oligarchy; in executive rapidity he was infinitely its superior. The *Maggior Consiglio*, and even the Senate, was too large a body to be executively efficient; the Doge, as we have seen, was an object of suspicion, and had been reduced to a nonentity in the constitution. The oligarchy was created, it is true, but it wanted an arm. How it supplied this defect, and so completed and rounded off the Venetian constitution, by the creation of the Council of Ten, shall be explained in the present chapter.

The closing of the Great Council was a movement unpopular with the majority of Venetians. It was not to pass unchallenged. Twice in the next ten years Venetians were to shed Venetian blood as the seal of the new order of things.

It appears that the first protest against the new constitution came from the people alone. In the year 1300, Marin Bocconio, a man of wealth but not of noble blood, prepared a plot for the overthrow of the Government. The chronicles detail the picturesque incident of Bocconio and his followers knocking at the door of the Great Council,

and claiming their right to a voice in the government of the State; the Doge is said to have invited them to enter one by one in order to receive their due; but he did ^{1300.} not say what he considered that due to be. They accepted the invitation and entered: one after another they were seized and killed to the number of ten, "and so," says the chronicle, "ended this conspiracy, in such wise that no one dare any more open his mouth after a like fashion." Stricter history may lead us to believe that the conspirators were arrested before they could mature their plans, and their leaders hanged, *turpissime*, that is head downwards, between the columns near the Porta della Carta. However that may be, Bocconio's conspiracy was crushed. The triumphant Doge and his party seized the opportunity to render admission to the ruling caste still more difficult. For the future no new name could be presented as a candidate for the *Maggior Consiglio*, unless its owner had obtained upwards of twenty votes in the Council of Forty.

The first demonstration of hostility proved a failure. The second and more formidable protest was delayed for another ten years. And as external disasters had a considerable share in precipitating events, we must turn now to a consideration of what was taking place outside Venice.

We have seen that Ferrara, from earliest times, had always been an object of commercial interest to Venice. The papal claims to suzerainty over the city were based upon the inheritance of Matilda, Countess of Tuscany; and when Ferrara was seized and held by the Ghibelline leader, Salinguerra, on behalf of the Emperor Frederick II., Venice had lent most valuable aid in capturing the place, and in establishing there the Este family as protégés of the Holy See. There is little doubt that Venice entertained the idea of making herself mistress of Ferrara, should a favourable opportunity present itself. With this object in view she maintained intimate relations in the city by means of her Visdomino, or representative there. She assisted Azzo d'Este against the enemies, whom the aggrandisement of his family procured for him in Bologna, Verona, and Mantua; and when he fell ill the Government sent three nobles to

Ferrara with orders to spare no efforts in order that the succession might be directed in a way agreeable to the Republic.

1300. The question of the succession was likely to raise a dispute. Azzo had no legitimate children; his brothers, Francesco and Aldrovandino, had. But Azzo had one natural son, Fresco, who also had a son, Folco; and this grandson Azzo named his heir. Azzo died on 1st February,

1308. Fresco endeavoured to protect his son's inheritance against his uncles, Francesco and Aldrovandino. But he was weak and unpopular. In his straits he appealed for help to Venice, who sent her militia into the city. Another actor, however, was about to appear on the scene. The Pope, as over-lord of Ferrara, asserted his right to direct the succession. He supported Francesco, and despatched his troops to take over the city in the name of the Church. In the face of this new complication, Fresco ceded to the Republic his son's claims on Ferrara, and retired to Venice, leaving the lagoon city to learn, for the first time in her history, what difficulties were implied in any attempt on her part to form a mainland State. The troops of Francesco d'Este and of the Pope entered Ferrara, which was occupied in the name of the Church. But the Venetians still held the strongest position, the Castle Tedaldo, whence they could bombard the city. The Pope sent imperative orders that the Venetians were to evacuate the fortress at once; the Venetians replied that they were in their rights, by virtue of the concession which Fresco had made in their favour.

The situation was one of great gravity and of the highest importance in the history of the Republic. It admirably illustrates one of the difficulties to which Venice was exposed. For it was inevitable that a growing State, such as the lagoon city, young, hardy, vigorous, should endeavour to expand; at the same time any extension on the mainland of Italy deprived her of that isolation which had been so beneficial in her early development, embroiled her in the endless complications of the Italian peninsula, and, as we shall presently see, exposed to view one of the most serious defects in her remarkable constitution, her executive

incompetence. In fact, Venice, during this episode of the Ferrarese war, gave the first indications of a desire to extend upon the Italian mainland, a tendency which was to be slowly developed until it attained its fullest expression in the reign of the Doge Francesco Foscari, in 1308.

When the news of the papal attitude reached Venice, the gravity of the situation was immediately appreciated. The Great Council was summoned to deliberate. The radical defect of the new oligarchy, its weakness in executive, its cumbersomeness and difficulty of movement, were felt at once. The remedy applied demonstrates a natural bias towards administration through a series of colleges, or committees, a tendency in the *Maggior Consiglio* to delegate all those executive powers which it possessed, in theory at least, as the basis of the ruling oligarchy. This bias is characteristic of the Venetian constitution, and was presently to receive its most conspicuous example in the creation of the Council of Ten. The Great Council now appointed a committee to manage the affairs of Ferrara. This college was entrusted with powers to reply to the papal ambassadors, who had been sent to demand the restitution of Castle Tedaldo and indemnification for damage received. They did so, asserting that Ferrara was a free possession of the d'Este family, which was therefore at liberty to dispose of it; the d'Este had done so by ceding it to Venice, whose it now was. And to remove any doubt as to the nature of Venetian intentions on Ferrara, and their determination to possess the city absolutely, proposals for an accommodation, by which the Republic was to receive the Ferrarese as a fief of the Church in return for a tribute, were curtly refused. Then the papal legates threatened a bull of excommunication and interdict against Venice, her Doge, her councils, her generals; against all who had assisted to oppose the papal arms in Ferrara; above all, against the fighting Chioggiotti. All Venetian goods in Ferrara were to be confiscated, all commercial contracts annulled, all traffic with Venice suspended, unless the Republic abandoned her present line of action within ten days. The *Maggior Consiglio* met once more to deliberate,

and the speech said to have been then delivered by the
1308. Doge, clearly indicates the political conceptions of
the new party which had just come into power; the tone is militant, aggressive, haughty. "It is the duty," said Gradenigo, "of every good prince, and of every worthy citizen, to enlarge the State, to increase the Republic, and to seek its weal by every means in his power. Favourable occasions present themselves but rarely, and they are wise who know how to seize them the moment they offer themselves; while those are either foolish or mad who do not see them, or, seeing them, do not know how to use them. Children are terrified by words; valiant men fear not even the sword's point." Very significant phrases in the mouth of a Venetian Doge, showing in the clearest light the attitude of the new oligarchy towards the policy of mainland Empire and towards the Curia of Rome. The opposition was led by a Tiepolo, and the reply was such as might have been looked for in refutation of the doctrines of expediency and egotism, implicit in the Doge's speech. Tiepolo urged principles as against opportunism; it was the duty of a good prince and of all worthy citizens to keep the fear of God before their eyes, and that was not to be done by attacking his vicar on the earth; no war could be successful, no policy fruitful, if founded upon impiety and injustice. But the party of the Doge, the party in the ascendant, was too strong and too confident in its young powers to pay any heed to such abstractions as these. The Council voted to retain Ferrara. The result of the vote served to exasperate the defeated party; the city was divided into two camps, those who held with the Doge and those who held with Tiepolo; brawls, deeds of violence, murders, became frequent; the citizens began to arm. It seemed that Venice was on the high road to civil war.

But the hatred of the Doge and his policy was to be still further exasperated by the results of that policy. On
1309. 27th March, 1309, the Pope published his excommunication and interdict; the clergy were ordered to leave Venetian territory. Instantly all the accumulated jealousy of Venetian commercial prosperity burst out. In Asia Minor and in England, no less than in Italy itself,

Venetian merchants were threatened in their lives and despoiled of their property. Venetian commerce was everywhere ruined; with the Saracens only, as ¹³⁰⁹ with pagans for whom the thunders of Rome were meaningless, could the Republic preserve those commercial relations without which she was lost.

In this moment of supreme danger and discouragement the Doge and his party showed the stuff of which they were made; the new oligarchy justified its right to govern by the firmness and the vigour of its conduct. The day on which the Government received notice that the bull had been published, it ordered its Podestà in Ferrara to retire to the fortress of Castle Tedaldo, and to continue to exercise his functions from that stronghold. It also instructed the captain in Ferrara to make an estimate of the men and munitions which he would require, and promised that they should be sent to him at once; for, as they added, "We are resolved to act like virile men for the conservation of our rights and your honour." But the fortune of war was against them. Plague broke out in the city. Castle Tedaldo was pressed ever closer and closer. At last it fell, and the whole Venetian garrison was put to the sword. Events, which we shall have now to relate, were taking place inside Venice which rendered impossible any further attempt to hold Ferrara. The Republic sent ambassadors to the Papal Court in Avignon, and in June, 1311, a reconciliation took place, in virtue of which the Republic paid a certain indemnity to the Pope, and received his permission, whatever it was worth, to resume their trade with the Ferrarese.

In Venice we have seen party feeling rising higher and higher. The closing of the Great Council had exasperated a large section of the community, which was thereby excluded from all share in the government; the Ferrarese war, the interdict, and the ruin of Venetian trade increased the animosity against the new oligarchy and its Doge, the cause of all these disasters. On the other hand, Gradenigo and his party were in power; they were firm, they were strong. Street brawling became so frequent that the Government issued an order forbidding any citizen to carry arms. The

police magistrates, the *Signori di Notte*, were entrusted with the enforcement of the law. Matters reached a crisis
1309. over the election of Doimo, Count of Veglia, to a seat as a ducal councillor. He was supported by the Doge's party, and hotly opposed by Jacopo Querini and the Tiepoline faction, who demonstrated with efficacy that, by law, Counts of Dalmatia were excluded from all branches of the constitution, except the *Maggior Consiglio* and the Senate. The struggle grew so fierce that they came to blows in the council chamber. But the oligarchy possessed a majority in the Great Council. Doimo was elected. The result had an instant effect in the Piazza and in the streets. The partisans of Tiepolo and those of Dandolo went in armed groups. They met and fought; and some were wounded. One evening, as Piero Querini and his followers were standing near the arcades at Rialto, Marco Morosini, a *Signore di Notte*, chanced to pass by; partly in discharge of his duty, more from faction venom, Morosini came up to Querini and said, "Let me search you." Piero replied by a violent kick in the stomach, which threw Morosini to the ground; the Querini men drew their weapons, and falling on the watch put them to flight. This overt act of rebellion on the part of so highly-placed a family as the Querini brought on the final stage in the crisis. Marco Querini, the brother of Piero, called a meeting of the disaffected. He drew a picture of the present condition of the Republic, with many of its best citizens disfranchised, its commerce ruined, at war with the Pope. The cause of all these ills was the new oligarchy, and that could not be reformed as long as its chief and inspiring genius, the Doge, remained alive. Before proceeding any further, however, he recommended that they should invite Bajamonte Tiepolo, whose popularity was expressed in the title of *il gran cavaliere* which the people had bestowed on him, to assist them with his counsel. Tiepolo arrived, and at the second meeting in Ca' Querini the whole situation was discussed and the line of action chosen. Marco Querini attacked the policy of the Doge in closing the Great Council, and thereby rendering so many Venetians Venetians no more. What, too, was to be said of the disastrous war of

Ferrara? What of the excommunication it entailed? The Doge was the cause of all this. It was time to wake up and to save the country. Tiepolo followed with more explicit and more fiery declamations. He concluded with these words: "Let us leave talk on one side now, and come to action. Let us choose a good head of the State, a man beloved of the people and capable of leading the city back to her ancient ordinances, and of preserving and augmenting her liberty." The only voice raised in protest against violent measures was that of Jacopo Querini. His age and his character gained him a specious consent. But the more ardent spirits were only waiting till he should leave for Constantinople, when they would return to their original design of destroying the Doge. On Jacopo's departure a final meeting determined the details of the plot. All the conspirators were to assemble armed in the house of Marco Querini beyond the Rialto, on the night of Saturday, the 13th June; thence, at the dawn of the 14th, they were to issue in two bodies, one under Marco, the other under Bajamonte Tiepolo, and to reach the Piazza, Querini by the Ponte de' Dai, Tiepolo by the Merceria. Meantime another conspirator, Badoer Badoer, was sent to raise troops near Padua, with orders to reach Venice on the appointed day.

But there was a traitor among them. The Doge Gradenigo had an intuition that some movement was in preparation, but he possessed no certain information as to its nature and scope. Such information was supplied to him by Marco Donato, who had joined the conspiracy at the beginning, but now abandoned it. When the Doge learned the details of the plot he took the necessary steps. He sent orders to the Podestàs of Chioggia, Torcello, and Murano to come at once to Venice, with as many men as they could put together. He made the nobles arm their servants, and join him in the Piazza. All these preparations had to be carried out with speed and secrecy, for the appointed day had already arrived.

Meantime beyond the Rialto, in the house of the Querini, the conspirators had assembled and were waiting for the dawn. Day broke on Sunday, 14th, in thunder, wind, and a deluge of

rain, which spread all over the lagoon, and prevented Badoer and his Paduan contingent from arriving on the scene. But Querini and Tiepolo could not know that. They resolved to abide by their original plan. They issued from the Querini house in two bodies, shouting "Liberty! death to Gradenigo!" and took the appointed routes to reach the Piazza. Marco Querini was the first to arrive. As he and his men debouched upon the square from the Ponte de' Dai, Gradenigo ordered a charge. The conflict proved short but severe. Querini's followers were routed, and Marco himself, together with his son, was slain. Bajamonte meantime followed the line prescribed. When he reached the big elder tree which then grew at San Giuliano he halted, and divided his men into two companies; one with orders to enter the Piazza by the way of the existing clock-tower, the other by San Basso. The disposition may have been a good one, but under the circumstances it caused a fatal waste of invaluable time. When Tiepolo emerged on the Piazza, Querini had already been defeated; the Doge's victorious followers were able to concentrate their whole force against Bajamonte. He too was routed, and forced to fly. The populace, which had remained neutral spectators at the beginning of the conflict, now sided with the Doge. The shattered remnants of Tiepolo's band were received with a shower of bricks from the house windows, as they fled up the Merceria. His standard-bearer, carrying a banner inscribed with the one word *Libertas*, was felled and killed by a stone mortar flung by a woman from a window. The conspirators made a brief rally in the Campo San Luca, but were again defeated and driven across the Rialto; the whole design fell to ruin. It only remained to crush the broken groups of the conspirators' forces. Badoer was met, defeated, and captured, with his Paduan contingent, on the lagoon. He was tried, condemned, and beheaded. The same fate would probably have been in store for Bajamonte, had he fallen into the Doge's hands; but he still held out, formidably fortified in the Querini houses beyond the Rialto, and the Doge, though victorious, was not so popular that he could afford to risk the effect of prolonging the civil war inside the city. He

offered terms to Tiepolo, the mildness of which clearly indicates his doubts as to the strength of his own position in the city. Tiepolo and his more prominent followers were banished from Venice; the rest were pardoned. Bajamonte continued to haunt the shores of the lagoon. From Padua and from Treviso he plotted against the Republic, availing himself everywhere of that jealousy which Venice inspired in her neighbours. But his power was really broken. The Doge and the young aristocracy were victorious; and the State gradually settled down under the new order of the constitution which achieved its consolidation by the defeat of Querini and Tiepolo, and was destined to be seriously disturbed only once again by the conspiracy of Marin Falier. 1309.

Nevertheless, although victorious, the new aristocracy was not fully aware how thorough its victory had really been. The immensity of the danger occupied their minds. Tiepolo's conspiracy was far more serious than Bocconio's. It came far nearer to success. Had the storm not delayed Badoer's arrival, it is impossible to say what the issue might have been, and the number and the prominence of Bajamonte's followers warned the Government that there was a large body of Venetians in the State who were sworn enemies of the new constitution. Tiepolo's movements continued to arouse the alarm and the vigilance of the Doge. It seemed that some more rapid, secret, and efficient body than the Great Council or the Senate was imperatively required to track the operations of the traitors, and to watch over the safety of the State. Venice had already found, during the anxieties and difficulties of the Ferrarese war, the need for some such extraneous body, had learned that the ordinary machinery of the State was not sufficient to meet extraordinary crises. A committee of public safety appeared to be imperatively demanded by the dangers of the Tiepoline conspiracy.

On the 10th July, not a month after the collapse of Bajamonte's rebellion, a motion was made in the Great Council that the committee for the affairs of Ferrara, which was still in existence, together with the three chiefs of the Supreme Court, should be entrusted to take all steps which might be rendered advisable by 1310.

recent events. The motion was rejected on the ground that the committee of Ferrara had sufficient employment
1310. in the discharge of its own special duties. An amendment proposed that ten members of the *Maggior Consiglio* should be elected by that Council, and ten appointed by the Doge, his Councillors, and the chiefs of the Supreme Court; from among these twenty, ten were to be subsequently elected by the Great Council. The committee thus created might not contain more than one member of a family at a time; the Procurators of S. Mark alone were to be ineligible; the committee was to continue its functions down to Michaelmas. This amendment found acceptance: and here we have the origin of the famous Council of Ten. It was a temporary committee of safety in its beginning, but, when Michaelmas came, the Doge pleaded for an extension of two months, on the ground that Tiepolo still menaced the State. The value and the efficacy of the new Council became more and more obvious the longer it lived, and its lease of life was continually renewed, until on 20th July, 1335, it was declared permanent.

Thus under the pressure of the Tiepoline conspiracy, and following a natural tendency already displayed in the war of Ferrara, the new aristocracy remedied the one serious defect in its constitution—its executive incompetence—and acquired that weapon which its own idea of itself, as a dominant oligarchy, demanded. Venice emerged from the throes of the revolution entailed by the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio* with her constitution complete, with the Council of Ten as her real ruler; the power of the State was concentrated in the hands of a corporation, not, as in other Italian cities, in the hands of an individual lord.

Misconceptions and exaggerations as to the nature of this famous *Consiglio de' Dieci* are of such common occurrence that it may not be amiss to explain its real construction, its powers, the method of its procedure. The members of the Ten were elected in the Great Council for one year only, and were not re-eligible for the year after they had held office. Every month the Ten elected three of their own number as chiefs, or *Capi* of the Council. It was the

duty of the chiefs to receive and open all communications addressed to the Ten, to prepare the business to be submitted to the Council, and to attend to the execution of its decrees. During their month of office the *Capi* were obliged to stay at home; they were forbidden to mix with their brother patricians, so as to avoid exposing themselves to the seduction of bribes and other illegitimate influences. They were also obliged to present the Council, on the first of each month, with a complete list of all the prisoners waiting trial on the order of the Ten, and to take every means to secure a rapid jail-delivery. They were required to give audience to all who sought them, on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. As a proof of the exaggerations current regarding the powers of the Ten, we must observe that before proceeding to arrest a suspect, the chiefs of the Ten were obliged to secure the approval of four out of the six ducal councillors, and two out of the three chiefs of the Supreme Court. 1310.

The Council of Ten met in one of the smaller rooms of the ducal palace. The chamber is well lighted, with large windows looking on to the canal which passes under the Bridge of Sighs. The roof was afterwards painted by Veronese. The court consisted, besides the Ten, of the Doge and his six councillors, seventeen members in all, of whom twelve were necessary to make a *quorum*. One of the *Avogadori di Comun*, or State advocates, was always present, without the power to vote, but to act as clerk to the court, informing it of the law and correcting it where its procedure seemed informal. Subsequently it became customary to add twenty members to the Council, elected in the *Maggior Consiglio*, for each important case as it arose.

The Doge presided, seated in the middle of the panelled semicircle which closes one end of the chamber. He was supported by his councillors, robed in crimson; then came the chiefs of the Ten in violet; and then the members of the Council in black.

The sitting was opened by the secretary reading the letters addressed to the *Dieci*; this was followed by the list

of complaints or accusations which had reached the chiefs of the Council since the last sitting. These accusations
1310. were either public, that is, signed by the denouncer, or secret, that is, anonymous. If the accusation was public, the Ten proceeded to vote upon the question whether they should take it into consideration or not. If four-fifths of the councillors voted "Yes," the case was entered on the list of causes to be tried. If the accusation was secret, then, before the question whether the Council should take it into consideration could be raised, the Doge, his six councillors, and the three *Capi* were called on to declare, unanimously, that the contents of the accusation was a matter of public concern, and this declaration required to be confirmed by a vote of five-sixths of the Council; the question of taking the subject into consideration was then submitted, and if four-fifths voted affirmatively the case was placed on the list.

Having discharged the denunciations for the day, the Council proceeded to take up the first case on the list. The *Avogadori* read a report on the case, and the form of warrant for summons or for arrest. The question was then put whether the Council should proceed with the case or not. If the answer was affirmative, the warrant issued, and the *Capi* were instructed to give it execution. When the accused was in the hands of the Ten, a sub-committee, consisting of one ducal councillor, two members of the Ten, and one *Avogador di Comun*, received orders to prepare the case within fifteen days. This committee examined the prisoner and the witnesses, and, if it thought fit, applied torture, either of the cord, by which the patient was tied to a rope run over a pulley, raised from the ground, and then let fall, or of fire, by which his bare feet were exposed to an open brazier. The prisoner was not confronted with his accusers nor with witnesses, and had no other advocate than himself. At the close of fifteen days the committee presented its report of the case. If the number of separate documents exceeded 150 the report had to be read twice through, on separate days, so that the Council might be sure that they had grasped all the facts. When the report had been read motion was made in this form, "After what has been read and

said, do you think that the prisoner should be condemned?" If the motion obtained a majority, the question of the sentence was then raised. Any member of the ^{1310.} Council was at liberty to propose a penalty, or to move an amendment reducing the severity of a sentence proposed by another member. Each proposition with its amendments was balloted. If no proposition or amendment obtained a majority after being balloted five times, the accused was discharged, or his case transmitted to another court. The punishments ranged from fines, through outlawry, the galleys, imprisonment, and mutilation, to death by strangling or drowning, either in public or in secret.

Such was the constitution of this famous tribunal; not the arbitrary, irresponsible, cruel, and tyrannous institution it has so frequently been represented, but a body strictly governed by its own rules, constantly changing its component members, who were therefore unable ever to exercise a dangerous abuse of their power, and who, upon issuing from their single year of office, were instantly liable to prosecution by the very tribunal of which they had recently formed a part. Secret, it is true, by the very nature of its origin, which was the necessity for supplying the State with some rapid and efficient executive arm—and this secrecy, coupled with the character of the cases which came before the Ten, chiefly contributed to create that awe and dread which the Council undoubtedly inspired in the minds of Venetians and foreigners alike. For the Ten was established as a committee of public safety in its origin. It was the instrument of the new aristocracy, and they made use of it for the preservation of their own order. The cases, therefore, which came before the Ten were often of the highest importance; dramatic, and striking to the public imagination—treason against the State, as in the story of Falier and Carmagnola; suppression of a powerful family, for example, of the Foscari; conservation of public morals and the discipline of a riotous young nobility, whose misconduct offered such a large crop of scandalous and clamatory cases. It is not surprising that the people should have been impressed with the power of the tribunal when they suddenly saw now a Doge, now a

member of some dominating house, struck down, and knew
1310. that it was the arm of the Ten which had reached
them.

With the closing of the Great Council, and thanks to its corollary the creation of the Ten, Venice, as we have said, reached her full constitutional maturity. She was no longer a child; she had achieved, in the long process of some six hundred years, that singular political machinery which distinguished her from all other European states. Slight modifications took place, trifling additions were made, it is true, but the form of the constitution was fixed. That being the case, we can now present a succinct view of that system of government which was to carry the Republic through the most brilliant part of her career.

By the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, which was essentially a reform of the electorate induced by the growth of the Venetian population and the consequent differentiation in wealth and influence, the Great Council became the sole basis of the Venetian constitution; it contained the whole body politic; those who were outside the Council were politically non-existent. At first the *Maggior Consiglio* possessed legislative and even judicial powers, but these were gradually delegated—a process which was rendered inevitable by the size of the Council itself, until that body was left with election to office as its chief function. In the Great Council, and from among its members, almost all the great officers of State were chosen.

Immediately above the great Council came the Senate composed of 160 members, besides those who—like the Doge, his councillors, the chiefs of the Supreme Court—sat *ex officio*. The Senate was the principal legislative body in the constitution; and it also discharged the function of directing the foreign affairs of the Republic. In the Senate ambassadors were elected, and to the Senate they addressed their despatches and read their reports, on their return home from their diplomatic missions.

On a level with the Senate, but extraneous to the main lines of the constitution, an episode, a break in the pyramidal form of original structure, came the Council of Ten, with the

powers which we have just explained. The Ten was called into existence by a sudden and pressing need, and it retained the marks of its origin all through its history; it was never an integral part of the scheme of the Venetian constitution. Owing to its smaller size, its rapidity, its secrecy, this Council gradually usurped the place of the Senate on all urgent occasions. An order of the Ten was as binding as a law, and the terror of the Ten ensured the punctual observance of its commands. Ambassadors reported separately to the *Dieci*, and received from them secret instructions, which were sometimes in contradiction to the public instructions of the Senate. They always knew which to obey. As we have seen, the Ten possessed judicial functions; in short, its capacity as a committee of public safety left no department of government in which its authority would have been disowned.

Above both Senate and Ten came the *Collegio* or Cabinet, composed of the *Savii* or Sages; the six *Savii grandi*, the *Savii da terra ferma*, the *Savii agli ordini* or *da mar*, the responsible ministers of the State, the secretaries, as we should say, of war, marine, finance. It was the duty of the *Savii grandi* to prepare all public business, and to present it to the Senate or to the Great Council as the case might be. The six *Savii grandi* undertook their functions in turn, one each week. The whole affairs of Venice passed through the hands of the Cabinet, in which the *Savio grande* for the week was, as it were, the prime minister of the Republic, and it was in its competence to choose the assembly which should dispose of the business. The College could send a subject to the Senate or to the Ten. If the matter were urgent, requiring secrecy and rapidity, it naturally chose the *Dieci*, which had been framed especially to meet such emergencies; and thus all the more striking and picturesque episodes in Venetian history came into the hands of that tribunal. But the College was not merely the initiatory body in the State; it possessed also executive powers, and was charged to give effect to the deliberations of the *Maggior Consiglio* or the Senate; the Ten, in the person of its three chiefs, possessed an executive of its own.

Above the College came the six ducal councillors, intimately connected with the chief of the State; ^{1310.} where he went they went; they opened his correspondence; a *quorum* of the ducal councillors was equivalent to the Doge; they represented the attributes of the Doge, as it were, in commission.

At the head of all came the Doge himself, representing the majesty of Venice. His presence was necessary everywhere: he presided in the Great Council, in the Senate, in the Ten, in the College. His pomp was splendid, his power limited; he appears as a symbol rather than as a factor in the constitution, the outward and visible sign of the impersonal oligarchy.

Such in brief was the constitution which Venice developed for herself, and relying upon which she proceeded to take her place as a full-grown community among the other States of Europe.

CHAPTER XI

Death of the Doge—Venice desires to expand—The Powers which opposed this desire—Genoa, the Italian Signori, the Turks—Advantages of the Republic—No mainland frontier—*Marin Zorzi*, Doge, *Giovanni Soranzo*, Doge—Mercenary troops for the reduction of Zara—*Dalmasius de Banoli*, his treachery—Removal of the interdict—The d'Este family in Ferrara—Venetian trade—The trade circle—Venetian industries—Silk—Glass—Population of Venice—Prosperity of Venice—*Francesco Dandolo*, Doge—The Ottoman Turks in Europe—The Signori on the mainland—The Carraresi in Padua—The Scaligeri of Verona—They clash over Vicenza—Defeat of Carrara—Scala in Treviso—Venice and Scala—A war of tariffs—Weak position of Venice with no food supply—War with Scala : its importance—Objections to the war—Offers of help—League against the Scaligeri—*Marsilio Carrara*, Scala's emissary to Venice—His treachery—Padua captured—Defeat of Scala—Venetian territory on the mainland—Meaning and importance of this—Venetian treatment of her acquisitions—The statute of Treviso—*Bartolomeo Gradenigo*, Doge—Venetian prosperity reflected in the city buildings—Sumptuary laws—*Andrea Dandolo*, Doge—League against the Turk—Great Plague—Quarrel with Genoa—The Crimea—War—Capture of Negropont by Doria—*Nicolo Pisani* and *Paganino Doria*—Defeat of Venice—Battle of *Cagliari*—Venetian victory—Genoa places herself under *Visconti*—*Visconti* and Venice—League against *Visconti*—*Petrarch* in Venice—War with Genoa renewed—*Paganino Doria* in *Istria*—Defences of Venice—Death of the Doge—*Marin Falier*, Doge—Truce with Genoa—War again—Battle of *Sapienza*—Defeat of Venice—*Falier's* character—Meaning of his conspiracy : its failure—Execution of the Doge.

GRADENIGO died in 1311. He was buried without pomp, and with little show of mourning on the part of the people. The interdict forbade the Church to bestow
1311.
upon him the usual honours, while the disastrous results of his reign robbed him of any regard in the eyes of the masses. To all outward appearance the Republic was in a perilous position ; *Bajamonte Tiepolo* continued to be a danger, owing

to the help which he could reckon upon finding in Padua and Treviso, both jealous of their lagoon neighbour; the
1311. Ferrarese war had entailed an interdict and a serious check to Venetian commerce; Zara, with the Dalmatian coast, was in open revolt. But beneath this external appearance of weakness there was a solid core of strength. The Republic had achieved her constitution—she knew her own mind; she was a full-grown State, and intended to expand.

As we have already seen, the triumph of the new aristocracy was coincident with the declaration of a policy by the victorious party; Gradenigo's speech in defence of the Ferrarese war displayed the militant and aggressive spirit of the dominant oligarchy. Venice resolved to extend her dominion wherever she found occasion. Such a resolve was the inevitable result of her steadily growing influence, of her slowly accumulated riches. But this policy inevitably brought her into collision with rival powers. Those powers can be easily distinguished into three groups. In the Levant, while pursuing an extended Eastern commerce, Venice was destined to come to a decisive struggle with the maritime state of Genoa. On the mainland, following the line already indicated in the war of Ferrara, the Republic found herself opposed to the various families, Carrara, Scala, Visconti, which had made themselves lords of some portion of North Italy; lastly, the appearance of the Ottoman Turks in Europe gave the first warning that a foe more powerful, more deadly, than either of the others, had arrived on the scene—a foe for whose presence Venice had made herself, in a measure, responsible, by her diversion of the fourth Crusade, and by the overthrow of the Eastern Empire.

To assist the Republic in the coming struggle with these powers, the history of which must occupy our attention for some time, Venice possessed two great advantages—she was wealthy, and she had no mainland frontier. The first of these advantages served her in good stead against all the mainland lords and also against Genoa; the second—the absence of a mainland frontier—she, by the very nature of the case, by her determination to extend on the mainland, was about to

destroy. How this came about shall be explained in the following chapters.

Marin Zorzi succeeded Pietro Gradenigo on ^{1311.} the ducal throne. His brief reign of only ten months was chiefly occupied by the efforts of Venice to reduce Zara and the coast of Dalmatia, which had risen in revolt when the Republic fell under the interdict. The legacy of this enterprise, which was far from successful, Zorzi left to his successor Giovanni Soranzo, in whose reign we shall have to note a great recovery of tone, of force, of influence, on the part of the Republic, due no ^{1312.} doubt to the inherent strength she had acquired by the consolidation of her new Constitution.

The war with Zara was moving slowly and unfavourably for Venice, when the Republic determined to employ mercenary arms for the reduction of the city. The episode is of importance, for the conduct of the mercenary captain, Dalmasius de Banoli, instantly showed to the Venetians the danger which was inherent in the nature of such troops, and served as a lesson for the guidance of their future conduct. The government sent De Banoli to the siege of Zara. He pressed the city hard; but the Dalmatians were supported by the Ban of Croatia, and offered a stout resistance. Meantime Dalmasius had quarrelled with the representatives of the Republic in his camp. He wished to be entrusted with all the money for the payment of the troops; the Venetians naturally suspected such a mercenary request, and refused. The Ban was anxious to return home. He offered terms to the Venetians, which were rejected. He then began to treat secretly with Dalmasius, whom he found quite open to a bribe. The adventurer promised to occupy the city of Zara on behalf of the Zaratines and against the Republic. The plot was betrayed by a soldier, and the Venetian agents in camp were able to frustrate the scheme. Zara made a surrender to Venice, and promised to elect every second year a governor from among the Venetian Patriciate.

Other successes illustrated the reign of Soranzo. The interdict, inflicted by the Pope as a punishment for the Ferrarese war, was removed after the payment of 100,000

florins; and Venice recovered all her rights and privileges in Ferrara, where shortly afterwards (1317)
1313. the Este family was recalled by a popular rising against the mercenary leader Dalmasius, who held the city for King Robert of Naples. The Republic renewed her commercial treaties with the Estes, and when they received the papal Vicariate of Ferrara in 1331, Venice enrolled them among her patrician families. Other commercial treaties with Italian cities, with Milan, with Bologna, with Brescia, with Como, prove the recuperative power which Venice possessed, and distinguish the last eleven years of Soranzo's Dogeship. Nor was foreign trade less active or less lucrative. Venetian merchants sailed for London with cargoes of sugar, which they sold, and bought wool; this they took to Flanders, whence they returned to Venice carrying cargoes of cloth in webs, which they distributed down the Dalmatian coast and in the Levant, where they went to fetch new cargoes for the London market. The commercial circle was complete; the whole profits of exchange were in the hands of Venice, and she was not slow to feel the effects of her rapidly-rising revenue. Nor did traffic alone prove the sole source of growing wealth to Venice. Industries also took root in the city. Fugitives from Lucca introduced the silk trade, and occupied a whole quarter near the Campo S. Bartolomeo, at the foot of the Rialto. The glass-manufacture of Murano received an impetus; looking-glasses became a well-known product of the city in the lagoons.

There are abundant proofs that Venice occupied a high position in the eyes of foreign princes. The Emperor Frederick notified his victory at Muhldorf to the Doge in 1320; he granted redress for injury inflicted on a Venetian merchant; Alfonso of Sicily tendered an apology for a similar insult to Venetian traders. Edward III. of England asked for Venetian galleys to help him in his war with Philip of France; he offered the Venetians the most extensive privileges, and invited the Doge to send one or two of his sons to the English Court. The population of Venice rose rapidly—it was estimated at

200,000 inhabitants; houses and building-ground were in such demand that a scheme for filling in the lagoon between the *fondamente nuove* and Murano, ¹³¹³⁻ and for adding the seat of the glass trade to the city of Venice, occupied the serious attention of the Government. The Republic increased the Doge's salary; a jewel for him to wear on solemn occasions was purchased at the price of 1500 sequins; the Bucentaur, or State barge, was refitted for his use; his household was augmented in servants and furnished with silver plate, and other appointments.

Everything breathed an air of wellbeing during the second and third decades of this century. The Republic, feeling the self-confidence inspired by its new constitution and the discovery of its natural direction, seemed advancing along the road of prosperity with strides more rapid than it had ever taken before. But there were indications of two dangers which threatened the growing State; ¹³²⁹⁻ one distant and remote, a danger which only developed later in Venetian history, the other near and imminent. The Ottoman Turks appeared for the first time in Europe, thereby presaging that long struggle which Venice was doomed to carry on single-handed till her whole resources were drained, and she was left to dwindle and pine away, the mere dry shell of her ancient self. But nearer at home, and of more pressing importance, were the struggles between those despots of Padua, Verona, and Milan, with whom Venice was destined to collide in carrying out her policy of a mainland empire. With such an object in view it was impossible for the Republic to be indifferent to what was taking place in cities so close to herself as Padua and Treviso, and to a consideration of this we must now turn our attention.

After the downfall of Eccelino da Romano, Padua had established, preserved, and strengthened her independent municipal government. Her university brought her fame her commerce poured in wealth; she showed signs of that inevitable instinct to expand which seems at that time to have animated every city in Italy. She became mistress

of Vicenza, increasing her power as she supposed, but in reality making herself conterminous with the Scalas
1329. of Verona, and thereby initiating the long series of events which eventually made her a dependant of her rival in the lagoons. Party faction, from which no Italian mainland city could free itself, began to tear the commune of Padua. The popular party was victorious, and elected as its leader Jacopo Carrara, the man who had most largely contributed to its victory. But beyond the Vicentine frontier of Paduan territory the great house of Scala was rising into power, and obeying, contemporaneously, the universal instinct towards expansion. The Scalas had absorbed the territories of the Counts of San Bonifazio; they had fortified Soave, and were now on the very borders of the Vicentino. Belonging to the Ghibelline faction, and drawing their authority, nominally at least, from the Emperor, they were no friends to the Guelfh and popular government which had just been established in Padua. At their instigation and with their aid Vicenza revolted, and freed itself from Paduan domination only to become a part of the Scala territory, which still remained conterminous with the territories of the Carraresi. Jacopo Carrara made terms with Can Grande della Scala, and was allowed to retain possession of his native city. But this arrangement did not last long. Marsilio Carrara succeeded his uncle Jacopo, as ruler in Padua. The Scalas claimed Padua, besieged it, and compelled Marsilio to yield it to them, on condition, however, that he should remain there as governor on their behalf. The career of the Scalas did not, could not, terminate here; they continued to spread—occupying Feltre, Belluno, and the base of the Alps, and thereby rendering themselves masters of the passes. Treviso also fell into their hands in 1329. The attention of Venice was inevitably directed to the growth of this power, whose advance threatened to draw a circle round the borders of the lagoon, and to close all exits for Venetian merchandise. The capture of Treviso, however, was the last operation of the great Can Grande. He died, and his dominions passed to his nephews, Alberto and Mastino della

Scala. Alberto was a man of pleasure, but Mastino inherited all the pride and ambition of his house. Venice soon became aware that she was face to face with a rival whom she must either crush or be ruined. Mastino began his career by imposing new dues on all Venetian goods passing through the Trevisan marches or the Padovano, and erected a toll-house on the Po. The Venetian Government replied with a prohibitive duty on all Paduan and Trevisan merchandise. A war of tariffs ensued. But Venice could not sustain such a war for long. She was built on islands, without any stretch of cultivated land to feed her rapidly-increasing population. Her natural position rendered her unable to support herself if the food supply from the mainland should be cut off, or if she were suffering from a check at sea, such as the battle of Curzola had inflicted. That Padua and Treviso should cease to receive goods imported from the East through Venice was as nothing compared with the danger to the lagoon city when deprived of corn and meat from Padua and Treviso. The war of tariffs and of diplomatic correspondence continued for a short time; but Mastino della Scala knew the power of his position, and showed that he appreciated it when he said, "Tell the Doge to keep his leaden seals; he will want them all to roof the Campanile." Venice, in fact, was face to face with her most serious danger, the perils of a blockade. Her policy of aggression on the mainland, at least in its origin, may have been partly dictated by ambition, but it was none the less a policy of necessity, an absolute condition of safety for the Republic.

War was the only course open to the Venetians. The moment proved one of vital importance in their history. It is true that she had shown a desire, and had made an effort to expand on *terra ferma* at the time of the Ferrarese war; but this struggle with Scala, Lord of Verona, Vicenza, Brescia, Treviso, Feltre, Belluno, and Padua, would most undoubtedly prove a far more serious undertaking. If Venice were defeated, she jeopardised her existence; if victorious, she sacrificed one of her chief advantages, the absence of a

mainland frontier to protect. The decision as to the war with the Scaligers is really a turning-point in Venetian history, not the less momentous because the issue of the debate was a foregone conclusion.

1329. The Doge and many of the older members of the Government were opposed to war. They pointed out that Venice had no land army; that she would be forced to employ mercenaries; that it was a false policy which led the Republic to interfere in the affairs of the mainland. To this the reply was only too easy; it might be a dangerous policy, but there was no choice; starvation threatened the city; the *necessitas bladi*, the want of corn, could not be gainsaid. Venice dared not allow the Scaligers to become more powerful on the mainland; and as to the want of a land army, the jealousy and alarm of other North Italian States would help to supply that deficiency. Events proved this argument to be a sound one. War was declared. The population of Venice between the ages of twenty and sixty enrolled itself with enthusiasm, and produced a force of 40,000 men. The news that Venice had declared war on the Scalas instantly brought offers of assistance from all those who had suffered, or who expected to suffer, at the hands of the Veronese despots. The Florentines and the Rossi of Parma, whose youngest member, Pietro, was considered the most expert captain of his day, played a prominent part in the coalition. The first successes of the Venetian forces under Pietro de Rossi soon induced any waverers to join the confederation; and a league "for the destruction and the ruin of the brothers Alberto and Mastino della Scala" was the result.

The league was a powerful one. The army consisted of 30,000 horse and a proportionate number of foot. Venice paid one third, Florence a third, and the other members of the confederation a third. Florence stipulated to receive Lucca as her share. The other cities, when recovered from the Scalas, were to be restored to full liberty. So potent did this combination prove, that Mastino found himself compelled to negotiate for a peace. He chose his emissary with imprudence singular in a prince of so much ability.

He sent Marsilio Carrara, from whom his family had robbed Padua, as his ambassador, to treat with the Senate. Marsilio began to sound the Doge on his own ¹³²⁹⁻ account with a view to recovering his independent position in Padua. It is said that one evening, while supping with Dandolo, he dropped his napkin; both stooped to pick it up. "What would you give to the man who put you in possession of Padua?" whispered Marsilio. "The lordship of the city," replied the Doge. When the two heads rose above the table again, the Carraresi and the Republic had made their pact, which was presently to bear important consequences for both parties.

Mastino, meanwhile, had broken off negotiations and resumed the war. But the league was too powerful and too ubiquitous. Visconti's attack on Brescia called him away from the defence of Padua. In his absence Marsilio Carrara fulfilled his part of the secret understanding with the Doge. On 3rd August, 1337, Pietro de Rossi was admitted into the city by treachery. He ¹³³⁷⁻ captured Alberto della Scala and sent him as a prisoner to Venice. Padua was taken over in the name of the Republic, and the lordship of it at once conferred on Marsilio Carrara.

The end of the Scala dominion had arrived. The fall of Padua was followed by the loss of Brescia and Bergamo, seized by Visconti; of Feltre and Belluno, which returned to Charles of Bohemia. Mastino found himself driven to seek a peace, which was concluded in 1338.

By the terms then stipulated, Treviso, Castelbaldo, and Bassano passed into the hands of Venice. The subjects of Scala in those territories were to be allowed to enjoy their possessions undisturbed. The passage of the Po was rendered free of duties; the Scalas paid a sum in indemnity for damages wrought by the war.

The dismemberment of the Scala dominion left Venice in this position: she had acquired a quasi-suzerainty over Padua, whose lords, the Carraresi, had accepted a sort of investiture from the Republic. The Carraresi really depended for their existence upon the support of Venice; for

through the Scala of Verona were crushed, a still more powerful lord, Visconti of Milan, was rising into
1337. greater eminence on the ruins of the Scaligers. Venice interposed this quasi-dependent Padua between herself and the Lord of Milan; but any attack on the Carraresi was a threat to Venice, and in fact, if not in appearance, the Republic found to her cost that she had become conterminous with the Visconti. But besides this indirect lordship over Padua, Venice also acquired a direct sovereignty over Treviso and its district, which included Conegliano, Oderzo, and Castelfranco. She secured an extensive corn-growing district, and was sure of a meat supply; she need no longer dread a blockade and starvation into surrender after every defeat she suffered upon the sea. On the other hand, however, she now possessed a mainland frontier, conterminous on one side with her allies the Carraresi, and therefore not a danger as long as they could maintain themselves against the Visconti; but this frontier rendered Venice, towards the east, obnoxious to the Patriarch of Aquileia and the feudal Counts of Gorizia. The Republic was well satisfied with the issue of this war against the Scalas; she felt the joy of her growth. The publication of the treaty of peace was celebrated by a tourney on the Piazza of S. Mark, and the day became a national festival.

It is important for us to examine the way in which Venice dealt with her new possession, Treviso; for the method then adopted is typical of the attitude of the ruling city towards the many land dependencies which she subsequently acquired; and the wisdom of that method bore abundant fruit for the Republic, after the disastrous wars of the League of Cambray. The policy of the Republic consisted in leaving as much of local government and of existing institutions as was compatible with the protection of the city from attack and the maintenance of her own supremacy. Her representatives in each dependent city were a civil and a military official with their respective staffs. The civil officer bore the title of Rector, and was superior to the Captain, the military officer. For the rest, the city was allowed to govern itself by means of its Municipal Council,

which attended to such affairs as lighting, roads, local taxation. The police, however, remained in the hands of the Rector, who was in constant communication with the Senate and, in graver emergencies, with the Council of Ten. At the head of the municipal government, but subject to the Rector, was the Podestà, who might be a native of the city, or, as was frequently the case, a Venetian nobleman, or even the Rector himself. The *Statuto* of Treviso provided that, three months before the expiration of his term of office, the Podestà should summon a meeting of the Council of 300, and proceed to the election of eight members, four nobles and four commoners, whose duty it was to nominate twelve, six nobles and six commoners, who again elected four nobles and four commoners, who should name three candidates for the Podestate, from among whom the Council were to choose their Podestà by ballot. It is clear that this elaborate method of appointment was an imitation of the system pursued in the election of the Doge; and as a matter of fact the Podestà of any city dependent upon Venice stood in a position analogous to that of the Doge; he enjoyed a similar apparatus of pomp concealing a stringent code of restrictions; he seemed to govern, but the Rector was his real master, as the Ten was master of the Doge. The *Statuto* of Treviso, after providing for the office of Podestà, proceeds to deal with questions of *octroi*, of fortification, of lighting, of roads and bridges, of wells, of fires, of sanitary matters, of the guilds of artisans, of wet nurses; in short, of all the multifarious details of municipal, and even of private, life. Good government, peace, encouragement of trade, comfort of living, are its chief objects; and it is not surprising that the inhabitants of a city under Venetian sway should have found themselves secure and contented, when they compared their lot with that of a citizen under the rule of an individual despot such as a Scala or a Visconti.

The reign of Francesco Dandolo closed in success and splendour for Venice. The reflex of this extension, of this increase in power and in wealth, made itself apparent in the reign of his successor, Bartolomeo Gradenigo.

It was a short reign, but the new position of Venice received sufficient demonstration, both from outside and from
 1339. within. We have already referred to the appeal for help which reached Venice from Edward III. of England. In the East, with John Paleologus, too, she renewed her commercial treaties, though the steady advance of the Turks rendered such privileges of less and less value, except as giving some colour of legality to Venetian pretensions against the Genoese, with whom the Republic was in constant and increasing rivalry for the possession of the Eastern traffic—a rivalry destined shortly to burn up into a furious flame of war.

Public buildings also marked the growing prosperity of the State. Granaries were built along the site of the present palace gardens, in which the Government, warned by the famines of the previous reign, and the risks of a blockade, stored corn for use in emergencies. A new *Sala del Maggior Consiglio* was decreed; the Church of the Servite monks, the Church of Paolo Sarpi that was to be, rose with its beautiful façade of striped marbles. Excessive luxury in private life produced the earliest examples of sumptuary laws in Venice. Everywhere the prosperity of the Republic made itself manifest. But the reign of the next Doge, Andrea Dandolo, was to see Venice plunged once more into another phase of her life-and-death struggle with her implacable rival Genoa, and struck down by the terrible scourge of the Black Death.

The success of the league against Verona, and the collapse and dismemberment of the Scala dominions, left
 1343. the plain of North Italy quiet for a time. Matters settled down under the new order introduced by the Peace of 1339. But Venice was not to enjoy this tranquillity. The affairs of the East instantly claimed the attention of the Doge Dandolo. He had no sooner come to the throne than the Pope called on him to take part in the earliest European league against the Turk; and although the league did not engage in any operations worthy of note, yet the event is significant in the history of the Republic, for she was now for the first time brought face to face with the

most deadly foe she ever encountered in the whole course of her career. The league ended, as was usual with Venice, in a business transaction between the Pope and the Republic by which, on condition of being allowed to draw the ecclesiastical tithes for three years, the Government undertook to protect all Christians against the Turks at sea. ¹³⁴³⁻

In the year 1348 Italy was attacked by the great Plague. Venice hoped to escape infection by drawing a cordon round the lagoons. Three commissioners were appointed to take the necessary steps. But the quarantine proved ineffectual; the Plague broke out in the city in the spring of the year, and its fierceness increased as the summer heats grew intenser. A commission of five was appointed. The existing cemeteries were insufficient to contain the dead, who were sent to San Giorgio in Alega, to San Marco in Bochalama, to San Lunardo de Fossamala, even as far out as Sant' Erasmo. The mortality increased so rapidly that the corpses often remained unburied in the houses. The Government found itself obliged to undertake the collection of the dead in each *sestiere* of the city. As the lugubrious death-boats, with their ghastly burden, passed down the small canals, the boatmen cried "Corpi Morti! Corpi Morti!" and in reply the survivors shot the corpses from doors and windows down upon the loathly pile. The bodies were hastily interred in large open graves, and barely sprinkled over with earth. Doctors were invited from other parts of Italy. But no precautions proved of any avail. The pestilence ran its course; and when it left the city the Venetians found that fifty noble families had been completely wiped out, and that three-fifths of the entire population had perished. ^{1348.}

The blow was a severe one, and all the more serious that the Republic was on the point of embarking upon a struggle with Genoa, in which she required every available citizen and an exchequer full to overflowing. The fur trade of the Crimea had for long been a bone of contention between Venice and her western rival. The city of Kaffa, which was really formed by the factories of the two

States, became the scene of constant brawls between Genoese and Venetian merchants. The final rupture was delayed by an attack made by the Tartar tribes upon Venetians and Genoese alike; the losses in men and goods which both suffered induced them to act in concert; and by the terms of a treaty signed in 1345 a Venetian bailo and a Genoese consul governed the city of Kaffa between them, establishing the tariff of market prices, the rent of houses, etc.; and furthermore, by mutual agreement, any traffic with the hostile Tartar tribes was forbidden. But both Venetians and Genoese were in the Crimea on purpose to trade with the Tartars; it was impossible that such a prohibition should be loyally observed. Both parties began a contraband traffic. It would seem that the Genoese were the chief gainers by this illicit commerce; at least the first complaint came from Venice, which would not have been the case if Venetian trade had been flourishing. The Doge sent an embassy to Genoa to protest. The reply was haughty in tone; by it the Genoese gave the Venetians to understand that their presence in Trebisond and the Black Sea at all was only permitted on sufferance, and by the courtesy of Genoa. War seemed on the point of breaking out when the violence of the Plague cooled the passions of the rivals by a common purge.

As the terror of the Plague died away, the Genoese, under their Doge, Giovanni de Valente, renewed their hostile attitude towards Venetians in the Black Sea. Several Venetian ships were seized at Kaffa; all efforts to obtain redress in Genoa proved unavailing, and Venice was compelled to declare war. The government raised a loan and sent a fleet of twenty-nine galleys, under the command of Marco Ruzzini, to the Levant. The war opened with a series of naval operations which were not of the highest importance except as clearing the way for the appearance of the great Venetian commander, Nicolo Pisani, upon the scene. Ruzzini began by making a prize of ten Genoese merchantmen which fell into his hands at Negropont. Four escaped and sought safety with Filippo Doria, the Genoese admiral in those waters. Doria, by way of reprisals, effected a sudden

descent on Negropont, and captured the city. Viario, its governor, was accused of treachery, tried and acquitted; Ruzzini, who lay under the charge of having been dilatory in sailing to the support of the city, lost his command. ^{1350.}

The struggle to which Venice found herself now seriously committed was insane and fratricidal. Petrarch, with poetic prevision, foretold the mischance which must befall Italy from the internecine hatred of its two great maritime States, "*Necesse est ut alterum e duobus Italiae luminibus extinguetur, obscuretur alterum.*" But the instinct of a growing race for expansion, for aggrandisement, rendered Venice deaf to the poet's prophecy of woe. The Republic gauged the severity of the coming struggle, and desired, if possible, to find support among foreign powers. Peter of Aragon was not unwilling to join the Venetians in the hope of reducing Genoese influence in the Western Mediterranean, where his interests lay. He bound himself to furnish eighteen galleys, while Venice bore two-thirds of their expense. This combination, which had important bearings on the issue of the war, exposed Genoa to an attack in her rear.

In the campaign of 1351 we find two great leaders, Nicolo Pisani and Paganino Doria, measuring their arms, making estimate one of the other, previous to joining battle. Pisani opened with a futile effort to capture Pera, the Genoese quarter of Constantinople. He was forced to abandon his operations in order to sail to the relief of Negropont, and, after some inconsequent manœuvres, both fleets retired to winter quarters. In the following campaign the Aragonese and Venetian fleet again made for Constantinople, intending to attack Paganino Doria under the walls of Pera. Paganino awaited their coming, and succeeded in drawing them on till he had them in a position so narrow that they were unable to develop their line. Pisani was opposed to the whole manœuvre, and wished to avoid a battle; but he was overruled by Ponzio de Santa Paola, commander of the Aragonese, who gave the order to cut the cables and bear down on the Genoese. It was late in the afternoon when the attack was given, and night came on before the battle ceased; but the

Genoese and Venetians—for the Aragonese and the Greeks fled at the very outset—fought desperately by the light
¹³⁵³ of their own burning ships, whose flames were fanned by a violent wind. The gale threw the fleet into confusion; it became impossible to distinguish friend from foe; Catalan sank Catalan, Venetian Venetian, Genoese Genoese, says an eye-witness. At last the Venetians were forced to yield. But in the darkness of the night the combatants were unable to estimate the relative losses on the one side and on the other. It was certain that both had suffered severely. In the morning Paganino Doria sent to ask the Venetian commander how many Genoese prisoners he held; the number sent back in answer seemed so small, and so many were missing from Paganino's ships' rolls, that he estimated his own losses very high.

The battle of the Bosphorus was a heavy blow to both parties. Paganino endeavoured to conceal the amount of his loss from his compatriots in Pera, so as to avoid throwing them into a panic. Pisani despatched a messenger to Venice to beg that the subsidy should be at once paid to the Catalans, to prevent them from deserting him, and to induce them to order a new fleet to take the sea, and thus to create a diversion in Genoese waters. The Catalans consented, and their admiral, Cabrera, sailed to attack Sardinia, a Genoese possession. The news of these movements brought out the Genoese fleet under Antonio Grimaldi, whose orders were to protect Sardinia, and to prevent a junction between Cabrera and Pisani. But Pisani had already effected this important operation, and was now in command of the united Catalan and Venetian fleet, waiting the coming of the Genoese in the waters of Cagliari. As Grimaldi's fleet hove in sight Pisani ran up the standard of S. Mark, to the astonishment of the Genoese, who believed that they were facing the Catalan fleet alone. It was S. John's day in the month of August, seven months after the battle of the Bosphorus, that Venetians and Genoese once more measured their strength. This time the fortune of war was reversed. Pisani now held the sole command, and he adopted tactics very different from those pursued in the previous battle. He was a great

sailor, and loved abundant sea-room. He drew out into the open, followed by the Genoese fleet; then, facing round, he ran his ships alongside of one another, ¹³⁵³⁻ and lashed them together into one solid front, leaving ten galleys free to skirmish, and to draw the enemy towards his close formation. Both sides fought with great valour, and with greater hate. The Venetians began to board the enemy, but many fell into the sea from the decks, which were slippery with blood. At last, on first one and then another of the Genoese galleys, the ensign of S. Mark began to fly. The battle was really over; the Genoese lost heart; they threw themselves into the sea or hid in the holds of their ships. Grimaldi caused his own galley to be towed out of the thick of the fight, and fled towards Genoa; for four hours more the Genoese fought desperately, and after losing thirty-three galleys out of fifty-one, they owned themselves defeated.

When Grimaldi's blood-stained vessel brought the news to Genoa, consternation filled the city. The people poured down to the mole, or climbed the hills behind the town, expecting each moment to descry on the south-west offing the sails of the victorious Venetian fleet. But Pisani's victory had not cost him little; he was in no condition to attack Genoa, and the Genoese Senate thus obtained a breathing space in which to deliberate upon the situation. The result of those deliberations altered the whole aspect of the war, and introduced a new and most important factor in the struggle between the two Republics. The Senate of Genoa made a voluntary surrender of the State to Giovanni Visconti, Bishop of Milan, on condition that he would furnish the means for continuing the war against Venice.

It is interesting to note that Venice was first brought into contact with the Visconti, not as a result of her extension on the mainland, but owing to her naval war with Genoa. That she should clash with Visconti sooner or later, was inevitable after her first step towards a land dominion; but at present she had the Carraresi as an intermediate State between her mainland frontiers and those of the powerful rulers of Milan. The Genoese act of surrender proves,

however, that Milan and Venice were the two dominant powers in North Italy, and a collision between
1353. them was only a matter of time.

Venice was enraged and alarmed at this unexpected step on the part of her rival. She was prevented from crushing her foe just when she believed her final triumph to be secure; and the possession of Genoa rendered Visconti far too potent not to arouse her fears. His aggrandisement was a threat to all North Italy. The Republic found no difficulty in combining in a defensive league the remnants of the Scalas, the Carraresi of Padua, the lords of Ferrara and Mantua, and the King of Bohemia, Charles IV. Visconti temporised; he followed the usual Viscontean policy of mystifying his opponents. His action led to one of the most interesting episodes which illustrate Venetian history.

1354. Petrarch, the laureate, went to Venice as his ambassador for the purpose of arranging a treaty. His letter, addressed to the Doge, is a beautiful piece of rhetoric, in praise of peace; to which the Doge replied in another epistle breathing the noblest sentiments. But at the arsenals of Genoa and of Venice a different answer was in preparation. It was vain for Visconti to believe that he could effect a peace, even had he desired it,—which is more than doubtful,—between these two implacable rivals, locked now in a deadly embrace. The Genoese took the sea first, and with only a few ships, made a sudden raid upon the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. A squadron of the Venetian fleet was sent down the gulf to guard its mouth, while Nicolo Pisani, in command of fourteen galleys, sailed for Sardinian waters to keep a watch upon the main body of the Genoese armament under his old opponent, Paganino Doria. But Doria gave Pisani the slip; and before the Venetians knew what had happened, they found that Paganino was master of Parenzo, on the Istrian coast, not sixty miles away from the Lido mouth of the lagoon. The alarm in Venice became intense. All the citizens were enrolled, a new tax for shipbuilding levied, an iron chain run across from San Nicolo del Lido to Sant' Andrea. At this crisis in the history of his country, twenty-two days

after the sack of Parenzo, the Doge Andrea Dandolo died, and was succeeded by Marin Falier, whose reign and name have gained an exaggerated importance¹³⁵⁴ from the tragic event which closed in violence his brief rule of nearly seven months.

The Venetian defensive alliance against Visconti and Genoa had produced but little good; not much could be expected from mainland allies in a purely naval war. But the presence of Charles IV. in Italy induced Genoa to sign a truce with Venice. This proved to be merely a breathing space. It was quite certain that nothing but the utter defeat of one of the combatants could put an end to this internecine struggle. The truce was no sooner over than Nicolo Pisani and his famous nephew, Vettor, took the sea and went in search of Paganino Doria in the Grecian Archipelago. Doria declined battle when offered; and Pisani, on instructions from Venice, withdrew to winter quarters in Portolungo, opposite the island of Sapienza, at the extreme south-west point of Greece, not far from Navarino.

While lying at Portolungo, Pisani was joined by four other vessels, which brought the number of his fleet up to thirty-five galleys and some twenty lighter craft. The mouth of the harbour was entrusted to the care of Nicolo Querini, with twenty galleys at his command. Meanwhile Paganino Doria, with thirty-six galleys, had also resolved to return to Genoa for the winter. The wind, however, was against him, and he was driven back to the shelter of some rocky islands near Sapienza. His nephew, Giovanni Doria, a young man of spirit, finding time heavy on his hands, took a light trireme, and went to reconnoitre the Venetian position. He reported to his uncle that an attack on the Venetians was certain to be successful, for the guard at the harbour mouth had been quite relaxed. Paganino accordingly, on the 4th November, 1354, gave orders to sail. He found the entrance to the port unprotected, sailed in, and took the whole Venetian fleet by surprise. Many of the crew jumped into the sea; Pisani himself escaped to land and sought refuge in Modon. Every vessel of the Venetian fleet was captured.

Such a blow had never fallen on Venice before, and popular imagination collected round the battle of 1354- Sapienza a legend of portents which presaged the disaster. A flight of crows had settled on the ships and plucked each other to death among the shrouds; huge fish had swallowed some sailors swimming from one ship to another, and the sea had been stained with their blood. The popular fury at Venice vented itself in depriving Pisani for ever of any command and fining him 1000 lire; Nicolo Querini, the more to blame, if he were not actually a traitor, was cashiered for six years, and fined 1000 ducats.

The ruinous defeat of Sapienza was bad; but Venice had not yet reached the end of her misfortunes. Marin Falier, ambassador with the Papal Court in Avignon at the time of his election to the vacant Dukedom, made his solemn entry into Venice on 5th October, 1354. In the light of subsequent events, the people interpreted as ominous the fact that the new Doge landed in a dense fog and passed between the columns of the Piazzetta, the place of executions.

Falier belonged to one of the noblest families in the Republic. He had filled many offices with vigour and ability. His temper was violent and imperious. It is reported that, while Podestà of Treviso, he had boxed the Bishop's ears in public for keeping him waiting in a procession. Whether the conspiracy which has rendered Falier's name conspicuous was the result of his own private ambition, his desire to make himself lord of Venice, as Visconti was lord of Milan, or whether it merely signified the last protest of the older nobility and the people against the dominance of the new aristocracy, which had risen to power with the *Serrata*, and been consolidated after the conspiracy of Tiepolo and the creation of the Ten, is by no means certain. Petrarch, a contemporary and a competent observer, who knew Marino intimately, says: "Causas rerum . . . explicare, si comperta loqui velim, nequeo; tam ambigue et tam varie referuntur. Nemo illum excusat, omnes autem aiunt voluisse eum in statu Reipublicæ a majoribus tradito, nescio quid mutare." However that may be, in spite of its picturesque, and notwithstanding the romantic colour with

which subsequent historians have indued it, the conspiracy of Marin Falier is of little importance in comparison with that of Tiepolo. Its chief interest lies ¹³⁵⁴⁻ in the proof which it furnishes that the Doge was impotent, that the Council of Ten was the sovereign of the State.

The facts as far as they can be ascertained appear to be these. At the festival of Maunday Thursday some young Venetian nobles permitted themselves to take a liberty with one of the Dogressa's waiting-women, whereupon the Doge ordered them to be expelled from the reception-rooms. In revenge, as they passed the council chamber, it occurred to one of them to write upon the Doge's throne—*Marin Falier della bella mujer, lu la mantien et altri la galde*. The Doge soon saw the insulting inscription, and thought he recognised its origin. He applied for a heavy punishment against the culprits. If any punishment were inflicted, it appeared to the Doge to be quite inadequate to the enormity of this reflection on the ducal *cornio*, and he conceived a hatred of the powerful caste which sheltered its own members at the expense of the Doge's honour. Another instance of the same overbearing spirit on the part of the nobility roused against them the fury of the dock labourers. Marco Barbaro struck a certain Gisello, a dock hand, in the face upon some frivolous excuse. Gisello went to the Doge for redress; but Falier, with the memory of his own unavenged insult rankling in his mind, replied that he was powerless. Gisello said, "When one cannot bind a dangerous brute, one kills it." The phrase chimed in with Falier's mood. A compact was soon made between the Doge, Gisello, Filippo Calendario, Israello Bertucci, and spread rapidly throughout the whole body of the arsenal hands. The 15th of April was appointed as the day on which the nobles were to be slain, and Falier proclaimed prince of Venice.

The secret had been so well kept that even the Council of Ten had no inkling of what was in preparation for the 15th of April. But now the affection of a certain Beltrame, a bergamasque leather merchant, for his friend and protector, Nicolo Lion, brought about the discovery of the plot and saved, no doubt, much useless bloodshed. Beltrame could not

endure the thought that Nicolo was to be slain while he could save him. On the evening of the 14th

1354. Beltrame went to his friend and begged him with such insistence not to leave his house on the morrow that Lion, suspecting something of importance, pressed his friend to tell him all. Beltrame did so, at least as much as he knew; for not even he was aware of the Doge's implication in the plot. Lion went to Marin Falier, and told him what he had learned. The Doge feigned incredulity. This did not satisfy Lion, who made a similar revelation to others, by whom the chiefs of the Ten were warned. The Council was summoned in haste at San Salvatore. On the information of Lion, the arrest of Calendario took place; and on his confession the Ten discovered that the Doge was an accomplice. The Ten adopted efficient measures, by numerous arrests and by increasing the guards, to obviate any danger, and the plot failed completely. Ten of the conspirators were hung in a row from the windows of the ducal palace. The trial of the Doge occupied rather longer. His examination led to his confession of guilt. He was condemned to be beheaded on Friday, 17th April, 1355. Execution followed that same evening. Falier was conducted first to the steps of the *Salu del Maggior Consiglio*, where he was deprived of his ducal cap; from this staircase he was escorted to the landing-place at the top of the marble flight which led down to the courtyard of the palace, and one blow severed his head from his body, which was buried without pomp at the church of San Giovanni e Paolo.

Thus came to an end the last attempt to destroy from inside that rigid and powerful constitution which culminated in the establishment of the Council of Ten, whose members had just proved their supremacy by the annihilation of the Doge himself.

CHAPTER XII

The Venetian policy of extension in the Levant and on the mainland—Petrarch's view of the Genoese war—*Giovanni Gradenigo*, Doge—Visconti makes peace between Genoa and Venice—Venetian recuperative power—Difference between her and Genoa—Hungarians claim Dalmatia—Alliance between Hungary and the Carraresi—Hungarians in Friuli—*Giovanni Dolfin*, Doge—Carrara declares for Hungary—Hungarians threaten the lagoon—Treasury exhausted—Income-tax—Venice is forced to come to terms—Surrenders Dalmatia—Lessons of the Hungarian war—Venice asks the Emperor to grant a title to its mainland territory: refused—*Lorenzo Celsi*, Doge—Visit of the Duke of Austria and of the King of Cyprus—Petrarch's library—Mysterious death of the Doge—Further curtailment of the ducal authority—*Marco Corner*, Doge—Revolt of Crete—Claim of the Candioti to representation at Venice—The harbour tax—Revolt of the island—Dissension among the rebels—Collapse of the revolt—Rejoicings at Venice—Second revolt: crushed—*Andrea Loredan*, Doge—The approaching crisis, and the men who met it—Difficulties with Trieste: with Francesco Carrara—Plot to murder Venetian nobles—War declared—Hungary assists Carrara—Capture of the Paivode—Hungary withdraws—Carrara alone against Venice—Makes peace—Genoa and Venice—Quarrel at the coronation of the King of Cyprus—Affairs of the Eastern Empire—John Paleologus in Venice—The island of Tenedos—The story of Andronicus—Genoa supports him in order to secure Tenedos—War—Carrara joins Genoa—Carlo Zeno and Vettor Pisani—Pisani's victory at Antium: his defeat at Pola—Venice in danger—Pisani on trial—Defence of the lagoon—Capture of Chioggia—Desperation in Venice—Attempt to secure terms—Failure—Taddeo Giustinian and Vettor Pisani—Pisani liberated—Takes the command—Self-sacrifice of the Venetians—Chioggia besieged by Pisani—The strain of the siege—Zeno arrives—Storm—Supplies from the mainland cut off—Sortie—Fall of Chioggia—Triumph of Venice.

In the last chapter we have seen the Republic embarking upon a new phase of her career, a policy of extension on the mainland. In this she was merely ¹³⁵⁴ carrying out a tendency which was introduced when the

new aristocracy came into power, and manifested itself for the first time in the war of Ferrara. The present
1354- chapter will show how the pursuit of this policy complicated the difficulties of the Republic, and led her through a series of crushing losses to her final triumph over her rival Genoa. In the midst of the complications and confusions of the years between 1355 and 1380 the main events of Venetian history will be found to arrange themselves round the movement of this expansive policy, which Venice, not so much deliberately as in consequence of her own inherent vitality, was compelled to pursue.

The Republic was strong internally; her constitution fully matured. The failure of Faliero's conspiracy had proved her solidity; the obscure case of the Doge, Lorenzo Celsi, will demonstrate this solidity once more. But externally the aims of Venice were more vast than those of any other Italian State; she was attempting extension in two directions—in the Levant for purely commercial purposes, and on the mainland of Italy partly through ambition, partly under the necessity of securing for herself a food-yielding district, which would free her from the dread of starvation after every defeat at sea. Her efforts to maintain and to extend herself in the Levant exposed her to two dangers, both of which will be illustrated in this chapter: on the one hand, her own colonies showed a tendency to revolt and to separate from the mother-country, as in the case of Crete; on the other, her ancient rival Genoa was still unconquered, and had recently inflicted a crushing blow at Sapienza. Petrarch judged the situation rightly, *pareva un sognatore ma fu profeta*, when he wrote to the Doge, Andrea Dandolo, "lateñis bellum defuisse nunquam puto," and in the Genoese war "it is inevitable that one of Italy's eyes shall be put out, the other dimmed."

Again, on the mainland, the new Trevisan frontier of the Republic exposed her to attacks from Hungary and Austria, with concurrent danger to Friuli, Trieste, and Dalmatia; while the family of Carrara, creatures of Venice, dependent upon her for their existence, and placed by the

Republic as a bulwark between herself and the lords of Milan, were compelled by the nature of their position, by their desire to be independent, by their ¹³⁵⁴ dread of being absorbed, to become the implacable and treacherous foes of their protector. Hitherto Venice had been engaged in a duel with Genoa; but her first step upon the mainland made combinations and coalitions against her inevitable. And so we shall find that the Republic is now called upon to face Carrara, Hungary, Austria, and Genoa, all banded together to destroy the powerful city of the lagoons.

Giovanni Gradenigo, who succeeded Marin Falier in 1355, came to the throne when the Republic was in a perilous position. The conspiracy and death of his ¹³⁵⁵ predecessor had given a shock to the whole of Venice, which still smarted under the defeat of Sapienza and the loss of her entire fleet. But the war had been weighing hardly less heavily on her rival Genoa. Both Republics were prepared to sign a peace, the terms of which were proposed by Visconti. The Genoese pledged themselves not to enter the Adriatic with ships of war, nor to assist any rebellion on the part of Venetian dependencies; the Venetians in like manner were excluded from Genoese waters; both parties bound themselves to abstain from trading in the Sea of Azoff for three years.

Venice immediately applied herself to restoring her fleet which had been ruined at Sapienza, and to re-establishing her business on an active basis. As after Curzola, so after Sapienza, the Republic displayed her wonderful elasticity and power of recovery. In Egypt, in Barbary, with the Flemish and with the Tartars, she renewed her treaties and reorganised her commerce; and when the three years of exclusion from the Sea of Azoff had expired, she was ready to step in at once and to resume the valuable traffic in those waters. The stability of her constitution enabled her thus to devote her whole energies to commercial enterprise, to the restoration of her exhausted treasury, and the rehabilitation of her shattered fleet after each disaster which she suffered at sea. With her rival Genoa the case

was different. Victorious as she had been at Sapienza, she was not a free agent; after the battle of Cagliari 1355 she had surrendered herself to the protection of Visconti, and Visconti dictated the terms of her treaty of peace with Venice. But after that treaty had been signed, Genoa was unable to devote all her energies to recuperation. She found herself at once engaged in a struggle to shake off the Visconti yoke, and to regain her liberty; and so, while Venice was recruiting her strength to try a fresh fall, her rival was exhausting her forces in a struggle for independent existence.

Venice herself, however, was no longer in that free and isolated position which she had enjoyed before the treaty of Treviso. She was now a mainland power, possessed of territory which exposed her to attack from hostile neighbours. The most vigorous and most formidable of these was the King of Hungary, who grudged the Republic its lordship in Dalmatia. Already, while the Genoese war was raging, Lewis I. had demanded the cession of Dalmatia, and though Venetian diplomacy had succeeded in avoiding the danger for a time, it was evident that the King intended to seize that province on the first favourable opportunity. The Republic saw itself, much against its will, on the point of being engaged in a serious war on the mainland. Reinforcements and commanding officers were sent to Dalmatia, and also to the Trevisan marches, the two points where an attack was expected. Lewis of Hungary meanwhile began to prepare a coalition against Venice. The Counts of Gorizia, now conterminous with the newly-acquired territory of the Republic, were ready to join in an attack on a neighbour whose extension they viewed with suspicion. But the King had in prospect the support of an ally still more dangerous to Venice. It is true that the Carraresi, the lords of Padua, had been established in their sovereignty by the help of Venice, and owed a quasi-allegiance to the Republic as their suzerain. But it was equally certain that the Carrara family would endeavour to make itself independent, would aim at becoming lord of Padua in the same sense that Visconti was lord of

Milan; and this policy could only lead to one line of conduct, hostility to their most powerful neighbour and alliance with its enemies, for the strength of Venice implied their ultimate absorption, the weakness of Venice gave them their one chance of achieving independence. 1355.

The Republic was aware of this inevitable attitude on the part of the lord of Padua. She sent ambassadors to sound him as to the position he proposed to occupy in the coming struggle. His answers were evasive; he endeavoured to throw the blame of a rupture upon Venice by making preposterous demands in return for his assistance. Meantime Lewis was advancing rapidly through Friuli; he seized Sacile and Conegliano and laid siege to the strong place of Treviso. At this juncture Gradenigo died, and was succeeded by Giovanni Dolfin, who at the moment of his election was shut up in the leaguered city by the Hungarian troops. The new Doge was a man of vigour and a born soldier. By a clever night sortie he escaped from Treviso, rode through the Hungarian cantonments, reached Mestre and thence Venice. His first operation was to force Carrara to declare himself for or against the Republic. Fresh ambassadors were sent to Padua. But Carrara, who had temporised at first while Lewis was still distant, hesitated no more, now that the King was in virtual possession of the Trevisan marches. He declared for Hungary against his protector. This was his death-warrant, though he could not know it; for Lewis was only in Italy in order to compel Venice to cede Dalmatia. As soon as that object had been achieved the King would retire, and it was certain that Venice, unless she were herself destroyed, would destroy the lord of Padua. No other course was open to her; the Republic could not, after this experience of Carrara's temper, allow so powerful a territory, and one so near to her, to remain in the hands of an independent lord who was sure to prove a foe. Venice learned from the hostility of Carrara that she must make herself mistress of Padua; and thus she began to find herself thrust further and further forward into the Italian mainland, and along a line of policy 1356.

destined to land her in the disasters of the league of
1356. Cambray in 1510.

The success of the Hungarian arms in the Trevisan marches continued uninterruptedly. Treviso itself alone held out. And that city was on the point of yielding when the Pope, after great difficulties, succeeded in procuring a truce for five months, till Easter of 1357. But this truce did not lead to a peace, and when it expired hostilities were renewed with greater fury. The Hungarians arrived on the shores of the lagoons, and threatened to attempt an entry into Venice with small boats. The cities Castelfranco, Oderzo, Noale, Mestre, headed by Treviso, still continued their resistance. But such a strain could not be endured for long, and the Hungarians, masters of the open country, showed no signs of retiring. Discontent grew apace inside Venice. The treasury, in spite of the open sea and the active commerce, was becoming exhausted. Merchandise might arrive in the port, but with the mainland in the hands of the enemy, there were no outlets for its distribution. The Government found itself forced to make use of the funds laid by to meet the interest on public bonds; and in order to replace this fund a fresh tax of one per cent. on income had to be raised. There was danger of an outburst of popular discontent in the city itself. The Government began to consider terms of peace which, under such circumstances, could not be otherwise than disastrous and humiliating. Ambassadors were sent to King Lewis at Zara.

The King's conditions were explicit. The Venetians were to surrender the whole of Dalmatia; the Doge was to renounce the title of Duke of Dalmatia; the King promised to restore all the cities he had captured in Istria and the Trevisan marches, and to guarantee Venetian shipping against pirates. When these clauses were reported to Venice the Senate made a brave show of indignation; Venetian pride could not condescend so much as to discuss proposals so insulting; Venice could not renounce Dalmatia; it was necessary for the very existence of the Republic; and how could the King of Hungary, a land power, guarantee

immunity from pirates? But the answer to all this was very short and only too obvious: Dalmatia was already lost, and Treviso on the point of falling; to save one it was absolutely necessary to sacrifice the other. The terms were accepted perforce, and the treaty of peace, with an additional clause including the allies of both parties, and therefore Francesco Carrara, was signed on 18th February, 1358.

The results of the Hungarian war left Venice but little reason to be satisfied with the first fruits of her policy of extension on *terra firma*. She had lost Dalmatia, and with it much of her power in the Adriatic; she was on the point of losing Treviso, and was still destined to do so; she had been debarred from vengeance on Carrara, and even compelled to receive him in Venice with outward honours, which made but a poor cloak for her inward animosity.

Peace, however, had been restored for the present; and the population of Venice was able once more to turn all its attention to the bee-like task of accumulating wealth and extending its commerce. The Government, in this breathing space, had time to study the lessons of the Hungarian war. They saw that their territory on the mainland was exposed to attack by princes as powerful as the King of Hungary. They considered how they could best protect themselves against such attacks for the future. No happier expedient presented itself to them than the method of diplomacy, which was entailed upon them as one of the consequences of their mainland dominion. They attempted to secure an imperial title for their newly-acquired possessions. In this they were merely following the usual policy of an Italian mainland prince, who sought a vague authority, and still more shadowy shield, in a title drawn from the Pope or the Emperor, in a papal or an imperial diploma. The Venetians sent an embassy to Charles IV. to request a regular infeudation of the Trevisan marches. But the mission proved most unfortunate. It failed at the Imperial Court; two of the ambassadors were made prisoners on their homeward journey, and remained in custody for nearly two

years; and while the whole matter was still in suspense the Doge died.

1358. Lorenzo Celsi succeeded to the throne, and the beginning of his reign was marked by a double event, which showed with what rapidity Venice was able to repair

1361. the disasters of war, and to restore her exchequer.

In September the Duke of Austria arrived with a large retinue, bringing with him the imprisoned ambassadors; he was met at Treviso and conducted down the Sile in barges of State, past Torcello, Mazzorbo, San Giacomo, where the Doge, in the Bucentauro, joined the procession. The city spent no less than 10,000 ducats in amusing him. And immediately after his departure it was called upon to spend another large amount for the reception of Pietro Lusignan, King of Cyprus.

The Republic was bent upon a policy of peace if she could by any means compass it. She refused to mix in the complications of Italy, though invited to do so by the Pope; she showed herself accommodating in the case of new difficulties between herself and Carrara; she renewed her treaty with John Paleologus, Emperor of Constantinople. Other indications of the pacific temper of Venetian diplomacy at this period may be found in the choice which Petrarch made of the Republic as the securest depository of his precious and much-loved library; a gift whereof no trace remains, although it formed the foundation of that famous library of S. Mark—enriched by Cardinal Bessarion, by Contarini, and by Nani—which exists in full and vigorous activity down to this very day. The manuscript books were accepted, and placed in a chamber over the portico of S. Mark's, though what became of them subsequently is unknown. In return for his generosity Petrarch received from the Republic a house on the Riva degli Schiavoni.

Lorenzo Celsi, though only fifty-three years old when he ascended the throne, enjoyed a very brief reign. He died in 1365. An obscure remark in Sanudo's *Lives of the Doges* leads us to suspect some tragedy concealed behind this early death. "And be it observed," says Sanudo, "that had he not died then, after ruling for four years, he would have

come to the same end as Marin Falier." Everything indeed points to the existence, or at least the suspicion, of some kind of conspiracy analogous to that of Falier. ^{1361.} But Falier's failure had demonstrated the power of the Ten and the solidity of the new constitution. The *Consiglio de' Dieci*, whatever may have been the facts of the case, were now able to declare, after the Doge's death, that, having examined the charges against him, it ordered all the papers to be destroyed, and officially affirmed that the charges were false. Nevertheless the *promissione*, or coronation oath, which his successor was called upon to swear, shows a marked increase in the restrictions which surrounded the ducal authority, and puts a coping-stone to that long series of enactments whereby the aristocracy rendered the chief magistrate a mere nonentity in the State.

Before proceeding to the election of a new Doge the *Correttori* of the coronation oath added the following obligations to the already onerous promises exacted from the head of the State. He now swore that he would abdicate, on being desired to do so by all the six *Consiglieri Ducali* and a majority of the Great Council, and would vacate the ducal palace within three days of the presentation of such a request; on the other hand, he was not allowed to abdicate of his own accord; when we reach the tragic episode of the Foscari family, we shall see both these regulations working in full force. As was usual in Venice, contemporaneously with a diminution of ducal authority came an increase in ducal pomp. The Doge's household was increased in numbers and in splendour, but this was not sufficient to render the position of the supreme magistrate anything less than repulsive to a man of spirit; and it is not surprising to find that the next Duke but one, Andrea Contarini, the great leader who conducted the Republic safely through the troubles of the war of Chioggia, and displayed such intrepid courage as head of the State, should have positively refused to accept his election as Doge of Venice, and should only have yielded on threat of confiscation and perhaps of worse.

Whether Lorenzo Celsi's conspiracy, if it ever existed, was an outcome of the reaction against the new constitution,

established by the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*; whether
1361. it is to be considered as the last and the weakest
of that series of protests which were raised by
Bocconio, by Tiepolo, by Falier, or not, it is nearly certain
that the revolt of Candia, which began under his reign, and
which he left as a legacy to his successor, Marco
1364. Corner, was very closely connected with the estab-
lishment and the policy of the new aristocracy.

We have already remarked that the course of this chapter would show us how Venice, by her policy of extension, brought herself into collision with Hungary, Austria, and Carrara on the mainland, with Genoa and with her own colonies in her Levantine Empire. The Republic had always been rather jealous of her own offshoots. After the fourth Crusade, the mother-city was seriously alarmed lest the Venetians in Constantinople should separate themselves from the parent stock; she had shown no objection to the restrictions which John Paleologus wished to impose upon Venetian holders of real property within the Empire. The Venetian system of colonisation was not a system of conquest, but of plantation. The Republic sent out her colonists to settle amicably, if possible, among the native inhabitants of the country to be colonised, and trusted to the industry and commercial ability of her citizens to make her mistress of the new territory sooner or later; she was, of course, ready to support her citizens by arms if need were; but her principle was to allow the flag to follow commerce; she did not expect commerce to follow the flag.

When Candia was first colonised many cadets of noble houses took part in the operation. These Venetian nobles, had they been at home, would, under the provisions of the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, have found themselves included in the governing caste inside the Republic. They claimed now to be admitted to such offices as that of Duke, of Captain, of Councillor, in the island where they were settled, offices all of which, by the constitution of the colony, could only be filled by a Venetian nobleman. The request was a natural one; to grant it would have secured to the Candioti a fair and intelligent government by Venetians, who were

at the same time thoroughly versed in the affairs of the island. But it was refused. Venice treated the nobles of the Candiot colony as if they had no¹³⁶⁴ claim to be considered patricians of the Republic. This bred a profound discontent, which easily amalgamated with the desire among the native Candiots for absolute independence.

Matters reached a crisis when Candia presented a request to be allowed to send twenty sages as representatives to protect Candian interests at the capital. This was something similar to the demand on the part of a colony for a voice in the Imperial Parliament; to accede to the request would have been to take a step in the direction of federation. But the new aristocracy had no such intentions in their view; and the scornful answer, "We were not aware that you possessed twenty sages in Candia," showed the Candiots that they had nothing to expect from the mother-country in that direction. The immediate pretext for revolt was the exaction of a tax for the improvement of the island harbours, which the Candiots refused to pay unless Venice consented to receive their representatives.

The Duke of Candia, Leonardo Dandolo, declared the claim inadmissible; he charged the rebels to disperse; they stood firm, and in a few days the whole island was in open revolt. The native Candiots were headed by a Calergi and a Mudazzo; the Venetian element in the revolution had a Venier, a Gradenigo, and a Falier as leaders. In expectation of the arrival of an armament from Venice, the rebels strained every nerve to collect troops; they enrolled all the rabble of the island—pirates, thieves, murderers; and with this undisciplined army they waited the coming of the Venetians. The Republic endeavoured to pacify the revolt. Twice it sent commissioners with orders to use persuasion, not force. Both times the commissioners were repulsed and compelled to seek safety on board their galleys. Then Venice became seriously alarmed lest she should lose Candia. She addressed the Emperor, the Pope, Naples, and Hungary, begging them to remain neutral in the quarrel; and she despatched a force under the famous mercenary captain, Luchino dal Verme, to

reduce the island to obedience. The force was a small one, and would have been quite insufficient for the purpose had not the state of Candia rendered the task comparatively easy. The rabble army of the Candioti had taken to murder and to plundering; the leaders of the revolution did not act in accord among themselves; the natives were hostile to the Venetians, and had massacred many. When Luchino arrived off Candia, it only cost him three days to reduce the capital, which was handed over to him by the Venetian Candioti, who preferred to rely on the clemency of their compatriots rather than remain any longer associated with the natives, who threatened them all with death. Some of the rebels were executed, others pardoned, and the whole island seemed to be reduced to its allegiance once more. The Venetian side of the rebellion was crushed, and the news despatched to the capital. "It was on the 4th of June," writes Petrarch, "that I was standing at my window, enjoying the prospect of the open sea, in company with the Archbishop of Patras, when a galley under oar and sail swept through the mouth of the port, and arrested our conversation. We augured good news, for the masts were garlanded with flowers, and on the deck were lads, crowned with green wreaths and waving flags over their heads; from the poop trailed the standards of the enemy."

The news that Candia had submitted spread through the city; and the joy it occasioned is a proof of the alarm which Venice had experienced. A solemn thanksgiving service was ordered in S. Mark's, to be followed by a festival in the Piazza. "The crowd was immense. Not an inch unoccupied, and yet no confusion, no tumult, no ill humour. The games were held in that Square to which the world cannot show a match. The Doge and his suite viewed the spectacle from the platform in front of the Church where stand the four bronze horses, and to shield them from the glare of the sun, a rich and many-coloured awning was spread over their heads. I was there myself, upon the Doge's right. The Piazza, the Church front, the tower, the roofs, the porticoes, and windows presented a living wall of people. At one side of the basilica was a magnificent

pavilion for the Venetian ladies, who, to the number of four hundred, lent splendour to the scene, in which some relatives of the King of England took a part, and the strangers were astonished at the sight of so much magnificence." So writes Petrarch, eye-witness of the brilliant spectacle. ¹³⁶⁴

But these rejoicings were premature. The Venetian element in the revolt of Candia had been crushed, it is true; the native element, however, led by the Calergi, soon blazed up into rebellion again when the troops of the Republic withdrew from the island. This time the Government acted vigorously and mercilessly. It was a guerrilla war carried on among the mountains of Candia; but little by little the rebels were hunted down and slain. In the year 1366 their last stronghold, Annapoli, was captured, and Paolo Loredano reported to Venice that, "Thanks to the grace of God, I have put an end to a cruel war, and that famous island which has cost so much blood is for ever rendered incapable of further revolt. The rebels are without leaders, of whom I made a terrible example. All the forts and strongholds which it seemed undesirable to keep, I have destroyed; their inhabitants have been moved elsewhere; the district round them made desolate; return to them forbidden upon pain of death. All native statutes and ordinances are abolished; all natives removed from office; your governors will be guarantee for their submission." ¹³⁶⁶

It was in this way that Venice passed through her first great danger from one of her own colonies, and displayed the policy which she intended to adopt towards all Levantine possessions which might subsequently come into her hands. They were to be ruled as conquered dependencies; the absolute sovereignty of the capital, her title of *Dominante*, was asserted; the idea of federation rejected.

The remaining years of Marco Corner's Dogeship were passed in peace and in commercial activity. He was succeeded by Andrea Contarini, whose eventful reign saw Venice passing through the last phase of her desperate fratricidal struggle with her rival Genoa. Difficulties and

dangers thicken around her. Her enemies, Austria, Hungary, Carrara, Genoa, draw closer together for her destruction; she is approaching the greatest crisis in her external life; and she is enabled to meet that crisis triumphantly, only because she had already achieved her internal completion, the full maturity of her constitutional growth. The men she now produced were born and bred under the conception of that Venice which had been created by the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*; the reactionary and recalcitrant element, prone to rebel against the domination of the oligarchy and its instrument the Council of Ten, had been crushed and absorbed, after the revolts of Bocconio, of Tiepolo, of Falier, of Celsi, at home—of Candia led by Veniers and Gradenighi abroad. The men who were now coming to the front were animated by the spirit of the dominant party, enthusiastic in their self-sacrifice, self-negation, devotion to the abstract idea of Venice which was the essence of the oligarchical conception, and produced a patriotism more fervent than any that was ever offered to a personal sovereign. Self-effacement is the note of the great Venetians of this glowing period, of Andrea Contarini, of Vettor Pisani, of Carlo Zeno. With all the accumulated glory and prestige of centuries to lend it strength and substance, the passionate devotion of the first fisher settlers for the mud banks of their lagoons wakes once more in these their most vigorous offspring, and nerves them to conduct their beloved city in safety through the severest crisis of her long career.

Andrea Contarini had no sooner ascended the throne than he found the Republic embroiled with the Duke of Austria. From the time of Enrico Dandolo onwards Trieste had been in the position of a lax tributary to Venice. The city was obliged to pay certain nominal dues, and to fly the standard of S. Mark on festivals. She now seized an opportunity to revolt. She refused to run up the lion of the Apostle, and placed herself under the protection of Leopold, Duke of Austria. Venice laid siege to the town; 1369. Taddeo Giustinian defeated the Austrian troops which were marching to its aid; and Duke Leopold, following

the true Hapsburgian policy, accepted 75,000 ducats in lieu of whatever rights he possessed over Trieste. The city yielded to the Venetians, and to secure themselves against a similar revolution, the Venetian captain, Michiel, began to build the strong and dominating castle of S. Giusto. 1368.

The Triestine episode was no sooner concluded than another enemy, Francesco Carrara, began to cause uneasiness. He was working slowly down the Brenta, building forts at Oriago and elsewhere; he was stealing gradually nearer to the lagoons, and intended to establish salt-pans of his own if he were able. This would have seriously interfered with one great source of Venetian revenue, her monopoly of salt; but, more than that, Carrara's presence in force on the Brenta was a continual menace to the water system of the lagoons, a subject upon which the Republic had learned by experience to be peculiarly sensitive. All attempts at an amicable settlement of the disputed points proved useless. War was inevitable; unsought by Venice, desired and precipitated by Carrara, who counted on copious and vigorous support from the King of Hungary. While matters were still doubtful, and war not yet declared, the whole city of Venice was alarmed and infuriated by the discovery of a plot to murder some of the members of the Senate who were most keenly opposed to Carrara; and this horror was intensified when it was found that the lord of Padua had succeeded in suborning two Venetian nobles, Leonardo Morosini and Luigi Molin, to assist his designs by furnishing information of what passed in the Senate Chamber. The assassins lodged in the house of an old woman called *la gobba* (the hunchback), who lived near the Merceria. They naturally kept loose company, and the plot was revealed to the Government by two women of the town. Morosini and Molin, the two traitorous nobles, were killed in prison. The assassins were dragged at a horse's tail from the Rialto to S. Mark, and quartered between the columns of the Piazzetta. The Venetians never forgave this treacherous design; they remembered it against the Carraresi when Francesco Novello fell into their hands some thirty years later.

War broke out. The troops of the King of Hungary were marching to the assistance of his ally Carrara. 1369. Venice implored the Duke of Austria to bar their passage, and offered him all they had to offer, a large sum of money, if he would assist them. But Carrara outbid the Republic; he possessed Feltre and Belluno, which the Duke of Austria coveted more than money. The Hungarian troops came through the Austrian passes undisturbed, and debouched upon the plain of Friuli. They were led by Stephen, the Vaivode of Transylvania, nephew of King Lewis. At Narvesa, on the Piave, the Venetians under Taddeo Giustinian sustained a crushing defeat. This they repaired, however, by the victory of Fossa Nuova, where Venetian pikemen broke the charge of the splendid Hungarian cavalry. The Vaivode himself was taken prisoner. The capture of the Vaivode was a turning point in the war, for the possession of his person enabled Venice to detach the King of Hungary from Carrara. At the price of the Vaivode's liberty, Lewis withdrew his troops. Carrara was left alone; he was unable to cope single-handed with the Venetians; his own brothers were plotting against his life, as he very well knew. Under these circumstances he sought peace.

1373. The terms exacted by Venice were:—

1. A delimitation of Paduan territory.
2. A war indemnity of 250,000 ducats.
3. The destruction of all the forts Carrara had raised along the Brenta.
4. The city of the Feltre as a security for the observance of the contract.
5. Padua to supply itself with salt from Chioggia only.
6. Francesco Carrara to come in person to Venice, and to ask pardon of the Doge.

To these terms Francesco was obliged to subscribe. He sent his son Novello to fulfil the personal part of the engagement. In company with Petrarch the young Carrara presented himself to the Senate. The laureate declaimed a Latin oration in praise of peace, at the conclusion of which Carrara knelt and begged the Doge's pardon for his father's shortcomings.

Venice enjoyed this triumph over her implacable enemy.

But a peace which was not based upon the thorough suppression of one or the other party could not be of long duration in a country where, as in Italy, ¹³⁷³ each little state was struggling to preserve its own existence by absorbing its neighbours. It was certain that, on the first favourable opportunity, Carrara would again attack Venice. And the opportunity was not long in arriving. Carrara found himself taking an active part in the last deadly struggle between Venice and Genoa. He did everything that in him lay to support and assist the Genoese; and but for him the war of Chioggia would have had a much more rapid termination. The events which led up to this ultimate phase of the Genoese war will take our attention, for a time, from Italy to the Levant, the hereditary battlefield of the two maritime Republics.

After their victory at Sapienza, the Genoese had been so fully occupied with their own internal affairs that they were unable to profit by their success, and were debarred from carrying on any vigorous commercial rivalry with the foe they had just defeated. They watched the recovery of Venetian commercial prestige with jealous eyes, but were unable to take any steps to counteract it. In the year 1373, the ceremony of the coronation of the youthful Pierre Lusignan, King of Cyprus, furnished the occasion for an outburst of spite. In the coronation procession Paganino Doria, Genoese consul, claimed precedence of Malipiero, the Venetian representative. The Court officials decided the dispute in favour of Venice. At the coronation banquet Paganino vented his humour by throwing bread at Malipiero. The Venetians, supported by the Cypriotes, retaliated by hurling some of the Genoese out of the windows of the banqueting-hall. There was a general rising against the Genoese, and many were killed. When the news reached Genoa, the Doge's brother, Pietro di Campofregoso, was despatched with a very powerful fleet of thirty-six galleys to exact satisfaction. He captured Famagosta, obtained possession of the King's person, made him consent to pay an annual tribute of 4000 florins, and returned to Genoa with hostages for the King's good faith. Pierre Lusignan appealed to Venice for protection. But the

Republic was not prepared to make the King's quarrel a *casus belli*; it contented itself with sending an¹³⁷³ embassy to Genoa to protest against Campofregoso's high-handed proceedings at Famagosta, and accepted a conciliatory answer from the Genoese Doge.

Other events, however, were in preparation which ended by rendering a war between the two Republics inevitable. John Paleologus, Emperor of the East, was being slowly crushed by the growing Ottoman power. He had come to Italy in the vain hope of securing some support against the Turk. On his way through Venice he borrowed money of Venetian merchants, and when he wished to depart, he was informed that he could not be allowed to do so without depositing some security for his debt. John had no security to offer; he had come to borrow, not to deposit, and so he was obliged to remain in Venice. His son Andronicus, who was acting as regent in Constantinople, showed no eagerness to bring his father home; but John's younger son, Manuel, converted all his own possessions into jewels, sent them to Venice, and secured the Emperor's release. When John Paleologus reached Constantinople he was quickly followed by a Venetian ambassador, who demanded a renewal of the commercial privileges in favour of the Republic, and the cession of the island of Tenedos for the price of 3000 ducats and the jewels which John had left in pawn. The Emperor refused; but Marco Giustinian, the Venetian commander, presented an ultimatum couched in most peremptory language, informing Paleologus that if he persisted in his refusal Venice would make terms with the Sultan Murad, and deprive him of his throne. John was forced to yield, and thus the island of Tenedos became nominally the property of Venice. But the opportune position of this island, lying as it does so near to the mouth of the Dardanelles, made the possession of it an object of extreme desire to the Genoese. They could not quietly consent to see it pass into the hands of their rivals.

Meantime Andronicus, the son of John Paleologus, and Saugi, son of Sultan Murad, entered into a plot against their respective fathers. Murad marched against both rebels, captured them, blinded and slew his own son, and sent

Andronicus with a message to John, that the Sultan would judge of the Emperor's character by the way in which he dealt with his rebellious offspring. 1373. Paleologus replied by blinding Andronicus, and imprisoning him in the tower of Anema. It now occurred to the Genoese, in search of some pretext for upsetting the Venetian claim to Tenedos, that this rebellious and imprisoned prince was an instrument made to their hand. From their stronghold in Pera they virtually governed the Imperial city; they could therefore offer to place Andronicus on the throne if he would promise to make them a gift of Tenedos, the coveted. Andronicus consented gladly. By a *coup de main* the Emperor John was seized by the Genoese and imprisoned in the same tower whence they had just released his son to place him on the throne. But the Genoese calculations failed. When they presented the Imperial order for the surrender of Tenedos to the governor of the island, he refused to recognise Andronicus, and insisted that John's cession to Venice was the only valid one. On the strength of this he offered to place Tenedos in the hands of Giustinian at once. There was no time to consult the home Government. Giustinian accepted the cession in the name of the Republic; and the lion of S. Mark was hoisted on the island.

War could no longer be avoided. Genoa hastened to urge Carrara to join her in attacking the Republic; he agreed with alacrity, and on his side he secured the 1378. promise of help from Hungary. Against this powerful coalition Venice could only rely upon the doubtful support of the Visconti, lords of Milan. But she entered upon her preparations with enthusiasm and courage. Her levies were called out by the system of groups of twelve, and the first three divisions were drafted for immediate service. Mercenaries were hired for the defence of the Trevisan marches. A loan was raised, and increased duties on wine and food poured a large sum of money into the treasury. Two great naval commanders took the sea; Carlo Zeno, the intrepid and fiery, was sent to Negropont; Vettor Pisani, the able tactician and strategist, was invested with the supreme command.

He received the standard of the Republic in the Basilica of

1378. S. Mark, at the hands of the third great hero of the coming war, the Doge Andrea Contarini: "You are destined by God to defend the State, and to avenge her injuries through your valour. Therefore we consign to you this glorious ensign; see that you bring it back safe and victorious."

Pisani sailed in April. He made for Genoëse waters, intending to intercept Fieschi, should he attempt to make for the Levant. On the 30th of May, off Cape Antium, in a stormy sea and a deluge of rain, he attacked and utterly defeated the Genoese admiral. Had he been stronger he might have attacked Genoa itself. As it was, after a cruise in the Levant he returned to clear the Adriatic of Genoese pirates, who were infesting it from the shelter of the Dalmatian coast. He took Cattaro and Sebenico, and then upon orders from the Senate, who refused to allow him to return to Venice, and much against his better judgment, he went into winter quarters at Pola.

In May, 1379, Pisani was still lying at Pola; his fleet stood in need of repair, his men of rest and recruiting. He had been on the sea more than a year without touching Venice. But the Senate would not consent to his return. They despatched instead, two *Proveditori* to advise and supervise the admiral. Their presence was both annoying and, as it proved, disastrous. On 7th May Luciano Doria suddenly appeared off the mouth of Pola harbour. Pisani did not wish to fight. But his crews were weary of inaction, and the *Proveditori* displayed the confidence of the ignorant. The commander, seeing himself outvoted, gave orders to sail, and put himself in the van, crying, "Who loves S. Mark, let him follow me." Pisani in person bore down on the enemy's flagship, and killed the admiral Doria; but some of his captains missed their charge, and the Venetian fleet was thrown into confusion through unskilful handling. In spite of the Admiral's heroic conduct, which even his enemies praised, the rout of the Venetians was complete; only six galleys succeeded in finding shelter in Parenzo.

Venice had nothing more than this miserable remnant of Pisani's fleet between herself and the victorious Genoese. Hard pressed by Carrara on the main-^{1379.} land; with Mestre bombarded by some of the earliest cannon used in Italy; with Pietro Doria, Genoese admiral, cruising off the Lido, it is little wonder that the city was almost panic-stricken; and her terror found expression in the unjust punishment of her defeated commander. Pisani was summoned to Venice and placed upon his trial. The Court condemned him, and the law officers of the State even moved for sentence of death; but Venice was to be spared that disgrace. Pisani was sent to prison for six months, and deprived of the power of holding office for five years to come.

Immediately after the defeat of Pola the position of Venice seemed nearly desperate. But the Genoese had lost their admiral in the fight; and while waiting the arrival of his successor, Pietro Doria, the Government had time to recover from its temporary panic, and the whole population, as one man, set to work to defend the home waters against the attack which was expected day by day. Chains were run across the mouth of the Lido port; ships with batteries were anchored in the channel; troops under Giacomo Cavalli were landed on the Lido; the piles which mark the sinuous course of the canals through the lagoons were taken up; the convent of S. Nicolo was fortified. In July Pietro Doria was off the Lido mouth, but he did not attempt to force a passage; he contented himself with setting fire to a galley, whose smoke and flames were visible in the city. He then sailed down the shore of the Lido to Malamocco, entered that port, landed troops on the lido of Palestrina, and sailed on till he reached Chioggia; he passed out again into the open by Brondolo. In a short time he returned once more, with his fleet raised, by reinforcements, to thirty-three sail. He cast anchor near Chioggia and began to take soundings; his intention clearly was to make Chioggia his headquarters. Upon his departure the Venetians closed the Malamocco mouth in the same way as they had already closed the Lido; and more than this, seeing now that Doria

proposed to establish himself in the lagoons, they organised a
1379. flotilla of light boats which would serve to harass the
enemy. On 6th August Doria was again off the Lido
with forty-seven sail. He moved leisurely down the coast
and made for Chioggia. The presence of Carrara with 24,000
men on the mainland, which was close to Chioggia, caused
Doria to choose that lagoon city as his headquarters. There
he was sure of provisions and supplies, and from Chioggia
he proposed to blockade the sea approaches to Venice, while
Carrara did the same on land. But Chioggia was garrisoned
by a courageous Venetian nobleman, Pietro Emo, and was
not yet in Genoese hands. On 11th August Doria delivered
his first assault, and was repulsed. Between the 12th and
the 16th the operations of attack and defence were con-
tinuous. On the latter day, as the Venetians were retreating
from a vigorous sortie the Genoese poured over the bridge
along with them, entered the town, and Chioggia fell.
It was taken over in the name of Carrara, lord of Padua.
Francesco urged the Genoese to push on at once for Venice;
and had Doria done so it is almost impossible that the city
should have escaped falling into his hands. But the
admiral resolved to abide by his plan of a blockade, and
his design for starving Venice into surrender; a decision
which proved the salvation of the Republic and his own ruin.

The fall of Chioggia closes the first period of this memor-
able war. When the news reached Venice the alarm was
intense. The bell of S. Mark rang to arms. The citizens
crowded to the Piazza, expecting every moment to see the
Genoese streaming up from Malamocco and Poveglia and S.
Spirito, for they never doubted that Doria would follow
the course indicated by Francesco Carrara, and attack at
once. No Genoese appeared. The position of the city
seemed almost hopeless, with hardly any ships in the
arsenal, with the mainland shore of the lagoons in the hands
of the enemy. The Government considered that their last
resource lay in negotiating for the least ruinous terms their
foes would grant. The Doge sent to ask Carrara for a safe-
conduct in favour of three envoys. The answer showed
how little Venice had to hope from the mercy of such foes.

Carrara replied that he would not hold his hand till he had bitted and bridled the horses on S. Mark's.

At this moment of extreme depression the Venetians showed the stuff which was in them. A palisade was run across the lagoon from the Lido to S. Spirito; all the magistrates renounced their pay; new imposts were borne without a murmur; the unity of the race was demonstrated when the whole population was summoned to the Piazza, and Pietro Mocenigo, in the Doge's name, with few but weighty words, explained the extremity of the peril, announced that the poor would find food at the homes of the rich, for all distinctions disappeared in face of the common danger, and invited the people to express their wishes on the question of continuing the war. The answer came back at once in the cry, "Let us man every vessel there is in Venice, and go to and fight the enemy."


The question was who should take the command in this supreme crisis of the national history. The Government nominee was Taddeo Giustinian. But there was another leader who had won all the love of the people, all the confidence of the sailors, Vettor Pisani, who still lay in prison, paying an unmerited penalty for a defeat which was none of his fault. The popular cry for Pisani grew so strong that the Government thought it prudent to yield. Pisani was taken from prison, and the Doge solemnly exhorted him to obliterate the memory of past defeats by future victories, to dwell more upon the present clemency than upon recent severity, and to wipe out, not any fancied wrongs inflicted on himself, but the real injuries suffered by his native city. Pisani's reply was inspired by a noble self-sacrifice. "Neither the State nor its magistrates have done me any wrong. All that I suffered was but the inevitable result of your wise maxims, the outcome of your natural pain. I endured my imprisonment without a murmur; now that I have regained my liberty, my whole existence is dedicated to my country." Nevertheless, though the Government had yielded to the popular cry, in appearance, the people soon found that, in fact, it intended to retain its own nominee. Pisani was only associated with

Giustinian, and in the division of commands he received
1379. the less important, the Lido district, not the post
of admiral of the fleet. The sailor population, so
personally attached to its hero, was on the point of mutiny.
They went to Pisani and said, "My Lord, give us what
orders you please, for we are going to stay with you;"
and Messer Pisani answered, 'My comrades and brothers,
go at once to the Signory, they will give you your orders.'
They went with banners flying, and said, 'Give us galleys
for us to man, that we may sail under Messer Pisani wher-
ever he may go;' but the governors replied, 'Go, get ye
small boats from the Arsenal; man those, and put your-
selves under Messer Taddeo Giustinian, the Captain of the
sea.' With this answer they went away very ill content,
muttering that they would be cut in pieces rather than
serve under Taddeo Giustinian; and, as they left the
palace, they threw down the flag, with many wicked words,
which it is better to pass over in silence." So an old
chronicler describes the scene. The Government was wise
once more, and to the joy of all the people and the sailors,
Vettor Pisani received the supreme command. Messengers
were sent in search of Carlo Zeno, with orders that he
should return home. The Government promised to ennoble
the thirty citizens who should make the greatest sacrifices
for their city. The Doge declared that he himself would sail
on board the fleet. A forced loan of 5 per cent produced
the enormous sum of 6,294,040 lire, proving that, in spite
of long wars and present reverses, Venetian financial
resources were still profound. The appointment of Pisani
seems to have restored tone and confidence. Thirty-four
galleys were put together, and the public was still further
heartened by a slight success which the light flotilla under
Barbarigo secured, and by Cavalli's expulsion of the
Genoese from the Malamocco; he drove them slowly down
towards Chioggia, till he had freed the Palestrina lido as
well, leaving the enemy still in possession of Sottomarina,
Brondolo, Chioggia, and the mainland.

Meanwhile the Genoese were beginning to feel the diffi-
culties of a campaign conducted far from home. Provisions

were not lacking, it is true ; the mainland was in the hands of their ally Carrara. But the ships showed signs of wear and tear. Winter was coming on, and Doria ¹³⁷⁹⁻ drew his whole fleet into Chioggia, intending to wait there for reinforcements from Genoa.


This operation suggested to Pisani his brilliant plan of campaign. He resolved to blockade the blockaders—to shut the Genoese into Chioggia. To effect this blockade it was necessary to close the exits from Chioggia to the open sea. Three channels gave egress to the sea—the port of Chioggia, between Palestrina and Sottomarina ; the port of Brondolo, between Sottomarina and the mainland ; and the Canal di Lombardia, which led from Chioggia across the lagoon, passing the Malamocco port, and reaching Venice and the Lido opening into the Adriatic. Pisani determined to close all these exits by sinking ships full of stones in the deepest waters. On the night of 23rd December, after a solemn service in S. Mark's, the Doge, many of the Senate, and almost the entire male population embarked on board the thirty-four galleys and the flotilla of lighter boats. With a fair wind, and headed by Pisani and Giustinian, they sailed away across the lagoon for Chioggia. By daybreak they were at the Chioggia port. One side of this outlet, the Palestrina side, was already in their hands ; the other, the Sottomarina side, was held by the Genoese. Pisani landed troops, who engaged the enemy at that point, while his sailors proceeded to sink two barges in mid-channel, upon which the lighter boats heaped stones. The loss on the Sottomarina point was heavy, but in a short time the Chioggia port was effectually closed. Brondolo presented greater difficulties. The deep water was there divided into two channels, one of which ran close under the Sottomarina shore, the other under the mainland shore. Both banks were held by the enemy. The fire, therefore, upon those who were working to block the channels, was near and deadly. But Federico Cornet, to whom Pisani entrusted the operation, succeeded. The Brondolo port was also closed. Pisani turned and sailed up the Canal di Lombardia, blocking that also behind him with sunken ships. Then he passed out into the open



SKETCH MAP
OF THE
WAR OF CHIOGGIA

Reference

- A. — Sunk or ships.
- B. — Front where the Genoese tried to break out.
- — Genoese troops
- △ — Venetian troops.



sea, and sailed down to Chioggia, where he took up his station, with the double purpose of preventing the
1379. Genoese from breaking through the barriers he had just erected, and from receiving any provision or reinforcement by way of the sea. The mainland now was the only source of supply left to the Genoese, who found themselves suddenly besieged instead of besiegers, completely shut up in Chioggia.

The blockade of Chioggia closes the second period of the war. Pisani's position was far from secure. He was on the open sea; it was winter; both *levante* and *scirocco*, two violent and prevailing winds, would give him a lee shore. The Genoese, who recognised the danger of their situation, were incessantly endeavouring to break out. Pisani's crews, working by turns, day and night, defended the Brondolo barricade. The strain was becoming more than they could endure. A promise was wrung from the Admiral that if, by the first of January, Carlo Zeno had not arrived to his relief, he would withdraw from the blockade of Chioggia. The anxiety of those days was intense. But the Doge nobly supported his great captain; he swore that, come what might, go home who would, he had resolved never to see Venice again till Chioggia was recaptured. The horizon was scanned day by day for the sight of a sail; that sail might be the vanguard of Genoese reinforcements for Doria, or Carlo Zeno's long-expected fleet. At length, on the very last day, on the first of January, ships were descried on the offing, and presently the lion of S. Mark, not S. George of Genoa, was recognised as the ensign.

Carlo Zeno had arrived not a moment too soon to save the waste of such months of heroism. His presence gave the Venetians not only the superiority in numbers, but what was more valuable still, a body of picked sailors. Zeno reported himself to the Doge, and the very same day proceeded to the point of danger, the Brondolo channel. But now the foreseen arrived. A storm blew up and drove Zeno's ship ashore, under one of the enemy's towers. Only by fighting furiously, and by throwing some of his cannon

overboard, could Zeno succeed in floating his vessel, and bringing her back into safety. On 6th January Pisani effected a landing on the Brondolo point, ¹³⁷⁹⁻ and planted his cannon, the *Trevisana* and the *Vittoria*, so little understood as yet that their gunners did not venture to fire them more than once a day; but they did good work. A shot from one of them struck the campanile in Chioggia, and the ruins, in their fall, killed Doria, the Genoese admiral. His successor, Napoleone Grimaldi, seeing how desperate the situation was becoming, resolved to cut a canal through the Lido of Sottomarina and so effect an escape to sea. But by the 13th of February the Genoese were driven out of Brondolo and forced into Chioggia. Pisani took possession of Brondolo, and all possibility of cutting a new canal was at an end. Carrara, however, was still able to throw provisions and troops into the town. In order to destroy this last resource of the Genoese, Pisani entrusted the necessary operations on the mainland to Carlo Zeno. His land forces consisted of mercenaries drawn from various nations—English, German, besides Italians. They were eager for the sack of Chioggia, and rapacious for pay; they endeavoured to force Pisani and Zeno to deliver an assault upon the town. The caution of the two leaders counselled them to refuse. The mercenaries mutinied, and were only reduced to obedience when Zeno strung one of them, Robert of Recanati, up to the yard of his own ship. Still it was with such troops as these that Zeno succeeded in cutting off the convoys sent to Chioggia by Francesco Carrara, thereby convincing the Genoese that their last hope of salvation lay in a desperate sortie. In May they began to build light skiffs, made of the timbers and rafters of houses which they pulled down. They hoped to be able to sail over the obstacles in the Chioggia and Brondolo channels, and possibly to join the squadron of Matteo Maruffo, the Genoese admiral, who was cruising about on the farther side of the Venetian fleet, waiting to support a sortie from Chioggia. The sortie, twice repeated, failed. Zeno's men cut the Genoese to bits while they were in the shoals, and Pisani's bolts sank the skiffs that had escaped into deeper

water. Famine came to close the long list of Genoese disasters; and, after some preliminary negotiations, 1380. Chioggia and the whole armament of Genoa surrendered to the Republic, at discretion, on 24th June, 1380. The prisoners were conveyed to Venice, where, to the honour of the Venetians, they were most humanely treated.

Thus closed the famous war of Chioggia, the acutest crisis through which the Republic ever passed. Regarded from the point of general European history, the war must be considered a disastrous folly. That Genoese and Venetians should have cut each other's throats inevitably left Italy and all Christendom the weaker in the Mediterranean. Could the two maritime Republics, instead of exhausting themselves in a fratricidal conflict, have agreed to share the commerce of the Levant by amicable arrangement, it is possible that the Turk would never have reached Constantinople, and that Venice would have been spared her long and hopeless death-struggle. But the centrifugal quality in Italian political temperament, as well as the very vigour of the two growing States, placed such a combination beyond the bounds of human providence, and rendered it impossible. From the narrower, the purely Venetian, point of view, the war of Chioggia seemed a glorious triumph. The Republic emerged from it victorious; her great rival Genoa never recovered from the blow, and troubled her no more. The success of her arms and the indomitable courage and sacrifice displayed by her citizens, high and low, inspired every Venetian with a sense of pride and confidence in his city and his race. But if we enquire how the Republic was able to achieve such a success as the issue of so many disasters, how she supported the frightful strain of incessant war, and the crushing effect of blow after blow—Sapienza, Dalmatia, lost, the mainland closed, her fleet all but annihilated at Pola—the answer is not so easy to find. Italy was amazed at her recuperative power, and perhaps was not wrong in ascribing her vitality to the strength of her constitution, which became a kind of ideal to Italian statesmen such as Giannotti and Machiavelli. The stability of her Government,

combined with the strength of her natural position, allowed her citizens to make the fullest use of every period of peace, however brief. A few years of such active trade as Venetians knew how to carry on, was sufficient to recruit the treasury. Venice had virtually a monopoly of the Mediterranean trade; Genoa, her great rival, lacked her advantages—she had an unstable constitution, the city was on the land, and exposed to a siege, not on a group of unreachable islands. But more than this, the constitution which was so strongly built seems also to have inspired enthusiasm in the men who were brought up under it. The war of Chioggia is a splendid proof of the self-sacrifice which at that time animated the whole Venetian race; a race passionately devoted to its native city, and at the same time supremely practical in all matters of business. This, if any, is the heroic period of Venetian history, when she was approaching the maturity of her outward growth, as a natural consequence of having already achieved maturity in her political constitution. 1380.

CHAPTER XIII

The war of Chioggia continued on the mainland by Carrara—Venice gives Treviso to the Duke of Austria—Death of Pisani—Amadeo of Savoy brings about the peace of Turin—Terms of that peace—The fate of Genoa—Admissions to the Great Council—*Michele Morosini, Doge*—*Antonio Venier, Doge*—Venetian commerce—Petrarch's description of the port—Occupation of Corfu, Scutari, Durazzo, Nauplia, Argos—Troubles with Carrara—Visconti and Carrara in league to despoil the Scalas—Visconti's treachery—Seizes Vicenza—Visconti offers Treviso to Venice if she will help to crush Carrara—Venice accepts—Francesco Carrara abdicates in favour of his son, Francesco Novello—Venice recovers Treviso—Venetian policy—Her jealousy of Visconti—A league against Visconti—Venice offers to help the Carraresi to return to Padua—Adventures of Novello—His return to Padua—Peace of Genoa—Results for Venice—The Sultan Bajazet—Visconti again aggressive: his death—Effect on the relations between Venice and Carrara—*Michels Steno, Doge*—Dismemberment of Visconti's dominions—Effect on Venice and Carrara—Carrara attacks the Duchess of Milan—Tries to seize Vicenza, which surrenders to Venice—Clash between Venice and Carrara—War—Siege of Padua—Carrara's plot in Venice—Fall of Padua—The Carraresi prisoners in Venice: their treatment, and death—The fall of the Carraresi makes Venice a mainland State.

THOUGH victorious by sea, Venice was still hard pressed upon the mainland. The recapture of Chioggia and the surrender of the Genoese fleet, had freed her from the imminent danger of seeing the Genoese admiral triumphant in the Piazza of S. Mark. But Francesco Carrara still held the Trevisan marches, and was pressing the city of Treviso so closely that its surrender appeared to be the matter of only a few days. Venice, however, was determined that if she must lose her territory it should not be to the lord of Padua, whom she hated so cordially. She could not save Treviso, but she could thwart and mortify Carrara by

making a present of the town and territory to some stronger power. And so, just when Francesco thought that he was about to add this province also to his dominions, he saw, to his chagrin, the troops of the Duke of Austria appear upon the scene, and enter the beleaguered city with the consent of the Venetians, who had surrendered it to a distant rather than to a neighbouring enemy. 1380.

All parties were weary of this long, deadly, and fratricidal war. Genoa was disheartened by the loss of her fleet; Venice was mourning the death of her great leader, Vettor Pisani, who died of wounds received at Manfredonia, less than two months after Chioggia had surrendered; Carrara was disgusted at seeing Treviso slip through his fingers; accordingly, when Amadeo of Savoy offered his mediation in 1381, it was accepted. By the peace of Turin, Venice confirmed her renunciation of Dalmatia in favour of the King of Hungary; she surrendered Tenedos, which had been the immediate cause of the war, to the Duke of Savoy; she obtained from Carrara the restitution of the strong positions along the edge of the lagoon which he had fortified. These terms were not such as would have satisfied a victorious city. But Venice was not precisely victorious; she had saved the capital from occupation by the Genoese, but no more. She had lost Dalmatia and Treviso; her possessions on the mainland were reduced to a narrow strip of territory bordering the lagoon. Under these circumstances even such a peace as that of Turin was welcome. And Venice set herself at once to repairing the ravages of the Chioggian war. She did so in a remarkably short period, proving once again the surprising elasticity and recuperative force of her constitution. In the Levant she found herself virtually unopposed by her rival Genoa. For though Genoa cannot be said to have been actually destroyed by the loss of her armament at Chioggia, yet she now became a prey to internal party faction; she deposed no less than ten Doges in four or five years; and finally, in 1396, she renounced her independence, and received from Charles VI. of France, a governor, who ruled the Republic in the French interests. Venice

had nothing more to fear from Genoa. In this chapter
1381. we shall see how the Republic recovered and confirmed her power in the Levant; only, however, to find herself drawn closer and closer towards another and more formidable foe, the Ottoman Turks.

On the mainland the case was different. There Carrara was still powerful. Venice had learned during the war of Chioggia how much his hostility might cost her. She knew that Carrara must be crushed. But the operation was one of some difficulty. The combinations and coalitions of the continent called for a display of diplomacy as well as of force. The second topic of this chapter will be the explanation of the way in which Venice achieved her aim; how she crushed out the Carraresi, and established herself upon the mainland.

As after the revolution of Tiepolo the Republic consolidated her constitution, so after the war of Chioggia she confirmed her empire in the Levant, and after the destruction of the Carraresi she created her empire on the mainland of Italy. By the year 1405 Venice may be considered as full-grown, externally and internally. She expanded, it is true, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and on *terra ferma*: her constitution took a stronger and stronger tone of its original hue: Europe began to recognise the importance and the splendour of the city in the lagoons; but in essence the Republic had reached its maturity: as we shall find her at the close of this chapter, so she remained.

On the conclusion of the peace of Turin, Venice proceeded to fulfil her obligations towards those citizens who had deserved well of the State. In September, 1381, the Great Council elected the thirty commoners who were to be admitted to the ranks of the Patriciate and to a seat in the *Maggior Consiglio*, as a reward of merit. The great Doge,
1382. Andrea Contarini, died in 1382. But the work of recuperation was carried on by his successors, Michele Morosini and Antonio Venier. Chioggia was rebuilt. Trade in the Levant recovered, and spread even far beyond the borders of the Mediterranean. In the Indies, in distant Siam, the Venetians maintained a consular

agent; the Black Sea traffic grew under their hands, and beyond the Straits of Gibraltar Venetian galleys rode in the waters of England and of Flanders. 1382.

We have already seen how the commercial circle from the Levant and the East, through Venice to England, and back by Flanders through Venice to the Levant again, had been made out. At each return of peace the Venetian merchant knew the road he ought to take, and was sure of finding traces of his old commercial relations. Petrarch, from his windows on the Riva degli Schiavoni, commanding the basin of S. Mark, has described the movement of the port of Venice: "From this harbour I see vessels departing which are as large as my house, and have masts taller than its towers. They are like mountains floating on the waters. They sail to all parts of the world, and face a thousand dangers. They carry wine to England; honey to the Scythians; saffron, oil, linen, to Assyria, Armenia, Persia, and Arabia; wood to Egypt and Greece. They return laden with various merchandise, which is distributed over all Europe. Where the sea stops their sailors quit their ships, and travel on to trade with India and China; they cross the Caucasus and the Ganges, and reach the Eastern Ocean." Such indomitable courage, enterprise, activity, soon poured wealth into the treasury. The city began to extend rapidly in population. The Government no longer felt it necessary to continue the facilities for obtaining Venetian citizenship, which had been introduced under the stress of plague and battle, and the ancient standard of fifteen years' residence was enforced once more.

This internal prosperity found its counterpart in an extension of territory in the Levant. The island of Corfu had been assigned to Venice after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, as part of the dominion acquired by Enrico Dandolo. But the possession of the island had never been made good, and it was lost in 1221. By the peace of Turin, Venice had renounced her claim on the island of Tenedos, and now believed that her loss might be counterbalanced if she could recover Corfu. The island was in a state of virtual independence, owing to the disturbed condition

of the Neapolitan kingdom of which it nominally formed a part. The Corfiots were aware that they could
1382. not maintain themselves single-handed, and were now casting about to find some power under whose protection they might enjoy tranquillity. The Venetians suggested that the Corfiot nobles should invite the protection of the Republic, and a former act of surrender was drawn up in 1386. The deed was not confirmed, however, till 1402, when
1386. Ladislaus renounced his rights over the island for the sum of 30,000 ducats. This policy of suggesting to weak native governments that they should invite the protection of a power that intended to absorb them if they did not do so, had the advantage of giving the new owners a sort of title, and in many cases saved bloodshed and spared the expenses of a war. Venice pursued this policy to her advantage in Epirus and Albania, where she acquired Scutari and Durazzo; in the Morea, where she obtained possession of Nauplia and Argos; and in the Ægean Sea, and thereby laid a firm basis for her subsequent possession of the whole Peloponnesus. Her wealth, her diplomacy, her stability, were the instruments which she used in this rapid extension eastward through the Levant.

But while Venice, thanks to the effacement of Genoa, added triumph to triumph in the East, upon the mainland of Italy she was called on to play a far more difficult and more dangerous part. The issue of the war of Chioggia in its mainland aspect, had filled Francesco Carrara with an exaggerated conception of his own power. It is true that Venice had not been captured by the Genoese and himself, and that he had missed the possession of Treviso. Yet the fact remained that he had seen Venice at his feet suing for peace, he had for a brief period been master of all her mainland territory. His ambition was now to be still further fed. Venice, in her straits, rather than yield Treviso to Carrara, had made the city over to the Duke of Austria. The Republic thought to mortify Carrara. But the Duke of Austria had no need for Treviso, nor for Ceneda and Feltre, by the cession of which Carrara had bribed him to let the Hungarians come through his territory during the

war of 1373. He now sold all three cities to Francesco Carrara. The importance of this event lay in the fact that Ceneda and Feltre commanded one of the great commercial routes into Germany, the road by Cortina d'Ampezzo to the Pusterthal. Venice could not but see with alarm this important outlet for her merchandise in the hands of so confirmed an enemy as Francesco Carrara. The Republic, however, was not in a position, as yet, to make this new acquisition on the part of Carrara a *casus belli*. She was not happy on the mainland, where she was obliged to employ mercenaries; she had no sufficient mercenary army at her disposal, she was still suffering from the recent effects of the mainland movement of the Chioggian war. But she knew that Carrara could not stand still; that the very nature of his position would force him to expand; she was aware that beyond the Veronese borders lay a great power, the Visconti, with whom Carrara must infallibly come into collision, sooner or later; she thought that, by waiting, events might serve her purpose; that Carrara would be crushed for her, not by her. And Carrara's ambition pursued the course which Venice had foreseen. He was now lord of Padua, Treviso, Ceneda, Feltre, Belluno, Bassano, the whole district between the Alps and the lagoons; he commanded the passes; nothing remained for him to take from Venice, unless it were the lagoons and the city itself. But the issue of the Chioggian war had shown him that such an object could not be achieved even in combination with all the naval force of Genoa. On the other side of his territory, however, towards the west, a prey lay ready to be devoured. The last of the Scala family, Antonio, still maintained a feeble grasp upon Verona and Vicenza. His precarious possessions stood between two expanding and vigorous Signori—Visconti of Milan and Carrara of Padua. It was inevitable that he should be absorbed. In 1387, Visconti and Carrara entered into a league for the partition of the Scala territory. Visconti claimed Verona; Vicenza was to be added to the possessions of the lord of Padua. What Venice foresaw and desired now happened; Carrara, by this league with Visconti, came into immediate relations with the lord of Milan, a prince far abler and more

powerful than himself, whose ambition was not likely to
 1387. stop short at Verona. Carrara was a doomed man,
 though he did not know it.

In accordance with their agreement, Gian Galeazzo Visconti and Carrara attacked Antonio della Scala. The resistance was of the feeblest. Antonio fled down the Adige and sought shelter in Venice. Verona opened its gates to Gian Galeazzo's general, who, instead of remaining there, pressed on to Vicenza, and captured the city, which he held, not in the name of Carrara but of his master, Visconti. Then, at last, Carrara understood the situation. He saw that his ally, the *biscione*, the snake of the Visconti, intended to absorb him also. He applied to Venice in his alarm. He pointed out that the Republic could not see, without anxiety, the extension of the Visconti territory from Milan to the borders of the lagoons; that Venice must, in self-defence, forget past injuries and support Padua as a bulwark between herself and Milan. But the emissaries of Gian Galeazzo were already in Venice promising to give Treviso, Ceneda, Feltre back to the Republic if she would assist him in crushing Carrara.

The moment was an important one for Venice; and the
 1388. choice which she made was justified, from her own
 point of view, by events, though at the time it must
 have seemed a perilous resolve. The danger of bringing the Lord of Milan down to the lagoons was obvious, but Venice believed in the impregnability of the city; she recalled the injury she had suffered from Carrara during the war of Chioggia; she remembered the plot to murder her senators; she saw her way to recovering Treviso at very little cost to herself, and along with Treviso the important mountain passes. Visconti's proposals were accepted. Francesco Carrara had, of course, no power to resist such a combination. He took a step which he trusted would appease Venice, and detach her from her Milanese alliance. Believing that the action of the Republic was dictated purely by personal animus against himself, he resigned in favour of his son, Francesco Novello, and retired to Treviso. But Venice was actuated by more motives than one. She desired to recover Treviso quite as

much as to humiliate Carrara; and so Francesco's abdication produced no result. Padua was attacked and fell. Venice recovered the whole of the Trevisan marches, and Visconti took possession of all the Padovano. 1388.

Could Venice have kept the Carraresi as quasi-independent princes between herself and the Visconti, had such a policy been possible, it would doubtless have been wiser for the Republic; it would have saved her from the clash with Gian Galeazzo, her subsequent extension on the mainland, and the disasters of Cambray implied thereby. But the policy was not possible. The Carraresi themselves would not understand the situation, from a Venetian point of view. They had proved this by their violent hostility during the Chioggian war, and again by their endeavours to expand, and to shut out Venice from the passes, when that war was over. The Lords of Padua would not recognise themselves as dependants of Venice; they aimed at being nothing less than autocratic princes. But even if the Venetians had succeeded in establishing such relations between themselves and their neighbour, they could hardly have avoided collision with Visconti, who was aspiring to a kingdom of North Italy; the Paduan frontier would virtually have been the Venetian frontier, if the Republic supported Carrara, and the clash must have come. The policy of maintaining the Carraresi was impossible. In the deplorable condition of the times, no course was open to Italian principalities but one of internecine warfare; to kill or be killed was the sole alternative.

Venetian aims in the midst of these complications are quite clear. The Republic desired to recover Treviso at the least possible expense, but she never supposed that Visconti would prove a more welcome neighbour than Carrara had been. She trusted, however, that the rapid movement of Italian mainland politics would help her to checkmate Gian Galeazzo in any attempt at further aggrandisement in her direction; that the kaleidoscope of Italian diplomacy would soon offer a combination which would enable her to expel Visconti from the Padovano; and in the meantime she had recovered Treviso.

Carrara's prophecy that Visconti would prove a dangerous neighbour, and Venetian hopes that a coalition against
1388. him might be formed, were both rapidly fulfilled. Visconti, now lord of North Italy from Milan to the lagoons, continued his policy of extending his dominions southward. He declared war on Bologna and Florence. Venice was invited to join in a league against the too powerful Lord of Milan, and complied. But she desired to avoid an open conflict with Gian Galeazzo on the mainland, a struggle for which she was in no way prepared. She adopted a surer and less expensive method for expelling the Milanese from her borders; she invited the Carraresi to return to Padua, and promised her support for their enterprise.

After the capture of Padua by Visconti, Francesco Carrara the elder had been interned in Monza, his son Novello in Asti. From Asti, Novello made his escape, and, in company with his young wife, Taddea d'Este, he crossed the Cenis, in snow, to Vienne, upon the Rhone. Always pursued by Visconti's emissaries, he passed down that river to Marseilles; sailed along the Riviera coast; storm-tossed and seasick, Taddea implored to be put on shore, but the party had no sooner landed than they were ordered by the Doge of Genoa to take ship again. They passed along that lovely land by Nervi, Porto Fino, Porto Venere, Spezzia, to Pisa, near which town they disembarked and hid in a wood. Gambacorta, the lord of Pisa, feared to show them open support, but he secretly sent them food and horses, and thus they reached Florence. Florence dared not venture to shelter them for dread of Visconti's anger; Francesco received, however, money and provisions for his further wanderings. From Florence he went to Bologna, from Bologna to Ancona, from Ancona to Croatia; from Croatia, after incredible adventures and sufferings, all of which are recounted with an admirable vividness in the Paduan chronicle of the Gattari, he reached the court of his kinsman, the Duke of Bavaria. From Bavaria, at the instigation of Venice, with a handful of German troops, he descended into the plain of Friuli, and made a dash at Padua. It was June, and the water in

the Bacchiglione had run low ; by night, he stole up the bed of the stream, climbed the palisade and entered the town ; the Paduans were weary of Visconti's rule, ¹³⁹⁰ and declared for Carrara: to the cry of "*Carro, Carro; Carne, Carne,*" the witch of Segna's prophecy was fulfilled, "He who went out by the gate came in over the wall."

This was a severe check to Gian Galeazzo. It compelled him to withdraw some of his troops from the Bolognese and Florentine frontiers. He was hard pressed by Sir John Hawkwood, who had worked his way into Lombardy, as far as the Adda, and was only prevented from still further punishing Visconti, by the imprudence of his colleague, Jean d'Armagnac. At last peace was concluded in 1392, and signed at Genoa by all parties, including Francesco Novello Carrara, after consultation with, and approval from, his ally and protector, the Doge of Venice. By the terms of this treaty Carrara retained possession of Padua, for which he bound himself to pay a yearly tribute for fifty years to Visconti.

The outcome of all these movements, which terminated in the peace of Genoa, had been highly satisfactory for the Republic. Without shedding a drop of her own blood, and at a price very moderate for her abundant treasury, she had recovered Treviso, thwarted her powerful neighbour Visconti, and placed in Padua a submissive and a grateful, not a turbulent and hostile, Carrara.

The final settlement of the mainland question had not been reached, however, as yet, though a long period of quiet followed the peace of Genoa. Venice was living in harmony with Carrara ; and Visconti, held in check by the powerful league against him, was quietly recruiting his treasury and maturing his plans, before making another attempt to establish a kingdom of North Italy.

But while Venice was enjoying a period of repose in one of her long struggles—her effort to establish herself on the mainland of Italy—in the East she was being brought face to face with another source of constant danger and anxiety. The Sultan Bajazet Ilderim, the Thunderbolt, had crossed over into Europe. Leaving Constantinople on one

side, he had marched on to Nicopolis, where in 1396 he met the Hungarian army and the French contingent—
1396. the only European powers which had responded to Manuel Paleologus's appeal for help. By the intolerable rashness of the French, the Christian army was utterly defeated. Though Venice took no direct part in this war, except in so far as she placed her Black Sea fleet at the disposal of the Christians, still the issue of the conflict, the virtual submission of Manuel to Bajazet, the erection of a mosque in Constantinople, and the establishment of a Cadi's court in the Imperial city, all warned her that her ruinous action in the fourth Crusade was bearing its inevitable fruit, that the Roman Empire was tottering to its fall, and that she would soon be called upon to deal with a new power in Constantinople and in the Levant.

The peace in North Italy was of short duration. Gian Galeazzo received the title of Duke of Milan in 1395, and immediately proceeded to attack his neighbour, Gonzaga of Mantua. This action called up against him the league of Florence, Bologna, Carrara, and Venice, who were still on good terms with each other, in face of their common enemy, Visconti. This new war was closed by a truce in 1398, followed by a peace in 1400. But no one believed in Visconti's pacific intentions; and when Robert of Bavaria, Count Palatine, succeeded the Emperor Wenceslaus on the Imperial throne, Carrara and Florence invited the new Emperor to descend upon Italy; to assert his rights, as they said, against Milan, which pretended to hold for Wenceslaus, but really in the hope that he would assist them in crushing the Lord of Milan.

Robert came, with a great display of feudal force and German chivalry; but he was defeated by Visconti's general, Dal Verme. His army dwindled away, and in a short time the Emperor saw himself deserted and powerless, in a country of which he had become the laughing-stock. Visconti instantly made use of his success to push forward his arms. He entered Bologna, and was on the point of attacking Florence; his army was the finest that had been seen in Italy for many years; his treasury was full; it was

doubtful whether there existed any power strong enough to oppose his progress towards a kingdom of North Italy, when, in the year 1402, death came suddenly^{1402.} and cut him short in mid-career.

The demise of Gian Galeazzo is a turning point in the history of the relations between Venice and the Carraresi. Hitherto Francesco Novello had shown himself a loyal ally of the Republic, owing to his lively dread of being absorbed by Visconti. But now, on Galeazzo's death, the vast Viscontean possessions were divided between two legitimate sons and a bastard—Giovanni Maria, Filippo Maria, and Gabriele Maria, all minors, under the regency of the Duchess of Milan. Her government was feeble. Each of Gian Galeazzo's great generals began to help himself to some part of his late master's dominions. A break-up of the Visconti's territory was at hand. This position of affairs produced a double effect on Venice and Carrara: it awoke the cupidity of both; each resolved to obtain some share of the prey; while this ambition on the part of Carrara roused the jealousy of Venice, and at the same time gave her an opportunity of finally crushing the Carraresi, for whom she had no longer any need, now that Visconti was dead.

Carrara proceeded to attack the Duchess. He claimed Vicenza, and would have liked Verona. He arrived before Vicenza, but the citizens showed no disposition to receive him. They knew too well what the rule of a personal lord meant for them; they had experienced Scalas, Carraresi, and Visconti in turn. To them the milder and wiser rule of Venice seemed preferable; and if they were compelled to surrender the city to any one, they resolved to consign it to the Republic.

Meantime the Duchess had sent her ambassadors to Venice to implore the Government to check Carrara's advance. As a condition of her support Venice demanded Vicenza, Verona, Bassano. The danger was pressing, and the ambassadors yielded. Thus doubly armed with the voluntary surrender of the Vicentines, and the cession by the Duchess, the Venetians despatched a herald to Carrara, who was still under the walls of Vicenza, informing him of the

state of the case, and requesting him to withdraw. The brutality of Carrara's answer showed that he had
1404 thrown off the mask, and intended to fight the Republic if it interfered with his ambitious progress: "Let us make a S. Mark's lion of the herald," he said, and caused the man's nose to be slit and his ears cropped. War was inevitable. Venice made her preparations; but, as she was too apt to do, she under-estimated at first the force which she would require. Reinforcements placed her on a better footing. Jacopo Carrara was shut up in Verona, and his father Francesco gradually beaten out of the field, and forced to retire into Padua. Then began a long siege, sustained with the greatest courage by Francesco. But it was a hopeless struggle. Venice could always throw more and more men into the Padovano and the Veronese, while every fresh success detached Carrara's supporters, and left him more and more isolated. Verona fell; Jacopo Carrara was sent a prisoner to Venice.

Inside Padua the plague appeared, and famine was beginning to make itself felt; but with extraordinary obstinacy Francesco held out. Venice, weary of the war, offered him terms, very favourable at first; Carrara refused them. He hoped for help from Florence, though in vain. Negotiations were reopened. This time Venetian offers were less favourable: again Carrara refused. The Paduans were on the point of rising against him, driven to desperation by plague and hunger; still Carrara fought on. The reason for this tenacity only appeared subsequently—Francesco was waiting for the successful issue of a great conspiracy which his emissaries had concerted in Venice; but that, too, failed. The populace of Padua became ungovernable. The Venetians assaulted the town on the 17th November, scaled the walls, and with the help of the people entered the city.

Francesco Carrara and his son were sent to Venice. The mob, recalling the story of the elder Carrara's plots, received the prisoners with hostile cries; though the Government treated them gently at first. They were lodged in the island of S. Giorgio Maggiore. Summoned to the presence of the Doge, they made solemn act of

humiliation and demanded pardon. The Doge's answer was far from harsh. But on the 30th November a change in the treatment of the captives took place. ^{1404.} They were removed from S. Giorgio to a prison in the ducal palace. The cause for this increased severity was the discovery of the clue to a vast plot, whose ramifications seemed to reach some of the highest functionaries in the State. The Government naturally felt alarmed. The depositions of some of Carrara's dependants, and the examination of his papers, increased the panic. On the 23rd December the Carraresi were placed in stricter confinement, and only one attendant, a fellow-prisoner, was allowed to wait on them. The Council of Ten sat day and night. Fresh revelations led to the arrest of two Venetian nobles, Pisani and Gradenigo. They were tried and condemned, the one to five years' imprisonment and confiscation of goods, the other to three years' imprisonment and exclusion from office. There could be no doubt as to the reality of the plot, nor as to the fact that it centred in the Carraresi. The Council proceeded rapidly with the case. The prisoners were condemned to be strangled in prison, and the sentence was executed on 17th January, 1405. It is said that Francesco defended himself violently to the ^{1405.} very end, using a prison stool as his weapon. His son Jacopo, of gentler temper, submitted quietly to his fate. When the news spread through the city, the people endorsed the action of the Government by crying "*Omo morto, vera finia*"—"Man dead, war over."

Such was the end of the Carraresi. They suffered the fate of all the lesser princes of Italy, and were crushed out between their two greater neighbours, Visconti and Venice. The downfall of their family left the Republic in possession of a large mainland territory—the Trevisan marches, Padua, Vicenza, Verona, and their districts, together with the high tableland of the Seven Communes above Bassano. The boundaries of the Republic in Italy were now, roughly speaking, the sea from the mouths of the Tagliamento to those of the Adige—the Tagliamento to the east, the Alps to the north, and the Adige to the west and south. This

territory she held, with the brief exception of the wars of the Cambray League, undisturbed down to the fall of the Republic in 1796. Henceforward Venice can no longer be considered as a purely naval and commercial power, with interests centred almost entirely in the Levant. She now enters the comity of Italian States. She becomes a land power as well, with a land frontier to defend, with ambitious rivals beyond those frontiers, always ready to attack her—in short, with all the prestige, but also with all the difficulties and dangers, of an Italian principality. The centre of gravity is changed, and Venetian history assumes another aspect from the date of her consolidation upon the mainland.

CHAPTER XIV

Condition of Venice in the fourteenth century—Her recuperative power—Fra Enrico da Rimini—Sources of Wealth—Commerce—Venice different from all other maritime city States—Commercial circle—The six State fleets—Merchant marine regulations—Merchantmen convertible into men-of-war—The destinations of the State fleets—Revenue—Taxation on import and export—Smuggling—Italian trade—German Trade—Fondaco dei Tedeschi—Venetian industries—Trade secrets—Glass—Metal—Bells—Silk—The guilds: their peculiar character in Venice—*Mariegole*—Taxation of Guilds—Salt monopoly—Banking—Total revenue of Venice in the fifteenth century—House property—Expenditure—Payment of officials—Public ceremonies—Navy—Army—Mercenaries—Cost of a troop—Population—The relations between patrician and dependant, between government and people, paternal—Child labour—Doctors—Druggists—Riding—Nuisances—Hotels—*Lacqueys de place*—Luxury—Corruption—Dante's and Petrarch's remarks.

At this moment in Venetian history, when the Republic had just achieved her fullest development, when she was about to add a land empire to her vast maritime sphere ^{1405.} of influence, and thereby to alter the whole tenor of her subsequent career, it will not be amiss to pause and to sketch very briefly the internal aspect of Venice as a city, for such a review will show how very much she owed to the sea, and how much she was risking by turning away from it. The first point which must strike the student of Venetian history in the fourteenth century, is the ease with which the State recovered from wars that followed each other with such frequency, and were often disastrous. This recuperative power implies a great resource of wealth. A contemporary, Fra Enrico da Rimini, remarks of Venice that "every Venetian has some property of his own." How did the Republic acquire such vast riches? In order to answer that

question we must consider the sources of Venetian wealth under its three heads—commerce, industries, and banking.

1405. The beginnings of Venetian commerce are to be found in the necessity which compelled the earliest Venetian settlers in the lagoons to turn all their attention to the sea, and to the art of navigation. The position of Venice differed widely from that of Amalfi, Pisa, or Genoa, her rivals. She had absolutely no mainland territory from which to draw her supplies of daily life. Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa, though chiefly maritime cities, were still mainland cities as well, with a certain amount of territory around them. They were not therefore forced to give an undivided attention to seamanship. The result was that Venice drew ahead of these cities in naval skill; and when Europe, under the Carolingian revival, began to demand the merchandise of the East, the lagoon city was more ready than her neighbours to seize the profits which arose from the carrying trade. A similar consequence took place at the epoch of the Crusades; Venice was the Italian State best able to furnish transports and to reap the gains. Later on we have already seen how the commercial circle from the East through Venice to London and Flanders, and back again through Venice to the East, was established and maintained by Venetian enterprise. In ordinary years the State provided for the despatch of six separate fleets with suitable convoys. The ships were government property, let out for each voyage to the highest bidder at auction. To these government fleets the ships of private owners were allowed to attach themselves; and the whole squadron took a route, which had been carefully discussed and prescribed for it, either in the Senate or in the *Maggior Consiglio*. Every private owner, and every hirer of a government ship, was bound by oath to observe the instructions laid down, and to maintain, on all occasions, the honour of the State and of S. Mark. The Government required its ships to be restored to the arsenal in good condition at the close of the voyage. The regulations of the merchant marine prescribed the number of the crew, the size of the anchors, the quality

of the cordage, obligatory for each description of vessel. The load-line was indicated by a cross, and government officials were charged to see that no vessel ^{1405.} left port with an excessive cargo. New vessels, such as we should now describe as A1, were allowed to load above the line, but to a diminishing amount each year, for the first three years. The vessels were all built upon government measurement; private individuals were compelled to conform to the regulation size. Two reasons led the Venetians to insist upon this uniform build. In the first place, ships of identical burden and rig would all behave like one another under stress of weather, and therefore the squadrons could be kept together with greater ease than if each vessel were of a different build. Secondly, this uniformity of construction enabled the consuls at the various ports, whose duty it was to maintain a supply of refittings, masts, rudders, yards, shrouds, to meet the demand with certainty and accuracy. The ships were all convertible from merchantmen to men-of-war, and this fact helps us to understand how Venice was able to replace her fleets so rapidly after such losses as Curzola and Sapienza. The six State squadrons are estimated to have numbered 330 ships, with crews to the amount of 36,000 men, employing in the arsenal 16,000 workmen for their build and upkeep. In fact, the secret of Venetian naval supremacy, of that display of maritime power which impressed the world so deeply, lay in this, that her merchant marine and her navy were convertible; her men-of-war were also her merchantmen, her seamen of the merchant service were also her sailors of the fleet. If the State was at war, her ships were ready; at the first moment of peace her fleet resumed its commercial task of amassing wealth.

These six government squadrons sailed for (1) the Black Sea, to trade in skins; (2) for Greece and Constantinople, taking, as now, wood and bales of English and Flanders cloth; (3) for the Syrian ports, trading in gums, spices, etc.; (4) for Egypt; (5) for the north coast of Africa; and (6) for England and Flanders. In England they exchanged glass, sugar, spices, silk, and wines, for tin, wool,

hides, and broadcloth. The Venetians, in spite of their commercial acumen, were cheated sometimes, as in 1405. England, where they had bought stitched bales of cloth, which, when opened, proved, after the outside web, to be mere shoddy.

It will be seen, then, that Venetian commerce covered the whole of the civilised world. Venice became a great reservoir of merchandise, constantly filled and constantly emptied again, with eastern luxuries flowing west, and western commodities flowing east; and upon exports and imports alike the Venetian levied a tax which furnished a large part of the revenue. But the existence of customs duties produced its inevitable effect. There were always a certain number of enterprising spirits ready to run their chance of making a high profit by smuggling. The Government was obliged to create and maintain a flying squadron of custom-house officers, armed with corselets and belly-bands of steel.

But Venice traded not merely with East and West, with Syria and England. Some of the goods which were poured into her great emporium found their way up the Italian rivers to the markets of mainland cities, or over the mountain passes to Germany and the Sarmatian plain; the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, or German Exchange House, became one of the most important features in Venetian commercial economy. To a lesser degree the city itself supplied a certain amount of income by its industries. These were carefully fostered. Artificers were forbidden to leave Venice; some arts, such as that of glass-making, were placed under the most rigid control, the secrets were guarded by a penalty of death; the export of material, such as sand and alkali in the glass industry, and of rags in the paper trade, was strictly forbidden. On the other hand, every facility was offered to foreign workmen who desired to settle in Venice. They were exempt from taxation for the first two years of their residence, provided they came with their families as a guarantee for their permanence.

Among the more important industries of Venice we find metal work, both in copper and iron, and the art of

bell-founding, among the earliest; even in the reign of Doge Orso Particiaco (880) we read that he sent a present of twelve bells to Basil the Emperor in Constanti-^{1405.}nople; and metal work still constitutes one of the few industries of modern Venice. The silk trade was introduced from Lucca, and the Lucchese refugees were settled in a quarter near the Campo San Bartolomeo and the Calle della Bissa. Cloth of gold, wrought leather, and above all bead-making, glass-blowing, and the manufacture of mirrors, formed important branches of Venetian industry.

The most remarkable feature in the history of Venetian trade is the peculiar quality which Art Guilds assumed in Venice. The tendency to erect guilds was carefully encouraged by the State, which, while allowing a large amount of self-government to the corporations, always maintained its own hold over them, and supervised all their arrangements by means of its officers, the *Giustizieri* and the *Proveditori di Comun*, under whose direction the guilds were immediately placed. The statutes of each corporation, which were framed with the greatest care to maintain the efficiency of the members and to prevent the divulgence of trade secrets, were known by the name of the *Mariegole*, and were engrossed in the matriculation-book, whence, no doubt, that strange word is corrupted.

The matriculation-books were open to the inspection of the *Proveditori*, and no bye-law, passed in a chapter of the guild, was valid till it had received the sanction of the government officials. Each member of a trade guild paid two taxes to the State, which were exacted through the officers of the corporation, the *taglione* or capitation-fee for belonging to the guild, and the *tansa insensibile* or small tax upon the profits of his work each year. The *Mariegole* provided for the taxation of the guild members, for the upkeep of the guild funds, for the examination and admission of new members, for the maintenance of the decrepit, the burial of the dead, the provision for widows and orphans. In short, the guilds were self-supporting corporations, which, by the excellence of their constitutions, maintained the high quality of Venetian manufactures, and inculcated

the principles of thrift and insurance against sickness and old age. The wealth of some of these corporations ^{1405.} may be estimated by the splendour of their guild halls, and by the large subsidies which they were able to offer to the Government in times of pressure.

But in Venice the guilds never acquired the political importance which they achieved in other Italian city States. And this again is one of the points which distinguishes the Republic from all other Italian communities. In Venice the guild—its management and its internal politics—served to occupy the political instincts of those citizens who, by the *Serrata*, were excluded from all share in the direction of the State; but the guild never succeeded in controlling the State, as in Florence for example, nor did it ever acquire a voice in the government. The reason for this is probably to be found in the fact, already observed, that Venice never passed under the feudal system. The guilds in most Italian towns acquired much of their political power because they represented and protected the *popolo* against the nobility of arms and of territory. In Venice such a nobility never existed; the patrician was himself a merchant and probably a member of a trade guild.

A third source of State revenue, besides the export and import dues, and the taxation of industries, is to be found in the State monopoly of salt. Venice was extremely jealous of any interference with her rights; and, as we have seen in her dealings with Carrara, was always ready to make any attempt to establish salt-pans a *casus belli*. Cassiodorus judged soundly when he indicated the salt monopoly as a more valuable source of income than gold or silver mines; for "men might do without the precious metals, but neither man nor beast can live without salt." All agricultural operations became virtually dependent on Venice. What the income from the salt-pans amounted to in the fourteenth century we do not know, but in the year 1454 the Republic was drawing 165,000 ducats, or more than a tenth of her whole gross revenue, from this source.

Finally, the Government of the Republic conducted a large banking business on his own account. The sovereigns

of Spain and of France and the Emperor frequently applied for loans, on which, no doubt, they paid a remunerative interest. We do not know what revenue the Republic drew from these four sources—commerce, industry, salt monopoly, and banking—during the fourteenth century; but half a century later, that is after the mainland districts had been thoroughly absorbed, we find that the gross income of the State was 1,305,000 ducats, the cost of collecting 225,480 ducats, net income 1,079,520. We do not know precisely the value a golden ducat represents in our money; but if we take it as somewhere about 15s., that would bring the revenue to somewhat under one million sterling a year. But though we have no positive indications as to the Venetian revenue in the fourteenth century, a rent-roll of 1367 sets forth the value of all house property in Venice for each *sestiere*, and for each parish in each *sestiere*. The total amount is 2,880,818 ducats of gold; and under the stress of the Chioggian war we know that a forced loan of five per cent produced 6,294,040 lire for the service of the State.

The chief items of Venetian expenditure were the payment of State officials, the ceremonies of State, the navy, and the army.

The salaries of officials, including the Doge's privy purse and his civil list, were met in this way: the sum of 6,700 lire was paid every month into the chests of the Procurators of S. Mark, and the ducal councillors drew upon it as required. An audit took place every three months. The expenditure upon public ceremonies was of course a fluctuating sum; but the Republic was always lavish in this respect, and her lavishness increased with time, till Venetian festivals became noted throughout the world for their sumptuous splendour. Even as early as 1361, we have seen her, at a moment of great difficulty, when she was on the point of losing such a rich province as Dalmatia, expending no less than 10,000 ducats for the entertainment of the Duke of Austria; and immediately afterwards almost as large a sum upon the reception of the King of Cyprus. No doubt Venice considered such displays

as diplomatic, and would have urged that in many cases the money was well invested. But, in addition to that, ^{1405.} her people had an innate love of a show, and on the occasion of such a purely domestic event as the reported suppression of the Candian revolt, the expenditure was no less lavish. The Republic, in fact, was beginning even in the fourteenth century to exhibit one of its characteristics, the love of splendid presentation—a passion which lasted long after all vital force and growing power had disappeared from the State.

As regards the expenditure on the navy: we have seen how, down to the end of the fourteenth century at least, the navy and the merchant marine were convertible; and how, owing to the system of government merchant fleets, the Venetian marine was, probably, to a large extent self-supporting. Of course, in time of war the fighting crews had to be paid; but it is not till Venice is brought into collision with the Turks, and is haunted by the dread of their ascendancy in the Levant, that the navy becomes a severe drain on the exchequer.

With the army, likewise, the case is not very different. Hitherto for purposes of self-defence inside the city, or for foreign expeditions, Venice had made use of levies among her citizens. It is only when she passes on to the mainland and is compelled to employ mercenary troops, that the tax on her resources grows serious. But we have now just reached precisely the period when she was about to throw herself on to the mainland, and to face all the financial consequences of continuous wars carried on chiefly with mercenary troops. Already, when threatened by Austria in 1376, the Republic had endeavoured to secure the services of Sir John Hawkwood, the most famous captain of his age, but his price was thought to be too high. The Republic, without any territory to lose on *terra ferma*, could at that time afford to bargain and might practise economy; but when she made herself a continental power it became inevitable that, some day or another, under the pressure of a defeat, she would be obliged to pay the price demanded or to forfeit her territory; nothing but a full purse could

save her when brought face to face with all the conditions of mercenary warfare. It has been estimated, though with what accuracy is doubtful, that a troop of cavalry numbering 300 lances cost upwards of 10,000 ducats a month, or 120,000 ducats a year—figures which show at least how enormously costly a war of this nature must have been.

If we may judge from the levy of men made for active service in 1336, the population of Venice appears to have been about 200,000 souls; of whom perhaps 1,000 belonged to the patrician caste. The idea of the relation between patrician and plebeian, between governing and governed, in the intimacy of daily life, and in the internal economy of the city, was a paternal idea. The great noble was surrounded by a number of clients, dependants, who lived in smaller houses clustering round the patron's palace, and whose relations with their patron were often very familiar. A nobleman frequently stood sponsor for a client's child; and the lien of *compare de zuan* was a strong one. The same conception animated the Government. It aimed at being the father of the whole of its citizens. It interfered to protect child labour—as in the looking-glass trade, where we find a law declaring that boys and girls are on no account to work with mercury or lead—and to check dangerous overloading on shipboard; it supplied medical advice gratis to the poor. Venetian physicians were bound to attend a course of anatomy once a year, and to meet every month for the exhibition and discussion of difficult cases. The druggists' shops were under the surveillance of Government officials. The doctor was bound by oath to warn his patient early in his conduct of the case if he considered it a serious one, so as to allow the sick to set their minds at ease about their worldly goods, and their consciences about their future state. Several police regulations prohibited nobles from reckless riding through the narrow streets, to the danger of the foot passengers. All horses were obliged to carry bells on their collars; and these provisions continued till the increasing population and the introduction of stone bridges with steps rendered riding altogether impossible. Public

nuisances, such as noxious smoke, were suppressed. Hotels received a regular inspection, to ensure the decency of the company and the cleanliness of the house. The more famous hostelries of the fourteenth century were the Luna, the Leon Bianco, and the Salvadego. The Government supplied a service of *lacqueys de place* called *tholomagi*, for the benefit of strangers; they were bound by oath to conduct the foreigner to a good inn, to make a fair bargain for him, to see that he was not cheated by shopkeepers or shipowners. Whether they kept their oath we do not know. In short, no efforts were spared to make life pleasant in Venice of the fourteenth century, and to lay the foundation of that great trade in foreigners which has always remained one of her most remarkable characteristics.

But with this general and diffused wellbeing in the middle and lower classes, came luxury and riot in the upper. The young men of the company of the Rose, who look so engaging and so free as they figure in Bellini's pictures, kept the town in a frequent state of uproar. A favourite pastime was to tie a cord to the neck of a large hound and to run him down the narrow streets, sweeping the people before them. The insolence of these young nobles is shown by the episode of Michel Steno and the Doge Falier; or still more vividly in the case of Doge Venier's young son, who fastened to a patrician's door, one night, a bunch of coral charms of curious form and opprobrious significance. The Government was not remiss in the punishment of these wild bloods; but it never quite succeeded in getting the better of their spirits. The city was comfortable, but it was corrupt. Two outside witnesses bear testimony to this—Dante, with his scathing phrase about *il fango della loro sfrenata lascivia*; Petrarch, with his horror of their intellectual scepticism and their contempt for all "who worship not the Stagyrite, or who still believe the fables of Christianity and those asses' tales of Heaven and of Hell."

Such was the condition of Venice when she was called upon to enter a new phase of her existence, in which the period of her growth is completed, her primal vitality exhausted, and her declension begun.

CHAPTER XV

A new epoch in Venetian history : its characteristics—Could Venice have avoided her passage to the mainland ?—Could she have made a really powerful mainland State ?—Venice consolidates her new land empire—The ceremony of surrender of Verona and Padua—The schism—Position of Venice towards the Curia—Supports the conciliar principle—Venice represented at Constance—The end of the schism—Burning of Huss—Recovery of Dalmatia : bought from Ladislaus—Sigismund's claim—Conspiracies in Padua and Verona—Sigismund's general, Filippo Scolari, in Friuli : his character—Undecided operations—Balduino's plot in Venice—Scolari at S. Nicolo del Lido—Venetian victory at La Motta—Cost of the war strains Venetian funds—Additional taxation—Truce with Sigismund—National debt—*Tommaso Mocenigo*, Doge—The last Doge elected by popular consent—Abolition of the Doge's right to summon the Arengo—Restrictions on ducal authority—Death of Bajazet—Affairs of Constantinople—Venice makes a treaty with the Turks—Mahomet, his fleet—Hostile to Venice—Battle of Gallipoli—Pietro Loredano's despatch—Peace—War with Sigismund—Filippo Maria Visconti—Venetian success—Conquers Friuli—Carmagnola—Florence alarmed at Visconti's progress—Proposes an alliance with Venice—Importance of this invitation—Two parties in Venice—Francesco Foscari and Tommaso Mocenigo—Unfavourable answer to the Florentines—Mocenigo's speech—His deathbed warning—Death of the Doge.

WE have reached a new epoch in Venetian history ; we are about to enter upon the second great period in the life of the State. Down to the year 1405 it is the ¹⁴⁰⁵ growth of Venice which has occupied our attention. By the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio*, by the conspiracy of Tiepolo, by the defeat of Genoa, and by the acquisition of Padua, Verona, and Treviso, the Republic had completed the period of her making. This second period, the years between 1405 and 1540, will show us the marring of Venice by circumstances which she was powerless to control,

but which she herself had largely helped to create by her previous action. During this century and a half, 1405. the Republic began by increasing her territory to a surprising extent. There was an astonishing burst, as it were of a flower into full bloom. In the Levant, on the Adriatic seaboard, on the mainland of Italy, her power and the development of her dominions, aroused the surprise and the jealousy of Italian States, and claimed the attention and the respect of Europe. Never before had Venice occupied such a high position in the eyes of the world. But this splendid achievement was the result of her past efforts, the final fruit of her growth, the outcome of her early vitality, which appears to have really exhausted itself in the long process of creating the State. Before this second period was half-way through, symptoms of decline made themselves felt, and by the close of the epoch Venice had fallen from her high rank to a third-rate place among the powers of Europe, with whom she has for the future to be measured. For it is now no longer a question of comparing the Republic with Genoa or Pisa, with Visconti or d'Este; by passing on to the mainland, and by the extraordinarily high position which she achieved for herself during the larger part of the fifteenth century, Venice entered the comity of European States, and it is with France, with Spain, with Austria, that the comparison must be made. The point of view from which we must henceforth regard the Republic is changed, the focus shifted. We have said good-bye to the old Venice of merchant venturers, the Venice of Enrico Dandolo, of Marco Polo, of the Zenos, the Pisanis, whose life was on the sea, and whose interests looked east. We are coming now to a Venice struggling to be a power in Western Europe, exhausting herself on the mainland with mercenary armies and captains of adventure; the Venice of Francesco Foscari; the Venice which, in her inherent weakness, endeavoured to maintain her position by elaborate diplomacy; the Venice of the ambassadors, of Lippomano, of Paruta; the Venice of Paolo Sarpi; sceptical, genial, opportunist, because of her weakness, because she was struggling to accomplish a task beyond her powers and instinctively felt herself doomed to failure.

If it be at all permissible to discuss the spiritual complexion of a whole people, such would seem to have been the mental attitude of Venice during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Venetians themselves may very likely have been unconscious of the true state of the case; they probably believed in the destiny of their race to continue a growth which, in its extraordinary rapidity, must have dazzled their own eyes as well as those of their neighbours. But the instinct of the people, the informal consciousness, cannot have failed to cause occasional pangs, such as found expression in Tommaso Mocenigo's deathbed warning, when it endeavoured, in the performance of its self-preservative function, to rouse a sense of the danger which was patent in the external facts of circumstance. And it is with these external circumstances that we have now to deal.

To help her through this period Venice possessed one great element of strength inside herself, the solidity of her constitution, and the affection inspired by a government which was essentially humane. Externally the Republic was kept in a state of abnormal activity by two factors, intimately connected with her dual position in East and West: bound up with her interests in the Levant the Turk was a permanent menace; as the result of her mainland extension she could not long avoid a collision with Visconti.

But before resuming the narrative thread of Venetian history, two questions suggest themselves for answer. Could Venice have maintained herself as a purely commercial state, or was her step upon the mainland a necessity which she could not avoid? It was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Republic might have left Italian and European politics alone, and have devoted herself entirely to commerce. Experience had proved that the city was virtually impregnable. The one condition necessary for the success of such a policy was the absolute and undisputed supremacy of the Republic at sea. Without a provision-yielding district at her back, any maritime reverse rendered Venice liable to blockade and starvation. It is doubtful whether Venice, wealthy as she was, could have maintained

an absolute mastery of the sea: Genoa and she together might have held the Turk in check; but she had 1405. crushed Genoa, and had now to pay the price; and it was certain that, commercial as she was, she would do anything rather than spend the enormous sums necessary to secure that supremacy, unless compelled to do so by the most violent pressure. As a matter of fact, in her relations with the Turk she was constantly endeavouring to arrange a friendly commercial understanding, rather than to exhaust herself by continual hostility. Her instinct was to trade with the Turks, not to fight them. But she was a Christian State, in name at least, and she could not carry this policy too far without raising an outcry against her in other Christian States which, while preventing her from cementing friendly relations with the Mussulman power, refused to assist her with arms in attacking it. Indeed, the dubious relations between the Republic and the Turk awoke much of that European hostility towards Venice which found vent in the League of Cambray. There was another consideration, however, which rendered it difficult for Venice to avoid acquiring mainland territory; that was the question of the passes. Had the mainland to the foot of the Alps and the passes over the Alps into Germany been in the hands of a power other than Venice, that power would, even in times of peace, indubitably have reaped a large share of Venetian commercial profits by imposing taxes for transit; and in time of war would have been able to check Venetian land traffic entirely. It seems, then, that it was hardly possible for Venice to have avoided occupying mainland territory—first, because she could not, or would not, maintain a fleet sufficiently strong to render her independent of it; secondly, because the possession of the passes was essential to her commerce. When once engaged upon the mainland, a frontier open to attack rendered her no longer independent and mistress of her own actions, while a frontier to be defended exhausted her treasury, and prevented her from ever developing to the full her naval power, upon which she really relied, not only for her position in Europe, but also for her very life.

The second question, intimately connected with the first, is this: having once embarked upon a land empire, could Venice have created a truly powerful mainland state? one which would have acted in concert with her naval forces, helping, not hampering her. The condition in this case, is the possession of a good frontier. But the plain of North Italy presents no frontiers at all, till the Alps and Apennines are reached. Had Venice been able to absorb Milan, Piedmonte, Bologna, and Ferrara, she would then have been mistress of a territory sufficiently extended to be an assistance, whose frontiers, roughly speaking, would have been the Alps, the Apennines, and the Adriatic; with the sea all her own, and North Italy in her power, the Republic would then have been undoubtedly the most formidable State in Italy, a menace to the balance of power upon which other Italian states depended for their existence. Her enemies at the time of the League of Cambray declared that she intended and was able to accomplish this task. But the creation of such a dominion was absolutely impossible. The next chapter will abundantly prove that Venice possessed no army capable of defeating and despoiling Visconti, and she could not reach him from the sea. But more than this, even had she reduced Visconti and occupied Milan, the French claim to the Milanese had already been established, and Venice would have found herself face to face with France. Any attempt to absorb Bologna or Ferrara to the south would have produced a coalition of other Italian States against her; and the dominions of the Church barred any further development in that direction. It was impossible for Venice to create a great land empire, just as it was impossible for her to avoid the effort to do so. Her inability to achieve her object, and her desire to preserve what she already possessed, forced the Republic, in her weakness, to fall back upon diplomacy. It was during this period that her politicians learned, and put into practice, those theories of the balance of power which became traditional among Venetian statesmen. Without sufficient and trustworthy armies at her back, there was no other way of preserving her Veronese frontier than by playing Florence against Visconti, and, later on, France against Spain.

The compulsion which drove Venice on to the mainland ; the impotence which prevented her from forming a strong
1405. dominion there ; her double contest with the Turks by sea and the Visconti and Sforza on the continent ; the exhaustion which resulted from her efforts to maintain her weak position ; the diplomatic adroitness with which she endeavoured to cover her lack of force, form the theme of Venetian history during this second great period, and constitute what may, perhaps, be called the tragedy of the race. The following chapter begins the long series of demonstrations which lead up to the League of Cambray on the one hand, and to the victories of Sultan Suleiman, to the conquest of Rhodes and the Morea, on the other ; while side by side with these disasters came the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, an accidental event for which Venice was in no way responsible, but which delivered a deathblow to the State—cutting the tap-roots of her commerce, altering the high-road of traffic from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, throwing the trade line of the world beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, into the hands of the Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch.

When Venice, by the fall of the Carraresi, came into possession of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona, her first care was to provide for the good government of those provinces. As we have already noted in the case of Treviso, her earliest land possession, the principle pursued by the Republic was to retain as much of local self-government as she held to be compatible with the security of her tenure, and the supremacy of Venice as a capital. She interfered as little as possible with existing local institutions, which, in most cases, were the remains of the old Roman municipal constitutions. The Republic considered that her objects were attained by the establishment of a civil and of a military governor, with their respective suites. Both of these officials were in immediate relations with the home executive, to whom they reported and from whom they received orders. But in all cases the Rector, or civil governor, was bound to swear that he would respect the ancient civic constitution of the city he was called upon to rule ; and in some cases, as at Vicenza for example, the Venetians allowed the citizens to elect a body

of eighteen, with the right to censure the Rector's conduct where he had violated the antique statutes. Local affairs at Vicenza were managed by a council of five hundred citizens, an institution already in existence, to which Venice was able to give some semblance of her own *Maggior Consiglio* by making it the body which elected to all the offices of the commune, and which passed the laws proposed to it by a smaller council of one hundred members, among whom were numbered the heads of the trade guilds. In the courts of justice the Rector, or one of his three assessors, merely presided; he did not constitute the court, which was composed of Vicentine citizens. Provision was made for the gratuitous defence of poor respondents. At Verona, where the immediate rule of the Scaligers had broken down more of the municipal independence than in Vicenza, the Venetians were able to construct a somewhat less democratic form of government. There the governing council consisted of fifty members, with an executive and initiative body of twelve. Provision was made for public instruction in the humanities, in canon and civil law, in medicine, to which the Republic always paid great attention; primary education, equivalent to grammar schools, was supplied by what were called schools of arithmetic. The cost of maintaining this educational system was charged upon the revenues of the province.

Towards Padua, the richest of her new acquisitions, Venice displayed a slightly different temper. She caressed it more, and she charged it more. Half the salary of the Rector was defrayed by the local revenue. But, on the other hand, she renounced the whole of the wheel-tax to the commune for the upkeep of roads and of the public palace; and when that building was destroyed by fire the Republic rebuilt it at her own sole charges. She assigned 4000 ducats a year and a part of the octroi duties for the support of the professorial body in the Paduan University. She protected Paduan wine from foreign competition. Above all, immediately after the conclusion of the long and desolating siege, she supplied seed to the Paduan peasants to resow their ruined fields, and she opened in the city a club

house, where, as she expressed it, Venetian and Paduan gentlemen might meet and come to know each other.

1405. The policy of the Republic in dealing with her mainland possessions was to reproduce as far as possible the institutions of the capital city, without offending local sentiment. What she really retained for herself through the agency of her government officers, the Rector and the Captain, was this: police, taxation for the revenue, and levies for the army. The Rector and the Captain were in immediate communication with the Council of Ten and with the Senate, from whom, as regards police, revenue, and levies, they received orders which were paramount. All else was left to the local councils presided over and directed, but not commanded, by the officials of the supreme government.

In fact, the rule of Venice over her new possessions was just, lenient, and wise. She had set herself, in her own words, to provide *taliter quod habeamus cor et amorem civium et subditorum nostrorum*, "that we may have the heart and the affection of our citizens and subjects"; and she had them. The people were content; they acquired now what they had long been seeking in vain at the hands of a local lord, a Carrara, a Scala, or a Visconti—peace and good government. Only the nobles were disaffected under a rule which deprived them of the power to tyrannise. Venice reaped her reward in the trying times when, after the wars of the League of Cambray had shattered her forces, her subject states returned of their own accord to the protection of S. Mark.

The formal ceremonies for the surrender of Verona and of Padua took place in 1406. Both were

1405. conducted with great pomp. The Doge, the College, and the Senate, seated on a platform in front of S. Mark's, received the Veronese delegates, who were clothed in white and mounted on horses with white trappings. They advanced from the far end of the piazza, and on nearing the ducal throne they dismounted. They offered to the Doge the symbols of submission, the keys of the city gates, a long white staff, the emblem of government, the banner of the people, and the banner of the commune. The Doge accepted the offerings with the remark, "The people that

walked in darkness have seen a great light." The Grand Chancellor administered the oath of allegiance, and the delegates received from the Doge the crimson standard of S. Mark with the winged lion blazoned in gold. A similar ritual was observed in the case of Padua, save that Venice swore that she would impose no new taxes upon her subjects. 1406.

The Republic had hardly completed the arrangement of her new possessions, when external affairs called for attention. The Church at this period was still divided by the great schism; Benedict XIII., supported by Spain, continued to claim allegiance as the true head of the Church. Venice had hitherto stood as far aloof as possible from all ecclesiastic quarrels; she desired to abstain from any action which might involve her in those troublesome and infinite dissensions. But an event now took place which compelled her to join in the dispute, and thereby forced her to declare her attitude towards ecclesiastical politics, an attitude which it is important to observe, as she constantly maintained it throughout her career. In the year 1406 a Venetian, Angelo Correr, was elected Pope in Rome, under the title of Gregory XII. Gregory endeavoured to come to an understanding with Benedict, the antipope, in order, if possible, to end the schism. A meeting was arranged to take place at Savona. But Ladislaus, King of Naples, fearing that some advantage might accrue to the house of Anjou from this meeting, resolved to prevent it. He entered Rome, and Gregory was forced to retire to Viterbo and then to Siena. The schism became more hopeless than ever, for now neither claimant to S. Peter's chair was in possession of Rome. In 1409, a general council at Pisa deposed both popes and elected another Venetian subject, Pietro Filargo of Crete, who assumed the name of Alexander V.; and the question now presented itself to Venice, what course should she follow? Angelo Correr had already asked for an asylum in his native city, and expected the support of the Government; while, on the other hand, ambassadors from England, France, and Burgundy were in Venice, imploring the Republic to support the

conciliar Pope, Alexander, and thus to assist in closing the schism. There was a hot debate in the Senate. 1406. The Doge wished to recognise Alexander, and his motion was carried by 79 votes against 48. Venice accepted the Pope elected by the Council of Pisa.

This act was a distinct declaration of ecclesiastical policy, doubtless the right policy for the Republic. As a temporal power, Venice, along with France, the Emperor, and other temporal princes, was concerned to resist the claims of the Roman Curia, and to support the conciliar principle that general councils are superior to popes, from whom may lie an appeal to a future council. To this fundamental line of ecclesiastical policy, declared now for the first time by the Republic, Venice adhered throughout all her many disputes with Rome.

Meanwhile Alexander died in 1410, and was succeeded, as Pisan Pope, by that vigorous soldier and bandit, Baldassare Cossa, John XXIII. But the schism continued. There were still three popes, Benedict XIII., Gregory XII., and John XXIII. At last the Emperor Sigismund summoned

1414. the Council of Constance in 1414, to put an end to this intolerable state of affairs. Venice sent three cardinals, Barbarigo, Condulmer, and Morosini, who, in her name, solemnly pledged the Republic to abide by the decision of the Council; thus affirming over again the line of ecclesiastical policy which she had already adopted. Benedict and Gregory were represented at the Council. John was present in person. As he crossed the Vorarlberg to reach Constance, his carriage was overturned by the roadside, and the Pope swore like the trooper that he was. When he came in sight of the city he grimly remarked, "A trap to catch foxes." He soon suspected that his life was in danger, and fled. He was then solemnly deposed; so were Benedict and Gregory. Otto Colonna was elected Pope as Martin V., recognised by the powers, and the great schism came to an end. But for Venice the Council of Constance had another most important issue, which we shall presently find bearing its fruit. The burning of Huss involved the Emperor Sigismund in a long religious war with the Bohemians, and hampered his actions to such an extent that he was

unable to attack Venice effectively in Friuli and Dalmatia, unable to support the Patriarch of Aquileia against the Republic, unable to prevent her from acquiring ¹⁴¹⁴ the whole north-east corner of the Venetian plain as the outcome of the wars which we have now to follow.

Venetian successes on the mainland, the acquisition of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona, had been followed by a further triumph, the recovery of Dalmatia, which Ladislaus, unable to resist Sigismund's Hungarian claims, had sold to the Republic. But when Ladislaus sold his claims ¹⁴⁰⁹ he also sold his quarrel. Venice very soon found that Sigismund did not intend to allow her to retain undisturbed possession of a province which he considered as his own in virtue of the Hungarian crown. Sigismund was encouraged in his hostility to Venice by the presence at his court of Marsilio Carrara and Brunoro della Scala, the last remnants of those two great houses whose territories the Republic now enjoyed. Scala and Carrara both assured Sigismund that they were able to assist him by creating revolutionary risings in Padua and Verona among the nobles who still remained attached to their ancient lords, or who at least detested the strong government of Venice. As a matter of fact, conspiracies were hatched in both cities. In Padua the plot was easily discovered and vigorously crushed. In Verona a rising actually took place, but the answer to the cry of *Viva la Scala* was cold; the cry *Viva San Marco* was at once taken up by the people, who already, in these few years of Venetian rule, had learned to appreciate the benefits of a good government, and declined to pass once more under the tyranny of a Scala. Sigismund's preparations for war continued. His army, composed of 12,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, was already in Friuli under the command of his general, Filippo degli Scolari, called Pippo Span, or Pip the Captain. Pippo was a most brilliant cavalry officer, a person of extraordinary fascination, young, beautiful, of medium height, perfectly formed, with dark eyes, a fair complexion, and a radiant smile: he was devotedly fond of magnificent dress: no less accomplished in mind than remarkable in his person, he spoke besides his native Tuscan, Hungarian, Polish, German,

and Bohemian: his habit of life was extremely abstemious:

1409. one of those officers like Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, General Custer, or General Skobeleff, in later times, whom the cavalry arm seems best able to produce: made to be the darling of their men: dearly beloved, and usually unsuccessful.

When Pippo arrived in Friuli at the head of his brilliant Hungarian cavalry, Venice was far from ready for war. She endeavoured to pacify, or at least to delay, Sigismund by negotiations. She offered to hold Dalmatia as a fief of the Hungarian crown, at a yearly fine of a white horse and a web of gold cloth. But Sigismund would not listen to any terms. Meantime Pippo was pressing on through the Trevisano; Feltre and Belluno opened their gates to him, and

1411. Brunoro della Scala was established there as Imperial Vicar. At last the Venetian army under Carlo Malatesta took the field, and after an indecisive battle at La Motta di Livenza, Pippo determined to return to Hungary to collect more troops, as his present army had suffered considerably and was insufficient to secure the defeat of the Venetians.

During this pause in the war, Venice was exposed to an internal danger. A certain Francesco Balduino—a man of wealth and position, but ambitious of entering the noble caste from which he saw himself excluded, in spite of his own belief that he had merited this honour after the war of Chioggia—by continually brooding over his wrongs, arrived at the mad resolve to compass the overthrow of the Government by assassinating the leading members of the Council of Ten. One day, as he was walking near the Frari Church, he met a friend, Bartolomeo d'Anselmo, whom he believed to share his hatred of the noble caste. To Anselmo, Balduino communicated his plans, and received promises of help.

1412. The following Sunday, 6th March, 1412, was the day selected for the execution of the scheme. The friends separated, but Anselmo had not gone very far before he was seized with alarm at the thought of the risk he was running. If the conversation had been overheard he knew that he was doomed to torture and death. Before he reached

his own house his terror became so unendurable that he resolved to betray Balduino to the Council. He did so. Balduino was arrested, and on Saturday, ^{1412.} 5th March, was hanged between the two red columns of the loggia in the ducal palace.

Early in 1412 Pippo was back again in the Venetian plain. He even, with his accustomed audacity, ventured upon rafts, by night, as far as San Nicolo del Lido, surprised the guards, and ravaged the cultivated fields; but Venice was roused by the sound of S. Mark's bell; the people rushed to arms, and Pippo, with his handful of Hungarians, retired. In August of the same year he was thoroughly defeated at La Motta by the Venetians under Pietro Loredano and Malatesta.

The war was becoming an intolerable burden to both parties; the Hungarians might hold Friuli and the Trevisano, but they could not reduce Venice itself; while, on the other hand, the Venetian land army was not strong enough to sweep the enemy from so wide a plain. The struggle resembled the contest of the dog and the shark; neither could get at the other. There seemed no reason why it should ever end. But the finances of the Republic were beginning to crack. The war was costing 50,000 ducats a month; Treviso and its district were yielding nothing to the exchequer. The Government found itself obliged to impose a property tax of 10 per cent, and the unpopularity of this step showed them that it was time to bring the campaign to an end. Tommaso Mocenigo and Antonio Contarini were sent on an embassy to the Emperor. As Mocenigo crossed the mainland districts, ravaged by foreign troops, he received an object lesson in the consequences, for the Republic, of a land war—a lesson which he inwardly digested, and embodied later on in his famous deathbed recommendations to his countrymen.

A truce, not a peace, for Sigismund would not abandon Dalmatia, was concluded in 1413, and Venice immediately set to work to repair her shattered finances. She appointed a commission of ten nobles for the reduction of public burdens and for the extinction of the debt incurred by the war. In order to raise funds for this purpose, the commissioners increased the tax on all brokers

or middle-men; they sold some portion of the property of the State, and they appropriated the income derived
 1412. from the salt trade with the mainland. In the next ten years we know that Venice paid off 4,000,000 ducats out of a national debt of 10,000,000.

Tommaso Mocenigo was still at the Imperial Court, endeavouring to negotiate a peace, when the news of
 1414. his election reached him. His reign represents the very end of the old order in Venice. He was the last Doge whose election received the formal sanction of the people. For long the ceremonial act of consulting the people by the formula "This is your Doge, an it please you," had lost all real significance; it was a dead letter; now it drops off, and the next Doge, Francesco Foscari, is presented to the people of Venice as "your Doge," whether it please you or not. The oligarchy had finally achieved its supremacy, not merely in fact, but also in form. And the *promissione* of the Doge Tommaso Mocenigo bears further proofs of this change. The Doge was deprived of his right to summon the *Concio* or *Arengo*, the general meeting of all Venetian citizens; this step merely precluded that legislation which was about to deprive the *Arengo* of any voice in the election of the chief magistrate. The Doge was also forbidden to display his family arms anywhere except inside the ducal palace. Finally, it was open to any two of the three *Avogadori* to impeach the Doge for any action which they considered a violation of the constitution.

This legislation was brought about by an episode in the life of the late Doge, the impetuous Michel Steno. In the year 1410 Donato Michiel had moved to cancel a resolution of the *Maggior Consiglio*, and upon this the *Avogadori* proposed to indict Michiel for an infringement of the law. The Doge opposed the motion of the *Avogadori*, and they declared that, by the terms of his coronation oath, he had no power to do so, unless his action were sanctioned by four out of the six *Consiglieri*. Steno, however, continued his arguments, whereupon two ducal councillors and one chief of the Supreme Court rose and said, "May it please your Serenity to sit down, and hold

your tongue, and to allow the *Avogadori* to do their duty." The Doge found support from two other councillors who were present, and continued his attack. The ¹⁴¹⁴ *Avogadori* declared his Serenity suspended, and threatened him with a fine of 1,000 lire and a citation before the Ten. The Doge refused to give way and completed his speech. The matter remained in suspense, but the Doge would not allow it to continue thus. He insisted that the *Avogadori* should either inflict the fine, and proceed with the impeachment, or should formally withdraw. The *Avogadori* availed themselves of a quibble, and signed a formal act declaring that the Doge was within his rights in addressing the Council, as they had never really intended to indict Donato Michiel. There the matter ended; but on the accession of Tommaso Mocenigo care was taken that no Doge should be able for the future so to override the officers of the Republic.

The reign of Mocenigo was remarkable on three accounts. It witnessed the first brush between Venice and the Turks; it saw the satisfactory conclusion of the war with Sigismund and the acquisition of Friuli; and it covered the opening moves in the long struggle with Visconti, which was to occupy so much of the following Dogeship. Conflicts with the Ottoman power in the Levant, extension on the mainland of Italy and the consequences entailed thereby, the two main threads of Venetian history, both are illustrated in this reign.

On the death of Bajazet I. in 1403, the Ottoman power was torn and weakened by the quarrels among his sons, Suleiman, Musa, and Mohammed. Manuel, the Emperor in Constantinople, could do nothing to profit by this fratricidal contest; he merely allied himself first with one and then with another of the brothers, against the strongest for the time being. The Venetians, too, in their anxiety for their Levantine commerce, followed a similar policy. But Suleiman died, Musa was killed, and Mohammed concentrated the whole Ottoman power in his own person. Through her ambassador, Francesco Foscari, Venice signed a treaty with the victorious Turk, which she believed would secure all her extensive colonies from molestation.

Mohammed, however, was not long in creating a fleet with which he proceeded to harass the independent
1413- Christians of the Archipelago. The Turks followed up some Venetian merchantmen who were returning from Trebisond, ran them into Negropont, and threatened the town. Pietro Loredano, the Venetian admiral in those waters, desired to come to a parley with the Turkish admiral in the port of Gallipoli. But while the admirals were discussing the situation, the two fleets had already engaged, and a
1416. battle was unavoidable. Loredano himself describes the engagement in a despatch, dated Tenedos, 2nd June, 1416. "I, the commander," he says, "battling like a man, attacked the first galley, which defended itself with great courage, for the Turks are well found, very vigorous, and fight like dragons. By God's grace I took her and cut most of the Turks to pieces. But it cost me much to save the prize, for other galleys bore down upon my stern, on the left-hand side, and raked me with arrows and darts; and I felt them, I can assure you, for I was wounded in the left cheek, just under the eye, by a dart that passed through my cheek and nose. Another passed right through and through my left hand; these wounds were serious; I was wounded, too, about the body, and in the right hand, but these were of no consequence, compared with the other two. I fought on, however, and drove back the attacking galleys, took the first galley, and ran up my flag. Then I rammed and disabled a galleot, cut her crew to bits, put some of my own men aboard, and ran up my flag. The rest of the fleet fought splendidly, and the Turks made a brave defence, for the flower of their men was on board. But we routed them and put them to flight, and many of them, to their shame, jumped into the sea. The battle lasted from the morning early till past two o'clock. We took six of their ships with all their crews, whom we spitted on the sword, among them their admiral Cialibeg, with all his nephews. When the battle was over we sailed under the walls of Gallipoli and defied them to come out; but no one dared. Then I drew out to the open sea a bit, to rest my men and allow them to dress their wounds. On board the captured

ships we found Genoese, Catalans, Provençals, Sicilians, and Candiots, and these I cut to bits, as well as all the pilots, so that the Turks have no more just now. ^{1416.} George Calergi, a rebel against your Serenity, I ordered to be quartered on the poop of my own ship; this will be a warning to Christians not to take service with the Turk again. And now we may say that, for a long time to come, the power of the Turk by sea is utterly destroyed. I have 1,100 prisoners."

The victory of Gallipoli was a splendid achievement of Venetian arms, and secured for the Republic an advantageous peace as well as the admiration of all Europe. But Loredano's estimate was too sanguine; the power of the Turk could not be broken by one naval defeat, however conspicuous.

The Venetians were still endeavouring, but without success, to convert the truce with Sigismund into a peace. Dalmatia blocked the way. Sigismund refused to allow Venice to hold it as a fief, and Venice declined to give it up. It was necessary to prepare for war. The Republic attempted to strengthen herself by treaties, of which the Visconti alliance promised most; though Filippo Maria was not yet in a position to be of very great service, as he was engaged in recovering his paternal dominions from his father's usurping generals. The Imperial army entered Friuli in 1418. It was supported by the Patriarch of Aquileia, Ludwig von Teck, and the Counts of ^{1418.} Gorizia. The Venetians were assisted by the great family of Savorgnan. The war was entirely favourable to the Republic. Sacile fell; Cividale yielded of its own accord; Feltre and Belluno were recovered; Udine was closely besieged. The Patriarch, a prisoner in the leaguered city, in vain implored the Emperor to come to his aid; Sigismund, who had miscalculated Venetian resources, was at that moment rendered helpless by his war with the Hussites in Bohemia, and the Turkish menace to his Hungarian frontier. The Patriarch fled to the Counts of Gorizia for protection. Udine fell, followed by Aquileia and all the strong places of Friuli. The year 1420 saw

the Republic mistress of the whole province from the sea to the Alps; the Patriarch made a formal surrender
1420. of his signorial rights, and the Counts of Gorizia acknowledged a feudal overlordship in the Republic. This produced an immense addition to Venetian territory; the frontiers of the Republic were strengthened towards the east, where they had hitherto been so weak, and ran, now, from the Alps, by Monfalcone, to that long line of low hills, near Custozza and Somma Campagna, which separate the basins of the Adige and the Mincio, passing thence down the line of the Po to the sea. And all this new territory to the east had been acquired at comparatively little cost of blood or money, thanks to the fortunate circumstance that Sigismund had allowed John Huss to be burned at Constance, and was now hampered by a religious war. It is not surprising that Venetian pride rose high at such unprecedented success; that she acquired a thirst for glory and an appetite for territory, which presently drove her, under the Doge Foscari, to still further efforts, and brought her face to face with the Visconti of Milan.

But Filippo Visconti* was quiet as yet. As we have seen, he was fully occupied in recovering and consolidating his father's dominions. In this he was assisted by the military courage and ability of his general, Francesco Bussone, better known as Carmagnola from his birthplace near Turin. By the year 1420, that is contemporaneously with the Venetian conquest of Friuli, Visconti had achieved his task. Carmagnola had restored to him his lost possessions, and had placed the crown upon his services by subduing Genoa to the Duke of Milan.

Florence was the first power in Italy to take alarm at the Visconti's attitude. She sent an invitation to Venice, begging the Republic to join her in a league against the growing power of Milan. This invitation, and the way in which it was received, is a crucial point in Venetian history. The Republic up to this moment had hardly been conscious of all that was implied by the conquests which she had recently been making on the mainland. She had passed on, more or less lightly, from Treviso to Padua, Vicenza,

Verona, Friuli. But now by this question of the Florentine ambassadors she was suddenly made aware that she was no longer the free, isolated, independent Venice ^{1420.} of the lagoons, a Venice that could afford to be indifferent to mainland politics, and could pursue her great commercial career undisturbed by consideration of who was lord in Milan or Verona, provided they bought her goods. She learned now, for the first time, that the whole flood of complicated and turbulent Italian politics had been let in upon her through the gate of Verona, Vicenza, Padua; that her peace was gone; that she was no longer her own mistress. The deed had been done some time ago, but the realisation of all that it entailed only arrived now; and hence it is that the Doge Mocenigo, in his treatment of the Florentine invitation, in the advice he gave to his fellow-citizens upon this occasion, was led to believe that he could point out alternative lines of action, could indicate a possible choice. That was not the case; the choice had already been made by Venice, unwitting of its full meaning, but made; the Republic could not go back now.

When the Florentine proposal arrived, as by a sudden flash of lightning it revealed in Venice two policies, two parties, diametrically opposed to one another, but hitherto unconscious of their antagonism. The Doge, representing the older party, was averse to a Florentine alliance; he thought it possible to remain on good terms with Visconti, and to trade with the Milanese, not to fight it. The party of young Venice, the party of ambition, eager to extend, bitten with land-hunger, was headed by Francesco Foscari, and warmly espoused the Florentine alliance. Mocenigo's influence was sufficiently strong to secure an unfavourable answer for Florentine envoys. The excuse was the league with Visconti against Sigismund which already existed. When Florence offered to mediate between the Republic and the Emperor, and so to remove this obstacle to an alliance which they so dearly desired, they were informed that mediation had already been tried, but in vain. The Doge is said to have made a long oration in the Great Council, during the course of which, addressing himself personally to Foscari, whom,

with taunting iteration, he calls "our young procurator,"
1420. he brought illustration after illustration, from sacred, from ancient, from modern history, to prove that States which go to war are always ruined. The address is probably apocryphal. More authentic is the famous testamentary exhortation of the dying Doge. Summoning to his bedside the principal statesmen of the Republic, he placed before them the financial and commercial condition of the community, never more flourishing; he showed how the merchant marine was the greatest in the world; how the national debt was rapidly disappearing; how their naval struggle with the Turks trained for their service a number of admirable captains; how, in detail, Milan, Como, Pavia, Brescia, Bergamo, Parma, Cremona, all the territories of the Duke of Milan, contributed to the ten millions of ducats, which yearly passed through Venetian hands, leaving not less than two million ducats of profit behind; how, if this rate of expansion were kept up, Venice would soon be mistress of all the wealth in the world: how this prosperity might be ruined by a war; and how the question of war or peace depended on the choice of his successor. "Many of you are inclined," he said, "to Messer Marino Caravello, a good man and one deserving of that high honour; so too Messer Francesco Bembo, Messer Giacomo Trevisan, Messer Antonio Contarini. Many again are inclined to Messer Francesco Foscari, but they know not that he is a braggart and vainglorious, without solidity, light-headed, grasping at much and holding little. If you choose him you will always be at war; your ten thousand ducats will be reduced to one; the man who owns two houses will be left with only one; you will waste your gold and lose your honour; instead of being the masters, you will become the slaves of your men-at-arms and their captains."

With these weighty words of warning on his lips Tommaso Mocenigo died, leaving to the Republic the momentous question of choosing his successor and of giving
1423 a definite answer to the Florentine envoys, who were still attending in the hope of bringing Venice to their side.

CHAPTER XVI

Francesco Foscari, Doge—His election corrupt—*Sala del Maggior Consiglio*—The question of a Florentine alliance—Growth of Visconti—Ridolfo's threat—Visconti and Carmagnola—Carmagnola in Venice—His speech in the Senate—Foscari urges the Florentine league—Concluded—Carmagnola engaged by Venice—The *condottieri*—Venetian relations to her *condottieri*—The *Proveditori in Campo*—First campaign against Visconti—Brescia—Carmagnola's conduct—Second campaign—Carmagnola's conduct—The populace accuse him of treachery—Battle of Macalo—Prospect of capturing Milan—Carmagnola's conduct—Bergamo—Carmagnola's demands—Third campaign—Venetian defeat on the Po—Venice determines to arrest Carmagnola—Proposal to poison the Duke of Milan—Finances disturbed—Carmagnola's trial and execution—His guilt—Result of his campaigns—Jealousy of Venice : expressed at the Council of Basel—Question of investiture of her new dominions : granted at Prague—Ceremony—War with Visconti continued—Venetian galleys on Garda—Rise of Francesco Sforza—Death of Filippo Maria—Change in the aspect of affairs—Sforza's claim to Milan—The French claim to Milan—Importance of this—Sforza Duke of Milan—Peace between Venice and Milan at Lodi—Affairs at Constantinople—Venice makes terms with the Turks at Adrianople—Mohammed the conqueror—The Emperor Constantine asks help from Venice—Siege of Constantinople—Presence of the Venetian fleet—Fall of Constantinople—The new order of things : in Italy ; in the Levant ; inside the city—Plot of the young nobles to secure offices—The story of Jacopo Foscari—The Doge withdraws from public life ; is compelled to abdicate ; and dies—The results of Foscari's reign—Acquisition on the mainland—Exhausted treasury—Pomp.

WHEN the Doge Mocenigo solemnly exhorted his countrymen to be careful in their choice of a Doge, he did not mean that the personal influence of the new ^{1423.} Doge would affect the policy of Venice, but rather that the choice of his successor would be an indication of the policy which the State intended to pursue. In his deathbed speech Mocenigo had placed the situation clearly before the Venetian

magistrates. It was this: the process of elimination which had slowly crushed out the Scala and Carrara families had¹⁴²³ now left only two possible competitors for supremacy in North Italy, Visconti, and Venice. Mocenigo's policy was to arrest the extension of the Republic at the point where she now stood; "the hills of Verona," he said, "are our frontier, which we will defend if attacked." He believed it possible to trade with the Milanese and to defend the frontier; and he urged that a war with Milan would exhaust Venetian capital, while at the same time, it cut off one great outlet for her accumulated merchandise.

But such a calculation left out of account the ambition of Visconti, the fact that he claimed Verona, Vicenza, and Padua, in virtue of his father's occupation of those provinces and the essential weakness of the Veronese frontier; for, by "the mountains of Verona," Mocenigo meant nothing more than that low range of hills near Somma Campagna which separate the Veronese from the Lago di Garda. We have endeavoured, in the preceding chapter, to show reasons for thinking that Mocenigo's policy was impossible; that, whoever might be his successor, the Republic was already committed to a policy of extension and aggrandisement on the mainland, with all the consequences implied thereby. But the question still presented itself to the Venetians as an open one; and so the election of the next Doge was made the pretext for a trial of strength between the two parties—the party which represented the old policy of abstention from mainland complications, and the young, or "jingo" party, which desired to follow up Venetian success on *terra ferma*. In spite of Mocenigo's warning, and notwithstanding the sharp struggle, which carried the balloting over several days, the party of young Venice was victorious; Francesco Foscari, "our young procurator," the embodiment and personification of the new spirit, was elected.

The election of Foscari presents several points which instantly mark it as the beginning of an epoch in Venetian history; they are all of them instructive as indicating the spirit of the new departure.

Whether bribery and chicanery had been employed before in the election of a Doge or not, this is the first occasion upon which we find serious stress laid upon these charges. Foscari's enemies did not hesitate to accuse him of having employed a surplus, which he found lying to the credit of the Procurators when he assumed that office, in smoothing his path to popularity and the throne, by liberal donations to the families of the poorer nobility. At the actual ballot his election was achieved by a trick. His own supporters voted against him and for another candidate, thereby inducing those who wished to exclude that candidate to cast their votes for Foscari; then suddenly on the tenth ballot they all transferred their suffrages to Foscari, and secured a majority.

The old purity of election had disappeared, whether at a single stroke or as the outcome of a slow process we do not know; but election to office now became a question of arrangement, manipulation, jobbery. Just at the very moment when the aristocracy, the oligarchical body, had succeeded, after centuries of endeavour, in extruding the people from all share in the management of the State, when the last remnants of popular government are removed by the abolition of the *Concio*, or general assembly, and the Doge is presented to the people as "your Doge," whether it please you or not; just when the Doge himself has been thoroughly muzzled and curbed,—that aristocratical body, that ruling caste which has thus achieved its aim, begins to show signs of corruption; election to office is made a matter of arrangement between the more powerful nobles, and there arises a class of pauper nobility open to bribes. It would seem that the integrity of the oligarchical caste could only be maintained while it had an opposition to conquer—the people and the Doge; when its objects are achieved, when the opposition is overcome, disintegration sets in.

Such are the inner aspects of Foscari's election. But externally also everything contributed to mark the opening of this new era. The ducal pomp, the dress, and the retinue, were still further magnified; fur mantles were ordered for the Doge, bright liveries for his servants; the new *Sala del*

Maggior Consiglio was opened for the first time by a ceremony at which the Marquis of Mantua was admitted to the ranks of the Venetian aristocracy; and the triumphal progress of the Doge's wife, from her private house to the palace, surpassed all previous processions in the lavishness of its splendour.

When Foscari came to the throne the question of a Florentine alliance against Visconti was still pending. From Mocenigo the Florentine envoys had received an unfavourable answer; but they knew that Foscari was on their side, and his election to the Dogeship induced them to approach Venice once more upon the subject. The Mocenigo party, however, was still powerful, and could always point out that a Florentine league would throw Visconti and Sigismund together, exposing Venice to attack from east and west. Foscari and his friends, the Florentines, were obliged to wait some time longer before the current of events brought about the combination which they desired. Visconti, meanwhile, was steadily pursuing his way southward. His troops were in the Romagna, and had occupied Imola. The defeat of the Florentines at Zagonara (27th July, 1424), and the capture of their general Carlo Malatesta, reduced them to the greatest straits, and compelled them once more to have recourse to Venice. The Republic was the only Italian power from which Florence could expect any aid. But even Zagonara, though it alarmed the Venetians, was not sufficient to cause them to unite with Florence. The defeat in that engagement was followed by other crushing disasters at Val Lamone, Rapallo, Anghiari. Visconti's arms seemed invincible, and Venice was seriously disturbed by the rapid growth of his power. These repeated misfortunes forced the Florentines to come once more a-begging; and in his struggle with the coldness of the Venetian attitude, Ridolfi, the Florentine ambassador, burst into an appeal which ended in a threat. "If Venice will not help us to retain our liberties, we will pull the whole house down about our ears. When we refused to succour Genoa, she made Visconti her lord; if you refuse to help us, we will help to make him king." This threat had

some effect, and the Senate for the first time consented to consider the question of a Florentine league, in November, 1424.

But other events were taking place in Filippo Visconti's dominions which were destined to throw a weapon into the hands of Foscari and the Florentine party, and to effect the union of Florence and Venice against Milan.

We have already seen how the Duke of Milan had recovered his paternal dominions chiefly through the military skill of his favourite general, Carmagnola. Carmagnola's career continued with uninterrupted success down to the year 1424. He had amassed a vast fortune, part of which he invested in Venetian funds; he had married Filippo Maria's daughter, and bore the Visconti arms; he had begun to build a magnificent palace in Milan. But the jealous whisperings among Visconti's inner circle of courtiers roused the suspicion of the Duke. He determined that Carmagnola should not become so powerful as to be a danger to the Visconti dominions. The Duke accordingly removed his too-prosperous general from the government of Genoa, and refused him an audience. Carmagnola at once left the Milanese, and sought refuge with the Duke of Savoy. Failing to induce him to engage in a war against Visconti, Carmagnola passed on to Venice, where he at once found himself welcomed by the Doge Foscari, and soon learned that his arrival was likely to bring about the very object he had most at heart, a combination against the Duke of Milan. Carmagnola was introduced to the Senate, and, in the course of an address, he pointed out the ease with which the Duke might be attacked, and gave much valuable information as to the resources of the Milanese. The Senate resolved to engage the services of Carmagnola; and, until he was required to take the field, he retired to Treviso, where he soon discovered that Visconti had tried to assassinate him by poison. The Duke's agent was seized, tortured, and killed. The Florentine party in Venice was now very much stronger, and the Doge renewed his endeavours to bring about an alliance. An impassioned speech concluded thus: "Shall we suffer Philip to crush the liberty

of Florence? Shall this raging tyrant overrun, destroy, confound, all Italy unpunished? No! Carmagnola
1425. has shown us that the power of Philip is not so great as was supposed; and if Carmagnola is our general we may surely look for a successful issue to the campaign; all Italy cannot show his match in bravery and in military skill. Under such a leader we have every hope of extending our borders. These considerations counsel us to declare war, which after all is a necessity, for our enemy is our neighbour, is powerful, and aspires to supreme dominion in the peninsula. Against him, then, we must league with Florence, throw down the gauntlet, avenge our wrongs, and crush the common foe." The eloquence of the Doge, and the combination of events, carried the day. The Florentine League was voted on 3rd December, 1425, and Venice was committed to the greatest land war upon which she had ever embarked.

Foscari, in his decisive speech, had praised Carmagnola as a general; but he said nothing about his essential character as a *condottiere*, as a mercenary captain of arms. Mocenigo's warning, that if Venice embarked on land wars she would be compelled to employ mercenary soldiery, and that where she had been mistress she would become the slave of her captains and their men, had been forgotten, but was none the less true. In the unfortunate conditions of Italy, when the whole country was divided among a number of small despots, each endeavouring to aggrandise his own family at the expense of his neighbour, and maintaining with difficulty his authority in his native city, whose inhabitants groaned under his tyranny, it was impossible for any one of these lords to entrust his fortunes to native arms which would be hostile, or to native captains who were ambitious. Foreigners with no stake in the community were required. Under these circumstances there arose a whole class of men, soldiers by trade, mercenaries, captains of adventure, who undertook to supply the demand. These captains were ready to contract with any of the Italian States, for placing so many troops in the field at so much a month and at a separate salary for themselves. They became proficient in

the art of war, and it soon came to be understood that a raw and untrained native militia was powerless against their elaborate tactics and their skilful strategy. At ¹⁴²⁵ the same time, they formed a class by themselves; their own objects were never those of the master they served; it was nothing to them who ruled in Milan, Verona, or Padua, provided there was some one there with a large purse and an insatiable ambition. War alone, war for its own sake, was their sole interest; the camp their only fatherland; peace the one thing they dreaded. And so among themselves, they began to develop a code of military usage which would favour their own special interests. Wars were not to be finished too rapidly; it was not the captain's interest to conclude a campaign as long as the employers' pockets were full; accordingly decisive engagements were avoided; or if a decisive victory were necessary to restore the market value of a *condottiere*, the custom of war compelled him to liberate all his prisoners on the morrow of his victory; marching and counter-marching, through well-stocked districts, was their delight, and early retirement to winter quarters in some wealthy city was prescribed by etiquette; midsummer appeared too hot and midwinter too cold for military operations. In vain the employers, the belligerents who did not fight, urged their respective captains to vigorous measures. They were compelled to stand by and look on at a game which was ruining their exchequer. They had no means of compelling their mercenaries to act unless it pleased them; nothing remained but to offer them enormous bribes and to make vast promises. The struggle, as far as the despots were concerned, was carried on chiefly in the cabinet; it was the longest purse that won the day, for the moment the salary ceased, or upon the offer of higher terms, a mercenary captain would pass with all his men from one camp to the other without the smallest scruple. And the success of these adventurers was often very remarkable. Some amassed huge fortunes like Colleoni; some carved temporary principalities for themselves out of their employers' dominions, like Gian Galeazzo's group of generals; some, like Francesco Sforza,

succeeded in placing their family permanently on a throne.

1425. The stakes they played for were high, but the risks they ran were great, as the history of Carmagnola will presently prove.

In opening her career of extension upon the mainland, Venice exposed herself to many of the difficulties inherent in the mercenary system. In her earlier land wars, which were few and far between, as her population was almost entirely a seafaring population, she had found herself compelled to use mercenary armies as well as mercenary captains. In 1312, for example, she had employed Dalmasio de Banoli to find the troops and the means to reduce Zara. Venice was thrifty; she was willing to pay liberally, but she also determined to see that the moneys were properly employed, and to avoid the risk of the whole funds remaining in the captain's hands while his troops revolted for want of pay. To secure this object she appointed two of her nobles, with the title of *Proveditori*, to attend the camp of Dalmasio, and to superintend the army chest. Dalmasio objected; he maintained that in the interests of discipline, it was necessary for the troops to be dependant on their commanding officer for their pay. Venice refused to admit the argument, and Dalmasio sold himself to the enemy. This action on the part of their mercenary captain did not induce Venice to abandon her proveditorial system, and all through the ensuing wars, two or more Venetian nobles were present in the *condottiere's* camp, acting as *Proveditori*, keeping a sharp eye on the general's actions, and sometimes interfering in the conduct of the campaign. The presence of these government officials in the mercenary camp, is one of the most striking features in the peculiar relations of Venice towards her *condottieri*, and distinguishes her from other States. But there were other important points of difference. When the Republic entered upon the wars with Visconti she was already mistress of a considerable mainland territory, from which she raised a part at least of her troops; about one-third of her army was drawn from Padua, Treviso, Vicenza, and Verona. Moreover, Venice was a very different employer from the lords of the mainland.

Her government was not concentrated in the hands of a single despot, ruling in a city whose hatred constantly exposed him to the danger of rebellion or of assassination. Her government was strong, popular, unassailable, and she was immensely wealthy. The Republic stood in a far more commanding position towards her *condottieri* than any mainland despot.

When war broke out, Venice and Florence were joined by the Duke of Savoy, and by some other smaller princes. The results of the first campaign were highly satisfactory for the Venetian, if not for the Florentine, Republic. Carmagnola invested Brescia; the lower town opened its gates at once and after a siege of some months the upper city and the two castles fell. But the credit of this important siege and capture does not belong to Carmagnola. From the very outset of his career in Venetian service, his conduct was a source of surprise and annoyance to his employers. He had no sooner led his army under the walls of Brescia, than he applied for leave to retire to the Baths of Abano, on the plea that as he had been thrown from his horse while living in Treviso, his health was delicate. It is not quite certain whether Carmagnola availed himself at once of the permission grudgingly given. The Senate urged him not to leave the army for long, and promised to create an independent State for him if he would cross the Adda, and press forward to Milan. In reply Carmagnola sent to inform the Venetians that the Duke of Milan had offered to open negotiations for a peace through himself as mediator. Whatever may have been the intention of Filippo Visconti, whether he wished to make it appear that he was on intimate terms with the general of the Republic, or whether he wished to win back Carmagnola to his service, his extraordinary conduct in keeping up a constant succession of messages between Milan and the Venetian camp succeeded in rendering Venice suspicious, and in leading Carmagnola forward to his doom. The Republic now begged Carmagnola to pay no heed to these empty proposals of the Duke; and the general, leaving the engineer Nicolo da Tolentino to conduct the siege of Brescia,

retired to the Baths of Abano. The peace of San Giorgio, concluded on 30th December, 1428, put an end to the first campaign, and left Venice with Brescia and the Bresciano as an addition to her land dominion.

1426. Venice was soon to learn how little faith could be placed in a *pace volpina*, in a Visconti's treaty of peace. Filippo had merely signed the treaty of S. Giorgio in order to arrest a campaign which had proved disastrous. He entertained no idea of adhering to its clauses. By March, 1427, war was evidently coming on again. Carmagnola obeyed a summons to Venice to consult as to the conduct of the campaign; and he took the field in April. But again his behaviour proved distressing. He remained inactive for weeks. Casalmaggiore was besieged by Piccinino, Visconti's general, and for want of support from Carmagnola it fell. He declared that he could not move, as he had no forage for his horses; then, that he was not in sufficient force; then, that he wanted money. The Venetian fleet on the Po, native Venetians commanded by Venetian nobles, won a decisive victory over the Milanese flotilla under Eustachio Paccino, and pressed on till they were nearly under Pavia; but through a failure of support they were forced to retire. Nothing could be more vexatious than Carmagnola's conduct of the war. He was at the head of the finest army that had been seen in North Italy, 22,000 horse and 14,000 infantry, and yet he let himself be seriously damaged in an ambuscade at Gottolengo, and failed to secure a victory at Casalsecco. A diversion on the Savoy frontier compelled the Duke to withdraw a portion of his troops, and Casalmaggiore was recovered; but some ineffectual operations on the Lago d'Iseo were all that Carmagnola undertook, and at Venice the populace began openly to accuse him of treachery. The Doge was obliged to write to the infuriated general, excusing the conduct of the commonalty, and assuring Carmagnola, that the Government had unbounded confidence in his ability, only they wished he would show it.

Carmagnola seems to have understood that he must undertake some more active operation, unless he wished to be arrested. He moved his army to Macalo, near the river

Oglio. There, on 11th October, 1427, he was attacked by Visconti's three generals, Piccinino, Sforza, and Malatesta; and there he gained the one great ¹⁴²⁷ victory which he secured for Venice. Malatesta, and 8000 prisoners, remained in his hands, and, in accordance with military etiquette, were liberated the following day.

The joy at Venice was unbounded. Now for the first time it seemed possible that Milan itself might fall to the Republic; no one doubted that if Carmagnola had crossed the Adda he would have had a very fair chance of capturing the capital of the Visconti. But Carmagnola was in no hurry to finish the war; and such a victory as that of Macalo gave him an opportunity of winning gratitude from the Duke—a possible employer in the future—by using it gently. Some trifling operations in the Bresciano were the sole outcome of this splendid victory.

Meantime the Pope, by the instrumentality of Cardinal S. Croce, was endeavouring to arrange a peace. Venice claimed not only Brescia, but also Bergamo and its district. Visconti refused to surrender these, and began again to make offers of negotiation through Carmagnola. The spring of 1428 arrived before any terms had been arranged, and the Venetians urged Carmagnola to take the field. He replied that he wished to retire to Abano. The Senate, losing patience, declared that they knew him to be perfectly well; and while this quarrel was still in progress, Visconti gave way, surrendered Bergamo, and the peace of Ferrara was published in May, 1428.

The first campaign against Visconti had added Brescia to the Venetian territory; the second gave her Bergamo as well. Her land possessions now extended from the Julian Alps in the east to the river Adda in the west. This is the point of greatest permanent extension which Venice achieved on the mainland of Italy. She acquired and held for a brief period other territories farther west; but her permanent frontier remained the river Adda.

In these successive campaigns which occupy the reign of Foscari, and exhaust Venetian treasure, it is not Venice who renews the war. Her desire was to remain quiet, and to

consolidate the territorial possessions which she had acquired.

1428. But the fact that the struggle was, on the whole, unfavourable to Visconti, made it impossible for him to accept the result of each campaign. He had set out with the intention of recovering Verona and Vicenza; he had succeeded in losing Brescia and Bergamo. His attitude, therefore, was always threatening; and in October, 1428, war seemed once again inevitable. Yet it was precisely this moment which Carmagnola chose for tendering the resignation of his command. The whole of the general's conduct looked as though he were acting in collusion with the Duke. The Senate met to consider the communication, and refused to accept the proposal. But they could not afford to disgust Carmagnola; they still believed in his military skill—Macalo confirmed their belief—though they did not know how to evoke it for their own benefit. The Venetians consented to the extravagant terms which the general demanded as the price of remaining in their service. He was to draw 1000 ducats a month, in peace or war; to enjoy supreme command of all the troops of the Republic, with power of life and death; to possess the fiefs of Chiari and Roccafranca, with descent to his legitimate heirs; and to enjoy all the ransoms for persons of importance captured in war.

The threat of a rupture with Visconti passed by; but in the interval of peace the Duke of Milan continued to ply Carmagnola with letters, with messengers, with suggestions that he should arbitrate between Milan and Venice. Carmagnola never made any concealment of this correspondence; he reported it all to Venice, where his extraordinary conduct merely produced mystification and suspicion. In 1431 war broke out once more, and the Republic offered to make Carmagnola lord of Milan if he succeeded in destroying the dominion of Visconti. But this

1431. third campaign repeats all the exasperating features of previous operations. Through inertia, the capture of Lodi failed. The Venetian flotilla on the Po was utterly routed, owing to Carmagnola's dilatoriness in moving to its support; Nicolo Trevisan, the admiral, was condemned to

imprisonment, and, in contumacy, was outlawed. Carmagnola failed to support Cavalcabò in his night surprise of Cremona, and the design miscarried. The situation ¹⁴³¹ was becoming intolerable to the Venetians. In October the Senate proposed to take their general's conduct into consideration, *et non stare in his perpetuis laboribus et expensis*. But the question was laid aside for a while, and fresh efforts were made to incite Carmagnola to active operations. In the meantime a proposal to poison the Duke of Milan was accepted by the Council of Ten. The assassin who made the offer, was a certain Micheletto Muazzo; but the Ten, having some doubts as to the efficacy of the poison he proposed to employ, ordered him to experiment in their presence upon two pigs. Having received ocular demonstration that the drugs were efficient, they promised Muazzo 25,000 ducats if he succeeded in killing the Duke; the plot, however, like most of the plots so freely propounded by the members of the corrupt and ruined classes, failed.

Carmagnola still maintained his attitude of inactivity; it was in vain that the Government despatched a special commissioner to his camp, to renew the offers of splendid rewards if he would move. Matters were becoming very serious for Venice; no new territory accrued to her; commerce was interrupted by military operations, and yet the strain on her exchequer, for the support of Carmagnola and his useless army, never ceased for a moment. The Republic found herself forced to apply to her mainland provinces, begging them to anticipate their tribute by four months, and renouncing to them the octroi dues, till the extinction of the debt. The transaction was conducted on a fair and business-like footing; the provinces were not forced to make the loan, and they were fully secured. But the episode is ominous; it is the first sign that this land war might prove a strain upon the finances of the Republic, which they were unable to bear. Mocenigo's prophecy was receiving a rapid and complete fulfilment; Venice found herself the slave of her captain-general, and was losing both her money and her honour.

At length the Government resolved to submit no longer. On 28th March, 1432, the Council of Ten undertook the

conduct of the case, and acted with its wonted promptitude and vigour. It imposed silence upon all members
1432. of the Senate and of the Ten, under pain of death. It asked for a *giunta*, or addition of twenty members, thus raising the numbers of the Court to thirty-seven. The following day a secretary of the Council, Giovanni de Imperiis, a man with a long pale face, but a trusty servant, was despatched to Brescia to invite Carmagnola's presence in Venice, as the Government wished to consult him about the conduct of the approaching campaign. If Carmagnola showed signs of unwillingness or suspicion, Giovanni was authorised to cause the Podestà and the Captain of Brescia to arrest him; at the same time the Ten sent a letter to the general requesting him to put all confidence in the words of their secretary, Giovanni. De Imperiis fulfilled his commission without difficulty. Carmagnola manifested no reluctance. He set out at once for Venice. He was received with distinction at Padua, and reached the capital on 7th April. A guard of honour met him, and conducted him to the ducal palace. As he passed upstairs, his personal suite was dismissed, on the excuse that the general would dine with the Doge. In the Sala delle Quattro Porte, Carmagnola waited a little while, and presently a message came to say that his Serenity was indisposed, and would receive him to-morrow. He turned to go down to his gondola. As he was making for the staircase one of the attendant nobles said, "This way, my lord Count." "But that is not the way," replied Carmagnola. "Oh, pardon, it is the right way!" At that moment he was surrounded and hurried into one of the prisons: as the door closed on him he exclaimed, "I am a lost man." The trial was begun on 9th April; suspended for the festivities of Easter, and resumed on the 23rd. The committee of examination presented their report; and the vote to proceed to sentence was passed by 26 against 1, with 9 neutrals. Two sentences were proposed, the first that the Count should be beheaded that same day, in public, with a gag in his mouth; the second, moved by the Doge, that he should be imprisoned for life. The former was carried. On the 5th May, towards evening, Carmagnola,

dressed in a crimson velvet vest and mantle, and a cap *alla Carmagnola*, was led into the Piazzetta, and there, between the two columns, his head fell from his ¹⁴³² body at the third blow.

There can be little doubt of Carmagnola's guilt towards Venice. His conduct had been that of a true *condottiere*—absolutely regardless of his employers' interests; thinking solely how he might prolong the war, draw his salary, and prepare a good reception from Visconti, if he ever wished to return to the Milanese service. Venice had behaved with great long-sufferance, partly from necessity, partly from surprise and ignorance of what the employment of a *condottiere* implied; when she did learn, at last, the significance of her position, she struck rapidly and boldly. Her conduct startled the rest of Italy; such vigour seemed hardly within the rules of the game; but it served as a lesson to the generals she subsequently employed, no one of whom ventured to give her so much trouble as Carmagnola had inflicted on the State.

We have dwelt at length on the episode of Carmagnola, because it illustrates the Venetian spirit when brought, for the first time, into contact with the system of mercenary captains; and also because, under Carmagnola's leadership, Venice, in spite of all her disappointments, touched the highest point of her land development. Bergamo and Brescia were solid acquisitions, after eight years of almost incessant war.

This extension of land dominion, and the power it was presumed to bring with it, could not fail to produce its natural consequence in stirring against the Republic the first symptoms of that European jealousy, which broke out in its full violence at the League of Cambray. At the Council of Basel, which had been sitting since 1431, the Patriarch of Aquileia formally accused Venice of being in illegal possession of his patrimony, the province of Friuli. He claimed the use of spiritual weapons against the robber of church property; and the Council, complying with his request, prepared a monitory, with excommunication as its sanction. The Republic sent an embassy to defend its rights, with

private instructions to do all that was possible to avert the publication of the monitory, but if it were inevitable, to make no effort to moderate its terms, as the more violent it proved in expression, the easier it would be to protest against it. The monitory was issued, and Venice passed under excommunication, but without any result. The Pope, Eugenius IV., was a Venetian, and no friend to the Council of Basel; without the authority of Rome the excommunication, in Italy at least, was not a serious matter.

The episode, however, enlightened Venice as to one consequence of having created a land empire; she learned now that the question of a title, in spite of its seeming hollowiness, might be of importance; the lack of a good title was always an excuse for an attack. As a matter of fact Venice had no valid title *de jure* to any of her land possessions. Nominally Friuli belonged to the Patriarchate of Aquileia, while Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, and Bergamo belonged to the Visconti family; and in Italy, though a good title in law was a useless title in fact, unless supported by possession, it was desirable all the same to combine both. Accordingly Marco Dandolo, Venetian ambassador at the Imperial Court, was instructed to demand a formal investiture

of Venetian land possessions, and to represent the Republic at the ceremony. That took place with much pomp at Prague on 16th August, 1437. The Emperor and his court occupied a raised dais at one end of the great square. Dandolo, magnificently dressed in cloth of gold, entered the square, and was received by 200 noblemen, who conducted him to the foot of the throne. There Dandolo sank on his knees, but the Emperor bade him rise, and inquired the nature of his petition. Dandolo replied that the Republic of Venice sought the investiture of her mainland possessions. Sigismund signified his consent, and the whole assembly passed into the Cathedral, where after mass Dandolo took the oath of fealty. The diploma of investiture gave the Doge the title of Duke of Treviso, Feltre, Belluno, Ceneda, Padua, Brescia, Bergamo, Casalmaggiore, Soncino, Peschiera, and defined Venetian possessions as all

territory *di quà*, that is east of the Adda. The fine upon which these fiefs were held, was a web of gold cloth valued at 1000 ducats, to be presented to the Emperor each year at Christmas. ^{1437.}

The arrest and execution of Carmagnola did not conclude the Milanese war. It was maintained under the leadership of one of the *Proveditori*, Giorgio Corner, who displayed the activity which might be looked for in a native not a mercenary captain; but he proved to be no match for the trained generals of Visconti. He pushed forward as far as the Valtelline; there he was shut in by Piccinino, and forced to surrender. He was sent as a prisoner to Milan, where he suffered horrible tortures in order to extract from him the names of the Venetians who had accused Carmagnola. When the news reached Venice the Republic found itself once more obliged to have recourse to a mercenary captain-general, and she elected Gian Francesco Gonzaga to fill her treacherous leader's place.

It is not necessary for us to follow in detail the long and complicated series of campaigns which devastated North Italy from 1432 to 1447. There was a continual struggle between the two great northern powers for the possession of Lombardy, Venice endeavouring to hold what she had acquired and to extend beyond the Adda, Visconti using every effort, every ruse, every political combination, in order to recover the lost provinces of Brescia and Bergamo. In the long contest both powers exhausted their resources, while their captains—Piccinino and Della Pergola for the Duke, Gonzaga and Gattamelata for the Republic, and Sforza, now for one and now for the other—marched and counter-marched, and played their elaborate and costly game of war. There are picturesque and moving details in abundance; Piccinino besieged Brescia, and the city, in her affection for the rule of Venice, held out against unheard-of sufferings. Gattamelata, attempting its relief, found himself shut in between the Lago di Garda and the Alps; it seemed that he would be forced to lay down his arms, but by a daring march, which won for him the esteem of all military critics, he passed through the mountains, rounded the north

head of the lake, and emerged upon the Lombard plain by the Val Caprino in Valpollicella above Verona, and

1437. thereby threw an army between Visconti's troops and the lagoons. The Venetians, desiring to relieve their faithful city of Brescia, found that it was necessary to place a flotilla on the Lago di Garda, the object of which was either to convey provisions into the Bresciano, by way of Salò, or to draw the Milanese troops up towards that side of the lake and so to leave the land road to Brescia open. The ships, six galleys and twenty-five lighter boats, were built at Venice, taken up the Adige to Mori, just below Ala, and there placed upon rollers and greased boards; more than 2000 oxen were employed to haul them uphill, into the waters of the little lake of S. Andrea. From S. Andrea they were hauled in like fashion, over a depression in Monte Baldo, and gradually lowered down the western slope till they reached the lake at Torbole—a feat of remarkable skill and courage. Sforza, attempting to relieve Brescia, defeated Piccinino and his Milanese troops; Piccinino himself only escaped by being carried in a sack on the shoulders of one of his men, down to Salò on Garda. But he instantly crossed the lake, and before Sforza had time to measure his victory, he was informed that Piccinino was in possession of Verona. So, with varying success, the long war continued, till Brescia was relieved in 1440, and Visconti

1440. agreed to a peace in 1441. In the same year Venice entered upon the formal possession of Ravenna, which she had virtually held for the last thirty-five years as guardian and remainder-heir to the Polentani, Lords of that city. This important step southward involved her, however, in a dispute with the Court of Rome, which claimed that territory as a fief of the Church; and Venice found herself obliged to do homage to the Church for the fief of Ravenna in 1451.

The struggle with Visconti was developing yearly more and more complications; the rise of Francesco Sforza, his ability as a general, and the strength of his army, really gave him the control of North Italian politics, and we find

him changing about from one service to the other. Matters were in this dubious condition when Filippo Maria died suddenly, after six days' illness, at the Castle of Porta Zobbia in 1447.


Instantly the whole aspect of affairs was changed. The great question now arose who should possess Milan. Filippo had left no male heirs; his one daughter, Bianca, was married to Sforza, and gave him some colour of a right to succeed. But the house of Orleans also put in its claim upon the Milanese, which it held through Valentine Visconti, the mother of Charles of Orleans. The appearance of this French claim is a most important event in the history of North Italy, and opens up an epoch of Italian politics which, for many years to come, will be found to centre round the rival pretensions of France and Spain to the Duchy of Milan. But there were other factors in the problem besides Sforza and Charles of Orleans; the Milanese people desired to erect a Republic; and finally Venice herself would have been glad to become mistress of a city whose lords had cost her so much trouble as neighbours.

On the death of Filippo the Milanese declared a Republic; the Visconti possessions fell to pieces; neighbouring cities like Lodi and Piacenza, jealous of Milan, gave themselves up to Venice. The Republic of the lagoons offered to support the new Republic of the plains, on condition that she was allowed to retain Lodi and Piacenza. The Milanese demurred. Meantime Sforza in his own interests had seized Pavia and Piacenza. He was at open war with the Republic of Venice. He soon became master of most of their Lombard possessions; he refused to treat with Venice on the basis of ceding Cremona. After a long period of vacillation, during which Venice was uncertain whether she would join Sforza or support the Republic, the situation was cleared by Sforza's successful attack on Milan. The city opened its gates to him on 25th March, 1450, and he was proclaimed Duke of Milan on the following day.

To Venice Sforza was no more acceptable a neighbour than Visconti had been. His ambition was as great; he claimed

**VENETIAN POSSESSIONS
IN
ITALY AND DALMATIA
1450 - 1500**

Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100



the Visconti dominions in right of his wife, and that claim was a threat to the Venetian tenure of Bergamo and
1450. Brescia; he was an able general, and in possession of a splendid army. But Venice was unwilling, indeed hardly able, to fight the new Duke of Milan. Her treasury was exhausted, and an event which will presently occupy our attention, the fall of Constantinople, came as a shock to all Europe, inclining men's minds to peace.

An accord between Venice and Milan was concluded at Lodi on 9th April, 1454; by it Venice secured
1454. her possession of Brescia and Bergamo, and acquired Crema and Treviglio. This peace was followed by a defensive alliance between Sforza, Florence, and Venice; the contracting parties bound themselves for the next twenty-five years to a common protection of their respective possessions.

While Venice was thus occupied with her wars in Lombardy, a series of events in the East was leading up to the final collapse of the Eastern Empire, and the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. The general conditions of Europe, the universal wars—in Hungary against the Hussites, in Italy between Venice and Milan, in France against the English, in Spain against the Moors—rendered it impossible to send any effectual aid to the impotent Emperors of the East. Venice had done what she could, but she was unsupported by Europe, and did not intend to ruin her trade by an inefficient warfare against the Turks, when it was open to her to trade with them instead. Hungary too, another interested power whose frontiers touched the Ottoman borders, had also endeavoured to support the Eastern Empire, but in her isolation she, like Venice, was compelled to make peace. Already Turkish mosques and Turkish courts of justice existed at Constantinople. It was only a question what moment the Mussulmans would choose to make their possession of the Imperial city complete. At each new step forward the Republic sent ambassadors to confirm the existing commercial treaties, and to secure the safety of Venetian property in the Levant. After Murad's siege of Constantinople, which he abandoned in 1423, Venice despatched

Jacopo Dandolo to beg from the Sultan the restoration of the territory of Salonika. He refused, and laid siege to the city. It fell after a short resistance, and was ¹⁴³²⁻ treated with the greatest barbarity. In 1430 Venice signed the peace of Adrianople, by which the Sultan promised to leave her in free enjoyment of her commerce, while she paid a yearly tribute for the possession of Lepanto, Scutari, and Alessio. Venice, hampered by her Lombard struggle with Visconti, and unwilling to risk a rupture with the Turk, took no part in Hunniady's glorious victory of Nissa, nor in the second campaign which was ended by the defeat of Varna (1444).

In 1449 the Emperor, John Paleologus, died. Of his brothers, Demetrius and Constantine, the latter ascended the throne; and two years later, in 1451, Mohammed II. became Sultan of the Turks. He very soon showed the ambitious nature of his designs. He began by building a fort on the European side of the Bosphorus. There could be no doubt as to the meaning of this step. In February, 1452, Constantine sent to implore the help of Venice. The Senate replied that the Lombard war prevented her from acting singly in the matter, but that she would willingly combine with other European powers, if the Emperor succeeded in inducing them to come to his aid.

Meantime at Constantinople the Turkish army was pressing closer and closer round the city. The Emperor caused the gates to be closed, and the siege began. Mohammed had cast a great cannon in Adrianople, with which he intended to destroy the walls, that had hitherto resisted all Turkish assaults. The Republic sent orders to Gabriel Trevisan, vice-captain of the Gulf, to sail for Constantinople, with a view to protecting Venetian shipping, and to assist in holding the city, if that were possible. He entered the port of Constantinople, and shortly after him, by a strange piece of irony, arrived the Cardinal Isodore, sent to celebrate the union of the two Churches; a union decreed by the Western Church when not even at union inside itself, and accepted by the Eastern Church which was on the point of losing its capital. The day after this ceremony, the 14th December,

a council was held on board one of the Venetian galleys, at which the Cardinal implored the Venetian commanders not to abandon the city. The captain^{1453.} replied that his orders were not to stay more than ten days in those parts. If the merchants chose to sail with him, well and good; if not, he would go without them. The Venetians of Constantinople, however, refused to allow their compatriots to sail, and retained them by force; sending, at the same time, a message to Venice to excuse the captains for this involuntary breach of orders.

The siege was opened in form on 6th April, and on the 15th of the same month the Turkish fleet blockaded the harbour. A slight diversion was caused by the arrival of a Genoese squadron and one imperial galley. The Turks, though far superior in strength, failed to prevent them from entering the harbour. On the 28th an attempt was made to destroy the Turkish fleet with fireships, but failed. The Emperor still relied on help from Venice: day by day he expected the coming of the Venetian fleet: day by day his hopes fell lower. At last, on 3rd May, he summoned the commanders of the Venetian ships, and said: "Captains and nobles of Venice, ye perceive that the Signory sends me no fleet to succour this unhappy city; it would be well to send a light boat out to sea in the direction of Negropont, that, should she fall in with the Venetian fleet, she may hasten its coming." That same night the little vessel, flying the Turkish flag, with her crew in Turkish dress, stole out, and sailed away south. But no Venetian fleet was in those waters, and the pinnace returned to Constantinople with the disheartening news.

Though all hope had now disappeared Constantine held out. He rejected an offer to spare the city if it surrendered at once. Then Mohammed gave the order for the assault. On Monday, 28th May, the Emperor received the sacrament in S. Sophia. On the following day at dawn the Turks attacked. The assault was severest near the Adrianople gate, which was bravely defended for a time; but at length the Genoese, Giustinian Longo, was wounded and fled. A panic seized the garrison. The Turks poured into the city through a postern which had been left open by accident or treachery. The

Emperor died fighting to the last. "He called upon his men to kill him; he rushed into the mêlée with his sword drawn, fell, rose again, fell once more, and so ¹⁴⁵³⁻ died." His body was buried under a mound of his followers. The Venetians, such of them as had not fallen in the battle, saved themselves on board their galleys, which immediately set sail and reached a place of safety.

Thus, while Venice on the mainland was brought face to face with a new combination of circumstances by the death of Visconti, the rise of Sforza, and the appearance of the French claim to Milan, she was confronted by new conditions in the East, through the fall of Constantinople, and the advent of the Turkish power. She assisted in feebly defending the Imperial city, which in 1204 she had vigorously attacked. Though it is unlikely that she could have prevented the ultimate victory of the Turk, still the fall of Constantinople in 1453, with all the consequences which it entailed, was in a measure due to Venetian action in the fourth Crusade. The disastrous results of her Italian policy, of her complications on the mainland, and her destruction of Genoa, left her unable to render any efficient aid to the Eastern Empire, in whose preservation she was vitally concerned.

Nor was it merely in the external aspect of her relations to Italy and to Constantinople that the change in the conditions of Venice made itself apparent. Internally, in her private and domestic life, the new order, the changed circumstances began to manifest themselves. We have seen how the election of the Doge presented some ominous features indicative of incipient corruption; and that tendency continued to declare itself throughout his reign till it ended in the tragic fate of the Doge's son and the humiliation of Foscari himself. In 1433 a plot had been discovered, in which thirty-seven nobles conspired together with a view to securing government appointments for themselves and those who bought their support. Their object was to make a corner in State offices by a careful manipulation of the *Maggior Consiglio*. The Ten, before whom the matter was brought as a question of public safety, dealt stringently with the offenders. Many were banished, and all were excluded from office, either in

perpetuity or for a term of years. In 1444 Jacopo Foscari, the Doge's son, was accused of having received bribes¹⁴⁵³ and presents as the price of his influence in the disposal of offices of State. His servants were arrested, but Jacopo, dreading the issue of a warrant against himself, escaped. The trial was continued in his absence, and the evidence of his servants revealed the presence of a chest in the Doge's private house, in which were the gifts which Jacopo had received, and papers bearing upon the subject. This chest was impounded, and after having examined it, the Council of Ten proceeded to pronounce its sentence that Jacopo be banished to Nauplia in the Peloponnesus. The sentence was read in the Great Council. Jacopo, when he fled from justice, had taken refuge in Trieste, and the execution of the sentence seems to have been allowed to stand over. It was published in February, 1445, and in March the Dogarressa, Jacopo's mother, asked leave to go to Trieste to visit her son. This was refused. In April the sentence received confirmation, but no steps were taken to carry it into effect; and in June of the next year we find the Ten complaining that nothing had as yet been done to execute its decrees. More surprising still, five months later the Ten consented to alter the place of banishment from Nauplia to Treviso, on account of Jacopo's ill health. The discovery of a chest full of money and plate, sent by Francesco Sforza to Foscari, did not move the Ten to any severer measures; and in 1447 a petition from the Doge that his son might be allowed to return to Venice met with acceptance, on the ground that it was necessary for the good of the State, that the Prince should have his mind free and serene, which was impossible under the present circumstances in which his son was placed. Jacopo returned to Venice, and seems to have passed three years in quiet. But on 5th December, 1450, Ermolao Donato, who had been one of the *Capi* of the Ten at the time of Foscari's first trial, was murdered while leaving the ducal palace. Suspicion did not attach to Jacopo at first. Others were arrested, but set at liberty. High rewards were offered for information. At last, in January, 1451, a denunciation of Jacopo Foscari, signed by Antonio Venier, was submitted to

the Ten. There was no direct proof forthcoming, and only the meagrest circumstantial evidence—the loose words of some of his servants—to convict Foscari; ¹⁴⁵³⁻ nevertheless a motion, made in the Ten, to abandon the prosecution was rejected. Jacopo himself, under torture, revealed nothing. But the Ten seem to have felt that they had gone too far to withdraw, and so, as they express it, “under the necessity of bringing this case to a close,” and “in the certainty that Jacopo Foscari is guilty, though it has been impossible to wring a confession from his own lips,” he is relegated to the island of Candia. The sentence was published in the *Maggior Consiglio*, and announced privately to the Doge, who had taken no part in the trial of his son. In March, 1453, Jacopo was deported to Candia. But even there he did not remain quiet. For shortly after his arrival he seems to have entered into correspondence with the Turk, in the hope of being assisted to escape. This news caused the Ten to meet once more for the consideration of his case. A motion was made declaring that, owing to his foolishness and considering the place in which he was confined, where he could do but little harm, it would be sufficient that the governor should administer a severe reprimand. An amendment, proposing to bring Jacopo home and to place him on his trial, was carried, however. He arrived on the 21st July. The trial was a brief one; the prisoner offered no defence. The Ten proceeded to sentence; one proposal was to send him back to Candia, another to behead him between the columns of the Piazzetta. The milder measure gained the day. Jacopo was allowed to see his father before returning to exile. He made an appeal to the Doge: “My father,” he said, “procure for me that I may return to my home.”—“Jacopo,” replied the Doge, “go, and obey the orders of your country, nor seek ought beyond.” After his son had left his presence the old man fell back in his chair, crying, “*O pietà grande!*” Jacopo was reconveyed to Candia, but the ducal party did not cease to labour for his release, and they were on the point of succeeding, when news of his death ¹⁴⁵⁷⁻ arrived.

This was a final blow to the tottering health of the

aged Duke. Worn out by a long and momentous reign, mortally wounded in his own family circle, Francesco
1457. Foscari withdrew from public life. He ceased to attend the sittings of the various councils, and caused much embarrassment to the Government. The Council of Ten resolved to invite the Doge to resign. This was an infringement of the statutes, which required that such a request should come from the Great Council. Foscari told the representatives of the Ten that such was the case, and declined to abdicate. But the Ten insisted. It was useless for the Doge to struggle against the real masters of the State. The old man bowed to a positive order that he must abdicate and quit the palace within eight days. As the commissioners of the Ten were leaving the room, one of the younger men, Jacopo Memmo, looked with compassion on the fallen prince. Foscari caught the look. "Whose son art thou?" he said. "I am the son of Messer Marin Memmo."—"My dear good friend," replied Foscari, "tell him to come and see me. We will go and amuse ourselves in a boat, rowing to the monasteries." So, on 24th October 1457, Francesco Foscari left the palace, where he had reigned for thirty-four years, to the great glory and the inevitable ruin of his country. As he passed down to his gondola he refused to take the covered stair. "No, no," he said; "I will descend by the way I came up to my Dukedom."

This whole episode in the private life of the Foscari family is valuable chiefly for the light it throws upon the internal history of Venice. We are clearly in an atmosphere unknown before. The Council of Ten is all-powerful; it even usurps functions which do not belong to it by the constitution. The air is charged with plots, suspicion, assassination, denunciation, spies—all the paraphernalia which went to confirm the popular legend as to the terrible nature of the *Dieci*. We have reached the beginning of that period in which the noble caste, after winning its battle against the people and the Doge, fell a victim to a haunting terror of itself, to a blind dread of its own members, which may perhaps be explained on the supposition

that Venetians lived in perpetual alarm lest their State should suffer the doom of all its Italian neighbours, and pass under the domination of a single ruler. 1457.

If we look at the sum total of Foscari's reign, the outcome of all these years of activity for Venice, we find that the Republic had increased her landed territory by the addition of two great provinces—Bergamo and Brescia. She acquired a preponderating position in Italian politics, and obtained recognition as a European power of much importance. But the price had been enormous. The first ten years of the war alone cost her 7,000,000 ducats; her debt, instead of decreasing, rose from 6,000,000 to 13,000,000. Venetian funds fell to 18½; the Republic was forced to anticipate her revenues from her subject provinces. The death of Visconti brought up against her French claims in the Milanese; the loss of Constantinople left her to deal with the powerful and victorious Turk in the East. Externally there was much pomp and splendour. The Imperial investiture of the mainland provinces flattered the national vanity; the Emperor John Paleologus was received with lavish splendour; the marriage of Jacopo Foscari, in 1441, was one of the most magnificent ceremonies which the State had ever celebrated—the Companions of the Horse caracoled about the Piazza, dressed in velvet brocaded with silver fringes, crimson velvet doublets, open sleeves, and squirrels' fur caps, each of the eighteen followed by six servants, all on horseback, dressed in gorgeous liveries. Venice never looked more splendid than she did just now, and all this pomp seemed but the fitting counterpart to her extraordinary development on the mainland.

But underneath this bravery there lurked the official corruption of the nobles, the suspicion of the Ten, the first signs of bank failures, the increase in the national debt, the fall in the value of the funds. Land wars and landed possessions drew the Venetians from the sea to *terra ferma*. The pure Venetian strain in the navy declined; its place was taken by subjects like the Dalmatians and the Morlacchs. Venice was forsaking her native element. The beginning of the end had arrived.

CHAPTER XVII

The possibility of Venice ceasing to be a city State and becoming a territorial State—The enemies of Venice—Perilous state of Venice—Outward splendour—*Pasquale Malipiero*, Doge—*Cristoforo Moro*, Doge—Turks in the Morea—Failure of Pius II.'s Crusade—Venice single-handed against Turk—Turkish fleet—Venice tries to conclude a peace with Turks—Fails—Fresh Turkish fleet—Venetian armament—Nicolo Canal at Negropont—Loss of the island—Arrest and trial of Canal—Pietro Mocenigo in command—Cost of the war—Exhaustion of treasury—Attempt to make peace—Attack on Scutari: its defence by Loredan—*Pietro Mocenigo*, Doge—Colleoni's legacy—Impoverishment of the Exchequer—Terms of peace with the Sultan—*Andrea Vendramin*, Doge—The Turks seize Otranto—Accusations against Venice—Ferrarese war—A war tax—Issue of government bonds—The Pope interferes—Venice under an interdict—Attitude of Venice—The war unsuccessful—Coalition against Venice—Financial exhaustion—Invitation to the Duke of Orleans to claim Milan—Peace of Bagnolo—The acquisition of Cyprus—Affairs of Cyprus—Giacomo Lusignan marries Caterina Cornaro—Caterina's story—*Marco Barbarigo*, Doge—*Agostino Barbarigo*, Doge—Caterina forced to renounce Cyprus: her life at Asolo; her death—Discovery of the Cape passage—Results to Venice—Pietro Pasqualigo in Lisbon: his report—The epoch of diplomacy—Numerous combinations among Italian princes—A new element, the intervention of ultramontane powers—Galeazzo Sforza's warning to Venice—Lodovico Sforza's invitation to Charles VIII.—Venice attempts to preserve a neutral position—Charles's offers to Venice—Charles in Italy—Commines in Venice—League against Charles—Battle of Fornovo—Maximilian in Italy—Death of Charles VIII.—Louis XII.—George d'Amboise—Cesare Borgia—Venice embraces the French cause—Price of her treachery the Milanese—Lodovico Sforza replies by rousing the Turk against Venice—Despatch of a Venetian ambassador at the Porte shows that the Turk is bent on war—Antonio Grimani, commander—Disastrous battle of Sapienza—Grimani tried and banished—The French occupy Milan—Cesare Borgia—D'Amboise and the Emperor arrange a partition of Venetian territory—*Leonardo Loredano*, Doge—Isolation of Venice—Death of Alexander VI.—Julius II. determined to recover States of the Church held by Venice—The enemies of Venice coalesce at Cambray—Venetian wealth; and real weakness.

THE reign of Francesco Foscari appeared, no doubt, to Venice, to Italy, and to Europe, a period of great glory for the Republic. Brescia, Bergamo, Ravenna, were permanent acquisitions. It seemed possible that Venice might change her character, and, ceasing to be a purely city State whose whole life had been commercial, might become a territorial State with a career of conquest before her. Such an experiment would have been quite new to North Italy, a country which had never possessed other than city States, a country in which the idea of a territorial State seems hardly to have presented itself to the minds even of its acutest statesmen—to Machiavelli, to Guicciardini, to Giannotti. Whether Venice could have achieved a conversion of this nature, whether she even possessed the idea of such a development, is very doubtful. But had the peace of Lodi, which put an end to the long Lombard war, proved an enduring peace, had Venice been allowed a breathing space in which to adjust herself to her new acquisitions, she might possibly have succeeded in making the conversion from a city to a territorial State. She was proceeding upon the right lines of good and sound government; she soon acquired the affection of her dependencies on the mainland, and, had peace been granted her, she might have developed a form of government which would have made those dependencies integral parts of one dominion, not merely a number of districts attached to a capital by bonds which were more or less feeble.

But events moved too rapidly. Italy at the close of the fifteenth century seemed to be seized with a vertigo; Italian politics became more and more shamelessly egotistic; the confusion produced by the period of the despots and the career of the *condottieri*, left no well-defined boundaries between State and State; each prince sought feverishly to aggrandise himself, or endeavoured, by complicated political combinations, to prevent his neighbour from extending his borders. Venice found no time to consolidate her new land empire, the possession of which brought her into collision with so many conflicting claims. The Duke of Milan demanded Bergamo and Brescia; the occupation of Ravenna exposed her to hostility from Rome. Moreover the Venetians themselves were seized by

the prevalent desire for empire; the greed for landed possessions grew upon them, and, as the violent revolutions of 1457. of Italian politics gave them opportunity, we find them endeavouring to press westward across the Adda and southward into the Romagna, arousing fresh antagonism at each step, and confirming the growing belief in the "insatiable cupidity of the Venetians, and their thirst for dominion," which the preamble of the treaty of Cambray sets forth as the reason for the formation of that avenging League.

Everywhere troubles thicken round the path of the Republic—jealousy of rivals; ruinous expenses which cripple the exchequer, aggravated by the fall of Constantinople, and the sudden cessation of the eastern trade; a steady decline in the value of the funds; the ominous spectacle of a growing deficit, in spite of a growing territory; the final blow to Venetian commerce by the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope. And, in the midst of all these complications, Venice is called upon to perform more than any other State in Italy. Europe was clamorous that she should do her duty by the Turk, should fight him to the last drop of her blood and the last penny of her treasury; but she was left alone to carry out this commission; and if, under the intolerable burden, she found herself forced to make peace, Europe declaimed against her defection, and proposed to erase this foe to Christianity. On the other hand, a fate which she could not escape was slowly drawing the Republic into the jaws of the greater European powers—France, the Empire, and Spain, who, invited by Italy herself, were about to repeat the barbarian invasions of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries.

During all this disastrous period, which really closes the vital history of Venice, it is not men who are lacking to the Republic. We shall find many instances of shrewd ability, and of high personal courage. There are characters as vigorous as Vettor Pisani or Carlo Zeno, who illustrate Venetian history. It is rather that the central government seems paralysed, the head dizzy, aghast at the complications in which the State was involved by her mainland

policy, and without sufficient time to adjust itself to the new order of things, which moved so rapidly that it might rather be called no order at all. 1457.

And yet, while the Republic was really hurling headlong to its ruin, the outward pomp, the glory, the splendour of Venice were just beginning to attract the eyes of Europe, blinding many Venetians and all foreigners to the real aspect of the situation. Venice was acquiring her reputation as the city of magnificent private life, the city of "masks and balls begun at midnight, burning ever to mid-day"; the city, too, of *sfrenata lascivia*, the "Gehenna of the Waters." This is the period when her great palaces arose, in all their pomp of balcony and pillared windows and frescoed façades, along the Grand Canal; when Vivarini, Carpaccio, and Bellini were preluding to Titian, Giorgione, Tintoret; when Bessarion presented his priceless codices to the Marcian Library; when the colony of Greek scribes was endeavouring to hold its own against the new invention of printing, against John of Speyer's *Epistolæ Familiares* and Jenson's *Ad Atticum*; when Aldus, by his brilliant, earnest, passionate scholarship, and his practical acumen in the conduct of his press, began to render the Greek classics the common property of mankind.

It would seem that, just as the rapid extension of Venice on the mainland under Francesco Foscari was the blossom of all her long centuries of physical and constitutional growth, so the sudden artistic expansion of the later fifteenth century was the flowering of Venice in the intellectual and emotional region. The bloom presaged decay. Death was already at the roots before the flower had opened to its fullest splendour.

In tracing the complicated history of Venice from the death of Foscari to the declaration of the League of Cambray in 1508, and in order to show what Venice was called upon to do and how she failed to do it; how she was slowly ruined—bled to death—in the East and on the mainland of Italy, by circumstances which were largely the result of her own previous actions; how she received her

coup de grace from the League of Cambray and the discovery of the Cape route to India, it will be most convenient to follow events in three sections, which, however, interlace at certain points—the Levant, commerce, and Italian mainland.

The peace of Lodi, in 1454, had settled the affairs of Lombardy as between Venice and the new Duke of Milan. Venice might have looked forward to some years of repose, which would have allowed her to restore her shattered finance and to consolidate and absorb her new mainland possessions; but Constantinople had fallen the year before the peace was concluded. The Turks were now masters of the Levant, and it was inevitable that their first collision should be with Venice, the European power most nearly interested in that quarter of the Mediterranean. By means of her ambassador, Bartolomeo Marcello, the Republic had arranged a treaty with Mohammed the Conqueror in 1454; while the Pope, under the influence of Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, was endeavouring to prepare a Crusade. Europe, however, was too deeply occupied with its own domestic dissensions; no European State had as large an interest in the Levant as Venice; upon Venice the sovereigns of Europe determined to throw the whole burden of the Turkish war. By the year 1460 the Conqueror was in the Morea; in 1462 he captured Mytilene, and proved that he intended to contest the whole Levant with the Republic, by constructing an arsenal at Constantinople, and preparing that fleet which subsequently showed itself more than a match for the Venetian armament.

Æneas Sylvius ascended the throne of S. Peter in 1458, as Pius II., and the ardour for a Crusade which inspired his nunciatures was by no means diminished. His ambassador, Cardinal Bessarion, came to Venice to urge upon the Republic the duty of abandoning its neutral attitude, and of adopting active measures against the Turk. Bessarion found Venice already committed to a war, brought about by Mohammed's incursions in the Morea. Alvise Loredan, the Captain-General, had fortified the isthmus of Corinth by

a wall 6 miles long, 12 feet high, with a double ditch and 136 towers; in the middle was an altar, and over it floated the banner of S. Mark. But the Venetians failed to hold this bulwark, and the Turks regained possession of the Morea. Under these circumstances Bessarion succeeded in persuading Venice to join a league of the Pope, the Duke of Burgundy, and the King of Hungary. Pius II. strained every nerve to render the Crusade effectual. He resolved to sail in person, and compelled his cardinals to follow him to Ancona, where he intended to take ship on board the Venetian fleet; but when he arrived at that port he found neither soldiers nor money, nor any signs of that splendid army of the Cross which he had fondly pictured in the fever of his enthusiasm. The Pope, broken-hearted, retired to his bed, from which he never rose. Meanwhile Venice had fulfilled her part of the contract, and the Doge, under pressure from his Council, set sail in August. He arrived in Ancona only to find the Pope dying, and the whole expedition a lamentable failure; he returned home to Venice that same month.

The Republic was now left alone to carry on single-handed a war which she had undertaken in the expectation of European support. Her treaties with the Sultan were of no avail, for he was resolved to ignore them on any occasion which suited his purposes. Venice no longer enjoyed any weight at Constantinople, and she was soon to feel acutely the change which her position had undergone by the fall of the Greek Empire.

Letters reached Venice from Antonio Michiel, a Venetian merchant, resident in Constantinople, warning the Government that the Sultan was making large naval preparations for the coming March, and was arming his Christian subjects. "This fleet of two hundred sail," continues the despatch, "is intended for Negropont. But the Government need not be alarmed if it can man forty light galleys, twenty great ships, from five to six hundred tons each, with crews of one hundred men apiece, and ten big galleys. Matters here call for serious attention; they are not to be treated lightly to the deceiving of ourselves. The Turks estimate that the

Republic is not able to arm more than forty galleys, and they reckon that four or five of their ships are
1464. sufficient to give a good account of one Venetian. This is their habit, I know it by experience; they are inclined to over-estimate their enemy's strength, and so they make their preparations regardless of expense; we ought to do the same." Sound advice, doubtless, but how was Venice to profit by it with a debt of 13,000,000 ducats, and an empty treasury? The Government was disposed rather to attempt the way of diplomacy. In May 1465 an ambassador, accompanied by a certain David, a Jew, was sent to Constantinople to open negotiations in the name of Venice and of Hungary. But they found the ground undermined; Italian jealousy of the Republic reached even to the Bosphorus; Genoa and Florence checked every Venetian move for peace; and the Grand Vizier, Mahmud, insulted the Venetian representative to his face when he said, "The despot of Servia sent all his treasure to support Hungary and got snuffed out like a candle for his pains. You say that you are treating in the name of Hungary, but Hungary has informed us that she will not have shopkeepers making peace on her behalf"—the first time, for many centuries, that Venice had been forced to swallow an affront in the city where she was accustomed to command.

Operations against Persia diverted the attention of the Turk for a while. But, in 1469, a letter from Girolamo Longo, captain on board the fleet, roused all the Venetian fears once more. The Turkish armada was out; it had seized the Castle of Imbros, and attempted that of Stalimene. "At first," says Longo, "I thought that the fleet numbered three hundred sail, now I calculate it at four hundred. The whole sea bristled like a pine forest. Do not be surprised that the Turk has been able to arm such a fleet, for, during the last sixteen years, he has been building new ships every year. The Turks row very well with a quick stroke. Their galleys are not so good as ours under oar; but in their sails and all else they are better found. From van to rearguard their fleet measured over six miles. Here we want deeds, not words. In my opinion we require not less

than a hundred good galleys, and I am not sure if even that number will suffice. Now is the moment for the Government to show its power. Setting aside ¹⁴⁶⁴⁻ every other consideration, it must send us at once ships, men, bread, and money; otherwise Negropont will be in danger, and with it all our Levant possessions, and the Adriatic as far as Istria; for next year the Turk will be half as strong again." This estimate, and the demand based upon it, was endorsed by the Captain-General, Nicolo Canal. Clearly neither Longo nor Canal had any doubt that the home Government could send out the fleet required, if she chose. But in the Venetian arsenal itself, let us see what reply the Republic was really able to give to this appeal. The Turk had been building ships for the last sixteen years; for the last forty, Venice had been spending recklessly. Her commanders asked for at least one hundred ships. She now raised, by loans, 200,000 ducats, and armed fifteen great ships, of three hundred tons and upwards, fourteen great galleys, and some lighter craft. The provinces offered supplies of biscuits, corn, and money; and the Government made a piteous appeal to the Pope, declaring she had done all she could—she had sent ships, men, and money, she had drained the last drop in her veins, but unsupported she was powerless. Canal's squadron, therefore, numbered in all fifty-two galleys, eighteen ships of war, and some other craft; under eighty sail in all.

This fleet was concentrated at Negropont, with orders to defend that island. In July the Turkish armada entered the channel between the island and the ^{1470.} continent, while the Sultan in person arrived by land at the head of his army. A bridge of boats was thrown across the narrow straits, and half the Turkish force passed over and encamped on the island; the siege of the city began. The extreme danger of the stronghold was announced to Nicolo Canal, and he advanced to its support, entering the narrow channel by the mouth opposite to that which had given access to the Turks. He had a fair wind and the tide with him; his vessels were making fifteen miles an hour; before him lay the bridge which joined the Turkish camp and the

mainland ; on the other side of the bridge, the Turkish fleet.

1470. His officers wished him to keep the way on his ships, and to charge and cut the bridge, thus dividing the Turkish host in two. But Canal was timorous. He let go his sheets, put down his helm, slued round into the wind, and called a council of war. The wind changed, the tide set the other way, and the opportunity for breaking the bridge was lost. So was Negropont, after a brave but hopeless resistance ; the men, women, and children contesting the town, street by street, with boiling water, quicklime, barrels, beams, any weapon which came to hand. The Turks took their usual terrible revenge, regardless of sex or age.

When the news reached Venice the Government resolved to recall and to prosecute Canal. Perhaps they were expecting too much from a commander to whom they had sent some forty vessels in reply to an appeal for about double that number, and sent them too late ; Canal may have argued that if his fleet were annihilated there was nothing to prevent the Turk from sailing up the Adriatic to Venice itself. But the fact remains that he did not charge the bridge, as he was urged to do by his officers, and that he displayed a timidity and vacillation which we shall have to note more than once in Venetian admirals—a timidity which was, in all probability, the result of that severity of judgment, coupled with weakness of action, which characterised the home Government at this period, and robbed all its officials of the courage to adopt a free and vigorous line of their own.

Pietro Mocenigo was appointed to supersede Canal ; he was charged to arrest his predecessor, and to send him to Venice. When Canal heard the order of the Ten from the lips of Mocenigo, he simply answered, "I am here to obey. Dispose of me as it seems good to you." The commander on his arrival in Venice was tried and found guilty on all the charges—of deserting Negropont when first assaulted ; of failing to attack the bridge on the 11th July ; of having let the enemy's fleet escape after the sack of the city and others of less weight ; and yet his sentence was simply

that of confinement in Portogruaro, a city on the mainland not far from Venice.

The war had already cost the Republic 1,200,000 ^{1470.} ducats, and the loss of Negropont filled the Venetians with a desire for peace. All the government officials whose salaries were in excess of twenty-five ducats, had ^{1471.} been deprived either of two-thirds or of a half of their pay for two years. The Doge himself was subjected to this forced contribution for the replenishment of the State coffers. No war could be carried on for long by a State reduced to such expedients as these, and Venice soon began to open negotiations for an accord with the Turk through the Sultan's stepmother. But no result was reached, for the Venetians desired to recover Negropont, on payment of a large sum of money, while the Sultan absolutely refused to give the island back to the Republic. War was renewed in a desultory manner. Venice, failing to obtain any support from Europe, did all she could, which was very little, to encourage the Persians in their attack on the Turks in Asia. But the defeat of Usunhasan at Tergian, ^{1473.} in 1473, completely destroyed all hopes in that quarter, and the next year witnessed the Turkish attack on Scutari, in Albania, and its memorable defence by ^{1474.} Antonio Loredan. The city, which is placed on a hill above the lake of the same name, was closely invested and reduced to the greatest straits for want of water. Loredan quelled a popular rising, and inspired new courage, by baring his breast and crying, "If you are hungry, here is my flesh; if you are thirsty, I give you my blood." So obstinate was the resistance that Suleiman Pasha was forced to raise the siege and to retire.

When Pietro Mocenigo, the admiral who had superseded Canal, came to the throne, his wide experience in the affairs of the Levant gave Venice some hopes of making headway against her enemies. His first care was to attempt a replenishment of the treasury; four years' command in the Levant had taught him that without a full exchequer nothing could be done against the Turk. The Republic was able to raise 50,000 ducats in subsidies

from her mainland provinces, and this relatively small contribution was augmented by the lucky accident —

¹⁴⁷⁴ if accident it were—of Bartolomeo Colleoni's death. The great *condottiere* left to the Republic, as his heir, upwards of 500,000 ducats in specie, land, jewels, and buildings; of this sum the Government at once appropriated 100,000 ducats to the prosecution of the Turkish war. Nothing could more forcibly display the financial impoverishment of the Venetian treasury than this instant application of a fortuitous legacy to meet the pressing needs of the State, if it be not the fact that, in spite of this refreshment of her exchequer, the Republic was only too glad to entertain negotiations for peace, which were once more introduced by the Sultan's stepmother. The proposals arrived while the Doge was entertaining Don Federico d'Aragona at a magnificent public reception in the ducal palace, so dramatically contrasted was the real poverty of the State with the outward pomp and show which it struggled to maintain. The offer was discussed for two days in the Council of Ten. There was a strong party which, in ignorance of the true state of affairs, still favoured war at any cost; but the Doge and those best informed replied that thirteen years of continuous campaigning had impoverished private and public purses alike; that the sailors for the reinforcements had, before sailing, appeared at the doors of the palace clamouring for pay; that there were not funds sufficient to maintain forty galleys, far less such an armada as was needed to make head against the Turk; in short, that the Republic must perforce endeavour to come to terms. The safe-conduct for an ambassador was accepted, and Girolamo Zorzi departed for Constantinople. But the Turkish demands were excessive, as usual; they were in the position of command, and did not care to make peace upon terms

¹⁴⁷⁶ advantageous to Venice. Negotiations and partial hostilities dragged along for two years more. Scutari was again besieged by the Sultan in person, who, in his furious determination to enter the town, blew besieged and besiegers alike to bits before his great siege cannon. But Scutari repelled Mohammed as it had

repelled Suleiman Pasha. The assault was converted into a blockade.

Both parties were weary of the conflict, and ^{1476.} Venice was thoroughly exhausted. It was only a question of days how long Scutari could now hold out; the Republic could offer no help. In these circum- ^{1478.}stances peace negotiations were resumed, and carried through. The Republic gave up Scutari, Stalimene, Brazzo, and all places which the Turks had occupied in the Morea. The Venetians secured the right to keep their Bailo ¹⁴⁷⁹⁻ at Constantinople, and preserved their trading privileges, for which they were to pay 10,000 ducats a year.

Thus, after sixteen years of continuous warfare, Venice secured a ruinous peace, which deprived her of a large portion of her Levantine Empire, and rendered her tributary to the new lords of Constantinople. She had undertaken the war at the request of Europe and encouraged by promises of support; she had been deserted at the very outset; she struggled on with great bravery, spending men and money till she could endure no further drain; she made the best terms she could, and instantly all Europe attacked her for her perfidy to the Christian faith. The princes of Italy professed to believe that Venice had retired from the war in order to devote her attention to the increase of her mainland kingdom; a policy that filled them with the liveliest apprehensions for their own safety, which depended on the maintenance of the balance of power in the peninsula. And, unfortunately, Venice was about to take a step which gave colour to the accusation. Had she been supported she would never have closed the Turkish war with such a balance against her; she was simply too weak to go on. The Doge was in the right when he declared that both public and private purses were exhausted, and in Venice, which relied so largely on patriotic contributions, and whose policy forbade her to tax her subjects heavily, the latter deficiency was the more serious of the two.

But however jealous of Venice the Italian princes might be, they had no desire to see her destroyed. The successes

of the Turks and the growing weakness of the Republic began to cause serious alarm. The Pope summoned representatives of all Italian States to meet him at Rome in 1476, with a view to concerting measures against the Ottoman power; but nothing came of this step. Suddenly, in 1480, not only Italy, but all Europe, was startled by the news that the Turks had seized Otranto. This was an inevitable outcome of the peace between Venice and the Sultan, which was due to the failure of Europe in supporting the Republic. Mohammed was insatiable of conquest, and found nothing now between himself and Italy; it looked as though he were going to keep his famous daily *rendezvous* with his janizaries at "the red apple"—Rome. Venice had been accused of suggesting this attack on Italy to the conquering Sultan, and the accusation, which was generally believed, roused the utmost indignation against the Republic. It is difficult to see what advantage could be supposed to accrue to Venice from the presence of the Turk in Italy. Moreover, the Sultan required no such promptings to an obvious course; the road to the "red apple" was open before his very eyes, and he took it. Venice was at peace now with the Turk, and would not and could not embark upon a fresh war for the sake of Italy, which had left her to struggle alone for sixteen years. When invited by the Pope to join the Italian league she pleaded the treaty of 1479, and confirmed Italian suspicion of her secret understanding with the Ottoman power.

But worse was still to come. Venice by her action, immediately after 1479, was about to convince all her Italian neighbours that her lust for land dominion was "insatiable." She already possessed Ravenna, under protest from Rome, which claimed the overlordship; she now embarked on a war with the Marquis of Ferrara, whose dominions lay between Ravenna and the Venetian southern frontier on the Po. The excuse was the erection of salt-pans at the mouth of that stream, in contravention of Venetian monopoly, and the exaction of dues for navigation on the river. In the strained relations brought about by these disputed points, a small episode set Venice and Ferrara in a flame. The Venetian

consul (*visdomino*) arrested a priest for debt. The papal Vicar excommunicated the consul, who retired to Venice when he saw that the Marquis supported the Vicar. ^{1480.} The Bishop of Ferrara condemned the act of the Vicar and, with the approval of the Pope, apologised to Venice. But the Marquis refused to reinstate the Venetian consul. ^{1481.} Venice declared war, which was immensely popular, as the State was thirsting to be reassured of its own powers again, after the long years of miserable discomfiture at the hands of the Turks. Taking advantage of this burst of patriotic enthusiasm, the Government was able to raise the necessary money; two-fifths of all incomes were called for, half as a loan bearing interest, half as a free gift; the Colleoni Bequest supplied 240,000 ducats; and new government bonds bearing five per cent were issued to the amount of 500,000 ducats. The reply to the government call shows that the private resources of Venice were still considerable, and could be counted on for a popular war. Of the funds thus raised 400,000 ducats were spent in the month of April, on the preparation of a flotilla and an army.

At the opening of the campaign the Pope supported the Republic, and Venetian arms under San Severino were victorious. But in 1483, Sixtus IV. requested Venice to abandon its war with Ferrara. He was moved to this step by the jealousy of the Duke of Milan, who was little pleased at the successes of his neighbour Venice. The Republic, in spite of the Papal request, resolved to continue her operations. Funds, however, were exhausted, and the Government consented to the sale of certain public offices to Venetian nobles for sums as large as 80,000 ducats—an ominous episode. The Pope, in view of the Venetian attitude, placed the Republic under an interdict. Diedo, the ambassador at Rome, refused to forward the bull; and it was affixed to the door of S. Peter's. The Patriarch of Venice received orders to communicate the bull to the Government. He feigned illness, and privately informed the Council of Ten; the Council at once imposed silence upon him, and commanded that all sacred offices should be administered as usual. At the same time


they covered this rebellious action against the Church by the technical plea of appeal to a future Council. We
1481. shall find that the Republic repeats the same tactics during her struggle with Paul V., at the time when Paolo Sarpi was her councillor. The appeal to a future Council was actually made out and affixed to the door of S. Celso in Rome.

The Ferrarese war, however, did not maintain the brilliant promise of its opening. Ferdinand, King of Naples, had from the beginning of the campaign declared himself as an ally of Ferrara, and his galleys were fighting with the Venetian fleet off the coast of Apuila. The Venetians succeeded in capturing Gallipoli and other seaports. But the war was exhausting a threadbare treasury; the Pope, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Marquis of Ferrara, formed a combination too powerful for Venice to combat single-handed. A contemporary, Malipiero, a brave officer, thus describes the condition of the Republic: "All dues have been raised one-third; the plate of private individuals forcibly bought below real value; the gold chains of the women carried to the treasury. The income from Venice and the mainland is falling; we have lost many ships and men, and to fill their place we have been obliged to enrol the naked and the maimed; the arsenal, that once made the whole world tremble, is empty now; we have famine and plague at our door; we have spent 1,200,000 ducats. We shall have to beg for peace, and restore what we have captured." And in these dire straits Venice took a step which others took before and after her, but which was none the less indicative of a broken power and a ruinous policy; she attempted to save herself by a short-sighted diplomacy. The French claims on Italian States were brought into play; she invited Charles VIII. to occupy the kingdom of Naples; and the Duke of Orleans to make good his pretensions to Milan, by
1484. attacking her nearest neighbour and most bitter foe, Lodovico Sforza. The policy of Venice and the inextricable confusion of the peninsula led up to the peace of Bagnolo (7th August, 1484), by which Venice retained Rovigo and the Polesine, but restored, as Malipiero had foreseen,


Gallipoli and the Neapolitan cities in Apulia—a perfectly inadequate return for such a vast expense.

In the middle of this long but steady decline of ¹⁴⁸⁴ Venetian power the Republic enjoyed one striking success, though the achievement was marred by harsh, if not treacherous, conduct, and the outcome was a renewal of the Turkish war. The island of Cyprus came under immediate Venetian influence in the year 1473, and was finally annexed in 1488.

When Jean Lusignan II. died in 1432 he left one daughter Carlotta, married to Lewis of Savoy, and one natural son Jacques. Jacques, handsome and popular, was a distinct danger to Carlotta and her husband. They drove him out of the island. With the help of the Soldan of Egypt, and secretly supported by Venice in opposition to the Genoese, who espoused the cause of Carlotta, Jacques seized the kingdom, and in his turn expelled his sister and her husband. The new king relied on the Venetians, and he sought in marriage the hand of Caterina Cornaro, daughter of Marco Cornaro, and niece of Andrea, who was resident in Cyprus. The family and the Republic accepted the proposals with pleasure. The Government solemnly adopted Caterina as daughter of Venice; in 1472 she was married by proxy to Jacques Lusignan, and left Venice for Cyprus. But Caterina enjoyed her new life of splendour for a very short time. The following year the king died, leaving his wife with child. When the news of Jacques' death reached Venice, the Republic despatched Pietro Mocenigo to act as guardian, they said, to the daughter of Venice and her coming infant; in reality to take care that Carlotta and her husband should not recover their lost throne. As a fact Caterina's days of peace were over. Conspiracies were rife about her. On 14th November, 1473, the Count of Tripoli, the Count of Zaffo, and Rizzo da Marin burst into the young Queen's chamber, slew her doctor and her servant, who clung to the folds of her dress for safety; and, after searching the palace through, captured and cut to pieces Andrea Cornaro, the Queen's uncle, and Marco Bembo, her cousin. The arrival of Pietro



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Mocenigo secured the Queen from the hands of the rebels.

1484. But this first revolution brought as its consequence the presence of two Venetian nobles who, under the title of councillors, really assumed the government of the island. In 1474 Caterina's posthumous child died, and the Republic redoubled its vigilance. Caterina's father arrived in Cyprus, and Antonio Loredan, the captain-general of the fleet, was ordered to seize and send to Venice the mother of the late king, her daughter, and all his bastards. The Republic was determined to

1485. sweep away every possible aspirant to the crown, leaving only her own widowed daughter, Caterina, to whom she claimed to be heir. Fresh movements on

1486. the part of Alfonso of Naples, who was endeavouring to secure the investiture of the island from the Soldan, and at the same time desired to marry Caterina, ended in a conspiracy conducted by Rizzo da Marin, one of the murderers of the Queen's uncle. Rizzo was seized, sent to Venice and strangled. Finally, in 1488, the Venetians resolved to annex the island. Giorgio Cornaro, the Queen's brother, was instructed to persuade her to renounce her kingdom in favour of her adoptive parent. Caterina resisted for long; she clung to her shadowy State; she loved her island kingdom. But she was made to understand that if she did not yield with a good grace, she would be forced into submission. The standard of the house of Lusignan, the cross of Jerusalem with the crosslets in the

1488. cantons, was hauled down, and the crimson standard with the golden lion of S. Mark took its place for nearly a century to come.

The Queen of Cyprus was received with every sign of respect. The Doge went to meet her at the Lido. She was conducted to the Piazzetta in the Bucintoro, and in S. Mark's Church she solemnly confirmed her renunciation of Cyprus. She retained her title of Queen, and received the pleasant hill city of Asolo, and all its richly wooded slopes and district in the plain, as a home, and also as a mimic kingdom. She signed herself Queen of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia, Lady of Asolo. There she lived,

dispensing justice, founding a pawnshop for the assistance of the poor; distributing corn, gratis, in years of distress; listening to the courtly conversation of Cardinal Bembo; amusing herself in the gardens of her summer-house on the plain. The troubles of the League of Cambray drove her into Venice, and there she died in 1510. Her body was carried across the Grand Canal on a bridge of boats from her palace at S. Cassiano to the church of SS. Apostoli, where she was buried in the habit of S. Francis. Her coffin was removed in 1660, and she lies now in S. Salvatore, in a tomb which was raised in the right transept of the church.

But in the long *via dolorosa* of Venetian decline, in the deepening tragedy of the Republic, an event had taken place quite beyond the region of Venetian control—an event which, not immediately, but steadily and surely, completed the ruin of Venetian grandeur. In 1486 Diaz discovered the Cape of Good Hope. A new commercial route was opened to the world. Instead of passing up the Red Sea and across the Isthmus of Suez, or up the Persian Gulf and through Asia Minor, breaking bulk at Ormuz or at Suez, and being shipped again for European destinations at Alexandria or Aleppo, all the wealth of the Indies could now be carried in unbroken cargoes, round the Cape of Good Hope, to be discharged in the harbours of Portugal, of Holland, of the Hanseatic towns, of England. The Mediterranean instantly ceased to be the sole highway of communication between the East and West; the great commercial thoroughfare was now thrown outside the Straits of Gibraltar, and Venice, in whose hands Mediterranean traffic had become almost a monopoly, suffered a blow such as all her struggles with Genoa, and all the victories of the Turks, had hitherto failed to inflict. Nor was the shrewdness of her abler merchants slow to appreciate the importance of this event. Priuli notes in his Diaries that “on receipt of the news (of Vasco da Gama’s voyage in 1497) the whole city was distressed and astounded, and the wisest heads take it to be the worst piece of information that we could ever have had. For it is well known that Venice reached

her height of reputation and riches through her commerce
1488. alone, which brought foreigners to the city in great
numbers; and now by this new route the spice
cargoes will be taken straight to Lisbon, where the Hunga-
rians, Germans, Flemish, and French will flock to buy
them; they will find the goods cheaper in Lisbon than
they can be in Venice, for before the freights can reach
Venice by the old route, they have to pay exorbitant
dues for transit through Syria and the lands of the Soldan
of Egypt." And in fact the Venetian market began to
feel the effect of the new Cape route, which was frequently
adopted by the Portuguese. The Venetians did not them-
selves attempt to take advantage of the discovery, for two
reasons; first, because they were not masters of the Straits
of Gibraltar, and Spain would have levied dues on the passage
of their ships; and secondly, because the merchants of the
north found Portugal more handy to their shipping than
Venice, and by going to Portugal they avoided the difficult
and dangerous transit of the Alps, with its lavine-swept
roads and robber-haunted valleys.

The discovery of the Cape route was an irremediable blow
to Venetian commerce; she was quite unable to help herself;
but she did not abandon all hope at once. In 1501 the
Senate sent Pietro Pasqualigo to Lisbon, to examine the state
of affairs, and he reports thus: "I had an audience of the
King, and congratulated him on the safe arrival of his ships.
That evening there was a fête in the palace, and the day
following, processions all through the town. I had another
audience of his Majesty, and he bade me write to your
Serenity that you should send your galleys here to lade with
spices, and that he would make them very welcome." The
Government of Venice was in great doubt whether to accept
the Portuguese invitation or not; but the dread of rendering
the Soldan of Egypt hostile to the Republic by abruptly
breaking commercial relations which were profitable to him,
and thereby adding another enemy in the Levant to the
Turk, who was already too powerful for them, as well as the
danger of exposing all the Venetian warehouses in Cairo and
Alexandria to a sack, deterred the Government from any

decisive step. They attempted to open fresh negotiations with Portugal in 1505, but found their moves were all countermined by Florentine merchants, who ¹⁵⁰⁵⁻ already had the ear of the King, and could plead the advantages of dealing with free-traders like themselves, rather than with such rigid protectionists as the Venetians. They were obliged to sit still and to watch their once flourishing India trade die slowly away year by year, while the continual drain of Turkish and of mainland wars dragged the Republic surely downward to the gulf of bankruptcy and ruin.

We are now approaching the last act in the marring of Venice—the series of events which led up to the overwhelming league whereby the Republic was robbed of all her land possessions, reduced to the utmost straits, and only escaped political extinction owing to the mutual jealousy of her foes. The period is one of extreme confusion. The vortex which had been produced by the action of the *condottieri*, who disturbed the equilibrium of States in artificial balance, appeared now in the cabinet. The same passion, the passion for aggrandisement, for territorial extension, still governs popes, kings, princes, alike. Rome, Naples, Milan, are all endeavouring to enlarge their borders, or to prevent their neighbours from doing so. But no one of these States was really powerful; they therefore constantly endeavoured to attain their object by means of political combinations. League after league is made and broken again by the desertion of one of its members. If Venice and the Pope combine against Ferrara, Naples and Sforza support the Marquis, and soon succeed in checking Venice by persuading the Pope that Venetian success will upset the balance of power in the peninsula; that fear is enough to make the Pope withdraw from his alliance, and to place his former allies under an interdict. If the Pope attacks Florence, Venice and Milan stand by her; if Florence endeavours to absorb Pisa, she is opposed by Venice and by Sforza. The kaleidoscope of Italian politics moves with dazzling and meaningless rapidity.

But there is one ominous new element in the midst of

these political fluctuations to which Italian statesmen had been accustomed now for upwards of 200 years; 1486. that is, the appeal to foreign sovereigns. We have already seen how the death of the last Visconti opened the door to a claim upon the Duchy of Milan on the part of the house of Orleans. The Crown of France also claimed Genoa in right of voluntary dedition, and the kingdom of Naples in the name of Anjou. The princes of Italy, in their insane struggles with one another, had learned the art of combination; the presence of the French claim on Milan suggested to Venice, when hard pressed by the Pope and Sforza at the close of the Ferrarese war in 1484, that a splendid diversion might be created by offering to help Orleans, if he would attempt to make good his claim against Sforza's duchy; again, later on, Lodovico Sforza invited Charles VIII. to assume the Neapolitan kingdom. It was a fatal policy, but the natural outcome of weakness. The Italian princes began to offer their services freely to France if she would assist them against their Italian enemy of the moment. The King of Spain, who already had his foot in Italy through the Aragonese dynasty of Naples, was watching with jealousy the aggrandisement of the French, and therefore offered a still further subject for combination in the convolutions of Italian politics. The Emperor, who claimed to be lord paramount to both France and Spain, and to whom they must revert for such shadowy titles as he was able to bestow, desired to preserve what he called his rights, and so offered a third factor to be introduced into the medley. No Italian prince alone was strong enough to resist any one of these greater sovereigns, and their blind jealousy of each other prevented any effectual combinations among themselves. Charles VIII. was allowed to march to Naples and back again, as Borgia said, "with wooden spurs and piece of chalk," and when the Italians might have caught and crushed him at Fornovo, they contented themselves with his baggage-train, and the King escaped. The outcome of the tornado which Milan and Venice brought down upon themselves by their appeals to France, was that Milan virtually disappears as a political unit; and Venice only

escapes a similar fate, partly owing to the mutual jealousy of her opponents, partly thanks to the strength of her geographical position, partly through her own adroitness, partly by the affection she inspired in her subject lands. 1486.

Venice received the first warnings of the unpopularity which her apparent successes in the Lombard plain had created in the minds of Italy, and of Europe, from Galeazzo Sforza, the son of Francesco, who had succeeded to the dukedom of Milan in 1466. Sforza believed that Colleoni, that troublesome member of the *condottieri* group, was meditating an attack on Milan, supported by Venice. He sent for Gonnella, the Venetian representative at his court, and spoke to him very frankly. "Certes, you Venetians are wrong to disturb the peace of Italy, and not to rest content with the fine State which is now yours. If you only knew how every one hates you, your hair would stand on end and you would let other people alone. Do you believe that these Italian princes are really friends? Oh no; it is only their dread of you that binds them together. Every one of them will do his best to clip your wings. Do you think you have done wisely to arm all Italy like this? You would be amazed if you knew the offers that are made to me to induce me to declare war on you. No, no; let every one live in peace. When my father died it seemed to me that he had left me a fine estate, and so I went a-hunting and amused myself, and thought of nothing else; but now, with this Bartolomeo of yours, you have forced me to arms, and into an alliance with my mortal enemy, King Ferdinand of Naples. You imagine that you are acting wisely; you will see. You are acquiring a very bad name. Every one says you want to eat up all Italy. You have spent much, and your treasury is empty. I know the way you raise your loans, with what difficulty. I know that you have borrowed money from your banks and your private citizens, and have not repaid it yet. A single despot has a great advantage over a commonwealth, for he can keep his eye on everything, and has only to consult himself, while you have to trust to others. A monarch is worth more, and does more, with 50,000 ducats than a commonwealth

with 100,000. You are alone, and all the world is
1486. against you, not merely in Italy but also beyond
the Alps. Rest assured your enemies are not
asleep. Take good counsel, for, by God, you need it. I
know what I am saying."

After this Venice could not plead that she had not been warned. But perhaps she may have wondered what it all meant, unless she surmised the real cause—jealousy of her land possessions, dread of her prospective supremacy in Italy, and the intention to despoil her. And just ten years later Sforza did propose to the King of France a partition of the Venetian dominions in Lombardy, at a moment when the Turks were burning the homesteads of Friuli, and their fires could be seen from the campanile of S. Mark.

But though the idea of calling in the French was rife among Italian princes, it did not take definite and outward shape till the policy of Lodovico Sforza, Lodovico il Moro, brought Charles VIII. into the peninsula, in order to maintain himself in the possession of the Milanese duchy which he had usurped from his nephew, Gian Galeazzo. Gian Galeazzo was married to a daughter of Alfonso, son and heir of the King of Naples; Lodovico expected that Alfonso would use the power of Naples to enforce his daughter's rights, and he therefore begged Charles to make good his claim to Naples by expelling Ferdinand, Alfonso's father. The news of Charles's advent threw all Italy into a commotion. Each State asked itself which side it intended to take in the coming invasion. Naples was unable to combine a league against France; Milan was pledged to the French. Venice endeavoured to steer a middle course, without committing herself to one party or the other. Her replies to Beatrice Sforza, who came to sound her on Lodovico's behalf, and again to Charles's ambassador, Du Peron, were always ambiguous. She declared she was friends with every one, wished for peace, and could help no one, as she was exhausted by her long Turkish wars. Charles apparently believed that the Republic was only waiting to hear his price for her assistance. He sent another embassy to offer her various coast cities in the Neapolitan territory if

she would undertake to provision his army. The Republic again replied that all her ships were occupied in keeping a watch on the Turks. 1486.

At last, on 9th September, 1494, Charles and his army entered Asti. Philip de Commines, sent as ambassador to make still further offers to Venice, met with the same courteous reception and the same vague replies. 1494.

Charles marched south on his way to Naples. His success was phenomenal. He encountered no opposition worth mentioning, and in February, 1495, he was master of the whole of the Neapolitan kingdom.

The Italians saw now what they had done, and endeavoured to undo it. Lodovico had thought he could use Charles as a pawn to be moved about the chess-board of Italy. After the march on Naples he began to tremble for the safety of his own duchy, for French claims to Milan no less than to Naples were ever present. The Emperor and the King of Spain were jealous of Charles's success. Lodovico therefore was soon able to construct a league against Charles. The members were the Emperor, Spain, Milan; only Venice hung back, delayed, hesitated, so that Lodovico one day burst out, "Each one of those magnificent senators is doubtless wiser than I, but taken all together there is no comparison." At last the Republic sent in her adhesion. Commines, who was still in Venice, asked what the intentions of the Republic might be in case his master retired from Naples, and Venice declared that no one thought of closing the road against the King; every one would be only too glad to assist him on his way home.

Meantime the members of the confederation were preparing to contest Charles's return. But, of the league, the two greatest names were of least use. The Emperor Maximilian had no money—indeed he wished to borrow from Venice, a member of the league, the money he promised to contribute to the league; while the King of Spain was far away, and his contributions could hardly arrive in time. The burden of the campaign fell on Venice and Sforza. Charles, leaving half his army in Naples, set out for France.

He marched undisturbed through Rome and Tuscany, and on 5th July he debouched upon the Lombard plain, by the valley of the Taro, not far from Parma. On the 6th, in the morning, Commines came to the Venetian camp, commanded by Gonzaga, and begged the *Proveditori* to grant terms for the free passage of the King. This was refused. Commines returned to the French camp, which was then put in motion. The baggage, sent on in front, proved too great a temptation to the mercenary troops under Gonzaga; they fell upon the booty, while the French chivalry succeeded in cutting a way for the King, mounted on his black charger "Savoy," through the ranks of the enemy. There was a great slaughter, and the Venetians called Fornovo a victory; in commemoration thereof Mantegna painted that splendid picture of the Madonna now in the Louvre; but the escape of the King robbed it of all its importance, and Charles found shelter in Asti, whence he was able to assist Novara, besieged now by his late ally, Lodovico, and the Venetians.

Charles withdrew to France; both Venice and Lodovico, in alarm at the possible results of their hostility, appealed to the Emperor to "save Italy," as they called it. The menace of a second French descent upon Lombardy was always before their eyes, and they believed that it would be vengeful. The Emperor came into Italy, but his presence was not more welcome than that of Charles. He was impoverished, and desired money; and he began to raise disagreeable questions as to the title upon which his Venetian allies held their landed possessions. While matters were in this complicated condition, news reached Venice by means of a courier, who had killed thirteen horses through over-riding, and taken seven days to cover the ground between Amboise on the Loire and Mestre on the Lagoon, that Charles VIII. was dead.

The accession of Louis of Orleans to the throne of France as Louis XII. altered the whole aspect of Italian affairs; for he united in his own person the Orleans claim to Milan, and the claim of the French crown to Genoa and Naples. Louis was entirely governed by his minister,

George d'Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen, whose ambition was the tiara, and whose interests lay accordingly in Italy. Moreover, Cesare Borgia, the Pope's son, was at the French Court, and promised to secure d'Amboise's elevation to the papal throne if he would persuade his master to assist the Borgias in recovering the territories claimed by the Church. Lodovico Sforza augured ill for his own safety from the new King of France. He endeavoured to fortify himself by a closer alliance with Venice. But he had been forestalled. This time Venice did not hesitate to embrace the French cause, having learned, as she believed, by the experience of Charles's expedition that it was the winning side. The price of her desertion of Sforza, her treason of Italy, her alliance with the invader, was to be all the Milanese territory round Cremona, between the Adda, the Oglio, and the Po. Her desire to cross the Adda to secure some portion of the Milanese seemed on the point of being realised. But now Lodovico Sforza, stabbed as he was by Venetian treachery, made his counter-thrust. He roused the Turks to attack Venice once more. He brought about the second Turkish war, brief but disastrous to the Republic, and thereby he concentrated for one moment against Venice those two destructive agencies which she herself had been largely responsible for creating—the Turks by her policy in 1204, when she sacked Constantinople; the ultramontane sovereigns by her policy of mainland extension, and her submission to the tortuous methods of Italian diplomacy. Italian mainland politics combined with the current of affairs in the Levant to the destruction of Venice. 1499.

The report of a Venetian ambassador despatched to Constantinople, left no doubt that war was inevitable. Antonio Grimani was elected Captain-General, and besides giving his services he offered a loan of 16,000 ducats to the State; other private contributions flowed into the exchequer, and a fleet was manned. But when Grimani asked for instructions as to his conduct in case he met the enemy, with whom war was not yet declared, the Government made no answer—an ominous sign of weakness which

desired to shelter itself behind the commander and to plead his unauthorised actions in case of his failure.

1499. With such support from the Central Government it was hardly possible that victory should attend the Venetian flag. Nor did it. Grimani met the Turkish fleet at Sapienza, a place already disastrous in Venetian naval history. Without positive instructions from home Grimani wished to secure himself by inviting the *Proveditori* of the fleet to sign the order to attack. They did so. The fleets engaged first on the 12th August, with unfavourable results for the Venetians; then again on the 20th, but Grimani's vacillation robbed his crews of their *elan*; and finally on the 25th, when the Venetian fleet lost its order of battle, fell into confusion, and was utterly routed. Malipiero exclaimed, "We had the Turks in our hands, as sure as God is God, but for lack of courage, lack of discipline, lack of skill on our Captain's part." When the news reached Venice the popular indignation was intense; the people cried in the streets, "Antonio Grimani, ruina de Cristiani," and orders were sent to arrest the captain and to convey him in irons to the capital. His sons endeavoured to defend him; and one of them, Vincenzo, certainly saved his father from the worst consequences of his defeat, by compelling him to obey the orders of the Ten, that Grimani should arrive at Venice in irons, though he was obliged with his own hands to place the manacles on his father's legs. Grimani was condemned to confinement in the island of Cherso in Dalmatia, whence we shall see him escape, to follow a career which eventually led him to the ducal throne.

Venice was left powerless before the Turk by the defeat of Sapienza. Nothing remained but to negotiate for a peace. Her agent was treated with contempt by the Pashas. They denied that Sforza had been the prime instigator of the war with such vehemence as to leave no doubt that he was the real cause; other reasons assigned being the acquisition of Cyprus, which the Turk considered a hostile act committed in time of peace. When taking leave of the Divan the Grand Vizier said to the ambassador, "You can tell the Doge that he has done wedding the sea. It is our turn now"—a

message as true as it was brutal in its frankness. Negotiations were broken off, and matters remained in an undetermined state till 1503, when the second Turkish ¹⁴⁹⁹ war was concluded by a treaty of peace.

Meantime in Lombardy the policy of Louis and d'Amboise was being carried into effect. The French, under Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, entered Italy, laid siege to Milan, and, assisted by a rising of the people, acquired the city in 1499. Lodovico fled to Maximilian at Innsbruck. The Venetians entered Cremona on 10th September, and their ally, Louis, took possession of Milan on 6th October; and thus at last the Republic had crossed the Adda, and fulfilled a desire which she had nursed from the days when Carmagnola's victory of Macalo first gave her the hope of being one day mistress of the Milanese.

But it was madness of the Republic to believe that events would stand still at the point which suited her convenience. She was in the middle of complications which involved many other agents besides herself and France. Louis was not the ally of Venice only; he was pledged to assist Cesare Borgia in recovering the States of the Church, and some of these Venice now owned. Louis's success in Milan, which was confirmed in 1500 by the capture of Lodovico Sforza after a fruitless attempt to recover his duchy, led the King to consider an attack on Naples. He sounded Venice on the question; the Republic could not but be compliant to her only ally. Louis's attitude, however, roused the jealousy of Spain, who also advanced claims on Naples, and the Venetian attitude angered the Emperor, who began to inquire by what title Venice held her Lombard possessions. The Republic had every reason to suspect that the Emperor and the Cardinal d'Amboise, on the part of ¹⁵⁰¹ France, were arranging a partition of her mainland State in their frequent and secret conclaves at Botzen. The storm was fast gathering round her. She had no real ally. The two foreign monarchs were only pursuing a policy of aggrandisement. Louis had absorbed Milan; there was merely a doubt whether he or the Emperor would absorb the Venetian portion of Lombardy. In Italy Venice had no friends; no

Italian prince ever was true friend to his neighbour. Lodovico Sforza had disappeared; Cesare Borgia was
 1501. busy endeavouring to build himself a kingdom, and some of the territory he designed to annex was held by the Republic. It was only a question of the moment that Louis and Maximilian would choose for a united attack on Venice, in which, of course, the Church would join.

Matters were brought to a crisis by the death of Alexander VI. in 1503. Cesare Borgia lost the
 1503. support of the Papacy, and his schemes for forming an Italian kingdom vanished before the warlike attitude of Julius II., who declared his intention of recovering and keeping for the Church what to the Church belonged. Face to face with this critical situation, the policy of Venice seems to have been actuated by folly or despair; *quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat*, might truly be said of her. She had roused suspicion by her attack on Ferrara, jealousy by her acquisition of Cremona, and now in the collapse of Borgia's dominions she put out her hand to take Faenza, Cesena, and Rimini. Julius at once declared that these were the property of the Church, and he announced that he would recover them by foreign, or by any other arms. He appealed to Louis and to Maximilian, both of them ready, as

we have seen, to despoil the Republic, and the result
 1504. was an understanding at Blois, which was ratified and consolidated at Cambray in 1508. All Europe, France, the Emperor, the King of Spain, the Pope, the King of Hungary, the Dukes of Savoy and Ferrara, was combined
 1508. against what the preamble to the treaty styled *l'insaziabile cupidigia dei Veneziani e la loro sete di dominio*.

This, then, is what Venice had achieved by her policy of land empire, initiated in the first war of Ferrara and carried out with apparent success under Francesco Foscari. The two errors of her political life—the sack of Constantinople in 1204, and the extension on the mainland in 1404—were both bearing their fruit now, the one in the destruction of the Venetian Levantine empire at the hands of the Turk, the

other by the destruction of her Italian land empire at the hands of a jealous Italy and a greedy Europe. She learned her lesson from the League of Cambray and the long Turkish wars, and after the Council of Trent she abandoned her rôle as a great power, and contented herself with merely existing. 1508.

Yet there can be little doubt that until the lesson of Cambray opened their eyes the majority of Venetians were unaware of the true state of the case. They were living in a fool's paradise. In 1479, at the close of sixteen years of ruinous war with the Turks, a fire destroyed the ducal palace; and there was not wanting a strong party which proposed to build a new and more magnificent palace, which should occupy all the space of the present building and the whole block on the other side of the narrow canal, as far as the *Calle delle Rasse*. The cost of this scheme may be measured by the fact that the restorations which were adopted as a compromise, entailed an outlay of 80,000 ducats before they were half-way through. Venice seems to have believed in her own inexhaustible wealth; and in a certain sense she was justified, but, as we shall have occasion to note later on, it was a wealth of individuals, not of the State exchequer, which was constantly empty. The Republic appeared to herself and to foreigners much more powerful than she really was. Distant monarchs like Ivan of Russia sent to court her as a great factor in the European comity; but Fornovo disproved that claim; and when she comes into collision with such powers as France, and even the Emperor, her inherent weakness is at once revealed.

There is a mixture of blindness and of courage in her attitude. Her men of action are splendid in their belief that the Republic is inexhaustible; but they are puzzled, confused, disheartened by an inaction at headquarters which they cannot understand to be an inaction of vital paralysis. Only now and then an acute and dispassionate observer like Priuli notes in his *Diary* for 1500, "There can be no doubt that if we lose our marine we lose our name and our glory; and in a very few years they will have disappeared

entirely"; or an able soldier, like Malipiero, sees that the
1508. only issue of such wars as those of Ferrara and
Cremona must be that "we shall have to beg for
peace and to restore all we have acquired."

CHAPTER XVIII

The partition of Venetian territory proposed at Cambray—Information in Venice—The Council of Ten in charge—Doge's speech—Julius places Venice under interdict—Attitude of Venice—The French marching on Venetia—Battle of Agnadello—Loss of the mainland: its full meaning—Offers to restore the States of the Church; and to hold mainland as a fief of the Empire—Venice prepares for a blockade—The Emperor's delay saves Venice—Padua recovered—Julius deserts the League—Venice makes submission to the Church; and a secret protest against that submission—Foreign troops in Vicenza—The impregnability of the lagoons saves Venice—The Holy League against France—Cardona and Gaston de Foix—Gaston supports Bologna—Bergamo and Brescia return to Venice—Gaston besieges and captures Brescia—Bergamo yields—Gaston's march on Ravenna—Cardona retires—Battle of Ravenna—Death of Gaston—The French lose ground in Italy—Julius claims Parma—Venice in danger of reaping no benefit from the Holy League—She draws towards France—Treaty of Blois—Venetian army marches to join the French in the Milanese—French defeated at Novara—Venice exposed to attack from Cardona—Cardona at Mestre—Shots fired at Venice—The lagoons again save Venice—Frangipani in Friuli: repulsed by Savorgnan at Osopo—Francis I. in Italy—Battle of Marignano—Milan occupied by the French—The peace of Brussels—Venice buys off Maximilian's claims—End of the complications of Cambray—Venice returns to the possession of her mainland provinces—Her altered position—Charles V.—His attitude towards Venice after Pavia—Demands money—Venice abandoned by France at the peace of Cambray—The position of Venice in Italy—Her physical weakness develops her diplomacy—Internal condition of Venice—Apparent wealth—Real poverty of the State—Sanudo's remarks—Doge's speech—Weakness of Venetian finance—Schemes for replenishing the treasury—Private luxury—Sumptuary laws—The Government appeals to private wealth—Whence did private wealth come?—Landed estates and banking—Venice a pleasant residence—Inefficient police—Asylum in embassies—The plot of Abondio and Cavazzo—The French embassy—The causes of Venetian longevity after the wars of the League of Cambray—Three points of vitality: the Turks, the Church, the Ten.

IN the partition of Venetian territory devised by the League of Cambray, Ravenna, Faenza, and Rimini, together with the districts of Imola and Cesena, were to go to the Pope;

Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Roveredo, Friuli, and Istria to the Emperor; Brescia, Bergamo, Crema, Cremona, and the
1508. Ghiaradadda to France; Brindisi, Otranto, Gallipoli, Trani, to Naples and Spain; the King of Hungary, if he joined the League, was to receive Dalmatia, and the Duke of Savoy the island of Cyprus—a complete dismemberment which would have reduced the possessions of the Republic to the lagoon islands from which she had originally emerged. Yet on 14th December, ten days after the conclusion of the treaty, the King of France assured the Venetian ambassador that there were no clauses in the treaty which were not for the good of Venice. At Venice, however, the suspicions of the Government had been thoroughly roused; and by 29th December the Council of Ten was already in charge of the matter, owing, as they said, “to the rumours of evil practices and intentions towards us and our State.” The wide extent of the combination against the Republic was not grasped at once; her suspicions were directed to the Emperor and the King of France. She did not surmise that the Pope, too, and other Italian princes were parties to the League; she used every effort to induce them to join her in an alliance for the defence of Italy, but, of course, without success; and she despatched ambassadors to the Courts of England and of the Emperor to endeavour to detach them from the League.

The failure of all these efforts to avert the storm compelled the Doge to announce the danger in the Great Council; he concluded his speech by exhorting every Venetian to active measures for the defence of the State, and he himself set the example by sending his plate to the Mint.

The attack began from Rome. In April the bull of excommunication and interdict was issued. The Council of Ten, to whom had been entrusted the management of all foreign affairs at this crisis, forbade the publication of the bull in Venice, and appointed special guards to prevent it from being attached to the walls of the city; at the same time they prepared an appeal to a future Council, which they succeeded in surreptitiously affixing to the door of S. Peter's in Rome.

The Pope had opened the attack. It was followed up by the King of France. The Venetian commanders were Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, and ^{1508.} Alviano. Pitigliano, cautious and experienced, wished to remain on the east side of the Adda; Alviano, young and impetuous, desired to cross the Adda and to seize Lodi before the French could develop their plan of campaign.

Time was lost in discussion and in referring the question to Venice, where the Senate debated the matter, and finally ordered the *Proveditori in Campo* to decide. The decision was made, however, by the enemy, the French, who crossed the Adda in opposition to the advice of their general Trivulzio. Had the Venetians remained on the defensive, as Pitigliano recommended, they would probably have forced the French to recross the Adda in face of their strong artillery; but Alviano ordered an advance. He was not supported by Pitigliano, and, after fighting with great bravery, he was wounded in the face, and only saved by the devotion of one of his men, who had never left his side the whole day. The rout of the Venetians was complete; round the Venetian guns lay a pile of corpses, estimated at four thousand. Alviano declared that he would have won the battle had he been in sole command; but as it was, his impetuosity ended in his own captivity, and the annihilation of his army corps, leaving that commanded by Pitigliano too weak to render any valid resistance to the victorious French.

The battle of Agnadello was fought on 14th May. The news reached Venice the following day. The terrible consequences of the disaster were appreciated at once. There was no army between the French and the lagoons; and if the Imperial troops appeared on the scene, the whole programme of the League of Cambray could be immediately carried out, and the Republic, despoiled of her land dominions, would be reduced to the bare possession of her native waters.

The loss of the mainland provinces meant much more to Venice now than it would have done a hundred years earlier; for she was no longer a purely commercial State: the fall of Constantinople had virtually ruined her Levantine trade; she

did not now live by the sea alone: much of her wealth was
invested in the mainland; most of her supplies were
1508. drawn from that source. In short, the loss of the *terra
ferma* meant the rapid starvation and death of the Republic,
and there was no apparent means of averting that loss after
the battle of Agnadello. The effect of the blow was seen
in the agonised and paralysing alarm displayed in the
Senate at Venice. The Government elected two new
Provveditori, but the nominees refused the appointment. The
Ten showed more firmness and courage. They endeavoured
to raise men and money, though without much success;
they wrote to the Governor of Brescia and to the *Provveditore*
Gritti, that the executive had not lost heart, and would
do everything to support the mainland cities and the army;
they sent at the same time most humble representations to
Rome and to the Emperor, offering in the one case to restore
the papal territory, in the other to hold their mainland
possessions as fiefs of the Empire, at a large annual fine.
But the fate of all these mainland possessions was already
decided by the battle of Agnadello. On 1st June, writes
Sanudo in his Diaries, not a town in Lombardy remained
to Venice, except Pizzighettone, Crema, and Asola in the
Mantovano; "all the rest is lost; yielded to the French
without drawing sword."

At Venice the Government prepared for a blockade.
They collected as much grain as was possible, established
floating mills in the stronger tideways, and expelled all
suspect persons from the city.

Thus at a single blow the French had carried out the
larger part of the provisions of Cambray. They had acquired
all the territory which was due to them by the treaty of
partition, and they were masters of the part which belonged
to the Emperor. Louis, with a magnanimity which de-
lighted the romantic temper of Maximilian, refused the
keys of Verona, Vicenza, and Padua, bidding the citizens
take them to their rightful lord, the Emperor. The French
had completed their task in the annihilation of Venice; but
Maximilian was tardy in confronting his. His temper
was procrastinating, his pocket impeccunious. His delays

caused a turn in the tide of Venetian disasters. Padua was recovered on 17th July; and when the Emperor did at last appear before its walls, the city was so well defended that he was compelled to retire. 1508.

But the conduct of another member of the League of Cambray was about to save the Republic from the worst consequences of the defeat of Agnadello. The Pope, now that he had recovered Ravenna, Faenza, Rimini, and the States which he claimed for the Church, remembered that he too was an Italian prince. He had no longer any need for the presence of the French or the Imperial troops, and he was by no means anxious to see Venice entirely blotted out from the map of Italy, leaving in its stead two such powerful neighbours as Louis and the Emperor. The Pope showed every disposition to desert the League and to come to terms with Venice. The Republic was unable to raise serious difficulties as to the terms, and in February, 1510, a compact was concluded. Venice abandoned her appeal to a future Council, acknowledged the justice of her excommunication, renounced her claim to tax the clergy and her ancient privilege of nomination to benefices; she consented that clerics should be tried by ecclesiastical and not by civil courts; in short, the Republic openly withdrew from all the main points of her very independent position towards the Curia, and the extent of this renunciation may be taken as a measure of her distress. But she had not fought the Roman Curia for so long without learning the use and the value of some of its weapons; and on the day on which the Republic authorised its representatives to make these concessions, it drew up in the Council of Ten a protest declaring the concessions void as being wrung from it by force. Such a reservation was consonant with the disingenuous policy of the times. Francis I. held himself absolved from his oath to Charles V. by a similar quibble, and Cardinal Cesarini by a like sophistry induced the Hungarians to break their word to the Turks. The Republic, when her position became a little stronger, did not hesitate to display in public the proof of a duplicity which made all political faith impossible.

The alliance between Venice and the Pope exposed the territory of the Republic to brutal outrages at the hands of the enemy. The Prince of Anhalt marched upon Vicenza, which had resumed its allegiance to S. Mark. The troops of the Republic, under Baglione, were insufficient to defend the city, and retired. The people of Vicenza also fled before the invaders; but about six thousand, who had thought to conceal themselves in a disused quarry near the town, were tracked to their hiding-place, and all of them suffocated by the orders of a French captain of adventure named d'Herisson.

Nevertheless, though Venetian territory still suffered at the hands of the allies, the defection of the Pope, the slackness of the Emperor, and the growing jealousy of French successes, had really destroyed the power of the League and rendered it almost harmless. Venice owed her salvation to the impregnability of her natural position. Had she been a mainland city, like Padua, she must almost certainly have fallen before the French immediately after Agnadello; but seated in her lagoons she was herself unassailable. With the capital untouched there was always a fair prospect that the rapid course of Italian politics and arms would lead her back sooner or later to the possession of her mainland cities.

And this result actually happened. The triumph of France threw Spain, the Pope, and Venice together in a league, which the Pope called "Holy." England and Maximilian were, for the present, sleeping partners in the confederation. The army of the League was commanded by Raymond de Cardona; their enemies, the French, were under Gaston de Foix. The Pope's chief object was to recover Bologna, which had been lost in May, 1511, by the panic-stricken flight of the Pope first, then of his legate Alidosio, then of his general the Duke of Urbino. The army of the League marched on Bologna, and began the siege in January, 1512. But Gaston de Foix, by one of those brilliant marches which gained him the title of "The Thunderbolt of Italy," threw himself into the town in February, and Cardona raised the siege.

The moment Gaston left Lombardy to move to the help

of Bologna, Brescia and Bergamo seized the opportunity to throw off the French yoke and to return to their Venetian allegiance. But Venice was unable to give ^{1512.} them sufficient support. "The Thunderbolt" left Bologna, and sped across the plain to Brescia; on his way he annihilated a Venetian division under Baglione, in an engagement fought at four o'clock in the morning by starlight. He laid siege to Brescia, and mounted to the assault with bare feet, to give him hold upon the slippery ground. The city fell, and was subjected to the most horrible treatment, which only served to impress upon its inhabitants the great difference between Venetian and any other rule. Bergamo submitted in order to avoid a similar fate. But the sleeping partners in the Holy League now began to declare their alliance. In face of the threatening attitude of England and the Emperor, Louis ordered Gaston de Foix to deliver a decisive battle which would place the Pope at the King's mercy. De Foix marched upon Ravenna, Cardona falling back before him; but under the walls of the city Gaston allowed himself to be caught between the army of the League and the fortifications. He was forced to attack Cardona's position. The French were victorious, but at a fearful loss; and the French commander himself died on the field. This blow was fatal to the cause of France in North Italy. The battle of Ravenna was fought on 11th April; by the month of June, Louis held hardly any portion of the territory which he had acquired at the opening of the war in 1509.

The success of the Holy League, however, soon brought about the inevitable result of jealousy among its components. The Pope claimed Parma and Piacenza; the Emperor showed no signs of restoring Verona and Vicenza to Venice. The Republic, the weakest member of the League, was in danger of receiving no recompense for her expenditure. France no longer represented a danger; the Emperor and the Pope did. Venice alone was absolutely powerless. The inevitable result followed: the Republic drew towards the power which was weakest and absent, therefore for the moment least likely to despoil her. She listened to the overtures of France, and the

outcome was the treaty of Blois, signed in March, 1513.

^{1513.} The King of France was aware that the Emperor and Henry of England were preparing a joint attack upon him. He determined to recover the Milanese before the blow fell. The French army entered Lombardy, and the Venetians, under Alviano, marched to join it, recovering on their way all their territory up to the Adda, Cardona being too weak to offer any resistance. But on 6th June the French were surprised and completely routed at Novara. Their whole army retired across the Alps, and Venice found herself alone without a single ally in North Italy, with only Alviano's inadequate force between Cardona and the lagoons. Cardona advanced, recapturing all the towns that Alviano had occupied, and pushed his troops down to the very shores of the estuary. He burned Fusina and Mestre, and at Malghera he planted his cannon and fired a few defiant shots towards the town. But Venice herself was impregnable; again the lagoons saved the city that had risen upon their surface; they and they alone had rescued the capital from the Huns, from Pepin, from the Hungarians, from Saracens, from Genoese, from Trivulzio after Agnadello, and now from Cardona after Novara. As at the beginning of her history, so now at its close, the indissoluble connection of the place and the people, the debt of Venice to the lagoons, was demonstrated once more by the impotence which compelled Cardona to retire.

Cardona retreated by way of Castelfranco and Schio.

¹⁵¹⁴⁻ Alviano attempted to cut his line of march, but was utterly defeated, and the Venetian provinces during the next year, 1514, were the scene of continual operations which yielded little result. Count Frangipani overran, tortured, devastated in Friuli, and was repulsed by Savorgnan before the strong castle of Osopo. But all these movements only served to display the essential weakness of the Republic, and, as we shall presently see, to strain her resources of money and of courage to a point where they broke down.

On the 1st January, 1515, Louis XII. died. He was

succeeded by Francis I., who at once showed his intentions as regarded Italy, when he assumed the title of Duke of Milan. By the middle of July his army was ¹⁵¹⁵ ready, and the French accomplished the passage of the Alps over an unexplored route, and with a rapidity which took their enemies completely by surprise. The Venetians, who maintained their French alliance on account of the Emperor's attitude about the Veronese and the presence of Cardona in that province, were commanded by Alviano, and paralysed the Spanish army by holding Cardona in check under Verona. Francis, therefore, found himself opposed only by the Swiss, who, in great numbers, were in possession of Milan. They attacked the French at Marignano on the 13th and 14th of September. The issue was still doubtful when the arrival of a Venetian detachment, which had been pushed forward by Alviano to support the King, decided the victory in favour of Francis. Milan at once fell to the French, and by 4th October they were masters of the citadel. The victory of Marignano left Francis arbiter in Italy. The Pope, Leo X., came to terms with him at Bologna. Cardona was included in the treaty, and withdrew to Naples, Charles V., who succeeded to the throne of Spain in 1516, was not ready yet to measure arms with Francis; and in August, 1516, he entered into a treaty with ¹⁵¹⁶ the French King at Noyon. This was followed in December by the peace of Brussels, in which the Venetians were included.

The Emperor was now the only original member of the League of Cambray who was still at war with the Republic. He had always been the feeblest member of the confederation, and now, when left alone, without gold and without men, Venice, even after all her misfortunes, was certain to prove more than a match for him in Italy. The Republic offered the Emperor a sum of money, and in return he abandoned all the places to which he laid claim under the partition clauses of Cambray.

The peace of Brussels brought to a close the long and complicated series of events which sprang out of the League of Cambray. Venice, to all appearances, returned to her

former position ; her mainland territory came willingly once
1516. more under the banner of S. Mark. But in fact she
is quite a different Venice ; the trials through which
she had passed, and the altered conditions of Italy, placed
her in a position which she had not hitherto occupied—a
subordinate, dependent position from which she never after-
wards escaped.

In the struggle between Charles V. and Francis I., which
occupies the years between 1523 and 1525, the Republic
plays hardly any, certainly no decisive rôle. The battle of
Pavia made Charles master of Italy, and Venice was afraid
that he would make her pay the price of her French
sympathies. But it was no part of Charles's scheme to
occupy Venetian territory ; he merely asked the Republic to
supply him with 80,000 ducats. " I have heavy expenses,"
he said. " You are rich and have no expenses ; you ought
to help me"; and the Republic was obliged to find the
money.

By the peace of Cambray in 1529, Francis abandoned
Venice, who had been once more drawn into alliance with
him by the League of Cognac in 1526, which was intended as
a counterpoise to the growing power of Charles. The League
cost Venice 1,500,000 ducats, and she gained nothing from it.
She was left out of consideration entirely at the Peace of
Cambray. Charles's settlement of Italy in 1529, which was
based on the treaty of Barcelona, whereby the Republic
surrendered Ravenna and Cervia to the Pope, and all the
Apulian ports to the Emperor, left Venice with her mainland
frontier at the Adda, the point she reached in Foscarini's reign
and under Carmagnola's leadership ; and the Adda remained
her real frontier down to the fall of the Republic. Her days
of expansion were over.

We have followed the tedious complications of the war
between 1509 and 1516, because they offer the external
proof of what had really taken place in the nature and
position of Venice. These wars demonstrated that the city
itself, the capital, was impregnable ; had it not been so, Venice
would have disappeared from the political chess-board as
completely as Milan. But further, this impregnability of

the capital, combined with the mutual jealousy of the powers which were endeavouring to occupy the mainland territory, produced this result that, neither power¹⁵³⁰ being able to seize and hold the capital, they neutralised one another, and Venice herself was always there, ready to step back and retake possession of her former dominions; and this solution offered a compromise which both the rival powers were able to accept without diminishing their dignity, or strengthening their enemy's position. And so Venice remained a political factor in Italy. An alliance with her always counted for something in the political scale, therefore she was courted by Spain and by France. Her diplomacy, upon which she prided herself, was kept alive, and her vanity flattered. But she was incapable of an independent or an initiatory policy, and from this time forward we shall never find that she attempts such a policy.

At the same time, the Republic had saved her existence. She was not the appanage of any crown; she was still autarchic. But she had seen her existence placed in the greatest peril, and she never afterwards felt safe between the great European powers who were struggling for a preponderance in Italy. Spain was a constant source of alarm to her, and this alarm gave to her policy a French tone. Venetians, in fact, after the League of Cambray, believed that their whole energies were required for their self-preservation. Diplomacy was the only weapon by which they thought that they could attain their object. And hence it is that we find the growing influence of the Council of Ten; the institution of the Three Inquisitors of State; the suspicion of ambassadors at foreign courts; the secrecy, the mystery, the sudden punishment of those who revealed State secrets—all the symptoms of a nervousness which was the result of a conscious weakness, and is the note of later Venetian diplomacy. This attitude in the governing body accounts for the extraordinary importance which attached to Venetian diplomacy, and explains the reputation which it acquired in the eyes of Europe. It also enables us to understand the tremulous excitement which stirred the whole city to its

centre, and threw it into a panic upon alarms which had so little foundation as the rumoured Spanish conspiracy, 1530. or the alleged treason of Foscarini. Venice after Cambray was always in terror lest she should lose her freedom. She thought that diplomacy, vigilance, secrecy, silence, mystery, could save the State. Her real salvation lay in her impregnable natural position, and the jealousy aroused by any movement to absorb her mainland territory.

So far we have followed the outward course of events produced by the League of Cambray, and have endeavoured to show the result they bore upon the external position of Venice as a member of the European comity. We must turn now to consider what was taking place inside Venice during these momentous years.

We shall have to note an apparent contradiction, the extreme poverty of the State and the contemporaneous development of luxury. The first ten months of the war, from January, 1509, to October of the same year, cost the nation no less than 1,700,000 ducats. The speech in which the Doge Loredan announced the attack as inevitable, closed with an appeal to private citizens, and an offer of the Doge's own private plate. When Cardona, after the battle of Novara, was threatening Venice itself, the position was declared by Sanudo to be almost desperate. "Venice is obliged to beg for the possession of those lands which, now that she has lost her pre-eminence at sea, are her only resource; for the vast expenditure, the loans, the taxes, the plate in the mint, the sale of public offices, the suspension of salaries, are inadequate." The Doge once more addressed the Council, and laid before it the ruinous condition of the community. "The Spaniards and Germans have burned Malghera and Fusina; they are burning Mestre; if they could they would make short work of us, for we are no more than 2500 flies, and what could we do against them? But I have to announce that to-day our army has moved from Padua. It is full of spirit, and nothing is wanting but money. The treasury is unequal to these great expenses. Accordingly, in the first place, we order all debtors to the treasury to pay their arrears at once; and in the second place we impose an income-tax

of a fourth; and if it had not been for help from private individuals like Zaccaria Gabriel, both the banks and the treasury would have been in a very bad way. We must go back to the example of the good old times, when a Contarini offered 60,000 ducats to the treasury, and a Corner brought fifteen bars of pure silver to the mint. That was the way in which, though only simple fishermen, we raised our State to such a pitch of grandeur that it pleases God now to chastise us. Further, we invite volunteers for service in Padua and Treviso; those who are ready to serve are requested to enrol themselves. We must all help the commonwealth. There are some who are in debt to the State, and yet dower their daughters and spend money at home, which is an unspeakable shame. I therefore urge every one to make his offering of money, jewels, robes, furniture; and the names shall be published as a proof of their patriotism." But the Council waited for the Doge to set the example; he did not, and the list remained blank. The Grand Chancellor instantly opened the roll for volunteers to Treviso and Padua; "but not a soul moved," says Sanudo, "a thing of great moment and of very bad augury for the affairs of the State"—"*E cossi va le nostre cosse.*"

From this speech it is clear that the finances of the Republic were not well managed. The appeals to private purses and the warnings to treasury debtors prove it. Later on, in 1537, when Venice was at war with the Turk it was found necessary to proceed with severity against the public debtors; but the so-called severity consisted merely in selecting by lot twenty-five names from the black list, and distraining their goods for the debt; plate and jewels were accepted in payment. In fact, the Republic was afraid to tax its subjects heavily, or to exact those taxes rigorously. She claimed to be popular, and to have the *cor et amorem subditorum nostrorum*, and she succeeded; Brescia and Bergamo, Padua, Verona, Vicenza, are all willing to return under the rule of S. Mark; but she paid the price in a weakened exchequer, which she dared not replenish at the cost of her provinces when her sea commerce was taken from her.

Again, in 1539, at the close of the third Turkish war, Venice was in straits for money. Five schemes
·1530. for refreshing the treasury were advanced in the Senate, and debated. The first was to raise two forced loans, taking 90 as 100, from the city, and two subsidies of 100,000 ducats each from the provinces. This scheme was calculated to yield 240,000 ducats. The second was to levy a poll-tax upon all Venetian subjects in the capital and in the provinces alike, excepting those in orders and children under twelve. The tax was to be arranged upon a sliding scale, calculated upon house-rent for those who were not owners, and upon income for those who were. This scheme was expected to yield 400,000 ducats. The third proposal was a tithe upon all incomes. The fourth was the application of a tithe in kind; and the fifth was the exaction of six soldi for every head, for every (*campo*) acre of land, and for every ducat of rental. This scheme was calculated to yield 186,750 ducats. The Senate adopted the third proposal, a tithe upon all incomes; but they were unable to carry out the operation. The cities of the mainland raised objections, and sent representatives to Venice to support their pleas; time was wasted and money was wanted. The scheme was abandoned for a direct tax on the industries in Venice, a subsidy from the mainland provinces, and an increase in the duty on cloth throughout the Venetian dominions. There is therefore no doubt that Venice, as a State, was constantly in want of money during these wars, and that she was unable to take efficient steps for replenishing her treasury.

It is impossible to make an accurate calculation of what these campaigns cost her; no documents have been published even if they exist. But we know what the minimum must have been from two stray entries in Sanudo's Diaries, one giving the cost of the war down to October, 1509, as 1,700,000 ducats; another stating that the *Santa lega*, in 1526, cost the Republic 1,500,000 ducats; in all, 3,200,000. This was the state of the case which was known to the Government. But to the majority of Venetians, and to the world at large, a very different aspect was presented. State ceremonies had never

been more gorgeous ; private luxury had never touched such a pitch of refinement ; this is pre-eminently the epoch of those minute and meticulous sumptuary laws, by ¹⁵³⁰ which the more rigid members of the Government hoped, in vain, to recall their fellow-citizens to the primitive simplicity and robustness of their fisher and merchant ancestry. Priuli in his Diary notes that the Carnival of 1510, with the defeat of Agnadello still recent in their memory, and the horrors of the Vicentine stone quarries not forty miles away, "was kept with as much gaiety, with as many masquerades, balls, and concerts, as if the Republic had been in her most flourishing days." The ambassadors of Spain, of the Pope, of Hungary, that is to say of the powers who were united and sworn to undo Venice, were all of them present and sumptuously entertained at the marriage ceremony of Francesco Foscari and the daughter of Giovanni Venier. The members of the club, the *Eterni*, gave a pantomimic representation, in which France, Spain, and Hungary were characterised by suitable dances ; and yet the French were in possession of Brescia and Bergamo, and were holding Verona and Vicenza in the name of the Emperor.

In 1513, while the issue of the French descent upon the Milanese was still uncertain, Venice, with an impoverished exchequer, spent large sums upon the ceremony of conferring the standard and bâton on Alviano. On the 13th of May the committee of nobles appointed to escort the general to the Senate, went to wait on him at his palace. They were robed in cloth of gold and scarlet silk, and were preceded by trumpeters. Alviano, in a robe of gold brocade, took the head of the procession ; he was followed by his household in white and red liveries, and by his French pages in velvet suits of red and white. The Doge received him in the hall of the Senate. He was surrounded by the ambassadors of all the powers except Spain. When Alviano reached the Senate chamber, the Doge rose, and both together, followed by the whole brilliant assembly, passed down the stairs and entered S. Mark's, where the Patriarch celebrated mass, and the Doge gave into Alviano's hands the consecrated

banner of the patron saint and the bâton of commander-in-chief of the Republic.

1530.

In 1527, while the women and children were crying in the streets for bread, and while the plague was at their very doors, Sanudo, that faithful and impartial eye-witness, with his coldly accurate pen, notes that the carnival balls and masquerades in the palaces of the rich never ceased for a moment.

Venice presents a curious spectacle—a State mad with pleasure in the midst of its death-throes; for while the Republic made this brave figure with its ceremonies in public, its masks and balls in private, it was engaged upon wars which, as one of her own writers has put it, “were carried on at a most serious loss of reputation, and to the clear demonstration that the forces of this State are quite unequal to their task; while every prince in Europe is against us. From all of which things we may learn that the art of peace is the true preservative and aliment of this Republic, while war is its poison and its death.” Venice was surely passing away for ever from among the ranks of the great nations.

If, however, the public treasury often proved empty, there is no doubt that there was abundance of private wealth. Upon this the Government made frequent calls to supplement the deficits in the exchequer. The call was answered with an enthusiasm which diminished in proportion to the frequency of these irregular appeals. Foscari found himself obliged to warn the Government that it was useless to talk of continuing a war, as the private purses were nearly exhausted; and Loredan found no one to answer his appeal for funds in 1509. The Venetians were very liberal in their patriotic support of the State; but it was not to be expected that the Government could be successfully conducted on such an unsound financial basis as reliance on voluntary subsidies. Much of this great private wealth was devoted to the magnificent spectacles in which Venice delighted, and with which she dazzled Europe and herself. We know that on one occasion each member of the Company of the Rose contributed 2000 ducats to furnish forth one festival. If

we ask where were these riches stored? whence came the moneys which maintained the gorgeous pageant of Venetian splendour? the answer is not so easy to find. It is probable, however, that when commerce in the East received a check by the fall of Constantinople and its death-blow by the discovery of the Cape route, the wealth which had been amassed and continually re-employed in that commerce was concentrated either in large estates in the newly acquired mainland provinces, or was diverted to banking purposes. We know that the great Venetian families acquired whole districts on the continent, such as the vast Pisani properties along the Gorzone and the Adige, the Memo estates in Friuli, the Morosini territories near Ceneda. Other families, such as the Lippomano, Badoer, Priuli, developed banking businesses, and through their Government and its ambassadors supplied the wants of the Spanish and French monarchs. These banking houses were supported partly by what remained of Venetian commerce and partly by the landed estates of the great nobles. But banking alone cannot maintain itself; it is a non-recuperative business. Lacking the aliment of commerce, which was gradually dwindling away, and therefore exposed to losses from bad debts without the means for repairing them, the whole banking system had become inflated and burst before the close of the sixteenth century. Out of 130 banking houses, large and small, only six weathered the storm. Landed estates remained the great source of whatever private fortunes existed in the Republic, after the collapse of her commerce.

The impregnability of her situation made Venice a desirable residence in those troublesome times. She was the only city in Italy which had never been sacked, never exposed to the brutality of foreign soldiery. All those to whom war was a horror naturally sought her as an asylum. The arts flourished; the apparatus of comfort was carried to an excessive pitch. Morals became relaxed; the police was inefficient, and, indeed, almost indifferent on the subject of private crime. Only on the delicate ground of political misdemeanour it showed that it could be

active if it chose. A thief was condemned to be hanged in the Piazzetta; the police officer in charge of the execution was his friend; at the moment when the noose was placed round his neck, his friend stepped up and removed it, saying, "There, you see now whether I like you or not," and both disappeared in the crowd; nor was the terrible Council of Ten ever able to lay hands on either. The palaces of foreign ambassadors became the asylum for hosts of bravi and ruffians, maintained in the pay of the ambassador for service as spies or assassins. The Government was almost powerless to deal with this lawless horde. As an instance we have the episode of Abondio, Cavazza, and Valier. In 1539 a secretary of the Ten and a secretary to the Senate, both in the pay of France, kept the French ambassador at the Porte informed of all the deliberations which took place in the Venetian Councils, and thereby rendered the terms of the peace with the Turks more disastrous to the Republic than they would otherwise have been. The treason was discovered and one of the secretaries arrested. But an accomplice, a certain Agostino Abondio, took refuge at the French Embassy. The Government, after some hesitation, resolved to send an *Avogador di Comun*, with the chief of the police and his posse, to the Embassy in the Calle S. Moise. The *Avogador*, Zorzi, arrived at the Embassy, and left his men outside while he passed in. He met three of the ambassador's retainers in the courtyard and begged them to tell their master that the *Avogador* wished to speak with him. But one of those men rushed up the palace stairs roaring, raging, and calling for help. Zorzi followed him, trying to quiet him, but was met by an armed man on the first landing. To him Zorzi repeated his request to see the ambassador; before he could finish his remarks, however, the staircase was swarming with men armed to the teeth. Zorzi cried, "Stand back! let none move!" They came on at him, and he was obliged to call for the police officer and his men, some of whom charged in, and a fight on the stairs began. Meantime some of the ambassador's bravi had climbed on to the roof of the palace and began to bombard the remaining

police force in the Calle with tiles and stones, and the *Avogador* was obliged to retire. The Ten, however, took strong measures. They ordered out 600 men from the Arsenal, marched them down to the Embassy, forced an entrance through the wall of the court, which was barricaded, and the ambassador thought it prudent to give way; he surrendered Abondio, not, however, before he had considered whether he should cause him to be strangled in order to prevent the revelation of any secrets damaging to his master, the French King. The episode is characteristic of the time and of the condition of Venice. 1530.

After the disastrous lesson of the League of Cambray the Republic continued to exist, it is true, but it is no longer an existence of activity, of initiative. Venice owed her longevity to two causes—the intangibility of the city, secure in the lagoons, and the strong constitutional formation which she had evolved in the years of her vital growth. Her whole energies now were directed to a double object—her self-preservation by means of an elaborate diplomacy and an awe-inspiring executive, and the presentation of herself before Europe, as a city of refinement and pleasure, a gorgeous pageant to which the world was invited as spectator.

On three points only does the Republic display any remains of her old vitality: she has still to fight a losing battle with the Turks; the rigidity and absolutism of her oligarchical constitution is further accentuated by the development of the Council of Ten; and Venice, under the leadership of Paolo Sarpi, takes a foremost place in the battle of the State against the Church.

CHAPTER XIX

The weakness of Venice; shown in the Valtelline wars—The war of the Spanish succession—The Turkish wars—The courage displayed in these wars a contrast to Venetian conduct on the mainland—The home Government hampered by its attempts at diplomacy—Suleiman—Capture of Rhodes—Piracy in the Levant: always an excuse for war—Venice desired to remain at peace with the Porte: but is forced into war—Barbarossa—Suleiman taxes Venetian merchants—War declared by Suleiman—Defence of Corfu—Barbarossa seizes Greek islands—Venice endeavours to form a league: formed; but of no help—Doria's conduct—Venice sues for peace—Turkish terms severe—Reason, treachery at Venice—Selim the Drunkard—Attack on Cyprus—Venice appeals for help to Europe—Philip II. promises a fleet—Defences of Cyprus—The fleet sails—Waits at Zara for Spanish ships: fatal—Turks land in Cyprus—Spanish fleet arrives at Corfu—Fleet at Candia—Quarrels—Doria's conduct—Siege and fall of Nicosia—Siege and fall of Famagosta—Death of Marcantonio Bragadin—Loss of Cyprus—Battle of Lepanto—Inadequate result—Giacomo Foscarini's remarks—Peace—Venice protests against Spanish treachery—Visit of Henry III. of France to Venice—Plague—Venice remains at peace by paying for it—Sultan Ibrahim: resolves to attack Candia; his excuse—Venetian ambassador at Constantinople: his report—War inevitable—Defences of Candia—Turks land—Negotiations at Venice for help hamper movement of Venetian fleet—Siege of Canea—Fall of the town—Exhaustion of Venetian treasury—Admission of new families to the Patriciate—Candia still resists—Turkish blockade—Venetian fleet in the Dardanelles—Lazzaro Mocenigo: threatens Constantinople; his death—Siege of the town of Candia—Venetian courage attracts attention of Europe—French supports: their uselessness—Francesco Morosini—Fall of Candia—Peace—Morosini's Peloponnesian campaign—Bombards Athens—The Morea gained, and lost—Peace of Passarowitz.

THE blow dealt at Venice by the wars of the League of
1530. Cambray, and the final settlement of Italy by Charles
V., destroyed for ever any prospect which she might
have enjoyed of eventually becoming a great European power.

The rest of her history in her relation to the Christian powers is entirely occupied with the question of her self-preservation, face to face with such overshadowing monarchies as Spain, France, the Empire. By one or the other of these she was constantly solicited; her alliance still counted for something in the balance of power. The sole object of the Republic was to remain neutral, to offend no one. Her weakness on land debarred her from taking such a share in war as would have entitled her to an increase of territory, or could have assured her in obtaining it. She was unable to guard even her own neutrality. She had no native land army worth speaking of, and she could not afford to raise large mercenary forces. The provincial militia, called the *Ordinanze*, which was recruited from the population of the various districts, numbered, on paper, 30,000 men, at the most; it cost 100,000 ducats a year, and the troops were drilled every Sunday. But the regiments were not kept up to their full numbers, and drill and discipline became relaxed. Troops such as these were incapable of preserving the integrity of Venetian soil, during a campaign in which Venice herself was neutral.

Proof of this impotence upon the mainland is abundantly displayed in the attitude of the Republic during the war of the Valtelline, throughout the Thirty Years' war generally, and during the war of the Spanish succession. The Valtelline is that long valley of the Adda which stretches from the head of the Lake of Como to the Stelvio Pass. The possession of this valley by Spain, therefore, would have connected Spanish territory in the Duchy of Milan with Imperial territory in the Tyrol, and would have drawn a complete Austro-Spanish cordon round the dominions of Venice; cutting the Republic off from any outlet towards France or Germany, exposing her to a direct Spanish attack from Milan, and depriving her of any flank assistance from her ally, France, by way of Tirano, the Aprica, and Edolo. The independence of that valley was therefore a matter of vital importance to Venice. The Valtelline, intensely Catholic in its religious sentiment, had passed under the

yoke of the Protestant Grisons. Fuentes, Spanish Governor at Milan, made use of the inevitable hatred inspired ^{1620.} by the Bündners, to stir the Valtellinesi to revolt; and in 1620, a general massacre of all Protestants in the valley took place. Spanish supremacy was secured for a time. The Grisons asked Venice to support them in recovering the Valtelline. But the Republic had never been in a position to give any actual support to her allies of the Grisons; she lived in perpetual dread of an attack from the Spanish Duchy of Milan, and did nothing but spend money and temporise. When the other allies of the Grisons, the French, came upon the scene, the Venetian ambassador Contarini heard some very plain speaking from Richelieu, who told him that the Republic was trifling with France, and that she had better take care; that she was always declaring herself ready, and never moving a regiment; that her obligations required her to put 12,000 infantry and 4000 horse in the field, and yet she had not 4000 troops at command in all; that he suspected the Republic of playing into the hands of Spain. The Republic was not playing into the hands of Spain; she was simply miserably weak on the mainland; she had no army; and her diplomacy was directed to the dangerous task of endeavouring to lower the power of Spain, and to countermine all Spanish moves, while avoiding an open rupture with her powerful neighbour, especially as she had no faith that France would support her.

Again, in the war of the Spanish succession the French were very anxious to prevent the Imperial troops from entering Italy by way of the Tyrol, to the support of the Duchy of Milan. D'Estrees, the French ambassador, was sent to Venice to beg the Republic to close the passes against Prince Eugene. The debate in the Senate explicitly declared the position of Venice as regards European powers. The party which desired to refuse the French demands pointed out, and with success, that the Republic possessed no adequate army; that the treasury was empty; that to refuse passage to the Imperial troops would expose Venice to Imperial attack in Dalmatia; that French support was proved by history to be a delusion. The Government,

therefore, resolved to adopt "a decorous, armed neutrality, and by representations and complaints to keep both belligerents within bounds." Such were their hopes, 1690. or perhaps hardly hopes; but the facts soon undeceived them. Eugene came down the valley of the Adige, Catinat crossed the Mincio, and both armies proceeded to manœuvre in the Venetian territory of Verona, unimpeded by anything more serious than "representations and complaints." The *Proveditore* Molin reports from Verona: "While your excellencies were exchanging views with the ambassadors in Venice, the Marshal Catinat overran the territory between the Adige and the Lago di Garda; a few days later the Prince de Vaudemont informed me that he too was going to eat a trout on the lake. The troops have now moved up to Rivoli, where they are entrenched. At first they paid for what they took, but now they help themselves. Both armies are occupying winter quarters, and fortifying themselves wherever they choose; they cut the country with cordons, interrupt commerce, and blockade the principal cities." No situation could have been more humiliating. It is not needful to multiply examples of the absolute helplessness of the Republic upon the mainland. Indeed it would seem that all through her history, whenever she touched *terra ferma*, she lost her orientation, became distracted and incapable; the sea was her true element, and on dry land she is as impotent as a fish out of water.

But the long decline of Venice was not occupied solely, nor indeed chiefly, with her diplomatic complications on the mainland of Italy, and at the courts of European sovereigns. In the preceding chapter we stated that after the settlement of Charles V., when almost all Italian States fell into a torpor, Venice remained vital on three points: she continued her struggle with the Turk; she developed and enunciated her view of the relations between Church and State; and her constitution still showed some activity in the expansion of the Council of Ten. These three lines of vital activity are sufficiently detached from one another to allow us to follow them separately.

If on the mainland the Venetian Republic was dying in ignominy and ridicule, the East, where she learned ¹⁵³⁰ the first use of her arms, whence she drew her early riches, saw the Republic burning her life out in a blaze of heroism and glory. Never in the whole course of Venetian history had individual Venetians displayed such qualities of courage, endurance, and resource as during the last two hundred years of her struggle with the Turk. The home Government, it is true, remained vacillating, feeble; hampered by its European complications, and tenaciously clinging to its false belief that it could manipulate the princes of Europe, through diplomacy, into lending active assistance in this life-and-death conflict, where Venetian interests were those chiefly at stake. But the individual men of action are heroes, and they pass through a series of the most heart-thrilling episodes, in which the siege and defence of Famagosta and of Candia stand out as the most illustrious examples. The Republic emerged from the struggle a loser on each occasion, until the last campaign of Francesco Morosini, when success came too late; but she proved that her sailors were still the same sea-dogs who had made the Mediterranean a Venetian lake, and by fully occupying the Turk, she prevented him from spreading westward, though at the price of her own existence.

After the treaty of Bologna, Venice might have hoped for a period of repose. Her mainland territories were secured to her, and she was nominally at peace with the Turk; she had made terms with Suleiman, which preserved to her the traffic of Aleppo and Beirut. But Suleiman was restless; he had taken Rhodes in 1522, and his career of conquest was not closed. He contemplated an attack on the Morea. Peace between Venice and the Turk was never a complete peace. There was a constant irritation kept up by acts of piracy, and therefore an excuse ever ready for that party which desired to declare war. Venice, however, was not likely to be the aggressor, for peace with the Turk was now almost a *sine quâ non* of her existence. Experience had taught her that, whatever promises Europe might make, she

alone would bear the burden of the war. Her policy, therefore, was to do all that in her lay to remain on friendly terms with the Porte. Accordingly the Republic ¹⁵³⁰ declined to join a league of the Pope, the Emperor, and some Italian States, if the objects of that league had any reference to Ottoman affairs; and in 1533, when her admiral Girolamo da Canal had defeated a hostile Turkish ¹⁵³³ squadron off the island of Candia, the Government sent humble apologies to the Sultan, and even thought of cashiering Canal with a view to pacifying the Turk. A few years later, in 1537, an opportunity occurred for driving the Venetians into a war. Suleiman and Francis I. were in alliance against the Emperor, and the joint Turkish and French fleet, under Chaireddin Barbarossa, were acting together in the Mediterranean. Suleiman invited Venice to join the confederacy, and, when he met with a refusal, he taxed all Venetian merchants in Syria ¹⁵³⁷ ten per cent on the value of their goods, and otherwise vexed their commerce. His fleet under Barbarossa was sent to cruise in the waters of Apulia; there it inevitably came into collision with Venetian ships, which defended themselves. Suleiman said he was attacked, and declared war. On 26th August the fleet of Barbarossa was sighted in the channel between Corfu and the mainland. Venice at once asked for help from the powers, while sending out her own fleet to defend Corfu. She received abundant promises, but little else; and Doria, who commanded the Spanish ships, actually sailed away, leaving Venice alone to the defence of the island. This she undertook with great courage, and by 15th September she had forced the Turks to raise the siege. Barbarossa, after retiring from Corfu, occupied a number of the islands in the Archipelago which were under the immediate rule of Venetian noblemen, and the quasi protection of the Republic. Venice was unable to defend them. She had already engaged in that fatal policy of attempting to form alliances against the Turk; a policy destined to hamper all the movements of the home Government, without securing any increase of strength. The Emperor, the Pope, and Venice entered upon a league, by the

terms of which the Ottoman Empire was light-heartedly partitioned: Venice hoped to receive all the islands

1537. and coast towns to which she could show any claim; the Emperor expected to recover all the Imperial rights and possessions as held by the Emperors of the East; and the Pope looked for the creation of a suitable dominion as his share.

At Venice great preparations were undertaken, but nowhere else. Doria joined the Venetians with a part of his

1538. Spanish fleet; his presence, however, proved of more harm than service to his allies. His excessive caution, if it were not downright treachery, prevented the Venetian admiral, Capello, from carrying out his operations at Prevesa with sufficient *élan* to secure a victory. The issue of the combat was doubtful, and the honours rested with the Turks, for the whole allied fleet withdrew to Corfu.

The confederation had proved less than helpful to Venice. The Republic had spent so much money that she found herself obliged to adopt extraordinary measures of taxation to replenish the treasury; and the hope of assistance from the league had delayed her from following up Barbarossa after his repulse at Corfu, and thus allowed him time to seize Scyros, Ægina, Patmos, and Tinos. The Emperor showed no signs of actively supporting the Republic, and Venice was compelled to open negotiations for peace. Her minister found the Turks very resolute upon the cession of Nauplia and Malvasia. All efforts to save these two places, even the offers of large sums of money in compensation, proved fruitless. Such obstinacy on the part of the Turks surprised the Venetians; but the Sultan declined any other proposals, and in 1540 peace was concluded upon

1540. these disastrous terms. It was only subsequently that the Republic learned how the Turk had already been treacherously informed of the secret orders from the Council of Ten to the ambassador at the Porte, authorising him to yield upon the subject of Nauplia and Malvasia, if all else failed. This ruinous treaty of 1540 closed the third Turkish war, by which Venice lost still more of her Empire in the Levant.

In the year 1566 the Sultan Selim, the Drunkard,

succeeded Suleiman the Magnificent, and the Republic soon had reason to believe that the new Sultan intended to occupy Cyprus. It was rumoured that the ^{1568.} conquest of that island had been suggested to him by his powerful favourite, the Jew Nassi, who inflamed the Sultan's mind by a glowing description of Cyprian vintages. More probably the Sultan considered the possession of Cyprus a necessary step towards the conquest of Egypt. There is little doubt that Nassi was the prime instigator of the attack; and Selim while discussing his plan of campaign exclaimed, "If we conquer the island thou shalt be King!" The Sultan was resolved on the enterprise. In 1570 an agent was despatched to Venice to claim the surrender of Cyprus, on the ground that it was a dependency of Mecca. On the receipt of this outrageous demand the College informed the Nuncio, who, in his speech, exhorted Venice to strenuous resistance; he promised in the name of his Holiness, that the Republic should be supported by Europe; he assured the Venetians that this time they had to deal not with a warrior Sultan, such as Suleiman, but with a Sardanapalus, consumed by luxury and vice. The Republic endeavoured to translate these promises into concrete terms of assistance. Her appeal to the Pope led him to recommend her cause to Philip II., who, after some hesitation, guaranteed fifty galleys. The King of Portugal refused help, and the Emperor gave one of those usual promises which meant nothing. In short, the Spanish galleys were the only support which Venice could look for at the hands of Europe.

Military engineers and a considerable amount of artillery and ammunition had been already despatched to Cyprus; reinforcements were ordered from Candia, and volunteers raised in the mainland provinces. The fleet, numbering upwards of two hundred sail, was placed under the command of Girolamo Zane. He sailed from the Riva degli Schiavoni amid every circumstance of pomp and with ^{1570.} every ceremony of religion; but instead of making straight for Cyprus, he waited at Zara, to be joined by the promised galleys from Spain, and the disastrous consequences of an

allied war began once more. The time lost at Zara was not only ruinous to the health and the discipline of the 1570. fleet; it bore worse fruit in allowing the Turk to land on Cyprus, and enabling him to isolate Nicosia and Famagosta. Zane was governed by orders from home, and they were marked by an excess of caution. After long delay he received instructions to move on Corfu, and there to await the allies. Doria was the first to arrive; but his presence was a disappointment, not a support, for he declared that he had no orders to act in conjunction with the Venetian Admiral. More time was wasted at Corfu, during which, however, some reinforcements from the Pope, under the command of Marcantonio Colonna, joined the confederates. At last, on 1st September, the allied fleet was able to put to sea and to make towards Cyprus. But at Candia it cast anchor, and a divergence of opinion began to show itself among the three admirals, Zane, Colonna, and Doria. The Venetian wished to push on to the relief of Cyprus; others suggested an attack on the Dardanelles, which would compel the Turk to withdraw from Cyprus, or would at least prevent him from sending reinforcements—a plan of campaign adopted with great success in the subsequent war of Candia; Doria finally announced that the season was too far advanced and that he would not sail at all. Again there was a pitiful waste of time. It does not appear to have been the fault of the Venetian admiral, for he did all that in him lay to stir his indifferent colleagues to action. He succeeded at last in wringing a consensus from Colonna and Doria, when suddenly a violent quarrel as to their respective precedence in the fleet sprang up between these two, and Doria in a fury set his sails and disappeared to westward.

Meantime, in Cyprus, the Turk had not failed to take full advantage of the absence of any fleet to prevent him from landing. Piali Pasha had disembarked troops, unopposed, at Limasol as early as 1st July, that is, two months before the Venetian fleet sailed from Corfu. This operation gave the Turks the command of a landing-place, and they were able to pour fresh forces into the island. This they continued to do, till Nicolo Dandolo was shut

up in Nicosia, and Marcantonio Bragadin in Famagosta, and both towns were isolated. The garrison of Nicosia numbered 50,000, of which, however, not ^{1570.} more than 5000 or 6000 were regular troops; the rest were the servants and dependents of local lords, or townsmen. The bombardment began. Great breaches were opened in the walls. No signs of the Venetian fleet appeared upon the offing, and help from Famagosta could not be expected. At last the garrison resolved upon a sortie, an expedient which Dandolo had hitherto refused to sanction. On the 15th August, the Assumption of the Madonna, about midday, when the sun, at its hottest, had compelled a cessation of the Turkish fire, Cesare Piovone, with part of the garrison, stole out of the city. He was upon the Turks before they were aware of what was happening. He pierced through two lines of entrenchments, spiking the guns, and might have broken the Turkish cordon completely, had he been supported from the town. But Dandolo refused to allow the rest of the garrison to follow up Piovone's success. The Turks began to hold their ground; the sortie was first checked, and then thrust back upon the outworks. The failure of Piovone's gallant effort sealed the fate of Nicosia. After a last desperate street fight, Mustafa gained possession of the city. Dandolo and most of the Italians were killed, and two thousand of the inhabitants reserved for slavery. The spoils were placed on board three Turkish galleys which weighed anchor for Constantinople; but they had not cleared the harbour before one of the slave women, in an access of desperation, seized a torch and set fire to the powder magazine; all three vessels went to the bottom. Dandolo's head was sent to Bragadin at Famagosta as a warning of the fate which lay in store for him.

When the news reached Venice, though the Government made fresh preparations for the relief of Famagosta, it returned once more to its tedious and fatal policy, of endeavouring to secure a formal league with Spain and the Emperor against the Turk. The Emperor refused on the ground of his eight years' truce with Selim, concluded in 1567; Spain, however, showed more readiness, though the

negotiations hung fire for so long that when the treaty was concluded in July, 1571, it was already too late ^{1571.} to save Cyprus. The Venetian fleet lay at Messina waiting for the Spanish galleys under Don John of Austria, while Famagosta was capitulating.

In Famagosta Bragadin had refused to accept the warning conveyed by Dandolo's gory head. During the winter of 1570-71 the Venetians had been able to throw a small reinforcement of 1400 infantry and some guns and ammunition into the town. But, all told, Bragadin found that his garrison did not number more than 7400 men. With this force he prepared to resist the attack of Mustafa at the head of 50,000 Turks. No doubt the hope of relief from the Venetian fleet lent to the leaguered city fresh courage for its great resistance.

The Turks began the bombardment of the town from ten forts. Breaches soon appeared in the walls; but behind these openings, the assaulting parties found barricades of casks and sacks, with loopholes for the harquebusses, which flung them back. Household furniture, bedding, clothes, everything available, were thrown into the breaches, where the women, the monks, the Bishop of Limasol, worked hand in hand with the soldiery. But the powder was running short, and the enemy renewed their assaults with troops which, owing to their vast numbers, came fresh to the attack, while the besieged were slowly decimated and exhausted. The population began to perceive that longer resistance was impossible. No fleet appeared to seaward, and on 2nd August Bragadin consented to hoist the white flag.

The terms which he secured were highly honourable. The Turks were loud in their praises of his valour: they allowed the garrison to march out with flags, guns, and church bells, and supplied ships for the transport of such of the population as wished to leave the town. Most of these had gone on board, and Bragadin, with some of his officers, either invited or of his own accord, went to pay a visit to Mustafa, and to hand over the keys of the city. The Venetian commander met with a courteous reception; and

the conversation in Mustafa's tent was cordial in the extreme. All of a sudden the Turk said, "What security are you going to give me for the Turkish ships which I am lending you?" Bragadin replied, "The public word of honour." Mustafa laughed, rather contemptuously, and said he wished for some more solid guarantee—hostages, for example. Bragadin refused. Instantly Mustafa burst into a passion; Lorenzo Tiepolo was hanged, while Baglione, Martinengo, and Querini were cut to pieces on the spot. Bragadin was first mutilated, and then, after witnessing all the horrors of a sack to which Mustafa abandoned the unhappy city, he was flayed alive on the public square. His skin was stuffed with straw and paraded, under a red umbrella, through the streets of Famagosta, then hung to the yardarm of a Turkish ship, and so conveyed in triumph to Constantinople. This grim trophy of so much valour, and so much barbarity, was stolen in 1580 from the arsenal at Constantinople and deposited in the church of San Gregorio, at Venice, whence it was removed in 1596, and rests now in an urn at the church of SS. Giovanni e Paolo. Thus Cyprus was lost to Venice without a single blow being struck in its defence by the Venetian fleet, which never came so much as within sight of the island during the whole period of its heroic resistance.

When too late, the allied fleet of 250 sail moved from Messina to Corfu. Sebastian Venier was in command of the Venetian division, and insisted, at a council of war, that the allies should at once attack the Turks. On the 7th October the fleet lay off Lepanto, where the Ottoman armament was known to be at anchor. The battle of Lepanto lasted five hours, and resulted in a complete victory for the allies. The losses are estimated at 8000 Christians and 30,000 Turks, including the commander-in-chief, Ali Pasha; 117 galleys came into the hands of the confederates. The chief glory of the victory rests with Sebastian Venier and the Venetians; and news was at once sent to the capital. On the 18th October the despatch boat entered the Lido, with Turkish flags trailing from her stern, and Turkish turbans

piled upon the deck. Instantly all business was suspended in the city; the shops were closed with the notice, "For
1571. the death of the Turk," though that was premature; the Government attended a *Te Deum* in S. Mark's, and Paolo Paruta pronounced the funeral eulogy of those who had fallen in the battle.

But, great as the victory had been, and reasonable as were the rejoicings at Venice, the result proved absolutely inadequate. The Republic desired to follow up the victory, and to press on at once to Constantinople, in the reasonable hope of crushing the Ottoman power at its centre. But Philip II. would not consent; and Don John, doubtless under orders from Spain, insisted upon taking his fleet into winter quarters. By the next spring the Turks, with amazing rapidity, had replaced their armament, and the opportunity was lost. The bitterness of Venice found expression in the words of her captain, Giacomo Foscarini: "And so, to have been leagued with allies has wrought the greatest injury to the Republic. And from this we may draw the following useful conclusions: in war, promptitude and a ready capture of occasions is of the highest importance; it is injurious to act in concert with princes so powerful that we are obliged to consider their wishes; we should never count on the forces of our allies; the commander-in-chief must never be a prince, but some one amenable to reward and punishment; in fine, without a good prospect of utterly destroying the enemy it is wiser to preserve peace, or if war is inevitable to attack rather than to defend." But Venice, though she saw clearly the consequences of allowing the Turk to recover from the blow of Lepanto, and even predicted the probable loss of Candia, had no power to move Spain, which was occupied in the Netherlands, or France, which was occupied with the Huguenots, to take active measures for the purpose of crushing the Turk. Alone she could not hope to be a match for the Ottoman power, so vast in resources of men
and money, that it had, in six months after
1573. Lepanto, recreated a fleet of 210 sail. And so, in 1573, the Republic concluded a peace. She made it

with a protest against Spanish treachery on her lips. Spain who, in the words of Morosini, "Signoreggiando la miglior parte d' Italia, et vedendo questa sola Republica, questo sol angolo d' Italia, esser libero, e non sentir peso di servitù alcuna, l' invidiano, invidiando l' odiano, odiando l' insidiano, et dove non possono arrivar con le forze, tentano d' arrivare con gl' inganni. . . . Il fine dunque di Spagnuoli nella lega con Venetiani è di far che Venetiani, estenuadi dalle gran spese di lunga guerra, necessariamente caschino nel suo ingordissimo grembo." Morosini was right; Venice was being slowly extenuated by these long and ruinous wars, with the continual loss of territory which they implied. And a few years later the conspiracy of Bedmar came to convince her that she was in grave danger of falling into the insatiable maw of Spain. 1573-

The peace of 1573 and the acquisition of Cyprus satisfied the Turk for a time. Venice was able to enjoy a period of repose, and to forget her losses and her troubles in one of those gorgeous displays of pageantry which were so dear to her spirit. In 1574 Henry III. arrived in Venice, on his way from Poland, to receive the crown of France. He was met at Malghera by a splendid train of gondolas, draped in silk, in velvet, in cloth of gold which trailed upon the water. The young nobles destined for his special service, were dressed in tight-fitting hose and slashed jerkins, with their family arms emblazoned on their breasts. The King wore purple velvet, in mourning for his brother, Charles IX. His gorgeous retinue accompanied him from Malghera first to Murano, where he lodged in the palace of Bartolomeo Capello, famous for the sumptuous hangings of its chambers, and its pleasant gardens on the lagoon. The following day he made his entry into Venice by way of the Lido, moving down behind the arsenal. At the Lido he landed, and passed under a triumphal arch, designed by Palladio and painted by Veronese and Tintoretto. After meeting the Doge and hearing mass, the King again took ship, and surrounded by the great barks of the various guilds, gorgeously symbolical of the arts and crafts, by the galleys of the Republic, and 1574-

the innumerable variety of private boats, from the patrician's gondola to the *barche*, *barchette*, and *sandoli* of the
 1574- people, he swept in procession across the lagoon to the landing-place at the Piazzetta. He was lodged at the Palazzo Foscari, to which were added the two adjoining Palazzi Giustinian. His rooms were newly furnished, and adorned with stamped leather and silk hangings, *semé* of *fleurs-de-lys*. In front of the palace, on the water, floated a large platform, which served the serenaders at night and the actors and *commedianti* by day. The King witnessed a regatta, and a fight between the Nicolotti and Castellani on the bridge by the Campo S. Bernaba; he was entertained at a banquet and a ball in the *Sala del Maggior Consiglio*. Venice despatched him on his way home up the Brenta by Fusina to Padua, intoxicated and enchanted by the beauty, the charm, the luxury of the sea siren, "the revel of the earth, the masque of Italy." But the dark side of the picture was not slow in appearing. In 1575, 1576; and 1577 the plague carried off over 50,000 inhabitants of the lagoons.

The peace of 1573 preserved Venice from open warfare with the Turk for upwards of seventy years; though there were continual skirmishes between Venetian and Turkish shipping, and the Venetian Bailo at Constantinople was occasionally threatened with the Seven Towers. Venice was so anxious to maintain pacific relations, she was always ready to pay an indemnity for any injury done to Turkish ships or cities, as in the year 1623, when she handed to the Sultan 250,000 ducats as a solatium for the injury inflicted on Valona when her ships were bombarding Barbary pirates, who had taken shelter under the guns of that stronghold. But peace was only maintained at the pleasure of the Sultan. The constant acts of piracy and the disturbed state of the sea, easily afforded a pretext to any Ottoman sovereign whose conquering instincts made him desire to declare war on the

1644- Republic. Such a prince, and such an excuse, arrived in the year 1644. The Sultan Ibrahim turned his eyes to the last great Venetian possession in the Levant—the island of Candia. The excuse for an attack was given by

the piratical act of the knights of Malta. One of their ships had seized and plundered a Turkish ship, with pilgrims on board. The Maltese had touched at Candia, and, though warned off by the Governor, this fact was sufficient to allow the Sultan to accuse the Republic of hostile acts. The scene at Constantinople, as described by the Venetian Bailo, Giovanni Soranzo, is extremely interesting and instructive. When the Sultan learned that the Maltese ship had touched at Candia he ordered his private secretary and his chief of the staff to summon all the ambassadors resident at the Porte, and to find out the facts of the case. "The chief of the staff began," writes Soranzo, "by saying that the Sultan had caused us to be summoned with a view to discovering what we knew about the affair. The French ambassador was the first to answer; he said he only knew what was reported here. I said the same; so did the Dutch ambassador. The chief replied, 'The Sultan is convinced that one of you knows all about it, but will not speak.' We all said we knew nothing, neither in general nor in detail. The secretary broke in with his usual vehemence, and said, 'This is not the time for denials, which will only provoke the rage of the Sultan,' and with that he made a sign by running his hand round his neck, which signified 'bow-string.' At this the French dragoman lost his nerve, and I told Grillo (the Venetian dragoman) to answer, that from his Majesty we looked for nothing but the most perfect correctness of conduct, and that, as his Excellency was aware, we resided under the protection of treaties. The secretary replied that in such a case as this the Sultan would not pardon his own mother; that he knew the Maltese had boarded the ship, and was resolved to find out what they had done with it. The French ambassador replied very coldly, observing that Malta was a long way from France; and he drew a rough map to show their relative positions. I said that Malta was an independent government; and the Dutch ambassador, thinking to use a clinching argument, said that the religion of the Maltese was different from that of his master's, and that, therefore, there was no communication;

whereupon the Beglierbey of Greece closed him with an
1644- argument which, in the eyes of the Turk, is un-
answerable, 'If their religion is different they must
be your enemies, and so you will join the Sultan in an attack
on Malta.' The Dutch ambassador replied, with more spirit
than prudence, as I thought, that if the Sultan would attack
the enemies of his 'country his master would be with the
Sultan. 'Who are your enemies?' said the chief. 'The
Spaniards,' replied the Netherlander. 'Oh, then you must
be with us all the same, for the Spaniards protect the Maltese.'
I thought this conversation was growing even more thorny
than the first part, and so I broke in and repeated my
remarks. While I was talking I saw that the secretary
was calling for something in a fury, and Selvago, who was
standing near my chair, whispered that he was asking
for a notary. The notary presently entered, sat down
between us and the Turkish ministers, and prepared to
write. The secretary then requested each of us to make
our report separately. The French ambassador was begin-
ning when I pointed out to him that it would never do to
have our words taken down as evidence. I then told
Grillo to say that as we did not know the language and
could not read Turkish, we would not be bound by anything
which the notary might put down. The secretary in a
rage declared that here again I wished to cross the Sultan's
authority, and that he knew the galley had been taken to
Candia. I replied that I was sure the galleys of Malta
had never touched at any place within shot of Venetian
cannon. When Grillo began to interpret my answer the
notary began to write. I therefore drew Grillo back, and
rose and said to the French ambassador that I would never
submit to this innovation. The ambassador said, 'But
what are we to do?' I then, through Grillo, told the
Turkish ministers that if they wished an answer in writing
I would furnish it. The French ambassador said the same.
The Beglierbey of Greece, who is a very able man, and
reasonable, here whispered to the secretary, and then said
that our proposal would be accepted." And thus the inter-
view terminated, to the credit of Venice and the firmness

of her ambassador. But no answer on the subject of the Maltese galley would have satisfied the Turk, who was determined to occupy Candia. By way of a plea ¹⁶⁴⁴—any plea would do—the Sultan declared that Candia had formed a part of the Empire of the East, and all that belonged to the Empire was his by right of conquest. This only meant that war was inevitable. Venice began to provision Candia. She sent military engineers, grain, 100,000 ducats, 2500 soldiers, and some ships; all that she could send, in fact, but none the less a provision quite inadequate to the exigencies of the case.

On the 30th April, 1645, the Turkish fleet of 400 sail passed through the Dardanelles, and opened a war which was to last for twenty-four years. The Turks found no difficulty in landing. The garrisons were ¹⁶⁴⁵ soon driven in the towns. But then a real resistance began, and it was no less heroic than that of Cyprus.

As in the war of Cyprus, so now the Venetian admiral, Girolamo Morosini, was hampered by orders from home obliging him to await the upshot of negotiations for help from Spain and Holland. Navagero, who, like a second Bragadin, was holding Canea against terrible odds, wrote in despair to Morosini: "I ask your Excellency to consider whether we have time to wait for help from Holland and from Spain. You are strong enough of yourself to thrash this barbarian. You have only to take the resolve." This was on the 24th July, and yet it was not till the 29th November that Morosini was joined by the confederate fleet, while he lay at Zante. The allied contingents were very small ones. The Pope sent five ships, Tuscany five, Naples five, and Malta six. During these months the Turk had been training his siege works against Canea. The governor of the castle of S. Teodoro, one of the outposts of the town, seeing that longer defence was impossible, had blown himself, his garrison, and his tower into the air. In Canea, Navagero still resisted, but by 22nd August he was forced to hoist the white flag, though he secured the right to march out with all the honours of war, and to embark for Suda, where Capello and a Venetian squadron were lying at anchor.

Meantime in Venice itself the home Government was receiving little if any support from European powers. Money began to run short. Interest had risen to 7 per cent. The Republic was forced to resort to extraneous measures for supplying the means to prosecute the war. The office of Procurator of S. Mark, a purely honorific title in this case, was offered for sale at 20,000 ducats, and the Government reluctantly agreed to admit new members to the close caste of the patriciate on payment of sums as large as 100,000 ducats, and after the names of candidates had been submitted for approval to the *Maggior Consiglio*. Seventy families, among them the Labbia, Gozi, Ottobon, and Widiman, were enrolled in this way, producing to the State a sum of 7,000,000 ducats, which of itself alone would prove the extraordinary elasticity and resources of Venetian private wealth.

Though the Turk had been successful in the first attack on Candia, yet it soon became evident that he was unable to obtain complete mastery of the island. The towns—principally Candia, the capital—held out, and the Turkish operations were converted from assault into blockade. This operation produced a corresponding change in the tactics of the Venetians, whose object now was to close the Dardanelles, and so deprive the blockading force of any support from Constantinople. The scene of action was changed from the waters of Candia to the waters of the Dardanelles, and there Venetian arms were illustrated by a series of splendid victories, which are associated with the names of Luigi Leonardo and Lazzaro Mocenigo. Negotiations for peace were opened in 1648 with Ibrahim's successor, Mahomet IV., but no result followed. The long siege operations at Candia continued to call forth the heroism of the Venetians and the obstinacy of the Turks, while Mocenigo's fleet at the Dardanelles prevented the Sultan from sending sufficient forces to complete the conquest of the island. The Senate, sitting at home in Venice, even proposed to order the fleet into the Sea of Marmora, to bombard Constantinople, but the operation was deemed too hazardous. In the last of the

great series of battles in those waters, fought in 1657, Lazzaro Mocenigo surpassed himself in "doughty deeds." He desired to force the passage of the Dardanelles, and, if possible, to reach the capital. But the fire from the shore was overpowering. Mocenigo's ship was soon in a blaze; the powder magazine blew up, and the commander was killed by the fall of a yard upon his head. 1657.

The death of Mocenigo changed the whole aspect of the war. His successor, Lorenzo Renier, was unable to maintain discipline, and the Dardanelles ceased to be impassable to the Turk. At Venice they even discussed the possibility of a peace. But the cession of Candia, on which the Sultan insisted, proved an insurmountable obstacle, and war was continued.

The interest of the war was removed now from the Dardanelles back again to the town of Candia, which still held out. At this moment the last of the great Venetian commanders, Francesco Morosini, appears upon the scene. He was appointed to succeed Lazzaro Mocenigo as admiral of the fleet. The stubborn resistance of Candia had at last roused the attention of Europe, and fired the more romantic spirits with a desire to share in the glory that was being won. In 1660, 4000 men left France for the island. With the impetuosity characteristic of their race, they had no sooner landed than they attacked the Turkish position. They were supported by the Venetians of the garrison, and at first the Turks retreated. But in the attempt to gain a hill which would have given them a flank attack on the besiegers, their ranks fell into disorder in a covered way which they had not observed. The Turks returned to the charge, and the whole force was driven within the city walls. The French succours dissolved as rapidly as they had arrived, and Candia was left to its native and Venetian defenders once more. 1658. 1660.

The obstinate defence roused a corresponding determination in the Turk. He founded new guns, threw up seven batteries, lodged his troops in earthworks, and on 28th May, 1667, began a bombardment of the town. The whole of the ground in front of the fortifications 1667.

was honeycombed with mines and counter-mines, one passing below the other—the Turk trying to get lower than the Venetian, and *vice versa*—till they sometimes reached the enormous depth of ninety feet below the counterscarp. Working in the dark, both parties were attentive to the slightest sound which might indicate whether the enemy were above or below them. The constant explosion of these mines ploughed the ground into hollows and ravines. From the outworks, the Crown battery Santa Maria, and the half-moon Mocenigo, from the ravelin Bethlehem, the enemy was prevented by a cross fire from approaching the walls. Between May and November of this memorable year the Venetians sustained 32 assaults, made 17 sorties, sprang 618 mines, and lost 3600 men, while the Turkish dead were reckoned at 20,000. The Republic was dying; but dying gloriously here in the Levant, the earliest, as it was the latest, scene of all her solid triumphs. Europe awoke at length, when too late, and appreciated the splendour of this final up-flaming of Venetian heroism. More succours arrived from France. The Duc de Feuillade, de Château Thierry, de Caderousse, landed in Candia, only to repeat the hot-headed follies of their predecessors. They insisted on an immediate sortie. Morosini opposed them, but at last gave way. The French charged with their usual *élan*, and carried the first lines. But they were breaking themselves against an impenetrable wall of Mussulman troops. Nothing could exceed their bravery, but it proved of no avail. The sortie was a failure, and the French sailed away as impatiently as they came. Other help was coming from France, from Sweden, from the Pope, who was finally convinced that Venice could not hold out much longer, when he learned that the war had cost her 4,300,000 ducats in 1668 alone. But the moment for saving Candia had passed. The Duc de Noailles' French troops shared the same fate as de Feuillade's, and when they sailed away on 21st August, 1669, all hope for Candia disappeared. Morosini called a council of war, and asked for advice. Though there could be but one opinion,

no one cared to be the first to express it. At length it was agreed that Morosini should negotiate with the Turk for the surrender of Candia, and he further took upon himself, with a wise transgression of his authority, to conclude a peace between the Republic and the Sultan at the same time. He obtained honourable terms. The guns, to the number of 328, were preserved. The people, the sacred vessels, and the ammunition were to be removed on board ship, and the roadstead of Suda remained to Venice. Thus, on 29th September, Candia, and the island of Candia, passed away from Venice, after a defence which had lasted twenty-five years, and was unmatched for bravery in the annals of the Republic. The loss to Venice was irreparable, and the burden entailed by the war left the State with bankruptcy staring her in the face. 1669.

One last encounter, and the Venetians and Turks part company for ever. Both were exhausted; both in full decline. The fortune of this last campaign proved favourable to Venice, and she closes her account with Turkey by a success which she was not slow to blazon on the walls of the *Sala dello Scrutinio*, by an inscription to the hero of the war.

In 1685 war broke out on account of threatened incursions on the northern frontier of Albania. Francesco Morosini was placed in supreme command; and, believing the Turk to be weak, he conceived the idea of recovering the Morea for Venice. This he achieved without much difficulty in his campaigns of 1686 and 1687. In 1688 he bombarded Athens, and a Venetian bomb set fire to the Turkish powder magazine in the Parthenon, and ruined the temple; upon which Morosini, contemplating the work of his guns, exclaimed, "*O Atene, o delle arti cultrice, quale sei ora ridotta!*" While still occupied in the Peloponnesus consolidating Venetian government, and endeavouring to restore some semblance of cultivation and prosperity to a country that was thinly inhabited and quite untilled, Morosini received the news that he had been elected Doge in recognition of his services. The glory of his conquests was some solace to the 1615.

Republic, which had suffered so long and so persistently at the hands of the Turk.

Morosini endeavoured to complete the possession of the Morea by reducing the town of Malvasia. But in this he failed; though, during the progress of the siege, the Venetians had the satisfaction of receiving and rejecting offers of peace proposed by the Turk. Morosini returned to Venice. But the incompetence of his successor made it necessary for the veteran to take the field once more. In 1693 he embarked for Greece, and the ceremony of his departure was one of the last of the great solemnities celebrated by the Republic. His age, his long services, the desperate defence of Candia, had worn out Morosini's strength. He reached the Morea only to die at Nauplia, on 9th January, 1694.

Venice did not long retain her hold upon Morosini's conquests. The whole revenue of the Morea was consumed in the management of the province, and its possession was of no value to her. She had not the resources nor the energy to fortify and govern with profit her newly-acquired territory. By 1716 the Turks were once more in possession of the peninsula, and were besieging Corfu, which, however, repulsed them successfully. The peace of Passarowitz 1718. formally deprived the Republic of the Morea, and closed the history of Venice in the Levant.

CHAPTER XX

Venice and the Church—The aims of the Church after the Council of Trent—Attitude of Venice independent from earliest times—The Ferrarese war—Succession dues—Council of Constance—*Mensa episcopalis*—Appointment of Venetian bishops, of Venetian parish priests—The *foro ecclesiastico*—Taxation of Church property—Visitation of monasteries—The *index expurgatorius*—Inquisition—New spirit in the Church—Julius II.—The State Erastian—Private Venetians good Churchmen—Difficulty of this position—Venice accepts the Council of Trent—Her religious toleration—Sir Henry Wotton—Sarpi—Paul V.—Venice limits the erection of churches, etc. ; and forbids the alienation of lay property in perpetuity—Taxation of clergy—Venice resists Papal claim to examine Venetian bishops in Rome—The arrest and trial of two clerics—Spanish party at Rome stirs up the Pope—Venetian replies—The Papal briefs—Interdict—Nuncio dismissed—Edict—Protest—Literary warfare—Danger of Spanish interference—Compromise—Close of the incident—Pope not satisfied—Attacks on Sarpi's life : his illness and death.

THE second point upon which Venice still retained a certain vitality, after the disasters of Cambray, and the settlement of Italy by Charles V., was the question ^{1550.} of the relations between the Republic and the Church.

While the Republic was still expanding, while she was endeavouring to extend her mainland empire and was encroaching on Ferrara, Ravenna, Faenza, or Rimini, we have already seen how she came into collision with Rome, which made claims to superiority in those districts. These were territorial aggressions on the part of Venice, which were met by the Church with weapons spiritual and temporal alike.

But there were other grounds of contention between Venice and the Curia. The Church, especially after the Council of Trent, displayed a tendency to encroach upon the

civil and secular prerogatives of the State. If Venice
1550. attempted to absorb some of the temporal possessions
of the Church, the Church on her side invaded the
domain of secular government, and endeavoured to establish
a jurisdiction inside the State but independent of the
State.

The cause of Venice was the cause of all secular
princes; and, though the Republic was only partially
successful in her encounter with the Curia, yet she was the
first European power to formulate what she considered the
true lines of delimitation between secular and ecclesiastical
authority, while still remaining within the pale of the
Catholic communion.

The attitude of Venice towards the Church of Rome
had always been singularly independent. This, no doubt,
was partly due to her early and long-continued connection
with the Eastern Empire. For many centuries of her
existence Venice cannot be considered as a part of Italy in a
political sense. By the treaty between Charles the Great
and Nicephorus, the lagoons were excepted from the
dominions of the Western Emperor. The Republic never
quite abandoned that attitude, and S. Mark the Evangelist,
patron saint of Venice, was held by good Venetians to be
at least the equal of S. Peter the Apostle. The Venetians
always professed themselves faithful sons of the Church.
But they succeeded in keeping their Patriarch in close
dependence on the State, and comparatively free from the
direct influence of Rome. In their reluctance to admit the
Inquisition, and the restrictions which they placed upon
it when admitted, they showed their inherent desire to
manage their ecclesiastical matters for themselves. When
the position of Venice in Italy was weakened by the results
of the League of Cambray, and by the constant dread of
Spain, the Venetians were unable to resist the encroaching
claims of Rome as fully as they desired; but they never
thoroughly abandoned their initial attitude, and in their
final struggle with the Papacy, which we shall now have
to recount, they won a victory which in appearance at least
was satisfactory.

We find the first note of this independent attitude struck as early as 1308, in the reign of Pietro Gradenigo, while the Ferrarese war was raging. The Doge, with ^{1550.} a courage which must at that time have seemed presumptuous, very frankly stated that the Pope had no concern with temporal affairs, and made an early use of that important weapon in ecclesiastical warfare—the appeal from a Pope misinformed, to a Pope better informed. But the Republic was forced to give way before excommunication and interdict—weapons which, in those days, exposed Venetian merchants to pillage, and left the Venetian dead unburied by the Church, and therefore excluded from heaven.

In 1351 Venice was again opposed to Rome over the question of succession dues. The great mortality of the plague had raised the point in an acute form. The Church claimed that, upon death, the deceased's property should be valued, and one-tenth devolved to the Bishop of Castello. But in many cases, deaths had been so numerous in one family that, had this provision been enforced, nothing of the family property would have remained. The Government, therefore, ordered that no succession dues should be paid to the Church unless devised by testament, and such payment was to be understood as being made with the consent of the Government, not as an ecclesiastical right. Foscari, the Bishop of Castello, at once appealed to Avignon, whither he retired in person. He summoned the Doge to appear before the Rota to defend the action of the Republic. But after Bishop Foscari's death in 1376, his successor accepted a compromise, whereby the death dues were compounded for 5500 ducats annually. The whole of this episode illustrates the usual attitude of the Republic in similar cases—a strong statement of position, vigorously maintained, and concluded by a concession.

During the Council of Constance, the Republic once more affirmed its independence by accepting the Conciliar principle, and by pledging itself to support the decisions of that body. By so doing it obtained possession of an effective weapon in the ecclesiastical arsenal—the appeal to a future Council as a palliation of present disobedience; and in the course of the

subsequent struggle with Rome it made frequent use of this arm.

1550. The relations between the Republic and the Venetian clergy were well defined by the middle of the fifteenth century. In 1454 the Patriarch of Grado was removed to Venice, and became the spiritual chief of that city. Neither the Patriarch, nor the Bishop of any Venetian diocese, might be other than Venetian subjects. The clergy and the Senate elected the Bishops by a plurality of votes. The name of the nominee was submitted to Rome for approval, but the State refused to allow the *mensa episcopalis*, the temporal fruits, to a successful candidate who had not received recognition from the Government. In this command of the temporal fruits lay the secular curb upon appointments direct from Rome. The parish clergy, on the other hand, were chosen by the clergy and the people, and approved by the Senate.

Such was the attitude of Venice towards the Church in her dominions; but it is very doubtful whether the position was ever really accepted at Rome, in spite of various concessions, and many thorny questions were still left open: the trial of criminous clerics before secular courts; the taxation and alienation of Church property; the claim of Rome to examine the governmental candidates for Venetian Sees; the right to visit monasteries; the Inquisition in heresy; the examination and prohibition of books;—all of them points upon which the Republic found it necessary to defend what she considered the rights of princes as against the rights of the Pope.

As regards the question of secular jurisdiction over clerics; so long as the Republic and the Church had been on good terms—that was until the Church, under the terror of the Lutheran heresy, began to extend her claims in the secular region, and, by the laxity of her morals, became a danger to the State—no serious difficulties had arisen. The statutes of Jacopo Tiepolo (1224) placed the jurisdiction in cases criminal as well as spiritual in the hands of the bishops; while the execution of sentence belonged to the secular authority; purely civil cases, and cases of a political

complexion, were tried by the civil courts. By the concordat of 1344, injury done by a cleric to a layman was reported to the bishop, who tried the case according to Venetian law; injury by a layman to a cleric was reported to and judged by the secular authority. Such a provision looks like a recognition on the part of the Government that clerics were not merely subjects of the State, but that they were under another allegiance, and subject to an alien jurisdiction. The terms of this concordat, however, produced such confusion that the Curia withdrew, in part, from its previous position. Paul II. abandoned to the secular arm those who had taken the tonsure after the commission of the crime, or who had committed the crime in lay habit. Sixtus IV., in 1474, renounced the trial of those arraigned for coining, or treason, or gross immorality, although he wished that the patriarchal vicar should be present in court.

Down to the close of the fifteenth century, Venice, while maintaining a considerable independence in ecclesiastical matters, had not come into serious collision with the Curia upon questions of principle, only upon questions of external territorial aggrandisement. But at the opening of the sixteenth century, a new spirit, a spirit of aggression, manifested itself in the Church, under the guidance of such fiery tempers as that of Julius II. At the same time the weakness of the Republic in the political arena—a weakness which the League of Cambray brought into full view—displayed itself equally in the ecclesiastical region. Julius was the first member of the hostile League to open the attack on the Republic. He launched an excommunication and interdict. The grounds alleged were, the territorial usurpation of Rimini and Faenza; the incitement of Bologna to revolt; opposition to papal nomination of Venetian bishops; taxation of ecclesiastical property; and the claim to try clerics in the secular courts. Venice resisted. She forbade the publication of the bull, set guards to tear it down, if affixed to the walls, appointed doctors in theology to advise upon the crisis, and appealed to a future council. But the battle of Agnadello followed on 24th May, 1509, eighteen days after the publication of the bull, and Venice collapsed. The

Republic was compelled to submit to the Pope as the price of detaching him from the League. On 14th February, 1550, she agreed to abandon her appeal to a future council; to acknowledge the justice of the excommunication; to withdraw her taxation of the clergy; to renounce her right of nominating Venetian bishops; to surrender clerics to the ecclesiastical courts; and to offer no asylum for fugitives from the Papal States. Her extreme danger from the League of Cambray compelled the Republic to withdraw from all her positions as against the Curia; and her secret protest, by which she, to herself, declared the concessions void, as being wrung from her by force, might serve her as plea for subsequently breaking her word, but could not excuse her for doing so. On 24th February the Venetian ambassadors in Rome made public submission in the atrium of S. Peter's, where the ceremony of scourging was omitted, though the humiliation was inflicted by compelling the ambassadors to receive twelve white scourging rods from the hands of twelve cardinals.

Venice was thoroughly humbled by Julius, under the terror inspired by the League of Cambray. She lost her nerve, and was unable to make any vigorous resistance; it is not till the epoch of Paolo Sarpi that she shows once more, and for the last time, the old spirit which had made her so frequently and so courageously affront the thunders of Rome.

The new aspect of affairs in Italy rendered it impossible for Venice to take a very strong line in ecclesiastical policy. The Republic was in a very difficult position, a position which paralysed her. Most of her nobility, and by far the larger part of the population, were good Catholics. There is hardly any sign that the State ever contemplated seriously detaching itself from the body Catholic, and becoming Protestant. Such action would have exposed Venice to attack, and probable absorption by Spain. The Government accepted the Council of Trent in 1560; and, in the very heat of the struggle with Paul V., the Doge was able to exclaim with truth, when accused of Calvinistic tendencies, "*Che vuol dire Calvinista? Siamo Cristiani*"

quanto il Papa, e cristiani moriremo, a dispetto di chi non lo vorria." At the same time the Republic retained her desire for religious toleration—a necessity of her ¹⁵⁵⁰ widely diversified commerce—and her intention to maintain her ecclesiastical independence as far as possible. The attempt to reconcile these two attitudes is the key to Venetian ecclesiastical policy, after the troubles of the League of Cambray had passed away.

The difficulty in which Venice was placed finds illustration upon many occasions. The Republic promised immunity to the merchants and craftsmen from the Grisons who still desired to settle in Venetian territory, provided they caused no scandal; and the Church protested. She permitted Sir Henry Wotton, England's ambassador, to celebrate Protestant service in his private chapel, and to introduce what books he chose. And when the Court of Rome remonstrated, the Doge replied that "it is impossible for the Republic to search the boxes of the English ambassador, when we are absolutely certain that he is living most reserved and quietly, causing no scandal whatever. We know nothing of these dangerous works, and if they had existed we should have heard of them, for we do not keep our eyes shut in matters of religion." In 1565 the Pope complained openly "that the Signori (of Venice) are excessively lenient, and have always adopted measures far too mild in this question of heresy." This attitude of the Venetians, which was dictated by a desire to encourage their commerce, laid them open to the suspicion of being heretics at heart. The Spanish ambassador at Rome was always able to point to this lukewarmness as a sign of perversion, and to urge that "these gentlemen govern their dominions by rules of statecraft, not by the laws of the Church." The Pope had only to threaten sufficiently, and, as in 1564, the Ten are obliged to send an order to all the Rectors on *terra ferma*, that, within fifteen days, every heretic is to be expelled from Venetian territory. No doubt the order was not rigorously enforced; nevertheless Venice, by her attitude as a good Catholic, left herself no choice but to yield, in appearance at least. So again in 1581, the question as to the visitation of monasteries compelled the Government to make a show of resistance;

they secured the removal of the first visitor, who was
1581. nominated by the Pope, and then gave way on the
main point, declaring that they did so out of regard
for the person of the newly-appointed visitor. Once more,
in 1589, Venice recognised Henry IV. as King of France.
The Pope, urged on by Spain, remonstrated. It was with
the greatest difficulty that Venice obtained permission to
receive the French ambassador, and only on the understanding
that he did not appear at any public functions. From what
further humiliations the Paris Mass of Henry rescued the
Republic, we can only guess.

Almost the only triumph which the Republic obtained
during this long series of struggles with the Court of Rome
was when she wrung from an unwilling Curia the Concordat
of 1596, whereby the operation of the Index Expurgatorius
was neutralised for any Venetian printers and booksellers who
chose to avail themselves of the clauses in that agreement. But
as a matter of fact, the Index remained in active operation;
the Concordat was hardly known to the Venetians. The
Index was sown broadcast over the territory of the Republic,
and its regulations enforced from the pulpit and in the con-
fessional; whereas hardly a hundred copies of the Concordat
were printed, and of that number few found their way into
the printing-presses and book-shops. Venice could not
effectively resist the encroachments of Rome while she was
in a dual attitude towards her antagonist—an attitude of
spiritual submission and of political defiance. Yet at the
opening of the next century, in her last great encounter
with the Curia, she was enabled by the genius of one man,
Paolo Sarpi, to formulate, and to formulate splendidly, the
conception of her political doctrine as regards Rome. It
is the voice of the Servite monk which speaks throughout
the struggle; it is the intellectual grasp and clarity of the
Friulian peasant which enunciates the formulas whereby
Venice summed up her official and public, though not her
individual and private, conception of the relations between
Church and State.

The events which led up to the last conflict are
briefly these. In 1605 Camillo Borghese came to the

papal throne under the title of Paul V. He was so surprised by his election that he considered it directly the work of heaven, which had chosen him especially to protect the authority of the Church. His first demands were that France should accept the Council of Trent, and that Spain should exempt the Jesuits from taxation. It was not likely that a Pope of this temper would overlook any acts of independence on the part of a secular prince. Yet just at this moment Venice passed two legislative orders which Paul considered an infringement of ecclesiastical rights. 1605.

In 1603 the Republic renewed its previous laws, forbidding the erection of more churches, monasteries, or pious foundations in the city, without licence. The reasons given were that such buildings already occupied half the area of Venice, and were sufficient for all religious needs, while the foundation of new establishments would tend to starve the older ones, towards whose maintenance the funds of the pious had better be directed. In 1605, the year of Borghese's election, the Senate by a large majority—120 against 27—had forbidden the alienation, in perpetuity, of lay real property, thereby depriving the Church, as a corporation, from inheriting under the wills of pious donors. This act was probably in reprisals for a bull of Clement VIII., Borghese's predecessor, prohibiting the sale or alienation to laymen, of any ecclesiastical real property. The Senate justified its action on the ground that the piety of the Venetians threatened to impoverish the State for the benefit of the Church, that the Republic would soon be unable to perform her function of defending Christendom against the Turk.

To complicate matters still further, other causes of friction between Rome and Venice had recently risen. The Senate had resolved to tax the clergy of Brescia, in common with the other citizens, for the restoration of the ramparts; and a protest from Rome led to the expression of one of the earliest of those formulas enunciated by the Republic in the course of this conflict. "If the clergy," said the Doge to the Nuncio, "enjoy protection from the State, let them contribute to the expenses which are incurred for their security."

The second cause of disagreement involved the question of the papal claim to examine Venetian bishops, at 1605. Rome, before confirming the nominee of the Senate. The Patriarch, Matteo Zane, had died, and the Senate named Francesco Vendramin as his successor, and asked for approbation from the Vatican. The Pope replied that Vendramin must present himself for examination. The Senate admitted that they had consented to such a course in the case of Zane, but for that one time only. They now forbade Vendramin to leave Venice.

The situation was becoming more and more strained, when two events occurred which led to an open rupture. The Council of Ten found itself obliged to arrest, and to try for monstrous crimes, two clerics, the Canon Saraceni of Vicenza and Abbé Brandolin of Nervesa. The Ten based its action, and rightly, on the bulls of Paul II. and Sixtus IV., unless the Venetian surrender to Julius II. is to be considered as a bar, and that can hardly be maintained, for a subsequent bull of Paul III. gave the secular courts the right to try atrocious crimes, and no one disputed the atrocity of those in question.

As yet the relations, though strained, remained friendly. The Borghese family were enrolled among the Venetian nobility, to the great satisfaction of the Pope, and the embassy of congratulation was cordially received at Rome. But in the college of cardinals there were not wanting those who endeavoured to fan the smouldering indignation of his Holiness into a lively flame of wrath, the Spanish party taking the lead. The Pope began to make vehement protests to the Venetian ambassador; and in sending its pacific answer through its representative, the Senate enunciated another maxim: "We cannot understand how it is possible to pretend that an independent principality like the Republic, born such, and as such preserved by the grace of God for more than one thousand two hundred years, should not be free to take such steps as she may consider necessary for the preservation of her State, when those measures do not interfere with or prejudice the government of other princes." Such an answer appears reasonable; the only difficulty lay in this,

that neither party would condescend upon a definition of what was or what was not to the prejudice of another prince. That depended entirely upon what the other prince claimed as his rights. And this consideration, the need for such a definition before the question could be brought to a conclusion, led Sarpi to formulate precisely what he considered the boundary line between matters spiritual and matters temporal. "The dominion of the Church," he said, "marches in the paths of heaven; it cannot, therefore, clash with the dominion of princes, which marches on the paths of earth." Could he have obtained subscription to a dichotomy of this nature, the quarrel would have been at an end. The Church, however, never dreamed of accepting such a renunciation of its substantial authority; the Republic shrank from claiming such an extension of hers.

The argument was an *infinita questio*. The Church could always say *per angusta ad angusta*—if heaven was its acknowledged kingdom, earth was the portal thereto; and it is surely absurd to prevent the master of the house from showing the entrance to his invited guests. The acceptance of the doctrines of the Church, its claim to a divine origin, its possession of the keys, vitiates any attack upon the Church. The Roman Curia left no other alternative to those who disagreed with its dogmas than this, "Stay in and obey, or go out and be damned." And Sarpi, for all his splendid common sense, the lucidity of his reasoning, the pungency and limpidity of his expression, could do nothing for Venice, whose position of hostility was paralysed from the very outset by her acquiescence in the Church's fundamental claim. He, like others before and after him, like Contarini, like Valdes, or like Döllinger, dreamed of another kind of church, a gentle, all-embracing, comprehending guide from this world to the next; but he had never been called upon to construct such a church, or he would have found that dogma is of its essence; if all roads lead to heaven, then there is no need of a shepherd, no function for a church; if they do not, then the shepherd must point out the way—must drive if need be, that is, must dogmatise; and where the human mind has dogmatised upon spiritual matters, it has instantly raised denial, rebellion,

assertion of a wider truth—a fact which Sarpi himself was about to prove.

1605.

And so the quarrel went on. The Senate instructed its ambassador, Nani, to return a pacific answer to the Pope's recriminations, and despatched a special agent, Leonardo Donato, to Rome. But while Donato was on his way, the Pope had already prepared and despatched two briefs; one on the subject of Church property, the other dealing with the cases of Saraceni and Brandolin. The briefs threatened excommunication if the Republic did not annul its decrees in the one case, and restore the two prisoners in the other.

The Nuncio received the briefs, and, after some hesitation and renewed orders from Rome, they were presented on 25th December, 1605. The same night the Doge died, and the missives were not opened till his successor, Leonardo Donato, had been elected. When the briefs came to be read, it was found that, by some oversight, two copies of one and the same brief had been sent.

On grasping the nature of this first brief the Republic began to prepare for resistance. Paolo Sarpi, a Servite monk, was appointed official adviser to the Government, and information of the papal threats was sent to foreign powers. In their reply to his Holiness, which was still apologetic in tone, the Senate declares that "princes, by divine law which no human power can abrogate, have authority to legislate on matters temporal within their jurisdictions; there is no occasion for the admonitions administered by your Holiness, for the matters under discussion are not spiritual but temporal." So Venice said. The Pope thought otherwise.

On 25th February the second brief, the one which had been omitted from the first dispatch, arrived. The Senate replied that they could not consign the two ecclesiastics without forgoing privileges which the State already possessed. This answer, and the constant suggestions of the Spanish party, finally drove the Pope to take extreme measures. In the consistory of 16th April he announced that he would publish the excommunication and interdict against Venice, unless the Republic made submission within twenty-four days. Venice had no intention of yielding, and the bull was issued.

When the news reached the lagoons the Government took vigorous steps. The patriarchal Vicar was ordered to continue in his functions. The parish priests were required not to receive any copy of the bull, and to discharge their divine offices as though no bull had been issued. It is said that an incumbent who declined to say mass, woke to find a gibbet in front of his church door one morning, and took the hint. In Padua a priest, when asked to swear that he would not receive the bull, replied that he would act as the Holy Ghost inspired, whereupon the governor informed him that the Holy Ghost had already inspired the Council of Ten to hang anyone who disobeyed its orders. The Doge dismissed the Nuncio in a very vigorous speech which contained these words: "Monsignore! you must know that we are, every one of us, resolute and ardent to the last degree, not merely the Government but the whole nobility and the population of our State. Your excommunication we make light of and hold it as nought. Now just see where this resolution would lead to if our example were followed by others."

After the Nuncio was dismissed the Government promulgated an edict to their whole dominion declaring the papal briefs to be null and void, and requiring all ecclesiastics to continue their functions. The Jesuits refused, and were expelled, followed by the Theatins and Capuchins. There was no doubt about the vigour and earnestness of the Republic. The controversy between Venice and Rome began to take wing over Europe, owing to the literary warfare which now burst out. The powers sympathised with Venice as protagonist of their own struggles against curial encroachments. Holland offered support; England proposed a league; France promised to mediate. But there was a danger menacing Venice, to which she was not blind. It was quite possible that the Pope would call in temporal weapons to subdue the Republic, and the arms he was sure to use were those of Spain. Fuentes was arming, and threatening in Milan. Venice had made her formal protest on behalf of temporal

princes with great vigour; but she remembered that she had fought the Turks on behalf of herself and Europe
1606. with no less courage and self-denial; and she did not forget how little support she had received. In the present case the only material assistance she could look for was from Protestant powers, and she shrank from allying herself wholly with them. The mediation of France seemed more acceptable.

Accordingly the French ambassador, Du Fresne Canaye, and the Cardinal de Joyeuse charged themselves with the delicate negotiations. Venice insisted, as a preliminary to any treatment of the points in dispute, that the Pope should unreservedly withdraw the excommunication and the interdict. The French negotiators knew that Paul would not accede to this demand. They finally induced Venice to give way so far as to say that, if France chose to beg his Holiness to withdraw his censures, the Republic would allow her name to be attached to the petition; and she further promised that when the censures were removed, she would consign the two prisoners to the French ambassador out of consideration for his Majesty, but without derogating from her right to try them for their crimes. When the censures were raised the edict would be withdrawn, not before. With these terms Joyeuse went to Rome, and after much difficulty, the Pope, who wished to insist on the return of the Jesuits, gave way, and everything was ready for an accommodation.

The various steps in the ceremony of reconciliation were carried out with the utmost punctiliousness on the part of Venice. The terms of the proclamation withdrawing the edict were carefully considered, so as to allow no word to escape which might imply that Venice admitted an error. The surrender of the two prisoners then took place in the following manner, as described by the secretary who conducted the proceedings. "This morning I, Maria Ottobon, most humble secretary and servant of your Serenity, came to the palace, and presented the following report of what took place yesterday evening. The two prisoners were placed in two gondolas; each with an officer and three men of the guard. The two gondolas were

followed by three others, containing four men each. I, with two young men from the Chancellery, went to the palace of the Cardinal, and waited for the prisoners there. When they had arrived, I went up stairs alone, and entered a room where I found the Cardinal and the ambassador of France, and, after arranging the method of procedure, the Cardinal withdrew into the long gallery, while I called up the young men from the Chancellery and the prisoners in custody of the officers. I then said, 'Monsignore, his Serenity has ordered me to consign to your lordship the Abbé Brandolin and the Canon Saraceni; this he does to please his most Christian Majesty, and without abrogating his right to try ecclesiastics.' The ambassador replied, 'And so I receive them.' After this we all advanced towards the Cardinal, and M. Du Fresne said, 'Monsignore, here are the prisoners to be given to the Pope.' The Cardinal turned round and said to a certain priest, 'Take them'; which he did. They then begged that I would resign the prisoners to the guard, to be held at their disposal. And with that we all left." 1606.

Joyeuse then presented himself to the College, where he announced that "all the censures are raised"; whereupon the Doge handed to him the proclamation withdrawing the edict. An ambassador was despatched to Rome, where he was received with honour, and so the celebrated episode of the interdict came to an end.

The moral victory remained with Venice. She did not recall her laws as to taxation of the clergy and the foundation of new churches and monasteries. She had vigorously formulated her position, and had won the sympathy of Europe; and, though she had been forced to surrender her prisoners in fact, she had saved appearances by her manner of doing so, and had placed on record a claim to try ecclesiastics, which, if not admitted at the moment by the curial party, was not denied.

The extent of the victory may perhaps best be measured by the antagonism which was stirred at Rome. The struggle, in its later phases, seems to have reduced itself to a question as to the disposition of the two criminal clerics, Brandolin and Saraceni. The other questions, which after all touched a

profounder stratum of ecclesiastical policy, were left on one side for the moment in the all-absorbing consideration of how to dispose of the Abbé and the Canon. But the Pope soon began to show his dissatisfaction with the arrangement, if it was to be considered final. He raised once more the questions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Ceneda; of the papal claim to examine bishops; of the return of the Jesuits; above all, he desired to punish those hardy theologians who had dared to support Venice in her successful resistance to curial encroachments.

The hero of the whole episode, Fra Paolo Sarpi, continued to live quietly in his convent of the Servites at S. Fosca. The Government received warning from Rome that danger was threatening. In its turn it cautioned Fra Paolo. But he paid little or no heed. For a man who had so completely renounced the world, who had so thoroughly achieved the *gran rifiuto*, death, whenever it might come, had few terrors, as he himself abundantly proved. On the 25th October, 1607, towards five o'clock in the evening, as he was returning to his convent accompanied only by his body servant, Fra Marino, and the old nobleman, Alessandro Malipiero, he was assailed by three assassins. They inflicted wounds in three places, twice in the neck, while the third, and most serious wound, left the dagger fixed in the right cheek-bone. Sarpi fell to the ground unconscious. The assassins, after firing their guns to frighten any passers-by, fled towards the *Fondamente nuove*, where they took boat and escaped, landing at Ravenna, and so making their way into the Papal States, in which they found not only shelter but a welcome.

Sarpi's life was saved by the assiduous care of his physicians. He himself showed his belief that the blow had been launched from Rome, when, punning on the sharpness of the stiletto, he said, "I recognise the Roman style." Other attempts to destroy Sarpi's life are reported; the very inmates of his own cloister could not be trusted. There were rumours of a plot to kidnap him and to convey him to Rome. One of his colleagues, Fra Fulgenzio Manfredi, the Franciscan who had ventured to surrender himself to the Vatican, was well received at first, but ended

his life, after a useless humiliation and recantation, on the Campo dei Fiori, hanged first and then burned. Sarpi remained in Venice, carefully watched over by the Government, whose faithful and able adviser he continued to be. They offered him a guard for his security, and a house on the piazza; but such precautions annoyed him. He would only accept the construction of a covered way and a separate door, which allowed him to reach his gondola, and so to attend at the palace, without passing through the streets. 1607.

He lived for many years, occupied with his studies and the continual resolution of questions which the Executive submitted to his judgment. On Easter Eve, 1622, while engaged in the archives, he was seized with a violent shivering fit. It was the beginning of the end, though his constitution resisted for another year. On Epiphany of 1623 he was called to the palace, and, though very ill, he determined to obey. When he returned to his convent he knew himself stricken for death. On 14th January he took to his bed. When the brothers gathered in tears about his couch he said, "I have many a time heartened you up, it is your turn now to hearten me." His faithful, inseparable friend and biographer, Fra Fulgenzio, was summoned to the College. "How is he?" they said. "At the last," replied Fulgenzio. "And his intellect?" "Quite clear." Then with an incredible ruthlessness, which was also a supreme recognition of what they were about to lose, they proposed three questions to the dying statesman. Sarpi dictated his answers, which were read in the Senate and acted upon. He was rapidly growing worse as night came on; still he was able to say with a smile, "Praised be God; what is His pleasure pleases me; and with His help we will through with this last act becomingly." Later on he said, "Well, let us go whither God calls us." Then, falling into a delirium, they heard him murmur, "I must to S. Mark's. It is late. There is much to do." About one o'clock in the morning he turned to his friend Fulgenzio, embraced and kissed him, saying, "Do not stay here to see me in this state. It is not right. Go you to bed; and I will return to God whence I came." The end was now at hand. Sarpi made one last

effort; crossed his arms on his breast; his head fell back, and he died. *Esto perpetua*, "May she endure,"
1623. were the last words on his lips—a prayer which his audience took as on behalf of his beloved Republic. His own temper, sane, clear, incisive; his own personality, sad, gentle, aloof; have outlived the State he served so well. With Paolo Sarpi expired the vigorous intellect, the calm courage, of the better Venetian spirit.

CHAPTER XXI

The development of the Council of Ten : its place in the Constitution—The *Zonta* : its importance—Functions—Safety of the State—Purity of morals—Illegal action of the Ten in the case of Foscarei—Definition of the field of the Ten—*Secretissime*—Delegation of powers—*Esecutori contra la Bestemmia*—*Tre Inquisitori di Stato*—Reasons assigned for creating the Three—Nature of the Three—The *Maggior Consiglio* and the Ten clash—The case of Da Lezze, and of the *bravi*—The *Zonta* disappears—The position of Venice as judged by the Inquisitor Donà—The Spanish conspiracy—The case of Giambattista Bragadin, and of Antonio Foscarini—Growing dislike of the Ten, fed by the growing poverty of a large part of the nobility, who withdraw from commerce, and are ruined by extravagance, and therefore become unfit to fill the office of Councillor of the Ten—The economic condition of Venice—Renier Zeno : his attempted reforms—The action of the Ten brings on a commission to examine their rights—Real victory of the Ten—The second attack—The new condition—French philosophical ideas—Angelo Querini—Giorgio Pisani—The Doge Paolo Renier.

The third point upon which Venice continued to display a vital activity after the middle of the sixteenth century was in the development of her constitution, by the growth of its most potent member, the Council of Ten. 1550.

The great stability of the Venetian political machinery, which impressed Europe with a sense of power in the Republic, and contained the secret of that long persistence of her osseous structure after real vitality had left the State, was due in a large degree to the vigilance with which the Ten watched over the interests of the city which they governed. It will be remembered that the Council of Ten was established in 1310, after the conspiracy of Tiepolo. In its origin it was a temporary institution, a committee of public safety,

designed to meet a single crisis, and not intended to be a permanent member of the Venetian constitution. It
1550. was extraneous to the general lines of that constitution which started from its basis in the Great Council, and passed upwards through the Senate, the College, the Ducal Council, to the Doge. But the size of the Great Council, and of the Senate, while excellent for legislative purposes, rendered their movements cumbersome and slow, ill adapted to meet sudden emergencies, and incapable of preserving secrecy on affairs of State. The Venetians, therefore, first provisionally, and then permanently, retained the Council of Ten as an alternative branch to the Senate, with which it was on a level in the constitutional pyramid, though outside the lines of that pyramid. It was in the competence of the College to send affairs to be dealt with either by the Senate or by the Ten. The Senate retained the ordinary management of the State, finance, the army and navy, diplomacy; but all extraordinary and urgent business was confided to the care of the Ten, in accordance with the wide definition of its field of action, as the safety of the State and the preservation of morals. The Ten were competent to cite any case before their tribunal; to make special and secret expenditure; to give private instructions to ambassadors; in short, that Council became the real master of Venice.

There was another reason which accounts for the preponderating position of the Ten in the Venetian constitution. In the days of its earliest establishment, either through diffidence of its own anomalous position in the State, or through dread of private vendetta, the Council, when dealing with a serious case, had been accustomed to ask the Senate to strengthen its hands by an addition, or *Giunta*, of Senators, elected for that special occasion. This *Giunta*, or *Zonta*, became a permanent institution in 1529. Seats were given to the most prominent members of each of the other Councils of State. Thus the Ten became, as it were, the quintessence of the deliberative and executive authorities in Venice. Its action if impugned was sure to be defended by the most weighty members in each Council, members of the

Zonta, who naturally supported the conduct of that most powerful body to which they belonged.

The constitutional history of Venice during the 1550. last two centuries and a half of her existence, is the history of a slow but growing reaction against the overweening authority of the Ten.

The power of the Ten rested in the first instance upon the declaration that its functions were to provide for the safety of the State and to preserve the purity of morals—a field so wide that it included almost every action of which a citizen was capable. But, as time went on, the rapid growth of the decemviral authority, and the perpetual interference in all matters of importance, rendered a definition of those terms absolutely necessary. The first outbreak of resentment against the Ten was brought about by the illegal action of that body in the case of Foscari's deposition. As we have seen, this Council ordered the Doge to abdicate; but, by the constitution, the Doge was forbidden to take such a step except upon a vote of the Great Council and the advice of the *Consiglieri Ducali*. The Great Council resented this infringement of their rights, and the authority of the Ten was declared to be limited to those matters which might be submitted to them as *secretissime*, or most delicate (1468). But the term "most delicate" was still wide enough to cover all important affairs of State, and the practical efficiency of the Ten was so great that the reform of 1468 did little to diminish the power of that Council. It is the Ten who conduct the war of Ferrara in 1483, and the dangerous complications of the League of Cambray were dealt with by them.

The terror which that League inspired, the haunting dread of being absorbed by Spain, the necessity under which Venice found herself of devoting her whole energies to her own preservation, all helped to strengthen the hands of the most powerful body in the constitution. And this period of concentration is marked by a new departure in the Council of Ten. It began to delegate its powers to sub-committees, directly dependent upon and responsible to itself, and therefore one step farther removed from responsible

touch with the constituency of Venice, the Great Council, and the legislature of Venice, the Senate. In the region
 1550. of public morals the Ten created the *Esecutori contra la Bestemmia* (1537)—a committee which took cognisance of every kind of vice, and attempted to check corruption by a terrorising penal code; and in the region of public safety the Ten created the Three Inquisitors of State, to deal more efficiently with treason, which the gold and the intrigues of Spain led them to suspect in every Venetian subject (1539).

When the proposal to create the Three Inquisitors was first submitted to the Council of Ten, the reason given for that step was solely the impossibility of proceeding with sufficient secrecy and despatch in so large a body as the Ten. That is to say, the same cause which led to the creation, the permanent establishment, and the power of the Ten, led now to the creation of the Three. The sale of State secrets, as was proved by the case of Abondio already recorded, had become a regular and lucrative trade, and neither the secretaries of the Ten nor of the Senate could be trusted. The Venetian ambassador writes from Spain declaring that the contents of all his despatches are communicated to the Spanish resident in Venice, and adds that it is not possible *governare stato dove manca la segretezza*. The Venetians felt that constant vigilance and severe examples were necessary if diplomacy, which after Cambray they considered as their only weapon of defence, was not to be rendered absolutely futile. They accordingly created the Three Inquisitors for that special purpose. The Three were (1) elected for one year; (2) were re-eligible; (3) had power to try and to condemn, but were obliged to publish the sentence in the Great Council; (4) were invested with the same authority as that possessed by the Ten; (5) when the Three were not unanimous they were obliged to submit the case to the Ten. The Inquisitors were distinctly a committee of the Ten, acting only through a delegation of the powers of the Ten. But clause 4, which invested them with the same authority as that of the Ten, gave them the right of inquisition into the morals of Venetian subjects, and

their action in this respect soon rendered them hateful to a nobility which, for various reasons, was growing both 1582.
impoverished and corrupt.

This antipathy found expression in 1582, when the first really serious difference between the constituency of Venice, the Great Council, and the Council of Ten, was brought about by two events of small moment in themselves, but sufficient to set on foot that hostility between the *Maggior Consiglio* and the Ten which lasted till the fall of the Republic. The Great Council refused to elect Andrea da Lezze as a member of the *Zonta*, and the Ten, who desired his presence in return for his money, secured their object by illegally increasing the number of Procurators who sat in the *Zonta ex officio*, and nominating Da Lezze to the post. The Great Council, however, refused ratification, and carried its point. The second event brought the Ten into collision with the riotous element in the Venetian nobility. A party of young patricians went to the Lido accompanied by their *bravi*; they fell in with a party of *bravi* alone; they insulted a woman of that company, and were thoroughly thrashed by the independent *bravi*, who then, that same day, reported the affair to the Ten. The nobles appealed to the same tribunal the following day, and were told that they had got what they deserved. This quarrel brought out the relative strength of the parties in the *Maggior Consiglio*. At the next election of the *Zonta*, the full complement of fifteen was not chosen; and this act was understood to mark disapproval of the conduct of the Ten, and led to an effort to revive the law of 1468, and to define the word *secretissime*, without, however, arriving at any positive conclusion. The upshot of the whole episode was that the *Zonta* disappeared for the present, and Venice was warned that a serious split existed between the mass of the nobility and government.

But the inherent efficiency of the Ten, and its delegation, the Three Inquisitors, rendered it impossible that they should not retain the real authority in the State. The more serious the difficulties and dangers which threatened the Republic, the more certain the continuance of their power.

At the opening of the seventeenth century Venice was embroiled in a furious quarrel with Paul V., and fully convinced that the Pope would use the arms of Spain to reduce the Republic to obedience, if he were able. Though to the eyes of Europe, and probably to the eyes of most Venetians, the city appeared to be in enjoyment of undoubted security, and had little else to occupy it than a consideration of its pleasures, yet to the governing body the situation wore a very different aspect. How it struck a contemporary sufficiently informed on the subject, we may gather from the following memoranda, jotted down by the Inquisitor Donà in his own copy of the regulations for the Three Inquisitors of State. The date is 1612. "Right piteous is our condition. Alone we cannot resist; allies we have not, neither ready enough nor warm enough. Treaties we cannot construct upon any terms which are not ruinous to us.

"Condemned: for frequenting the Spanish ambassador's house, and for betting there on elections to the Great Council, Alvise Battagia, ten years in prison.

"Alvise Gabriele, for betting in the ambassador's house, three years in a lighted prison; and very cheap he got off.

"The Bishop of Laconia expelled from the city for suspicious relations with ambassadors.

"Domenico Moro, for suspicious dealings in the house of the Spanish ambassador.

"The Spanish ambassador has his house full of *bravi* and assassins, and keeps a bank to receive bets on elections to the Great Council. One of these bandits declares that the ambassador intends to blow up the Great Council, and that he has stored in his house barrels of powder, which he pretends are full of figs and oil."

And this dread of Spanish plots, of Spanish gold, of Spanish treachery, received confirmation a few years later when the famous Spanish conspiracy was brought to light. The Duke of Ossuna, Viceroy of Naples, and Alfonso della Queva, Marquis of Bedmar, Spanish ambassador in Venice, were supposed to be at the bottom of the plot. The immediate agents were found among that loose stratum of society, *bravi*, soldiers of fortune, broken men, who were

said to haunt the Spanish ambassador's houses; ready to turn their hand to any deed of violence, and loving 1618. bragadoccio, mystery, assassination, for their own sake, for the excitement and piquancy which they gave to life. The chief of these agents was a certain Giacomo Pierre, a Frenchman. It was he who stirred the fantasy of Ossuna to contemplate the sudden seizure of Venice by means of boats, which were to enter the lagoon at Malamocco and steal up to the Piazzetta under cover of night. At the same time, however, Pierre had opened secret relations with the Venetian Resident at Naples, Spinelli, from whom he demanded employment at Venice, in return for the revelation of secrets vitally important to the Republic. Pierre had in his company two other Frenchmen, Regnault, who acted as his secretary, and Langlade, who professed to be an artificer in Greek fire. Spinelli determined to send all three to Venice, though Contarini, the ambassador in Rome, did not fail to inform his Government of the doubtful character enjoyed by the newcomers.

When the three reached Venice the Government was in doubt how to treat them. They were left alone, unempoyed, but watched. Finally, on further representations from Spinelli, who was alarmed at some hints of assassination conveyed by Pierre in a letter, Pierre and Langlade were received into Venetian employment. Pierre began, on the one hand, to win the confidence of the Government by constantly giving information as to Ossuna's designs against Venice, his intention to attack the city with the Neapolitan fleet; on the other, to attempt the fidelity of the mercenary troops in pay of the Republic, and to lay the basis of a plot inside Venice itself. Ossuna's fleet was really in the Adriatic, but it never came near Venice; it suffered severely in a storm off Manfredonia, and Pierre's operations, which were to take place in concert with the fleet, were delayed. Meantime the Ten had received anonymous warning to beware of the Frenchmen, and they gave orders that Pierre and Langlade should both embark on board the fleet; but Pierre was able to avoid these orders for a while. Meantime a young Frenchman, Balthazar

Juven, nephew of the Marshal Lesdiguières, had arrived in Venice. He made friends with a member of Pierre's 1618. conspiracy, a certain Moncassin, who endeavoured to persuade him to take part in the plot. Juven pretended to agree. He revealed everything, however, to the Doge; and Moncassin, seeing his own danger, turned informer in full. The matter, was of course, entrusted to the Ten, who, after convincing themselves of the truth of the denunciation, arrested Regnault and the Brothers Bouleaux. These three were strangled and hung by one leg to the gibbets between the columns. Pierre and a certain Rossetti, who were with the fleet, were executed by the Admiral, and Langlade, who had escaped to Dalmatia, was pursued, but we do not know whether he was caught or not. The serious extent of the conspiracy, the number of *bravi* and vagabonds who had been induced to join Pierre, was proved by the sudden way in which the inns and lodging-houses were emptied at the sight of the three bodies hanging between the columns of the Piazzetta.

The Spanish conspiracy came to nothing. But that Spanish gold was corrupting the impoverished Venetian aristocracy became evident soon afterwards (1620) in the case of Giambattista Bragadin. He had secured his election to the Senate, along with many others, by a fraudulent use of ballot balls. He turned his position as senator to account by selling to the Spanish ambassador, Bedmar's successor, information of what took place in the Council Chamber. His method was to use a particular faldstool for his devotions at the Frari. In a crack in this faldstool he left his informations in writing. A secretary from the embassy used the same place of worship, and withdrew the informations as he found them. The treason was discovered by a monk of the order, whose curiosity was aroused by such frequent and fervent devotions. In the interval between the departure of one worshipper and the punctual arrival of the next, he abstracted the treacherous correspondence, and consigned it to the Doge. Bragadin was hung between the two columns of the Piazzetta, and the Spanish ambassador found it expedient to retire from Venice.

There can be no doubt that treason was rife in Venice, that the danger from Spain was real and pressing, and that all the vigilance of the Ten barely sufficed to counteract the vicious tendency and the danger. But within this obscure region of bribes, of plots, of treachery, of sudden executions, a case was about to arise which was destined to deal a severe blow at the reputation of the Ten, and to give a ground for attack to its growing number of enemies inside the State. Antonio Foscarini, after serving in various posts of trusts, received the appointment of ambassador to the Court of S. James in 1609. When he had been at his post for a short time, it was discovered that the contents of his despatches were being communicated to the representatives of other powers in England. Suspicion fell on Foscarini's secretary, Scaramelli, who was dismissed, and his place supplied by Giulio Muscorno. At first Muscorno and his chief were on satisfactory terms, but after a while serious disagreements arose. Muscorno was a young man of pleasant manners and various accomplishments; he became very popular with the Queen and her ladies; he spoke soft Venetian, which they liked; he could play the guitar; and he could mimic his master. His head was soon turned, and he began to neglect his duties. He applied to Foscarini for a letter of recommendation to some person of importance, which the ambassador refused. Muscorno vowed that he would be revenged, and said so openly. Foscarini's own conduct was not above reproach on the score of extravagance in outward show, of freedom of conversation, and of ostentatious indifference to religion. His angry secretary published a volume entitled *Sayings and doings of the Ambassador Foscarini*. Muscorno was implicated with the Archbishop of Canterbury and a Sir — Smith, who had advanced him money. The scandal became vociferous. Muscorno asked leave to return to Venice; and when he arrived there he denounced Foscarini as having himself sold the copies of his own despatches, and as being an unworthy representative of the Republic; given over to irreligion and loose living; one who allowed himself to speak of the Queen as "a woman of the town." It was all mere calumny; but the idea that State

secrets might have been sold was enough to put the Venetian Government in a tremor. Foscarini was recalled, and
1618. both he and his accuser were tried before the Inquisitors. After a long period of uncertainty, and the most careful collection of evidence from London and other Courts, Foscarini was acquitted, in 1618, and Muscorno condemned to two years' imprisonment in the fortress of Palma.

So far the ends of justice seem to have been met, except that Muscorno's punishment was inadequate. But the suspicion of treason, once created, could not be allayed, Foscarini, though acquitted, remained under observation, and his own conduct led to his ultimate ruin. In England he had made the acquaintance of a Lady Arundel. That lady was now resident in Venice for the education, she said, of her children, *con modi e costumi italiani*. Foscarini renewed his intimacy, and at Lady Arundel's house he met the Tuscan minister, and the secretaries of the Imperial and the Spanish ambassadors. This fact was sufficient to furnish the grounds for a second attack on the unfortunate diplomatist. Whether Muscorno was at the bottom of this renewed persecution or not is uncertain. The information against Foscarini was laid by a professional spy, Girolamo Vano. Foscarini found himself arrested and accused of selling State secrets. His trial was entrusted to the Three Inquisitors. On the 20th April, 1622, the Inquisitors reported to the Ten, who condemned the accused, as a traitor, to be strangled in prison that same night, and to be hung by one leg in the Piazzetta the following morning. Foscarini met his death with fortitude, after calmly dictating his will to the chief jailor and an assistant.

But the spectacle of the strangled corpse not only terrified, it angered the nobility. This feeling of rage against the power of the Ten, and its delegation the Three, was increased and justified when, within four months of Foscarini's execution, it was discovered that he had suffered unjustly. The infamous informer, Girolamo Vano, was in his turn strangled; and the Council did all that lay in their power to make amends. By an order, which was printed, published to the whole city, and sent to

all foreign courts, they declared their fatal error; they exhumed, and reburied with all pomp, the body of the murdered senator; but such a flood of lurid light had been let in upon the dark places of the Ten, and such suspicion of their procedure was aroused, that they never recovered their prestige. They had given a handle to their enemies, and these were not slow to take advantage of it. 1618.

The cases of the Spanish conspiracy, of Bragadin, and of Foscarini, displayed a corrupt state of society in Venice, with which the Ten endeavoured to deal vigorously in the interests of the State. But the exercise of their power, showing itself as the only real efficient power in the State, roused the jealousy of the other branches of the constitutional structure, the *Maggior Consiglio* and the Senate. This jealousy now drew support from a radical transformation which had been slowly taking place inside the constituent body of the Venetian oligarchy, the noble caste. The long conflict on the mainland of Italy in the fifteenth century, the continual drain of war with the Turks, the immense and unprofitable expenditure entailed by the League of Cambray, had all contributed to exhaust not only the public treasury but private resources as well. The blow which Venetian commerce received through the opening of the Cape route, and by the altered conditions of the Levant after the capture of Constantinople, had caused Venetian merchants to withdraw their capital from trade, and to invest it in banking, or in large landed possessions on *terra ferma*. In 1610 Leonardo Donà, addressing the Senate on the economic conditions of the Republic, declared 'that "commerce now lacks capital. The nobility takes no more part in trade; all its resources are tied up in funds or in real estate, and expended either on house property or on amusements in the city." The patriciate had withdrawn from commerce; at the same time luxury was on the increase, as is shown by the repetition of useless sumptuary laws. One noble house vied with another in the splendour of its display: it became derogatory for a patrician to engage in the acquisition of wealth. The greater houses were able to support this tax on their resources. But a large

number of the less substantial nobility was utterly im-
1618. poverished. In the interests of the dignity of the
State it was considered desirable that the highest
offices, such as those of Inquisitor or member of the Ten,
should not be filled by any who were unable to maintain a
fitting train of life, or who, owing to their impecuniosity,
were open to bribes. And thus a vast schism took place
inside the aristocratic body. On the one side were many
nobles who, while still members of the Great Council,
were excluded from participation in the supreme offices
of the administration; on the other, a few wealthy
families, in whose hands the whole power in the State
threatened to become concentrated. The divergence between
the two classes grew more and more accentuated, and it
was to the poorer class of nobles that the reformers looked
for support in their attack on the position of the Ten and
the Three. The poor nobles, called *Barnabotti*, commanded
a majority in the Great Council, and the struggle which was
now approaching resolved itself into a contest between the
Maggior Consiglio, the basis of the whole Venetian constitu-
tion, and the Council of Ten, the efficient member of the
Venetian executive.

This commercial impoverishment, which produced the
class of *Barnabotti*, was effecting not merely the noble caste
but the whole population as well. Leonardo Donà, in the
speech from which we have already quoted, first confirms
the growing poverty in Venice, and then points to the
universal decline of trade as its cause; foreign merchants
no longer come to Venice; wanting them, industries fall off;
population diminishes; consumption of produce decreases;
customs dues shrink; the treasury suffers. He lays the
blame for all these disasters at the door of protection.
Venice is a close port, with heavy duties on imports and
exports, and governed by laws which prevent any but
Venetian citizens from trading by sea, or from buying direct
from traders and not through the medium of Venetian
middlemen; these oppressive burdens, he said, had thrown all
Mediterranean commerce into the hands of the Florentines
at Leghorn, and of the Genoese, both of whom were free

traders; while outside the Mediterranean the Levant trade was absorbed by the English and the Dutch. The remedy, he suggested, was to open the port of Venice to foreign traders and merchants. If this were done, the natural advantages of her geographical position, lying so far into the heart of Europe, would again make themselves felt, and would restore prosperity to the State. "Unless some such step be taken," continued Donà, "your Excellencies must remember that we have no more ships, no sailors, no navigation, few merchants, little capital, the population is leaving the city, and even those merchants who still have houses, intend to follow." The Government, in face of this disastrous condition of affairs granted the freedom of the port to foreigners, under certain conditions; and this proving insufficient to restore commercial activity, they, later on (1662), removed the import dues, but unwisely retained the export dues. The result was that merchants who brought their goods to Venice still experienced difficulty in distributing them over the continent; the goods lay locked up in Venetian warehouses. The commercial decline of the port continued, and the poverty it entailed produced a whole class among the citizens who were hostile to the Government from which they were excluded. This hostility coalesced with the indignation against the ever-growing power of the few great families, who made the Ten, the real core of the administration, their private appanage.

A reformer appeared in the person of Renier Zeno. He had distinguished himself during his Roman embassy by attacking various Venetian noblemen of note. He alleged that Antonio Donà had been guilty of appropriating the public funds, and that the Cardinal Dolfin was a paid emissary of France. He made himself so unpopular at the Vatican that the Government sent an ambassador-extraordinary, who took the management of affairs out of Zeno's hands. When Zeno returned to Venice he became the champion of the reform party. In spite of strong opposition from the executive the Great Council elected him a Ducal Councillor. Some violent words of his, uttered in the College, were held to be an insult to the Doge. The Ten

met and summoned Zeno to present himself within eight days. He failed to do so, and was banished for a year to Palma.

1625. During this period the Doge and his family, without raising any opposition from the chief authorities in the State, committed several acts in direct contravention of the statutes. One of the Doge's sons accepted a cardinal's hat, and two others were elected to the Senate. The reformers succeeded in securing the recall of Zeno, whose time of banishment had nearly expired. On his return to Venice he was at once elected a member of the Ten, and began his attack on the illegal actions of the Doge and his family. He insisted on delivering in person an admonition to the Supreme Magistrate, which he justified upon the ground of the duty he owed to the Great Council, from whom, as member of the Ten, he declared that he drew all his authority. In making this statement he was attempting to reaffirm the original conception of the constitution, that all offices of State drew their authority from the great constituent body, the *Maggior Consiglio*. The Doge gave way, and ordered the election of two other senators in the room of his two sons.

So far, in spite of considerable tension, matters had proceeded in order. But Zeno now insisted that the admonition to the chief of the State should be registered. This called up all the friends of the Doge, and in replying to them Zeno, in the Senate, made a further violent attack on the dual conduct, pointing out fresh instances in which he had contravened his coronation oath. Donato, a member of the Doge's party, rejoined by an attack on Zeno, declaring that he had acted illegally as a member of the Ten, in administering an admonition without the consent of his colleagues. This was a statement of the independent position of the Ten as against Zeno's view, that a decemvir was individually answerable to the *Maggior Consiglio*. When Zeno mounted the tribune for the purpose of replying, two of the *Capi de' Dieci* ordered him to descend. He refused, declaring that they had no authority to give such an order in the Senate. The chiefs said, "Then we shall summon the Ten." The sitting broke up in confusion. The question was now fairly posed

between the *Capi de' Dieci* and the *Maggior Consiglio*. Zeno attacked the two in the first sitting of the Great Council. He moved that they had rendered themselves liable to a fine, and requested the Council to declare whether or not a member of the Ten was within his rights in admonishing the Doge. The Council voted in favour of Zeno, and he secured a triumph. 1625.

But the victory of Zeno exposed him to the bitterest hatred from the ducal party. On the evening of 30th December, 1627, as he was standing at the *Porta della Carta* of the palace, he was attacked by five individuals, and so severely wounded with a hatchet that he fell to the ground in a faint. He recovered, and his feelings against the Ten were more than ever embittered. He declared that they protected the Doge's party while they left him exposed to danger of assassination. The flight of the Doge's son Giorgio, immediately after the deed, left no doubt whence the blow had come. Giorgio was deprived of his nobility, his goods were confiscated, and, along with two of his companions, and two gondoliers, he was banished from the State. But the Ten took no active measures to enforce the decree, and Giorgio was able to realise and save his property, and to live unmolested at Ferrara. Zeno insisted that, as he had suffered in execution of his commission from the Great Council, the trial and punishment of his assailants belonged to that Council, not to the Ten. The Ten replied by enjoining upon him silence as regarded all matters already decided by their tribunal. Zeno kept silence for a while, but at length he spoke in the *Maggior Consiglio*, attacking the murderers of liberty, and inveighing against the order of the Ten, which forbade free discussion of affairs. The Doge took part in the debate, constantly interrupted by Zeno: the sitting grew more and more stormy: the ducal party drowned the voices of their opponents by beating on the benches, and at last the assembly dissolved in uproar. The Ten immediately held a meeting. They ordered the arrest of Zeno, but instructed their officer to avoid finding him. They were afraid of a revolution. Zeno was cited to appear, and was condemned in contumacy to ten years' imprisonment in Cattaro.

This high-handed act, interfering with the freedom of debate in the Great Council, set the whole city in a blaze, and brought matters to a crisis. The Ten found themselves forced to give way. A commission to examine and revise the statutes of the Decemviral Council was appointed. Following up the current of hostility to the Ten, the Great Council cancelled as illegal the injunction to keep silence, and the sentence of banishment pronounced by the Ten; and further, ordered those documents to be erased from all public registers.

1627. The Commission presented its report, and many of its recommendations were accepted. The Ten lost its right to revise decisions of the Great Council, and some modifications in the election of its secretaries were approved. But the burning point—the jurisdiction over the patriciate—which the Commission wished to retain for the *Dieci*, raised now, as always, the most violent debate. It was proved, however, that the conduct of the nobles was essentially a matter of State importance, and the Commissioners carried their point. An order of the day was passed defining the limits of the Decemviral authority. It closed with these words: "The Council of Ten, and its chiefs, shall not interfere in any matters other than those above mentioned, without express orders from the *Maggior Consiglio*, which alone is able to regulate and define the authority of all the other magistracies in the Republic." This clause was designed as a sop to the defenders of the Great Council against the Ten; but, as a matter of fact, the Ten retained all, or nearly all, their ancient authority, and after this long struggle they still emerged as the real governing body in the State.

The episode of Renier Zeno had in reality been productive of very little effect. It serves to show that the Republic, at the close of its career, was endeavouring to return to its early constitutional conception, in which the *Maggior Consiglio* was the core of the administration. The conditions of Venice remained the same as before. There still existed the poorer class of nobles, in opposition to the few wealthy families who reserved to themselves the vital authority of the most powerful council in the State.

The opposition became active once more in the eighteenth century. The only difference between the opposition of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries is, that the members of the latter were tinged with philosophical revolutionary ideas imported from France. 1700.

The spirit of hostility to the Ten and the Three was fanned to a flame by a slight accident, which illustrates the looseness of the times and the petty tyranny which a Venetian noble was capable of exercising. Angelo Querini, a senator, in order to please a lady friend of a friend of his, procured an order of expulsion against a *modiste*, whose caps had not suited the lady in question. The *modiste* appealed to the Inquisitors of State, and they cancelled the order as unjust. Thereupon Querini began to complain of the intolerable tyranny of the Three. He quickly found sympathy, and formed a party among the poor nobles. The Three resolved to arrest and deport Querini to Verona. This act roused all the latent hostility of the Great Council, and, in 1761, they refused to elect the new members to the Council of Ten. The quarrel followed the same lines as the Zeno episode. A Commission was appointed to report on the authority of the Ten, and its delegation the Three. The Commission was divided, three signing a majority report in favour of the Inquisitors, and two presenting a minority report, in which they endeavoured to crush the tribunal of the Three, and to reduce all jurisdiction to the Ten alone. The whole episode, which ended in the complete triumph of the Three, is chiefly remarkable for the spirited and wise defence of that body by Marco Foscarini. "The tribunal has frequently saved the State from dangerous conspiracies. Its impartiality is above suspicion when we remember that office lasts for one year only, and that any of its members can easily be removed by a decree of the Great Council. The Three have no funds at their disposal. It is certain, from the universal testimony of all statesmen, that no aristocratic Government can last for long unless it provide some corrective for its defects; and these defects are want of rapidity and want of secrecy.

In some corner of the constitution we must place a rapid
1761. and a secret authority. The body which punishes
crimes will always be exposed to criticism and attack.
Thanks to the Great Council and the Magistrates, the State
has been able to preserve in efficiency the tribunal of the
Three while preventing it from affecting the constitution of
the Republic in any way."

But in spite of the triumph of the Conservative party,
French philosophical ideas were spreading rapidly in Venice,
sapping the authority of the Government, and encouraging
a general break-down of law and order. The Administration
endeavoured to react against the growing spirit; and when
the inefficiency of their policy caused an outcry against the
Ten, they tried to stifle criticism by closing all cafés and
wine-shops at nightfall, and forbidding the discussion of
political topics. The following notice was found posted up:
"The company of night thieves thanks the Chief of the Ten
for giving them the opportunity of winning their supper at
a reasonable hour."

The growing spirit of Republicanism found expression
when the Government proposed to take over the port, which
had hitherto been worked by a Guild. Giorgio Pisani
became the mouthpiece of the party, and declared such
a policy to be "anti-politic, anti-economic, anti-civil, anti-
forensic, anti-republican." Whenever a member of the
Government speaks we find his remarks deeply tinged with
a sense of disquietude, a dread of change, a presentiment of
the end. This feeling received full expression when Carlo
Contarini addressed the Great Council in 1779. "All is
in confusion, in disorder," he exclaimed; "our commerce
is languishing; bankruptcies continually prove it. Food is
exorbitantly dear. That which sufficed once to maintain
our families and left a margin to help the State, is now
insufficient to keep us alive." When the Doge, Paolo
Renier, speaks in 1780, the note is the same. "If there be
any State in the world which absolutely requires concord at
home, it is ours. We have no forces, neither on land nor on
sea; we have no alliances. We live by luck, by accident,
and solely dependent upon the conception of Venetian

prudence which others entertain about us." Renier thought the evil lay in the schism between the rich and the poor nobility; between the democratic revolutionary ¹⁷⁷⁹⁻ ideas espoused by the one party, and the conservative and rigid ideas maintained by the other. And yet, while statesmen were using such language in the Council Chamber, the population of Venice, in its cafés and salons, was entirely engrossed in discussing whether Vitalba, as Don Adone in Carlo Gozzi's *Droghe d'Amore*, really represented Pier Antonio Gratarol, Secretary to the Senate; and Ballarin was detailing the trivialities of Venetian society to his master, the ambassador of the Republic in France.

The Republicanism of Giorgio Pisani, however, was not destined to alter the constitution of Venice. In spite of his great popularity, which secured for him election as Procurator of S. Mark, he and his party were not as strong as the Inquisitors of State. In May, 1780, Pisani was arrested and deported to Verona.

CHAPTER XXII

CONCLUSION

THE long process of decay and death which has formed the dolorous theme of the preceding chapters, does not, however, represent the whole picture of Venetian decline. It is the essential fact about the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in Venice, but it was not the most obvious fact. During this period the Venetians were enjoying, in a way which attracted and dazzled Europe, that lovely home which they had constructed for themselves while the spirit of their constitutional vitality was still vivid within them. The osseous structure, the rib-work of the constitution, remained long after the spirit had departed. That beautiful and variegated structure, the city of Venice, survived, and still survives and floats upon the waters of the lagoon, though the force which gave it birth has disappeared. It is this external Venice which continues to exert such a potent fascination, and draws now, as it drew centuries ago, countless enthusiasts to the city in sea.

My endeavour in the course of these pages has been to display the inner working of the Venetian spirit, to grasp the essential features of Venetian political and constitutional life. We have seen how Venice was born under the pressure of barbaric invasion; how the mainland refugees settled like a flock of frightened birds upon the mud-banks of the lagoon; how the fusion of discordant elements took place under the dread of attack. The physical difficulties of their home gave the newcomers the mastery of seamanship,

and fitted them to take advantage of their opportunities, when the Carolingian revival of Europe created a demand for foreign merchandise. Venice was launched as a commercial race, and mistress of the Mediterranean. In the fourth Crusade, actuated by a purely selfish policy, she committed a crime when she sacked Constantinople. The immediate results of this action were materially advantageous. But the rapid development produced two consequences. The population of the city increased, and with the increase came a division—a distinction between rich and poor, destroying the ancient equality of the Venetians, and creating a caste. This double process led up to the settlement of the constitution. Venice emerged from the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio* under the dominion of a rigid oligarchy, with the Ten as its executive arm. The sack of Constantinople entailed further results. It brought Venice into collision with Genoa in a struggle for supremacy in the East. She fought and destroyed her rival. But each fresh success was surely leading to further complications. The continuous growth of population raised the question of her food supply. Without a food-yielding territory, Venice was in danger of starvation if defeated at sea. Her neighbouring princes, Scala, Carrara, Visconti, were weak compared with the Republic. Their feebleness offered her the occasion which she took. She put out her hand, created a land empire, and reached the apogee of her development.

But now arrived the consequences of her actions. The sack of Constantinople let the Turks into Europe. The destruction of the Genoese left them supreme in the Levant. Venice lost her Eastern trade.

The creation of a land empire roused the jealousy of Italian princes and the alarm of European sovereigns, lest the balance of power should be disturbed. Venice was crushed by the League of Cambray. The discovery of the Cape route completed her ruin. The rigidity of her constitution kept her alive to all appearances, but what remained was the mere shell; the vital spirit, the initiatory principle, had disappeared.

And yet it was a beautiful shell which the Venetian spirit had constructed as its dwelling place. A Venetian writer, Sansovino, calls his history of the city "*Venezia, citta nobilissima e singolare*": *nobilissima* in its pomp of palaces and the splendour of its decorative art, *singolare* for the beauty of its natural position, floating on the waters between sea and sky and Alps. The long series of eulogists, stretching through the centuries, bear sufficient witness to the truth of Sansovino's title. Cassiodorus, Longinus, Enrico da Rimini, Petrarch, Coryat, Fynes Moryson, St. Didier, De Brosse, George Sand, Goethe, Byron, Shelley; Rogers, and so on, through the list of living moderns, all have paid their tribute of devotion to that wonderful seashell of the Adriatic, which the Venetian spirit evolved for itself during the long process of its birth, growth, and decay. There can be no mistake as to the fervour of the passion; it is impossible to doubt the sincerity of the accent. Take, by way of example, Cassiodorus's "Hic vobis aquatiliū avium more domus est"; or Canal's "Por honor de cele noble cite que l'en apelle Venise"; or Moryson's "This most noble city, as well for the situation, and for the freedom which citizens and very strangers have, and for manifold other causes, is worthily called in Latine Venetia, as it were *veni etiam*, that is, Come again"; or Howell's "Renowned Venice, the admiredst citie in the world, a citie that all Europe is bound unto. Did you know the rare beauty of the virgin city, you would quickly make love to her"; or Shelley's

"Sun-girt city, thou hast been
Ocean's bride and then her queen."

These writers vie with each other in the warmth of their admiration.

Nor is this fervour altogether singular. In no other city of the world, perhaps, have natural beauty of position and wealth of decorative art combined to produce so homogeneous a whole. Large tracts of Venetian history may be explored in the architecture of Venice. The remnants of more ancient temples, the columns and capitals of so many

Venetian churches, recall the flight from the mainland and the earliest settlement in the lagoons. S. Mark's, with its Eastern aroma, bears continual witness to the connection between Venice and the Greek Empire, and is the monument of her greatest glories. The Ducal Palace, and the splendid private dwellings which line the Grand Canal, are reminiscent of Venetian land empire.

Her painting, no less than her architecture, is intimately connected with the history of the Republic. That art bloomed to perfection after Venice had touched her apogee, had reached her highest point of vigour in her development upon the mainland; and those master brushes of Veronese and Tintoret were largely employed in chronicling the glories of Venice in the home of her chief magistrate. After the League of Cambray the Republic resigned herself to the rôle of magnificent self-presentation, and her great masters, one and all—Titian, Tintoret, Veronese, Tiepolo—assisted her design; they are decorators called upon to make the Ducal Palace, the Guild Hall, the private house, worthy of the Venetian claim to be the most gorgeous city in Europe.

Whether or not the absence of any considerable literature in Venice is to be explained on the theory that poetry was unessential to her rôle, that she required the decorative rather than the reflective arts, the fact remains that the Republic gave birth to no poet of the first rank. Her chief services to literature undoubtedly lie in the protection and encouragement which she offered to the art of printing; and she received her reward in the glory which such names as John of Spires, Jenson, Ratdolt, Aldus, Giolitti, bestow upon the city of the lagoon.

The enthusiasm which Venice awakened in those who visited her is no doubt due in part to the amenity and the pleasurability of life on the lagoons. Moryson notes "the freedom which the citizens and very strangers have." Venice laid herself out to be a city of diversion for Europe, "the revel of the earth, the masque of Italy," and she succeeded. "Veni etiam" she is supposed to have said to her guests, and most of them were only too ready to return. Of

course this glittering sea of pleasure concealed dark abysses of corruption, where a whole world of loose characters lived, moved, and had their being. We catch glimpses of this doubtful region in such cases as those of Bragadin, the sixteenth-century Cagliostro, with his *anima d'oro* to gull the greedy and needy patricians; or again in that vivid episode of Venetian life, the murder of Lorenzino de' Medici; or in Lord Orford's curious publication; or, above all, in the unpublished calendars of the criminal departments of the Ten or the Holy Office.

The decline of the Republic, the failure of her vital force, did not interrupt the flow of pleasure, nor check the flaunting glories of civic state. Amusement, ease of life, when business and battles were over, was still sought for and found. The political effacement of the Republic, and the rigid prohibition of politics as a topic, left Venetian society with little but the trivialities of life to engage its attention. The *Illustrissimi*, in periwig and crimson cloak and sword, sauntered on the Liston, at the foot of the Campanile, in the Square. The ladies over their chocolate tore each other's characters to shreds. Venice laughed when the following *mot*, at the expense of the Procuratessa Tron, went the round of the salons: "La Trona vendeva el palco più cara dela persona." "Gavè razon," replied that spirited lady, "perchè questa, al caso, la dono." They might discuss with ribald tongues the eccentric tastes of the great Procuratore Andrea Tron, but if they ventured to suggest a remedy for financial embarrassments, if they dared to contemplate a reform, deportation to Verona stared them in the face. And so life was limited to the Liston, the café, the casino; to a first night at the Teatro San Moise or San Samuele; to a cantata at the Mendicante, the Pietà, or Incurabili. Their excitements were scandal and gambling—though the game of panfil was forbidden upon pain of death, *pena la vita al solito*—varied by the interest which might be roused by a battle-royal between Goldoni and Gozzi, or the piquant *processo* of Pier Antonio Gratarol. Sometimes the whole city would be thrown into a flutter by the arrival of some princes incogniti, like the Counts of

the North, when the ladies would put on their finest dresses, and fight with each other outside the royal box for the honour of presentation.

Tiepolo painted their houses with hues as delicate, evanescent, aerial, as the miracle of a scirocco day on the lagoon; Longhi depicted their lives in the Ridotto, in the parlour of a convent, in the alcove; Chiari, Goldoni, Gozzi, Buratti, or Baffo, wrote for them; Galuppi, Jomelli, Hasse, Faustina Bordone, made music to them in their *conservatories*. There was taste—though rococo; there was wit—though malicious, in their salons, where the cicisbeo and the abbatino ruffled their laces, toyed with coffee-cups, learned to carry their hat upon their hip while leaning on the back of a lady's chair. And this diffusion of taste found its best expression in a late *rinascimento* of Venetian art and culture, pungent in Buratti, realistic in Longhi and Goldoni, fanciful and capricious in Carlo Gozzi; reminiscent of the great age, while looking forward to the modern world, to post-revolution art, in the work of that superb master Tiepolo, whose easel pictures might have hung in the *Salon*, and been painted by the most recent of *plein-airists*. It was a charming existence, which Venetians and foreigners alike enjoyed. The Venetians appeared to their visitors as a happy family, disturbed by no more serious troubles than the pretty tempers and humours of its pets. Goethe likens the Doge to "the grandpapa of all the race"; the heir to the Russian throne exclaims, "Voilà l'effet du sage gouvernement de la République. Ce peuple est une famille." An easy, elegant, charming life the Venetians spent in their beautiful chambers, stuccoed in low relief and tinted with mauve and lemon, with pistaccio green and salmon; there they read their Baffo, their Buratti, their Calmo; and thence late at night, or rather in the early morning, they were wont to pass across the lagoon to the Lido, where they made a matutinal supper and paid their orisons to the rising sun.

But all this charm, this amenity, this *decor* of life, was doomed to be swept away. Mightier forces of a younger and therefore more vigorous birth were at work beyond the

Alps. Could the Republic have survived the shock of the French Revolution, had she been able to resist Napoleon till England had time to appreciate the value of her position as a point of attack against the conquerer, and to come to her rescue, the State of Venice, whatever modifications she might have undergone in her constitution, would probably have maintained her independence.

That, however, was not to be. In 1796 Bonaparte arrived in Italy. He had the Austrians in front of him. Venetian territory was quite unprovided with defences sufficient to secure its neutrality. It became the field of operations for both armies. The Republic could only complain at Vienna and to Napoleon. The latter requisitioned as he pleased, and stormed when provisions did not come in to his orders. He threatened to impose a fine of one million lire on Vicenza if the Podestà did not instantly supply an ambulance train. The Republic was powerless. The Senate discussed the advisability of retiring from the continent altogether. Later on, they proposed to surrender the mainland provinces to Austria. Bonaparte had no sooner established his position against the Austrians, than he let it be seen that he was resolved to overthrow the Venetian Government. Immediately after the truce of Judenberg, he sent Junot to Venice. The General brought a letter in which his chief declared that all Venetian *terra ferma* was in arms against the French, and for this he held the Government responsible. He claimed the murderers of French soldiers, and demanded the instant disbanding of the armed masses, on threat of war. The College made a mild reply, in the hope of appeasing the fury of Bonaparte. But immediately afterwards an event occurred which caused Napoleon to declare war at once. The French commandant Laugier, on board the *Liberatore d' Italia*, was cruising about the Adriatic in search of Austrian ships. He approached the Lido, and made as though he were about to enter the Lido port. The commandant, Pizzomano, requested him to withdraw; but whether on purpose, or swept on by the tide, Laugier's ship continued to advance. Shots were exchanged, the *Liberatore* boarded, and Laugier was killed. This gave Napoleon his

pretext. By the secret clauses of the peace of Leoben, he had already assigned to the Emperor of Austria, Dalmatia and the mainland provinces between the Oglio and the Po. He was looking for an excuse to attack Venice, and the death of Laugier furnished him with one.

It was perfectly impossible for Venice to make any resistance by force. She had ships in the arsenal, but they were in bad repair, and without crews. Inside the city itself there was a party, imbued with the ideas of the Revolution, and desirous of upsetting the government of the Ten and the Three. The fall of the Republic was inevitable. The Government sent a deputation to Napoleon at Gratz. They found him in a domineering mood. His remarks were all prefaced by "*io voglio*," and he concluded thus: "I have 80,000 men and twenty gunboats, *io non voglio più Inquisitori, non voglio più Senato, sarò un Attila per lo Stato Veneto.*" This was language which had been used before towards Venice by the League of Cambray, by Ossuna, Viceroy of Naples; but this time it was on the lips of a man who could make it good. Napoleon was convinced that Venice had been treacherous to him, that she intended to cut off his retreat had his campaign against Austria miscarried. He was resolved that French troops should enter the city. Between Napoleon's insistence and a dread of a rising inside the town, the Government was forced to give way. The Procurator Pesaro expressed the common opinion when he exclaimed, "*Vedo che per la mia patria la xe finia*"; and the Doge when he said, "*Sta notte no semo sicuri nè anche nel nostro letto.*" On the 12th May the *Maggior Consiglio* passed a resolution which accepted a new form of government, subject to the approval of General Bonaparte. The Republic of Venice disappeared in the whirlwind of the French Revolution, and the Doge, as he laid aside the ducal bonnet, was able to say to his servant with only half a regret, "Take it away; we shall not use it any more." "*Tolè questo; no la doperò più.*"

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
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