The Radical Whigs, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon

Libertarian Loyalists to the New House of Hanover

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INTRODUCTION

If one looks at the early Hanoverian polity from 1760, after almost fifty years of successful Whig entrenchment, the accession of a new royal dynasty and ensuing Whig political dominance seem well-nigh inevitable. As we know, a Hanoverian-Whig ascendancy did occur and did prove durable. Yet that very longevity may create an impression of relentless inevitability that is quite misleading. As Eveline Cruickshanks puts it:

> Politics in the reigns of the first two Georges (1715-1760) have usually been looked at from the point of view of the reign of George III (1760-1820), which is viewing them through a distorting mirror.

Before 1715, contemporaries had little ground upon which to predict a Hanoverian-Whig hegemony; indeed, most Englishmen of the time would probably not have welcomed it. The early Hanoverian polity is best approached from the point of view of contemporaries as they themselves reached those years, from the Restoration era, the Revolution of 1688-89, and late Stuart England. The way people thought in 1714 and for a long time thereafter "was still dominated by the great events of the Revolution of 1688 and the Restoration of 1660, much as ours still is by those of the Second and First World Wars."[1] Their political and religious beliefs, intrinsically related to one another, were deeply rooted in the second half of the seventeenth century when the civil-war legacy invited the reinstatement and defense of political and religious orthodoxy.

This study of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two major early Hanoverian publicists, focuses on the political and religious conflicts that dominate the Restoration and post-Restoration world. This is the world that Trenchard and Gordon address in their publications, *The Independent Whig*, issued weekly from 20 January 1720 for almost a year, and *Cato's Letters*, published regularly in the London press from late 1720 for three years. The half century before the Hanoverian accession constitutes a determinative background that informs the politico-theological orthodoxy Trenchard and Gordon so assiduously challenge those four years in which their publications appear.

In Restoration England the Anglican Establishment and its principal supporters--the Anglican Cavaliers and after the Exclusion Crisis, the Anglican Tories--dominated politics. The real legacy of the 1688 Revolution and its so-called "Settlement" of 1689 was bitter strife between Tory and Whig parties. Most of that

[1]Eveline Cruickshanks, *Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45* (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1979), p. 1.

conflict was religious; High Anglicanism played a major role in the party contention. An Anglican hegemony characterized the Restoration polity and that Anglican ascendancy was a driving aspiration for a significant number of Englishmen after 1689. A powerful "Church party," the Restoration reality, remained an influential political force in post-Revolution England.

By the end of Queen Anne's reign, August 1714, the Whigs were a very fragile party, much weaker than the Tories and, in the elections of 1710 and 1713, less resilient than the Jacobites. There was nothing inevitable about the success of the Hanoverian accession and the Whig rise to power is even more amazing. Recent research underscores the survival of traditional Toryism in late Stuart England; one scholar, J. P. Kenyon, even believes the accession of Georg Ludwig, the Elector of Hanover, to the throne of Great Britain as King George I "ought to be ascribed to the workings of fate."[2] Indeed, as Richard R. Johnson comments, Kenyon's Ford Lectures, published subsequently as *Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689-1720,* "make it difficult to understand how the Tories ever fell from power."[3]

Those scholars who have highlighted the enduring strength of religious and political orthodoxy in late Stuart England, have also considered patriarchalism, divine-right monarchy, and the theory of divine providence to have become obsolete in early Hanoverian England. In this decade, however, the 1980s, new work on eighteenth-century English society rejects this view. Instead of demise, this scholarship insists on the enduring vitality of legitimist doctrine and High-Church ecclesiology during the reigns of the first two Georges.[4] The writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two of the most important journalists in early Hanoverian England, are additional evidence of the continuing dominance of religious orthodoxy and dynastic legitimism after 1714.

Trenchard and Gordon's weekly essays in the London press, from January 1720 to late July 1723, express, above all, their deep-seated fear of the endurance of politico-theological orthodoxy and their sincere as well as exceptional desire to defend "Revolution Principles." Their *Independent Whig* is an explicit challenge to

[2]J. P. Kenyon, *Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689-1720,* Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 169.

[3]Richard R. Johnson, "Politics Redefined: An Assessment of Recent Writings on the Late Stuart Period of English History, 1660-1714," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3d Ser., 35 (October 1978), n. 74, p. 713.

[4]J. A. W. Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought,* McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas (Kingston/Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), pp. 120-41; and J. C. D. Clark, *English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during the Ancien Regime,* Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

the pervasive and dangerous influence of High-Church doctrines. *Cato's Letters* are, to a considerable degree, an express, public effort to depict the evils of arbitrary monarchy, associated with Stuart absolutism, in contrast to the benefits of England's limited monarchy under the new House of Hanover and to vindicate the contract theory of government and the right of human beings to resist tyranny. Trenchard and Gordon recognize not only the persistence of High-Tory doctrine but the unpopularity, frequently justified, of the Hanoverian-Whig regime and they, thus, genuinely believe a Stuart restoration is a dangerous possibility. These two "Independent Whigs" are highly heterodox political and religious thinkers who try to bury the past in order to bring about the "Quiet and Stability of this Free State." They write, first and foremost, against what they considered counterreformation and counterrevolution.

Since the 1950s, scholars have recognized the importance of the works of Trenchard and Gordon. Early commentators underscore their role as transmitters of libertarian values on both sides of the Atlantic.[5] The most important recent reading of *Cato's Letters* presents Trenchard and Gordon as Country-opposition writers who attack government methods and measures they consider detrimental to the political and economic independence of the propertied classes in the exercise and fulfillment of their civic roles and duties. Country writers express their case against the Court in the following constitutional and moral terms. Placemen, including army officers, and pensioners who sit in the House of Commons, the Country writer charges, lack the political independence necessary to resist Court encroachments, when strong resistance is a requisite for the maintenance of the traditional balanced constitution against the perennial aggressions of prerogative power. Long Parliaments encourage politi-

[5]Clinton Rossiter, *The First American Revolution: The American Colonies on the Eve of Independence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, A Harvest Book, 1956), pp. 224-33; idem, *The Political Thought of the American Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, A Harvest Book, 1956), p. 68; idem, *Six Characters in Search of a Republic: Studies in the Political Thought of the American Colonies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956), pp. 133 and 237 [These three works are revised versions of Parts One, Two, and Three, respectively, of idem, *Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1953)]; Caroline A. Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (New York: Atheneum, 1968; first published by Harvard University Press, 1959), chap. 4; David L. Jacobson, ed., *The English Libertarian Heritage: From the Writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in* The Independent Whig *and* Cato's Letters, The American Heritage Series (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), "Introduction," pp. xvii-lx; idem, "Thomas Gordon's *Works of Tacitus* in Pre-Revolutionary America," *Bulletin of the New York Public Library* 69 (January 1965), pp. 58-64; Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 2; and idem, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970; first published in *Perspectives in American History* 1 [1967], pp. 9-120 and in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 40-5.

cal corruption and the seven-year span, established by the Septennial Act (1716), tends to make campaign bribes personal investments while infrequent elections deny voters a regular opportunity to reject corrupt candidates and select economically and thus politically independent property holders. Finally, new forms of wealth play havoc with the material foundation of civic virtue, namely, economic independence, synonymous with the debtless landholder free from the burden of government taxes.[6]

Yet, as this work argues, the description of "Cato" as the high priest of a Country ideology barely touches Trenchard and Gordon's major preoccupations and modes of argument. Exclusive, current emphasis on the Country features of *Cato's Letters* tells only part, and a very small part, of the story. There is a need to give more attention and sufficient weight to Trenchard and Gordon as *Whig* writers. The Country-versus-Court depiction of early eighteenth-century ideology overlooks the Tory-versus-Whig ideological divide that characterized this period. This ideological conflict warrants a more prominent position in the analysis of early Hanoverian England. Such a position would help to explain when and why Establishment Whigs and Independent Whigs could and did agree.

Independent-Whig acceptance, in 1716, for example, of the Establishment-Whig proposal for the extension of Parliaments to seven years compromised the Country conviction that frequent Parliaments were a fundamental part of the constitution and necessary to avoid the Court corruption that long Parliaments inevitably encouraged. As long as "Independent" Whigs, like John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, Robert Molesworth, and John Toland, believe that many of their countrymen remain fiercely loyal to the Stuart dynasty, their Whig fears for the security of the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover dominate other concerns. The Jacobite Rebellion of 1715 and subsequent plotting against the House of Hanover were disturbing reminders of the survival of divine-right theory and High-Church support for the House of Stuart. Although one may describe Independent-Whig acceptance of the Septennial Act as a crisis posture, High-Church efforts against the new Hanoverian dynasty continue and some "Independent" Whigs, perhaps like Establishment Whigs before them, respond to what they consider potential as well as overt Jacobitism.

Although "Cato's" letters, specifically those that appeared during 1721, vehemently attack Court corruption including certain Whig ministers for their vicious compliance with South-Sea fraudulence and others, especially Robert Walpole, for their failure to vindicate public justice, Trenchard and Gordon devote little attention to placemen, bribery, or infrequent elections. Major gaps exist between "Cato" and the Country vision.

[6]J. G. A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3d Ser., 22 (October 1965), pp. 549-63; reprinted in idem, *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*, Studies in Political Theory (New York: Atheneum, 1973), pp. 104-47; and idem, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 14.

This study challenges the current, Country interpretation of "Cato" and gives, instead, greater prominence to Trenchard and Gordon's efforts against the dangerous ideological and political influence of the High-Church clergy. "Cato" was not, primarily, a Country opponent of Court corruption. Rather, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon are better understood if they are interpreted as fearing High-Church counterreformation and High-Tory counterrevolution. The "Whig" behind "Independent" and "Establishment" is much larger and more rooted in the political struggle between Whigs and Tories than the Country-versus-Court analysis holds.

CHAPTER ONE

THE REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION SETTLEMENT OF 1688-89

Fear of More Rebellion

In 1660, after two decades of civil turmoil and political upheaval from intestine wars and multifarious, tottery governments, all Englishmen yearned for peace and stability. Since monarchy was thought to be the key to a more stable order, almost everyone in the English political nation now considered that a return to strong monarchy, the ancient political structure, was absolutely necessary. As J. R. Jones puts it:

> The instability and confusion that followed Oliver Cromwell's death, and were intensified after the fall of Richard Cromwell in April 1659, had enhanced the appeal of the exiled and dispossessed monarchy. Apparent political disintegration led most men to believe that only if the King came into his own again could the nation hope to enjoy its constitutional and legal rights, and properties, without fear of further arbitrary interference from self-constituted and oppressive military governments.[1]

Most responsible for Charles Stuart's return from exile were the Presbyterians, traditional supporters of limited monarchy who expected to impose strict conditions on the King they restored. Although the Presbyterians were ascendant in 1660, as readmitted members to the revived Long Parliament where they dominated Republicans and in the Convention Parliament where they held a numerical superiority over the Royalists, they failed to restrict the King's power. Instead, "an assiduous and intelligently directed" Royalist minority blocked "presbyterian policies on most major issues."[2] In 1661 and for the first time in twenty-one years an unquestionably constitutional parliamentary election took place. The English electorate decided in favor of the Anglican Royalists. Only a handful of Presbyterians and Congregationalists were returned. Anglican Royalists or, as they are frequently designated, Anglican Cavaliers, dominated the House of Commons. The Presbyterian party was now a mere residual minority and this overwhelmingly royal House of Commons had no intention to seriously limit monarchic powers. The Cavalier Parliament wanted a

[1]J. R. Jones, "Introduction: Main Trends in Restoration England," in *The Restored Monarchy 1660-1688,* ed. J. R. Jones, Problems in Focus Series (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 8.

[2]J. R. Jones, *Country and Court: England, 1658-1714,* The New History of England, vol. 5 (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), p. 131.

strong monarchy but not, it should be pointed out, one capable of threatening "the liberty and property of the Anglican gentry."[3]

Bitter, personal experience with rebellion and civil war haunted Restoration Englishmen for decades. After years of political dissension, religious dispute, social disorder, and for some, personal duress, Anglican Royalists anxiously yearned for an ordered polity. The most immediate task was to restore a strong, stable central government. In this, Anglican Royalists eagerly and enthusiastically embraced the Stuart monarchy and the Church of England. Crown and Church were, in their opinion, ancient, God-ordained establishments that not only had been the recent victims of evil assault but that promised the best guarantees of stability and order.[4]

In the early 1660s, the Cavaliers settled upon the restored monarchy most of its basic, original prerogatives. Roger North, near contemporary and Tory historian, believed the "horror at the very thoughts of the past miseries of the civil war" and the desire to avoid "the like for the future," were the reasons why the Cavalier Parliament opted, quite deliberately, for a strong monarchy.[5] John Miller, a recent commentator on the later Stuart monarchy and from his own researches into the period, thinks North's point of view an historically valid one.

> A strong ruler seemed necessary to guard against any resurgence of the radical 'Good Old Cause' of the 1650s, whose strength was habitually overestimated by Restoration Englishmen.[6]

The Cavalier Parliament passed numerous laws "expressly intended to prevent any repetition of the agitational techniques that had been used in 1640-42."[7] The first statute of the Cavalier Parliament was the Act for the Preservation of the King's Person and Government which confirmed the existing Statute of Treasons (1352) and applied it to

[3]John Miller, *Restoration England: The Reign of Charles II*, Seminar Studies in History (London: Longman Group, 1985), p. 35. Ronald Hutton, the most recent scholar to examine the Restoration, correctly qualifies the nature of Cavalier support for monarchy. Hutton explains that although the Cavalier Parliament destroyed "most of the constitutional reforms of 1641-54," it kept, precisely, those "reforms which benefited its members as a class, an estate or an institution" (Ronald Hutton, *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales 1658-1667* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985], pp. 154-5).

[4]John Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," in *The Restored Monarchy*, pp. 30-3; Jennifer Carter, "Laws, Courts and Constitution," in *The Restored Monarchy*, pp. 71-3; and R. A. Beddard, "The Restoration Church," in *The Restored Monarchy*, pp. 155-70.

[5]Roger North, *Examen: or, an Enquiry into the Credit and Veracity of a Pretended Complete History* (London, 1742), pp. 427-8, quoted in Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," p. 31.

[6]Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," pp. 31-2.

[7]Jones, *Country and Court*, p. 142.

> all printing, writing, preaching, or malicious and advised speaking calculated to compass or devise the death, destruction, injury, or restraint of the sovereign, or to deprive him of his style, honour, or kingly name.[8]

The right to petition the monarch was severely limited. Charles II received the Crown's traditional command of the militia. The Triennial Act of 1664 removed those mechanisms, outlined in the first Triennial Act of 1641, that had permitted English subjects to elect and commence a Parliament without royal approval.[9]

For almost everyone, the restoration of the Stuart monarchy seemed absolutely necessary in order to extricate the nation from a state of pervasive confusion. The Anglican Royalists certainly viewed the restored and bolstered Crown as a *sine qua non*. But they also considered the Church a crucial institutional foil against any resurgence of civil turmoil. For the Anglican Royalists, only an exclusive, hierarchical Church, supported by the arm of the law, could keep England from endlessly "dividing into sects and factions" and from falling, once again, into that dreaded world of chaos.[10] Accordingly, they restored the Church of England and buttressed it with political, social, spiritual, and intellectual monopolies. Anglican parsons and the country squires--the bulk of the political nation--depended much more upon the Church of England than they did the Crown to protect them from the civil and social strife they associated with religious sectarianism, especially the individualistic and highly anarchical tendencies that most Anglicans considered inherent in Puritanism. Anglican Royalists believed Calvinists were naturally seditious and that "Calvinism had destroyed civil peace ... and should never be allowed the opportunity to do so again."[11]

The reestablishment of the Church of England and its subsequent defense against royal interference constituted the keys to Restoration politics. Although the Restoration bishops were active propagators of the King's sovereignty, those champions of monarchy also believed in the *jure divino* character of episcopacy. They considered members of the episcopate to be direct descendants of Christ and his Apostles. The Anglican bishops were responsible for maintaining the "true" Church and for interpreting God's will. Monarchs were indeed sovereign but it was for the episcopate to decide what God wanted in and of his Church. "Anglican Royalism was, therefore, monarchically absolutist in the things of this world, but potentially subversive in

[8]David Ogg, *England in the Reign of Charles II*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956; reissued in one vol., 1984), pp. 513 and 197-8. See Carter, "Laws, Courts and Constitution," p. 87.

[9]Carter, "Laws, Courts and Constitution," pp. 72 and 82.

[10]Beddard, "The Restoration Church," p. 162.

[11]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 76.

defence of 'true religion'."[12] Most Englishmen considered the Church of England a holy fortress and they cherished the Anglican Establishment as a divine shield against the assault of evil men. The pre-eminent Restoration safeguard was, above all else, the Church of England.

Different, major statutes, aggressively endorsed by the Cavalier Parliament, granted the Church of England a monopoly in politics, religion, and education, as well as total control over the sources of information and propaganda.

Within only ten days of its first session, the Cavalier House of Commons ordered the public hangman to burn the Solemn League and Covenant (the Long Parliament's pledge, in 1643, to establish Presbyterianism as the official religion), and resolved that every member of Parliament (members of the House of Lords and those elected to the House of Commons in the spring of 1661) be required to take the sacrament of Holy Communion according to prescribed Anglican usage. The Corporation Act (1661) obliged municipal officers to receive the host from an Anglican priest and renounce the Covenant. That requirement gave Anglicans a political monopoly in town governments and potential dominion in the House of Commons since municipal officers chose, in many boroughs, the town's representatives for Parliament.

According to the terms of the Act of Uniformity (1662), every clergyman had to abjure the Covenant--to swear that no obligation lay upon him or any other person "to endeavour any change or alteration of government either in Church or State"[13]--and give public assent to each and every article of the revised Book of Common Prayer (1662) under pain of deprivation. And only those clergymen who had or would accept an episcopal ordination, which included an oath of canonical obedience to those in charge of the ecclesiastical government over them, could retain their church livings. About 1,800 ejections resulted. Additional legislation--the Conventicle Act (1664) and the Five Mile Act (1665)--denied those "nonconformists" any form of public worship and prohibited expelled ministers from coming within five miles of the place where they had preached or of any town sending representatives to the House of Commons.

All educators had to be licensed by the Anglican bishops. The Bill to License and Control Printing (1662) established censorship in the interests of conformity. The Church pulpit was the major media in Restoration England and the pulpit was far more influential than the press as an instrument of political persuasion.

[12]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 77.

[13]J. P. Kenyon, ed., *The Stuart Constitution 1603-1688: Documents and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 381.

Apart from the numerous, legal sinews granted to the Church of England by the Cavalier Parliament, the Anglican Establishment enjoyed widespread support among the landed classes. They appreciated the reinstated Church as an institutional and spiritual arm for preventing dissidence, but they also felt a deep emotional commitment to the Anglican clergy.[14] The English squirearchy recognized the fact that episcopacy--diocesan bishops with spiritual authority avowed by the inferior clergy, enjoined by canon law, enforced by statute, and sustained by landed revenues--provided crucial institutional means for promoting political stability. But in addition to that vested interest in a hierarchical Church, a strong bond of real affection allied country squires and High-Church parsons. The Church of England derived much of its strength from the loyalty of the laity. That loyalty, during the course of Restoration politics, proved particularly powerful in moments of conflict between Church and Crown and took precedence over the gentry's commitment to royal authority when King Charles II's efforts in favor of toleration threatened Anglican uniformity.[15]

Even though the Church of England came first when a Stuart monarch threatened to undermine the exclusiveness of the Establishment, the newly restored Anglican Church exuberantly subscribed to divine-right theory of monarchy. The doctrine of the divine origin of kingship and its corollaries, indefeasible hereditary right, non-resistance, and passive obedience, gained complete ascendancy in Restoration England. "The belief that kings ruled by divine right"--that God, a supernatural, universal, omnipotent, all-knowing creature, constituted the fountainhead of political authority and bestowed upon kings their right to rule--"was an ancient theory" to which "the events of the first half of the seventeenth century" gave a new significance. With return of the Stuart monarchy, divine-right theory revived with vastly enhanced authority and influence.[16] The Anglican pulpits, in particular, "rang with the revived tenets of divine indefeasible hereditary right, of passive obedience, and of the sinfulness of rebellion."[17]

Given their haunting awareness of civil war, the ruling classes felt an urgent need to insure obedience. Various sections of several statutes obliged borough officers, members of the clergy, leaders of the militia, schoolmasters, college fellows and tutors, university readers and professors to declare, under oath, "that it is not lawful upon any pretense whatsoever to take arms against the King."[18] In post-war England,

[14]Beddard, "The Restoration Church," pp. 155-9 and 161-4.

[15]Ibid., pp. 158-9; Carter, "Laws, Courts and Constitution," p. 80; and Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," pp. 75-80.

[16]G. R. Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of England 1660 to 1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 157.

[17]Norman Sykes, *Church and State in England in the XVIIIth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934; reprint ed., New York: Octagon Books, 1975), p. 23.

[18]J. R. Western, *Monarchy and Revolution: The English State in the 1680s*, Blandford

political and religious leaders fastened upon an ideology that seemed to promise a rule of law and order. They welcomed and encouraged authoritarian and providential notions of the origin and character of government and the nature of political obligation.[19]

Of particular importance for demanding acquiescence from the masses was divine-right theory. With its crucial tenets of non-resistance and passive obedience, divine-right theory permitted the Church of England to invoke an unquestioning loyalty to the divinely sanctioned authority of the King from numerous Anglican parishioners. The entire Anglican clergy, with incessant regularity, exhorted their listeners to obey all forms of authority. The Church also taught, regularly and officially, a patriarchal theory of political obligation that centered on a vision of government that underscored the paternal character of kingly authority and successfully converted the familiar Fifth Commandment into a potent political injunction.[20]

Obedience to all forms of authority became an obsessive, Restoration norm. The incessant inculcation of obedience to authority seemed absolutely necessary to shield England against the dreaded recurrence of civil war. On each anniversary of the execution of Charles I and of the miraculous return of his son, Charles II, "the pulpits thundered forth the doctrines of the divine hereditary right of kings and the utter sinfulness of resistance to their commands."[21]

History Series: Problems of History (London: Blandford Press, 1972), p. 33.

[19]Beddard, "The Restoration Church," p. 167.

[20]Gordon J. Schochet, "Patriarchalism, Politics and Mass Attitudes in Stuart England," *The Historical Journal* 12 (September 1969), pp. 424-41; and idem, *Patriarchalism in Political Thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), chaps. 1, 6, 8, and 14. See Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, pp. 8-13; Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," pp. 64-6; and J. C. D. Clark, *English Society*, pp. 64-93 and 125-6. Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha: A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People* was written around 1630 [See Richard Tuck, "A New Date for Filmer's Patriarcha," *The Historical Journal* 29 (March 1986), pp. 183-6] but first published in 1680. *Patriarcha*, in circulation before it was actually published, reinforced divine-right theory with patriarchal justifications for obedience to political authority.

> "The essence of Filmer's theory of political obligation was not that all present kings were the true and direct heirs of Adam's power, not that they were the literal and natural fathers of their people, but ... that they must be considered to wield a power *like* that of Adam and the patriarchs and to be in a position in relation to their people *like* that of the father of a family. That is to say, the crux of the matter was not an historical argument at all, but an analogy or correspondence between the king of a people and the father of a family and between the authority of each" (W. H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought 1500-1700* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964], pp. 86-7).

[21]G. V. Bennett, *The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688-1730: The Career of Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 5.

Although the Anglican clergy "regularly stressed the duty of unconditional obedience by all subjects to the King, and the absolute inadmissibility of any resistance, even to a tyrant," those doctrines did not prevent Anglican clergymen "from defending their corporate interests and privileges whenever these were threatened, and they could count on an immediate response from a large bloc of peers and M.P.s."[22] The majority of the political nation considered religious uniformity a political necessity. Schism in the Church meant, inevitably in their opinion, dissension in the State. Whenever monarchical policy seemed to challenge the Establishment, to undermine, in other words, its capacity to promote stability, the Anglican Cavaliers balked at and did, in fact, stand against royal authority.[23] Of great

[22]Jones, "Introduction," pp. 14-15.

[23]Since many of the traditional assumptions about the history of England in the early seventeenth century have recently been vitiated, especially the conventional depiction of early Stuart politics as "an inevitable constitutional conflict centred upon rival claims to power between an absolutist monarchy and a developing House of Commons," the traditional view of the Restoration polity as a continuation of that conflict--resurgent Stuart absolutism and an enduring parliamentarianism--is not tenable (Kevin Sharpe, "Crown, Parliament and Locality: Government and Communication in Early Stuart England," *The English Historical Review* 101 [April 1986], p. 323). There are already signs of the emergence of a very different and far more complex picture of the Restoration polity. The reestablishment of the Church of England, including a strident Anglicanism (political as well as religious), seems to be a central, if not the determinative, feature of Restoration polemics. Ronald Hutton describes Charles II as "the first monarch since the Middle Ages to be successfully defied by his leading churchmen" who, along with "the local magistrates," could "afford to preach non-resistance because they had resisted the royal will perfectly well without recourse to arms" (Hutton, *The Restoration*, pp. 181-2). The Restoration Church settlement, shaped by the Anglican Cavaliers "who drafted and passed legislation and took the lead in harassing and ejecting non-Anglican ministers and persecuting Dissenting congregations," constituted a major defeat for Charles II and "was indicative of a fundamental feature of the Restoration settlement" itself: Anglican Cavaliers granted their monarch extensive powers "because the ruling elite, as represented in Parliament, *wanted* him to have them" but they expected Charles II "to use those powers in a manner compatible with their interests and prejudices" (Miller, *Restoration England*, p. 46). See John Miller, "Charles II and His Parliaments," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 32 (1982), pp. 1-23; idem, "The Potential for 'Absolutism' in Later Stuart England," *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* 69 (June 1984), pp. 187-207; idem, "The Crown and the Borough Charters in the Reign of Charles II," *The English Historical Review* 100 (January 1985), pp. 53-84; and idem, "The Later Stuart Monarchy". Mark Goldie is the scholar, in particular, who uncovers the prominence of Anglicanism in Restoration England and presents us with surprizing political postures vis-a-vis royal sovereignty over religion. Cavaliers and (later) Tories encouraged the exercise of monarchical authority to serve Anglican causes but denied the monarch's right to use that authority when its exercise threatened the Anglican hegemony. Anglican Royalists stood against their King and asserted, "as Anglican absolutists were apt to do, that God's laws were superior to earthly magistrates, and that not even God's anointed sovereign could be permitted to countenance schism and heresy" (Mark Goldie, review of *Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England*, by C. C. Weston and J. R. Greenberg, in *The Historical Journal* 26 [December 1983], p. 1030). See idem, "John

relevance, in what constituted difficult moments of divided loyalty between Church and Crown, were the enduring fear of anarchy and the conviction that religious dissent and political subversion went hand in hand.

When, in late 1662 and early 1663, Charles II sought the Cavalier Parliament's consent to exercise his dispensing power and provide some toleration for those outside the Establishment, the House of Commons refused compliance. Members of the House of Commons condemned what they thought would "establish schism by a law"[24] and explained their position as a necessary check against potential disorder:

> The asserting of the laws and the religion established, according to the Act of Uniformity, is the most probable means to produce a settled peace and obedience through the Kingdom; because the variety of professions in religion, when openly indulged, doth directly distinguish men into parties, and, withal, gives them opportunity to count their numbers; which, considering the animosities that, out of religious pride, will be kept on foot by the several factions, doth tend, directly and inevitably, to open disturbance.[25]

In March 1672 Charles exercised his royal prerogative to suspend the operation of a law and issued a Declaration of Indulgence that suspended all the penal laws against Nonconformists and Catholic recusants. The Declaration allowed Dissenters public worship in licensed chapels and permitted private worship to Roman Catholics. The King said he wanted to promote national unity and removed those penal laws for "the quiet of his kingdom."[26] The Anglican Cavaliers disagreed completely with their monarch's reasoning. The Declaration of Indulgence suspended laws that had been passed, expressly, to avoid divisiveness since toleration meant, in their opinion, inevitable disquiet.

On the five[27] different occasions that Charles II "attempted to give toleration to Dissenters he was resisted and defeated by an Anglican Parliament"; in 1672-73 he

Locke and Anglican Royalism"; idem, "The Nonjurors, Episcopacy, and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," in *Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689-1759*, ed. Eveline Cruickshanks (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), pp. 15-35; and idem, *The Tory Ideology: Politics and Ideas in Restoration England*, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[24]William Cobbett, ed., *The Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the Year 1803*, 36 vols. (London: T. C. Hansard, 1806-20), 4, p. 262, quoted in Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution*, p. 402.

[25]*Journals of the House of Commons*, 8, pp. 442-3, quoted in Beddard, "The Restoration Church," p. 168.

[26]Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," p. 35; and Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution*, pp. 407-8.

[27]1660, 1662, 1663, 1668, and 1672. See D. T. Witcombe, *Charles II and the Cavalier House*

"was driven by political necessity to capitulate to the deadweight of Parliamentary Anglicanism."[28] Charles had to withdraw his Declaration and assent to the Test Act (29 March 1673), an explicit reversal of the monarch's efforts to permit religious diversity. Under the Test Act only those who received the Anglican communion (confirmed by written evidence), took the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and disavowed the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation could hold a civil or military office under the Crown. Because as a Catholic he could not meet those tests, the King's brother, James Stuart, Duke of York, had to resign his office of Lord High Admiral. Although the Test Act of 1673 and a second one in 1678, that extended the obligations of the first to members of both Houses of Parliament, were directed against Roman Catholics, those statutes were also against Dissenters.

Historians usually view this famous conflict between the Cavalier House of Commons and the Stuart Crown in political-constitutional terms: parliamentarians insisting the King, Lords, and Commons exercised legislative sovereignty coordinately. The issues in 1672-73 were not constitutional ones. Rather, the crisis turned on religion:

> The public debate which raged was about the merits of toleration versus the claims of Anglican uniformity, and about the Christian prince's authority over ecclesiastical affairs.[29]

In 1673 King Charles II surrendered "not to his enemies but to his friends," to those who upheld royal authority and had been "horrified to find themselves forced into something like opposition to the crown."[30]

From 1673 until the Exclusion Crisis (1679-1681) and under the direction of Sir Thomas Osborne, best known by his 1674 title, Earl of Danby, the King accepted an alliance with the Anglican Cavaliers and allowed a thorough execution of the existing laws against Nonconformists. Those years bore witness to "the steady prosecution of Dissenters, in which the government lent its aid to the bishops and JPs, along with the active discouragement of Roman Catholicism, especially about the Court."[31] This alliance between the Crown and the Anglican-Cavalier party repeated itself in the 1680s as an Anglican-Tory one under the direction of Laurence Hyde, the Earl of Rochester.[32]

of Commons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), p. 10.

[28]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 76.

[29]Goldie, review of *Subjects and Sovereigns*, p. 1030. See Miller, "The Potential for 'Absolutism' in Later Stuart England," n. 34, p. 195.

[30]Witcombe, *Charles II and the Cavalier House of Commons*, p. 136.

[31]Beddard, "The Restoration Church," p. 171.

[32]Jones, *Country and Court*, p. 179 and chaps. 9 and 11; Miller, "The Later Stuart

The Exclusion Crisis (the struggle, beginning in 1679, to exclude Charles II's Catholic brother, James Duke of York, from the monarchical succession) split the political nation into two bitterly hostile parties, the Whigs and the Tories. Each group felt a genuine yet distinct apprehension about the nation's future. All Whigs assumed a "Popish successor" would impose Catholicism and political absolutism.[33] They opposed the succession of the heir presumptive, the Catholic Duke of York, because they feared the danger of royal absolutism and Popery. The Whigs appealed to the masses through an active, polemical press, urban political clubs, mass petitions, and intensive, systematic electioneering, in a major effort to mobilize popular support in favor of exclusion. But those appeals terrified most of the landed classes.[34] The developing Tory party arose out of the genuinely felt fear that the nation was again on the brink of rebellion, civil war, and republicanism.[35]

The Anglican prelacy, the parochial clergy, and the Church's clear commitment to divine-right theory were major driving forces behind emergent Toryism. Under William Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1677, the Church of England strongly resisted the Whig effort to exclude James Stuart from the succession and defended King Charles "against the declared enemies of divine rightist monarchy and episcopacy."[36] The first and most energetic Tories were the country parsons who raised the cry of "the Church in danger" from their numerous pulpits; it was the clergy who voted in a mass against Whig candidates in the two elections of 1679 (February and August-September) and a third in 1681 (February).[37]

Apart from the importance of the Church's early conviction that the Whigs posed a serious threat to the Anglican Establishment and the clergy's concomitant and assiduous efforts to check them, that perennial, albeit now reinforced, fear of civil war "reawakened loyalist sentiment in the country." The cry "Forty-one is here again" was heard throughout the realm and rang a familiar alarm.[38]

Although the Whigs branded their opponents "Papists," the Tories were certainly not pro-Catholic. As their votes for the Test Acts demonstrated, they stood for an *Anglican* supremacy in both Church and State. The traditional landed classes were

Monarchy,", p. 39; and idem, "The Crown and the Borough Charters in the Reign of Charles II."

[33]Miller, "Charles II and His Parliaments," p. 17; and idem, *Restoration England*, p. 63.

[34]J. R. Jones, "Parties and Parliament," in *The Restored Monarchy*, p. 67; and John Miller, *The Glorious Revolution*, Seminar Studies in History (London: Longman Group, 1983), p. 2.

[35]G. E. Aylmer, *A Short History of Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: The New American Library, Mentor Books, 1963; first published by Blandford Press, 1963 in Blandford History Series: The History of England under the title *The Struggle for the Constitution 1603-1689*), p. 204.

[36]Beddard, "The Restored Church," p. 173.

[37]Jones, "Parties and Parliament," p. 66; and Beddard, "The Restored Church," p. 173.

[38]Jones, "Parties and Parliament," p. 57; Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," p. 34; idem,

usually "more hostile to Dissent than to Popery" and fear of the latter was greater than "hatred of Nonconformity only for two brief phases: in 1678-81 and 1686-8." And "as the Exclusion crisis wore on, the gentry's fears of Whiggish excess drove them away from Shaftesbury, once again coming to believe that Calvinism was at least as dangerous as Popery."[39] Whig political appeal to the masses seemed to Tories to presage potential rebellion and republicanism; dark reminders of the 1640s overshadowed Tory bigotry towards Roman Catholics.

Tory devotion to royal authority, especially the principles of divine indefeasible hereditary succession and non-resistance, took precedence over any concern about possible problems with the reign of a middle-aged Catholic King.[40] For Archbishop Sancroft, the lawful inheritance of James Stuart was part of the Anglican scheme of things. Besides, the Duke of York's recent conduct in Scotland--suppression of field conventicles and patronage of the downtrodden bishops--gave the Anglican clergy faith in and affection for James as well as, in their opinion, "the lie to Whig allegations that 'a popish successor' was incompatible with Protestant government."[41]

Although the Whigs failed to pass the Exclusion Bill, Tory fears of imminent civil war did not abate. The Exclusion Crisis intensified, in fact, Restoration phobias. Elections in 1679 and 1681 revealed the political clout Whigs and Dissenters possessed in the parliamentary boroughs. Whig electoral success made it disturbingly clear to the Tories "that the Corporation Act had been widely ignored or evaded."[42] The Exclusion Crisis reaffirmed that traditional Cavalier conviction: political subversion was a reflex of religious heterodoxy.

The Tories as much as, and probably more than, King Charles II considered the persecution of Nonconformity a political necessity. Remodellings of the county Commissions of Peace, begun in 1679 and stepped up in 1681, guaranteed (until 1687-88 at least) the loyalty of most J.P.s to Church and Crown. In the counties, therefore, persecutions increased:

> the dissenters were now exposed to the most severe, sustained and effective persecution of the whole period. In the 1670s the clergy had often found it

Restoration England, p. 65; idem, *The Glorious Revolution*, p. 3; and Carter, "Laws, Courts and Constitution," p. 73.

[39]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 76.

[40]Aylmer, *A Short History of Seventeenth-Century England*, pp. 195, 199, and 203; and Miller, *Restoration England*, p. 64.

[41]Beddard, "The Restoration Church," pp. 173-4; and idem, "The Commission for Ecclesiastical Promotions, 1681-84: an Instrument of Tory Reaction," *The Historical Journal* 10 (March 1967), p. 26.

[42]Miller, "The Crown and the Borough Charters in the Reign of Charles II," p. 70.

increasingly difficult to persuade magistrates to enforce the existing laws, but after 1681 there were few JPs sympathetic to dissenters. Tory clergy and gentry hated the dissenters for consistently supporting the whigs, and saw in dissenting principles and practices the living spirit of law-breaking and potential rebellion. Frightened of another rebellion, most JPs were eager to act, and willingly followed directives from Whitehall to enforce the penal laws systematically against protestant dissenters.[43]

To secure the loyalty of municipal magistrates proved more difficult. Not only the extent of religious and political disaffection in certain towns but the independent, self-government of many corporations precluded those direct and immediate royal dismissals and appointments the monarch made among the county J.P.s and Lords Lieutenant.[44] The Tories were particularly anxious to purge the towns of disaffected personnel but they needed the power of the Crown to break the Whig hold on many parliamentary boroughs.

> They could regain power and wreak revenge only with the King's help, so they begged him to use his authority and his law courts to confiscate the boroughs' charters and issue new ones which gave him greater control over appointments to municipal office. He could then use this to give his 'old friends', the Tories, a monopoly of local power.[45]

Behind royal intervention in the boroughs in the 1680s was the Tory desire for a loyal magistracy. It was the King who issued a *quo warranto* against a municipal charter or threatened just such a forfeiture, but many *quo warranto* proceedings reflected Charles's response to local, Tory initiatives. The Tories frequently encouraged the exercise of the royal prerogative in the municipalities in order to guarantee effective enforcement of religious and political oaths.[46]

The Crown possessed extensive powers in ecclesiastical affairs. One important monarchical privilege was the right to appoint the dignitaries of the Church of England. In 1677, before the Exclusion Crisis had raised the spectre of rebellion and when potential conflict with a future Catholic King was the major concern, Danby and the Anglican hierarchy proposed, unsuccessfully, "Bills stripping the Crown of its powers to select bishops and appoint to benefices."[47] But, by the early 1680s, with

[43]Jones, *Country and Court*, p. 221.

[44]G. C. F. Forster, "Government in Provincial England under the Later Stuarts," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 33 (1983), p. 44.

[45]Miller, "The Later Stuart Monarchy," p. 45; idem, *Restoration England*, pp. 66-7; and idem, *The Glorious Revolution*, pp. 2-3.

[46]Miller, "The Crown and the Borough Charters in the Reign of Charles II."

[47]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 78.

fresh, reinforced fears of civil disorder holding emotional sway, Crown and Church allied with each other.

In February 1681, Charles created a Commission for Ecclesiastical Promotions to advise him on church preferment. Archbishop Sancroft, the Bishop of London, Henry Compton, and the Earl of Rochester, the leading secular figure of the "Church party" and the most important leader at Court, were the outstanding members of this small but powerful Commission. They shared the King's preference for active, competent clergymen who evidenced a clear commitment to the Stuarts. This Commission served to encourage and guarantee express loyalty to monarchical authority in the Anglican hierarchy. Churchmen with a "high" notion of ecclesiastical authority usually held a "high" idea of monarchy. The Anglican clergy, especially scholars trained at Christ Church, Oxford, were the outstanding ideologists of Restoration Royalism: "political theory was largely a commentary on the sacred Scriptures and so often an occupation of men of the cloth." Energetic divines with a strong sense of *jure divino* episcopacy and monarchy "might expect and under the auspices of the Commission did receive speedy promotion."[48]

By the end of Charles II's reign, High Anglicans--dedicated episcopalians and, usually, intrepid monarchists--occupied many of the bishoprics, deaneries, prebends, and advowsons of the Establishment. Efforts to secure reliable and loyal magistrates in the counties and the corporations provided Tories with significant powers in the local judiciaries. Municipal officials in the purged towns were usually the nominees and/or dependents of the Tory gentry who had encouraged royal intervention in the corporations. Remodellings of the parliamentary boroughs laid the structural groundwork for the election of Tory burgesses in the future. All these and other endeavors, during the 1680s, gave the Anglican Tories a complete monopoly in Church and State.[49]

The Revolution and Revolution Settlement

When, in February 1685, the Catholic Duke of York became King James II, he inherited a wide range and high degree of loyalty. The majority of the political nation, not only Anglican-Tory leaders in Church and State but the numerous Anglican parsons and country squires, strongly supported the Stuart monarchy. These same people also remained deeply hostile to Whigs and Dissenters. For the Anglican Tory, James Stuart, although a Roman Catholic, was King Charles II's legitimate heir with an irrevocable, divine right to the throne.

[48]Beddard, "The Commission for Ecclesiastical Promotions, 1681-84: an Instrument of Tory Reaction," p. 39.

[49]Ibid.; and Jones, *Country and Court*, pp. 219-36.

Quite amazingly and in an incredibly brief span of time, James II seriously eroded the loyalty of those very "Yorkists" to whom he owed his peaceful accession. James's assiduous efforts to promote his own religion and co-religionists together with the birth, in June 1688, of a male and inevitably Catholic heir frightened the Tory gentry and Anglican clergy into a reluctant suspension of their traditional championship. A few staunch defenders of divine right even cooperated with their political and religious enemies. Fears of the establishment and perpetuation of Roman-Catholic absolutism, a concern all Englishmen could share and a seemingly real probability in mid-1688, put into motion the dramatic and convoluted events that make up the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89

In the spring of 1688, Tory and Whig leaders agreed about the need for outside military support to successfully challenge James and his large standing army. Many Englishmen believed the King was on the verge of Catholicizing England. His political purges and electoral preparations and the new additional threat of a permanent Catholic dynasty outweighed chronic fears of civil war. Many reluctant Anglican Tories now decided to confront their legitimate sovereign monarch.[50]

At the end of June, seven prominent figures from the Tory and Whig leadership[51] anxiously urged Prince William of Orange to bring an army to England so that Englishmen could effectively check King James's subversion of their religion, laws, properties, and liberties. William agreed, expressing his intentions in terms that were meant to appeal to the majority of the political nation. In his *Declaration ... of the Reasons Inducing Him to Appear in Armes in the Kingdom of England for Preserving of the Protestant Religion and for Restoring the Lawes and Liberties of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (30 September 1688) William said his objective was to provide for an immediate calling and free election of a lawful Parliament as the proper instrument for dealing with the King's current behavior.[52]

King James possessed superior military forces--30,000 in comparison with William's 15,000. Significant defections, however, among officers demoralized the entire army and the King. In the last week of November and the first of December, James capitulated militarily and seemed to give way politically as well. In a Council of War at Salisbury, where the bulk of the royal army was assembled, the King

[50]John Miller, *The Glorious Revolution*, pp. 3-16, where the author, an expert on James II, provides a succinct description of his reign.

[51]The "immortal seven" who signed the invitation were the Earls of Danby, Devonshire, and Shrewsbury; Lord Lumley; Henry Compton, Bishop of London; Edward Russell and Henry Sidney, cousin and brother, respectively, of the Whig "martyrs" Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney.

[52]Lois G. Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 17-18.

accepted the cautious, minority position of his commanding general, the Earl of Feversham, who recommended a retreat to London. James rejected the majority opinion of his officers who argued for an offensive against Prince William. On 23 November the royal forces were ordered to retreat and that same night, John Churchill, who was second in command, defected to the Prince of Orange.

Before James left London for Salisbury, a group of secular and spiritual Lords, who wanted to preserve their sovereign's lawful authority through a compromise settlement with the King himself, presented James with a petition calling for the immediate convocation of "a Parliament regular, & free in all its Circumstances" as "the only Visible Way, to preserve your Majesty, & this your Kingdom."[53] James adamantly refused the peers' petition. But, after returning from Salisbury, the King called a meeting of the lay peers and bishops and, contrary to his initial rejection, consented to the terms of the original petition. On 30 November a proclamation for the calling of a Parliament to meet on 15 January was published. In accordance with this proclamation, writs for parliamentary elections were actually issued on James's authority.

In the first week of December, James sent three royal commissioners--Lords Halifax, Godolphin, and Nottingham--to negotiate at Hungerford with Prince William. The commissioners carried instructions to work out an agreement with William for the acceptance of a free Parliament convoked by James. At Hungerford, political divisions between Tories and Whigs emerged. William's adherents, long out of contact with the constituencies, felt unprepared for immediate elections and feared that a Tory-dominated Parliament would "mediate between James and William, substantially reducing their own opportunities for power, influence and offices."[54] Against the majority opinion of the Whigs at Hungerford, William accepted the election of a new Parliament based on the writs just issued by James.

William preferred a constitutionally legal Parliament assembled under the royal authority of King James. William's *Declaration* of 30 September had promised to secure a free Parliament through which grievances could be redressed. This suited the Tories who were pressuring James to turn to his "old friends," the Tories themselves, and bring into existence a "free" Parliament, which meant a "tory-dominated" one that would, once again, make the world safe for the Anglican Tories.[55]

[53]Tanner MSS. 28, folio 249, quoted in R. A. Beddard, "The Guildhall Declaration of 11 December 1688 and the Counter-Revolution of the Loyalists," *The Historical Journal* 11 (September 1968), pp. 409-10; and J. R. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688 in England*, Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 299.

[54]Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, pp. 303-4.

[55]John Miller, "The Glorious Revolution: 'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," *The Historical Journal* 25 (September 1982), p. 549.

King James's convocation of a free Parliament, an apparent political acquiescence to the compromising efforts of his loyal peers, and the despatch of his royal embassy to Hungerford were not sincere negotiations on James's part. As early as 28 November, two days before the publication of his proclamation, the King had made plans for his flight to France and left, in fact, before the royal commissioners had had an opportunity to report back to him.

By this sudden maneuver, James tried to create political chaos that would require his recall. First, he cancelled election writs that had been issued and destroyed the remaining ones. To further thwart the meeting of a legal Parliament he revoked the nominations for sheriffs and dropped the Great Seal into the Thames. James expected the ensuing confusion to necessitate his recall. He also assumed his absence would further inflame Tory-Whig conflict so characteristic of English politics in recent years and intrinsic to the existence of Tory and Whig parties.[56]

To the chagrin of both the King and the Prince of Orange, James failed to reach France. Although London warmly welcomed the King and men loyal to James met with him and begged him to remain in England, the King was determined to follow his wife and son to France. James's second attempt, on 23 December, succeeded because William, who wanted his father-in-law out of England, aided his departure. William now intended to wear the Crown himself.[57] He had, though, to live up to the terms of his *Declaration* and to resolve the crisis through the instrument of a freely elected Parliament. He thus refused to assume the Crown as *de facto* conqueror as many of his Whig supporters advised.[58]

After James's flight, division among Tories and Whigs did intensify. Shared fears brought about the Revolution of 1688, but consensus between Tories and Whigs was no more than a mutual recognition of the need to check James's Catholicizing policies. Cooperation between Tories and Whigs reflected, merely, a crisis posture and proved brief, indeed. As early as December 1688, differences, intrinsic to the reality and essence of these two political groups, arose once again and prevailed for a very long time.

Deep political differences quickly emerged when Tory and Whig peers met together to form a provisional government the day James left London. Although the King's departure was a surprise to everyone, two men--Dr. Francis Turner (Bishop of Ely) and the Earl of Rochester--suspected that James would flee the kingdom and had prepared for such an eventuality by persuading the Archbishop of Canterbury to

[56]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 126-7.

[57]Beddard, "The Guildhall Declaration," p. 420; Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, pp. 302-3; and Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 308.

[58]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 132-3.

summon the peers to meet at the Guildhall in case the King did actually withdraw. More than half the peers, the originators of the meeting and their associates, formed a significant group of temporal and spiritual Lords deeply loyal to the Stuart monarchy.[59]

These loyalists wanted to present a declaration to William that reasserted the agreement reached at Hungerford--the election of a free Parliament "of his Majesty's calling"--and that contained a proviso for the recall of James "with Honor and Safety."[60] In sharp contrast, an assertive minority among the peers, referred to as a "violent party" and so-labelled for their aggressive opposition, objected strenuously to any mention of loyalty to James or of preservation of his rights.[61] This "violent party"--including Lords Wharton, Montague, Delamere, Newport, Culpepper, and Mordaunt, and the Earl of Devonshire--maneuvered to depose James and make William the King.[62]

The final draft of the declaration of the peers--the Guildhall Declaration--reflected a patched-up compromise. The Declaration merely asserted the only principle everyone could agree upon, namely a free Parliament. The Guildhall Declaration expressed the peers' "resolution to assist the Prince in procuring 'a free Parliament'" and "concluded with a broad promise to do, 'as occasion shall Require', anything necessary 'for promoting His Highness's Generous Intentions for the Publick Good'."[63] Yet, neither the loyalists nor their assertive antagonists were satisfied. The "revolutionary party" wanted to invite William to London; on the other hand, the loyalists desired an explicit confirmation of King James's legitimate rights. Neither objective figured in the Guildhall Declaration adopted on 11 December and presented to William at Henley on the 13th.[64]

Even though the loyalists had made concessions so that the Guildhall Declaration failed to embody their real sentiments, they had no intention of abandoning their sworn allegiance to King James II. Most Tory peers remained committed to the Stuart sovereign and continued to protect his legitimate authority.[65] Contrarily, leaders of the "violent party" gave "fanatical support of the Prince and his measures at every

[59]R. A. Beddard, "The Loyalist Opposition in the Interregnum: a Letter of Dr. Francis Turner, Bishop of Ely, on the Revolution of 1688," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 40 (May 1967), p. 103; and idem, "The Guildhall Declaration," pp. 403-7.

[60]Beddard, "The Guildhall Declaration," pp. 409-10 and 411; idem, "The Loyalist Opposition," p. 106; and idem, "'The Violent Party': the Guildhall Revolutionaries and the Growth of Opposition to James II," *The Guildhall Miscellany* 3 (April 1970), p. 121.

[61]Beddard, "'The Violent Party'," pp. 120-1.

[62]Ibid.; and idem, "The Guildhall Declaration," p. 413.

[63]Beddard, "The Guildhall Declaration," pp. 407-8.

[64]Ibid., pp. 413-17 passim. See Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 129.

[65]Beddard, "The Guildhall Declaration," pp. 414 and 420.

stage of the Interregnum struggles."[66] The commitment of the loyalists to James was a genuine and principled one whereas the enthusiasm of the "violent" peers for the Prince of Orange was essentially opportunistic. Not surprisingly, loyalists despised the vociferous Williamites and their base motives.[67]

There were, in mid-December, additional meetings of the peers and these gatherings, like the Guildhall assembly, revealed clear divisions. Each proposal presented at these meetings included, in one way or another, the possibility of James's recall. On 20 December 1688, three days before the King's second and final departure, Prince William asked the peers' advice about how best to implement his promise to provide for the calling of a Parliament. Two of the schemes showed a clear preference for a Parliament elected under the authority of the King. Though the final decision called for the issuance of circular letters by Prince William for the election of a "Convention Parliament" and requested the Prince to undertake the administration of the realm in the meantime, it did not preclude James's return. Those Lords, a majority, who wanted to preserve King James II's rights accepted the calling of a Convention, a proposal made, in fact, by one of their own group.[68] But as the Earl of Rochester commented at this time, "if the King had not again withdrawn himself, the Peers would have sent to him before they had made any address to the Prince."[69]

Prince William wanted the Crown but the majority of the peers, Anglican Tories, had no intention of giving it to him. They had agreed to the election of a "Convention" because it would permit Englishmen themselves to deal with the political crisis. In this way, the options remained open. For most Tories, then, the meeting of a Convention Parliament composed of the traditional components, including a House of Commons chosen by those who usually voted, was an acceptable, even promising, instrument for working out an agreement that would check William's ambitions and secure the King's interests.[70]

William refused to respond to the address of the peers until he had received the opinion of a wider political spectrum. The Prince wanted to undermine any impression of exclusive dependence upon those few Whig aristocrats--that "violent party"--who favored him. He also wanted to counterweigh the loyalist sentiment for James

[66]Beddard, "'The Violent Party'," p. 134.

[67]Ibid., p. 136; and idem, "The Guildhall Declaration," p. 416.

[68]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 128-35 passim. This and following paragraphs depend upon Schwoerer.

[69]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *15th Rept.*, app. i Dartmouth MSS., iii, p. 141, quoted in Henry Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 47 (May 1974), p. 38.

[70]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 135 and 137.

among the majority of the peers. To achieve wider political support William called a meeting of those individuals who would ordinarily form a House of Commons.[71]

From mid-November up until Christmas the peers had taken the lead in political affairs but on 26 December a large number of former members of Charles II's Parliaments including a significant representation of the City of London met in response to the Prince's summons. William asked them, as he had the peers, to recommend a method for fulfilling the terms of his *Declaration.* The intentional exclusion of those who had been members of James II's only Parliament, one that had included many staunch loyalists, gave the Whigs an exceptional yet very important opportunity to assert their opinions. The Whigs managed, in fact, to dominate the proceedings. But, just as the loyalist Lords had conceded to pressing political realities in their Guildhall Declaration, the Whigs, who wanted to offer the Crown to William and Mary directly, recognized the strength of those who only sought necessary adjustments in the reigning monarch's kingdom.[72] The Whigs chose, therefore, to accept and endorse a proposal identical to that made by the peers--a Convention Parliament.

On 29 December Prince William had *Letters* dispatched calling for elections to a Convention to meet and sit on 22 January 1689. Loyalty to King James II was strong at the time of these elections. Although Tories had welcomed Prince William to help them counter and change James's policies, they did not expect William to be their King. The Tories correctly suspected that "William was not living up to the terms of his *Declaration* and that, on the contrary, he aimed to win the crown."[73] Growing suspicion of William's real motives in contrast to his avowed objectives augmented Tory support for King James II. When the elections took place in early January, the King enjoyed more loyalty and the Prince less approbation among Tories and, indubitably, "by the end of January 1689 many tories were profoundly dissatisfied with William."[74]

The elections to the Convention Parliament were, Henry Horwitz argues, "neither so lacking in contests nor so devoid of national issues as has generally been supposed" by earlier scholars.[75] No consensus, either against James or for William, existed. There is some recent, albeit slim, evidence that the question over the settlement of the Crown was a national issue.[76] Efforts of the loyalists did contribute

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid., p. 136.

[73]Ibid., pp. 143-4 and pp. 142-50 passim. See Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," pp. 40-2.

[74]Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," pp. 549-50.

[75]Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," pp. 40-2.

[76]Ibid.

to the election of a significant number of Tories. Although the Whigs gained a majority of at least eighteen, Tories were sufficient in number "to form a solid opposition in the Convention."[77] And just what "little unanimity actually existed amongst the political nation" during the elections "was only too quickly to be demonstrated by the debates and votes of the convention itself."[78]

Although most Whigs believed the Convention Parliament possessed the constitutional authority to depose James, name a successor, and limit the royal prerogative, they did not endorse those rights explicitly in spite of the fact that in 1679-1681 they had readily argued for James's exclusion. The Tory presence in the Convention Parliament required recognition. The numerical strength of Tories--a significant minority in the House of Commons and a majority in the House of Lords--contributed to Whig caution. In face of that Tory strength, the Whigs blurred and masked their convictions and avoided any outright assertion of the right of Parliament to depose a monarch who violated the fundamental laws and subverted the constitution. Even though "it may well be that many whigs believed that James should be deposed," they "thought it impolitic to say so," and, in order "to avoid offending tory sensibilities," instead argued that James's misdeeds were equivalent to a voluntary abdication.[79]

The Tories in the Convention Parliament found themselves in a particularly perplexing situation. Unlike the Whigs, they experienced real distress in face of any open breach with divine-right theory. Tories were deeply and genuinely attached to the principle of direct hereditary succession.[80] Anything that suggested deposition of a legitimate King ran counter to Tory political and religious principles and was

[77]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 151-2; and J. H. Plumb, "The Elections to the Convention Parliament of 1689," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 5, 3 (1937), pp. 235-54. Schwoerer follows Horwitz who disagrees with Thomas B. Macaulay's description of the elections as essentially uncontested and with Plumb's belief that the dynastic issue was a minimal one.

[78]Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," p. 42. Even though Plumb does not consider the dynastic issue a crucial feature in the elections to the Convention Parliament, he does believe the House of Commons "swung more to the right," after January 1689. See Plumb, "The Elections," p. 245; and Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 152.

[79]Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," pp. 545, 547, 554, and 548.

> "In normal circumstances the whigs would gladly have ridden roughshod over the tories' sensibilities, as they were later to do with the Association of 1696 and the oaths abjuring the pretender. In January 1689, however, they needed to be more accommodating and conciliatory. William had temporarily taken over the direction of government, but the army (which included many regiments from James's forces) was unreliable, Ireland was in chaos and many expressed fears that the established government would collapse, leaving the way open for a republic. In these circumstances it was vital to settle the succession question quickly and in a manner acceptable to tories as well as whigs, especially as the tories were in a majority in the lords" (Ibid., p. 545).

[80]The following descriptive analysis of the Convention Parliament is based on Schwoerer,

inconsistent with loyalty to the Stuart monarchy and Anglican religion which the Tories had recently professed with particular pride and dedication in the last years of the reign of Charles II. Only when James's Catholicizing policies threatened the Established Church did Tories weaken in their usual loyalty. When Tories in the House of Commons talked about James's "withdrawal" or when certain Tory Lords tried to confine the meaning of the word "abdication"[81] to King James's renouncement only of *his* right to the throne, they still tried to defend, as best they could, the principle of hereditary succession in conjunction with their desire for a regency and/or the accession of Princess Mary.[82] Those mental gymnastics were not only an expression of Tory principle but evidence of Tory hostility towards William. They resented the preference he showed to their enemies, Whigs and Dissenters, and "his coldness towards the high anglican clergy."[83]

Whigs and Tories did not agree about very much at all. They did not reach solid decisions. They merely managed, and only after tortuous hedging, to construct general pronouncements. Seemingly bipartisan resolutions lacked any real cogency and failed to constitute meaningful agreement. The famous Commons' resolution of 28 January 1689

> that King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of this kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king and people, and by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, has abdicated the government and the throne is thereby vacant[84]

The Declaration of Rights and Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered." Other secondary sources on the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89 were consulted but my dependence on the work of Schwoerer, especially, and Miller must be acknowledged. It should be pointed out, though, that Miller and Schwoerer present different depictions of the Convention of 1689. Miller underscores its pragmatic, bipartisan character whereas Schwoerer emphasizes its radical Whiggery. See Henry Horwitz, "1689 (and All That)," *Parliamentary History* 6, pt. 1 (1987), pp. 23-32, where he qualifies the conclusions of both: Schwoerer should heed the support Tories gave to very novel restrictions on Roman Catholic successors and Miller should recognize Whig and Tory agreement to exclude Catholics as a much clearer example of genuine bipartisanship than their strained, compelled "agreement" on the settlement of the Crown which led, almost immediately, to highly partisan views of the meaning of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement.

[81]See Thomas P. Slaughter, "'Abdicate' and 'Contract' in the Glorious Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 24 (June 1981), pp. 323-37 where Slaughter argues that "abdication" could and did mean for the Tories "deposition"; and idem, "'Abdicate' and 'Contract' Restored," *The Historical Journal* 28 (June 1985), pp. 399-403 where Slaughter responds to Miller's "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered" in which the latter disagrees with Slaughter's arguments.

[82]Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 552.

[83]Ibid., p. 550.

[84]*Journals of the House of Commons*, 10, p. 14, quoted in Miller, "'Contract' and

was riddled with ambiguity. The Whigs meant much more than the resolution explicitly stated and the Tories meant much less than their initial and almost unanimous endorsement suggested. Consensus was only apparent not real. Eight days later, on 5 February, 151 members of the House of Commons took a completely different position from the one they seemed to have had on 28 January.[85] A third of the House of Commons accepted the House of Lords' deletion of the phrase, "the throne is thereby vacant," which had been the crucial conclusion of the Commons' resolution.

Whig spokesmen from the lower House and Tory peers met together on 6 February to try to resolve the deadlock between the two Houses. During this famous, inter-House "Free Conference" leading Whigs and Tories confronted each other in a direct, open debate and disputed significant political principles.

A basic Tory concern--an elective monarchy--was underscored during the debate. The phrase, "breaking the original contract," a part of the Commons' resolution incautiously accepted by the Lords on 30 January, received considerable attention. The Earl of Clarendon strongly opposed such language but the Bishop of Ely used those Whiggish words for Tory tenets.[86] Turner admitted to an "original compact" but he equated it with the whole existing body of laws including, of course, statutes passed after that initial contract.[87] He pointedly mentioned the Oath of Allegiance to the King as part and parcel of the first compact.[88] Turner went on to argue that it would be a breach of the original contract for a Parliament to dispose of the succession since that very contract had established the English monarchy as hereditary.[89] The Bishop, who became a Jacobite, was underscoring, not surprizingly, the loyalty and obedience owed to one's legitimate monarch. Twisting Whig doctrines to serve Tory and/or Anglican ends became a characteristic political ploy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The Whigs "reminded the peers that they had already voted to accept the clause containing the words 'original contract'" and asserted, in addition, "that, whatever the laws enacted subsequently to the original contract, the original contract reserved a superior power to the legislature to use in times of emergency, 'such as ours now'."[90]

'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 541. See Lois G. Schwoerer, "A Jornall of the Convention at Westminster begun the 22 of January 1688/89," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 49 (November 1976), pp. 242-63.

[85]Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," p. 43.

[86]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 217 and 148.

[87]Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 546.

[88]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 217; and Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, p. 313.

[89]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 217.

[90]*The Debate At Large, Between The Lords and Commons, at the Free Conference Held in the Painted Chamber, in the Session of the Convention, Anno 1688. Relating to the Word,*

When Sir John Holt put forth another Whig argument that "government and magistracy" were "under a trust and any acting contrary to that trust" constituted "a renouncing of the trust, though it be not a renouncing by formal deed,"[91] the Earl of Nottingham differed. Earlier, on 29 January, Nottingham had denied the Whig claim "that a king may be called to account as a trustee of certain powers."[92] Although he employed "the language of 'trust'" during the inter-House Conference, Nottingham was very careful to qualify his rhetoric by arguing "that violation of a trust was not automatically equivalent to renouncing that trust."[93]

For Tories, any suggestion that a Parliament had the right to determine a succession was to be avoided. They gave, as they had earlier, considerable attention to "abdication" and "vacancy":

> If the words meant that the throne was vacant with respect to James and his heirs, then, the peers declared, the kingship was elective, the constitution broken, and the government of Lords and Commons dissolved. The 'election' of a king, even on a one-time-only basis would provide precedent for other elections and was entirely unacceptable.[94]

The Whigs denied any intention to make the monarchy elective. And many feigned an attitude of mere necessity. They gave the impression of being forced to respond to particularly confused and difficult circumstances. But the apparently pragmatic approach of these Whigs could not completely blunt the essentially radical character of their position: "To declare the throne vacant was, as the Tories charged, to make the kingship elective, even if just for one time."[95] Nottingham came very close to the reality of the Whig position when he said with considerable insight: "You understand your own words to signify less than they do really impart."[96]

It is extremely important to realize and remember the fact that the Whigs never fully admitted to the real import of their words. And eventually, in fact, those

Abdicated, and the Vacancy of the Throne in the Commons Vote (2d ed., 1710), p. 47, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 217-18.

[91]J. Torbuck, *A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates* (London, 1741), ii, p. 196, quoted in J. P. Kenyon, "The Revolution of 1688: Resistance and Contract" in *Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb*, ed. Neil McKendrick (London: Europa, 1974), p. 49; Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 219; and Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 544.

[92]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 206.

[93]Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 544.

[94]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 218. See Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," pp. 550-1.

[95]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 219.

[96]*Debate at Large*, p. 56, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 219; and see

significant Whig clauses about James's "breaking the original contract" and "having violated the fundamental laws" were omitted from the final document in spite of the argument of certain Whig managers that "original contract" was, indeed, a crucial premise to "abdication" and "vacancy." Such an omission spelled an abandonment and possibly an outright rejection of the radical-Whig position that "the original contract was broken, the government dissolved, and the power returned to the people." The removal of those relevant premises avoided offending not only Tories but moderate Whigs as well.[97]

The Whigs in the inter-House Conference denied any likelihood of changing the nature of government so as to make monarchy elective.[98] The Tory peers probably doubted the conservative ring of the language of former exclusionists but the latter were, at least, on record for claiming "the word *Elective* is none of the Commons word; neither is the making the kingdom elective the thing they had in their thoughts or intention."[99]

The Tories conceded little. Their attachment to principle was tenacious. The Tory peers would only agree to the "abdication" and "vacancy" clause if interpreted in reference to King James alone or if it meant the Crown devolved upon the next heir. Neither reading included William. The Tory position in the Conference can be attributed, certainly, to "genuine scruples of conscience" but such doggedness may have also reflected a desperate "rearguard action against William's being made king."[100]

The debates inconclusive, the Conference ended in deadlock:

> Full agreement was impossible since the Commons' managers, prominent among them such rising Whig lawyers as Sir George Treby and John Somers, were unwilling to answer the question posed by Nottingham (and reiterated by Rochester and Clarendon) as to whether the 'vacancy' applied only to James or to his heirs as well. Similarly, the Lords' spokesmen were almost as

E. N. Williams, ed., *The Eighteenth-Century Constitution 1688-1815: Documents and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 25.

97Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 225 and pp. 25, 208, and 217; Kenyon, "Resistance and Contract," pp. 47-9; and Mark Goldie, "The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument: An Essay and an Annotated Bibliography of Pamphlets on the Allegiance Controversy," *Bulletin of Research in the Humanities* 83 (Winter 1980), p. 477.

98Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, p. 312; and Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 551.

99*Debate at Large*, p. 33, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 218.

100Miller, "'Contract' and 'Abdication' Reconsidered," p. 552.

> reticent when the Commoners sought to find out who, in their view, did occupy the throne if it were not now vacant.[101]

The candidates themselves narrowed the choice. A more limited range of possibilities made the situation clearer even if more unpleasant for many. William communicated in a private meeting with a group of peers, on 3 February, his already suspected disinclination to be either a regent or a consort. Mary, in a letter to the Earl of Danby, disclaimed any willingness to reign alone and thereby crushed the Tory recourse to accept her as the next, legitimate heir. Princess Anne waived her right to succeed at once should Mary predecease William. James prepared to invade Ireland.

Regencyites and Maryites, the bulk of the legitimist Lords, were without a candidate. William's attitude--that he would only accept the Crown in his own person for life--and Anne's public waiver "left the Lords little room for manoeuvre after the free conference had exhausted the existing forms for inter-House compromise."[102] That same evening, 6 February, former Maryites joined the supporters of Prince William, whose ranks had been intentionally augmented with recent, new recruits just as those of the regencyites had been depleted by deliberate absenteeism. Together, Williamites and Maryites voted by a margin of almost twenty to accept the original Commons' resolution. The House of Lords then voted, without a division, to name William and Mary, King and Queen.[103]

Forty-six peers rejected, for the third time, the contention that James II had abdicated and therefore the throne was vacant. Many more shared their opinion but felt they had no real choice but "to swallow both."[104] William's role was, of course, decisive: he had left the legitimists no alternative. Fears of civil war convinced some of the need to accept William in order to avoid chaos. Many legitimists probably swallowed the "legal fiction of 'abdication' because 'there was an absolute necessity of having a government' and there was 'no other way than this'."[105] Gilbert Burnet, assiduous Williamite and future Bishop of Salisbury (1689), believed "the dubious sense" of the word "abdicated" helped peers pass the Commons' resolution. But, as the Earl of Clarendon correctly commented, those "who had by far the better of the argument, both upon point of reason, and according as the law now stands" had lost

101Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," p. 45.

102Ibid., p. 46.

103Ibid.; and Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 220.

104Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III* (Newark, N.J.: University of Delaware Press, 1977), p. 11.

105Eveline Cruickshanks, David Hayton, and Clyve Jones, "Divisions in the House of Lords on the Transfer of the Crown and Other Issues, 1689-94: Ten New Lists," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 53 (May 1980), pp. 56-8; and Eveline Cruickshanks, "Introduction," in *Ideology and Conspiracy*, p. 5.

the vote.[106] Some forty peers, he believed, would have rejected the motion to make William and Mary King and Queen, but for the obvious uselessness of such a gesture.[107] This leading Anglican, son of Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon, became, perhaps not surprisingly, a Nonjuror.

Even though numerous Tory peers felt they had to accept William, their acquiescence did not constitute ideological apostasy. Nor did the circumscribed political concession that they made, as is usually believed or as logic dictates, explode divine-right theory.

Immediately after the vote to declare William and Mary joint sovereigns, leading Tories, raising the relevant issue of allegiance, reactivated in the House of Lords the Tory concern for and commitment to legitimacy. Nottingham, who had opposed William's accession as illegal, said that while he personally could swear allegiance to William as *de facto* King, not everyone would be willing to take the oaths in their existing form. Danby seconded Nottingham's call for reworded oaths to meet the difficulty many would feel if they had to swear, as the traditional oath required, that William and Mary were "rightful and lawful" monarchs. Even though the speaker, Lord Halifax, a moderate famous for his political "trimming," strongly opposed, the upper House agreed to propose new oaths of allegiance and supremacy.[108]

No subject was to be asked to swear that William and Mary were "rightful and lawful," *de jure* sovereigns, but simply to say, instead, "I do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their majesties King William and Queen Mary, so help me God." The new oath of allegiance reflected the Tory belief (or the Tory illusion) "that the new régime was provisional rather as a regency would have been: a violation of the constitution to be tolerated by reason of exceptional circumstances until better times returned."[109]

Some, those who hoped to bring James back, even convinced themselves they could take the new oath of allegiance without relinquishing their principles. Lord Ailesbury, who became a prominent Jacobite in the exiled court of James, explained himself in the following manner:

> I took the oath ... for it was my opinion that he being declared king (although

[106]Gilbert Burnet, *Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time*, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1833), 3, pp. 386 and 397-8 and *Correspondence of Henry Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, and of his brother Laurence Hyde, Earl of Rochester*, ed. S. W. Singer, 2 vols. (London, 1828), 2, p. 260, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 219.

[107]Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, p. 316.

[108]Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, pp. 315-16.

[109]Ibid., pp. 316 and 320. See Goldie, "The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument," pp. 476-91.

> I did in parliament do all that lay in my power to obstruct it) he was to protect the kingdom, and that those that desired protection ought to take some oath.[110]

Others, William Sancroft, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and seven other prelates, including Francis Turner, Bishop of Ely, refused the oaths. They, along with some four hundred members of the lower clergy, "suffered deprivation of their benefices rather than perjure their conscience by taking oaths of allegiance to the usurpation in Church and State effected by the expulsion of James II."[111]

Most Tories took refuge in the *de facto* posture that the new oath of allegiance permitted and encouraged. By accepting the theory that subjects owe allegiance to the king in possession of power, Tories could sidestep disturbing qualms over the legitimacy of that possession. From the moment of their assertive and successful call for new oaths, Tories unveiled what would be their characteristic strategy: justification of the Revolution and acceptance of the Settlement in terms (possession, conquest, divine providence, etc.) that allowed the survival of traditional principles of hereditary right, non-resistance, and passive obedience, of an *Anglican* ideology suitable to the existence of a Tory "Church party."[112] Although *de facto* theory was one of the most important Tory recourses, "many tories swore to the de facto king with casuistical reservations on behalf of the *de jure* James."[113]

Another very important discussion--the drafting and passage of a claim of rights in the Convention Parliament--reveals, once more, the extreme differences among Tories and Whigs and the lack of real consensus or actual agreement behind apparently bipartisan resolutions. The Tories had criticized James II's use of the dispensing and suspending powers to promote his co-religionists. Their primary concern had not been excessive monarchical authority but the dangers his policies posed to the Church of England, the foundation and bulwark of Tory hegemony and the institution to which Tories remained tenaciously dedicated during the entire eighteenth century. For some Whigs the curtailment of royal prerogatives had been a radical goal during the Exclusion Crisis although most Whigs had limited their

[110]*Memoirs of Thomas, 2nd earl of Ailesbury*, ed. W. E. Buckley, 2 vols. (London, 1890), 1, pp. 237 and 254-5, quoted in Western, *Monarchy and Revolution*, p. 320.

[111]Sykes, *Church and State*, p. 29.

[112]Mark Goldie, "Edmund Bohun and *Jus Gentium* in the Revolution Debate, 1689-1693," *The Historical Journal* 20 (September 1977), pp. 569-86; and idem, "The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94," *History of Political Thought* 1 (June 1980), pp. 223-4. See idem, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism"; Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, chap. 3; Gerald M. Straka, *Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688* (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1962), chap. 5; Charles F. Mullet, "Religion, Politics, and Oaths in the Glorious Revolution," *Review of Politics* 10 (October 1948), pp. 462-74; and Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, pp. 177-82.

[113]Goldie, "The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument," pp. 487-8.

energies to the more narrow aim of excluding the Duke of York. Now, the Whigs had a new and better opportunity to address the question of limitations. There existed some grounds, at least, for expecting relevant and decisive conclusions about the nature and exercise of royal power. They did not emerge. Severe partisanship thwarted that seeming probability. And, instead, the pervading lack of unanimity about constitutional or political theory determined a convoluted course for both the formulation and passage of a declaration of rights and led, once again, to Whig fudging between apparent and intended meanings.[114]

The Tories were not as committed to limitations as the Whigs. But it was, in fact, a Tory--Anthony Cary, Lord Falkland--who first broached the theme: "Before you fill the throne, I would have you resolve, what power you will give the king, and what not."[115] Tories did support restrictions on the suspending and dispensing powers and statements against them came to occupy the first position in both the initial and final drafts of the Declaration of Rights adopted by the Convention Parliament in February, 1689. But, as Professor Lois G. Schwoerer demonstrates, in her valuable revisionist study of *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, most Tory talk about limitations came only early in the game and usually concealed ulterior motives.[116] Even though the Tories "favored restrictions on royal power to avoid a recurrence of conditions under James, their principal reason for promoting rights was to delay a decision on the headship of the government."[117] The Tories, in other words, initiated the effort to assert the rights of the nation "for tactical reasons," primarily.[118] Roger Morrice, a moderate Presbyterian who wrote what is now considered an invaluable diary of the Convention, described the Tories as "Intreaguers," their statements as "specious" and "disingenuous."[119] Another Whig supporter, also outside of Parliament, stated in

[114]Mark Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," pp. 206, 210, and 215. The discussion of the formulation and passage of the Declaration of Rights depends upon the work of Lois G. Schwoerer who offers a very scrupulous analysis of that famous document. Professor Schwoerer sees "radical Whigs" and "radical Whiggery" as the men and ideas that informed the Declaration and Bill of Rights. Some scholars disagree with Schwoerer's claim about the radical Whiggery of the proponents of the Declaration and the question remains in debate but what seems particularly relevant is the amount of semantic hedging the participants used, once more, to avoid a dangerous deadlock. The untidy, ambiguous nature of the so-called "Settlement" of 1689 is a crucial consequence of the verbal variation so prevalent in the Convention Parliament.

[115]Anchitell Grey, *Debates of the House of Commons, from the year 1667 to the year 1694*, 10 vols. (London, 1793), 9, p. 30, quoted in Robert J. Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights," *The Historical Journal* 17 (June 1974), p. 266.

[116]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 189.

[117]Ibid., p. 198.

[118]Ibid., p. 229.

[119]Roger Morrice, "Entr'ing Book, Being an Historical Register of Occurrences from April, Anno, 1677 to April 1691," 4 vols., 2, pp. 445 and 447, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 190. See Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 219, for a very different reading of Morrice's words.

print that the Tories wanted "to embroil the Convention in schemes of reform so as to distract the nation and recall the king in the turmoil."[120]

Whigs had to contend with the bold political fact of Tory strength, including astute, disruptive Tory tactics, and in addition, with William's adamant adverseness to a conditioned Crown. William's role was, once again, crucial but to the jeopardy of radical Whiggery this time. His opposition to limitations undermined any full fruition of the reformist goals desired by radical Whigs just as his refusal to be regent or prince consort played havoc with Tory principles. Throughout the deliberations on rights, Whigs had to take into account both the Tories and the Prince.[121]

On 29 January leading radical Whigs in the House of Commons sincerely endorsed the Tory "call to 'change things as well as hands,' to 'lay the foundations' of the government anew."[122] Radical Whigs overrode the reluctance of other Whigs, especially Whig lawyers, to undertake such a time-consuming task in face of potential Jacobitism and/or other dire prospects, such as the loss of Ireland, a possible mutiny in the army, and an expected French invasion.[123] A motion was presented and carried for the creation of a committee "to bring in general heads of such things as are absolutely necessary to be considered for the better securing of our religion, and laws, and liberties."[124]

Four days later, Sir George Treby, chairman of the basically Whig committee, reported back to the whole House with a listing of twenty-three grievances and rights to which the Commons added five more. The first draft, the "Heads of Grievances,"[125] may not have met "the radical renovation evidently envisaged by some members during the 29 January debates," but it did constitute a significant "package of constitutional reform" that received the endorsement of the full House that same day, 2 February.[126]

Two days later there was some complaint about the lack of action on Treby's

[120]*A Free Conference concerning the present revolution of affairs in England* (London, 1689), p. 14, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 190.

[121]Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights"; Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," pp. 48-9; and Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 232-4.

[122]John Somers, "Notes of Debate, January 28, January 29," in *Miscellaneous State Papers, from 1501 to 1726*, ed. Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, 2 vols. (London, 1778), 2, pp. 414 and 417, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 186.

[123]Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights," p. 267.

[124]*Journals of the House of Commons*, 10, p. 14, quoted in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 185.

[125]See appendix 2 in Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 299-300.

[126]Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights," p. 268; and Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 220.

report and a subsequent recommendation for the swift dispatch of the "Heads" to the House of Lords. Some expressed concern about such a procedure and recommended the committee "distinguish such of the general heads, as are introductory of new laws, from those that are declaratory of ancient rights."[127] Radical Whigs agreed:

> To seek the Lords' agreement to the Heads of Grievances, with its undefined mixture of old liberties and new laws, might cast doubt on the validity of those rights which Whigs for the past ten years had been claiming were legally theirs. They felt it wiser to stipulate which provisions in the Heads of Grievances merely re-affirmed traditional liberties, and which required new legislation.[128]

On 7 February enthusiasm for the Lords' acceptance of the Commons' resolution and their vote to declare William and Mary King and Queen sparked a move to settle the government immediately and almost led to the loss of a claim of rights. The House was quickly brought back to its senses and proceeded to ask the committee to report as soon as possible. That same afternoon Treby presented the second draft and his report revealed a clear retreat from the arguments characteristic of the radical Whigs. This second draft was very different. The first three indictments against James were clearly and almost exclusively Tory concerns. Particularly remarkable was the committee's deletion of those crucial Whig premises that had preceded and informed the abdication and vacancy clause, even though the entire resolution had been accepted in the House of Lords. Whig awareness of Tory objections to any suggestion of an elective monarchy--theories of original contract, the dissolution of government, the sovereignty of the people, and certain readings of "abdication" and "vacancy"--must have had considerable impact on the committee. This was an exercise of prudence, an attenuation of radical Whiggery in order to avoid offending the Tories.[129]

The next day, 8 February, Whig members of the House of Commons made additional and equally revealing decisions. They called for the inclusion of the claim of rights with the offer of the throne *but* only that section of the claim of rights declaring ancient law was to be included. Commons created a new committee to add their amendments to the Lords' vote. The committee was chaired by John Somers and, like the rights committee, Whig in composition. The House of Commons instructed the Somers committee to do the following: 1)connect the Commons' amendments--vesting the administration of government solely in William and

[127]*Journals of the House of Commons*, 10, p. 19, quoted in Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights," p. 269.

[128]Frankle, "The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights," p. 269. See Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 220-1.

[129]Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, pp. 223-4.

specifying the order of succession after William and Mary--to the Lords' vote declaring William and Mary King and Queen; 2)join those with that section of the Heads of Grievances that asserted known laws *leaving out* those heads that required new legislation; and 3)link the whole with the oaths proposed by the Lords.[130]

That same day the House of Commons voted, without a division, to approve the entire package: the claim of rights "shorn of those heads 'introductory of new laws'"; an equally fleeced version of the Commons' resolution of 28 January; the Lords' vote in favor of William and Mary; and the Tory peers' proposals for new oaths.[131] After an unsuccessful Tory ploy, foiled by the Whigs, to sabotage the claim of rights and four days of trying effort to formulate, discuss, and reconcile amendments between Commons and Lords, the famous Declaration of Rights was approved on 12 February. At 10:30 the next morning it was read to Prince William and Princess Mary and then the Crown offered to them.[132]

Leading Whigs had rejected the explicitly reformist Heads of Grievances and had opted for the more moderate Declaration of Rights. They said the Declaration simply asserted *known* law. But, as Lois Schwoerer demonstrates, many articles went well beyond a mere restatement of ancient rights.[133] Schwoerer argues, in addition, that the Whig assertion--to be restoring the ancient constitution--was pure strategy: a feigned accommodation of Whig convictions to the political weight and principled sensibility of the Tories and to William's reluctance to accept a fettered Crown. Leading Whigs, in other words, intentionally disguised the true nature of their endeavors.[134]

Whig leaders did, certainly, achieve much more than they admitted but were they committed libertarians and did they uphold, as best as possible, genuinely radical-Whig principles? The very formulation of such queries reflects the divergence of opinion among historians on this crucial issue of ideology. Schwoerer does, of course, consider the promoters of the Declaration of Rights "radicals" but other scholars do not regard the chief proponents of the Declaration as the real radicals.

Geoffrey Holmes, an eminent specialist in early eighteenth-century politics, praises Schwoerer for providing an illuminating elucidation of the truly revolution-

[130]Ibid., pp. 228-30.

[131]Horwitz, "Parliament and the Glorious Revolution," pp. 47-8.

[132]Ibid., pp. 48-9; and Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, chap. 14.

[133]While articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 12 did, with some minor exceptions, reaffirm old laws, articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10 (excessive bail clause), 11, and 13 did not constitute a mere reaffirmation of undisputed, ancient laws. See Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 283 and chap. 1. See also Horwitz, "1689 (and All That)" and Mark Goldie, review of *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, by Lois G. Schwoerer, in *Parliamentary History* 2 (1983), pp. 242-4 for both qualifications and additions to Schwoerer's study.

[134]In Schwoerer's opinion:

ary features of the Declaration of Rights, but continues to support prevailing scholarly opinion about the political attitudes of the Whig leaders when he points out:

> It is a palpable weakness of Dr Schwoerer's argument that because she uses the term 'radical Whigs' too capaciously, she fails to distinguish the 'commonwealthmen'--led by Wildman, Hampden and Birch in the Commons and by such as Delamare, Bolton and Lovelace in the Lords--from those more pragmatic advocates of 'rights' (Treby, Somers, Wharton, Jephson and the like) who were Williamites first, and 'radicals' very definitely second. For it was of course the pragmatists' moderation (or 'trimming') which eventually prevailed.[135]

Mark Goldie, in his recent and very important essay, "The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94," makes a strong case for the reservation of the term "radical Whigs" for those who endorsed, unequivocally, the explicitly radical implications of basic Whig principles. Goldie believes most Whigs accepted contract theory:

> Contract and mixed monarchy formed the theoretical core of whiggism. The constitution derived its legitimacy from the consent of all substantial citizens whose rights and liberties it was the task of government to preserve. The monarch stood in a contractual relationship to the community as a trustee who ruled upon conditions, the breach of which rendered his crown forfeit. In the event of subversion of the constitution the representatives of the community were freed from allegiance and assumed the right to restrain or depose the monarch.[136]

But, Goldie points out and unravels a "divergence in whiggism" when he draws a distinction between those Whig polemicists who formulated Whig principles from an "historical-legal" perspective and those who developed Whig ideas on "arguments derived from reason and nature."

> The conviction that there was an immutable ancient constitution vied with the more ambitious notion that the principle *salus populi* liberated the community to refashion its constitution as it thought fit. A commitment to the language of the ancient constitution made it difficult to deny the historical fact of the king's supremacy over parliament.[137]

"If Whigs had adhered to their programmatic ideal, they might well have precipitated a civil war, or provoked the prince sufficiently to abandon England (as his spokesman threatened), or sacrificed entirely their personal political futures. But as it was, the ambiguities in the statement about James's leaving the throne and the compromises in the claim of rights provided material for diverse inferences to be drawn about the revolution, the aims of the revolutionaries, and the nature of the claim" (Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 290).

[135]Geoffrey Holmes, review of *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, by Lois G. Schwoerer, in *The English Historical Review* 98 (July 1983), p. 631.

[136]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 209.

Radical Whigs depended upon natural-rights theory and bypassed the inherent conservatism of the historical-legal approach characteristic of moderate-Whig emphasis on an immutable ancient constitution. Instead of leaning upon ancient-constitution theory with its crippling historical evidence of royal supremacy over Parliaments in the English past, radical Whigs insisted upon the "popular origin of government" and the "community's residual right of resistance." Radical Whigs considered the Convention a constituent assembly and expected that body to make explicit and sweeping reforms in 1689.[138]

Goldie does demonstrate the existence of both ancient-constitution and popular-origin theorists in the Convention Parliament but only the latter group of Whigs can be called, in his opinion, "radical." But he also recognizes the fact that many moderate-Whig leaders, adherents of ancient-constitution theory, felt obliged to accommodate Whiggism to the Tory reality.[139] It is possible to believe those Whigs--the "pragmatists"--opted for a conservative language as more inclusive and, thus, a potentially useful one in a Convention Parliament where Tories did matter, in a society where most of the gentry and clergy were Tories, and with a "deliverer" adverse to limitations. Schwoerer does, perhaps, employ the term "radical Whigs" too capaciously. But in a forum where semantics were more ruse than connotation Whig leaders could have taken refuge in a political vocabulary that did not, in fact, reflect real convictions. It is certainly true that neither the Tories nor the Whigs always said what they meant or meant what they said.

What does seem important and as Goldie, once again, demonstrates, is how widely Whig responses to the Tories varied. Radical Whigs were far more aggressive against the Tories than their moderate colleagues. Radical Whigs identified Tories and their Cavalier predecessors as the key political forces behind Stuart authoritarianism. In fact, radical Whigs drew a direct link between *Anglican* Royalism and the "legal" tyranny they believed characterized Restoration politics. The Cavalier Parliament had embellished royal authority with numerous, "legal" statutes in the 1660s; Danby had augmented Anglican predominance through a manipulated legislature; Tories, at Court and on the local level, had converted, after 1681, Anglican Royalism into the political and ideological status quo; major Anglican scholars had endorsed *jure divino* authoritarianism in Church and State; and clergymen had convinced almost everyone to submit to *Anglican* absolutism. In 1689, the

[137]Ibid.

[138]Ibid., pp. 208-12.

[139]Ibid., pp. 208-11, 220, and 223.

radical Whigs demanded the agents of Anglican authoritarianism, in the reigns of both Charles II and James II, be proscribed, including, significantly, those who taught absolutist doctrines. In addition, they wanted to educate the political nation with doctrines that would drive away the theory of divine right and propagate that of natural rights.[140]

The Restoration polity was riddled with paradox: not only Cavalier/Tory resistance to divine-right Kings whenever monarchical prerogatives threatened the Anglican Establishment but radical support for the exercise of royal sovereignty over religion. Nonconformists and future Whigs had supported Charles's Declaration of Indulgence and in 1686 numerous "former whigs and revolutionaries" had considered "the prospect of toleration and the destruction of anglican dominion" worth their support of King James II.[141] Even after the Earl of Shaftesbury, the father of the Whig party, had gone into opposition he

> expressly defended the Indulgence, and the crown's ecclesiastical supremacy, against the 'High Episcopal Man, and the Old Cavalier'. He did so in the major testament of nascent Whiggism, *A Letter from a person of quality* (1675). His protege, John Locke, drafted memoranda in 1669 and 1672 supporting the crown's ecclesiastical authority.

Nonconformist and Whig acceptance of royal supremacy over the Anglican Church "flowed naturally from a radical Lutheran and Erastian hostility to usurpation by prelatical priestcraft over civil magistracy and lay conscience."[142]

Radicals, in the second half of the seventeenth century, had "believed, rightly, that their enemy was not solely monarchical absolutism, but also the tyranny of the anglican church establishment, reimposed in the Act of Uniformity of 1662".[143] For men like John Wildman, Henry Neville, Richard and John Hampden, William Williams, William Sacheverell, and their Dissenter associates, English monarchs were necessary allies, necessary paradoxically, as shields against religious despotism, especially the mental tyranny Anglican clergymen exercised over most of the population.[144]

[140]Ibid., p. 212; and idem, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism."

[141]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 207. As Mark Goldie recently puts it: "The central paradox of Restoration politics is that a popular and gentry Anglicanism, ferociously intolerant, was some times challenged by absolute power in alliance with 'radical' forces" (Mark Goldie, review of *Revolutionary Politics & Locke's* Two Treatises of Government, by Richard Ashcraft, in *The English Historical Review* 103 [January 1988], p. 126).

[142] Goldie, review of *Subjects and Sovereigns*, p. 1030.

[143]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 207.

[144]Ibid.; and Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," pp. 76-7 and 80-3.

In 1689 Whig chieftains in the Convention Parliament were, it seems, political realists who considered the Tory majority in Lords, its strong minority in Commons, and "the tory prejudices of the greater part of the gentry and clergy"[145] a weighty political force that demanded Whig recognition and accommodation. It is also possible that those realists intentionally muffled the radical implications of contract theory with the idiom of ancient constitutionalism. But radical Whigs, subsequent supporters of the famous Sacheverell clause that called for a seven-year exclusion from municipal office of those--Tories, of course--responsible for interference in the boroughs, sought the political elimination of Tories. Radical Whigs called for an oath of allegiance that required a *de jure* recognition of William and Mary with the intended purpose of embarrassing and compromising "conscience-stricken tories."[146] Yet, at worst, if such proposals had succeeded, the Tories would have refused support for William and possibly revolted. At best, if the radical-Whig proscription policy had succeeded, "William would have been deprived of his most able ministers and tory acquiescence in the new regime would have been ruled out."[147]

But even radical Whigs attenuated their principles when faced with overt Jacobitism. As early as May, 1689 a radical Whig, John Birch, argued for the suspension of Habeas Corpus, a basic Whig law for which radicals had fought so hard in 1679. Birch urged suspension when he thought the Revolution and Revolution Settlement were threatened from without and from within:

> 'Tis said, 'now the Government is settled, no need of this'; but we all know that it is not settled yet; and before it will be better it will be worse. We are in a State of War, and worse than War. There is a great man on one side of the water, and King James on the other; and a Popish party, and another in the midst of us; and this is a State of War, Sure.[148]

Perhaps the Whig chieftains had simply possessed more foresight. Tory acquiescence in 1689 was certainly a real necessity.

Whig supporters of the Revolution Settlement did achieve more than they admitted. But whether they were committed contractarians, who merely muffled the radical import of their actions with a conservative linguistic camouflage in the face of what was, indeed, serious opposition, remains debatable. But no matter what

[145]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 211.

[146]Ibid., p. 221. See Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics*, pp. 54-6, 108-9, 165, 175-6, and 301-2.

[147]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 222.

[148]Grey, *Debates of the House of Commons*, 9, p. 265, quoted in Howard Nenner, "Constitutional Uncertainty and the Declaration of Rights," in *After the Reformation: Essays in Honor of J. H. Hexter*, ed. Barbara C. Malament (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), n. 7, p. 306.

stance one takes on the question of the committee leaders and the degree of their commitment to a radical Whiggism, no particular position on that issue diminishes the most salient feature of the so-called "Revolution Settlement," namely, its pervasive ambiguity.

Even though the promoters of the Declaration of Rights accomplished more than they admitted and even if they exercised a necessary, studied, politic quiet about their real convictions, the very nature of such a strategy--an ideological cover-up--undermined the credibility of what many Whigs claimed, in the 1690s, to be their "Revolution Principles." If the Whig leaders were moderate ancient-constitution theorists, no radical reading of the Revolution should have been heard from them; but, in fact, many Whigs did affirm a radical interpretation of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement.

> For the first decade after the Revolution the Whigs generally claimed that resistance had been used in 1688 and that this was justified because James II had broken the contract which existed between sovereign and subjects. Since he betrayed his trust by attacking the religion, property and liberties of his subjects, then his subjects were absolved from their allegiance.[149]

Such *ex post* and *de facto* articulations of "Revolution Principles" suggest support for Schwoerer's theory about Whig strategy during the Convention Parliament. But certain Whigs--"True Whigs"/ "Commonwealthmen"/ "Radical Whigs"--provided a fuller picture of the Convention Parliament when they promulgated their interpretation of 1689. They lamented Whig accommodation to Tory qualms and to the Prince's hostility to limitations. One of the most militant "Commonwealthmen," the Reverend Samuel Johnson, criticized, openly and explicitly, the Whigs for launching the fiction of abdication. Johnson, like other radical Whigs, said James had been *deposed* and the Declaration of Rights "had been annexed to the crown as a condition."[150] Furthermore, these radical Whigs articulated what was a constant and very basic concern among them: the Tories. They expressed shock at the accession of Tories to the seats of power. With the agents of repression in government, England was, in Johnson's opinion, in the greatest danger. And with characteristic radical-Whig vehemence, Johnson saved his greatest bitterness for the Anglican clergy. For the radical Whigs, the failure to destroy Anglicanism was the major shortcoming of the Revolution of 1688-89.[151]

[149]H. T. Dickinson, "The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* 61 (February 1976), p. 31.
[150]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," p. 231.
[151]Ibid., pp. 221, 231, and 232.

The Tories, as we will see, indignantly attacked "Revolution Principles" as presumptuous, partisan, and dishonest. To recognize the fiction of abdication in the Convention Parliament and to talk, simultaneously, of deposition was, like the widespread reading of the Settlement, promulgated in the 1690s, a reflection of the basic confusion--that pervasive ambiguity--of the proceedings in the Convention Parliament from 28 January to 12 February 1689.

During the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89, Tory and Whig protagonists did demonstrate an impressive ability to negotiate under very tense conditions. Concession and compromise, as well as fecund fudging, contributed to the relative bloodlessness of the Glorious Revolution. A certain degree of give-and-take helped to avoid a political stalemate over the potentially insoluble ideological differences that separated Tories from Whigs. But such give-and-take failed to bridge those ideological fissures. The Revolution Settlement of 1689 avoided much more than it resolved. Crucial political and constitutional pronouncements depended, at best, upon tenuous compromises and fragile concessions. The so-called "Settlement" was devoid of any real, meaningful meeting of minds. It had too much mental artifice, political maneuver, and mere exigency to provide a solid constitutional foundation upon which to guarantee a stable polity. Only the half-fictitious accommodation of most Whigs and the very reluctant acquiescence of most Tories to trying circumstances permitted the disparate participants to achieve as much as they did. In addition to a lack of potentially durable agreement between most Tories and Whigs, a significant number of the High Tories refused to acquiesce at all. And finally, a small but demanding and articulate group of Whigs considered their colleagues' accommodation a travesty.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POST-REVOLUTION POLITY

Post-Revolution England: Religion and Politics

The Revolution of 1688-89 was a major watershed in the history of modern Britain: the successful and, in England at least, bloodless transfer of the Crown from the living, legitimate, Catholic James Stuart to the Dutch, Calvinist Prince of Orange. But, although truly remarkable and, given the avoidance of another terrible civil war, even glorious, the Revolution and Revolution Settlement remained unhinged. Neither enjoyed solid support. The events of 1688-89 owed very little to meaningful, bipartisan agreement and, instead, too much to political and ideological evasiveness.

The lack of real consensus about the nature of the constitution in Church and State--a necessary precondition for a stable polity--brought much further political and religious controversy and conflict. The Revolution of 1688-89 and its ambiguous arrangements produced divisive contention between Tories and Whigs and continued to do so for many years. The real legacy of the Revolution was bitter political and ideological strife.[1]

[1]Henry Horwitz, "Parties, Connections, and Parliamentary Politics, 1689-1714: Review and Revision," *The Journal of British Studies* 6 (November 1966), pp. 45-69; idem, "The Structure of Parliamentary Politics," in *Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689-1714*, ed. Geoffrey Holmes, Problems in Focus Series (London: The Macmillan Press, 1969), pp. 96-114; idem, *Parliament, Policy and Politics;* I. F. Burton, P. W. J. Riley, and E. Rowlands, *Political Parties in the Reigns of William III and Anne: The Evidence of Division Lists* (*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* Special Supplement No. 7 [November 1968]); E. L. Ellis, "William III and the Politicians," in *Britain after the Glorious Revolution*, pp. 115-34; J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675-1725* (Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 1973; first published by Macmillan Press, 1967); Geoffrey Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* 2d ed. (London: The Hambledon Press, 1987); idem, "The Achievement of Stability: The Social Context of Politics from the 1680s to the Age of Walpole," in *The Whig Ascendancy: Colloquies on Hanoverian England*, ed. John Cannon (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 1-22; W. A. Speck *Tory and Whig: The Struggle in the Constituencies 1701-1715* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1970); and Geoffrey Holmes and W. A. Speck, eds., *The Divided Society: Parties and Politics in England 1694-1716*, Documents of Modern History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968); B. W. Hill, *The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976); David Hayton, "The 'Country' Interest and the Party System, 1689-c.1720," in *Party and Management in Parliament, 1660-1784*, ed. Clyve Jones (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), pp. 37-85; idem, "The Country Party in the House of Commons 1698-1699: a Forecast of the Opposition to a Standing Army?," *Parliamentary History* 6, pt. 1 (1987), pp. 141-63; and Eveline Cruickshanks, "Religion and Royal Succession: The Rage of Party," in *Britain in the First Age of Party 1680-1750: Essays Presented to Geoffrey Holmes*, ed. Clyve Jones (London: The Hambledon Press, 1987), pp. 19-

Although Whigs and Tories battled each other, the odds were quite uneven. More often than not, Tories, as the majority party in the nation, held the upper hand while the Whigs were a frequently beleaguered minority. Tories fared much better than the Whigs in the ideological battles of the post-Revolution era and succeeded more often at the polls.[2]

In the 1690s the Whigs claimed for themselves full credit for the events of 1688-89 and stamped them with a radical-Whig label. The very ambiguity of the Revolution Settlement made it possible for many Whigs to sincerely believe Englishmen had legitimately resisted monarchical tyranny, had legally deposed James II for breaking the "Original Contract," and had offered a conditioned Crown to Prince William. The Whigs labelled those beliefs "Revolution Principles." But when challenged about the relevance of such ideas to the Revolution or the Revolution Settlement, the Whigs could not prove what were partisan, as well as presumptuous, claims.[3]

The case for resistance in 1688 was weak since no actual force had been used against James before his flight nor could the Whigs provide explicit evidence of deposition, breach of contract, or limited monarchy.[4] The very nature of Whig strategy in the Convention--a necessary, studied, politic quiet about such questions--had left them ideologically vulnerable. That ideological cover-up deprived the Whigs of viable referential proof to support their "Revolution Principles."

The Whig interpretation of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89, in terms of resistance and contract, failed to take firm root. With ease and cogency, a Tory pamphleteer could correctly explain, in 1699, how the proceedings of the Convention Parliament constituted a careful, conscious avoidance of dangerous principles:

> [So] that the honourable Convention might not seem to make dangerous precedents to posterity, give the people a scandalous authority, or render the monarchy of England precarious, and not worth acceptance, they cautiously and honestly avoided such pretences, and settled the nation upon the express renunciation of James the Second, his voluntary withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, and the necessity of providing for the nation when the throne was vacant; and therefore would never depart from the words 'Abdication' and 'Vacancy of the Throne'. So that what the Convention did upon that extraordinary occasion was, when the late king went hence, but shutting the door after him.[5]

Whig attempts to appropriate exclusive credit for the events of 1688-89 and to interpret them in revolutionary terms not only failed but backfired. Tory writers, in pamphlets and newspapers, and the Anglican clergy, in numerous, influential pulpits and in their printed sermons, besmeared the Whigs with charges of raving republicanism and blatant irreligion.[6] The accusations were essentially false. But Whig talk, in the 1690s, about the rights of the people to resist and depose monarchs sounded ominous, particularly so when, at the same time, a thousand Dissenting congregations suddenly gained the right to worship.

After the failure of a bill to comprehend most Nonconformists and the adventitious passage of a Toleration Act in 1689, Trinitarian Protestants were granted the right to worship in licensed chapels.[7] And in July 1689, the new monarch, a strong

43. See J. V. Beckett, "Introduction: Stability in Politics and Society, 1680-1750," in *Britain in the First Age of Party*, pp. 1-18 for an excellent, up-to-date discussion of historical scholarship on party configurations in post-Revolution society.

[2]Holmes, *British Politics*, p. 248; Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 45; idem, *Revolution Principles*; Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," pp. 32-5; idem, *Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), Part One; Bruce Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980), p. 110; G. V. Bennett, "English Jacobitism, 1710-1715; Myth and Reality," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 32 (1982), pp. 150-1; and Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, pp. 120-41.

[3]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," pp. 31-2; and Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 50.

[4]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," p. 32; and Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 46.

[5]"Cursory Remarks upon some late Disloyal Proceedings," in *A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts ... Selected from Public as well as Private Libraries, Particularly That of the Late Lord Somers*, ed. Sir Walter Scott, 13 vols. (London, 1809-1815), 11, pp. 172-3, quoted in Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 51.

[6]Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," pp. 55, 61-2 and 67; and idem, *Revolution Principles*, pp. 45-54 and 82.

[7]Historians usually view the 1689 Act of Toleration as a narrow measure and contemporaries, in particular radical Whigs and Dissenters, considered it very inadequate. If, though, one looks at the events of 1688-89 from the most appropriate perspective, namely "one which takes religion seriously," (Goldie, review of *The Declaration of Rights*, p. 243) and if one keeps in mind the fact that, for many, Restoration authoritarianism was *Anglican*, especially manifest in the persecution of Dissent, the Act of Toleration can be considered an "achievement." (See Cruickshanks, "Religion and Royal Succession," p. 27.) The Revolution and Revolution Settlement did, certainly, muffle both Roman Catholic and Anglican absolutism. Articles 14 and 15 of the Heads of Grievances--barring Roman Catholics from the succession--were not included in the Declaration of Rights but did form part of the Bill of Rights and constituted "the most novel" (Horwitz, "1689 (and All That)," p. 30) as well as "the most effective (perhaps the only really effective) provisions of the Bill of Rights" (J. C. D. Clark, *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], p. 75). The Act of Toleration, although generally considered (then and now) a shortcoming, did bridle the rampant Anglicanism that had meant real oppression for many in Restoration England. Yet, one must also bear in mind that while the

Calvinist, gave his official sanction to the Scottish Parliament's abolishment of episcopacy and their establishment of a Presbyterian Church-order in Scotland.[8]

For some thirty years most of the political nation had considered Anglican uniformity a political necessity and believed religious dissent and political subversion went hand in hand. The violence and disorder of the mid-seventeenth century continued to haunt memories: the "Great Rebellion" and "murder" of Charles I "were still live political issues, perhaps more alive than any."[9] One of the great phobias in late Stuart England was the "dread that the nation might eventually be engulfed by a new wave of sectaries and 'fanatics'."[10] Nonconformity and contractarianism remained anathema. The dread spectre of chaos, immediately associated with anything that gave political and religious privileges to individuals, raised itself readily among men emotionally close to the horrors of anarchy.

Many Englishmen, especially those who enjoyed the right to vote and who exercised it in ten General Elections between 1690 and 1713 and upon whom radical-Whig theory bestowed the right to resist and depose a tyrannical monarch, turned a deaf ear to Whig ideas. Most Englishmen continued to follow traditional guides, especially Anglican parsons (about 10,000) who defamed the Whigs as rebels and atheists. Indeed, in the General Election of 1690, the first in the reign of King William III, the radical Whigs suffered a stunning defeat. Merely to criticize the "abdication" formula spelled political suicide.[11] Instead of establishing "Revolution Principles," the Whigs were damned for religious and political heterodoxy and held up as the dangerous supporters of an ungodly world.

In addition to smears in the press, from the pulpit, and on the hustings, Anglican Tories mounted an effective ideological offensive against Whiggery. They justified the events of 1688-89, especially the change of monarchs and the concomitant allegiance issue, in deep-rooted political and religious terms--hereditary succession, conquest theory, possession, divine providence--that sustained the doctrines of non-resistance and passive obedience. Instead of "being demolished by John Locke and

events of 1688-89 gain considerably when measured with a yardstick carefully marked with questions over religion, the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89 did not resolve religious issues. Most of them remained alive and some were even aggravated by other factors in post-Revolution England. The Tories, who really did matter, were very nervous about Dissent after 1689. See Geoffrey Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England* (London: The Historical Association, 1975), pp. 12-13; and idem, *British Politics in the Age of Anne*, pp. xxix-xx and 62.

[8]G. V. Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," in *Britain after the Glorious Revolution*, pp. 160-3; and Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, pp. 12-14.

[9]Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 57.

[10]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 10.

[11]Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism," pp. 224-5.

other Whig writers," in the 1690s, traditional Anglican-Tory ideology survived and even "enjoyed a new lease of life in the early eighteenth century."[12]

In face of this strong Anglican-Tory onslaught and alarmed that it "might herald a move to reverse the Revolution and put the Pretender on the throne," Whigs grew more circumspect about contract and resistance. They "were careful not to condone rebellion except in the most pressing emergency." Yet, even with this conscious ideological retreat, the Whigs still could not carry "a majority of a conservative political nation with them."[13]

Throughout the post-Settlement era (1689-1745) religion and politics were intimately intermixed. In the early eighteenth century they were "as closely involved with each other as they had been at any time since the Reformation."[14] The Anglican Establishment, especially its High-Church clergy, was the determinant force behind Tory political clout. All scholars underscore the religious dimension of political issues in the reign of Queen Anne and describe the politics of that period as the "rage of party."[15]

If religious concerns produced much of the party strife of the early eighteenth-century decades, long before 1700 (as the previous chapter shows) religion was politics and politics religion. The Church of England and the majority who supported it--Anglican Cavaliers until the Exclusion Crisis and Anglican Tories thereafter--played a central role in Restoration politics. Recent evidence also shows that the Tories retained a political identity and even sustained considerable political viability in Hanoverian England as the traditional, natural defenders of Anglicanism.[16] Without a doubt, a "Church Party" constitutes the major, thematic thread in the history of politics and ideology from the Restoration to, and perhaps beyond, the reign of George III.

[12]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," p. 33. See also Straka, *Anglican Reaction to the Revolution*, chap. 10; and Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*.

[13]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," p. 34.

[14]Geoffrey Holmes, *The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), p. 41; and idem, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, pp. 4 and 6.

[15]Holmes and Speck, eds., *The Divided Society*, pp. 3-4, 49-52, and 114-16; Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England;* Bennett, "Conflict in the Church"; and Kenyon, "1688: Resistance and Contract," p. 55.

[16]Linda Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 104-17.

> "One of the most striking features of the eighteenth-century tories which this new study highlights is the extent to which they continued to fill their traditional role as 'the Church party'.... There can be no excuse in future for neglecting a factor which, we are deftly shown, lent purpose and logic well into the 1750s to the claims of tories to be the natural defenders of Anglicanism under the first two Hanoverians, no less than under the last

In Restoration England the conflicts between the Stuart monarchy and the Anglican gentry were religious in nature. In 1672-73 Charles II had had to surrender to the monarchists--Anglican Cavaliers--and fifteen years later James II made the serious mistake of ignoring his Anglican-Tory loyalists. The Cavaliers and Tories were, first and foremost, Anglicans. They used the Stuart crown and its powers for their own purposes, especially to buttress an Anglican hegemony, both political and religious, on the local level. In the 1680s it was the Tory gentry who had encouraged royal intervention in the corporations. Remodellings of the parliamentary boroughs were made to facilitate the election of Tory burgesses. Such endeavors had permitted the creation of an Anglican-Tory monopoly in Church and State. When King James II mounted the throne he had enjoyed an enormous degree of loyalty but it was a qualified one. Most Englishmen considered themselves "supporters, in the heraldic sense, of the Crown but not as its dependents." The Tories were united and resolute when they blocked James's policies. Royal moves against the Church of England "forced the Tories to operate as a party."[17] James failed, foolishly perhaps, to yield to the friends of monarchy.

The Anglican Establishment supported divine-right monarchs when, and only when, royal policies agreed with or were espoused by the Church. Restoration divines defended the Church's authority against any and all encroachments, including, especially, those of an Erastian prince. The unity between Church and Crown in Stuart England "was a fortunate coincidence which tended to evoke from churchmen an exaggerated royalism." Historians often, and understandably, see the Churchmen as unquestioning Royalists, but the loyalty of Anglican primates to the Stuart monarchy came second in their hierarchy of values. In Churchmen's eyes God was first; they were his divinely appointed apostles who, as the heads of an "Apostolic, quasi-monarchic episcopacy," were morally obligated to preserve true doctrine against all enemies.[18]

The reestablishment of the Church of England and its defense against any encroachment whatsoever were the crucial political concerns in Restoration England. Similarly, the vicissitudes of the Anglican Church, so prevalent after the Revolution, were central to Tory politics in the ensuing eighteenth century.

Anglican clergymen faced many difficulties in post-Revolution England and their various reactions to particular grievances converted the Church of England into

two Stuarts" (Geoffrey Holmes, review of *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-1760*, by Linda Colley in *The Historical Journal* 26 [September 1983], p. 757).

[17]Jones, "Parties and Parliament," pp. 69 and 70. See also Linda Colley and Mark Goldie, "The Principles and Practice of Eighteenth-Century Party," *The Historical Journal* 22 (March 1979), p. 246.

[18]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 16.

a bitterly divided institution. Each clerical group turned to a rival political party for help. The bulk of the clergy--the lower clergy--believed only the Tories would save them; the upper clergy, in contrast, sought protection from the Whigs. Many Tory politicians supported the High-Church faction. They dedicated themselves and their party, and (as in previous situations) without monarchical support, to the Anglican cause. Whigs welcomed the episcopate's dependence on their party, especially, of course, their votes in the House of Lords.

G. V. Bennett, a specialist in early eighteenth-century religion and politics, underscores the real distress clergymen felt when they had to face a loss in status and authority as well as widespread attacks on their traditional prestige. Appropriately, Bennett refers to the experience of clergymen, after the Revolution, as the "Anglican Crisis."[19]

The new dispensation granted Dissenting congregations, the growth of rival churches, and the rise of Dissenting schools and seminaries greatly alarmed the Anglican clergy. Moreover, the spread, in the mid-1690s, of Occasional Conformity, the practice whereby Dissenters occasionally took communion in the Anglican Church in order to qualify for public office, galled Anglicans. Tory squires grew angry when faced with economically successful Nonconformists in many corporations including such important cities as London and Bristol. An aspect of Anglican-Tory hostility towards Dissent was the socio-political threat of Nonconformists. Particularly irksome

> was the fact that despite the civil disabilities which Dissent still legally incurred, especially in terms of office-holding and university entrance, there was no necessary correlation between religious conformity and privileged social status.[20]

The lapsing of the Licensing Act, in 1695, ended censorship of the press and removed the previous requirement of the bishop's *imprimatur* on religious works. Popular bookmarkets were flooded with heterodox and anticlerical writings. The growing assault on religious orthodoxy was open and systematic; moreover, "heresy and attacks on the clergy became virtually unpunishable."[21] Deists, like John Toland,

[19]G. V. Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, chap. 1; and Holmes, *The Trial*, pp. 21-8.

[20]Geoffrey Holmes, "The Sacheverell Riots: The Crowd and the Church in Early Eighteenth-Century London." in *Rebellion, Popular Protest and the Social Order in Early Modern England*, ed. Paul Slack, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; first published in *Past and Present* 72 [August 1976], pp. 55-85), p. 240; and idem, *The Trial*, pp. 177-8; and Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 167; and idem, *The Tory Crisis*, pp. 13-14.

[21]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 163.

author of the scandalous *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696), demoted revelation. John Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) celebrated human reason as the viable vehicle to religious truth. These and other works tried "to pare away doctrine to the barest minimum of rational, natural religion, and coupled this with attacks upon the panoply of the temporal church, upon priestcraft, superstition and doctrinal censorship."[22] Even Bishop Burnet, a Whig, a Latitudinarian in theology, and an Erastian in Church-State relations, recognized how anticlerical writers ridiculed and undermined church authority and reputation:

> it became a common topic of discourse to treat all mysteries in religion as the contrivances of priests to bring the world into blind submission to them; *priestcraft* grew to be another word in fashion, and the enemies of religion vented all their impieties under the cover of these words.[23]

Anglican clergymen also confronted the first and only schism in their hierarchy when, in February 1690, a third of the prelacy lost their episcopal sees for failing to fulfill the terms of a merely secular law. These Nonjurors, as the first primate, his colleagues, and some four hundred members of the lower clergy were appropriately called for their refusal to take the oaths of loyalty to William and Mary (required of all officeholders and clergymen within a specified period of time according to the terms of an Act of Parliament), considered the deprivations outrageously unjust as well as invalid.

> Unjust because the political crime of failing to swear fealty was insufficient cause for derogating a bishop from his holy function and canonically invalid because only a Church synod was competent to depose a bishop. A temporal government--a usurped one at that--had invaded the spiritual realm. The Nonjurors had as early as autumn 1689 arrived at the conclusion that such deprivations would entail upon the conforming Church the guilt of schism....[24]

Although the Nonjurors were few in number, the impact of their presence on the majority of the Anglican clergy was enormous. Most Anglican clergymen had taken the oaths only with the greatest reluctance. Meanwhile, their uneasy consciences had made them hypersensitive to the presence of Nonjurors who "were like a ghost of the past, confessors who stood in the ancient ways, devout, logical and insistent."[25] Even more important was the powerful influence Nonjuror scholarship and polemics exercised on juring brethren. The Nonjurors, in the 1690s, stimulated the first phase

[22]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 15.
[23]Burnet, *History of My Own Time* [1823 ed.] 4, p. 378, quoted in Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 164.
[24]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 20.
[25]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 160.

of the famous "Convocation Controversy" and brought the crucial "question of the relationship between Church and state in post-Revolution England" to the center of politics.[26]

In the writings of the Nonjurors "lies a crucial seedbed of the Tory leitmotif of the 'Church in danger'." Nonjurors were the first to underscore the danger than an Erastian State and a Latitudinarian episcopate posed to the Anglican Church. The Nonjurors "transmitted to the mainstream of Tory ideology the elevated view of Church authority" that Tories defended so assiduously in the early eighteenth century.[27]

Anglican clergymen felt vulnerable in the face of the new forces of religious heterodoxy and secular interference in Church affairs. The government's indefinite suspension of meetings of Convocation, the traditional representative assembly of the Church of England, was especially painful. The willingness of some bishops to defend secular deprivations and to agree to the suspensions during the 1690s, and the intimate associations among archbishops, Socinians, and other heterodox intellectuals caused considerable consternation among the lower clergy.[28]

In response to these developments, and in an effort to defend the doctrines of the established Church against "what they saw as the drifting of the bishops to Latitudinarianism, of the Crown to Erastianism, and of the nation to secularism," the lower clergy agitated for Convocation to deal with heresy and blasphemy.[29] Francis Atterbury, a brilliant, talented Anglican divine from Christ Church, Oxford, provided the best public articulation of the lower clergy's position. In his influential pamphlet, *A Letter to a Convocation Man,* Atterbury insisted "upon the imperative need for a Convocation to deal with the horrifying advance of scepticism, Deism, Socinianism and contempt for the priesthood." In addition, he

> proceeded to demonstrate that meetings of Convocation ought not to be occasional events subject to the pleasure of the crown, for Convocation was an essential part of the constitution: Convocation for the Church was exactly parallel to Parliament for the state and the two must sit together, the one legislating for the spiritual corporation, the other for the secular commonwealth. As Parliament might deliberate in freedom, so too might Convocation, in spite of the general legal view that it might not debate without royal

[26]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 20.
[27]Ibid., p. 15.
[28]Holmes, *The Trial,* p. 26; and Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," pp. 15-16.
[29]Isaac Kramnick, "Augustan Politics and English Historiography: The Debate on the English Past, 1730-35," *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* 6 (1967), p. 46.

> licence. As Parliament required only the crown's consent to enact statutes, so Convocation required the king's consent alone, and not that of Parliament, to enact Canons. And as Parliament might act as a High Court, declaring the law, so Convocation might act as a spiritual court, declaring true doctrine and censuring heresy.[30]

Atterbury exploited conventional constitutionalist arguments to serve traditional High-Church independence and authority. Although his ideas were capably challenged by several Church scholars, the country parsons heeded only Atterbury: "his books and pamphlets were distributed through the dioceses by willing helpers, and he became a popular hero and a champion."[31]

Many politicians and some moderate bishops feared the calling of Convocation since they correctly suspected a very hostile Lower House. In spite of such warranted apprehension, William III summoned a Convocation to meet in early 1701 in fulfillment of a condition imposed by the Earl of Rochester, a High Tory, when William had had to turn to Rochester in order to form a ministry after two years of effective Tory opposition and the consequent collapse of the Whig Junto in 1700.[32]

The meetings of Convocation in the early months of 1701 produced vehement dissension between bishops and the lower clergy. Immediately the Anglican clergy split into "High" and "Low" parties. Archbishop Tenison and the bishops, the Low-Church party, frightened by personal insults and vociferous attacks from the High-Church party, turned to John Somers and other Whig leaders "as their only friends and supporters."[33] Moderate bishops, sincere and energetic leaders of the Anglican Establishment, "who for the most part had come to the Bench as the clerical friends of a prominent Tory lay-churchman," the Earl of Nottingham, sought refuge from High-Church aggression in the well-known moderation of John Somers.[34] The government's cautious efforts to reconcile as many clergymen to the new regime as possible and the ameliorating approach of Somers when he was King William's Lord Keeper soon reaped political benefits. Somers astutely and correctly informed William, in the winter of 1701, of "the bishops' desire for a new parliament and the likelihood of their active assistance."[35] But, it was fierce High-Church fury that

[30]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," pp. 17-18.
[31]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 166.
[32]Ibid., pp. 165-6.
[33]G. V. Bennett, "King William III and the Episcopate," in *Essays in Modern English Church History in Memory of Norman Sykes*, eds. G. V. Bennett and J. D. Walsh (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 129; Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, p. 60; and idem, "Conflict in the Church," p. 166.
[34]Bennett, "King William III and the Episcopate," p. 130.
[35]Ibid.

shaped politics in the next reign and the grievances of the Anglican clergy persistently agitated and divided both Church and State.

Just as the upper clergy found itself in an unexpected and uneasy alliance with the Whigs, the lower clergy, on the other hand, "looked to the Tory politicians to vindicate their cause, relieve their sufferings and lead them back to that fair country where they had dwelt before 1685."[36] Indeed, at times, the "Anglican Crisis" expressed itself in a rebellious, not merely a nostalgic, longing for a return to the Stuart era.

With the death of William III (8 March 1702), for many the Calvinist foreigner who had usurped the throne, and the accession of Princess Anne, the English daughter of a legitimate king as well as a devout Anglican, many Englishmen felt both relief and hope. High Churchmen and High Tories in the counties and popular boroughs--a "self-proclaimed 'Church party'"--expected their "Church of England Queen" to restore the Anglican Establishment to the ground it had lost since the Revolution.[37] Most Anglican priests now anticipated a Court-sponsored revival of the doctrines of divine right and passive obedience and a full-scale return to those guarantees of morality, proper deference, and political obligation. Although Anne did not expressly endorse such doctrines, traditional Tory ideology did reappear with "pristine vigour" under this legitimate Stuart monarch. The doctrines of divine hereditary right and non-resistance "regained their old predominance in High Church pulpits."[38] But although Anne appointed a Tory ministry that included Rochester and Nottingham--High Tories sincerely dedicated to the Anglican Establishment--she had no intention whatsoever to inaugurate a period of Anglican reaction. The Queen abhorred religious factiousness, and her chief minister, Sidney Godolphin, shared Anne's distaste for religious strife and was totally absorbed with the problem of financing the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13).[39]

Accordingly, the "Church party" had to pursue its proprietorial goal--a new Anglican hegemony--without support from its Anglican Queen. The lack of royal guardianship was not new to High Anglicans. In the recent past, under Anne's uncle and father, they had, by necessity, depended upon parliamentary allies. In early Restoration England the Cavaliers first established an Anglican hegemony and gave it subsequent protection. Defense of the Anglican Establishment was an intrinsic

[36]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 166.
[37]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, pp. 16-17; and Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 167.
[38]Norman Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor," in *The Social and Political Ideas of Some English Thinkers of the Augustan Age*, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (London: George G. Harrap, 1928), p. 117.
[39]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 167.

feature of the Tory party and Tory ideology. Both, Cavaliers and Tories, supported the Church of England in and through Parliaments and against the wishes of their monarchs. A Cavalier Parliament passed the Act of Uniformity in 1662 "in reaction to Charles' concessive declarations of 1660."[40] Anglicans had depended upon the Cavalier Parliament to legislate a confessional state in which non-Anglicans were denied all religious and political rights and subjected to brutal, even if erratic, persecution. In different sessions of the Long Parliament of Charles II's reign, the Cavaliers successfully resisted and defeated the monarch every time he tried to provide some toleration for Dissenters. The Tories, led and inspired by a High-Church episcopate, defied King James II and his indulgence policy. Anglican Royalism was exclusive: the loyalty of Cavaliers and Tories did not include the acceptance of monarchical authority when the exercise of a royal prerogative or the desires of the Crown threatened the Anglican hegemony. When the Tories, in 1688, demanded a "free Parliament," they meant a Tory one in which an endangered Anglicanism would find its necessary and traditional protection against royal interference. For more than twenty-five years, throughout Restoration England, the Anglican Establishment depended upon and enjoyed, first from the Cavaliers and subsequently from Tories, a *parliamentary* championship.

After the Revolution and during not only the reign of King William but of Queen Anne as well, High Anglicans considered Parliament their major institutional resource for reestablishing an essentially Anglican polity. They had, they realized, to depend upon Parliament and that meant, of course, a Tory Parliament:

> Only from their old allies, the Tories, could they hope for acts illegalising Occasional Conformity, suppressing dissenting seminaries, resuscitating the moribund Church courts so as to revive their discipline over the laity, financing church-building from public funds, and restraining the freedom of the press to pour out heretical and anti-Christian literature.[41]

In response to the conviction that only a Tory Parliament offered hope for deliverance, Anglican divines

> canvassed their flocks assiduously. They rode to the poll in black-coated squadrons, two or three hundred strong, in many county elections. Above all they put their pulpits in the most bare-faced manner at the service of Tory candidates.[42]

[40]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," 31 *Political Studies* (March 1983), p. 76.

[41]Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 43.

[42]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 21.

Such efforts contributed to the electoral success of the Tory party in 1702 when, with the first elections of Queen Anne's reign, the Tories gained a significant majority in the House of Commons, their largest since the 1688 Revolution.

For the "Church party," as for their Restoration predecessors, Dissent constituted a terrible peril. High Tories in the Commons concentrated their political energies on that "abominable hypocrisy," Occasional Conformity, the practice of which they felt they must prohibit. In one session after another, from November 1702 until November 1704, bills against "Occasional Communion,"--"the first a vicious measure with draconian penalties, the second and third not quite so malevolent but stern enough"--did pass the Commons but not the Lords where Low-Church bishops supported Whig opposition.[43]

Frustrated and faced with able resistance in the House of Lords where the Whigs and Low-Church bishops were in control, the High Tories resorted to extreme tactics. In November 1704 they tried "to force the third 'Occasional bill' through Parliament by 'tacking' it to the main bill of supply, the Land Tax bill."[44] Obviously, to threaten the Land Tax bill (the Lords only approved or rejected revenue bills) meant financial chaos and would have brought "the whole war effort to a grinding halt for lack of revenue."[45] Enough moderate Tories refused to vote for the "tack" but High Churchmen were enraged. For them, "the struggle against occasional conformity was not merely an attempt to close an obnoxious loophole," but "a battle between civilization and anarchy."[46]

> The High Churchmen were thus profoundly reactionary, driven in their struggle against occasional conformity and their enemies by two almost manichean visions of the past: a golden age of political and social harmony defined and secured by the unquestioned authority of Church, monarch, and squire; and the Civil War, with the 'world turn'd upside down' and all degree, order, and precedence smashed by religious and political enthusiasts.[47]

High-Tory efforts in and out of Parliament to eliminate Occasional Conformity and their aggressive "tack" not only failed but alienated Queen Anne and her ministers. Anne turned slowly but steadily towards the Whigs and in the elections of

[43]Ibid., pp. 17 and 18.

[44]Ibid., p. 17; and Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 168.

[45]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 18.

[46]John Flaningam, "The Occasional Conformity Controversy: Ideology and Party Politics, 1697-1711," *The Journal of British Studies* 17 (Fall 1977), p. 58. See also Richard Harvey, "The Problems of Social-Political Obligation for the Church of England in the Seventeenth Century," *Church History* 40 (June 1971), pp. 156-69.

[47]Flaningam, "The Occasional Conformity Controversy," p. 57.

mid-1705 the Whigs gained sixty seats in spite of the fact that more than two thirds of the "Tackers" were re-elected. From 1705 to 1708 the Whigs "strode from fringe participation in a coalition to total ministerial dominance."[48] Now the "Church party" had to defend the Anglican Establishment against Crown *and* Court. High Churchmen and their political allies turned to their own political resources--pulpit, press, and a natural majority in the country--in order to agitate, as a party, autonomously, for their Anglican revival.

Rochester in Lords and Highflyers in Commons presented motions to the effect that under the existing administration "the Church was in Danger." The motions were defeated and the House of Lords voted (61 to 30) to declare anyone insinuating the Church in danger an enemy to the Queen, the Established Church, and the Kingdom. With genuine concern the Earl of Nottingham, a sincere Churchman, might well believe that some had nothing to do but go home and say their prayers.[49]

Most felt there was much to do and High Anglicans kept their "Church-in-danger" cry alive. That High-Church shibboleth reflected real fear of what a government dominated by Whigs augured and the people heard it regularly in the constituencies where the clergy "did not confine their pulpit politics to election times."

> The bolder spirits among them chose to vent their fears, and too often their turbulence and malice, by making 'the Church in danger' a regular feature of their sermons.... They strove to convince their congregations that the Church not only was in danger, but without drastic action must fall into the direst peril, from the dissenters, from the new intellectual forces unleashed against it, and above all from the enemy within the gate--from those black sheep, the Low Church bishops and the Whig or moderate politicians.[50]

When, after the General Election of 1708 which followed on the heels of an unsuccessful Franco-Jacobite invasion of Scotland, the Whigs acquired a majority in the House of Commons, "Church-party" cries became ever more shrill. In 1709 rumors about a Whig program to repeal the Test Act and break the Church's monopoly over the universities spread; despite the Whig Junto's efforts to check them, the rumors prevailed and caused additional fear and real anger. Attacks, especially "fire-raising, quasi-seditious sermons," delivered by "almost the whole body of the inferior clergy,"[51] were pervasive. The Nonjurors, that small but vociferous and influential group of propagandists, were particularly active as well.

[48]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 18.
[49]Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[50]Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 45.
[51]Ibid.

High-Tory ideology enjoyed an enormously successful revival that included an effective critique of "Revolution Principles." Several Whig writers did defend "Revolution Principles" that challenged High-Tory convictions--John Tutchin in *The Observator* (1702-12); Benjamin Hoadly, future Bishop of Bangor, in sermons, frequently reprinted; and Daniel Defoe in his *Review* (1704-13) and, possibly, as the author of a significant radical pamphlet, *Vox Populi, Vox Dei: or the True Maxims of Government*.[52] Nevertheless, the High-Tory assault on Whiggery was both formidable and popular. Apart from the incessant harangues from the pulpits, the most effective and influential spokesman for High Toryism was the Nonjuror and Jacobite, Charles Leslie, who promulgated High-Tory ideology, from 1704 to 1709, in his triweekly *Rehearsal*. In that periodical and several celebrated pamphlets, Leslie criticized the radical doctrines Tutchin and Defoe endorsed and skillfully refuted Whig claims, including those articulated by Benjamin Hoadly. Leslie upheld patriarchal power, passive obedience, and indefeasible hereditary right but he was particularly effective belaboring all the real or supposed Whig tenets--power from the people, the state of nature, the conditional status of an English monarch--"with an array of precedents and skilfully argued logical objections."[53]

Public discussion of the Revolution and its implications in printed sermons, political tracts, and newspapers was highly combative in the first decade of the eighteenth century and especially so between the years 1705 to 1710. The aggressive political debate reached a dramatic, and for the Whigs a nearly disastrous, climax in early 1710 at the impeachment trial of Doctor Henry Sacheverell. Sacheverell was an extraordinary preacher who delivered his most explosive sermon in St. Paul's on 5 November 1709; its printed version, *The Perils of False Brethren*, sold more than 100,000 copies and probably reached an "audience of between a quarter of and half a million."[54] Yet, even though Sacheverell's sermon was the best-selling tract in the age of Defoe and Swift, it was just one of "countless outspoken denunciations of Whiggery from pulpits throughout the land."[55]

In 1709 the Whigs decided to make an example of Sacheverell since he was the most provocative among the many Anglican clergymen who preached against the Revolution. The Whigs held a majority in the House of Commons, the only one they enjoyed between the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession. Their exceptional

[52]Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, pp. 106-11 and 122-3; Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, pp. 132-8; and Richard Ashcraft and M. M. Goldsmith, "Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology," *The Historical Journal* 26 (December 1983), pp. 786-9.
[53]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, pp. 132-6. See Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, pp. 109-11 and 125; and Clark, *English Society*, pp. 282 and 297-9.
[54]Holmes, "The Sacheverell Riots," n. 29, p. 238.
[55]W. A. Speck, "Political Propaganda in Augustan England," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th Ser., 22 (1972), p. 17.

success in the spring elections of 1708 owed a great deal to an attempted Jacobite invasion of Scotland in February. Whenever they could exploit the fear of Popery, a national phobia and easily linked to Jacobitism, as the Whigs did in 1696 after the discovery of Jacobite plans to assassinate King William, Whig political fortunes improved. The Franco-Jacobite invasion, albeit frustrated, gave the Whigs a "heaven-sent opportunity to deploy all their anti-Catholic, anti-Jacobite propaganda against the Tories--this time at the Election which, fortunately for them, followed immediately afterwards."[56] Their majority in Parliament could, hoped the Whigs, "be used as a trump card to win a propaganda war which they were clearly losing."[57]

Sacheverell was certainly an inviting target since he and several thousand of his brethren had never abandoned, in spite of their oaths to the post-Revolution regime, traditional Tory tenets. Theirs were the doctrines of divinely-appointed authority, non-resistance, and passive obedience. Sacheverell's celebrated sermon also attacked the Act of Toleration, Occasional Conformity, and the Dissenters as "the same hands that were guilty of Regicide and sacriledge, that at once divided the King's head and the Crown, and made our Church stables."[58] But what the Whigs found especially disturbing about Sacheverell and others like him was a menacing popularity. Sacheverell and his brethren may have preached passive obedience but their words inspired defiance of the existing government.

> The Doctor was a born demagogue; he had been recognized as such since he had first electrified Oxford with a savage attack on Occasional Conformity from St. Mary's pulpit in 1702. And being also a man of turbulent character and fierce ambition, he was fully prepared by 1709 to exploit both the pulpit, in which he excelled, and the popular passions, which in theory he deplored, to attempt to undermine a political regime and religious toleration he loathed.[59]

For the Whigs, High-Tory talk about passive obedience and Tory insistence on the supreme validity of Anne's hereditary title (an implicit dismissal of Parliament's role) implied Jacobitism.[60] Arguing that the government had not changed at the Revolution and offering the fiction of abdication and a conservative Revolution Settlement, the Tories could capitalize on the advantage of a traditional position.

[56]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 24.

[57]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," p. 34.

[58]Henry Sacheverell, *The Perils of False Brethren in Church and State: Set forth in a Sermon, preached before the Right Hon. Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of London, at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul's on the 5th of November 1709* (London, 1709), quoted in Cruickshanks, "Religion and Royal Succession," p. 32.

[59]Holmes, "The Sacheverell Riots," p. 238.

[60]Holmes, *The Trial*, chap. 4.

Whigs, on the other hand, still had to pay the heavy ideological cost of their accommodation in the Convention Parliament. In order to avoid what might have meant civil war and/or a Jacobite counterrevolution in 1689, Whigs had abandoned contractarian rhetoric and feigned a conservative posture when confronted in the Convention Parliament with Tory qualms and Prince William's hostility to limitations. Those concessions had left the Whigs ideologically impoverished and had seriously undermined attempts, in the 1690s, to apply resistance and contract theory to the Revolution and Revolution Settlement. In 1710 and in the face of an even more formidable and popular assault on "Revolution Principles," the Whigs were, once again, seriously handicapped since they lacked a "traditional or well-prepared rationale" with which they might defend parliamentary monarchy.[61]

Rank-and-file Whigs in both Houses of Parliament demanded a defense of the Whig view of the Revolution. They optimistically anticipated a confirmation of the Revolution's legality, an affirmation of the Queen's parliamentary title, and prohibition against the teaching of non-resistance. Daniel Defoe expressed Whig expectations of the trial:

> Here the validity of the Revolution will be tried, and the whole body of the people of Britain will determine whether it was a legal, just transaction, or a plain rebellion against God and the king.[62]

A public trial would, thought many Whigs, provide an open, official platform for the confirmation of principles that aggressive Whig protagonists like Daniel Defoe, Benjamin Hoadly, and John Tutchin had defended openly and assertively for almost a decade. Tutchin certainly deserved some sort of Whig recognition. He had begun his *Observator* on 1 April 1702, just a month after Anne's accession, and remained for some time the only Whig writer who made a persistent public effort to check High-Church influence and defend the right of a Parliament to determine monarchical succession. Tutchin, an explicitly libertarian thinker who celebrated the natural rights of the people, was the fatal and poignantly ironic victim of a Tory mob in 1707. The far more fortunate Hoadly did receive an unusual acclaim from the House of Commons when, in December 1709, after passing their resolution to impeach Sacheverell, the Commons thanked Hoadly and recommended the Queen bestow an ecclesiastical dignity upon him for his service to the constitution.[63]

[61]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, p. 140.

[62]Daniel Defoe, *Review* VI (7 January 1710), p. 464, quoted in Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, p. 132.

[63]Holmes, *The Trial*, pp. 94-5; Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor," p. 119; and Edwin R. Bingham, "The Political Apprenticeship of Benjamin Hoadly," *Church History* 16 (1947), p. 165.

Apart from the desire to vindicate the Revolution, the Whigs wanted "to set the stigma of Jacobitism" on Tory theories.[64] They may, in fact, have been "more interested in warning the nation of the threat posed to the Hanoverian succession if the Tory revival went unchecked than in re-stating the principles of John Locke."[65] The Whigs realized resistance and contract were serious political liabilities. They also knew that what electoral and/or political successes they had achieved in post-Revolution England--Junto dominance in the middle years of William's reign and electoral victory in 1708--were directly related to English fears of Popery associated with evidence of Jacobite activity (the attempt to assassinate William in 1696 and the Pretender's ill-fated project to invade Scotland in 1708). The Whigs prospered politically if, and only if, traditional fears of Popery were strong.[66]

The national obsession with Nonconformity, especially the pervasive conviction that all non-Anglicans were potential rebels, never really abated but fears of Popery matched, at times, the dread of Dissent. Animosity against Dissent was usually greater than antipathy towards Catholicism and (as the previous chapter says) only twice in the late seventeenth century--during the Exclusion Crisis and from 1686 to 1688--did fear of Popery outweigh deep-seated hatred of Nonconformity. The very origins of the Whig party had owed very little to libertarianism and a great deal to fears of Popery. But those moments, when Popery seemed more dangerous than Dissent, usually proved quite brief. During the course of the Exclusion Crisis itself, the English gentry's characteristic paranoia in face of any and all religious heterodoxy reappeared quickly.[67] And the demise of the Whigs in the early 1680s confirmed the greater emotional weight and tenacity of the civil-war legacy: the fear of potential rebellion by heterodox Protestants.

Since, traditionally, the English electorate only brooked Whigs when fears of Popery were as great as or greater than fears of Nonconformity, a basic Whig strategy in post-Revolution England was to raise the spectre of Jacobitism. On numerous occasions and in order to improve their party's political fortunes, the Whigs initiated legislation to "expose the true 'zealots of indefeasible hereditary right'" as potential traitors, to stigmatize their Tory opponents as Jacobites, and to dramatize any threat to the Protestant succession.[68] Whig motions, like the one in 1696 (after the assassination attempt) demanding all members of Parliament to subscribe to an "Association" for the defense of King William as the "rightful and lawful" monarch and the one in 1701 (after Louis XIV recognized the Pretender as James III) requiring all office-holders and members of Parliament to abjure allegiance to the exiled

[64]Bennett, "Conflict in the Church," p. 170.
[65]Dickinson, "Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," p. 35.
[66]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, pp. 24-6; and Lenman, p. 111.
[67]Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," p. 76.
[68]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 23.

Stuarts, were just two of a half a dozen Whig efforts to convert "equivocations on the succession and the nation's fear of Popery" into political gains for the Whig party.[69] Such political exploitation was a common Whig practice. However, while the Whigs could and did capitalize on fears of Popery, it proved much more difficult for Whigs to discredit Tories and members of the Anglican clergy with a Jacobite label.

Part and parcel of the Whig attack on Sacheverell's denial of the use of resistance in 1688 and of the right of subjects to resist an unjust ruler was to expose the doctrine of non-resistance "as an argument for passive acceptance of a jacobite restoration."[70] Robert Walpole, Secretary-at-War since February 1708, Treasurer of the Navy from January 1710, and one of the Whig managers of the prosecution, accused Sacheverell of advancing "doctrines destructive of the peace and quiet of her Majesty's government."[71] Lieutenant-General James Stanhope expressed Whig opinion about the real object of High-Church doctrines even more explicitly: "this Non-Resistance of his was due only to a Prince on the other side of the water."[72] Whig expectations in 1710--to vindicate "Revolution Principles" and, concomitantly, to attach the stigma of Jacobitism to Sacheverell and to all those who rejected the lawfulness of resistance--not only failed to materialize but the trial of Dr. Henry Sacheverell blew up in their faces.

Instead of effectively branding Anglican parsons with a Jacobite label, the Whigs, incredibly enough, managed to convince "hundreds of thousands of English men and women" that they themselves were the real threat: "that everything the highflying clergy and their Tory patrons had been saying for years, in proclaiming the Church's peril and parading the demon of Dissent, was very likely true."[73] During the trial itself popular clamor for Sacheverell was extraordinary. Cries in favor of "High Church and Sacheverell" by the rioters in London streets expressed the tremendous popularity of the cause of the Church of England. This was, clearly, a "Church mob" protesting "in defence both of the 'establishment', in a corporate sense, and of its flamboyant individual champion of the hour."[74]

The House of Lords voted Sacheverell guilty but only by a narrow margin of seventeen and made his sentence so light that most people viewed the three-year suspension of the Doctor's right to preach as "tantamount to an acquittal."[75] Whigs

[69]Ibid.
[70]Jones, *Country and Court*, p. 335.
[71]*The Tryal of Dr Henry Sacheverell before the House of Peers* (London, 1710), pp. 93-4, quoted in Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 137.
[72]*The Tryal of Dr Henry Sacheverell*, p. 109, quoted in Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 137.
[73]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 26.
[74]Holmes, "The Sacheverell Riots," p. 261.
[75]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 28.

were the real losers. In October (1710) the Tories overwhelmed the Whigs at the polls. During the General Election, mobs chanted "No Forty Eight," "No Presbyterian rebellion," and "Save the Queen's White Neck." Those slogans bespoke the enduring and detrimental association ordinary Englishmen made between Whigs and the terrible Civil War that had taken place decades ago.[76]

When the new Parliament assembled that November, Tories "found themselves stronger in numbers than at any time since 1685."[77] Country parsons thanked their true sovereign for the victory and "exultant Tory squires back at Westminster quaffed their ale round the tables of the October Club." Both looked forward to an imminent Anglican-Tory revival: the destruction of Dissent, the proscription of the Whigs, and "a new golden age for true Churchmen, more glorious even than the last years of Charles II."[78]

In absolute contrast to Tory exuberance, the Whigs had to face not only the ideological and political impotence of their own party but the pervasive tenacity and apparently growing popularity of Tories and Tory ideology. The people of England, not only Anglican clergymen and Tory squires but a significant majority of the entire nation, made their rejection of the Whig interpretation of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement absolutely clear. Numerous loyal addresses to the Queen from both county and borough during the spring and summer of 1710 expressed unequivocal support for Queen Anne's hereditary title, underscored divine-right theory, and denounced Whiggery. St. John's borough of Wooton Basset refused to

> continue silent at this time amidst the crowds of your Majesty's faithful subjects, who daily express their indignation against such doctrines as openly deny your Majesty's hereditary title, insolently invade your just prerogative, and hardly tolerate the Established Church....[79]

The address from the county of Denbigh, like those from other counties,

> assured the Queen that 'while Republican and factious spirits, the implacable enemies of your Majesty's family and government are ... reviving and maintaining those pernicious and fatal doctrines that paved the way to the execrable murder of your Majesty's royal grandfather, and laid these kingdoms in desolation and ruin', they did from the bottom of their hearts 'abhor

[76]Ibid., p. 5.

[77]Holmes and Speck, eds., *The Divided Society*, p. 28.

[78]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England*, p. 28.

[79]*A Collection of the Addresses which have been presented to the Queen since the Impeachment of the Reverend Dr Henry Sacheverell* 2 parts (London, 1711), pt. 1, p. 36, quoted in Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 249.

> and detest all those traitorous and damnable positions which assert the legality of deposing or resisting princes upon any pretence whatsoever'.[80]

Whig managers of the prosecution of Sacheverell ("Managers of Oliver's party and principles" according to one Tory handbill), like their Exclusion predecessors and those radical Whigs who defended "Revolution Principles" early in William's reign, fared very badly at the polls and many fell victims to this new Tory reaction. Walpole lost in the county of Norfolk; Stanhope was defeated at Westminster; and many other Whig managers of the impeachment did not survive a political contest. No one imagined that in just a decade or so this beleaguered party, under the leadership of Robert Walpole, would enjoy a forty-year political entrenchment. But, Whig political success in Hanoverian England owed very little to "Revolution Principles." To most of the nation radical-Whig ideology remained anathema.[81]

Before the devastating experience of Sacheverell's trial, the ensuing riots, and Tory electoral victory, most Whigs considered an official challenge of divine-right theory and its spokesmen a politically useful objective. By late 1710, many Whigs realized the Sacheverell affair had only marked their party "even more indelibly with the brush of republicanism and irreligion" and that explicit support of contract, resistance, and toleration was impolitic and even, perhaps, dangerous.[82] After a decade of vociferous critiques of High-Tory ideology, Benjamin Hoadly fell silent. With the exception of a few, brief, unsigned pamphlets that appeared in 1710 defending the Revolution Settlement and associating Tories with Jacobitism, Hoadly did not publish again until after the Hanoverian succession. The people, implicitly celebrated in Hoadly's work, burned him in effigy and his writings also. Hoadly may have considered additional public exposure dangerous. Or, perhaps he simply concluded, logically enough, that his ideas merely added fuel, literally and figuratively, to High-Church ardor.[83]

In the last years of Anne's reign, the Tory party sustained its popularity among the inferior clergy even though the Queen and her Tory ministry, headed by Robert Harley, the Earl of Oxford and Lord Treasurer from late May 1711, checked High-Church efforts to legislate an Anglican reaction. The Whigs expected, with misplaced optimism, to recoup in the elections of 1713 some of their previous losses. Instead of gains, the Whigs suffered an even greater defeat. The elections left the High Tories even stronger.[84]

[80]*A Collection of Addresses*, pt. 2, p. 8, quoted in Holmes, *The Trial*, p. 250.

[81]Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, chap. 7.

[82]Ibid., p. 146.

[83]Ibid., pp. 151 and 163; Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, p. 138; Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor," p. 137; and Bingham, "The Political Apprenticeship of Benjamin Hoadly," p. 164.

[84]Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, p. 161; Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart*

Now the newest Tory leader, Henry St. John, Secretary of State from September 1710 and Viscount Bolingbroke from July 1712, pursued a policy of systematic proscription against both Whigs and their Nonconformist allies. Bolingbroke worked assiduously to undermine the Earl of Oxford. He allied with Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester (1713), one of many Highflyers disgusted with Oxford's moderation policies. Bolingbroke championed legislative aggression against Dissent. Such a strategy guaranteed Tory unanimity in opposition to the Earl of Oxford, Bolingbroke's rival in the latter's bid for ministerial dominance. All Tories, not just High Tories but moderates as well, endorsed the Schism Bill (1714) to dismantle the educational system of Nonconformists: "it was openly avowed that the object was to extirpate Dissent in the next generation."[85] There was additional talk of repealing the Toleration Act. The Occasional Conformity Act, passed in late 1711, had already weakened the political influence of Dissenters in those constituencies with a corporation franchise and, in 1714, the Tories hoped to disfranchise them in popular constituencies as well. Such a law would have dealt a death blow to the Whig party in the counties where Whig candidates were absolutely unacceptable to most of the numerous freehold voters.[86]

For Whigs, the last years of Anne's reign, from the Sacheverell trial to the Schism Act, were filled with shocks and fear. Many worried about a seriously endangered Protestant succession and spoke nervously about the possibility of counterrevolution. Whig rhetoric brimmed with lament and apprehension. Few believed the House of Hanover could occupy the throne unchallenged. In fact, before Anne's death (1 August 1714) many Whigs had even begun to collect money and arms to ward off an anticipated Tory attempt to restore the Pretender. In Whig circles, fear for the prospects of the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover was dominant.[87]

By 1714 the Whigs were politically and ideologically belabored and at bay. In the election of 1710 the Jacobite wing of the Tory party had made great gains. According to one estimate, "at least 80" Jacobites sat in Anne's last Parliament (elected in 1713) and the number of committed supporters to the Pretender in the House of Commons may have been as high as one hundred.[88] Under neither William nor Anne had there been any acceptance of "Revolution Principles." Endeavors to create an efficacious legacy of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement--to glean from the ambiguous

England, p. 29; and Jones, *Country and Court*, chap. 17.

[85]G. M. Trevelyan, *England Under the Stuarts*, University Paperbacks (London: Methuen & Co., 1977), p. 496. For an examination of the ministerial conflict in the last years of Anne's reign, see Sheila Biddle, *Bolingbroke and Harley* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975).

[86]Jones, *Country and Court*, p. 350.

[87]Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, pp. 157-69 and chap. 11; and Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne*, pp. xxxiii and 97.

[88]Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne*, p. 279; and W. A. Speck, *The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 19. See

events of 1688-89 constitutional guidelines for the future--had not only failed, but had even backfired. Opponents, especially the High-Church clergy, had besmeared the Whigs with the very principles they failed to establish. In the last years of Queen Anne's reign the Whigs were, indeed, "a beleaguered party, unable to arrest the advance of Tory extremism and dependent for the resuscitation of their fortunes on a quick change of dynasty."[89]

Early Hanoverian England: The Tory Survival

Contemporary scholarship correctly disabuses us of that classic and neat vignette of Whig wax and Tory wane. The political and ideological significance of Tories in 1688-89 and throughout late Stuart England constitutes a crucial component in the history of the Revolution and its aftermath. Major depictions of the "rage of party" especially during the reign of Queen Anne attest to the relevance of a potent Tory party. Yet, those same studies of the late Stuart polity assume the demise of that Tory party in early Hanoverian England when the Whigs monopolized power and place. But now, the newest, most up-to-date work, verifies the political strength and ideological vitality of the Tories *after* 1714.

The Whigs always heeded the reality of Tory political strength; they could not afford to ignore the political and ideological weight of the Tories at any time. Cognizance of Tory strength in the Convention Parliament had led to Whig placation. No Whig could deny the success of the Tories and Toryism among the majority of voters in the post-Revolution polity nor fail to observe, concomitantly, just how unacceptable the Whigs and Whiggery were to many, perhaps most Englishmen. "The Stuarts might have secured widespread support in a referendum"; but radical Whigs knew very well "that they themselves would not."[90] Even though some radical Whigs, like Hoadly and the anonymous author of *Vox Populi, Vox Dei* and its successor, *The Judgment of Whole Kingdoms and Nations*,[91] had tried to keep resistance and contract theory alive, many Whig leaders shelved arguments about the right of resistance, the contractual basis of government, and the sovereignty of the people in face of successful Tory efforts to smear them with republicanism.

D. Szechi, *Jacobitism and Tory Politics 1710-14* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1984) a study that bears directly on the question of Jacobite Tories in the last years of Queen Anne's reign but one which reached me too late for consideration here.

[89]Nicholas Rogers, "Popular Protest in Early Hanoverian London," *Past and Present* 79 (May 1978), p. 70; reprinted in *Rebellion, Popular Protest and the Social Order in Early Modern England*, ed. Paul Slack, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 262-93.

[90]Clark, *English Society*, p. 292.

[91]Ashcraft and Goldsmith, "Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology," pp. 789-90 and 794.

Tory staying power, especially as a popular "Church party" during the reigns of the first two Georges, inspired, once again, Whig caution. Various Whig responses, as well as differences among Whigs about those reactions, form a large section of a complex, even baffling, tapestry of politics and ideology in this period of apparent stability.

For generations historians "bade farewell to disturbing notions of divine right, passive obedience, and the other trappings of absolute government, all supposedly overthrown by the Revolution."[92] Current research, however, affirms the endurance of providential and legitimist doctrines immediately after the Revolution. In recent years scholars of the late Stuart period have rehabilitated "modes of thought once dismissed as obsolete or irrelevant."[93] This chapter has emphasized their enduring strength in the quarter of a century after 1689. Yet, while the "specialists in the politics of the reigns of William and Anne have appreciated" the fact that "there was more continuity in political attitudes than was consistent with the general change of heart mysteriously credited to the Revolution," those same scholars rarely stretch "the span of time during which old ideas persisted" any further than the period of their own specialization. Thus, a relatively early date, 1714-15, for the demise of divine-right theory has remained the conventional view.[94] Now, very new evidence of "the persistence of High-Tory ideas" *after* 1714 has come to light. J. A. W. Gunn, in his *Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought* (1983) not only underscores the survival of divine-right theory in post-Revolution England but argues that traditional Tory doctrines remained alive under the first two Georges and even enjoyed a revival after 1760. Gunn's study shows how a "language suggestive of that view of political authority that had supposedly been supplanted by the accession of George I, if not by the Revolution itself" persisted in the press, at Oxford University, in the writing of history, and most of all, in sermons, especially those commemorating the death of "the royal Martyr" (Charles I).[95] Another, subsequent publication, J. C. D. Clark's *English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during the Ancien Regime* (1985), depicts the eighteenth century itself as an "ancien regime" still concerned with the dynastic idiom and one in which politico-theological orthodoxy dominates. Both Gunn and Clark deny the demise of divine-right theory in Hanoverian England.

Other recent, solid evidence of the survival of the Tories as a viable party after 1714 now exists. As Linda Colley ably demonstrates in her revisionist study, *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-1760* (1982), Tories maintained

[92]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, p. 120.
[93]Johnson, "Politics Redefined," p. 712.
[94]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, p. 121; and Clark, *English Society*, pp. 119-21.
[95]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, pp. 151, 141-64, and chap. 4, "The Spectre at the Feast: The Persistence of High-Tory Ideas."

throughout much of the eighteenth century an effective organization at Westminster and in the constituencies. Of special relevance is the degree to which the Tories endured as the traditional defenders of the Church of England. Under George I and George II, country parsons and Tory squires kept up their usual political alliance and that coalition sustained the existence of what has been called, in this chapter, a "Church party" capable of defending Anglicanism without royal or ministerial support.[96]

Indeed, if the accession of the Elector of Hanover saved the Whigs from potential extinction, the nation still remained predominantly Tory in its political and religious attitudes. An unabated Anglicanism and relentless antipathy to Dissent certainly survived. The Whigs did monopolize power and place but the Tories "would have won every general election between 1715 and 1747 had the number of seats obtained been commensurate with the number of votes cast."[97]

> Tories continued to believe, under George I and George II, that an uncorrupt general election would give their party a parliamentary majority, even with the existing electoral system. This was a realistic belief: the Tories probably secured a majority of the votes cast at every general election between 1702 and 1741, with the exception of 1715 (approximately equal) and 1708. It was widely held that a plebiscite would have refuted any Hanoverian contractarian claim to the throne....[98]

The Tory party did not accede to ministerial office and Tory expectations of royal favor never materialized. But the Tories did retain Anglican support and a long clericalist tradition, both Cavalier and Tory, had contributed to the "Church party's" ability to function "as an autonomous political movement independent of the Court."[99] The Tories converted their recent political efforts against both Crown and Court into an effective opposition by exploiting popular grievances against a despised King and his equally despicable ministry. Tory politicians capitalized on genuine popular anger. As political opportunists, they developed extra-parliamentary tactics that included the endorsement of popular issues.[100] Given their party's

[96]The Tory
"ideological apparatus was of the most immediate relevance and assistance to the Tory cause. In general the Tories were remarkably successful in adapting their 'Church and King' traditions to the realities of Hanoverian politics" (Frank O'Gorman, "The Tory Party, 1714-1760," *The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation* 24 [Spring 1983], p. 280).
See n. 16 of this chapter.
[97]Cruickshanks, *Political Untouchables*, p. 5.
[98]Clark, *English Society*, p. 132.
[99]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 30.
[100]Linda Colley, "Eighteenth-Century English Radicalism before Wilkes," *Transactions of*

pre-1715 success in open constituencies, the Tories championed wider franchises in various corporations--"in Norwich in 1722, in London in 1725, and in Bristol in 1734."[101] Those efforts reflected "self-interested electoral reasons" and were grounded on sound partisanship[102] but the Tory ability to attract urban support was, for the Whig party, highly disturbing. In fact and remarkably enough, London Tories took over the very agenda radical Whigs had originally formulated when the latter first drafted a democratic constitution for the Corporation of London in 1690.[103]

Part and parcel of Colley's depiction of the endurance and organization of a Tory party under the first two Georges is an insistence upon the loyalty of the Tories to those Hanoverian monarchs. English Kings did not, in her opinion, have to fear the Pretender as a political alternative because

> the prospect of a mixed administration--a ministerial format which had been the norm of postrevolutionary Britain and the invariable preference of William III and Queen Anne--was persistent and attractive.[104]

Colley's contention--that the Tories were Hanoverian because they "always had the prospect of limited royal recognition"[105]--is an explicit response to other historians, especially Eveline Cruickshanks, who recognize, as well, the survival of Whig and Tory parties after 1714 but who, unlike Colley, consider Jacobitism a crucial ingredient in eighteenth-century Toryism.[106]

In sharp contrast to Colley, Cruickshanks argues that, because Tories were proscribed, their party metamorphosed into Jacobitism. "Available evidence leaves no doubt that up to 1745 the Tories were a predominantly Jacobite party, engaged in attempts to restore the Stuarts by a rising with foreign assistance." Responding to Colley's interpretation, Cruickshanks reiterates her position:

the Royal Historical Society, 5th Ser., 31 (1981), p. 4.

[101]Ibid., p. 6.

[102]Ibid., p. 14.

[103]Gary S. De Krey, "Political Radicalism in London after the Glorious Revolution," *Journal of Modern History* 55 (December 1983), pp. 601-17; and see the author's full-length study *A Fractured Society: The Politics of London in the First Age of Party, 1688-1715* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). See also I. G. Doolittle, "Walpole's City Elections Act (1725)," *The English Historical Review* 97 (July 1982), pp. 504-29; H. T. Dickinson, "Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole," in *Britain in the Age of Walpole*, ed. Jeremy Black, Problems in Focus Series (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1984), pp. 59-60; and Nicholas Rogers, "The City Elections Act (1725) Reconsidered," *The English Historical Review* 100 (July 1985), pp. 604-17.

[104]Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy*, pp. 49-50.

[105]Ibid., p. 50.

[106]Eveline Cruickshanks is the contributor responsible for the last section--"V. The Tories"-

> The proscription of the Tory party at national and regional levels was unprecedented and drove the party into the arms of the Pretender, not out of choice but because they had nowhere else to go. This does not mean that every single Tory became a Jacobite, but that the party looked to a restoration of the Stuarts as the only means of escaping from an intolerable predicament.[107]

Nevertheless, most historians do not accept that the Tories were a Jacobite party. Given the lack of "evidence about the attitude of the bulk of the party's rank and file members" and the ambiguity, intrinsic to any conspiratorial effort, of "evidence of widespread, continuous and direct Tory support for Jacobite intrigues,"[108] we must also be skeptical.

Even if the exact nature and scope of the relationship between the Tory party and Jacobitism are never known, widespread disaffection during the early years of the new reign did exist. At the time of the Hanoverian accession,

> England resounded with riot and sedition. Although the proclamation of the new reign and the king's progress to London passed without serious incident, disturbances were reported in approximately thirty towns and villages on coronation day; and by the summer of 1715 the country was beset by demonstrations reminiscent of the High Church fury of 1710. In two months of almost continuous rioting, over forty Dissenting meeting-houses were pulled down--in the West Midlands hardly a chapel remained unscathed--and troops hurriedly occupied many leading towns.[109]

At Oxford University, a stronghold of High-Anglican clerical Toryism, the uproar was constant. Rioting prevailed "in Bedford, Birmingham, Chippenham, Norwich

-of the "Introductory Survey" in Romney Sedgwick, ed., *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715-1754*, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 1, pp. 62-78, where she first expresses her firm conviction that the Tory party contained a significant number of Jacobites; see also idem, *Political Untouchables*, "Introduction," pp. 1-14; idem, "The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole, 1720-42," in *Britain in the Age of Walpole*, pp. 28-31; idem, "Religion and Royal Succession," pp. 39-41 and 43; J. C. D. Clark, "The Decline of Party, 1740-1760," *The English Historical Review* 93 (July 1978), pp. 499-527; idem, *The Dynamics of Change: The Crisis of the 1750s and English Party Systems*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); idem, *English Society*, pp. 30-3, 182-4, and 279; and Paul S. Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

[107]Sedgwick, ed., *The House of Commons 1715-1754*, 1, p. ix; and Cruickshanks, "Introduction," pp. 6-7.

[108]Jeremy Black, "Introduction: An Age of Political Stability?," in *Britain in the Age of Walpole*, pp. 4-5; and Cannon, ed., *The Whig Ascendancy*, pp. 73, 57-9, 70, 181, and 185-7.

[109]Nicholas Rogers, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism in Early Hanoverian England," in *Ideology and Conspiracy*, p. 70.

and Reading" on the King's coronation day and there were "violent scenes at the polls in Brentford, Bristol, Cambridge, Hertford, Leicester and Taunton in the general election of 1715."[110]

Although London seemed quiet by comparison, a London crowd, as early as October 1714, greeted the new King "on his return from the Lord Mayor's banquet" with "shouts of 'Ormonde, No Marlborough'." When, by May 1715, the capital was the scene of numerous mobs, London rioters expressed themselves on one royal anniversary after another in apparently seditious terms. Jacobitism seemed to inform the typical expletives of popular protest in London and elsewhere: "High Church and Sacheverell Forever"; "Down with the Whigs"; "Down with the Rump"; "No Hanoverian, No Presbyterian Government"; "Down with Foreigners"; "Down with the Rump and the German"; "High Church and Ormonde, the Dr. and the Queen"; and "Down with the Presbyterians" sounded often in London during 1715. But, Nicholas Rogers, a recent scholar of urban dissidence under the first two Georges, considers those slogans, that language, the idiom of spontaneous, plebeian defiance.[111]

The prevalent unpopularity of the Whigs and the new Hanoverian monarch reflected, in the opinion of Rogers and other scholars, recent resentments and fears the Hanoverian-Whig regime seemed to embody and/or aggravate. Deep-rooted religious fears endured and the High-Church parsons worked assiduously to warn their parishioners "of the imminent danger of Whiggery" even as they "exploited public anniversaries and thanksgivings with telling effect."[112]

> Without doubt the Tory clergy were among the most resolute opponents of the new regime, rallying their congregations against Whiggery and nonconform-

[110]W. A. Speck, *Stability and Strife: England, 1714-1760,* The New History of England, vol. 6 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 79-80.

[111]Rogers, "Popular Protest," pp. 71, 72, and 89; and idem, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism," p. 79.

> "Rogers has done very useful work on 'seditious words' cases, as well as on the symbols and rhetoric of protest. He takes the view that these represented an expression of political consciousness rather than a genuine commitment. It might be thought interesting in itself that such expressions should have taken a Jacobite form rather than a 'Commonwealth' one. Tory voters, for instance, celebrated the defeat of both of Walpole's candidates at the Norfolk county election of 1734 by shouting 'No Hanover Succession, King James the 3rd for ever!' A forthcoming article on Jacobite riots in Staffordshire in the late 1740s takes the view that popular Jacobitism was genuine, while a thorough study of Jacobite engraved glasses has shown that they were English rather than Scottish in origin and were produced in 1743-6 rather than in the 1750s, and were thus a genuine political symbol rather than a nostalgic throwback" (Cruickshanks, "Introduction," pp. 4-5).

[112]Rogers, "Popular Protest," p. 89.

> ity, supplementing their sermons with anonymous broadsheets and pamphlets....[113]

Enough evidence suggests, at least, that many of the disaffected had "imbibed the High Church rhetoric about the threat to the Anglican inheritance from the combined forces of Whig latitudinarianism, Dissent and German Lutheranism."[114]

Although Rogers admits Tory churches and charity schools "formed valuable nuclei for political dissent," such indoctrination failed, in his opinion, to encompass the nature and range of plebeian antipathy towards the Hanoverian-Whig regime.[115] Far more important, he argues, were popular perceptions of the Whigs. Many people associated the Whigs with wars, a monied interest--especially the City financiers who profited from the war policy of the Whig Junto under William III and under Queen Anne--and with wealthy Dissenters.

> Since the time of William's Continental campaigns the Whig party had been overwhelmingly identified with Revolution finance, that concentration of monied power, cosmopolitan in nature and not without Dissenting associations, which had provided the state with its major sources of war credit. The Tory indictment of the monied interest and Whig foreign policy attracted support from a wide range of groups: the lesser gentry, whose pockets were pinched by the increase in the land tax and falling profits; certain vested interests in the City of London which viewed with alarm the new incubus of financial capital; and the metropolitan populace generally, who had to bear the brunt of wartime excise taxes against a background of high prices.[116]

In March 1710, the Sacheverell mob had attacked not only opulent meeting houses but had threatened the Bank of England as well: "many of the rioters saw the firing of the Bank of England as a natural extension of their attacks on conventicles." One of the slogans during the Sacheverell riots--"Down with the Bank of England and the Meeting-Houses; and God damn the Presbyterians and all that support them"--speaks for itself. "It was not fortuitous that the Sacheverell mob had tried to burn down the Bank, for this institution was at the heart of the revolution achieved after 1688."[117]

[113]Ibid., p. 90.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Ibid., p. 91.

[116]Ibid., pp. 91-2.

[117]Holmes, "The Sacheverell Riots," p. 241; and F. J. McLynn, "Issues and Motives in the Jacobite Rising of 1745," *The Eighteenth-Century: Theory and Interpretation* 23 (Spring 1982), p. 129.

Plebeian anger, late in Anne's reign, often directed itself against the Whig war generals, Stanhope and Marlborough. Part of the fury, heard in frequent curses against Marlborough in the streets of London, reflected hostility to those who supported the war effort and to wartime profiteering as well. The people lauded the Duke of Ormonde, the general most responsible for England's withdrawal from Europe, and the Tory Treaty of Utrecht was immensely popular.[118]

When George I's first Parliament resolved to impeach Bolingbroke, Oxford, and Ormonde--men beloved as "peacemakers"--fears of war, associated with the Whigs and concomitant Whig venality, resurfaced. Francis Atterbury played on popular fears of a new war. His *English Advice to the Freeholders of England*, "dispersed throughout the kingdom" in 1715, had accused the Whigs "of aiming at a new war, the destruction of the church and a standing army."[119] Two years later, Atterbury again fanned popular belief "that the Hanoverian accession would soon usher in a military regime." Much of the plebeian hostility towards the new political order "drew its strength from the conviction that there was a collusion of interests between Hanover and Whiggery." Many regarded the King as "'a German Stooge', an accomplice of Whig adventurism."[120]

When the new Hanoverian-Whig ministry passed a Riot Act (1715) that made the assembly of twelve or more individuals, after being ordered by a lawful authority to disperse, a capital offense; suspended Habeas Corpus; impeached popular figures; and resorted to public hangings and vigilantism, many Londoners interpreted those Whig measures and actions as vindictive and repressive. Popular Jacobitism constituted, in Rogers' opinion, a resentment against the suppression of traditional political and social license. The Jacobitism of plebeian slogans reflected the spontaneous use of a defiant rhetoric: urban dissidents, angry about and fearful of what they considered manifest and potential Whig repression, adopted a highly provocative language with which they might verbalize the depths of their anger and fears.[121]

Such self-generated resentments did, as Rogers also points out, permit the Tories to accuse the Whigs of anti-libertarianism and to depict them as authoritarian. And the Tories added the call for the repeal of the Riot Act, perceived as a suppression of popular assembly, to their growing list of popular causes in the Tory party's remarkably inclusive platform.[122]

The work of this very recent scholar of urban dissent is impressive and

[118]Rogers, "Popular Protest," pp. 91-5; and idem, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism," pp. 78-9.
[119]Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p. 172. See also Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, pp. 192-3.
[120]Rogers, "Popular Protest," p. 95.
[121]Ibid., pp. 99-100.
[122]Rogers, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism," pp. 80-1; and idem, "Popular Protest," pp. 98-9.

convincing. Urban dissidents were probably not genuinely committed to a Stuart restoration. But Rogers fails to take seriously enough the fact that many Whigs interpreted the riots and Tory populism as seditious. He denies historians even a small margin for assuming that some Whigs took what they heard and saw at face value. Orthodox political historians have, says Rogers, "either trivialised Jacobitism to a point where it becomes virtually insignificant, or they have interpreted it in a strictly literal manner." Those historians who take the second approach simply buy "the Whig line" and fall prey to "the conspiratorial version of discontent"--that the "resistance to Hanover was the work of Jacobite *provocateurs* and Tory agitators." Rogers rejects such statements as the following:

> Since the reversal of their fortunes in 1710, the Whigs had persistently asserted that the Tory party was prey to Jacobite proclivities and that their own return to power was absolutely essential to secure the Protestant succession and Revolution settlement. In their eyes the popular ferment confirmed this argument. Behind every demonstration Whig spokesmen saw the hidden hand of Jacobitism.[123]

Many did, in fact, perceive Jacobitism and such perceptions do not have to be correct to be genuine. To assert the authenticity of Whig perceptions of Jacobitism is not to confirm their validity. Robert Walpole, the key political figure in early Hanoverian England, did, genuinely, believe Tories were crypto-Jacobites. The Tories were, for Walpole, not only popular politicians but committed Jacobites who favored the restoration of James III. Indeed, other ministers and their supporters also dreaded a Stuart restoration, and their apprehensions constitute a reality that historians of early Hanoverian England cannot ignore. To recognize those fears does not lead, inexorably, to the exoneration of the Whigs. One hopes, obviously, to avoid "academic moralising," to refrain from explicit as well as implicit exoneration or accusation, and to understand and explain, as best one can, opinions formulated in a peculiar, even idiosyncratic, and often, for the student of early eighteenth-century politics and ideology, an alien political and cultural context.[124]

From hindsight, historians realize there was never any serious threat to the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover. But contemporaries did not know the strength or weakness of Jacobitism and for those who lived in Great Britain in the early decades of the eighteenth century, strife, not stability, was the norm. In addition to a long tradition of "conspiracy and rebellion, treason and plot," before the Revolution, many people were personal witnesses to "the political chaos that followed the Revolution when ministers and ministries, from left, right and centre,

[123]Rogers, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism," p. 72; and idem, "Popular Protest," p. 84.
[124]Clark, *The Dynamics of Change*, p. 2.

toppled and changed like a kaleidoscope tossed by a gale."[125] In addition to that "rage of party," assassination attempts, conspiracies, projected invasions, and potential civil war formed a significant, determinant part of human experience for a quarter of a century.

Contemporaries did express sincere concerns about the danger of a Stuart restoration. If no evidence of any genuine fears of Jacobitism existed, one could readily agree with those historians who believe the Hanoverian-Whig regime was simply unpopular and essentially corrupt. If the Whigs only used a Jacobite bogey to tie the Hanoverian monarchs to their party and as an excuse for the ruthless exploitation of repressive laws for selfish Whig purposes, then the Whigs could be correctly called "a gang of adventurers and free-booters."[126]

Other scholars, even after acknowledging the valuable work of Nicholas Rogers, continue to endorse George Rudé, also a specialist in popular dissidence and the history of crowd politics, and his earlier conviction that "the propensity of the city of London and the city mob to Jacobitism could hardly be doubted" at the beginning of the reign of George I.[127] Many contemporaries claimed the same.[128]

Contemporary claims were not merely a political frame-up. Many did fear a Stuart restoration even though they failed or did not even try to understand the real grievances behind the Jacobite rhetoric of plebeian slogans. But, it is also true that Whigs branded Tories with the Jacobite label and accused them of stirring up the mobs. Whigs welcomed each and every opportunity to exploit, for political purposes, real as well as sham plots. The Whigs tried to attach the people to their party with cries of "Popery" and "Tyranny" associated with the exiled Stuarts and their tenacious

[125]Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability*, pp. 15-16.

[126]Speck, *The Butcher*, p. 3. See Speck's "Introduction" where he discusses the question of the acceptability of the Walpole regime.

[127]McLynn, "Issues and Motives in the Jacobite Rising of 1745," pp. 122-3.

[128]Charles Townshend, a year after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1715, considered "the rage and spirit of the party" alive and feared "that the fire of the whole rebellion is rather smothered for a time than totally extinguished and that it is ready to catch hold of the first convenient matter that shall be offered it, and may break forth with fresh fury" (William Coxe, *Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford*, 3 vols. [London, 1798], 2, p. 52, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, pp. 6-7). In 1739 Charles Hanbury-Williams wrote to Lord Holland: "Take away the Jacobites and where will you find a Tory" (British Library Add. MSS 51390: Hanbury-Williams to Lord Holland, 28 October 1739, quoted in Black "Introduction," p. 5; see also Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, chap. 2). Hanbury-Williams admitted that others disagreed with him, but the fact that significant political figures did consider Tories Jacobites and did fear Jacobitism is of the greatest relevance in any thorough scrutiny of the nature of the Whig ascendancy after 1714.

commitment to Roman Catholicism. To raise the spectre of Popery was, from the time of the Exclusion Crisis, a regular Whig tactic and a traditional Whig political foil against Tory resilience. One wonders, in fact, whether the Whig party, its origins and survival, can be explained without the Catholic bogey in one dress or another. The fear of Jacobitism, *both* genuinely felt and politically exploited, was probably a key to Whig longevity and the apparent political stability of the Age of Walpole.

Behind both sincere fears and the use of fears lay a crucial reality. The Whigs were a very vulnerable party sustaining an extremely unpopular King. On the heels of the accession disorders, in early September 1715, a major Jacobite Rebellion was blatant fact. Jacobitism was a real issue in early Hanoverian England and historians must give it due recognition. Given the reality of disaffection, including the literal Jacobitism that informed popular slogans; the Rebellion of 1715; the Swedish Plot of 1717; the Jacobite Attempt of 1719; the so-called Atterbury Conspiracy on the heels of the plunge, in August 1720, of South-Sea stock; projected invasions; and the Rebellion of 1745, J. C. D. Clark seems correct when he describes the period between 1714 and the Seven Years' War as one dominated, politically, by the danger of revolution, as one in which the threat of Jacobite counterrevolution constituted *the* central *political* fact.[129]

Radical Whigs also considered Jacobitism a real and present danger. Two famous "Independent Whigs," John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, very important political writers in the early 1720s, worried about the security of the House of Hanover. An examination of these two radical-Whig authors, especially their concerns and aims in early Hanoverian England, illuminates how two major Whig spokesmen coped and struggled with Jacobitism and the danger they believed it posed to the stability of "this free State."

[129]Clark, *The Dynamics of Change*, pp. 4 and 16; and idem, "A General Theory of Party, Opposition and Government, 1688-1832," *The Historical Journal* 23 (June 1980), pp. 303 and 316. See also idem, *English Society*, pp. 119-98 passim.

CHAPTER THREE

"CATO" AND THE "COUNTRY" CATEGORY

John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon

Thirty-five years ago, Clinton Rossiter, a well-known historian of colonial and revolutionary America, uncovered a very important, but previously neglected, body of political thought in the works of two early eighteenth-century English publicists: John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Rossiter discovered that the writings of Trenchard and Gordon, rather than those of John Locke, were "the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas" in the American colonies.[1] Subsequently, Bernard Bailyn, another distinguished scholar of early American history, substantiated and expanded upon Rossiter's initial discovery. In his important study, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* Bailyn describes the writings of Trenchard and Gordon as the determining influence in the development and character of a revolutionary mentality in the colonies.[2] The works and thought of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon are now considered preeminent among the various intellectual threads that make up the political tapestry of Anglo-American culture in the eighteenth century. In fact and quite dramatically, the "Great Mr. Locke" was superseded by the "Divine English Cato" in historical discussions of colonial political thought.[3]

Trenchard and Gordon were best known to the colonists as co-authors of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters*. Although each author wrote, independently, many political tracts, it was primarily their collaborative production, *The Indepen-*

[1]Rossiter, *The First American Revolution*, p. 225.

[2]Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 35-6 and 45-9.

[3]Rossiter, *The First American Revolution*, pp. 224-33; idem, *The Political Thought of the American Revolution*, p. 68; idem, *Six Characters in Search of a Republic*, pp. 133 and 237; Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, chap. 2; idem, *The Origins of American Politics*, pp. 40-5; Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, chap. 4; Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," in *Politics, Language and Time*, pp. 107-47; idem, *The Machiavellian Moment*, chap. 14; Jacobson, "Introduction," pp. xlviii-lx; idem, "Thomas Gordon's *Works of Tacitus* in Pre-Revolutionary America," pp. 58-64; Milton M. Klein, ed. *The Independent Reflector or Weekly Essays on Sundry Important Subjects More particularly adapted to the Province of New-York By William Livingston and Others* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), "Introduction," pp. 1-49; H. Trevor Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 14-17; and Lance Banning, *The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 55-7 and 67-9.

dent Whig and *Cato's Letters,* that enjoyed such widespread popularity in the colonies. In their original form, these works had first appeared in the London press, from 1720 to 1723. They were written on a regular, almost weekly, basis. From January 1720 to January 1721, Trenchard and Gordon, along with a third contributor, perhaps Anthony Collins, produced their own weekly, entitled *The Independent Whig,* in which, among other things, they attacked the High-Church ecclesiology that many members of the Anglican clergy believed and propagated. From November 1720 until early September 1722, Trenchard and Gordon submitted "Letters," usually under the pseudonym "Cato," to the "Author of the *London Journal*" and thereafter, until "Cato's Farewell" on 27 July 1723, to the "Author of the *British Journal.*" Trenchard and Gordon dealt with specific, contemporary issues. Yet their responses to and commentaries on specific events and contemporary affairs constituted major ideological discourses that remained vitally relevant for many decades. *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters* represent the bulk of Trenchard and Gordon's brief but intensely productive four-year collaboration.

The names and works of Trenchard and Gordon occupy, not surprisingly, a significant position in studies of eighteenth-century British intellectual history. Caroline Robbins is the first historian to deal with Trenchard and Gordon in their own, British, intellectual milieu. Her pioneer work, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman,* demonstrates the preservation and dissemination, in eighteenth-century Britain, of political principles that had originated in the Civil-War and Commonwealth period. Robbins shows the existence and efforts of various individuals and groups--the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen--who sustained and promoted libertarian ideas. Robbins describes both *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters* as evidence of and contributions to the retention, articulation, and transmission of a British libertarian tradition. The works of Trenchard and Gordon formed part of what Robbins calls the "Whig Canon." The "Commonwealthmen" or "Real Whigs," as they sometimes called themselves, were only "a small minority among the many Whigs" but they were energetic in their efforts to promulgate principles that most of their contemporaries rejected and government Whigs shunned.[4]

David L. Jacobson's subsequent "Introduction" to his carefully selected anthology of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters* echoes Robbins' interpretation. Jacobson comments on the work of Trenchard and Gordon within the context of early Hanoverian England, and like Caroline Robbins, Jacobson emphasizes their "Whiggery." Jacobson believes the two men wrote at a time when "the ideals of Whiggery, the Revolution of 1688-89, and the new Hanoverian dynasty still had to be defended against the remnants of old-style Toryism, a variety of Jacobite conspiracies, and the claims of High-Churchmen."[5]

[4]Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman,* p. 3 and chap. 4.
[5]Jacobson, "Introduction," p. xviii.

In 1965 J. G. A. Pocock, in a seminal article, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," questioned the adequacy of Robbins' description of "Commonwealthmen" like Trenchard and Gordon as transmitters of libertarian values and challenged the centrality of a Tory-versus-Whig and/or Whig-official-versus-Whig-intellectual polemic. Pocock urged, instead, a Country-versus-Court reading of "Cato." Pocock describes the "paper-war" against standing armies in the late 1690s; "Cato's" critique of "corruption" in the early 1720s; and Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke's press campaign against Robert Walpole in *The Craftsman* during the late 1720s and early 1730s as major expressions of the nature and development of a Country-opposition ideology.[6]

Pocock believes "Commonwealthmen," like Trenchard and Gordon, and Tory authors, like Lord Bolingbroke, whom Pocock calls "neo-Harringtonians," hold similar historical and political perspectives and share the same moral values. These Country authors or "neo-Harringtonians" uphold an idealized concept of the "Ancient Constitution" in which King, Lords, and Commons constituted sovereignty and in which the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements had once been in perfect balance. In contrast to the equilibrium that had characterized the "Ancient Constitution" in the past, however, "neo-Harringtonians" consider the necessary independence of the House of Commons now seriously undermined in post-Revolution England by the influence of the Court. Through the venal management of government funds and patronage, the King, through his ministerial and Court officials, bribes voters to enable government candidates to win elections and gives jobs and privileges to Members of Parliament in return for support of government measures. Such influence--"Court Corruption" as the Country authors called it--upsets the traditional equipoise among the three elements that characterized the "Ancient Constitution."[7]

Country writers hold, as Pocock explains their ideas, a particular moral view of the polity. Society depends upon the reality and exercise of civic virtue that consists of both the willingness and capacity of men to act in and for the public interest. Such civic virtue depends upon a specific material foundation, namely, landed property, the basis of economic and political independence. But the new forms of wealth characteristic of the post-Revolution polity--the fruits of burgeoning commerce and financial manipulation--are inherently selfish modes of income. Only the landed classes are capable of exercising an unselfish--virtuous--civic role in society.

The "neo-Harringtonians" assail the new economic order and Court corruption as threats to the political strength of the House of Commons that must, in their

[6]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 107-8; and idem, *The Machiavellian Moment,* pp. 426-7.
[7]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth

opinion, be based on the autonomy and virtue of independent landholders. Increasing numbers of pensioners and placemen (including army officers) occupy seats in the House of Commons. Their lack of economic independence, a *sine qua non* for the existence and exercise of civic virtue, weakens the popular element and, thus, upsets the crucial, traditional balance of the "Ancient Constitution." Country-opposition writers insist upon the need to eliminate placemen, which includes a concomitant reduction in the size of the standing army, and other forms of Court corruption so that the pristine equipoise be, once again, achieved.[8]

Pocock considers *Cato's Letters* a subsequent but similar expression of Trenchard's earlier Country vision. At the end of King William III's reign, Trenchard is a leading critic of standing armies. He considers a large military force in peacetime a potential instrument of royal tyranny and a dangerous means of Court corruption. His pamphlets explain how many army officers sit, as dependents, in the House of Commons where they vote according to the wishes of those in power to whom they owe their rank and seats. Trenchard believes numerous military placemen, an inevitable reality with the existence of a large standing army, thwart the independence of the House of Commons.[9] "Cato" also attacks standing armies and expands his critique of contemporary politics to complaints about bribery, placemen, and the pernicious effects of the financial revolution, especially the manipulation of stocks that has "caused all the Confusion in our publick Finances" and has "multiplied

Century," pp. 120-36 passim.

[8]Ibid; and idem, *The Machiavellian Moment*, chaps. 12-14. See also J. G. A. Pocock, ed., *The Political Works of James Harrington*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), "Historical Introduction," pp. 128-52; Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972; first published by University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 14-16 and 32-4; Speck, *Stability and Strife*, pp. 4-7 and 222-6; and W. A. Speck, "Bernard Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 11 (Spring 1978), p. 369.

[9]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies," pp. 125-6; Lois G. Schwoerer, of *'No Standing Armies!' The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 180-1 and 190; and Isaac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 244. David Hayton, in a very important new article, credits, as is usual among historians, the "neo-Harringtonians" for their initiative as Country publicists in the last decade of the seventeenth century when they "led the way, exposing the menace of the standing army and in more general terms denouncing what they saw as a Court-inspired programme to 'corrupt' the constitution." But Hayton qualifies, atypically, that conventional recognition: "While acknowledging the 'old Whig' leadership of the Country agitation in the press ... we should not underestimate the distinctively Tory contribution to the development of Country ideology. Fear of the corrupting influence of the Court did not have to originate with a belief in Harringtonian constitutional theory...." (Hayton, "The 'Country' Interest and the Party System, 1689-c.1720," p. 56). See comments on both Pocock and Hayton in J. C. D. Clark, *Revolution and Rebellion*, pp. 113-14.

Offices and Dependencies in the Power of the Court, which in Time may fill the Legislature, and alter the Ballance of Government."[10]

Most scholars of post-Revolution ideology agree with Pocock's analysis of the "neo-Harringtonians" and, like him, see *Cato's Letters* as an archetype of Country ideology. It is widely accepted, as well, that Trenchard and Gordon direct their Country polemic against the Court corruption so pervasive under the ministry of Robert Walpole.[11]

The argument, Dr. Pocock puts forth, that Professor Robbins' "Commonwealthmen" are better understood in a "Court-Country context than in a Tory-Whig or Whig

[10]John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, *Cato's Letters; or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, And other important Subjects*, 3d ed. (London, 1733; reprint ed., New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), No. 107, p. 21.

[11]Quentin Skinner, "The Principles and Practices of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole," in *Historical Perspectives*, pp. 113-16. The "Whig canon" of ideas, described by Skinner as the characteristic expression of Whigs at the turn of the century, of "Cato" in the 1720s, and of Bolingbroke and his party (for different reasons) between 1728 and 1734, are the same ideas Pocock considers best understood as Country ones. Skinner employs an expression that belongs to Robbins in her study of Whig intellectuals--the "Whig canon"--but the beliefs Skinner describes as the "Whig canon" are those same ideas Pocock presents to tell Robbins that her Whigs are really Country opponents to Court corruption. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins*, pp. 35-6, 39, 44, 46-54 and chap. 3; and idem, *The Origins of American Politics*, pp. 39-45, 54, 117, 137, and 143-4. Professor Bailyn is explicit about the libertarian side of Trenchard and Gordon's thinking and when he refers to them as opposition writers, he does distinguish them from Bolingbroke as writers of the "left." But what interests Bailyn is, in fact, "Cato's" critique of ministerial corruption, an essentially Country posture. Dickinson, *Liberty and Property*, chap. 5. Dickinson shows discrimination in his discussion of Trenchard and Gordon. He usually refers to them as "radical Country Whigs" and describes their thought as characteristic of the Country vision but he points out, as well, those features of their thought that were different from Country Tories, especially on the question of the Church. In a recent article on the Age of Walpole, Dickinson mentions the fact that the

> "opposition press did not just criticise some of the specific policies of Walpole's government. It increasingly upheld the liberties of the subject.... In the 1720s John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, in their influential *Cato's Letters* published in the *London Journal*, defended government by consent, the liberty of the press, the freedom of the individual and equality before the law" (Dickinson, "Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole," p. 66).

Those are some of the more important features of Trenchard and Gordon's political thought in early Hanoverian England. See also H. T. Dickinson, "The Precursors of Political Radicalism in Augustan Britain," in *Britain in the First Age of Party 1680-1750*, pp. 63-84. Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle*, pp. 237 and 243-52. Kramnick believes Trenchard and Gordon exemplify the ambivalence he thinks is particularly strong in Augustan "Commonwealthmen" who present two faces: "one that very much resembles Bolingbroke, and another whose appearance is genuinely liberal tending to radical." Kramnick does, just the same, describe *Cato's Letters* in the "Opposition weekly, *The London Journal*" in essentially Country terms, against a "corrupt England" (Ibid., pp. 237 and 243). Speck, *Stability and Strife*, pp. 22, 220, 223-

official-Whig intellectual one"[12] has taken firm root and now overshadows the Robbins-Jacobson description of Trenchard and Gordon as radical-Whig ideologues resisting the survival of High Toryism and complaining about the complacency of Whig statesmen. Historians accept the Country depiction of "Cato" as *the* correct view.

Contrary to Pocock's interpretation, the Robbins-Jacobson interpretation more accurately captures the works and thought of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Accordingly, the current Country interpretation must be modified. A return to Whig definitions and a qualified use of the Country description permit a more accurate and valid representation of "Cato's" ideas, concerns, aspirations, and political role in early Hanoverian England.

This chapter shows the inadequacy of a Country label as descriptive of the nature and character of "Cato's" thought. We also reject the conventional wisdom that the writings of Trenchard and Gordon form a part of the major opposition campaign against Robert Walpole. We cannot begin any inquiry about the appropriateness of the Country label to *Cato's Letters* without a precursory discussion of traditional views of Thomas Gordon.

Historians usually describe Gordon as Trenchard's secretary and junior partner--"amanuensis" as he is termed. Moreover, most scholars believe Robert Walpole bought Gordon off from opposition and paid him to declaim government policy.[13] If Gordon was a mere scribe who sold his secretarial abilities to the Whig Court, as is widely assumed, it would be impossible to consider, as this study does, Gordon an autonomous, principled writer and equal partner with Trenchard.

Gordon was a very prolific writer. He had published a great deal before his collaboration with Trenchard. He produced many, significant works after Trenchard's

4 and 227. This text connects their ideas with Bolingbroke but does mention the fact that Bolingbroke was the serious opponent Walpole faced.

[12]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 107-8.

[13]*An Historical View of the Principles, Characters, Persons, &c. of the Political Writers in Great Britain* (London, 1740), p. 15; J. M. Bulloch, "Thomas Gordon, The 'Independent Whig'," *University of Aberdeen Library Bulletin* 3 (1918), p. 604; and Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, p. 116. Charles B. Realey, "*The London Journal* and Its Authors, 1720-1723," *Bulletin of University of Kansas* 36 (December 1935), p. 31; H. T. Dickinson, *Walpole and the Whig Supremacy* (London: The English Universities Press, 1973), p. 155; Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p. 227; and most recently Clark, *English Society*, n. 97, p. 301. Robbins and Jacobson express skepticism, at least, about Gordon selling himself to the Walpole ministry, see Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, p. 116; and Jacobson, "Introduction," pp. xxviii-xxix.

death in 1723 and before his own death in 1750, a period that encompassed most of the reigns of George I and George II. It is true that Gordon held a minor but lucrative sinecure under the Whig ministries. Walpole named Gordon, in 1733, a Commissioner of Wine Licences. It is highly probable that Gordon was Walpole's "chief adviser in newspaper matters."[14] But, Robert Walpole did not have to buy off Thomas Gordon. Both, Gordon *and* Trenchard, assisted the Whig ministry as "Cato" when a major Jacobite conspiracy was discovered in the spring of 1722.

Misunderstanding of Gordon is related, in part, to the dominance of the Country label itself. Given the view of *Cato's Letters* as a second, major phase of Trenchard's characteristic opposition to the malignant influence of Courts, it is not surprising that historians relegate Gordon to a subordinate position and see him as a mere copyist. And since "Cato" is defined as a Country critic of Walpolean corruption, it is understandably difficult for scholars to consider Gordon an equal partner with Trenchard when they know he held a government job in the ministry of Robert Walpole.

The ease with which historians accept these assumptions is owing, above all, to their agreement with the recently ascendant "Namierite" depiction of early eighteenth-century politics as a power struggle without an ideological dimension. Even though several important studies of post-Revolution society successfully challenge that "Namierite" interpretation, another, very similar vision of the 1720s is put forth, quite powerfully, by E. P. Thompson in his study *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act*. This latter work props up, once again, a "Namierite" view of politics: a crass pursuit of power absolutely devoid of principle.[15]

The following discussion does not attempt a completely thorough analysis of Thomas Gordon's thought and career. Later chapters offer a fuller picture of both Trenchard and Gordon's thought and provide, therefore, more solid grounds upon which one can measure each writer. But, as indicated, it is impossible to deal with Gordon on equal terms with Trenchard without some preliminary effort to call in question the current view of Gordon as an unprincipled opportunist: a hack writer who took advantage of Trenchard's established reputation, and thereafter, of Walpole's patronage.

[14]*An Historical View*, pp. 15 and 17; W. A. Shaw, ed., *Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office*, 5 vols. (London: H.M.S.O., 1897-1903), 2 (1898), p. 402. James Ralph, *The Case of Authors by Profession or Trade, Stated with Regard to Booksellers, the Stage, and the Public* (London, 1758), p. 38; Laurence Hanson, *Government and the Press 1695-1763* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 27; Realey, "*The London Journal* and Its Authors, 1720-1723," p. 32; and Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle*, p. 243.

[15]See n. 1, chap. two. E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977; first published by Allen Lane, 1975), chap. 9.

When Trenchard and Gordon began their partnership in 1720 with the weekly *Independent Whig,* Gordon was already a published combatant against High-Church authoritarianism and a regular contributor in the London press. But Trenchard was a much more experienced and prominent person than Gordon. In fact, Gordon, the younger man, considered Trenchard his "best Tutor" and acknowledged, with gratitude and praise, his mentor's capacity and influence.[16] Public collaboration with the wealthy and veteran publicist, John Trenchard, particularly famous as an outstanding pamphleteer against standing armies in the late 1690s, raised Gordon's reputation. This association has led many scholars to underestimate the younger man's contribution and frequently to describe Gordon as Trenchard's "amanuensis."

All historians put Trenchard's name before Gordon's in any reference to the authors of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters.* But, in fact, the initial "G" identifies Thomas Gordon with most of *The Independent Whig* and more than half of "Cato's" essays. It is true that John Trenchard had been dead almost ten years when Gordon indicated the authorship of those individual articles and we know from Gordon himself that Trenchard did not like to write. Yet, those are not sufficient grounds for thinking Gordon credited Trenchard's work to himself even though one scholar believes Gordon was "never overready to acknowledge his literary debts."[17]

The alleged intellectual dominance of Trenchard contradicts clear evidence of Gordon's own, strong contribution. There are several reasons for considering Gordon the dominant partner in *The Independent Whig.* Before his collaboration with Trenchard, Gordon had written several popular, as well as highly controversial pamphlets supporting the Anglican, Low-Church bishop, Benjamin Hoadly, during the explosive Bangorian Controversy in the late 1710s. Many of these tracts voiced that hostility towards the High-Church clergy so characteristic of the later *Independent Whig.* In fact, two of Gordon's Bangorian pamphlets first brought him to Trenchard's attention and stimulated the famous partnership.[18]

Thomas Gordon also expanded the original, one-volume, collected edition of *The Independent Whig* to a four-volume work with articles Gordon wrote over a thirty-year period, from 1723 to his death in 1750. Gordon's large production of

[16] *Cato's Letters,* "Preface," pp. l-li; *A Collection of Tracts. By the Late John Trenchard, Esq; and Thomas Gordon, Esq;,* 2 vols. (London, 1751), 1, "Dedication," p. iv; and Richard Baron, ed., *Another Cordial for Low-Spirits: By Mr. Gordon and others,* 3 vols., 2d ed. (London, 1751), 2, "Preface," p. iii.

[17] Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman,* p. 93. In the 3d edition of *Cato's Letters* published in 1733 all letters are dated, numbered, and the initials "T"/"G"/"T & G" indicate the authorship according to Gordon himself.

[18] Richard Baron, ed., *A Cordial for Low Spirits. Being A Collection of curious Tracts. By Thomas Gordon, Esq. Author of the Independent Whig, and other Writers,* 3 vols., 3d ed. (London, 1763), 1, "Preface," p. iv.

anticlerical writings, both before and after his collaboration with Trenchard, strongly supports the contemporary view of Gordon as *the* "Independent Whig."[19]

Before "Cato's" letters appeared in *The London Journal,* Gordon had already published several articles in that same organ and had made regular contributions to another London newspaper, *The Weekly Packet,* from December 1718 to October 1719. Thus, Gordon was an active journalist before his partnership with Trenchard. And after the last "Cato" letter to *The British Journal,* Gordon continued to use London newspapers as an instrument for the promulgation of his thought. He published major political "Discourses" on government and society that he prefaced to his highly successful translations of Tacitus and Sallust. Gordon added several other political essays, published in *The British Journal* under the pseudonym "Criton," to *Cato's Letters,* and edited four different publications of that influential collection. Later, Richard Baron, a most assiduous and careful editor of the works of "Commonwealthmen,"[20] recognized Gordon's importance and published several volumes of the collected works of Thomas Gordon whom he identified as "Author of the *Independent Whig.*" Only one year after Gordon's death, Baron called Thomas Gordon "one of the most useful Writers of the Age." Baron considered Gordon's merit as a writer exceptional; he believed the English language had been greatly enriched by Mr. Gordon's

> many excellent productions. The *Independent Whig, Cato's* letters, the *Humourist,* the translation of *Tacitus,* and *discourses* on that author, to which may be added the *discourses* on *Sallust;* are noble monuments of his genius, and will transmit his name with honour to posterity.[21]

Baron's praise may seem excessive but scholars must recognize the fact that Thomas Gordon was no mere "amanuensis." He deserves, certainly, equal status with John Trenchard.

Given the fact that Gordon enjoyed a lucrative sinecure and supervised, apparently, the government press, historians assume the younger "Cato" must have been an unprincipled, albeit useful, writer who was easily bought off from opposition: a

[19] Jacobson, "Introduction," p. xxiv.

[20] Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman,* p. 393.

[21] Baron, ed. *A Cordial for Low Spirits,* 1, "Preface," p. iv. Baron, just a year after Gordon's death, comments:

> "And it may be said with the greatest Truth, that he was one of the most useful Writers of the Age. I know that he is thought by many to have been a *Deist:* But admitting that; none of his *Writings* are against Christianity, but highly Serviceable to it. They are all in Defence of private Judgment, and the Rights of Mankind, in Opposition both to civil and religious Bondage" (Baron, ed., *Another Cordial for Low Spirits,* 2, "Preface," p. vii).

once-upon-a-time "Independent Whig" who sold his ambitious abilities to the Whig oligarchy. That, certainly, was Alexander Pope's opinion:

> 'twill only be thought
> The Great man [Walpole] never offered
> you a Groat.
> There's honest Tacitus once talked as big
> But is he now an Independent Whig?[22]

Since some Country spokesmen, usually in Parliament, did dignify the struggle for office with an appearance of commitment to professed principles[23] and the Court did hire individuals to write its propaganda, Gordon seems guilty on both counts.

Some scholars do recognize Court writers as talented men,[24] and Reed Browning provides us with the first major examination of Court Whiggery in his recent study of the *Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs*.[25] Although the Court writers now enjoy scholarly attention, existing assumptions about Thomas Gordon remain unchallenged. And E. P. Thompson's devastating indictment of the Walpolean government--a predatory "junta of political speculators and speculative politicians, stock-jobbers, officers grown fat on Marlborough's wars, time-serving dependants" who wore their "libertarian rhetoric" uncomfortably "like fancy dress"--makes any claim of political commitment on the part of a writer associated with Walpole seem quite venal. In his *Whigs and Hunters,* Thompson examined, meticulously, the origins of the Waltham Black Act, a penal law passed in 1723. This act created, all at once, fifty new capital offenses for minor property violations and for going about "armed in disguise." The Black Act was, argues Thompson, an embodiment of a

[22]Alexander Pope, "Epilogue to the Satires," Dialogue I, quoted in Jacobson, "Introduction," p. xxviii.

[23]Hayton, "The 'Country' Interest and the Party System, 1689-c.1720," pp. 48-52.

[24]Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle,* chaps. 2 and 5, where the author considers government publications a valuable and authentic articulation of Walpole's beliefs even though he describes government writers as nonentities in comparison with the more illustrious opposition authors; Dickinson, *Liberty and Property,* chap. 4; and idem, *Walpole and the Whig Supremacy,* p. 152, where Dickinson says that "pro-Government propagandists were not all second-rate hacks, as has often been maintained"; Speck, *Stability and Strife,* pp. 227-8, where he explains Walpole's effort to defend himself against *The Craftsman* through a favorable distribution of works that supported his ministry, written by men less eminent than the opposition writers but hardly what one would call nonentities since Thomas Gordon, Benjamin Hoadly, and Lord Hervey wrote in defense of Walpole; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* p. 480, where he says they were "obscure men" but that their "abilities have been underrated"; and Alfred J. Henderson, *London and the National Government 1721-1742: A Study of City Politics and the Walpole Administration* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1945), p. 125.

[25]Reed Browning, *Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), see chaps. 1, 7, and 8.

Whig Weltanshauung--especially "the mind and sensibility of Walpole and his associates." That draconian law reflected the attitudes of men indifferent to the lower orders and obsessive about property.[26]

Thompson's indignation seems fair because he uncovers what is to us blatant repressiveness and because Robert Walpole did show a tremendous indifference to human suffering.[27] But the Black Act "was inspired by the Jacobite role in disorders in the south of England."[28] And Thompson himself recognizes in his "Postscript to the Peregrine Edition" of *Whigs and Hunters* the possibility, at least, of some connection between Jacobitism and the "hasty passage" of the Black Act.[29] One must also accept the fact that few people, unfortunately, cared about the so-called "dregs" of society; any violation of property, the basic and exclusive foundation of both "liberty" and "power," was anathema. The very existence and function of government was, in essence, to protect property. Severe personal punishment by physical pain was the widely-endorsed instrument for checking all kinds of misconduct.

What Thompson finds equally intolerable is the fact that historians accept the conventional description, even celebration, of Walpole and his "Junta" as political innovators who brought stability to a chaotic, ungovernable society. Thompson's work is a bold challenge to Sir John Plumb's renowned interpretation of Robert Walpole as a "politician of genius" who achieved political stability in a nation subject to incessant turmoil for more than a century. Given the depths of dissatisfaction that existed in Walpole's England, the term "stability" is a misleading one. Whig hegemony did not reflect political consensus and did depend upon coercive measures like the Riot Act, suspensions of Habeas Corpus, impeachments, vigilante activity, the systematic use of government patronage, the Black Act, and the City Elections Act.[30] But, all those actions require close scrutiny within very specific circumstances. The government's response to riots, for example, "varied greatly, depending on the political situation and on the degree to which they [the ministers] thought disturbances might be inspired or exploited for political motives."[31] The Whig system may

[26]Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters,* pp. 198 and 197. See "Part 3: Whigs," pp. 169-269.

[27]Cruickshanks, "The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole," p. 20.

[28]Black, "Introduction," p. 20. See Eveline Cruickshanks and Howard Erskine-Hill, "The Waltham Black Act and Jacobitism," *Journal of British Studies* 24 (July 1985), pp. 358-65.

[29]Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters,* pp. 305-06.

[30]Lawrence Stone, "Whigs, Marxists, and Poachers," review of *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England,* by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow and *Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act,* by E. P. Thompson, in *New York Review of Books* (5 February 1976), pp. 25-7. See Rogers, "Popular Protest"; idem, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism"; idem, "The City Elections Act (1725) Reconsidered"; Black, "Introduction"; and Dickinson, "Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole."

[31]Black, "Introduction," p. 19.

not be attractive but historians can and do understate the political challenges Walpole and other Whigs said they faced.

Walpole did work to contain and quell serious degrees of potentially rebellious discontent and the "Jacobite rising in 1745-46," after his fall, "is an important commentary on the Walpolean period."[32] Walpole's opponents said the Jacobite bogey "was just a convenient screen for Walpole to hide behind; but in the end the Forty-five rebellion was to prove him right."[33]

> The nature of the military crisis in 1745 should not be underrated. Though few were willing to fight for the Jacobites, few were prepared to fight for the Hanoverian succession, which was shown to rest on a very narrow base.[34]

Thompson's depiction of political life in England in 1720s as resembling a "banana republic" excludes any possible credibility for a journalist supporting Walpole. In contrast, Thompson considers Walpole's Tory critics genuine humanists. Francis Atterbury, John Gay, Nathaniel Mist, Alexander Pope, and Jonathan Swift, in Thompson's opinion, justly and aptly portray the repulsiveness of Walpole and his creatures and are much "less hyperbolic or misanthropic and more precisely aimed than is supposed."[35] Yet, Thompson minimizes the conservative, even reactionary, attitudes of these same men towards Nonconformists. Their works advocate, in Queen Anne's reign, severe measures against Protestants who do not conform to the Church of England. Several of Thompson's Tory humanists definitely prefer the Stuart Pretender to the Hanoverian monarch and such a preference concerns not only Walpole but the "Independent Whigs" as well.

Trenchard and Gordon genuinely fear Jacobitism, especially as they perceive it among the High-Tory clergy. When, in the spring of 1722, the Whig government uncovers the existence of a major Jacobite conspiracy involving Francis Atterbury, the Bishop of Rochester, Trenchard and Gordon try to check and counter the influence of Atterbury and his circle. As "Cato" both authors assist the Whig ministry with aggressive articles against those who encourage popular discontent and promote the Stuart cause.

Caroline Robbins believes Trenchard and Gordon sincerely fear Jacobitism

[32]Ibid., p. 20; and idem, "Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole," in *Britain in the Age of Walpole*, p. 160.

[33]Geoffrey Holmes, "Sir Robert Walpole," in *The Prime Ministers: Volume the First, Sir Robert Walpole to Sir Robert Peel*, ed. Herbert Van Thal (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 37.

[34]Black, "Introduction," p. 20.

[35]Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters*, p. 215.

especially among High Anglicans. She also believes there is some ground for their apprehensions:

> So long as the exiled Stuarts continued to exist and to profess Catholicism, there persisted a strong and vigorous prejudice against the Protestant but High-church group that were suspected of Jacobitism and of a belief in divine right.
>
> It would be rash to assume that because the Stuarts never had anything but fleeting success in attempts to return, and the government until the days of George III was ostensibly Whig, there was no danger that England would lose some of the freedom achieved so painfully in the seventeenth century.[36]

The Whig ministry gains the overt support of these two "Independent Whigs," especially the younger "Cato," because it is the only bulwark against what they fear most: counterreformation and counterrevolution. Thompson's Tory humanists probably mean what they say about Walpole's world, but Trenchard and Gordon also express sincere fears of the Jacobites' capacity to turn the world upside down; thus, they welcome Walpole as the best man to secure the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover.

These preliminary comments call in question the usual description of Thomas Gordon as an unprincipled opportunist and a mere copyist. It would be an historical distortion to claim Gordon only wrote what Trenchard said or what Walpole wanted. Gordon's role in *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters* is a large one. His subsequent writings are considerable. The fact that Trenchard as well as Gordon support, as "Cato," the Whig government's effort to check Jacobitism makes the younger man's admonishment of a government or a particular public figure as consistence as his defense of given ministry and/or minister. Recent scholars encourage a close examination of specific contexts when dealing with questions concerning the consistency and allegiance of politicians overtime and amid extenuating circumstances. As Cruickshanks remarks, the "political scene is a fast-moving one and politicians cannot be studied in set attitudes, like butterflies in an album."[37] Publicists must also be evaluated within their own, contemporary, context. Jacobitism exists for "Cato" and Gordon's response to that danger is a genuine expression of concern by a writer many contemporaries correctly admired as *the* "Independent Whig." Thomas Gordon is no more a scribe for sale than John Trenchard.

Cato's Letters *and the Whig Ministry*

This and the following three sections of this chapter deal with the conventional descriptions of *Cato's Letters* and try to correct errors and limitations. To assume

[36]Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, pp. 116 and 118-19.

[37]Cruickshanks, "Introduction," p. 7; and Hayton, "The 'Country' Interest and the Party

"Cato's" essays are directed against the ministry of Robert Walpole misreads their major message. To describe "Cato" as an exemplary Country-opposition writer oversimplifies the range and complexity of Trenchard and Gordon's writings.

James Ralph, an important journalist in the 1730s who was particularly well-informed about English authors in the Age of Walpole, recognizes the very broad character of Trenchard and Gordon's essays and correctly cautions against considering *Cato's Letters* an express attack on the ministry of Robert Walpole:

> What we call the *Opposition* to the Late Minister, precisely speaking should not, perhaps, be dated farther back than to the Year 1725....
>
> *Cato's Letters,* written immediately upon the iniquitous *South-Sea* Project, though level'd against all bad Administrations, are not to be supposed therefore particularly to point at this one Man. They are excellent Lectures on Government, and have been equally quoted by the Advocates and Opposers of Sir R. W.[38]

In Ralph's opinion it is only Bolingbroke's *Craftsman* that is "immediately directed against the Minister." The leaders of this opposition are, says Ralph, Lord Bolingbroke whose "Pen [is] equal at least to any that has appear'd in Behalf of the Constitution," and William Pulteney who "upon some Disgust ... quitted the Court, and took upon him ... the Character of a Patriot."[39] In contrast to Ralph's awareness and caution, modern historians claim that the polemics of Trenchard and Gordon "were clearly directed against the ministry of Robert Walpole." They go on to add that Bolingbroke, Gay, and Swift joined "Cato" in his attack on Walpole and shared "Cato's" hatred of the minister.[40]

Precisely speaking, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon are not and never had been critics of Robert Walpole's *ministry.* When *Cato's Letters* first appear, in the fall of 1720, it is a time of great economic and political crisis. The cause of that crisis is a drastic drop in the value of the South-Sea stock. By late summer 1720, thousands of investors, from the lower levels of the upper classes mostly, find themselves financially ruined and many turn their frustration, indignation, and fury towards the House of Hanover and its Whig administration. When the stock falls, James Stanhope and Charles Sunderland head the Whig government. Walpole is brought back into the ministry in June 1720 when he is given the secondary yet lucrative post of Paymaster

System, 1689-c.1720," p. 48.

[38]James Ralph, *A Critical History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Now Earl of Orford* (London, 1734), pp. 504-5.

[39]Ibid., pp. 504 and 506.

[40]Thomas A. Horne, *The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville: Virtue and Commerce in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1978), p. x.

General. Not until the spring of 1722, after the sudden deaths of Stanhope (February 1721) and Sunderland (April 1722) does Walpole visibly head the Whig ministry.[41] By that time anger about the South-Sea fiasco has subsided and a new crisis, Jacobite conspiracy, has just begun.

Trenchard and Gordon, like most public writers, give considerable attention to the disastrous consequences of the South-Sea Scheme. They criticize those who first supported the Scheme; the Company directors; and eventually, as a Parliamentary inquiry progresses, those Whig ministers who are apparently implicated in bribery and/or other forms of financial fraudulence.

A brief description of the South-Sea crisis will make "Cato's" concerns and Walpole's position clearer. The South-Sea Company was founded in May 1711 by Robert Harley, heading at that time the Tory government. Harley set up the South-Sea Company as a counterpoise to those Whig bastions of finance, the Bank of England and the East-India Company. The South-Sea Company was established as a joint-stock corporation to trade in Spanish America (with a monopoly of British trade in that part of the new world) *and* to undertake a conversion of some £9,000,000 of the National Debt.

> The government's creditors would become shareholders in the South Sea Company; in return the government would pay the Company annual interest and management fees until 1716, thus allowing a small dividend to be returned to the stockholders. Beyond this the Company's profits would come from its trading monopoly.[42]

As part of the Peace of Utrecht (1713) Great Britain had received an exclusive right to import slaves into the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean for thirty-some years--the so-called "Asiento." The South-Sea Company was granted the "Asiento" as well as other Spanish commercial concessions in that same geographical area. Even more important than those exclusive, trading privileges was the Company's financial role. Management of a significant proportion of the National Debt was a crucial aspect of the Company's activities from its establishment. Suspicions of

[41]Cruickshanks, an important authority on this period, does demonstrate that the year 1720 instead of 1721 or 1722 marks the commencement of Walpole's ministry: "Walpole, though nominally only paymaster, was in charge of the Treasury" and his "appointment as First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer in April 1721 merely regularised an existing situation" (Cruickshanks, "The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole, p. 23). But Trenchard and Gordon do not recognize, in the late summer and early fall of 1720, Walpole's immediate supremacy even though they are very aware of his political clout in the House of Commons where they want him to aggressively pursue the directors and all peculators including the Whig ministers.

[42]Biddle, *Bolingbroke and Harley,* p. 189.

collusion between ministers and the South-Sea Company also characterized the early years of the new corporation. In the summer of 1714 Bolingbroke "had to urge the Queen to prorogue Parliament ... before the Lords made damaging disclosures about his own involvement in the shady financial deals of the new South-Sea Company.[43]

In early 1720 and under a Whig administration--the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry--the Company directors proposed to take over the entire National Debt, "including those loans subscribed by the Bank of England and the East-India Company." Walpole, in the House of Commons, discouraged acceptance of such a scheme:

> Walpole, who for some years had been on very intimate terms with the directors of the Bank, agreed to put the Bank's case before the Commons in January 1720. He argued with great force that the Bank had far greater experience than the South-Sea Company in handling the National Debt and should be allowed even greater responsibility for raising the loans needed by the Government. Subsequent events were to prove the wisdom of Walpole's claim....[44]

The Whig ministry accepted the Company's proposal but excepted government stock held by the Bank of England and the East-India Company. Thus, the South-Sea Company was allowed to convert some £30,000,000 (more than three-fifths of the National Debt) of government stock into South-Sea stock. The Company paid the government £7,000,000 for the privilege and bribed ministers--the Earl of Sunderland; John Aislabie, Chancellor of the Exchequer; James Craggs, Postmaster General; Charles Stanhope, a junior Secretary of the Treasury--as well as Members of Parliament. Walpole, who disputed specific aspects of the Scheme in Commons, did not receive any special offers from the South-Sea Company. Parliament accepted the Scheme (1 February 1720).

One of the features of the South-Sea Scheme Walpole called in question was the fact that the ratio of government stock to be exchanged for South-Sea stock was not fixed. The failure to fix that ratio meant the directors were naturally interested in a rising market. They encouraged, not surprisingly, speculation. To convince holders of government stock, redeemable as well as irredeemable annuities, to make the exchange, the South-Sea Company circulated exaggerated prospects of potential profits from their exclusive, trading privileges in Spanish America. From the beginning, South-Sea stock sold above par: £100 of South-Sea stock "cost" £118 in government stock. By April the stock stood at £300, by late May £700 and on 24 June "it reached the record level of [£]1,050."[45] By mid-summer, if one wanted to acquire

[43]Dickinson, *Walpole and the Whig Supremacy*, p. 38.
[44]Ibid., p. 57.
[45]John Owen, *The Eighteenth Century 1714-1815*, A History of England series (London:

£100 of South-Sea stock with his government annuities, £1,000 of the latter was the necessary amount. The South-Sea Company had the right to issue additional company shares equal to the difference between the amount it received in government annuities and the amount it exchanged for them. Thus, by July 1720, £900 worth of new shares could be issued and sold by the Company on the market.

The evident success of the South-Sea Company as well as the profits some investors made when they "bought South Sea stock at one price then sold it soon afterwards when the price had soared," led to "a wild speculative boom."[46] Numerous new companies, anxious to capitalize on the human thirst for quick success, emerged overnight. Although most of the new companies were unsound financially, investors bought the stocks of those new companies. The South-Sea Company was, not surprisingly, unhappy about the existence of competitors and managed to get the government to pass the Bubble Act (24 June) to check that competition. Although the Bubble Act prohibited the existence of unchartered joint-stock companies, "great ingenuity was used to stretch existing charters to the utmost."[47] To stop the continuing loss of capital to other corporations--to force potential investment towards the South-Sea Company--the directors, in mid-August, "applied for writs against four rival companies." That move against their competitors contributed, ironically, to the undoing of the South-Sea Company itself:

> The stock of those who had speculated in these four companies dropped steeply in value, and they had to sell other stock--including that of the South Sea Company--to meet their liabilities. The general price of shares fell severely, that of South Sea stock disastrously.

Without realizing it, the South-Sea Company pricked the very Bubble--an ever-rising market--it floated on.[48]

Those who had exchanged and/or bought South-Sea stock early and sold their recently acquired shares quickly, made a fortune. Others, including Walpole who except for his London banker's advice would have foolishly purchased South-Sea stock as late as August, did not imagine the burst of the South-Sea Bubble, a crash that left investors all over the country with stocks worth less than the government securities they once held.

By late August pandemonium set in as thousands faced economic ruin. "Consternation," "rage," and "desperation" are the words contemporaries used to express the

Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1974), p. 20.
[46]Dickinson, *Walpole and the Whig Supremacy*, pp. 58-9.
[47]Owen, *The Eighteenth Century*, pp. 20-1.
[48]Ibid., p. 21.

feelings of those times. Arthur Onslow, the future Speaker of the House of Commons, described both the anger people felt towards the government and the danger this anger implied for the survival of the Hanoverian succession:

> The rage against the Government was such for having as they thought drawn them into this ruin, that I am almost persuaded, the King being at that time abroad, that could the Pretender then have landed at the Tower, he might have rode to St. James's with very few hands held up against him.[49]

The weight of Trenchard and Gordon's aggressively critical discussions of the results of the South-Sea Scheme in *The London Journal* were first targeted against the Company directors and later against leading ministers, especially Sunderland, who were deeply implicated in financial fraudulence. Walpole was not involved in any shady deals related to the Scheme. Like many others, he lost money when the Bubble burst. But, Robert Walpole, the major Whig leader in the House of Commons, did decide to defend the Whig ministry, as far as possible.

When Trenchard and Gordon do actually refer to Walpole, which is not often, they accuse him of obstructing the proper and due operation of justice. "Cato," like many writers in Tory journals, uses the word "Skreen" to attack Walpole for protecting those responsible, including major Whig ministers and other members of the government, from adequate examination and just retribution. Such references to "screening" in the numerous essays concerning the South-Sea fiasco, during the winter of 1720-21, do not make *Cato's Letters* a Country-opposition critique of corrupt Court practices in the ministry of Robert Walpole.

"Cato" does, indeed, oppose the corruption surrounding the South-Sea Scheme and Bubble. He directs his polemics against those in the South-Sea Company who cheated the nation and those in government who abused their authority to protect property by using that entrusted power not to defend but to rob innocent investors. He also criticizes Walpole for not endorsing a rigorous execution of justice. But, Trenchard and Gordon's specific critique of a particular economic tragedy (in which, we should remember, Tories as well as Whigs were implicated) is not a Country campaign against Walpolean corruption as such. Walpole's conduct greatly disappoints Trenchard and Gordon but he is not the prime target. Obviously, Bolingbroke and other Tory writers can not "join" Trenchard and Gordon in a campaign against Walpole since no such campaign exists.

[49]Historical Manuscripts Commission, Onslow MSS., p. 504, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 68. See also William Thomas Laprade, *Public Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth-Century England to the Fall of Walpole* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 235.

Some basic facts need emphasis. It is impossible for Bolingbroke to join Trenchard and Gordon in late 1726, when *The Craftsman* first appears. Trenchard had been dead for three years and Gordon had contributed, significantly, to the government effort, led by Walpole, to check the threat of Jacobitism. After "Cato's" last essay in *The British Journal*, Gordon continues, under the pseudonym "Criton," to attack, just as "Cato" and the "Independent Whig" had done before, High-Church excesses. "Criton" essays from *The British Journal* form the second volume of *The Independent Whig*. In 1728, Gordon publishes the first volume of his translations of Tacitus along with important political discourses usually described as an expression of radical Whiggery. Significantly, he dedicates this work to Robert Walpole. Moreover, Gordon himself affirms in the "Preface" to the full collection of *Cato's Letters* that Trenchard had been more partial to Walpole's administration than to any other. "Cato" and the writers in *The Craftsman* are worlds apart in the late 1720s and they always had been.[50]

Why historians link "Cato" with Bolingbroke's opposition to Robert Walpole can be explained. Viscount Bolingbroke and his circle appropriate "Cato's" critique of public corruption and convert it into particularly effective explosives for the ideological fire they direct against the "Great Man." *The Craftsman* compares itself, regularly, with "Cato."

> Gentlemen: "Cato's" Principles and mine are the very same; My Writings will descend to Posterity in the same Light with his.... The Object of our Complaints are the same, and the Subject of our Complaints too: My Papers have been received with the same general Approbation; and the Writers Against Me have met with the same general Contempt.[51]

[50]Gordon, *Cato's Letters*, "Preface," pp. xlii-xliii. *The British Journal*, like its predecessor, *The London Journal*, became a government organ and Gordon's hand, as "Criton," appears afresh. He explains that six of his "Criton" essays, added to the 1724 edition of *Cato's Letters*, had appeared earlier in *The British Journal*, after "Cato's" "Farewell" (27 July 1723). Furthermore, Gordon states his intention to add a large number of the "Criton" articles "upon the Subject of Religion and Controversy" to *The Independent Whig* "since they treat of the like matters" (Gordon, *Cato's Letters*, "Advertisement to the Reader," vol. 4, p. 290). That clear statement of intention has usually been overlooked by scholars and Gordon's large contribution to the government's *British Journal*, from August 1723 through June 1724 has been ignored. In fact Paul B. Anderson, "Cato's Obscure Counterpart in *The British Journal* 1722-1725," *Studies in Philology* 34 (July 1937), pp. 412-28 identifies "Criton" with Bernard Mandeville. Thomas Gordon, *The Works of Tacitus; Volume I: Containing the Annals. To which are prefixed, Political Discourses upon that Author.* (London, 1728), where Gordon dedicates the work "To the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Walpole, First Commissioner of the Treasury, Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Ex-chequer, etc."

[51]Quoted in *The London Journal*, No. 631 (28 August 1731).

What *The Craftsman* says about itself and "Cato," historians uncritically repeat. The very fact that Bolingbroke and his talented supporters can and do use "Cato's" earlier criticism of Whig ministers for their involvement with South-Sea frauds as well as the complaints "Cato" directed against Walpole's obstruction of adequately severe retribution certainly must be admitted. Gordon himself mentions, in his "Dedication" to the 1733 edition of *Cato's Letters*, "the frequent Quotations made from them in our late Party-hostilities."[52] But Bolingbroke's appropriation of "Cato" does not prove an identity either of premise or approach.

Quentin Skinner, in his article "The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus Walpole," believes that Bolingbroke, an arch-enemy of the Whigs, presents, intentionally, "in his own political writings the clearest and most stylish survey of a number of key Whig political beliefs." Bolingbroke endorses what Skinner calls, following Robbins, the "Whig canon" of ideas. But, argues Skinner, Bolingbroke does not sincerely believe what he expresses rhetorically. Instead, he appropriates the "views held by the accredited theorists" of the Whig party "in order to be able to make use of the immensely strong resonances of this tradition of thought to further his own cynical and self-interested political ends." Skinner does not believe "that Bolingbroke and his party ever felt that English political liberties were genuinely in jeopardy."[53]

The government press answers *The Craftsman* with great regularity. This was natural. But the open, very frank character of its response to Bolingbroke's appropriation of "Cato" and the latter's critique of the Court is very striking. Gordon himself may be the writer since Gordon is supposed "to have been employed by the government to revise or edit articles by court writers before they were published."[54] It is difficult to prove that Gordon supervised *The London Journal*, a government organ from September 1722, and its answers to *The Craftsman*. But the writer not only understands but echoes *Cato's Letters*.

Thus *The London Journal* complains about the *Craftsman's* wrongful application of "Cato's" complaints against corruption:

> When Cato wrote against Corruption, Public Corruption, State or Ministerial Corruption, he had a Reason for it, an Occasion was given, the greatest and most deplorable Occasion that ever was known in England; the matchless Wickedness of the South-Sea Scheme was the unfortunate Occasion; when the People were led like Sheep to Slaughter, and Thousands of Families cover'd

[52]Gordon, *Cato's Letters*, "Dedication," p. xix.
[53]Skinner, "The Principles and Practice of Opposition," pp. 126-7.
[54]Realey, "*The London Journal* and Its Authors, 1720-1723," p. 32.

> with Destruction, by the Contrivance and Artifices of Men in Power: This was a Time to write against Corruption, and the Abuses of Power.

In this same issue, *The London Journal* smears Bolingbroke with that opprobrious term "faction." If to rail against "Bribery and Corruption" makes one popular, the choice of topics is "calculated only to serve the Purposes of a Faction against their Country." Like Skinner, the government writer accuses Bolingbroke and his circle of feigning patriotic concern when they well know that English "Laws and Liberties" are "inviolably preserved," that there are "no Plots or Schemes laid to trick us out of our Properties" and, finally, that "there is as much Care taken of the People, and their Prosperity too, as the Nature of human Affairs will admit." Where "Cato" formerly had *real* abuses to criticize, *The Craftsman* has none because "no publick Ills are committed" and "Cato's Reasoning against weak and wicked Ministers cannot be employ'd against the present Ministry."[55]

Walpole, says *The London Journal*, had settled matters in Parliament "in such a Manner as seem'd best upon the Whole." But, adds the government writer with striking frankness, "Cato" had disagreed: the authors of *Cato's Letters* "wrote against" Walpole, that "Person whom they supposed caus'd a partial and unequal Settlement. They call'd him the Skreen." Yet, continues the government's journalist, even if the "Minister" *The Craftsman* "uses in so scurrilous a Manner, was the very Person call'd the Skreen" and "Things were not so well adjusted as they might have been: What's this to Mr. D'Anvers?" of *The Craftsman*. Walpole's failure, in Commons, to endorse "a rigorous Execution of Justice," "indeed, would justify Cato's Writing at that Time; but will by no means, justify" the *Craftsman's* present complaints against this, Robert Walpole's, ministry.[56]

When "Cato" drew "his Pen against the Court in the late reign," his critique was warranted because "Ruin and Devastation were scatter'd thro' the Kingdom." But now, in contrast to those times, there is no reason to launch accusations of corruption against the present Whig ministry. *The Craftsman*, asserts *The London Journal*, might

> with as much Propriety, write against the Star-Chamber and High Commission Courts, or against an arbitrary Power of dispensing with Laws, as against Court Corruption, and Ministerial Corruption; because there are no ill Things done by the Court or Ministry, at least none appear to be done.[57]

[55]*The London Journal* No. 631 and No. 643 (23 October 1731). See also No. 632 (4 September 1731).
[56]*The London Journal* No. 643.
[57]*The London Journal* Nos. 632 and 631.

As all students of Bolingbroke know, *Cato's Letters* do provide material for *The Craftsman*. But when those essays are first written they do not, in content or purpose, constitute a critique of Walpole's ministry. When Trenchard and Gordon begin to send "Letters to the Author of the *London Journal*" in late 1720 Sunderland and Stanhope, not Walpole, still head in "Cato's" opinion the Whig ministry. The limited number of specific references, or even allusions, to Robert Walpole fail to add up to a systematic attack. Thus, the conventional view that *Cato's Letters* constitute a major critique of the ministry of Robert Walpole is incorrect.

"Cato" and the Country Classification: Harringtonian versus Neo-Harringtonian

We can now turn to the important question whether the Country-versus-Court category used by Pocock is adequate. Most recent scholars accept the Country definition as the correct way to interpret and classify the "Cato" canon, but that widely-held depiction is, as these three sections of this chapter argue, both inappropriate and incomplete and, therefore, not a valid classification.

Most of "Cato's" essays contain ideas and political views that lie outside, or even in contradiction to, a pure Country vision. Although one must acknowledge the presence of Trenchard and Gordon's Country idiom, as numerous paragraphs and several articles written against bribery, placemen, pensions, standing armies, and stockjobbers attest, "Cato's" use of that language does not constitute a full embodiment of Country-opposition ideology. Trenchard and Gordon's historical perspectives, their views of human nature in relation to politics, and their political theories differ from those that J. G. A. Pocock and other scholars consider the defining features of Country ideologues.

As indicated before, Pocock describes Country writers as "neo-Harringtonian" and considers Trenchard and Gordon major representatives of a Country ideology. Pocock believes Country ideologues endorse James Harrington's analysis of the relationship between property and political power but that they reject Harrington's belief that free and stable government was a *post*-medieval phenomenon. Instead, the "neo-Harringtonians" reconcile Harrington's vision of a balanced commonwealth of independent landholders with the older, traditional, English concept of an "Ancient Constitution": the "neo-Harringtonians" present the medieval period of English government as that commonwealth of independent freeholders Harrington saw in Tudor England. The "neo-Harringtonians" abandon Harrington's description of the Middle Ages as a period when property was in the hands of a few men who engaged in incessant battles, a period in which anarchy prevailed, and, concomitantly, the Harringtonian vision of a stable commonwealth of independent, armed freeholders built on the *ruins* of feudal chaos. The "neo-Harringtonians," in Pocock's analysis, idealize medieval law and government, what "we call the ancient constitution." They place Harringtonian freedom in the Gothic and English past and not, like Harrington himself, on the ruins of feudal anarchy.[58]

Trenchard and Gordon do endorse James Harrington's concept of property and power but, in absolute contrast to what Pocock says about Country ideologues, Trenchard and Gordon subscribe to a Harringtonian, not the "neo-Harringtonian," interpretation of medieval society.

Trenchard reiterates his earlier description, made in 1698 during the standing-army controversy, of government as "a mere piece of Clockwork" and underscores what is, for him, the basically mechanistic nature of the relationship between property and political power:

> Government is Political, as a human Body is Natural Mechanism; both have proper Springs, Wheels, and a peculiar Organization to qualify them for suitable Motions, and can have no other than that Organization enables them to perform; and when those Springs or Principles are destroyed by Accident or Violence, or are worn out by Time, they must suffer a natural or political Demise, and be buried, or else smell above Ground; and though neither of them ought to be murdered, yet when they are dead, they ought to be interred.
>
> Now it is most certain, that the first Principle of all Power is Property; and every Man will have his Share of it in proportion as he enjoys Property, and makes use of that Property, where Violence does not interpose. ...[Property] is natural Power, and will govern and constitute the political, and certainly draw the latter after it, if Force be absent; and Force cannot subsist long without altering Property; so that both must unite together, first or last, and Property will either get Power, or Power will seize the Property in its own Defence....[59]

Harrington considers the Gothic polity both unstable and unfree. In emphasizing the anarchy and lack of freedom that are characteristic conditions under Gothic governments, Trenchard and Gordon sound like Harrington not Pocock's "neo-Harringtonians": all *Gothick* Governments," says "Cato," are in "constant States of War or Conspiracy between their Kings and Nobles" and, thus, a "forlorn Condition" for the "People" who are "vile Slaves and Vassals to their Princes, Lords, or other Proprietors of the Land."[60] "Cato" does not celebrate an "Ancient Constitution" nor does he express a "neo-Harringtonian" idealization of medieval government that places the epitome of English liberty in a Gothic, English past.

[58]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies," pp. 120, 128, 133, 135, 136, and 138.

[59]*Cato's Letters*, No. 84, pp. 150-1.

[60]Ibid., No. 67, p. 305; and No. 91, p. 207.

"Cato" describes and analyzes an end of feudal disorder that is identical to Harrington's and completely different from what Pocock considers the "neo-Harringtonian" notion of an "Ancient Constitution." Harrington identifies the accession of the Tudor dynasty as the moment when the House of Commons had come into its own. He "saw his commonwealth of freeholders as coming into existence only after 1485" when "the Tudor kings had brought about a redistribution of land in order to undermine their nobility, and in so doing had undermined themselves."[61] Trenchard and Gordon describe the same processes and place them at the same historical moment:

> *Harry* the VIIth, dreading the Strength of the Nobles, who had always plagued and sometimes destroyed his Predecessors, found Means to make them alienate a great part of their Estates, which threw a proportionable Power into the Commons; and his Son, by seizing the Revenues of the Ecclesiasticks, (who usually caballed with them) and dispersing those Estates amongst the People, made the Ballance much heavier; which Queen *Elizabeth* wisely observing, (though she loved Power as well as any who went before her) yet caressed them with so much Dexterity, that she preserved not only the Crown upon her Head, but wore it in its full Lustre, and by encouraging Trade, and letting Nature take its Course, still encreased the People's Wealth and Power....[62]

Unlike Country authors who believe the "Ancient Constitution" had survived until the late seventeenth century, "Cato" describes the early Stuarts and the Restoration monarchs as violators of the natural distribution of property and concomitant political power in the House of Commons. "Cato" believes James I and Charles I, unlike Elizabeth who had recognized the shift in property-holding from a few nobles to the gentry and accepted that reality, tried to go against the natural power, to resist the new reality. The reign of James I was one of "perpetual Struggle between himself and his Parliaments" that led to "that fatal and bloody Civil War ... in the reign of his Son." Cromwell, like all conquering Generals, "set up himself ... but the Property remaining where it was, this new Tyranny was violent and against Nature, and could not hold long."[63]

In 1660 the nation was restored to "Monarchy," the "ancient Form of Government." By then, after so many years of civil turmoil and political chaos, the "People" were "weary of the Sound of Liberty." The English

> had been harassed and exhausted by a long Civil War, and were weary of being tossed and tumbled once in a Month out of one Government into another; and

[61]Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies," pp. 135 and 120.
[62]*Cato's Letters*, No. 84, p. 155.
[63]Ibid., p. 156.

> all were prepared to accept and fall into any Measures which might satiate their Revenge upon those who had oppressed them, and to root out the very Principles of Liberty, the Abuse of which had brought such Mischiefs upon them.[64]

Thus, England's ordeal was still not over: "Extravagant Joy for the *Restoration* (which was doubtless a great and extraordinary Blessing) had well nigh cost *England* its Religion and Liberty...." Guided by that desperate desire for stable government, Parliament vested Charles II and James II with excessively generous revenues and with that money those

> Princes were enabled to keep standing Troops, to corrupt Parliaments, or to live without them; and to commit such Acts of Power as brought about, and indeed forced the People upon the late happy *Revolution*.[65]

Only with the Revolution did things change for the better. In 1688 the "People" resisted the lawless "Force" of Stuart oppression and since property still remained in the "People," they were in a position to recover their erstwhile political power. "Cato" believes the Revolution of 1688-89 has brought the monarchy of Great Britain into line with the real distribution of property.

"Cato" and the Country Classification: Passion versus Virtue

Trenchard and Gordon's views of human nature in relationship to politics preclude the Country ideal of a society composed of a selfless citizenry dedicated to the pursuit of the public good. They not only define human nature in highly pessimistic terms but they also insist on the need to acknowledge human depravity as a crucial component of socio-political reality. "Selfishness" is the essence of man, a basic fact necessary to face and accept. "Cato" stresses the "Crookedness and Corruption of human Nature" but not, he explains, with any intention of malice. He speaks darkly in order to check what he thinks is foolish, even dangerous talk, of "the Dignity of human Nature."[66]

Although, as Trenchard and Gordon acknowledge, many believe in man's benevolence and maintain the theory that "Virtue was its own Reward," they disagree completely. They caution against any anticipation of the exercise of "philosophical Virtue" in men's actions and argue, instead, that only through a systems of rewards and punishments can one expect some degree of integrity in the polity. Human beings act "virtuously" only when it is in their interest to do so.

[64]Ibid., pp. 156-7.
[65]Ibid., No. 39, p. 47 and No. 60, p. 235.
[66]Ibid., No. 40, pp. 53-4; and see Nos. 22, 24, 31, 33, 39, 44, and 47 passim.

> We do not expect philosophical Virtue from them; but only that they follow Virtue as their Interest, and find it penal and dangerous to depart from it. And this is the Virtue that the World wants, and the only Virtue that it can trust to.[67]

Human beings, especially "societies of Men," always do what they can get away with: "Great Bodies of Men have seldom judged what they ought to do, by any other Rule than what they could do." Such is the case of nations, corporations, parties, and of any group of people.[68]

"Cato" underscores and accepts, as Pocock realizes, "the supremacy of passion and interest."[69] Human beings do not have "any Views purely publick and disinterested." For men to act independently of "their Passions" is, in "Cato's" opinion, an outlandish contradiction because human "Passions enter into all that they do, and are the Source of it." "Ambition, Avarice, and Vanity, and other Passions" govern human conduct and always will as long as "Men are Men." If human nature is dominated, as Trenchard and Gordon contend, by passion and self-interest, little, if any, ground exists for Country aspirations of an ideally virtuous individual. An essentially selfish creature is no candidate for civic humanism, the celebrated ideal of Country ideologues.[70]

The very survival and success of a civil polity depends, for "Cato," not upon illusory concepts of human capacities but upon a willingness to acknowledge and heed the ever-present dangers of the human character. The real root of any society's distress lies with human nature itself and no society can permit itself delusions about mankind. Trenchard and Gordon's perceptions and basic assumptions about man play a highly determinative role in their political thinking. There is, for "Cato," a clear and explicit relationship between an adequate understanding of human nature and the establishment and maintenance of effective government:

> he who knows little of human Nature, will never know much of the Affairs of the World, which every where drive their Motion and Situation from the Humours and Passions of Men.[71]

"Knowledge of Politics" is, argues "Cato," based on "Knowledge of the Passions"; hence the "Art of Governing" consists of "artful Applications" to the "private Passions and Interests" of men. Since human beings are the "Materials for Government," the "Art of political Mechanism" is the ability "to erect a firm Building with such crazy and corrupt Materials."[72]

[67]Ibid., No. 63, pp. 257-9; No. 42, pp. 67-8; No. 61, p. 236; No. 108, pp. 25-6; and No. 40, p. 56.

[68]Ibid., No. 61, pp. 236-7.

[69]Ibid., No. 44; and Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 474 and pp. 447, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 481, and 515 passim. Pocock, of course, considers *Cato's Letters* an outstanding expression, a "peak," of "what has become known," due especially to Pocock himself, "as the 'Country' ideology." Yet, at the same time, it is Pocock who is uniquely aware of the fact that *Cato's Letters* contain features, significant ones, that are not only distinct from "Country" attitudes but are, in fact, very close to "Court" theories. To consider "Cato" an exemplary spokesman of Country-opposition ideology means a *major* critique of executive patronage as systematic and pernicious corruption. To state on the other hand, as Pocock does as well, that *Cato's Letters* admitted that "parliamentary monarchy, in which king, lords, and commons must work together, could not subsist without a measure of patronage or 'indirect influence'" (Ibid., p. 481) means the implicit acceptance of executive patronage as necessary for effective government. Pocock would, it seems, have cautioned, explicitly, against the full application of a Country label to "Cato." It is, after all, Pocock who observes Trenchard's acceptance of the limitations of modern English society and who mentions, as well, the probable impact of "High Church excesses" on the thought of John Trenchard and other "Commonwealthmen" (Ibid., p. 474). But Pocock's most recent statement about *Cato's Letters*--a work that "took parliamentary corruption as its chief target"--remains in line with the Country description that Pocock first offered (J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, Ideas in Context [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], p. 240). On the other hand, one must recognize the fact that Pocock, in his magisterial work, *The Machiavellian Moment*, does underscore the ambivalence all men experienced in this period of political and economic change that was characteristic of eighteenth-century England. Pocock talks about how politicians and publicists all along the political spectrum operated in a world of common perceptions and symbols. They shared the common experience of a new political and economic order and at the same time they shared many of the same assumptions. Pocock cautions students of modern British ideology against judging political adherences and he is unique for his indifference to the fact that Gordon wrote for Walpole. Such caution seems based on Pocock's general conviction that

> "Court and Country, Whig and Tory writers ... were not constant in their political allegiances [and] these changes of front are best explained not by attempting to assess questions of commitment and consistency, venality and ambition, but by recognizing that they were employing a highly ambivalent rhetoric, replete with alternatives; conflicts; and confusions, of which they were very aware and in which they were to some extent entrapped.... There were no pure dogmas or simple antitheses that were not shared and employed to differing purposes, by writers on either side" (Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 446).

Pocock seems to realize that a full application of the Country label may be inappropriate to *Cato's Letters* but he is far from clear. *The Machiavellian Moment* is a provocative but often obscure work and many may read Pocock without adequate recognition of his awareness of the interdependence or symbiotic relationship between Court and Country ideologies. For recent discussions of Pocock's work, see Jesse R. Goodale, "J. G. A. Pocock's Neo-Harringtonians: A Reconsideration," *History of Political Thought* 1 (June 1980), pp. 237-59; Andrew Lockyer, "Pocock's Harrington," *Political Studies* 28 (September 1980), pp. 458-64; and J. C. Davis, "Pocock's Harrington: Grace, Nature and Art in the Classical Republicanism of James Harrington," *The Historical Journal* 24 (September 1981), pp. 683-97.

[70]*Cato's Letters*, No. 40, pp. 54 and 53; and No. 70, pp. 13-14.

[71]Ibid., No. 31, p. 237.

[72]Ibid., No. 39, pp. 47-8; and No. 61, pp. 238 and 236-7.

"CATO" AND THE "COUNTRY" CATEGORY

Trenchard and Gordon offer no other solution against the "Fund of Corruption and Malignity in human Nature" than a system of restraints on the one hand and one of reciprocal interests on the other. "Concord and Security" can only be achieved "by the Terror of Laws, and the Ties of mutual Interest." Government can succeed only if avarice, greed, and ambition are checked through laws and by tying the private interests of men to the public interest. Men have no "Security against the Malice and Rapine of each other, but the Security of Laws." Thus, reasons "Cato," men first set up governments and form national constitutions in such a way and

> with such Wisdom and Art, that the publick Interest should be consulted and carried on at the same Time, when those entrusted with the Administration of it were consulting and pursuing their Own.

Government is created to protect men from men and "by the Prudence of Men it must be conducted."[73] "Cato's" pragmatic and mechanistic concept of "virtue" and his dark vision of human nature deny, even mock, the Country ideal of the autonomous, virtuous citizen.

"Cato" and the Country Classification: Lockean Ideology

In their weekly newspaper articles, Trenchard and Gordon often comment on the origin and nature of government. Their descriptions of the rise and character of political authority are based on such notions as the human creation of political society, the "State of Nature," natural rights, the "Laws of Nature and Reason," government as a "Trust," and the right of the people to judge the efficacy of their governors and resist persistently abusive power. Country writers do not espouse such ideas. Bolingbroke, for example, repudiates all theories about the state of nature. The essentially hierarchical view of society, characteristic of the Country vision, precludes the celebration of the rights of the people in egalitarian terms.[74]

"Cato" insists that government was instituted by "mere Men" and rejects any theory about the divine origin of political authority. Government is framed by human "Consent." Men have entered "political Societies" for the purpose of "mutual Protection and Defence." Trenchard and Gordon do not describe the state of nature as a peaceable condition but they do stress the natural rights of men in such a state. "Cato" seems close to Hobbes in his comments about the original need for government:

> if every Man had his Will, all Men would exercise Dominion, and no Man

[73]Ibid., No. 60, pp. 229-31; No. 40, pp. 54-5; and No. 61, pp. 236-7.

[74]Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle*, chap. 4; and idem, "Republican Revisionism

> would suffer it. It is therefore owing more to the Necessities of Men, than to their Inclinations, that they have put themselves under the Restraint of Laws, and appointed certain Persons, called Magistrates, to execute them; otherwise they would never be executed, scarce any Man having such a Degree of Virtue as willingly to execute the Laws upon himself.... This shews the Distrust that Men have of Men; and this made a great Philosopher [Hobbes] call the *State of Nature, a State of War;* which Definition is true in a restrained Sense, since human Societies and human Laws are the Effect of Necessity and Experience....[75]

If men remain in a state of "boundless Liberty which they claim from Nature, every Man would be interfering and quarrelling with another." In this, says "Cato," originates "the Necessity of Government, which was the mutual Contract of a Number of Men agreeing upon certain Terms of Union and Society." At the same time, Trenchard and Gordon emphasize "Liberty" as a natural right--a power each man had over his own actions including his right to enjoy the fruits of his labor, art, and industry--and explain that men enter into political society in order to protect that "Liberty."

> The entering into political Society, is so far from a Departure from this natural Right, that to preserve it, was the sole Reason why Men did so; and mutual Protection and Assistance is the only reasonable Purpose of reasonable Societies.[76]

Men allot to government only those powers they themselves possess in a state of nature. Political authority is limited by the "Measure of Power" that "Men in the State of Nature have over themselves and one another." In a state of nature, no man has "Power over his own Life, or to take away the Life of another, unless to defend his own, or what is as much his own, namely his Property." Nor does any man have a "Right to violate the Property of another." The people cannot, therefore, transfer to their governors powers and rights they themselves do not possess.[77]

On the one hand, the natural bounds of man in the state of nature determine and circumscribe the power of government; on the other hand, governments are obligated to respect, fully, the delegated, natural rights of human beings. Government is not only instituted by men but the public authority has the duty of protecting and respecting what are the inherent rights of men in a state of nature.

Revisited," *The American Historical Review* 87 (June 1982), pp. 629-64.

[75]*Cato's Letters*, No. 60, p. 226; No. 11, p. 66; and No. 33, p. 257.

[76]Ibid., No. 33, p. 257; No. 62, pp. 244-5; and see No. 40, p. 54; No. 20, p. 131; No. 11, p. 66; No. 55, p. 169; and No. 60, p. 226.

[77]Ibid., No. 60, pp. 227-9; No. 55, pp. 168-9; and No. 59, pp. 216-17.

> Every Man in the State of Nature, had a Right to repel Injuries, and to revenge them; that is, he had a Right to punish the Authors of those Injuries, and to prevent their being again committed.... Seeing therefore, that this Right was inherent in every private Man, it is absurd to suppose that National Legislatures, to whom every Man's private Power is committed, have not the same Right, and ought not to exercise it upon proper Occasions.[78]

Human beings also possess certain inherent resources. The "Laws of Nature and Reason" are eternal, common recourses to which all men can turn in time of need. The first "Law of Nature" is that of "Self-Preservation." When the "positive Laws of Nations" fail to protect property, for example, men can and should turn to "Reason and Nature." The "Laws of Nature and Reason" supersede and are antecedent to positive law. The latter only provides against "the Evils which it knows or forsees" but when it does not deal with a particular crime, "we must," insists "Cato," "have Recourse to Reason and Nature." Governors are bound to act in terms of these "Laws." Although some people believe the "Magistrates" are only held accountable to God, "Cato" considers such a belief absurd as well as wicked. Common sense or "Reason" denies such a theory.

> And as to wicked Men, their being accountable to God, whom they do not fear, is no Security to us against their Folly and Malice; and to say that we ought to have no Security against them, is to insult common Sense, and give the Lie to the first Law of Nature, that of Self-Preservation.[79]

"Cato" describes the nature of government as a "Trust committed by All to One or a Few, to watch for the Security, and pursue the Interest of All." Governors or "Magistrates" are themselves but members of society. All their actions are limited. Men in authority are to serve the good of the governed which is the sole end of government. Since "all legal and just Power" is "but a Trust, whoever executes the same, does an Act of Obedience, as well as Command: And every Trust is best executed, where those who have it, are answerable for it."[80]

"Cato" asserts and defends, with great insistence, the capacity and the right of the "People" to judge for themselves whether government meets or betrays its essential objective, that principle of *"Salus Populi Suprema Lex esto: That the Benefit and Safety of the People constitutes the Supreme Law."* Ordinary human beings can, indeed, evaluate the performance of their governors. The "People" have "natural

[78]Ibid., No. 11, p. 66.

[79]Ibid., No. 42, pp. 64-8; No. 12, p. 75; and No. 32, p. 261. See also No. 55, pp. 168-9 and 176; and No. 56, pp. 181, 183, and 189.

[80]Ibid., No. 25, p. 184; No. 60, p. 226; No. 76, p. 85; and No. 75, p. 83. See also No. 38, pp. 35-6.

Qualifications equal to those of their Superiors; and there is oftner found a great Genius carrying a Pitch-Fork, than carrying a White Staff."

> Every Ploughman knows a good Government from a bad one, from the Effects of it; he knows whether the Fruits of his Labour be his own, and whether he enjoy them in Peace and Security.[81]

For Trenchard and Gordon, the "Right and Capacity of the People to judge of Government" is the "Principle of a *Whig*," and the "Doctrine of Liberty." In "Cato's" opinion it is as much "Knavery" as "Folly" to deny the "Principle of People's judging for themselves," but he knows some believe it was "setting up the Mob for Statesmen, and for the Censurers of States." "Cato" disagrees, adamantly, and defends, energetically, the ability of men to judge of their governors and government:

> The word *Mob* does not at all move me ... nor weaken the Grounds which I go upon. It is certain, that the whole People, who are the Publick, are the best Judges whether Things go ill or well with the Publick. It is true, that they cannot all of them see distant Dangers, nor watch the Motions, and guess the Designs of neighbouring States: But every Cobler can judge as well as a Statesman, whether he can sit peaceably in his Stall; whether he is paid for his Work; whether the Market, where he buys his Victuals, be well provided; and whether a Dragoon, or a Parish-Officer, comes to him for his Taxes; if he pay any.
>
> Every Man too, even the meanest, can see, in a publick and sudden Transition from Plenty to Poverty, from Happiness to Distress, whether the Calamity comes from War and Famine, and the Hand of God; or from Oppression, and Mismanagements, and the Villainies of Men. In short, the People often judge better than their Superiors, and have not so many Biasses to judge wrong....[82]

Trenchard and Gordon write, often, against those who say: *"It is not the Business of private Men to meddle with Government"* and refute those who claim the "Doctrine of Resistance would destroy the Peace of the World." For "Cato," passive submission to lawless power or arbitrary monarchy puts an end to any real "Peace." The right to resist arbitrary power is the main security of human lives and property. It is, in fact, the duty of men to resist political tyranny.

> The Law of Nature does not only allow us, but oblige us, to defend ourselves. It is our Duty, not only to ourselves, but to the Society.... If we suffer tamely

[81]Ibid., No. 11, p. 66; No. 24, p. 177; No. 38, p. 35; No. 13, p. 86; and No. 15, p. 97. See also No. 59; No. 35, p. 17; No. 22, pp. 153-4; No. 43, p. 71; and No. 45, pp. 85-90.

[82]Ibid., No. 13, pp. 86-7.

a lawless Attack upon our Property and Fortunes, we encourage it, and involve others in our Doom.

Lawlessness is a "State of War." The use of "Force" or lawless power warrants and demands "Revenge." "Against any Man using lawless Force, every Man had a Right to use Force." Anyone who violates the "Law of Nature, ought by the Law of Nature to be destroyed."[83]

"Cato's" ideas about the human origins of political society, the natural rights of man, government as a "Trust," and the right of resistance echo closely the political thought of John Locke. Trenchard and Gordon endorse such ideas, and not surprisingly, *Cato's Letters* seem, for two scholars at least, to constitute a popular dissemination of Lockean thought.[84] Isaac Kramnick believes Gordon made Locke's ideas the basis of *An Essay on Government* published late in Gordon's career:

> Men left the state of nature and set up governments because 'confusion arose from men being judges in their own cause, and their own avengers'. This common power, or civil government, to be justly instituted, must have the consent of the people. 'The fountain and original of all just power must be from the people'.

Furthermore, Kramnick believes that Robert Walpole's government newspapers endorse arguments from natural rights, in fact, the entire body of Locke's thought: "Spokesmen for that most establishment of Whigs, Walpole, repeatedly invoked Locke."[85] If Gordon does, as a contemporary claimed, supervise the government press, there is a strong suggestion that Gordon is the common thread linking the expression of Lockean ideas from *Cato's Letters* to Walpole's press campaign against Country-opposition writers in *The Craftsman.*

Trenchard and Gordon know, obviously, who Locke is. Trenchard mentions "Mr. *Locke*" and "the Reasonings of Mr. *Locke*." Those references appear in Trenchard's essays about epistemological questions. Gordon is very much aware of

[83]Ibid., No. 38, p. 37; No. 42, pp. 68-9; No. 55, pp. 167 and 169; and No. 59, p. 216. See also No. 33.

[84]Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle*, p. 118. Kramnick distinguishes Bolingbroke from "Cato" because of the latter's explicit espousal of Lockean principles.

> "The writings on political theory by the great John Locke were preeminent, of course, and the basis too of much of Trenchard and Gordon. But the common people or newspaper public did not read formal political theory. Trenchard and Gordon, who were political journalists, popularized Locke and radical Whig ideas for readers on both sides of the Atlantic (Leonard W. Levy and Alfred Young, "Foreword," in *The English Libertarian Heritage*, p. vii).

[85]Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle*, p. 118.

the works of John Locke and he knows Locke's writings challenged traditional, High-Tory doctrines of divine-right monarchy, non-resistance, and passive obedience. In an early publication in *The London Journal,* Gordon, pretending to talk about his university experiences, makes some revealing comments about both the significance of Locke's thought and the hostility of Oxford University towards Locke's works. A "sensible fellow of the *Constitution Club*" at Oxford, that stronghold of "Sedition," says Gordon,

> lent me, and perswaded me to read *Locke upon Humane Understanding,* and *upon Government,* with his *Letters concerning Toleration.* The strong Reason, and invincible Truth, which run thro' these Books, made such strange and sudden Impression upon me, that I became like One awakened out of a ridiculous and turbulent Dream, into the Exercise of his Sense and Understanding; I grew, all of a sudden, sober and studious, which rendered me presently suspected to the University of ill Principles; besides, the above-mentioned Books were found in my Room, which confirmed me an Apostate from the Principles of the Place.[86]

Whether "Cato" did or did not derive his theories about the origin and nature of government from the political writings of John Locke is difficult to determine with certainty. Locke's name immediately identifies a core of thought scholars usually associate with that famous writer. "Cato" is distinguishable from the Country ideologues because Trenchard and Gordon certainly do endorse what scholars term Lockean principles. Trenchard and Gordon articulate and defend many ideas associated with Lockean political theory whereas Country authors do not espouse Lockean principles. "Locke was, indeed, unimportant to the earlier Augustan country ideology."[87] "Cato" can not be an exemplary Country ideologue and voice and echo Lockean ideology at the same time.

"Cato": A Radical-Whig Loyalist

Apart from the many ideas that are significantly different from those found in Country-opposition polemics, Trenchard and Gordon's writings express concerns much larger than the Court-Country dichotomy. *Cato's Letters* reflect an apprehensive awareness of popular dissatisfaction with the House of Hanover and its Whig ministry. When, in the late summer of 1720, South-Sea stock plummeted and worked economic havoc on thousands of people, Trenchard was, Gordon tells, not only

[86][Thomas Gordon], *A Second Collection of Introductions and Letters in the London Journal. Being the Author's Account of Himself: With Humourous Essays on Several Subjects* (London, 1721), pp. 11-12; and Thomas Gordon, *The Humourist: Being Essays upon Several Subjects* 2 (London, 1725), p. 6.

[87]Kramnick, "Republican Revisionism Revisited," p. 635.

fearful but "dreaded a Revolution" at the time of those "National Confusions, Distresses, and Despair."[88] In an urgent effort to persuade the ministers and the Members of Parliament to salve the justified rage many feel towards the Hanoverian-Whig government, Trenchard and Gordon send weekly essays to the editor of *The London Journal.*

The Whigs themselves, "Cato" believes, have not only contributed to but continue to be responsible for the lack of support the House of Hanover and their own party suffer. Whig failures, in the opinion of these two "Independent Whigs," cause and keep discontent alive. Therefore, the Hanoverian-Whig regime must pursue proper measures and avoid future miscarriages.

Trenchard and Gordon also believe that most members of the Anglican clergy welcome the financial distress and the concomitant anger of South-Sea victims as "Godsends." Trenchard and Gordon hold that disaffected clergymen can and will make political capital out of the South-Sea fraud in order to augment hostility to the new Hanoverian dynasty and thus pave the way for the Stuart restoration they desire.

Loyal, Libertarian Resolution

Trenchard and Gordon make a constant, assiduous effort to publicize "Revolution Principles." Even as they identify Whig failures that contribute to popular discontents and call for public vengeance against the South-Sea frauds, Trenchard and Gordon propagate, at the same time, radical-Whig principles that were very similar to, if not identical with, those of John Locke.

For Trenchard and Gordon, much of the discontent that pervades the early Hanoverian polity is an implicit rejection of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89 and a concomitant challenge to the legitimacy of the Hanoverian succession. They speak about the human origins of political authority, the conception of government as a trust, and the rights of men to resist the abuse of power for two basic reasons. First, they seek to counter strong, persistent, antithetical, and implicitly seditious political doctrines. Second, they offer their readers a radical political formula for the expression of their discontents. "Cato" tries, in other words, to gather and channel popular dissatisfaction into libertarian, legal, and loyal paths and divert discontent from the rebellious routes others follow.

As "Cato" plies his readers with animadversions about corrupt leaders who betray the people, he also teaches his audience natural rights, right-of-resistance theory, and the contractual origins of the state, thus vindicating, in the process, the

[88]Gordon, *Cato's Letters,* "Preface," p. xli.

1688-89 Revolution and the legality of the Hanoverian succession. The authors of *Cato's Letters* are certainly aware of the Jacobite character of much popular rhetoric. They believe there are real grounds for complaints but Trenchard and Gordon encourage and induce that justified discontent towards legitimate, constitutional, not seditious, resolution. "Cato" draws his readers to him with an aggressive and presumably very genuine defense of their cause but he carefully formulates their grievances and their corresponding rights and duties in a deliberately explicit libertarian and implicitly loyalist language.

Contemporaries recognize "Cato's" strategy. "Poplicola," the pseudonym of the author of a *Supplement to Cato's Letter, concerning Popularity,* speaks of the dangers of "Cato's" popularity with the public:

> CATO's Merits in asserting the Cause of an injured People [victims of South-Sea fraudulence], and pursuing the Betrayers of their Country [including Whig ministers], were so gratefully acknowledg'd, that we grew blind to his Mistakes. To sett us right, he condescended to copy Mr. *Hobbes's* monstrous Draught of humane Nature; ... *Spinoza's* Scheme of Religion, and some odd Notions of Government, were also reviv'd, tho' they have been often and unanswerably refuted, and are contrary to its Very Nature and Essence.

"Poplicola" considers, quite correctly in light of the tremendous success of *The London Journal* where Trenchard and Gordon do, indeed, challenge High-Tory ideology, "Cato" to be dangerous:

> His very Merit is pernicious, for the greater Service he has done to Truth and Virtue in some particulars, *he is so much the more capable* of betraying them in others. [emphasis added]

"Poplicola," not surprisingly, defends Charles I as a "gracious and lawful Sovereign, who died a Martyr for the Truth," and criticizes "Cato's" mistaken depictions of the "Characters of the Dead." To write about Whig crimes and Whig criminals is one thing but to accuse, as "Cato" certainly does, Stuart Kings of monarchical tyranny, quite another.[89]

Like radical Whigs at the time of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement of 1688-89, Trenchard and Gordon express anger at the failure to punish those responsible for Stuart oppression and at the absence of any effort to curtail the propagation of absolutist principles. But, in addition, Trenchard and Gordon believe that just such inaction had contributed to the survival and strength of Jacobitism in

[89]*Poplicola's Supplement to Cato's Letter, concerning Popularity* (London, 1722), pp. 2-3 and 10-11.

post-Revolution England. They decry the non-punishment of those Tories who had been, and perhaps still would be, the agents of Stuart absolutism. "Cato" constantly endorses severe punishment as a way to foster political security. If, says "Cato," "no Mercy were shewn to the Enemies of the State, no State would be over-turned"; and he warns, "if small or no Punishment be inflicted upon them, no State can be safe." After consciously invoking those, the "People," who in 1688 *resisted* Stuart tyranny and who in 1689 *elected* a new king, Trenchard explains how "this brave People"

> soon found that, by the Treachery and Corruption of their Leaders [Whigs], they had lost all they had fought for.
>
> Instead of completing their Deliverance, and punishing the Authors [Tories] of their Calamities, and sacrificing them to the Manes of their once lost Liberties; upon the most diligent Search, there was not a guilty Person to be found; not one who had contributed to their Misfortunes. Three Kingdoms had been undone by Male-Administration, and no Body had a Hand in it.

In "Cato's" opinion the lack of any legal action against those responsible for Stuart misgovernment had been a major stimulus to counterrevolution: such impunity "gave fresh Heart and Courage to the despairing Faction."[90]

Significantly, "Cato" also makes a similar complaint against the Hanoverian Whigs and their failure to punish those Tories who had mismanaged government and, even more importantly, who had worked for a Stuart restoration in Queen Anne's reign. Those who had negotiated what "Cato" considers the shameful Peace of Utrecht and who had intrigued with the Stuart Court deserve no mercy. If Whig leaders, in 1715 as well as in 1689, had exercised proper severity, conspiracy would not be such a national plague:

> Happy, happy had it been for this unhappy People, if these important and essential Maxims of Government had been duly regarded by our Legislators at the *Revolution;* (and I wish too, that the sincere and hearty Endeavours of our present Legislators to punish the Betrayers of the late unfortunate Queen had met the desired Success.) For I doubt that all our Misfortunes have flowed from these Sources, and are owing to these Disappointments.[91]

Contemporaries do not always share "Cato's" faith in the political efficacy of legal vengeance. Bolingbroke believes "the Tories had never universally embraced Jacobitism" if the Whigs had pursued "milder measures," deeming the very "violence of Whigs" had forced the Tories "into the arms of the Pretender."[92] Bolingbroke, in

[90]*Cato's Letters*, No. 20, pp. 136-7.
[91]Ibid., p. 136.
[92]Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *Works* (1809), 1, p. 38, quoted in Sedgwick, ed. *The*

fact, had fled to the Court of James III in 1714 rather than face a Whig impeachment. Although "Cato" and Bolingbroke have very different judgments about the severity and results of government action against Tories, it is worth observing that both of them assume and neither denies the existence of Tory-Jacobites.

Whig financial manipulation under King William III had also contributed, considerably "Cato" believes, to the political strength of Jacobitism. Whig "Projects and Stratagems to amass Riches and increase their Power" produced widespread economic distress, and Jacobites capitalized on them--made "Earnings" out of "the Miscarriages and Corruptions of those Miscreants."

> Thus the *Revolution* and the Principles of Liberty ran backwards again. The banished *Tarquin* [James II] conceived new Hopes, and made new Attempts for a Restoration.[93]

Trenchard, who writes this significant "Letter," clearly depicts early post-Revolution Jacobites. Conspirators who united in King James II's interest are the following: those "who had shared in the Benefits of the former wicked Administration"; everyone who has been an avowed enemy "to an equal Government and impartial Liberty"; the "grim Inquisitors, who had assumed an uncontroulable Sovereignty over the free and ungovernable Mind,"--those Anglican Priests, in other words, "who have ever pretended a divine Right to Roguery" and their victims, "the Riotous, the Debauched, the Necessitous, the poor deluded Bigots"; and, finally, all those "who had not received Rewards equal to their fancied Merit," that is the factious politicians who had supported the exiled Stuart Court in order to gain political jobs.[94]

Although that "formidable Party combined against the new established Government," the "People," out of gratitude to King William III and keenly aware of the evils they "had suffered, or had been like to have suffered, from the abdicated Family, still preserved him [William] upon the Throne, in spight of all Attempts to the Contrary."[95] Because Trenchard and Gordon consider a "lively Remembrance" of the horrors of tyranny a crucial determent to counterrevolution, many of *Cato's Letters* seek to remind readers of the evils of life under political tyranny.[96] But, "Cato's" major point in this essay, written to encourage a conviction against Sunderland, always centers on the failure to punish. He complains about the lack of proper severity--the sure "Preserver and Avenger of Liberty"--against Jacobites, the fact

House of Commons 1715-1754, I, p. 62.
[93]*Cato's Letters*. No. 20, pp. 137-9.
[94]Ibid., p. 138.
[95]Ibid., p. 139.
[96]Ibid., Nos. 59-73.

that conspirators were never punished severely enough either in William's reign or in Anne's:

> However, proper Advantages were not taken, neither in this nor the following Reign, from the many Defeats of this restless Faction, to settle the *Revolution* upon such a Basis, as not to be shaken but together with the Foundations of the Earth. There was always a Lion in the Way: The Figure, or the Number of the Conspirators, or the Difficulty of Discovery, or their Interest, Alliance, or Confederacy with Men in Power, were the Reasons whispered....[97]

Trenchard has one more major complaint about Whig shortcomings that constitutes, in my opinion, what the "Independent Whigs" and "Cato" view as the salient flaw in their polity, the key to the Whig dilemma, and *the* explanation of the Whig party's fragility in the arena of open politics. The "Source of all our other Evils" is, says "Cato," the Whig failure "to rectify or regulate the Education of Youth." The "Conspirators" are able to produce "new Tools to work with, just forged and sent glowing hot from the Universities," to educate a new generation "that had never seen or felt the Misfortunes their Fathers groaned under." Instead of the desperately needed regulation of the Universities,

> Liberty, being deserted by her old Friends, fell of Course into the Hands of her Enemies, and so Liberty was turned upon Liberty: By these Means the Discontents were fomented, the Evils still increased, and the Conspirators still went on.[98]

By 1714 everything pointed to a Stuart Restoration when, once again, only another, second "Deliverance" (the actual, fortunately bloodless succession of the House of Hanover) saved Great Britain. But disaffection remains, for "Cato," a threat to the survival of that recent accession. And Trenchard and Gordon constantly worry about *anything* that causes or contributes to discontent and about *anyone* who undermines, for whatever reason, the "Confidence between Prince and his People."[99]

Radical-Whig Exhortation

"Cato" knows, of course, how the South-Sea crisis is causing widespread disaffection and how Jacobite enemies are making political capital out of the distress. Both writers fear and resent the efforts of those who try to make the Hanoverians odious to the people. "Cato" criticizes, for example, Nathaniel Mist for openly

[97]Ibid., No. 20, pp. 139 and 136.
[98]Ibid., pp. 139-40.
[99]Ibid., p. 140.

defying the "present Protestant Establishment" in his High-Tory newspaper, *The Weekly Journal or Saturday's Post*. Gordon considers Mist's article of 27 May 1721

> a Heap of Falshood and Treason, delivered in the Stile and Spirit of *Billingsgate;* and indeed most of the Enemies of his Majesty's Person, Title and Government, have got the Faculty of Writing and Talking, as if they had their Education in that Quarter.[100]

Trenchard accuses Mist of using the South-Sea affair to encourage hatred and disaffection towards the new monarch. He addresses Mist's efforts in the following sarcastic terms:

> [no doubt Mist] proceeds, *in this Affair,* upon the same Principles of Liberty, of Love to Mankind, Detestation of Oppression from Friends as well as Enemies, and of Zeal to King *George,* and his *legal Government,* as I do.[101]

"Cato" would certainly agree with Parliament's condemnation of Mist's *Weekly Journal* as a

> false, malicious, scandalous, infamous and traitorous libel; tending to alienate the affections of his Majesty's subjects, and to excite the people to sedition and rebellion.[102]

"Cato," thus, decries "designing Men" who use the South-Sea tragedy intentionally to augment disaffection towards the House of Hanover. But, though Trenchard and Gordon resent those who try, factiously and/or seditiously, to make the Hanoverian-Whig regime despicable to the people, their "Letters" express a concerned awareness of the extant, real grounds for discontent.

From the late fall of 1720 and throughout the spring and summer of 1721 "Cato" combats disaffection and promotes allegiance to the new dynasty. In face of both the pervasive distress and the potential rebellion produced by the South-Sea crisis, "Cato" believes it absolutely necessary to deal effectively with this critical situation if the Whigs expect the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover to survive. Over and over, "Cato" insists upon the need to secure the new dynasty and to seek its security in the affections of the people. To achieve a popularly-based loyalty desperately depends, Trenchard and Gordon implore, upon palpable evidence of economic and political justice from the existing government.

[100]Ibid., No. 32, pp. 252-3.
[101]*The London Journal,* No. 18 (28 January 1721).
[102]Cobbett, *The Parliamentary History of England,* 8, pp. 808, 809-10, and see also 803-4.

Thus, for almost a year, Trenchard and Gordon send weekly editorials to *The London Journal* to exhort and instruct a Whig government, not to oppose it. "Cato's" letters urge, even preach, a certain agenda on the government of the day. "Cato" writes to advise, guide, even warn the legislators, the ministers, and the new King, to respond effectively and thoroughly to what is a nation-wide disaster. Trenchard and Gordon's major role, at the time of the South-Sea tragedy, is to admonish and instruct. They are not Country authors opposing a Court but concerned loyalists exhorting a Hanoverian-Whig government to punish the nations's most recent betrayers--the South-Sea directors and anyone, even the "Great Men," involved in the financial fraud--if they expect to avoid Jacobite rebellion.

"Cato" offers a specific program to the existing government. He calls for not only the seizure of Company estates but the legal execution of Company directors. Trenchard and Gordon argue against the adoption of any new economic arrangements. Trenchard criticizes Walpole's scheme to have the Bank of England and the East-India Company exchange £18,000,000 of their combined stock for South-Sea stock. Trenchard and Gordon attack Sunderland and seem to call for his resignation.[103]

Anyone involved in the economic crimes is to be punished; indeed, it is the right and obligation of the "Legislators" to try and convict such criminals. They have, argues "Cato," committed "Treason," a crime that the Parliament of Great Britain must punish. "*Peculatus*, or robbing the Publick" is the most serious crime against a State. It is, for "Cato," the worst kind of "Treason" since it threatens the very survival of the new dynasty, precisely because peculation "disconcerts all Measure of Government, and lays the Ground-work of Seditions, Rebellions, and all Kind of publick Miseries."[104]

Punishment of those responsible is not only warranted but absolutely necessary. Given the widespread consternation over the economic plight of the country, inadequate justice converts the nation's rage into rebellion. To "skreen" those who commit financial frauds is not only irresponsible but such flaunting of justice makes the House of Hanover deservedly and dangerously contemptible. To act in the public interest by punishing those who have engaged in peculation is the only way, "Cato" holds, "to preserve and continue the inestimable Blessing of our present Establishment."[105] Trenchard and Gordon guide the Whig Establishment towards policies that will best guarantee the security of the Hanoverian succession.

[103]*Cato's Letters*, Nos. 9 and 10. See also Nos. 17 and 20.
[104]Ibid., No. 20, pp. 134-5.
[105]Ibid., p. 143.

When Trenchard and Gordon call for aggressive parliamentary action against the directors and their ministerial accomplices, they base that demand on the radical-Whig theory that men in a state of nature possess a natural right to defend themselves and their property. The "People" as the "Principals" of government delegate their natural rights to the constituted authority, especially to the legislature whence the "People" expect protection and demand justice. When a Jacobite conspiracy is discovered a year later, "Cato" again calls for firm, severe punishment based on the very same theories and, in fact, numbers 11 and 12 of *Cato's Letters* were published in the government newspaper, *Pasquin*.[106] Treason against the people, within or outside of government, requires stern retribution as the only effective deterrence to those who defile the civil polity. The people, the principals of all government, have given up their personal liberty for an effective authority and if, warns "Cato," this government fails to fulfill its duty to defend them, the people, the creators of this government, will retract their original delegation.

After many months of instruction and exhortation, "Cato" is, by August 1721, convinced that nothing has tended more to the "Advantage and Popularity" of King George I "or more to the Credit of the Ministry, or more to the Security of the Subject, than the pursuing, with quick and impartial Vengeance, those Men who were Enemies to all Men." Gordon quotes Tully as a final vindication of "Cato's" role in the South-Sea crisis: "I appeal to Heaven and Earth, whether I could have done more for the Benefit of the Public in this its woful Distress?"[107] Ten years later, 28 August 1731, the government writer in *The London Journal* reiterates "Cato's" evaluation of his service. At that time, "Cato" spoke "greatly" against "the matchless Wickedness of the South-Sea Scheme" and he "was universally heard."[108] Gordon summarizes, in his preface to the 1724 edition of *Cato's Letters*, his and Trenchard's efforts during those dangerous weeks:

> They were begun in *November* 1720, with an honest and human Intention, to call for Publick Justice upon the wicked Managers of the late fatal *South-Sea* Scheme; and probably helped to procure it, as far as it was procured; by raising in a Nation, almost sunk in Despair, a Spirit not to be withstood by the Arts and Wealth of the powerful Criminals.[109]

John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon do not, then, properly belong to the class of opposition writers. They are, first and foremost, radical-Whig theorists, deeply concerned for the safety and maintenance of the House of Hanover. Their incessant

[106]*Pasquin*, No. XVI (II March 1723).
[107][Thomas Gordon], "The Preface to the Fourth Collection of Cato's Letters," in *A Collection of Tracts* 2, pp. 367-8.
[108]*The London Journal*, No. 631.
[109]Gordon, *Cato's Letters*, "Preface," pp. xxi-xxii.

and assertive calls for the rigorous punishment of public peculators constitute a major journalistic effort to promote policies and actions to check the public's justifiable fury against the Hanoverian-Whig regime and to animate respect and affection for the new dynasty. "Cato" tries to protect the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover against those who foolishly and/or selfishly cause discontent as well as those who intentionally promote disloyalty.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "INDEPENDENT WHIGS" AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

The Church of England and Whig Ministries

One historian, at least, of the early eighteenth-century English Church insisted, three decades ago, upon the need to heed the "range and seriousness of popular Toryism and Jacobitism" and the force of religion.[1] And it is now more than half a century since Norman Sykes, a well-known scholar of the Church of England, recognized just how real the possibility of a Stuart restoration seemed to Whigs in the second decade of the eighteenth century. In Sykes' opinion, the Hanoverian succession remains highly precarious "until the exile of Bishop Atterbury in 1723," and the Whigs who denounce the Stuarts and defend the Revolution do so not as "*laudatores temporis acti*" but as "protagonists in a conflict of which the outcome was very uncertain."[2] As chapter two points out, the most recent scholarship shows us that the Tories do survive and seem especially significant, in Hanoverian England, as a popular "Church party." The Whigs have to maintain a fiercely contested position and to wage an essentially defensive political battle. J. P. Kenyon's criticism of the Whigs, given their presumed strength in 1715, for their failure to consolidate "Revolution Principles," to abolish the Test Act, to reform the universities, and to control preaching,[3] ignores Tory resilience and the enduring influence of a High-Church party after 1714. Religion and Church-related issues hold a pivotal position in early Hanoverian England.[4]

[1]George Every, *The High Church Party 1688-1718* (London: S.P.C.K., 1956), p. xiv; and see W. R. Ward, *Georgian Oxford: University Politics in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958) for a similar recognition of the importance of religion to politics.

[2]Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," pp. 117-18.

[3]As Kenyon puts it:

> "It might have been expected that the Whigs, operating now [1715] from a position of overwhelming strength, would inaugurate a reform programme of the kind advocated by their followers ever since 1688: a statutory affirmation of the legality of the Revolution, and perhaps an oath to the same effect as a new test on office-holders; the reform, leading to the laicisation, of the universities; strict control on preaching; and the abolition of the sacramental test for office holders" (Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, p. 171).

[4]In his introduction to a collection of new essays on Britain in the Age of Walpole, Jeremy Black emphasizes the pivotal position of religion in eighteenth-century British culture:

> "In a society where religion was of such fundamental importance for ideological, social, political and cultural reasons, and where norms of conduct and concepts of legitimacy owed so much to religious ideas, it was inevitable that greater attention should be devoted to religious disputes" (Black, "Introduction," p. 14).

J. C. D. Clark insists, in his very recent study, that the Church of England "occupy a large place

Much of the Jacobite disaffection in the first half of George I's reign seems, to contemporaries, to be intimately connected with High Churchmen. Sykes summarizes the precarious Whig position in the early years of the Hanoverian accession when Jacobitism under High-Church leadership was, certainly, a real threat:

> It should not be supposed ... that the accession of George I was the end of the trouble from Jacobite sources. The first decade of Whig domination was a time of peculiar misfortune which brought little satisfaction to its supporters.... A revival of Tory hopes and Jacobite plotting was caused by the birth of the Young Pretender in 1720, and even the trial of Atterbury (1723), though resulting in his banishment, was eloquent of the extent of disaffection in the Church.[5]

In comparison with High-Church parsons who in 1710 did indeed stir up the London populace, clergymen, apparently, did little to incite popular passions during the years 1714-16.[6] But for those who had just recently witnessed the Sacheverell riots, when the clergy helped engineer popular protest but when the nation's security was buttressed with the existence of the beloved, Stuart Queen Anne, seditious sermons from numerous pulpits under the despised Hanoverian-Whig government must have been terrifying. Nor could contemporaries fail to observe the "geographical correspondence between disaffection and High Church parishes" and those parts of London where charity schools existed and "blue-coat apprentices" were indoctrinated "in Tory principles by Francis Atterbury."[7] M. G. Jones, a specialist on charity schools, finds it very difficult to measure "the strength of Jacobitism during the first half of the eighteenth century," admitting "it is true that Whigs and Low Churchmen often violently exaggerated the importance of facts and opinions which told against the Jacobites." But she finds "considerable evidence that Jacobitism had entrenched itself in many of the London charity schools, where its presence was a source of anxiety, not only to the Whig Government, but to level-headed ecclesiastics" as well.[8]

in any picture of eighteenth-century English society" (Clark, *English Society*, p. 277). See, also, Stephen Taylor, "Sir Robert Walpole, the Church of England, and the Quakers Tithe Bill of 1736," *The Historical Journal* 28 (March 1985), pp. 51-77; F. C. Mather, "Georgian Churchmanship Reconsidered: Some Variations in Anglican Public Worship 1714-1830," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 136 (April 1985), pp. 255-83; John Gascoigne, "Anglican Latitudinarianism and Political Radicalism in the Late Eighteenth Century," *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* 71 (1986), pp. 22-38; and James E. Bradley, "Nonconformity and the Electorate in Eighteenth-Century England," *Parliamentary History* 6, pt. 2 (1987), pp. 236-61.

[5]Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," p. 137.

[6]Holmes, "Final Discussion" in *Whig Ascendancy*, p. 186.

[7]Rogers, "Popular Protest," pp. 90-1.

[8]M. G. Jones, *The Charity School Movement: A Study of Eighteenth Century Puritanism in Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938; reprint ed. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, The Shoe String Press, 1964), pp. 113-14.

When "Whig spokesmen saw the hidden hand of Jacobitism," they usually turned their verbal guns on High Churchmen.[9] If Daniel Defoe did not consider disaffection well managed, he nevertheless wrote numerous pamphlets denouncing the provocative and dangerous role of Highflyers. He claimed the High Church "had become 'a Trumpet of Sedition'."[10] Even Nicholas Rogers acknowledges "some substance to the Whig attack upon the seditious activities of the high-flying clergy." Sacheverell, for one, remained very active. On several occasions, "the well-known demagogue defiantly confronted the Whig Establishment."[11] And when plans, in 1717, were being made for a Stuart restoration with Swedish support, Atterbury was expected to animate the clergy and warm "the City of London from the pulpit the Sunday before the invasion" while Sacheverell, "whose interest with the mob" remained "as great as ever," had "promised to obey orders and lift up his voice, like a trumpet."[12] Other Anglican divines and Nonjurors preached suggestively seditious sermons. As Rogers correctly admits, "it is hardly surprising that Whig spokesmen should have exposed their demagogy."[13]

One of the most explosive conflicts in the early years of the Hanoverian succession was the "Bangorian Controversy," the last phase of that major religious and political dispute, "the great Convocation Controversy." Anglican divines, throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, had thwarted civil encroachment upon their Establishment's ascendancy, but with the loss, after the Revolution, of their hegemony, Anglican Churchmen sought, at least, institutional independence. From the 1690s to 1717, "the most raucous and protracted claim for the Church's autonomy" expressed itself in "the High Church party's defence of the rights, powers and privileges of Convocation," the traditional representative assembly of Anglican priests and bishops. In its final phase, the Bangorian Controversy of 1716-1717, "an astonishing flood of pamphlets (seventy-four in the month of July 1717 alone)" appeared, most of them written in response to Benjamin Hoadly, the radical-Whig Bishop of Bangor, who aggressively denounced the High-Anglican effort to have and hold a Church independent of the State.[14]

Shortly after his elevation to the episcopal bench, at the end of 1715, as the Bishop of Bangor, Hoadly published in the spring of 1716 his pamphlet *Preservative against the Principles and Practices of the Non-Jurors* which asserted that anyone

[9]Rogers, "Riot and Popular Jacobitism," p. 72.

[10]Ibid., pp. 74 and 72.

[11]Rogers, "Popular Protest," p. 89.

[12]Historical Manuscripts Commission, Stuart MSS., II, pp. 69-70, quoted in Cruickshanks, "Religion and Royal Succession," p. 37.

[13]Rogers, "Popular Protest," p. 90.

[14]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," pp. 16-17.

who upheld the independence of the Church posed a dangerous threat to the security of the Hanoverian succession. The Nonjurors, who did so, were guilty of treason, a "treason made ten times hotter by religion." The State enjoyed a power necessary for its own defense and survival and that included, Hoadly made clear, the ability of the State to protect itself against priestcraft.[15] Whigs always depended upon the State, frequently the royal prerogative, to check any religion that made claims to powers greater than a mere civil authority. Those who believed "the Church had a right to an existence independent of the state"--Nonjurors "who claimed to be maintaining the purity of Anglican doctrine in opposition to the constituted government of the realm" and High Churchmen who insisted "Convocation was independent of parliament"--opposed, in Hoadly's opinion, the Revolution and Revolution Settlement and were, thus, disloyalists.[16] In H. T. Dickinson's opinion, Hoadly's *Preservative* presents "the standard Whig case against Jacobitism and in justification of the Glorious Revolution."[17]

Nonjurors, whose schism "was the clerical counterpart of Jacobitism,"[18] sustained their usual and significant influence on conforming contemporaries--"Nonjuring Jurors" as Stanhope called them.[19] Nonjuror ideas dominated in the ideology of Jacobitism. Nonjuror scholars were a talented, albeit small, group of writers who "traversed the boundary between the conformists and themselves and lent massive scholarly and polemical support to Anglican, Tory and Country opposition causes."[20] Nonjurors also served "as tutors and chaplains in Tory families" where they had an additional impact.[21]

Nonjurors were the first publicists to denounce the removal of bishops by laymen and to raise the question "of the propriety of summoning a synod." Atterbury, a key figure in the Convocation Controversy in the 1690s, "transferred the debate from the Nonjurors' camp to the established Church." Like the Nonjurors before him, Atterbury asserted the idea of the Church as an independent organization with the right and duty to meet and act in Convocation in fulfillment of its spiritual mission. Atterbury, like many High Tories, including Bishop Turner who had used contract theory to uphold and demand loyalty to James II in the Convention Parliament, frequently employed traditional constitutional arguments and Whig rhetoric to

[15]Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," p. 139; and Every, *The High Church Party*, pp. 160-61.
[16]Gascoigne, "Anglican Latitudinarianism and Political Radicalism," p. 24.
[17]H. T. Dickinson, "Benjamin Hoadly, 1676-1761: Unorthodox Bishop," *History Today* 25 (May 1975), p. 350. See, though, Browning, *Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs*, n. 31, p. 85.
[18]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 15.
[19]Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne*, p. 90; and idem, *The Trial*, p. 142.
[20]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 15.
[21]Cruickshanks, "Introduction," p. 6.

buttress his ideological case. He defended the rights of Convocation to sit freely to debate, to enact statutes, to function as a High Court, and drew a close parallel between Convocation as the representative body of the Church of England and Parliament, its secular counterpart.[22] Atterbury also attacked, using Whig arguments, any claim that bishops represented the clergy in Parliament: their presence in the House of Lords merely "reflected the fact of their baronies, and in the absence of Convocation, the clergy as an estate of the realm wanted representation."[23]

Atterbury continued to appropriate Whig principles for Tory and Anglican ends. *The Freeholder's Journal* (1722-23), a very popular High-Tory organ under Atterbury's influence, maintained an orthodox position in religion but encouraged the rights of the people as superior to any legislative authority and "stigmatised non-resistance."[24] Atterbury frequently used radical doctrines to defend an autonomous, *jure divino* Church against civil power, especially that exercised by Whig ministers. His "vision of the Church militant was never far from that of the Nonjurors" and although not a Jacobite before 1716, he and other Tories turned, in a brief period of time, to Jacobitism as a last resort and only hope.[25]

If, as Hoadly feels, the secular government has to protect itself, that includes the duty to "guard society from being undone by ecclesiastical officers as well as by laymen." The clergy, Hoadly insists, are not superior to civil government:

> As God approves of everything necessary to civil government, it is necessarily implied in that, that he approves of no powers or privileges in any persons upon earth, which are in such sense independent upon it as to be inconsistent with it.[26]

Ecclesiastical authority is second to civil authority and to claim an independent power for the Church is simply "Popery." Indeed, Nonjuror tenets, in Hoadly's opinion, lead directly to Catholicism, still the monster of monsters. In his satirical *Dedication to Pope Clement XI* Hoadly accuses the Anglican Church of imitating Roman Catholic intolerance and other Popish principles. Pretending to address the Pope, he satirizes the High-Church claim of an unbroken episcopal succession:

[22]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," pp. 20, 17, and 18.
[23]Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property*, p. 137.
[24]Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy*, p. 99.
[25]Goldie, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 28.
[26]Benjamin Hoadly, "A Preservative against the Principles and Practices of the Non-Jurors," in *The Works of Benjamin Hoadly*, ed. John Hoadly, 3 vols. (London, 1773), I, pp. 569 and 579, quoted in Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," pp. 139-40.

> upon this bottom, which makes us a true Church, we have the right to separate from you but no living persons have any right to differ or separate from us. ... [and] I believe in time no man of sense will be able to see any difference between your Popery and that of many amongst us, but that ours is Protestant popery and yours is Popish popery.[27]

In his famous Bangorian sermon, preached before the King on 31 March 1717 and published by royal command, *The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ,* Hoadly depicted the Church as a merely human institution. Since Christ left "no visible, human authority; no vicegerents who can be said properly to supply His place; no interpreters upon whom His subjects are absolutely to depend; no judges over the consciences or religion of His people," the State had the right to organize the Church.[28]

Hoadly's contention that the Church is under the State's dominion is directed not only against Nonjurors but against Edmund Gibson, Bishop of Lincoln (1716-1723), often derisively called "Dr. Codex." Gibson wanted to recoup for the Church's ecclesiastical courts the temporal courts' jurisdiction over moral questions. Temporal laws had taken "the suppression of vice out of the hands of the Spirituality (whose proper province it is, who are most likely to pursue it)," argued Gibson. Spiritual judges are more appropriate for spiritual censure, especially against false doctrines. Gibson wants, in particular, a reform of excommunication, an ancient, ecclesiastical instrument for checking the propagation of heresy.[29]

Hoadly, on the other hand, denies the right of the Church to impose sanctions on the laity. The Church is, says Hoadly like Locke before him, a voluntary association of sincere believers and as such it had no claim to spiritual authority over the consciences or conduct of its members. This was an explicit challenge to Gibson who, as the Bishop of London from 1723, directed Church policy including ecclesiastical appointments during most of Walpole's ministry. Hoadly did move steadily but slowly up the episcopal ladder and it was Gibson who thwarted what would have been a rapid, immediate rise to a rich episcopal see.[30]

[27]Benjamin Hoadly, "The Dedication to Pope Clement XI," in *Works,* 1, pp. 536 and 544, quoted in Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," pp. 145-6.

[28]Benjamin Hoadly, "The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ," in *Works,* 2, p. 404, quoted in Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," p. 143; and Gascoigne, "Anglican Latitudinarianism and Political Radicalism," p. 24.

[29]Edmund Gibson, *Codex Juris Canonici* (London, 1713), pp. xxx-xxxi, quoted in Every, *The High Church Party,* p. 149. See Every, *The High Church Party,* chap. 8, "The Authority of the Church," pp. 147-68 passim.

[30]Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," p. 153; and idem, *William Wake Archbishop of Canterbury 1657-1737,* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 2, pp. 110-11.

Almost to a man, all of Hoadly's opponents believed he was ending the Church's effective authority over society and exalting the principle of private judgment. He did, in fact, assert the principle of private judgment against Church authoritarianism. Indeed, as Sykes says, Hoadly's "object was to dissolve ecclesiastical authority, and to rest the whole edifice of Church organisation upon the basis of voluntary individual consent."[31]

A strong Church, with a divine-right, apostolic episcopacy, independent of civil authority, and with an effective jurisdiction over the lives of men, is what many members of the Anglican clergy hoped and worked for. But the Church, in the opinion of radical Whigs, like Benjamin Hoadly, must be subordinate to civil authority if it is to be kept from spreading doctrines both false and seditious.

Hoadly may be considered the victor of the "Bangorian Controversy." In 1717 Sunderland ordered Archbishop Wake to suspend the Convocation that had drawn up a "Solemn Representation" condemning Hoadly as "an enemy to the Doctrine and Authority of the Church."[32] Convocation remained suspended with the exception of the year 1741 when Walpole, "at the instance of Gibson and other bishops, allowed the Convocation again to sit for debate until a revival of the contumacy of the lower house toward the upper compelled its prorogation." Convocation would not meet again until the middle of the nineteenth century.[33]

The Bishop of Bangor's position cannot, though, be considered typical of all government Whigs since the "Bangorian Controversy" actually confirmed the concern of some Whigs, like Robert Walpole and Lord Townshend, about the political wisdom of their party's treatment of the Established Church. Hoadly's assailant posture did, though, coincide with that of Sunderland and Stanhope who pursued an offensive course against the Church of England in the late 1710s.[34]

From 1717 to 1719, the Whig ministry under Sunderland and Stanhope endorsed the Erastianism that Hoadly upheld as an important, traditional Whig position on the relationship between Church and State. Sunderland and Stanhope did use the civil

[31]Sykes, "Benjamin Hoadly," pp. 143-4.

[32]Bennett, *The Tory Crisis,* p. 215. Bennett does dismiss the usual description of a simple split between a Latitudinarian episcopate and a High-Church majority. Although the bulk of the lower clergy supported traditional religious and political orthodoxy, there were few, very few Latitudinarians among the upper clergy. Bennett's work cautions against generalizations; church loyalties were complex and peculiar; individual postures prevailed among the episcopate.

[33]Sykes, *Church and State,* p. 2.

[34]See G. M. Townend, "Religious Radicalism and Conservatism in the Whig Party under George I: The Repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts," *Parliamentary History* 7, pt. 1 (1988), pp. 27-8.

powers to check Anglicanism and to pass measures favorable to Dissenters. In addition to the suspension of Convocation, the Whig ministry repealed the Schism and Occasional Conformity Acts and attempted, at least, "to release Protestant Dissenters ... from the obligation of taking the Sacrament at all in an Established Church on assuming office." When Stanhope presented in the House of Lords the Whig bill "for strengthening the Protestant interest" (repeal of the Tory acts of 1711 and 1714 and a *de facto* "breach in the Test and Corporation Acts"), less than half a dozen members of the episcopal bench supported the motion and William Wake, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was not among the backers.[35] But the Whig ministers even dared draw up a Universities Bill that gave the monarch the right to name officers, masters, and fellows in order to deal, as the preamble stated, with the "notorious" reality

> that many of those Nurseryes dedicated to Religion Learning Loyalty & Peace have been infected with Principles of Sedition ... Riots & Tumults have disturbed the Peace of the Universityes ... there can be no reasonable expectation of enjoying Peace & Tranquility for any long time if the Youth of the Nobility & Gentry especially such as are designed for Holy Orders are infected with false Principles utterly inconsistent with our happy Establishment in Church & State.[36]

The mere rumor of the Universities Bill produced a tremendous uproar and the bill had to be withdrawn.

Robert Walpole, in opposition at the time but with the Sacheverell affair fresh in his memory, warned the incumbent Whig ministry against legislation that would afford a

> handle to the disaffected who would inculcate into the minds of the people that many of the measures which occasioned an unfortunate prince's abdication were now renewed.[37]

The far-reaching efforts of Sunderland to alter the ecclesiastical system "played a large part in producing the highly charged political atmosphere of the late 1710s."

[35]Basil Williams, *Stanhope, A Study in Eighteenth-Century War and Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 392-3; and Townend, "Repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts," pp. 24-40 passim.

[36]Wake MSS., XV [Christ Church, Oxford], quoted in Williams, *Stanhope*, pp. 401-2 and see Appendix D.

[37]Historical Manuscripts Commission, Portland MSS., v. 575-6, quoted in Williams, *Stanhope*, p. 394; and see Townend, "Repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts," p. 39.

Walpole took a much more cautious approach towards Dissent. His wariness, as a recent scholar of this period notes, was warranted:

> Walpole was correctly convinced that Sunderland had sought to use Whig dominance in a manner that was dangerous. Walpole did not intend to compromise this dominance, but he was determined not to use it in a way that would increase political tension, by, for example, legislating benefits for the Dissenters, important supporters of the Whig interest whose aspirations threatened many local political structures.[38]

High Tories had welcomed the outcry caused by the ministry's efforts in favor of Dissenters. A Jacobite observer echoed Walpole's views when he expressed the hope, as the Sunderland-Stanhope ministry was challenging Anglicanism, that the people would be inflamed against the House of Hanover on that "tender point" of the "church in this kingdom."[39]

Not only Walpole, but numerous Whigs considered conciliation towards the Church of England politically expedient.[40] With the significant exception of Stanhope, they viewed "the Anglican vote to be far more important in electoral matters than that of the dissenters."[41] Whig appeasement of the Church was a political tactic of some Whigs even before the accession of George I. In late 1711 Whigs, in a bargain with the Earl of Nottingham to gain his support against Tory peace efforts, agreed to vote for the law prohibiting Occasional Conformity. Such a posture had constituted an outright abandonment of the Dissenters, the Whigs' traditional allies. Apart from their desire to frustrate moves to treat for a separate peace with France and the concomitant need to gain Tory votes against the peace preliminaries, Whigs in Parliament yielded to the bill against Occasional Conformity to see just how far "it might go towards quieting the fears of those who seemed to think the church was in danger."[42]

The support of the Church of England remained, in early Hanoverian England, a critical factor in the possession and exercise of power. Since the Whigs never won acceptance by the majority of the Anglican clergy, they recognized the expediency of permitting the more orthodox, among the loyal bishops, a large voice in Church affairs. And even though the deaths of several bishops allowed the Whig government to strengthen its position on the episcopal bench, the Whig leaders named bishops

[38]Black, "Introduction," p. 10.

[39]Laprade, *Public Opinion and Politics*, p. 212.

[40]Townend, "Repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts."

[41]Hill, *The Growth of Parliamentary Parties*, p. 173. See Bradley, "Nonconformity and the Electorate."

[42]Kenyon, *Revolution Principles*, p. 180.

who were not merely loyal to the House of Hanover but, more importantly, acceptable to the body of the Church. Edmund Gibson was a Whig in politics but a High Churchman in theology. Hoadly was a radical Whig in both and therefore unacceptable for Church leadership. It was the High Churchman Edmund Gibson, the Bishop of London (1723-48), who primarily managed Church affairs.[43]

Although many Whigs would probably have preferred a full acceptance of Protestant Dissenters, Anglican strength dictated, for Walpole certainly, compromise with the most formidable organization in English society. Throughout his long career, Walpole avoided, as much as possible, any clear commitment to Dissent. He tried to quiet fears about the Whigs as the party of toleration and to diminish the peculiar socio-political threat that the clergy and squirearchy saw in Nonconformity. In the early 1720s the pragmatic Walpole protected the Church against anticlerical bills and let Gibson fill ecclesiastical offices with politically subservient but religiously orthodox candidates. In order to avoid anything that might "stir up the old Tory cry that the Church was in danger under a Whig government,"[44] Walpole bowed to Church power and influence. He jettisoned the radical Whigs' toleration plank and leading Tories were correct to contrast Walpole's indulgence towards their Church with the irreverence of their Whig "friends" in opposition.[45]

The presumed but doubtful "political stability" in the Age of Walpole owed a great deal to the government's hands-off policy towards the Anglican Establishment. For Walpole and other Whig leaders, the Anglican clergy was too powerful to challenge; like Charles II, they "surrendered" but not like him, to "friends." Fear of Anglican retaliation made Walpole unwilling to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts or remove the civil disabilities that legislation inflicted on Whig allies, or to heed radical-Whig calls for stringent measures to curtail High-Church influence over the populace. Instead of confrontation,

> Walpole bowed before the more powerful pressure exerted by the Anglican clergy. He warned the Commons that it must 'consider what was the opinion of people without doors, especially the Church'.[46]

[43]Norman Sykes, *Edmund Gibson Bishop of London 1669-1748: A Study in Politics and Religion in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 91-117; and idem, *Wake*, 2, pp. 144-7. See also T. F. J. Kendrick, "Sir Robert Walpole, the Old Whigs and the Bishops, 1733-1736: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Parliamentary Politics," *The Historical Journal* 11 (September 1968), pp. 421-45; Clark, *English Society*, pp. 137-8; and Taylor, "Walpole and the Church of England," pp. 52-5 which include his disagreement with Kendrick on some points.

[44]Kendrick, "Walpole, the Old Whigs and the Bishops, 1733-1736," p. 421.

[45]Black, "Introduction," pp. 11-15; Cruickshanks, "The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole," pp. 30-1; and Holmes, "Sir Robert Walpole," pp. 44-6.

[46]Dickinson, "Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole," p. 54.

In 1751 Walpole's brother, Horace, explained Whig policy and the need to insulate the government from religious dissension, *still* an explosive force in English society:

> the late Lord Townshend and my Brother laid it down as a fundamental principle in their management of affairs ... not to suffer any religious dispute to be canvassed in Parliament or any attempt to be made, if they could prevent it, to alter the laws relating to spiritual concerns being sensible that however reasonable and conciliating any proposition might be to make a stricter union and harmony among all Protestants well affected to the Government, yet the high Church party that is disaffected is so numerous, and warm and ready to lay hold of any occasion to inflame the nation, that any alteration in the form of doctrine of the Church of England would be, although in itself desirable, ... a dangerous attempt, as productive of greater troubles, than the good expected from it could compensate.[47]

Whig temporizing in face of strong opponents was not new; and, by the 1720s, ideological retrenchment and political pragmatism may even be considered standard Whig strategy. In 1689 Whig chieftains had sidestepped the issue of the deposition of King James II and the alteration of the nature of monarchy in order to prevent a serious breach in the Convention Parliament where Tories and Toryism, in the form of men clearly committed to the Anglican Royalism they derived from Restoration Cavaliers and High-Church ecclesiology, were numerous and strong. In the 1690s, Whigs had abandoned initial efforts to arrogate the Revolution to their party's credit when the post-Revolution electorate expressed even greater loyalty to Anglican Tories in reaction to Whig partisanship, presumptuousness, and an odious radical rendition of the Revolution and Revolution Settlement. The Sacheverell affair deserves all the attention historians have given the trial, the subsequent riots, and the Whig electoral routs in 1710 and 1713. Then, indeed, rare official-Whig endorsement of the Revolution, during the impeachment proceeding against a popular yet seditious demagogue, seriously harmed the Whigs politically. Robert Walpole never really forgot that experience.

Walpole, then, responded to Anglican-Tory clout, in a typically Whig way when he adopted strategies meant to avoid the detonation of highly explosive religious issues. To a considerable extent the Hanoverian Whigs did pacify the Anglican clergy by allaying their worst fears. Although they did not resolve or heal "the division in the Anglican Church, or the divisions between Church and Dissent," they did undercut "those clergy who tried to perpetuate them or turn them to political ends."

[47]*A Letter on a Proposed Alteration of the 39 Articles by Lord Walpole written in 1751* (1863): Horace Walpole to Nockold Tompson (12 December 1751), quoted in Black, "Introduction," p. 15.

Some Whigs preferred to defuse perennial religious charges; in that explosive area Sir Robert Walpole was, indeed, "the greatest bomb-disposal expert English public life has known."[48]

While many government Whigs shunned provocative religious measures to avert politically volatile cries over an endangered Church, the ministry initiated and endorsed legislation to curtail the threat of a Tory electoral majority. Their Septennial Act of 1716, a law that superseded the Triennial Act of 1696 and extended the maximum duration of a Parliament to seven years, reflected the Whigs' political vulnerability and helped produce the so-called "Whig supremacy." The Whigs could not readily face an electorate that usually gave most of its votes to Tories. Septennial Parliaments, electoral manipulation, and the systematic use of executive patronage were Whig methods to diminish the power of voters who, left alone, would have rejected Whig candidates. The Sunderland-Stanhope and Walpole ministries not only had to dodge open politics but to face popular "disorders." They invoked the Riot Act and frequently suspended the right of Habeas Corpus.

Each measure taken and every method used by the Whig ministries provided the Tories with political ammunition. Accordingly, Tories called for shorter Parliaments and more frequent elections; for the removal of placemen and pensioners from the House of Commons; and for legislation prohibiting electoral bribery. Those endorsements were combined with effective accusations of Whig ideological apostasy and equally successful depictions of the Whigs as authoritarian and anti-libertarian. The Tories ignored, of course, Whig dereliction towards Dissenters.

The famous "stability" of the Age of Walpole must be qualified with a clear recognition of the lack of political and religious consensus. Without Whig efforts, in particular the creation of seven-year Parliaments and electoral manipulation, to hold the people at bay, the Whigs would not have been able to sustain parliamentary superiority over the Tories. That parliamentary ascendancy or "stability" hung, primarily as well as precipitously, from coercive (albeit "legal") measures; and Whig political survival or "stability" depended, significantly and necessarily, upon a policy of studied desistance towards the Anglican Establishment.

Hanoverian England seems calm in comparison with Stuart strife but it is only a relative, comparative, even illusive, quiet. Religious divisions did, indeed, exist and religion continued to inform politics in the eighteenth century. Namier, even, recognizes the significance of religion behind what he, atypically, suggests to be a party configuration in the mid-eighteenth century: "in so far as parties existed among the rank and file of the electorate they usually had a religious background."[49] The

[48]Holmes, *Religion and Party in Late Stuart England,* p. 30.
[49]Bradley, "Nonconformity and the Electorate," p. 254.

Tory party, traditionally Royalist and concomitantly loyalist when, and *only* when, monarchy served Anglicanism, endured in Hanoverian England as a popular "Church party." Typical Tory (or, earlier, Cavalier) disregard for the prerogative of monarchs considered dangerous to High-Church Anglicanism (an indulging Charles, a Catholicizing James, and a Calvinist foreigner willing to comprehend co-religionists) expressed itself, once again, under the first two Georges whom the Tories viewed, despicably, as "Occasional Conformists." "Tory speeches in Parliament" reveal not only indifference towards the Hanoverian prerogative but, in addition, a "frequent use of revolution principles (not surprisingly since they were of more use to the Tories than to the Whigs after 1714) and strident anti-Hanoverianism."[50]

Walpole shunned politico-theological differences. But those differences did not disappear. Potential storms, especially excitement over religious issues and, concomitantly, possible Jacobite agitation lie just behind Hanoverian calm and threaten it. The so-called "stability" of the Walpolean system lacked a popular anchor and even Walpole's "policy of *quieta non movere*" proved to be, at times, very fragile.[51] The Hanoverian-Whig regime does not seem any more "stable" than an unanchored ship and it is no wonder Walpole dreaded commotion, especially religious turbulence.

The Church of England and Radical Whigs

Like their colleagues in government who temporized with the Anglican Establishment, Trenchard and Gordon also feared the power and influence of the Church of England. But instead of appeasement, Trenchard and Gordon chose confrontation. Walpole's determination to deter political upheaval over religion can be considered characteristic of Whig stratagems from the Revolution and Revolution Settlement. Whig accommodation to powerful political and religious forces was, by the early 1720s, traditional policy, but Trenchard and Gordon's efforts to challenge, in print, politico-theological orthodoxy belong to a much older tradition of religious confrontation and polemics.

As recent scholarship shows, the English Civil War was, to a considerable degree, a conflict over religion, especially the rise of Arminianism and its aggressive endorsement by Archbishop William Laud, his supporters among the bishops, and in various Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge.[52] There is also evidence, albeit slim, that

[50]Cruickshanks, "The Political Management of Sir Robert Walpole," p. 29; and idem, "Religion and Royal Succession," pp. 26-7.
[51]Taylor, "Walpole and the Church of England," p. 77.
[52]See the essays by Nicholas Tyacke, Robin Clifton, and P. W. Thomas in *The Origins of the English Civil War*, ed. Conrad Russell, Problems in Focus Series (London: The Macmillan Press, 1973), pp. 119-93; Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London: Edward

contemporaries perceived Laud and his party as more than Arminians. Laudian doctrines and practices seemed very close to Roman Catholicism and much more, certainly, than a mere Arminian assertion of free will over Calvinist predestination.[53] Perhaps, as a major scholar of the period postulates, "many people were desperately afraid of a religious counterrevolution, seeing Archbishop Laud, Charles I, and the Arminians as the spearhead of a popish restoration."[54] In 1641, opponents of episcopacy in the House of Commons claimed "a conjunction between Papists and Protestants in doctrine, discipline and ceremonies; only it must not yet be called Popery."[55] Restoration Churchmen reminded contemporaries of Laud. Andrew Marvell accused them of trying "to convert the established Protestant Religion into downright Popery."[56] Marvell, Sidney, Locke, and other publicists in Restoration England challenged what they considered an exclusive, dogmatic, perniciously authoritarian, national Church. They believed High Churchmen, supported by the learning of major Church scholars, had convinced the entire nation, through the pulpits, of the divine legitimacy of political and religious absolutism. The "first Whigs," concerned about a prevailing Anglican authoritarianism, attacked priestcraft.

John Locke and the Restoration Church

Historians are, of course, very familiar with Locke's assault on Stuart despotism but the anticlerical features of Locke's critique of tyranny are relatively unknown.[57] Many of the political, religious, and philosophical ideas found in Locke's works are

Arnold, 1981), pp. xxx and 417-18; John Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War 1630-1650* (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 46-51; idem, "The Church of England, 1642-9," in *Reactions to the English Civil War 1642-1649*, ed. John Morrill, Problems in Focus Series (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 89-114; idem, "Introduction," in *Reactions to the English Civil War*, pp. 15-17; idem, "The Religious Context of the English Civil War," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 34 (1984), pp. 155-78; idem, "The Attack on the Church of England in the Long Parliament, 1640-1642," in *History, Society and the Churches: Essays in Honour of Owen Chadwick*, eds. Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 105-24; and Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism c.1590-1640* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[53]David Hoyle, "A Commons Investigation of Arminianism and Popery in Cambridge on the Eve of the Civil War," *The Historical Journal* 29 (June 1986), pp. 419-25.

[54] G. E. Aylmer, "Crisis and Regrouping in the Political Elites: England from the 1630s to the 1660s," in *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 141.

[55]The Grand Remonstrance (1641), see Kenyon, ed., *The Stuart Constitution*, pp. 228-40.

[56]Andrew Marvell, "An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government," in *The Complete Prose Works of Andrew Marvell*, ed. Alexander B. Grosart (New York, 1966), p. 248, quoted in Charles D. Tarlton, "The Exclusion Controversy, Pamphleteering, and Locke's *Two Treatises*," *The Historical Journal* 24 (March 1981), p. 51.

[57]John Locke's challenge to politico-theological heterodoxy constitutes a crucial component of radical Whiggery in both Caroline and Augustan England. There is very recent

intimately related to the objectives, doctrines, and influence of the Anglican Establishment in Restoration England.

Locke's *First Tract on Government*, written at the time of Charles II's restoration and recommending an enlightened absolutism, offers very early evidence of the importance of religion in Locke's thought. Locke depicted a national Church as self-aggrandizing and disruptive by nature and considered the leaders of an uncontrolled national Church "the greatest threat" to quiet and stability since

> they are most likely to disturb the public peace, the state religion being usually the state trouble ... are apt to grow wanton and know not how to set bounds to their restless spirits ... where nothing checks them, they will be sure to mount still....[58]

Locke also believed the historical Church had converted the defense of religious orthodoxy into the primary political obligation and in the process had placed Church above State. The magistrate was persuaded to believe that "it was his duty to punish those the clergy called heretics, schismatics, or fanatics" and, in fact, that it was "to his interest to suppress them." Thus, when the clergy "excommunicated, their under-officer, the magistrate" was obliged "to execute."[59]

In 1660, Locke hoped an Erastian magistrate might use his secular authority to impose "indifferent things" in religion--forms of worship (time, place, posture, clothes, etc.) that Scripture ignored and that were unnecessary for salvation even though one sect or another considered them essential--[60] for the secular purpose of security and peace. When, twenty-five years later and in sharp contrast to his earlier faith in a prudential, enlightened absolutism, Locke advocated toleration as a

recognition of the central place of anticlericalism in radical-Whig ideology. See Richard Ashcraft, "The *Two Treatises* and the Exclusion Crisis: The Problem of Lockean Political Theory as Bourgeois Ideology," in J. G. A. Pocock and Richard Ashcraft, *John Locke: Papers Read at a Clark Library Seminar* (Los Angeles: The William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1980), pp. 79-80; Ashcraft and Goldsmith, "Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology," pp. 776-7; Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," for the second half of the seventeenth century; and Clark *English Society*, chap. 5 for Augustan England.

[58]John Locke, *Two Tracts on Government*, ed. Philip Abrams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 169.

[59]John Locke, "Sacerdos," quoted in Robert P. Kraynak, "John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration," *The American Political Science Review* 74 (March 1980), p. 54. "Sacerdos" is an entry in Locke's commonplace book marked "Adversaria 1661" and is reprinted in Lord Peter King, *The Life and Letters of John Locke, with Extracts from his Journals, Correspondence, and the Common Place Books* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1972; first published in 1830).

[60]Kraynak, "John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration," p. 56; and James Tully, ed. *John*

necessary public good, his original opinions about the naturally ambitious and disruptive character of a national, exclusive Church endured:

> The Heads and Leaders of the Church, moved by Avarice and insatiable desire of Dominion, making use of the immoderate Ambition of Magistrates, and the credulous Superstition of the giddy Multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves; by preaching unto them ... that Schismaticks and Hereticks are to be outed of their Possessions, and destroyed.

The "refusal of Toleration to those that are of different Opinions" had "produced all the Bustles and Wars, that have been in the Christian World, upon account of Religion."[61]

In 1675, after fifteen years of Anglican aggression, the famous pamphlet, *A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country,* appeared. This work, "standardly attributed to Locke in collaboration with Shaftesbury,"[62] was written at a moment when, "as in old Laud's time," English "statesmen and bishops" agreed about each other's *jure divino*.[63] In the pamphlet, Locke's opinion of the historical role of clergymen is applied to the Restoration Church. In the spring of 1675, the Anglican bishops--"the Laudian party"--tried, albeit unsuccessfully for technical reasons,

> to complete their fifteen-year operation to gain ecclesiastical dominion in church and state ... by freeing the monarchy from parliament, making it absolute and *jure divino,* yet subordinating it to the divine right of the church--'to set the mitre above the crown'.[64]

They introduced a bill, entitled "An Act to prevent the Dangers which may arise from

Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration (Indianapolis: Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), "Introduction," pp. 3-4.

[61]John Locke, "A Letter Concerning Toleration," in *The Works of John Locke* 10 vols. (London, 1823) 6, p. 53.

[62]Tully, "Introduction," p. 9. This pamphlet was burned by the public hangman and Locke, curiously enough, left for France in November 1675 where he remained for three and a half years, a time of considerable danger for Shaftesbury and his circle. See John Dunn, *Locke,* Past Masters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 8-9. See J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century A Reissue with a Retrospect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; first published in 1957), p. 342, for doubts concerning Locke's authorship.

[63][John Locke], "A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country," in *The Works of John Locke,* 10, p. 208; in subsequent footnotes referred to as "Pamphlet of 1675."

[64]Tully, "Introduction," p. 9.

Persons disaffected to the Government," requiring "all officers of church and state, and all members of both houses of parliament" to declare resistance to monarchy unlawful under any circumstances and to swear that they would never "endeavour the alteration of the government, either in church or state." *A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country* accused the Anglican episcopacy of instigating this latest "state masterpiece." It was first hatched," claimed the author, like most of "the mischiefs of the world have hitherto been," from "amongst the great churchmen."[65]

Particularly disturbing were the claims of the Restoration Church "that monarchy is of divine right." Episcopal endorsement, made before by Archbishop Laud in 1640, of *jure divino* monarchy makes "the greater part of our dignified clergy," wrote the author of the pamphlet, "the most dangerous sort of men alive to our English government." The fact that "our reverend prelates" endorse divine-right theory is "the first thing [that] ought to be looked into, and strictly examined by our parliaments."[66] The Cavalier Parliament did not, of course, share such apprehension and the Whigs, in their three Exclusion Parliaments (1679/1680/1681) had to concentrate on the issue of a Roman Catholic successor.

Locke did not expect Parliament to look into the episcopal endorsement of divine-right monarchy. He speaks, in the *Two Treatises of Government,* of acquiescent legislators and ministers who either promote or fail to hinder malicious designs,[67] such as the imposition of an oath committing English leaders to doctrinal absolutism. Instead, Locke himself undertook the task of looking into the "leaven that corrupts the whole lump."[68] In his *Two Treatises* Locke wrote against "a generation of men" who have "sprung up among us" in just "this last age" and who "flatter princes with an Opinion, that they have a Divine Right to absolute Power."[69] Although Locke aimed his verbal assault at Filmer, his real target was the Anglican clergy, those "whose Skill and Business it is to raise a Dust, and would blind the People, the better to mislead them" and who, from their pulpits, cried up magistrates as "Sacred and Divine."[70] Locke felt clergymen "dangerously misled others" and could do no "greater Mischief to Prince and People, than the Propagating wrong Notions concerning Government."[71] Anglican clergymen were, for Locke, "vicious

[65][Locke], "Pamphlet of 1675," pp. 213 and 200.

[66]Ibid., pp. 243-6.

[67]John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* ed. Peter Laslett, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 430-4; and see Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," pp. 63-4.

[68][Locke], "Pamphlet of 1675," p. 246.

[69]Locke, *Two Treatises,* p. 160.

[70]Ibid., pp. 159 and 432; and see Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," pp. 62 and 65.

[71]Locke, *Two Treatises,* "Preface," p. 156.

subjects" who "corrupted Mens minds."[72] The *Two Treatises* was, to a large degree, an attempt to challenge Restoration ecclesiology and to counter its potently pervasive dissemination in thousands of Anglican pulpits from which a huge section of society heard the tenets of absolutism as the word of "God."[73]

Jure divino theory was not merely dangerous for the absolute power it placed in the monarch but as a barrier, grounded in the corollary doctrine of one's religious obligation to submit passively to divinely instituted authority, against any human recourse, whatsoever, to resistance. Locke also believed, and correctly so, that the Church of England considered itself, ultimately, independent of civil authority. The Restoration bishops, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Gilbert Sheldon (1663-77), and his successor in that seat, William Sancroft (1677-91), did, in fact, carry "into the Restoration the Laudian commitment to the sanctity of the clerical estate and its moral and teaching authority." And "throughout the seventeenth century Anglican divines had been prepared to assert the Church's authority against the encroachments" of both Dissent and the State's secular power.[74] In 1675 Locke, as presumed author of the well-known pamphlet, recognized the Anglican Establishment's desire "to set the mitre above the crown":

> they design to have the government of the church sworn to as unalterable; and so tacitly owned to be of divine right; which, though inconsistent with the oath of supremacy, yet the churchmen easily break through all obligations whatsoever, to attain this station, the advantage which the prelate of Rome hath sufficiently taught the world.
>
> Then, in requital to the crown, they declare the government absolute and arbitrary; and allow monarchy, as well as episcopacy to be jure divino, and not to be bounded or limited by any human laws.[75]

Twenty-five years later, Locke reiterated that same concern:

> But that magistrates should thus suffer these incendiaries, and disturbers of the public peace [advocates of persecution], might justly be wondered at, if it did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a participation of the spoil, and have thought fit to make use of their covetousness and pride, as means whereby to increase their own power. For who does not see that these good men are indeed more ministers of the government than ministers of the

[72]Ibid., p. 360; and Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 65.

[73]Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism."

[74]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 78; and idem, "Nonjurors ... and the Origins of the Convocation Controversy," p. 16.

[75][Locke], "Pamphlet of 1675," pp. 232 and 201.

> Gospel; and that by flattering the ambition, and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth, which otherwise they should not be able to establish in the church? This is the unhappy agreement we see between the church and the state.[76]

According to Locke, divine-right theories were novel ones whereas traditional doctrines had placed ultimate political power in the people, including their right to resist tyranny.

> As a good Aristotelian, Locke believed commonwealths to be the contrivance and institution of man. As a good Biblicist, he took this to be the doctrine of St. Peter, in the injunction to 'submit yourself to every ordinance of man'. He held that Hooker was the last great writer in England to have held unswervingly to this view.[77]

Towards the end of his *Second Treatise,* Locke tried to remind clergymen of the validity of Hooker and, at the same time, warned them of both the novelty and the danger of their support for divine-right monarchy:

> But I thought *Hooker* alone might be enough to satisfie those Men, who relying on him for their Ecclesiastical Polity [moderate episcopacy], are by strange fate carried to deny those [consensual] principles upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the Tools of Cunninger Workmen, to pull down their own Fabrick, they were best look. This I am sure, their Civil Policy is so new and so dangerous, and so destructive to both Rulers and People, that as former Ages never could bear the broaching of it....[78]

But, as Mark Goldie points out, no Restoration ideologist, among the "high episcopal" party, would accept any political theory grounded on consensual principles. Even Hobbes, who certainly endorsed an absolute prince, was unacceptable since he built his theory "upon a wrong and rotten foundation," namely, "the natural liberty and equality of mankind."[79] Locke believed that if he could defeat Filmer and his followers, then, once more, "Governments must be left again to the old way of being made by [human] contrivance, and the consent of Men ... making use of their Reason to unite together into Society."[80]

[76]Locke, "A Letter Concerning Toleration," p. 54.

[77]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 73.

[78]Locke, *Two Treatises,* p. 444.

[79]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 74.

[80]Locke, *Two Treatises,* p. 162.

Some of Locke's radical contemporaries perceived Restoration Anglicanism as a "disguised Popery."[81] Marvell, like Sidney, Locke, and other Whigs, cited Sibthorpe and Manwaring (followers of Archbishop Laud) and ascribed new and dangerous political doctrines to that Laudian generation and their successors in Restoration England. But it was Marvell who explicitly connected Restoration Anglicanism, as a revived Laudianism, with Popery. Marvell spoke, like many other writers during the Exclusion Crisis, about a Court conspiracy to impose Popery and arbitrary government. The conspirators were not known, express Papists but sons of "our church," Protestants apparently: "under the name of good Protestants" they advanced "the ruin of the king and kingdom."[82] Locke was less explicit about the existence of a fifth column--"Protestant Papists"[83]--although he did mention "that Religion underhand favoured (though publickly proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce" arbitrary power.[84] Yet, Locke's clear concern with Anglican persecution, *the* hallmark of Popish tyranny for many, and with the apparent "drift of Anglican ecclesiology in the direction of an Anglo-Catholic interpretation"[85] of the clergy's role does, at least, suggest Locke saw the Church of England on or near the road to Rome. The third Earl of Shaftesbury described, in a letter of 1704, Locke's role in his grandfather's circle: his pen was made use of "to raise that spirit in the nation which was necessary against the prevailing Popish Party."[86] Locke did, indeed, attack persecution and the mental tyranny clergymen exercised over the populace. Post-Reformation Europeans associated Popery with just such physical and spiritual oppression and the Restoration Church seemed, for the Whigs, very similar to a Popish one.

Like the radical Whigs who followed him and who, in fact, took many of their ideas from him, Locke expressed his conviction that the clergy exercised an enormous and dangerous sway over many people. John Locke wrote to counter the clergy's influence, both mental and political, over the country gentry. The first Whig party, in its efforts to attract voters, had to face the political clout of those "black-coated squadrons" who marched regularly to the polls during the elections of 1679 and 1680. The Whig political movement depended, ultimately, upon their ability to win a significant portion of the gentry to their side. Richard Ashcraft believes Locke's *First Treatise* was first written to win support from those--gentry--over whom the

[81]John Miller, *Popery and Politics in England 1660-1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 151.

[82]Marvell, "The Growth of Popery," pp. 16-19, quoted in Miller, *Popery and Politics*, p. 150.

[83]Miller, *Popery and Politics*, pp. 150, 173, and 181.

[84]Locke, *Two Treatises*, p. 423.

[85]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), pp. 76-77.

[86]Quoted in Maurice Cranston, *John Locke, A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 159.

Anglican clergy held its greatest sway.[87] As Locke's contemporary Henry Care said: the gentry "are governed by their impertinent chaplain, or the parson of their parish."[88] Locke, in his preface to the *Two Treatises of Government*, pointed specifically to the pulpit and its endorsement of Filmerian absolutism:

> I should not speak so plainly of a Gentleman [Filmer], long since past answering, had not the Pulpit, of late Years, publickly owned his Doctrine, and made it the Currant Divinity of the Times ... Men amongst us, who by crying up his Books, and espousing his Doctrine, save me from the Reproach of Writing against a dead Adversary.[89]

John Locke could not convince the Anglican gentry to emancipate themselves from the religious and political inculcation of their parsons and he, like a few other radicals, opted for revolution.[90] He underscored the popular origin of government and the right to resistance against the Anglican doctrines of *jure divino* monarchy and passive obedience.

Locke tried to undermine the "Drum Ecclesiastick" not only politically but philosophically. In his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Locke described the significant "power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unquestionable Truths." Men, in their early youth, enjoyed the possession of uncorrupted understandings but those untainted minds were subject to priestly authority, received opinions, and as long as intolerance, orthodoxy, and tyranny remained prevalent, human understandings would be chained to ignorance: minds enslaved "to the Dictates and Dominion of others." In contrast Locke's task was "not to teach, but to enquire."[91] Locke believed the Anglican Establishment itself was a major obstacle to the pursuit of truth and the life of reason he envisioned in his *Essay*. He tried to encourage individuals to search for their own truths at the same time they admitted the human limitations to knowledge.[92]

[87]Richard Ashcraft, "The *Two Treatises* and the Exclusion Crisis," pp. 78-9; and idem, "Revolutionary Politics and Locke's *Two Treatises of Government:* Radicalism and Lockean Political Theory," *Political Theory* 8 (November 1980), p. 448.

[88]Henry Care, *English Liberties: Or, The Free-Born Subject's Inheritance* (London, n.d.), p. 93, quoted in Ashcraft, "The *Two Treatises* and the Exclusion Crisis," p. 78.

[89]Locke, *Two Treatises*, "Preface," p. 156.

[90]Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics & Locke's* Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

[91]John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 102, 99, and 162.

[92]John W. Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956) explains that while

> "it is correct ... to treat the *Essay* as a major philosophical work related to the traditional problems of philosophy ... there is another side to Locke's philosophical analyses which is usually ignored or only insufficiently remarked. For all the cosmopolitanism of his

In 1689 Locke published his *Two Treatises of Government* for some of the same reasons he wrote it: to check "a presse" that "openly scatters doubts" about the human origins of government and pulpits still sounding forth *jure divino* and passive obedience. High Anglicanism endured; it remained, Locke wrote after the Revolution, "an irreconcilable opposition to our quiet and [the] establishment of our present constitution." He described these post-Revolution *jure divino* men as the, now, "secret enemies of the government."[93] The post-Revolution problem was counterreformation *and* counterrevolution. John Locke published and continued to write, until his death in 1704, against both.

"Cato" on Traditional High-Church Aims

Like John Locke before them and like recent scholars whose works disclose and underscore the pivotal role of High Anglicanism in Restoration politics, Trenchard and Gordon view the celebrated Royalism of the Anglican Establishment, under Charles II and James II, as highly qualified. "Cato's" comments on the seventeenth-century Church support the newest historical interpretations of Restoration Anglicanism.

As Mark Goldie shows us, John Locke's work was, to a large degree, a concerned response to his recognition that "the Anglican Establishment was not merely the sycophantic auxiliary to the Crown," but "was engaged in an aggressive advancement of its temporal power." Archbishop Sheldon, described by Samuel Pepys as "one of the most powerful men in England," was, in contrast to the tactless Laud, "a skilful politician who carried the Anglican Parliamentary class with him." Archbishop Sancroft presided over a well-educated, socially significant, and confident hierarchy with a concomitantly strong "sense of the episcopate's mission." Restoration Churchmen were not, certainly, mere "sycophants." Instead, as Goldie explains, they "nourished the tradition of High Church ecclesiology, which taught the Apostolic origin of episcopacy and the episcopate's Godly responsibility to judge faith and morals." Anglican scholars "constructed an advanced theory of quasi-monarchic Apostolic episcopacy" and it was *jure divino* episcopacy that informed "the Seven Bishops' assault on James II in 1688, and, after 1697, the High Church movement's attack upon Court erastianism in defence of the rights of Convocation."[94]

analysis of knowledge, it had an immediate effect upon his own contemporaries in England, the nature of which strongly suggests that Locke himself was not unmindful of the relevance of his theory of knowledge to the problems and debates on morality and religion engaged in by his friends and associates" (p. vii).

[93] John Locke, "A Call to the Nation for Unity," Bodleian MS Locke e. 18 available in James Farr and Clayton Roberts, "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document," *The Historical Journal* 28 (June 1985), pp. 395-8.

[94] Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), pp. 76-8.

Trenchard and Gordon refer to the appearance, in Stuart England, of those Catholic principles of "the Power of the Keys, the Indelible Character, the Uninterrupted Succession, the real Presence, the Giving of the Holy Ghost, the Divine Right of Kings and Bishops" as serving to enlarge the "Ecclesiastical Power." And it was in order to "induce his Majesty to support" those High-Church principles, that clergymen consciously and artfully exempted the monarch from the restraint of secular law.[95] "Cato" is equally explicit about which *jure divino*, that of the State or that of the Church, came first in Stuart England:

> Many of the Ecclesiasticks have been for trusting their favourite Princes (and no other) with unlimited Power over others: But in every Thing that regarded themselves and their Interest, they have never failed to stipulate for the strictest Limitations upon all Princes, even upon those whom over the rest of the World they wished Arbitrary, and endeavoured by every Means to make so.[96]
>
> ... if the Possessors of these two Divine Rights can agree together, all is as it should be; otherwise, you are to take Notice, that God is to be obeyed before Man, and the Regale is to bow down, like the Sheaves in *Joseph's* Dream, before the Pontificate.[97]

"Cato" explains how clergymen had conducted themselves under King James II. In Restoration England Anglicans were "always mortal Foes to popular Liberty" and as such they welcomed James's accession and "consecrated all his Usurpations, his Armies, and dispensing Power." But when King James "gave Liberty of Conscience to Dissenters," they resisted him: they quarrelled with their divine-right monarch when "some of their own ill-contrived Oppressions were brought home to their own Doors." The High-Anglicans then "cursed their King, and helped to send him a begging" because he used his royal prerogative to assure toleration for their enemies, the Nonconformists.[98]

"Cato" underscores clerical inconsistency and the basically self-serving character of their loyalties:

> They resisted him [King James], and upon their Principles were Rebels to him, and animated others to be so; yet have been damning you and the Nation for that Resistance ever since: Which is a full Confession, That when a Popish Tyrant plunders and oppresses You, you neither can or ought to have any Remedy; but if he touch but a Tythe-Pig or Surplice of theirs, their Heel is

[95] *Cato's Letters*, No. 128, pp. 190-1. See also Nos. 135 and 130.

[96] Ibid., No. 76, p. 86.

[97] Ibid., No. 132, p. 227.

[98] Ibid., No. 128, pp. 194-5.

> ready to be lifted up against him, and their Hands to throw the Crown from his Head, and to put it upon another with fresh Oaths of Allegiance and Obedience; and to pull it off again in spite of those Oaths, or without any Forfeiture, or any just Provocation. Is not this infamous Conduct of theirs manifest to Sight?[99]

Trenchard and Gordon also recognize Whig dependence upon the power of the Crown to check the efforts of the Church to make itself sovereign. The High Anglicans had hoped

> that some favourable Opportunities might happen to get away the Regale from the Crown.... But what stood always in their Way, and made all these Designs impracticable, was the Power of Parliament, and the Liberties of the People, who preserved the Prerogative of the Crown to preserve themselves.[100]

Like their radical predecessors who had encouraged the use of the royal prerogative against the Anglican hegemony and, at the time of the Revolution Settlement, had called for statutory coercions against the Establishment, Trenchard and Gordon also depend and call upon the secular authority to check an ambitious Church. These "Independent Whigs" are, of course, frustrated since the Hanoverian-Whig government refuses to legislate against what Trenchard and Gordon consider the very dangerous influence and power of the Anglican Establishment. Although their dissatisfaction with Whig moderation towards High Anglicanism and their corresponding attack "against the alliance of Whig politicians with the established church"[101] are significant, it is Trenchard and Gordon's fear of this Church that requires the historian's attention.

Arminianism, Restoration Anglicanism, and High Churchmen in post-Revolution England constitute a single historical thread of counterreformation. Laud had harried Calvinists. Restoration Anglicanism reminded men of Laud. The "tenets of Popery" survived the Revolution. That is how, at least, many contemporaries perceived the Church of England in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The early eighteenth-century radical Whigs were, first and foremost, anticlericals. Whig politicians, like Walpole, refused to use secular authority against the Church of England and that left these "Independent Whigs" without a clear remedy, but it was the problem itself that really worried them, namely, an unbridled institution that seemed, as far as Trenchard and Gordon were concerned, bent on counterreformation and counterrevolution.

[99]Ibid., p. 195.
[100]Ibid., No. 130, p. 211.
[101]Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History,* p. 240.

"Cato" and the Church of England in early Hanoverian England

The initial, first-Whig vision of the Anglican clergy remained very much alive in early Hanoverian England. Anticlericalism was a deeply rooted and very significant aspect of radical-Whig ideology. Anticlericalism warrants a central position in any analysis of early eighteenth-century English society. The Anglican Establishment, not Parliament, was the "ubiquitous agency of the State." While "elections were infrequent, contests less frequent still, the franchise restricted, and access to MPs minimal for most electors," the Church of England was the institution

> quartering the land not into a few hundred constituencies but into ten thousand parishes, impinging on the daily concerns of the great majority, supporting its black-coated army of a clerical intelligentsia, bidding for a monopoly of education, piety and political acceptability.[102]

Like Locke before them, Trenchard and Gordon assault the Anglican clergy as malicious masters and manipulators of the human mind. And like Locke, they articulate "strikingly modern apprehensions, akin to what we would now call the 'sociology of knowledge', about the relationship between knowledge and power, and about the tyranny of opinion."[103] "Cato," again like John Locke, tries to counter the electoral influence of the Anglican clergy. Trenchard in his pamphlet, *Seasonable Advice to the Electors of Great Britain; with a Word or two relating to the Influence of the Clergy in Elections,* published anonymously during the elections in early 1722, warns voters about the pernicious influence of clergymen. He tells them not to be "Priest-ridden"--"I mean, that you would not follow the *Clergy.*" Avoid, especially at county elections, advises Trenchard, those clergymen who support the side "they call the *C----h,*" as well as "the Side which has got the Majority of these spiritual Guides with them." He reminds the voters of the artifices of clergymen:

> let not the Word C----h, guide you one Way or other, you know it is a stale Artifice, and an old Ecclesiastical Bite, that has formerly hurried great Numbers of ignorant People to work their own Destruction; let not therefore this senseless Noise of a Stone Wall, consecrated Bricks, and other holy Lumber, be of any Weight with you in this Affair; remember that empty Sounds and noisy Words are no Arguments; to follow such, is at once to give up your Senses and Reason.

Choose, urged Trenchard, those "who have been for strengthening the *Protestant Interest.*" Support "those who are true Friends to his Majesty ... and the Succession,

[102]Clark, *English Society,* p. 277.
[103]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), pp. 80-1.

as by Law established.''[104]

In the ideal, radical-Whig theorists considered the ''people'' as the ultimate source of political authority. But the very ''people'' upon whom radical thinkers ultimately based their conception of limited government preferred the High Tories and their ideology. Trenchard and Gordon directly face that dilemma, namely, Whig political fragility among voters who prefer Tories. They recognize the unpopularity of the House of Hanover and its Whig ministry. Unlike most Whigs, Trenchard and Gordon confront popular hostility to the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession that is so assiduously promoted, they firmly believe, in the pulpits, the press, the universities, the charity schools, and Anglican-Tory homes. For these two ''Independent Whigs,'' High Churchmen, who do, indeed, make Whigs and Whiggery odious to the people, are a pervasive, pernicious, and extremely dangerous power in early Hanoverian England.

According to the *Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters*, High Churchmen, who constitute a majority of the Anglican clergy, propagate doctrines that threaten the existence and survival of responsible government. The fact that clergymen still teach the doctrine of passive obedience and deny the right to resist arbitrary power constitutes a dangerous challenge to the legality of the 1688-89 Revolution and the Revolution Settlement and to the legitimacy of the Hanoverian accession. ''It is well known,'' writes the ''Independent Whig,'' that ''our Churchmen have got *Claims* and *Principles* utterly irreconcileable'' to the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover. ''The most mischievous Tenets of Popery are adopted and maintained'' and Churchmen spread ''their Poison, every Day, in every Place, and upon every Occasion.'' Trenchard and Gordon write ''to expose the Malignity and Danger of certain Principles which prevail too much'' and which threaten ''the Ground upon which our Security and Succession stand.''[105]

[104][John Trenchard], ''Seasonable Advice to the Electors of Great Britain; with a Word or two relating to the Influence of the Clergy in Elections,'' in *A Collection of Tracts*, 2, pp. 276 and 273. Trenchard, as ''Cato,'' speaks of ''corrupt Arts'' which led ''the Representatives of the *English* People in former reigns, ... to betray the People and to join with their Oppressors'' but the voters, as well as their representatives, had been and could be ''corrupted'' by party machinations:

> ''Party Watch-Words and imaginary Terrors, spread amongst the drunken 'Squires, and the deluded and enthusiastick Bigots, of dreadful Designs in *Embrio*, to blow up the Church, and the Protestant Interest [refers to High-Tory political rhetoric]; and sometimes with the Dread of mighty Invasions just ready to break upon us from the Man in the Moon [Whig political bogey]'' (*Cato's Letters*, No. 61, p. 238).

[105][Thomas Gordon], ''The Character of an Independent Whig,'' in *A Collection of Tracts*, 1, p. 317; John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, *The Independent Whig: or, A Defence of Primitive Christianity, And of our Ecclesiastical Establishment, Against the Exorbitant Claims and Encroachments of Fanatical and Disaffected Clergymen*, 3 vols., 6th ed. (London, 1735), 2, No. XLI; and [Thomas Gordon], "Considerations offered upon the approaching Peace, and upon the Importance of Gibraltar to the British Empire, being the Second Part of the Independant [*sic*] Whig" in *A Collection of Tracts*, 1, pp. 271 and 270.

These "Independent Whigs" support coercive legislation, for example, the bill drafted by the Sunderland-Stanhope ministry to control disaffection in the universities, against Anglican clericalism, especially the clergy's monopoly over education. The "Independent Whig" feels the Whig government has done little to check the causes of disaffection--the "Popish, Impious and Rebellious Spirit" of clergymen who inflame their parishioners and debauch young minds. Nothing has been done "to remove the Corruption of our Seminaries, and their disaffected Spawn in too many Parishes."[106]

"Cato" is firmly convinced that as long as the "Education of Youth be altogether inconsistent" with the nature of free government, the "Affections of the People" will "be perpetually debauched."[107] Trenchard and Gordon call for the government "to root out that Disease" and hope their writings will demonstrate the "necessity of some such Methods, by shewing the Danger we are in, while we want them." *But*, until there is "a final Stop to the Growth of those Principles that infatuate the Multitude, and undermine our Constitution," they themselves will challenge those who are enemies to "Reason and Liberty" and the major cause of "Defection among his Majesty's Subjects, and the Alienation of their Allegiance."[108]

The special power of clergymen over credulous listeners is a major preoccupation of the authors of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters*. They believe clergymen exercise a peculiar type of mental and psychological tyranny over human minds that are essentially weak, immune to contradiction, and stupidly "zealous for their own Bonds and Wretchedness." The fears of superstitious people give Churchmen great dominion and permit preachers "to do the greatest Mischief." Given the "Seeds of Superstition in Human Nature," Trenchard and Gordon find it difficult to prevent the awe many people hold for clergymen. They inspire "not only Admiration and Reverence, but often a superstitious Veneration." The clergy have numerous opportunities to exercise a powerful emotional sway since Churchmen enjoy "the Possession and Direction" of human life in moments of stress, at an impressionable age, and on a frequent, regular basis: They

> are admitted in Health and Sickness: Every *Sunday* they have the sole Opportunity of gaining our Esteem by worthy and useful Instructions, and all

[106]"The Character of an Independent Whig," pp. 317 and 319.

[107]*Cato's Letters*, No. 133, p. 239.

[108]"Considerations ... being the Second Part of the Independent Whig," p. 270; "The Character of an Independent Whig," p. 313; *The Independent Whig*, 2, No. XLI, p. 86; and

> the Week by their good Lives: They educate us whilst young, influence us in our middle Age, govern us in our Dotage, and we neither live nor die without them.[109]

"Cato" underscores the "People's" good opinion of government as the bulwark of the nation's security. But Trenchard and Gordon believe the "People" fail, at times, to formulate their own ideas and express their own views independently. Instead, public opinion stems from clerical indoctrination. "Credulity" overwhelms common sense and the "vast Fund of Stupidity in Human Nature" permits artful leaders to "mislead the Multitude" who are easily "abused with Words, ever fond of the worst of Things recommended by good Names." Left alone and without manipulation, the people are trustworthy but the "honest and unwary" people are too easily and frequently deluded.[110]

Trenchard and Gordon attack the High-Anglican clergy as powerful propagandists who, from their pulpits and in the press, shape public opinion and who, in the universities, charity schools, and private homes, form human beings. These clerical shapers of public opinion and educators of the nation's youth are "Champions of Tyranny," "Dogmatizers for unlimited Dominion," and adamant "Advocates for lawless Power" who "*corrupt*" the minds of men with "Doctrines of unbroken hereditary Right, and of blind Obedience."[111] Trenchard accuses High Anglicans of disloyalty to the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession. "Cato" challenges the "Two famous Universities" to confute the legality of the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession. What, asserts "Cato," had been done to

> the late King *James*, was just and necessary to be done upon the fundamental Principles of Government; and that all his Successors since have been rightful and lawful Kings and Queens of this Realm; and I [Trenchard] particularly glory to say, that no Prince has ever better deserved that high Title, than our present great and glorious Sovereign, King *George*.[112]

Moreover, "Cato" celebrates and holds up Algernon Sidney, a despised figure among many High Churchmen, and presents him to readers as

[Thomas Gordon], "Priestianity: or, A View of the Disparity between the Apostles and the Modern inferior Clergy," in *A Collection of Tracts*, 2, p. 391.

109"The Character of an Independent Whig," p. 319; and *The Independent Whig*, 1, No. II, p. 10 and No. III, pp. 19 and 18.

110*Cato's Letters*, No. 13, pp. 82-3; No. 24, p. 178; and No. 6 passim. See also No. 16, pp. 104-5 and 108; No. 18, pp. 120-1; No. 22, pp. 153-4; No. 31, pp. 240-1; No. 46, pp. 91-4 passim; No. 51, pp. 129-31; No. 61, p. 238; No. 63, pp. 262-3; No. 66, pp. 299-300; No. 82, p. 132; and No. 83, pp. 141-2 and 144.

111*Cato's Letters*, No. 14, pp. 94-5; and No. 36, pp. 25-6. See also No. 132.

112Ibid., No. 14, p. 95.

> An Author, who can never be too much valued or read; ... who was a Martyr for that Liberty, which he has so amiably described, and so nobly defended. He fell a Sacrifice to the vile and corrupt Court [High-Tory] of our pious *Charles* the Second.

Sidney deserves special attention, says "Cato," because he

> had exposed the absurdity and Vileness of the sacred and fashionable Doctrines of those Days, Passive Obedience and Hereditary Right; Doctrines which give the Lie to common Sense, and which would destroy all common Happiness and Security amongst Men! Doctrines, which were never practised by those that preached them! and Doctrines which are big with Nonsense, Contradiction, Impossibility, Misery, Wickedness, and Desolation[113]

Like Sidney, "Cato" tries to make men aware of "the inestimable Blessing of Liberty" and "the Odiousness of Tyranny." What keeps the "People in such abject Slavery" are false principles "sanctified by the Teachers of Religion." Nothing would keep the people of Asia under the yoke of tyrants "if their Priests and Doctors had not made passive Obedience a Principle of their Religion." In countries with arbitrary governments, the "publick Spirit" is "to be blind Slaves to the blind Will of the Prince." But in free countries, like Great Britain, "publick Spirit" does what "Cato" himself claims to do: "combat Force and Delusion," "reconcile the true Interests of the Governed and Governors," expose Imposters," and "resist Oppressors."[114]

The "Advocates for lawless Power" make it a "damnable Sin to oppose" oppression. They claim "that Magistrates being accountable to none but God, ought to know no other Restraint." When the "People" are "plundered, oppressed and butchered," they say "Complaints are Sedition; and to seek Redress is Damnation." But when clergymen "are hurt, they are the loudest of all Men in their Complaints, and the most outrageous in their Behaviour."[115]

The major difference "between free and enslaved Countries" is that in the former the "Magistrates must consult the Voice and Interest of the People; but in the latter, the private Will, Interest, and Pleasure of the Governors are the Sole End." The difference between arbitrary and limited monarchy is like the distinction between Turkey and England, two countries "Cato" frequently compares. Englishmen who say "private Men had no Right to concern themselves with Government" will turn England into a nation of slaves, will "convert Magistrates into Bashaws," as in Turkey, and will "introduce Popery into Politics." But, says "Cato" with emphasis:

113Ibid., No. 26, p. 195. See also No. 37.

114Ibid., No. 25, p. 186; and No. 35, pp. 12-13.

115Ibid., No. 33, p. 262.

> The late Revolution stands upon the very opposite Maxim; and that any Man dares to contradict it since the *Revolution,* would be amazing, did we not know that there are, in every Country, Hirelings who would betray it for a Sop.[116]

Only "ungodly Pedants" maintain the moral obligation to obey "a wicked Prince; who, though he be an Enemy of God, is the Vicegerent of God; and though he commit all Wickedness," they tell us, "it is a damnable Sin to resist him." The "Doctrine of unbroken hereditary Right, and of blind obedience" are, writes "Cato," the "Flights and Forgeries of Flatterers, who bely Heaven, and abuse Men, to make their own Court to Power."[117]

In spite of the "Fairy Notions idle and Sedentary Babblers may utter from Colleges and Cloisters"--"Doctrines" they teach others for "vile Self-ends" and "which they themselves are famous for not practising"--Trenchard does not believe any "Society of Men will groan under Oppressions longer than they know how to throw them off."

> Upon this Principle of People's judging for themselves, and resisting lawless Force, stands our late happy *Revolution,* and with it the just and rightful title of our most excellent Sovereign King *George,* to the Scepter of these Realms; a Scepter which he has, and I doubt not will ever sway, to his own Honour, and the Honour, Protection, and Prosperity of us his People.[118]

"Cato" writes numerous essays about the nature and evils of "Tyranny" and the "Blessings of Liberty." Trenchard and Gordon's graphic depiction of the evils of arbitrary monarchy in contrast to the positive, albeit precarious, conditions of English liberty under a limited monarchy constitute an explicit effort to *teach* the people an appreciation and affection for the House of Hanover. After many months of letters that contrast "Slavery" with "Freedom,"[119] Gordon describes his and Trenchard's task:

> And here I conclude this noble Subject of Liberty, having made some weak Attempts to shew its glorious Advantages, and to set off the opposite Mischiefs of raging, relentless and consuming Tyranny,--a Task to which no human Mind is equal.... We, who enjoy the precious, lovely, and invaluable Blessing of Liberty, know that nothing can be paid too dear to purchase and preserve it.... How execrable then and infamous are the Wretches, who, for

[116]Ibid., No. 38, pp. 42-3.
[117]Ibid., No. 36, pp. 19 and 25-6.
[118]Ibid., No. 59, p. 225.
[119]Ibid., See Nos. 60-68 and 71-73.

> a few precarious momentary, and perhaps imaginary Advantages, would rob their Country, for ever, of every Thing that can render human Life desirable; and for a little Tinsel Pageantry, and false and servile Homage ... would involve Millions of their Fellow-Creatures in lasting Misery, Bondage, and Woe, and charge themselves with their just Hatred and bitter Curses! Such unnatural Parricides, unworthy of the human Shape and Name, would fill up the Measure of their Barbarity, by entailing Poverty, Chains, and Sorrow upon their own Posterity.[120]

As we point out in the previous chapter, "Cato" vigorously answers those who say "the Doctrine of Resistance would destroy the Peace of the World" and that "*It is not the Business of private Men to meddle with Government.*" Such "Opinions" are "Contradictions," an "Affront to common Sense, and utterly destructive of all civil and religious Liberty." "Cato" also recognized that "some of the most popular Men in the World," have propagated the doctrine of non-resistance even though those same men were, paradoxically, the "most mischievous" men "in their Behaviour and Opinions."[121] Although "Cato" feigns annoyance about having to refute such irrational nonsense, he obviously (and correctly) believes refutation to be necessary:

> since it is and has been the great Design of this Paper to maintain and explain the glorious Principles of Liberty, and to expose the Arts of those who would darken and destroy them; I shall here particularly shew the Wickedness and Stupidity of the above Saying; which is fit to come from no Mouth but that of a Tyrant, or a Slave and can never be heard by an Man of an honest and free Soul, without Horror and Indignation.[122]

Men, if they are really true to human dignity, can never accept tyranny: "Men ... must cease to be Men, and in Stupidity and Tameness grow Cattle, before they can become quiet Subjects to such Government." Tyranny is the embodiment of the "Villainies, Falshood, Oppression, Cruelty, and Depredation, upon the Face of the Earth." And most shocking for "Cato" is the "blasphemous Position" of those who assert God is the "Author of such "Horrors":

> Nor can there be a more provoking, impudent, shocking, and blasphemous Position, than to assert all this Groupe of Horrors, or the Author of them, to be of God's Appointment.... And whoever scatters such Doctrine ought, by all the Laws of God, Reason, and Self-Preservation, to be put to Death as a general Poisoner, an Advocate for publick Destruction.[123]

[120]Ibid., No. 73, pp. 65-6.
[121]Ibid., No. 42, p. 69; No. 38, pp. 37-8; and No. 51, p. 134.
[122]Ibid., No. 38, p. 38.
[123]Ibid., No. 63, pp. 263-4.

Since the world is filled with "Narrow Minds, which locked up in received Systems, see all things through false Mirrors," Trenchard and Gordon endeavor "to disperse these thick and deceitful Mists from before weak Eyes" in order to help their readers weigh political and religious realities "as they appear in their own Nature, independent on the Quirks of Pedants" and as they coincide with "common Sense."[124] On just such grounds "Cato" boldly vindicates the lawfulness of Brutus' killing Julius Caesar. He argues against those who fail to recognize Caesar as a tyrant: those "who make the Person of *Caesar* sacred, declare the Person of a Tyrant and a Usurper to be sacred." That kind of thinking is characteristic of the "Advocates of lawless Power," but it contradicts all "Laws of Nature and Self-Preservation."

> Every Magistrate may be a Tyrant, every Tyrant is a lawful Magistrate; it is unlawful to resist the greatest human Evil; the necessary Means of Self-Preservation are unlawful.[125]

"Indeed," writes "Cato" sarcastically,

> had Sir *Robert Filmer,* or any other of the honest and sage Discoverers of *Adam's* right Heir, lived in those Days (as they have done since, and plainly pointed him out) and complimented *Caesar,* as doubtless they would, with a lineal and hereditary Title from Aeneas,

Caesar would have been considered "the Lord's Anointed" and "his Assassination been accounted Rebellion."[126]

Gordon, the author of "Cato's" defense of Brutus, says in the "Preface to the Sixth Collection of *Cato's* Letters" it is not surprising "that many of the *Tories* should assent to the Lawfulness of killing *Caesar,* because," he comments with poignant irony, "Men out of Power are naturally in the Interest of Liberty." But he resents those Whigs and others of his own political stripe who now disagree on this point.

> Is the Unlawfulness of killing Tyrants maintained at last by the *Whigs,* whose very Spirit and Character is founded upon the opposite Principle? I wish they would define and explain this modern *Whiggism,* especially upon the Principles of the old, and distinguish it from the most obnoxious Part of *Toryism.*[127]

[124]Ibid., No. 56, p. 177.
[125]Ibid., No. 55, pp. 167 and 175.
[126]Ibid., p. 176.
[127][Thomas Gordon], "The Preface to the Sixth Collection of *Cato's* Letters," in *A Collection of Tracts,* 2, p. 369.

In the 1721 "Preface to the Fourth Collection of *Cato's* Letters," Trenchard and Gordon express their major aims and achievements:

> *Cato* is happy if he has been the Means of bringing those Men to think for themselves, whose Character it has been to let other Men think for them:----A Character which is the highest Shame, and the greatest Unhappiness of a rational Being. These Papers having fully opened the Principles of Liberty and Power, and rendered them plain to every Understanding, may perhaps have their Share in preventing, for the Time to come, such Storms of Zeal for Nonsense and Falshood, as have thrown the Three Kingdoms more than once into Convulsions. I hope they have largely helped to cure and remove those monstrous Notions of Government which have been long instilled by the crafty Few into the ignorant Many.[128]

When, on 27 July 1723, "Cato" bids his readers "Farewell," Trenchard and Gordon summarize their efforts to defend the House of Hanover and underscore the open, bold character of their endeavors. They feel "Cato" has "unanswerably shewn that Civil Governments were instituted by Men, and for the Sake of Men." "Cato" has "thereby vindicated our present Establishment" by removing "many of the Prejudices imbibed by Education and Custom." He has, he hopes, freed his countrymen "from the wild, wicked, and servile notions strongly infused and planted in their Minds by Craft and Delusion."[129]

The "Independent Whigs" and High Churchmen in early Hanoverian England

From 1718 on Thomas Gordon (seen as *the* "Independent Whig" by contemporaries) warned his readers about the dangers of the rearguard actions that a reactionary High-Church clergy was deploying against the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover. Gordon made "his debut by taking part in the Bangorian Controversy" and, as mentioned in chapter three, "it was this that brought him to the notice of John Trenchard."[130] About this time (1718), Gordon writes a particularly revealing but relatively unknown pamphlet concerning the sermons High Anglicans preach on 30 January, the anniversary of King Charles II's execution, and other "Publick" occasions. In *A Political Dissertation upon Bull-Baiting and Evening Lectures. With Occasional Meditations on the 30th of January,* his first known work, Gordon begins a long career of sustained and provocative anticlericalism.

[128][Thomas Gordon], "The Preface to the Fourth Collection of *Cato's* Letters," in *A Collection of Tracts,* 2, p. 364; and *Cato's Letters,* "Preface," p. xxiv.
[129]*Cato's Letters,* No. 138, p. 282.
[130]Bulloch, "Thomas Gordon, The 'Independent Whig'," p. 602. Specifically, the "two Apologies for *Alberoni,* it has been generally said, first recommended him to the Esteem and Friendship of the excellent Mr. *Trenchard*" (Baron, *Another Cordial,* 2, "Preface," p. iii).

In the early eighteenth century there was, in spite of the Revolution, the Act of Settlement, and the Abjuration Oath, a renewed enthusiasm for political anniversaries as timely occasions to preach upon the horror of rebellion and to inculcate, as well, the doctrines of divine right and passive obedience. On every 30 January, the anniversary of Charles's execution, and every 29 May, the official anniversary date for the Restoration, eminent divines preached sermons before Parliament.[131]

Thomas Gordon finds these sermons both deceitful and dangerous. Instead of an "Occasion of Seriousness and Humiliation," "an Annual Remembrance of a National Calamity" to maintain "an abhorrence of the Means which brought it about," such occasions are "made use of, by many, to kindle new Animosities, and raise new Rebellions."[132] In his *Political Dissertation,* Gordon seeks "to make those Practices odious."[133]

Gordon analyzes why 30 January has been selected and states what should be properly said on such a solemn anniversary. In fact, however, the day is used as "an Occasion of breaking us to pieces" in order to encourage the "Enemy [the Pretender] in Readiness at our Doores." The 30th of January has been set up as an annual fast to keep up "a just Abhorrence of the Means of such Calamity, to prevent a Relaps at any Time into the like Measures." But that "very *Safe-Guard*" against one kind of enemy "has let in another." In order

> to keep out a Rebell in the shape of a *Phanatick,* has let in another in the disguise of a *High-Church-Man.* Instead of duly confessing before God the true Source of that National Distress, and impressing upon Peoples Minds a due sense of those Errors which led thereunto, in order to avoid them for the future, it is made an Occasion of Party Accusation and Reproach; and they who croud the Pulpits most on those Days, do it with no other View, than as it gives them a Handle, under a Notion of inveighing against the Agents in that Tragedy, of aspersing the best Friends to the present Government.[134]

Gordon introduces what is that constant theme in the writings of the authors of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters*: the pernicious influence of the clergy over the minds and emotions of their listeners. Listeners in the pews are easily moved by "Zealous Pretences" from the pulpits. Englishmen have been particularly prone to

[131]Helen W. Randall, "The Rise and Fall of a Martyrology: Sermons on Charles I," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 10 (February 1947), pp. 135-67; Kenyon, *Revolution Principles,* chap. 5; Gunn, *Beyond Liberty and Property,* pp. 150-6; and Clark, *English Society,* pp. 158-60.

[132][Thomas Gordon], *A Political Dissertation upon Bull-Baiting and Evening Lectures. With Occasional Meditations on the 30th of January* (London, 1718), pp. 3-4.

[133]Ibid., p. 4.

[134]Ibid., pp. 41-2.

strife over religious issues: they often, says Gordon, "cut one anothers Throats about the Church." But certain kinds of people seem even more susceptible than others; "the Commonalty of the *English* Nation, more than any in the World, are Surprizingly inclineable to Religious Controversy." When misled by the "Instigation of Wicked Persons," they frequently respond with physical violence: "Blows, very often to the disturbance of the Publick Peace." Instead, Gordon recommends, facetiously, public games and especially "Bull-Baiting" as most appropriate to the English character. But he is dead serious about the "Subtilty of those who envy or covet our Happyness in many Respects" and thus "run the Populace into Pursuits contrary to each other" and "destructive to the Publick Peace, and to their own well being." Gordon frequently uses images of fire to describe the nature and effect of clerical preaching: religion is like a "Flame" and whoever comes near it is bound to be consumed. The "Ignorant" and illiterate are those, he warns, most likely to be "blown up into these Flames." Gordon refers to clergymen as "*Pulpit Fire-Brands,*" "*Incendiaries,*" and "*Pulpit-Blazers,*" as the instigators, in other words, of popular protest.[135]

Gordon comments on the dangerous "Artifice" of the Sacheverell affair and refers to the sedition of clergymen at the time of the Hanoverian succession. The Jacobite Rebellion of 1715 began with the "Out-cry of the *Churches Danger,* with exclaiming against *Dissenters,* and censuring Persons for *Atheism, Deism,* and the like Terms of Reproach." He also mentions, as causes of the Rebellion of 1715, "great Pretensions to *Apostoliscism, Creeds,* and *Sacred Deposita;* and grevious Denunciations against *Sectaries,* and the *Degeneracy of the Age.*" The "Church-in-Danger" cry was *and* remains seditious, clerical rhetoric:

> Under such Pretensions the Commonalty have been Spirited up into Outrage, and even Rebellion, from the apprehensions, that such things are only to be remedied by altering the Government, and putting it into such Hands, as will be better Friends to the *Church;* for that is always the Standard of Orthodoxy, and ... many are yet hardy enough, to continue the like Practices, tho' with somewhat more Cunning and Reserve.[136]

Denunciations against Dissenters, complaints about a rise in atheism, and cries over the disparagement of the Anglican Establishment do not, in Gordon's opinion, reflect real problems for the Church of England. But, in fact, many clergymen sincerely feel a loss in status and authority under George I and his Whig allies. Gordon fails to see or is indifferent to the "Anglican Crisis": he considers clerical lamentations mere "Machinations." Such clergymen, "*High-Church Lunaticks*" in Gordon's words, are "*workers in Mischief*" who must not be allowed to incite the credulous with their "Seditious Harangues." Gordon, thus, writes "to convince the

[135]Ibid., pp. 12-17. See also pp. 26-8.

[136]Ibid., pp. 19-22.

World, that the Discontents and Uproars ... made about the *Church* cannot come from any good and Religious Designs"; he hopes to help the people to "distinguish between the *Priest* and *Traytor*."[137]

The number of High Churchmen and the means of influence at their disposal impress and disturb this "Independent Whig." Gordon believes there are "Great Numbers" of "*Jure Divino* Embassadors" and that these "Enemies of our Peace and Happiness" possess "many ways of Conveyance to the Populace." The press and pulpit are at their command. And in addition to many diligent, skillful, and industrious clergymen conveying political "Poison" from their pulpits,[138] Gordon also refers to other, more recent means of inculcation. In this, his first pamphlet, Gordon criticizes the charity-school movement. Trenchard, in one "Cato" essay near the end of his life, also, and aggressively, attacks charity schools.

Charity schools were started in the mid-1690s with the effort and inspiration of Thomas Tenison. Tenison, a man Trenchard and Gordon respect, succeeded John Tillotson, in 1695, as Archbishop of Canterbury. Tenison realized and accepted the fact that the Church of England could expect little support from the government and that any increase in "spiritual effectiveness would have to come from voluntary action."[139] Tenison founded the first charity school on land beside St. Martin's-in-the-Fields with financial support from laymen. The schools were for the children of the indigent where they were to be clothed, fed, and educated and, when ready, sponsored as apprentices. Their education was to be Anglican. Edmund Gibson also directed his energies to similar voluntary organizations such as the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts and its parent body, the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. But Gordon opposes those efforts and his *Political Dissertation* asserts what "Cato," five years later, boldly claims as well: charity schools are the nests of Jacobite masters who instruct the common people in sedition.

Trenchard admits that the schools were first begun and supported by "pious Men, many of them Dissenters." But High Churchmen, after intially ranting against them "as dangerous Innovations" set up "to subvert the Church, and the National Religion," later got them under their own, orthodox control. Accordingly, present instruction and "Lectures" to members of the community are "inconsistent with our present Establishment of Church and State." While the "Principles of our Nobility and Gentry are debauched in our Universities," the minds and hearts of the "common People" are misinformed and misled ("*corrupted*" as radical Whigs always put it) "in our Charity-Schools." The children "are taught, as soon as they can speak, to blabber out *High Church* and *Ormond;* and so are bred up to be Traytors, before they know

[137]Ibid., pp. 19 and 28-33.
[138]Ibid., pp. 32 and 18.
[139]Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, pp. 20-1.

what Treason signifies."[140]

Trenchard complains about the clergy decoying "superstitious and factious Men out of their Shops and their Business, and old doating Women out of their Infirmaries, to hear too often seditious Harangues." More explicitly, Gordon outlines the peculiar methods of "Lecturers." Preachers select certain occasions for special lectures. A certain "Smith," whom Gordon describes as a "Night Lecturer," chooses

> the Sunday after our Streets had been straw'd with two Seditious Libels, the one entituled *A Letter to the Army, and the People of England,* the other *A Letter to R t W le, Esq.*
>
> The text was given out some Days before, and the Sermon read over to all the Apprentices, and petty Tradesmen in our Neighbourhood; Messengers were sent out to invite an Audience, ... a prodigious Congregation was assembled, and in Truth, a prodigious Sermon was preach'd.[141]

Trenchard and Gordon describe these lectures in similar terms but once again Gordon is the more explicit. The theme is

> that the poor despised Church of *England* was now at her last Gasp; that many of her Clergy sided with her Enemies, the Dissenters; that they had all the Interest at Court; and the Church was never more in Danger since the Reformation than she is now; that they did the Work of the Lord deceitfully, if they did not exert themselves in her Defence, and would be cursed accordingly....[142]

Thus, these "New Clubs under pretence of Charity"--the schools themselves and the lectures given there--are "Instruments of Mischief." The "poor giddy Mob" receives "bold, seditious Rants." Trenchard believes the schools have successfully "corrupted all the Youth whose Education has been trusted to them" and as a result of that pernicious and extensive inculcation, Trenchard fears

> that at the End of near forty Years the *Revolution* is worse established than when it began. New Generations are risen up, which knew nothing of the Sufferings of their Fathers, and are taught to believe, there were never any such.[143]

Generally too, the masters of the schools are "Enemies to the Establishment" who

[140]*Cato's Letters*, No. 133, pp. 237-9.
[141]Ibid., pp. 237-8; and *A Political Dissertation*, pp. 36-7.
[142]*A Political Dissertation*, pp. 37-8.
[143]Ibid., pp. 39 and 34; and *Cato's Letters*, No. 133, p. 238.

promote "Disaffection to the Government." They engage "the Parents and Friends of the Children in the Interest of a Popish Pretender, and breed up the Children themselves to fight his Battles in due Time."[144]

Trenchard feels very strongly, only six months before his death and more than three years since the commencement of *The Independent Whig,* that the "Dread of Popery" is "almost lost amongst us." The vilest tenets of Popery are more alive than ever.[145] And the fact that High Anglicans wish an independent ecclesiastical power in Hanoverian society, as they had in Restoration England, deeply disturbs these "Independent Whigs." For them there is nothing, they say, as

> terrible as an Army of aspiring Ecclesiastics ... who make your own Heart conspire against you, by filling it with false Terrors. Dominion is the Word, Servitude the Duty, and Damnation the Penalty.[146]

Trenchard and Gordon, along with a third collaborator (perhaps the freethinker, Anthony Collins), write *The Independent Whig* "to expose those Claims that contradict Reason and the Gospel, and bring Contempt upon the Clergy."[147] Their style, content, and argumentation are not, they explain, typical of current religious exposition and they present their views in a weekly "Half-Sheet" since more people are likely to read that short work than a lengthy theological tract. These "Independent Whigs" write their weekly journal to discourage "the Growth of those Principles that infatuate the Multitude, and undermine our Constitution."[148] As Gordon explains, in his "Dedication" to the sixth edition (1735), those essays were written with "a View to the Quiet and Stability of this Free State."[149]

The Independent Whig was a very significant publication. Immediately reprinted in 1721, seven editions followed. It first appeared in the British colonies in North America in 1724, in France in 1767, and was published in the United States as late as 1816. Those repeated publications, for almost a century, strongly suggest *The Independent Whig* advanced ideas that were ahead of its time.[150] This weekly was, on one level, an intentionally public and secular attempt to refute and discredit the doctrines and practices of High-Anglican orthodoxy. These highly readable essays

[144]*Cato's Letters,* No. 133, p. 245; and see *A Political Dissertation,* p. 34.
[145]*Cato's Letters,* No. 133, pp. 238-9.
[146]"Considerations ... being the Second Part of the Independent Whig," p. 270.
[147]Ibid., p. 271.
[148]Ibid., p. 270.
[149]Thomas Gordon, "Dedication" to Lord Pagett, in *The Independent Whig,* 3, p. xiii.
[150]As one scholar comments:

> "The *Independent Whig* lasted fifty-three weeks. The author admitted in setting out that 'Whoever goes about to reform the World undertakes an Office obnoxious to Malice and beset with Difficulties'. In a dedication to the lower house of Convocation, he

put the tenets and actions of High Anglicans on public trial. *The Independent Whig* was not original but it did disseminate challenging, provocative ideas.

The authors can be considered "Deists." Early eighteenth-century deism, represented by John Toland in his *Christianity Not Mysterious,* accepted, apparently, the divine character of the New Testament subject to the application of rational thinking; later deists denied revelation. *The Independent Whig* is closer to the earlier deism since the authors seem to accept revelation, miracles, and the divinity of Jesus Christ. They are also very near the Latitudinarians and they certainly celebrate well-known latitude men like John Tillotson, Samuel Clarke, William Whiston, and Benjamin Hoadly. But, unlike most Low Churchmen, adherents of Latitudinarianism, *The Independent Whig* denies the mystery of the Trinity. This denial is itself a violation of the 1689 Act of Toleration.

Two of Gordon's contributions dealt specifically with Scripture. He considers the "*Revealed Will* of God" to be the Bible. He tells his readers that the Supreme Being, out of His infinite goodness and mercy, has made everything "he requires of us weak Men," obvious and clear. God's meaning is both fixed and universal: His words "are addressed to *all* Mankind, and given to remain as a Rule of Faith and Manners to the End of the World." Therefore, Gordon underscores, "whatever is necessary to be known" in Scripture "is to be as easy and intelligible at one Time as another, and to all Men alike."[151] Anything obscure is unimportant to man since the God of infinite wisdom could not possibly intend to confuse man: "Almighty God will never require of us to see in the Dark."

> A Rule which is not plain, is no Rule at all.... The Creator and Preserver of Mankind cannot take Delight in puzzling his Creatures with Darkness and Ambiguities, and in Points too where their Souls are in Danger. He is not a rigid Master, who would reap where he did not sow. This would be a cruel Mockery, unworthy of the Divine Being, *who has brought Life and Immortality to Light.*[152]

> announced that there could be 'no Medium between Popery and the Reformation', between Hoadly's views and a 'Popish Revolution'. He advocated the 'Spiritual Supremacy of the Crown; the Rights of the Laity to judge for themselves; the forming of all ecclesiastical Polity by the Legislature.... But he could scarcely have chosen a more unpromising year to launch his work. That what he wrote had merit and was apposite to circumstances in the time is clear from its repeated publication" (Laprade, *Public Opinion and Politics,* p. 228).

See Klein, "Introduction"; and Carl Bridenbaugh, *Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics 1689-1775* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 47-8 and 147.
[151]*The Independent Whig,* 1, No. IV, pp. 23-4.
[152]Ibid., pp. 24-5.

Again, a month later, Gordon writes: "God Almighty, in revealing his Will to Mankind, has always taken effectual Care that it could not be mistaken, and therefore made it so plain, as to need no farther Explanation."[153]

Gordon is saying that Scripture is accessible to everyone and that no special training or learning are necessary. It is an age-old English challenge to clerical authority. *The Independent Whig* seeks to overthrow High-Anglican orthodoxy and undermine the authority of High Churchmen who insist that the Bible, although the source of revealed truth and ascertainable to a degree through human reason, requires interpretation, a task only those qualified and prepared in church learning--Churchmen--can fulfill.

Instead, *The Independent Whig* affirms "that all Men have in their Power the Means to understand" the word of God; moreover, High Churchmen make Scripture "dark and insufficient" to ordinary minds when it suits their purposes. Gordon pointedly criticizes their inconsistency: when Anglicans confront the Papists,

> they praise the Scriptures, inveigh against the imposing of Opinions, and speak in the Stile of Dissenters. But when they ... rebuke Nonconformists, they borrow the Language of Papists.

Instead of encouraging their hearers to read the Bible, of showing its "Excellency and Advantage," of inculcating "the *plain Precepts* of Faith and Morality" found in Scripture, "High-Church Priests" manage to "confound ignorant People with Metaphysical Subtleties." Unfortunately, laments Gordon, the "Christian Religion, most easy and intelligible in itself, and adapted to the meanest Capacities," becomes "a Metaphysical Science, made up of useless Subtleties, and insignificant Distinctions; calculated to gratify the Pride of corrupt Clergymen."[154]

Trenchard and Gordon dedicate two publications to a specific rebuttal of the validity of the High-Church doctrine of the apostolic succession. They deny any biblical evidence for the High-Church contention that Anglican priests are the successors of the apostles with a divine commission, conveyed to present-day clergymen as the successors of the apostles who originally received the commission, to forgive or to retain sins. They point out, as well, the obvious contradiction of several claims to the same apostolic succession. It is impossible, explains *The Independent Whig,* for the English, Protestant clergy to consider themselves divine successors of the apostles. At the Reformation "*Cranmer* owned Ordination *then* to be no more than a *Civil* Appointment to an Ecclesiastical Office." It is the "Jacobite High Clergy" who absurdly and in defiance of the Reformation claim the apostolic

[153]Ibid., No. IX, p. 63.

[154]Ibid., No. IX, p. 64; NO. VI, pp. 39-40; No. IV, p. 28; and No. VIII, p. 56.

succession, "pure and undefiled." If they believe such a claim, "they are therefore forced to own the Church of *Rome* to be a *true Church*." Such tenets, Trenchard and Gordon fear, will bring the Church of England ever closer to Rome.[155]

What, ask Trenchard and Gordon rhetorically, can the Anglican clergy succeed to since the original apostles "had no Ambition, Jurisdiction, Dignities, or Revenues" to which present-day clergymen could aspire. And one cannot find "in Scripture one Word of Ecclesiastical Princes, Popes, Patriarchs, Primates, &c." *The Independent Whig* boldly denies the Anglican Protestant clergy any claim to a line of succession from the apostles or any special, divine commission from God to the apostles. Reiterating Hoadly's famous sermon, Trenchard and Gordon emphasize that Christ "himself declares, that *his Kingdom is not of this World*." In even stronger language, to the House of Convocation where High Churchmen are represented and to whom Gordon dedicates *The Independent Whig,* Gordon bluntly states:

> Your church is a creature of the constitution, you are creatures of the law: and you most evidently belye divine right, if you pretend to derive from thence, what all the world sees you owe to secular bounty.[156]

Nor did Anglican clergymen possess, as they claim, any monopoly on "the Administration of the Sacraments." Both the Lord's Supper and Baptism belong "to all Christians equally." In addition, Trenchard and Gordon dismiss the "boasted Power of Excommunication" as priestly presumption since each individual controls his own actions and conduct. Instead, insist the authors, true piety and faith can be identified simply by observing a person's conduct. Creeds, the Church Fathers, ceremonies, and other orthodox notions are irrelevant. A truly faithful person confirms his faith in Christ by "living well" which is "the best and only Evidence we can give that we believe well."[157]

The Independent Whig is convinced that clergymen present themselves as the *only* proper judges of human conduct "with good Policy" since such a claim advances the power and wealth that are endemic to the order. The clergy has, in other words and according to Trenchard and Gordon, a vested interest in making the smallest error damnable whereas God considers even the greatest errors, when involuntary, mere innocence. Laymen are "at least as capable of judging of *Error* as the Clergy, and more proper, as having no Interest on either Side of the Question." Men do not need

[155]Ibid., No. VII, pp. 47-9.

[156]Ibid., and Thomas Gordon, "Dedication to the Lower House of Convocation," in *The Independent Whig: or, A Defence of Primitive Christianity, and of our Ecclesastical Establishment, against the Exorbitant Claims and Encroachments of Fanatical and Disaffected Clergymen* (Hartford, Conn.: William S. Marsh, 1816), p. ix.

[157]*The Independent Whig,* 1, No. VIII, p. 59; and No. XXVI, pp. 224-7.

ecclesiastics for absolution since the "Dispensation of Providence" is far more encompassing:

> [God] sees our Hearts, penetrates the most secret Recesses of our Souls, makes indulgent Allowances for our Weaknesses, and expects nothing from us, but that he has given us the Means and Abilities of knowing and performing.

Human society depends upon the bonds of morality and not on a commitment to useless dogmas. These assertions constitute a clear and very important effort to affirm the right of private judgment against the authoritarian claims of Anglican orthodoxy. Gordon is explicit:

> our Judgment ought to be at no Man's Service, nor our Minds controuled in Religious Matters, but by God alone; for as no Man's Soul can be saved by Proxy, so no Man ought to exercise his Faith by Proxy.[158]

The "Independent Whigs" genuinely fear High-Church doctrines as the theoretical components of a very dangerous counterclaim to sovereignty in the State. To talk about *jure divino* episcopacy, the "indelible Character," an "uninterrupted Succession from the Apostles," the "Power of the Keys," the right to excommunicate, clerical mediation between God and man, "pardoning Sins, and having the sole Power of giving the Sacraments" is a clerical strategy

> to create Reverence to their Persons, Submission to their Authority, and to render themselves independent on the Civil Government.... And then they know that the Civil Government will be dependent on them.[159]

By contending for "independent worldly power, superiour to all the powers of the world," the High-Anglican clergy are analogous to the Roman Catholic Church--a "true popery, and yet it is a popery without a pope." In one of his last "Cato" essays, Trenchard vividly defines Popery as a dangerous, victimizing, independent force within the state:

> Popery is the most dreadful Machine, the utmost Stretch of human Politicks, that ever was invented amongst Men, to aggrandize and enrich the Clergy, to oppress and enslave the Laity. All its Doctrines, all its Views, all its Artifices, are calculated for the sole Advantage of the Priests, and the Destruction of the People, at the Expence of Virtue, good Government,

[158]Ibid., No. XXVI, p. 229; and No. IV, pp. 25 and 29.
[159]*Cato's Letters*, No. 130, pp. 208-9.

> common Sense and the Gospel. It is an open Conspiracy of the Ecclesiasticks, against all the rest of Mankind, to rob them of their Estates, of their Consciences, and their Senses; and to make them the Dupes and Tame Vassals of sawcy and ambitious Pedants.[160]

In "their demands and contention for power," Anglican clergymen had turned to many "Romish" principles. High Churchmen espouse such a stance to seize a power above and beyond that even of the Crown. Popery is the worst kind of clericalism--a total exaltation of the clergy at the expense of laymen and an absolute control over the behavior of human beings. High Anglicanism is another form of "Popish" tyranny. "Name makes no Difference," human bondage to clergymen is not "a whit better for being called Protestant, nor worse for being called Popish."[161]

High Churchmen are, for Trenchard and Gordon, also Jacobites. The Anglican clergy, the most numerous and most powerful propagandists in post-Revolution England, do not practice, Trenchard and Gordon tell us, what they preach. High Churchmen "never quit" the doctrine of passive obedience "yet they never observe it" either: "They preach against Rebellion, and practice Rebellion." Under the Stuarts, the English clergy had taught the divine right of kings and delivered men to rulers as their "Chattels," but "of late"--after the Revolution--

> We are, it seems, *at present,* living in the Guilt of Rebellion, which is a damnable Sin; and so we are to rebel upon Pain of Damnation which follows Rebellion. These are their Reasonings *now.*[162]

High-Church Anglicanism continues, after 1715, to be a major force in English society. High-Church ecclesiology, including the political implications of divine-right religious orthodoxy, and High-Church clericalism remain strong and influential. The Church of England, especially the High-Church orthodoxy that a majority of the Anglican clergy endorse, is a powerful institutional and ideological threat to the legality of the Hanoverian succession and the very security of the Hanoverian-Whig government. High Anglicanism, a successful reality in the second half of the seventeenth century, when an Anglican hegemony did, indeed, inform the Restoration polity, converts itself into an assertive and volatile force in post-Revolution England. High-Church doctrines discredit the constitutional legitimacy of the new

[160]"Dedication to the Lower House of Convocation," in *The Independent Whig* (1816), p. xii; and *Cato's Letters,* No. 130, pp. 207-8.
[161]"Dedication to the Lower House of Convocation," in *The Independent Whig* (1816), pp. iii and viii. See also p. xiv.
[162]"The Character of an Independent Whig," p. 320; and *The Independent Whig,* I, No. XVIII, pp. 142-3.

Hanoverian dynasty and even defy the State's traditional, parliamentary jurisdiction over the national Church.

The Anglican Establishment, in particular the pervasive and pernicious influence John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon believe clergymen exercise over the populace, deeply disturbs these "Independent Whigs." They are absolutely convinced High Churchmen inculcate doctrines antithetical to English Protestantism, the 1688-89 Revolution and Revolution Settlement, and the Hanoverian succession and, on the other hand, conducive to the establishment of a tyrannical regime in Church and State. Trenchard and Gordon see their government and society threatened by influential and ubiquitous seducers who successfully mislead and alarm the populace in a concerted effort to bring back the Stuarts by stirring up discontent in order to incite the nation to rebellion.

High Churchmen aggressively pursue, Trenchard and Gordon sincerely fear, counterreformation and counterrevolution. In sharp contrast to most Whigs, and Robert Walpole in particular, who bow to the reality of High-Anglican power, Trenchard and Gordon openly confront and challenge the politico-theological orthodoxy that High Anglicans propagate. Trenchard and Gordon write weekly articles in a consciously public attempt to counter High-Church doctrines, methods, and aims; to expose and check, in other words, what they believe is High-Church sedition.

CHAPTER FIVE

"CATO," TORY DISAFFECTION, AND JACOBITE CONSPIRACY

"Priestcraft" was a major target of Trenchard and Gordon's public writing during the early Hanoverian period. Loosely used to denote the ambitious aims and manipulative abilities of Anglican divines whose loyalty was highly questionable, "priestcraft" was, often, their shorthand term for behind-the-scenes, clerical agitation and unnamed, clerical agitators of Jacobite coloration. Once again, Trenchard and Gordon echo Locke, another, but earlier, foe to priestcraft:

> If we search for the Original of our domestic Feuds and petty Quarrels, we shall discover that they are caused by the Chaplain, or one of his Tribe; at least it will appear, that he was the Encourager, if not the Author, of them.

Indeed, writes Gordon in 1720, only the power of the inferior clergy "to create Quarrels, and foment Animosities" can explain "the Defection among his Majesty's Subjects, and the Alienation of their Allegiance." Gordon not only attributes most "Divisions, Seditions and Rebellions" in post-Revolution England to Anglican clergymen but believes the clergy *continue* to stir up rebellion. Just as "Divisions, Seditions and Rebellions" took "their first Rise from the Pulpit, so they are wickedly and industriously fomented from Pulpits ... to this Day."[1] The "Independent Whigs" sincerely believe High-Anglicans are willing to bring "Mankind under Tyranny and Bondage to such Princes as would divide the Spoil with them" and actually stir up rebellion against that "Prince" who protects "his People in their Civil and Sacred Rights." Thus, in Trenchard and Gordon's opinion, clergymen are "the constant Incendiaries of every popular and wicked Faction," treasonous preachers who ply the credulous with seditious aspersions against the legitimate government of King George I.[2]

The grounds for concern were real. In late April 1722 troops took up station in Hyde Park and elsewhere. On 8 May 1722 came the public announcement of a "wicked conspiracy, in concert with traitors abroad, for raising a rebellion in this Kingdom in favour of a Popish Pretender."[3] On 24 August 1722 Francis Atterbury, the Bishop of Rochester and High-Church leader, was arrested on a charge of high treason.

[1] "Priestianity," pp. 386, 391 and 392.

[2] *The Independent Whig*, I, No. II, p. 14.

[3] Public Record Office, State Papers 35/31 f. 158, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 83; and [Thomas Gordon], "A Short View of the Conspiracy, with some

Trenchard and Gordon's fears of Jacobitism seem warranted. Both knew how unpopular the new Hanoverian dynasty was. They were deeply concerned with popular discontent, and very aware of the widespread sympathy for the Stuarts that the Sacheverell affair, the electoral success of outright Jacobites in the elections of 1710 and 1713, and the Rebellion of 1715 had vividly demonstrated. Innumerable Jacobite intrigues against the Hanoverian monarchy after 1715 presumably helped keep these fears alive. Each new Jacobite threat received attention and "Cato" certainly knew about "a terrible Invasion ... from *Sweden*" (1717-18), and "from *Cadiz*" (the Spanish-Jacobite Conspiracy of 1719), and a "great Fear of the *Czar*" of Russia in 1721.[4]

The Atterbury Conspiracy

From the coronation of William and Mary, Jacobite plots, attempted assassinations, projected invasions from abroad, and open rebellion had been added to that already long English tradition of conspiracy, rebellion, treason, and plot. Such a legacy and the very recent record of numerous Jacobite attempts against the House of Hanover formed the anxious background to Trenchard and Gordon's reactions, in 1722-23, to yet another Jacobite effort to restore the Stuarts to the British throne. This was the "Atterbury Conspiracy." A brief discussion of the Atterbury Conspiracy will help us understand Trenchard and Gordon's writings from May 1722 to July 1723.

In early Hanoverian England the

> magic of the Stuart name was still powerful, and the romantic cause of a legitimate heir had a strong attraction for those at home who watched the crude process by which Hanoverian oligarchy established itself.

For many Englishmen, including dedicated, intelligent High Churchmen like Francis Atterbury, the House of Hanover "had become inseparably linked ... with the destruction of the Tory party and diminution of the influence of the Church of England." Atterbury's "loyalty was to the Church of England and to a vision of its place in English life and society"; he turned to "Jacobitism only after he had despaired that the Tory party would ever be able to rise again in sufficient strength to restore the Church to its ancient status and authority." For Atterbury and other Anglican Tories "Jacobitism held out the only hope for a sudden and complete revolution in English political affairs."[5]

Reflections on the present State of Affairs. In a Letter to an Old Whig in the Country, by Cato," in *A Collection of Tracts*, 2, p. 142.

[4]*Cato's Letters*, No. 95, p. 253.

[5]Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, pp. 203, 206-7, and 212-13.

In the spring of 1721, with the South-Sea crisis still going strong, the Jacobite cause "was in a state of hope and optimism." Atterbury wrote to the Pretender in April 1721 that

> With a very little assistance from your friends abroad, your way to friends at home is become safe and easy.... Your friends are ... under a full expectation that an opportunity may sometime this summer be given them to show their zeal for your service.[6]

Apart from the widespread "despair, consternation, rage, discontentment" that characterized the mood of the nation and gave hope to those who desired a restoration, the Jacobites also believed Sunderland, King George's favorite minister, would aid and protect them since he too was involved. From early 1717, Sunderland had made direct contact with the Earl of Mar, the Pretender's agent, under the pretence of sympathy for the Pretender's cause and from early 1721 on, Sunderland approached prominent Jacobite leaders in an effort to strengthen his own political position threatened by probable implication in the South-Sea fraudulence. When the Earl of Sunderland died (19 April 1722), the Jacobites urged that "the death of Lord Sunderland makes ... caution more indispensably necessary."[7] Walpole and Townshend certainly suspected Sunderland's complicity and, pointedly enough, seized his papers immediately after his death. Ironically, Sunderland had told a prominent Jacobite, just a week earlier, that "it is well for them [the Jacobites] ... that Townshend and Walpole had not in their hands what he had." But two days after his death and on the day of receipt of news from the Regent of France that the Jacobites were presenting urgent appeals for his assistance, "Sunderland's papers were firmly in the hands" of Charles Townshend and Robert Walpole.[8]

Just as the Jacobites were hopeful in 1721 and forged ahead, enthusiastically, with plans for a glorious Stuart return, many Whigs at the same juncture were extremely worried. Viscount Robert Molesworth, frequently mentioned by scholars of Augustan political ideology for his now famous description of "The Principles of a Real Whig," wrote in mid-summer (1721), a few weeks before an angry mob

[6]Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Stuart Manuscripts 53/48 [Atterbury to James, 22 April 1721], quoted in Charles B. Realey, *The Early Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Humanistic Studies, 1931), p. 49. See also Bennett, *The Tory Crisis*, p. 229; and Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 70.

[7]Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, pp. 68 and 81; and Cholmondeley (Houghton) MSS, iii, 69/4 (Papers Relating to Bishop Atterbury), quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 82. Discussion of the Atterbury Conspiracy depends upon the work of Fritz.

[8]Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Stuart Manuscripts 60/26, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 82; and Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, pp. 82 and 79.

stormed the lobbies and corridors of the House of Commons, that "our whole multitude will turn Jacobite in a very few months more."[9]

Francis Atterbury played a significant role in the English-Jacobite plans of 1721. The English-Jacobite plot of 1721, more familiarly, the Atterbury Conspiracy, did not include foreign backing, a lack considered suicidal by some. Although the Jacobites usually considered, after their failure in 1715, foreign support crucial, in 1721 leading English Jacobites and their associates were willing in light of the nation's temper to hazard a restoration based "almost entirely on 'the good disposition' of their supporters within the kingdoms of England, Ireland, and Scotland."[10] Numerous individuals--Atterbury, the Earls of Orrey, Arran, Oxford, and Strafford, Charles Caesar, Sir Henry Goring, and Lord North and Grey--encouraged the Pretender. By early October 1721, a "memorial" that embodied the views of the leading Jacobites about the ripeness of the moment and the need to take advantage of the propitious circumstances was "conveyed to the Pretender by Lord Falkland." With such encouragement from England, the Pretender agreed to undertake a restoration. Thus a plan was drawn up in England for raising a rebellion and insurrection in all the English counties. Although there were tremendous risks, "the Jacobites in England, encouraged and abetted by Dillon in Paris, Ormonde in Spain, and the Pretender in Italy, believed the advantages far outweighed the peril involved."[11] An insurrection was to take place at the time of the general elections "when all the Freeholders of England are necessarily assembled together, and when the whole Nation is too apt to be in a ferment, even in the quietest Times."[12] But the Jacobites found themselves inadequately prepared to implement their plans at the time of the elections. They lacked, especially, sufficient funds to provide the necessary weapons and ammunition and the rising had to be postponed. Atterbury wrote in mid-April 1722 to the Pretender and "expressed his disappointment that 'this opportunity' had elapsed but hoped another would offer before the end of the year; when a new 'occasion' presented itself," Atterbury assured James III, he, the Bishop of Rochester, "would not be 'idle'."[13]

Robert Walpole, obsessed with Jacobitism, gave almost neurotic attention to every sign of conspiracy. All Jacobite efforts had received his undivided attention and Walpole, in mid-April 1722, just after Sunderland's death, decided "to initiate a

[9]Historical Manuscripts Commission, Clements MSS, 318, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 68 and see p. 103.

[10]Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, p. 68.

[11]Ibid., pp. 70 and 69.

[12]*A Report from the Committee Appointed by Order of the House of Commons to Examine Christopher Layer, and Others* (London, 1722), 2, quoted in Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism*, pp. 76-7.

[13]Ibid., p. 79 and see chap. 7 passim.

Jacobite investigation of staggering proportions." For the better part of 1722, especially from April until the first session of the second Septennial Parliament, which began 9 October 1722, "Walpole's instinctive and internal fear of Jacobitism took external shape in one of the largest 'witch hunts' of British history." Walpole knew, of course, that there were Jacobite plans for a Stuart restoration but he had no names. He made a bold decision. In late April, the Guards were stationed in Hyde Park and several regiments were moved to their destined positions on Salisbury Plain and Hounslow Heath. The public was, understandably, alarmed. When on 8 May 1722 news of a Jacobite conspiracy was made public, Walpole had only a "few interceptions at the Post Office, intimations from the regent of France, Sunderland's papers, and reports from the British representatives in Paris and Rome." For "a figure less obsessed with his mission against Jacobitism it would have proved almost impossible, on the basis of such little proof, to discover the 'authors' of the plot."[14]

Walpole felt heavy pressure to identify the conspirators since it was always dangerous for a minister to place himself in a position to be accused of raising the bogey of Jacobitism. Who, exactly, the conspirators were was Walpole's major challenge. He needed to identify the person known by the names "Illington" and "Jones." From the letters intercepted at the Post Office, copied, and sent on, Walpole knew "Jones" to be "a person of great importance in Jacobite circles." Through an intricate and industrious spy system, intelligent as well as gruelling examinations of suspects and informers, and his own obsessive energy, Walpole managed to identify, in late May 1722, Francis Atterbury as the individual who used those names in his correspondence with Jacobites on the continent. Three months later (24 August 1722) Walpole arrested the Bishop of Rochester.[15]

"Cato" and Disaffection

For John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon the Atterbury Conspiracy encapsulated deeply rooted political and religious fears. Led by High Churchmen, supported by a brainwashed populace perniciously prepared to receive a popish tyrant, the Atterbury Conspiracy was, for these two "Independent Whigs," the archetypal embodiment of all they warned against.

Although Trenchard and Gordon did, eventually, attack the Atterbury conspirators openly and vociferously, "Cato" tried, for many months, to convince supporters and would-be sympathizers of the Pretender that their real interests lay with the existing "Establishment." Trenchard and Gordon also warned the Whig ministers about misusing fears of Jacobitism to pursue policies "Cato" considered politically

[14]Ibid., pp. 79, 82, and 84.

[15]Ibid., p. 84 and chap. 8 passim.

imprudent and reminded the Whigs that they themselves were responsible for contributing to the extant disaffection. "Cato" recommended, as always, the exercise of severe punishment against the latest conspirators, his usual ideal "curative."

After a full report to the House of Commons, in early March 1723, of the alleged extent and nature of the Jacobite intrigues (a House where Trenchard sat, for the first time, as an "Independent Whig" from Taunton), "Cato" continued to instruct and advise the Whigs. In addition, "Cato" told the government that, as Trenchard and Gordon had always apprehended, Whig policy-failures had helped to open the door to Jacobitism. At the same time and for six ensuing weeks (20 April-25 May 1723) Trenchard and Gordon lambasted High Tories and High Churchmen. In those six essays that crystallize the deepest concerns of the authors of *Cato's Letters* and where the Whigs are *still* held responsible for the survival and strength of Jacobitism, Trenchard and Gordon not only accuse High Tories of using the language of "Liberty" to render the administration unpopular but vilify clergymen as "restless Rebels" to "this Free State." Perhaps not surprisingly, a High-Tory Grand Jury indicted the publisher of *The British Journal* for "Cato's" vociferous attacks on clergymen; charity schools; and the doctrine of the Holy Trinity (a violation of the Toleration Act of 1689). The Middlesex Grand Jury condemned four of "Cato's" letters and Bernard Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees* as "Works of Darkness," carefully contrived "to run down Religion and Virtue as *prejudicial* to Society and detrimental to the State."[16] Two of the indicted letters were "On the Conspiracy" and all six of "Cato's" essays on Jacobitism deserve close attention.

Thomas Gordon and Tory Disaffection

Thomas Gordon's particular role in the spring of 1722 warrants commentary. Less than a week before the Jacobite plot was announced, Gordon, in a government organ, directly challenged High-Tory writers. This was *The St. James's Journal*, a newspaper expressly established by the government to counter High-Tory sedition. There is no reason to assume Gordon yet knew about the conspiracy. It is difficult, as well, to imagine how the government could decide to establish and actually set up a newspaper within such a short period of time: only thirteen days occurred between the receipt (20 April 1722) of a message from the Regent of France warning the British government about the plans for rebellion and the first appearance (3 May 1722) of the new journal. Perhaps, though, Gordon was privy to some information Walpole possessed. Yet, it is more likely that Gordon, always and genuinely concerned about criticism of the ministry in High-Tory journals, was willing to apply his pen to help Walpole. There is no doubt, whatsoever, that Thomas Gordon worried

[16]*Evening Post*, 13-16 July 1723, quoted in Speck, "Mandeville and the Middlesex Grand Jury," p. 367. This presentment was directed against Trenchard's "Cato-Letter" of 15 June 1723 on charity schools.

about Tory attacks on the Hanoverian-Whig administration. In early 1722, he publishes a pamphlet, *The True Picture of a Modern Tory*, which describes the Tories as seditious malcontents in a language that is almost hysterical:

> A *Tory* is a Monster, with an *English* face, *Popish* Heart, and an *Irish* Conscience; a Creature of a large Forehead, a prodigious Mouth, supple Hams, and no Brains: Noise and Debauchery, Oaths and Beggary, are the four Elements that compose him; his Arms are those of Isachar, an Ass couchant, of which the two Supporters are *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*. He seems to be descended from *Esau*, for he would fain truck away an invaluable Birth-right for a *Popish Pretender;* he has so great a Kindness for *Popery* and *Slavery*, that whenever they shall make a match, he'll be sure to put in for a Brideman ... they are a Sort of wild Boars, that would fain root out the Constitution, and break the Balance of our happy Government, by rendering that *despotic* which is *established and bounded by Law*. He is so certain that Monarchy is *Jure Divino*, that he looks upon all People, living under *Aristocracy's* or *Democracy's*, to be in a State of Damnation.

Gordon then explicitly equates Tories with Jacobites and concludes with this scathing identification:

> In a Word, a *Tory* is a Tool of *Rome*, an Emissary of the *Pretender's*, a Friend of *Priestcraft*, an Enemy to his *King* and *Country*, and an Underminer of our happy Constitution, both in Church and State.[17]

Trenchard, it should be pointed out, recommends this pamphlet "to those *Genuine Sons of the Church*, who have not seen their Pictures for a long Season," deeming that the pamphlet could "be useful to others, who have parted with their own Eyes to make use of the Parson's."[18]

Gordon expresses a view of the Tories that is much like Walpole's. Before the appearance of "Cato's" letters, Gordon had described High-Tory publicists as the "loud and forward Champions of a Party." As early as May 1720, he mocked those "worthy Journalists" who have, he then writes:

> *Two Columns of Names*, One in a *Black Letter*, and another in a *White;* which different Colours denote the Love and Hatred of these accomplished Pen-Men. Thus Mr. *Mist* has his White Column filled with his *Ormond*, his *Mar*,

[17][Thomas Gordon], "The True Picture of a Modern Tory; or High-Churchman painted to the Life," in *A Collection of Tracts*, 2, pp. 278-80.

[18]"Seasonable Advice to the Electors of Great Britain; with a Word or two relating to the Influence of the Clergy in Elections," p. 277.

his *Czar of Muscovy*, his *Blessed Martyr*, and his *Charity Schools:* Then for his Black List, he has furnished himself with *Oliver Cromwel* [*sic*], with *Republicans*, and *Whigs* ... With a dexterous Application of these Names, he makes himself Frightful and Roguish....[19]

In a later pamphlet, Gordon claims seditious aims informed the commencement of *The Freeholder's Journal:* first published at the time of the 1722 elections and in order "to get" a Parliament

least averse to their grand Purpose; and the better to succeed, the *Freeholder* was brought upon the Stage; a Paper fraught with the utmost Malice against the present Government. They knew full well that their own Faction would take the Hint, and they were in Hopes of biassing the honest unthinking Men of the Nation; the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience* was forgot, and the Lawfulness of Resistance preached up in many Places. To destroy the King's Title to the Crown, the Revolution was openly censured and condemned.[20]

Gordon was an apt candidate to lead a government campaign against what he certainly believed was a seditious press. In the first issue of *The St. James's Journal* (3 May 1722), which ran for one year and was "Walpole's best medium,"[21] Gordon's lead article, "Of Sedition," begins thus:

The Multitude of Papers is a Complaint so common in the Introduction of every new one, that it would be a Shame to repeat it; for my own Part, I am so far from repining at this Evil, that I sincerely wish there were ten times the present Number: By this Means one may hope to see the Appetite for Impertinence, Defamation, and Treason, (so prevalent in the Generality of Readers) at last surfeit it self, and my honoured Brethren, the Modern Authors, be obliged to employ themselves in some honester Manufacture than that of the *Belles Letters*.[22]

In this same article Gordon complains about those who heed "Defamation" against the government, especially "the confus'd Herd of Vagabonds, whose Ignorance and Poverty naturally retain 'em to the Interest of Rebellion and Publick Confusion."[23] Although Gordon frequently employs his humoristic tone and style in *The St. James's Journal*, his serious preoccupation with the reality of discontent and

[19]*A Second Collection of Letters in the London Journal*, pp. 23-4.

[20]"A Short View of the Conspiracy ... by Cato," p. 129.

[21]David H. Stevens, *Party Politics and English Journalism 1702-1742* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967; first published, 1916), p. 114.

[22]*St. James's Journal*, No. I (3 May 1722); and Gordon, *The Humourist*, 2, p. 240.

[23]*St. James's Journal*, No. I; and Gordon, *The Humourist*, 2, p. 242.

his belief that the press was a major cause of the dissatisfaction with the Hanoverian-Whig government are also visible:

I would not be thought an Enemy to Literature (being indeed a very learned Person myself;) but when I observe a worthy Trader, without any natural Malice of his own, sucking in the Poison of Popularity, and boiling with Indignation against an Administration which the Pamphleteer informs him is very corrupt, I am grieved that ever *Machiavel, Hobbes, Sidney, Filmer*, and the more Illustrious Moderns, including myself, appear'd in Human Nature.[24]

It is possible Trenchard and Gordon believe their efforts as "Cato" have backfired. "Cato" himself speaks more than once about the misuse and abuse of his published work. He seems to admit just such an event when he says he is not surprised that his

Letters should be ill understood, and maliciously applied, by some, who, having no Principles of their own, or vile ones, were apt to wrest *Cato's* Papers and Principles to favour their own Prejudices and base Wishes.[25]

Gordon further announces that the examination of "popular Frenzy" and proper "Prescriptions for its Cure" will be the business of *The St. James's Journal*.[26] He makes many, significant contributions to that organ and to another government newspaper, *Pasquin*, founded in November 1722. *Pasquin* tries for more than a year

to explode the dangerous *Sophistries* of Sedition, to detect the crafty purposes of false Patriots and popular Leaders, to raise the Spirits of a free and flourishing People to a just Enjoyment and Feeling of their publick and private Happiness, whose Hearts were sinking within them, under the idlest Impressions of imaginary Misery and approaching Slavery.[27]

[24]*St. James's Journal*, No. I; and Gordon, *The Humourist*, 2, p. 241.

[25]"The Preface to the Fourth Collection of *Cato's* Letters," p. 364; and *Cato's Letters*, "The Preface," p. xxiv.

[26]*St. James's Journal*, No. I. This expression of intention, the last line in the lead article, does not appear in *The Humourist*, vol. 2, where Gordon republished newspaper articles from *The London Journal, St. James's Journal*, and *Pasquin*. Gordon does not indicate any previous appearance of the essays collected in *The Humourist* but most of them are reprintings of articles that first appeared in the London press and while some of the articles, in the second volume, deal with themes usually associated with "Cato"--stock-jobbers, the South-Sea Bubble, the Company directors--and with subjects typical of the first volume, *most* of the essays in the second volume of *The Humourist* are writings that originally appeared in government newspapers created to defend the Hanoverian-Whig regime against Jacobite aims and methods. In 1732 in a "Dedication" to Queen Caroline preceding the collection of a complete set of the *St. James's Journal* (3 May 1722-18 May 1723), the compiler, a "Thomas Robe," explains that the journal was established in the spring of 1722 to offset "a Crisis of remarkable Danger and Disquiet."

[27]*Pasquin*, No. CXVIX [*sic*; recte CXX] 26 [*sic*; recte 27] March 1724. *Pasquin* began on

Gordon is obviously attacking those who, in his opinion, seditiously defame the administration.

About the same time, Gordon writes an essay on the role of journalists in which he says it is the "duty of an author" to heal "Divisions and Distractions." Most emphatically, a public writer should not "turn the Hearts of the People against the Government," and "stir them up to Tumult and Sedition."[28] "Cato" never writes to make the people unhappy or dissatisfied with the Hanoverian-Whig administration even though Trenchard and Gordon do try, constantly, to convince the government to avoid measures that produce discontent and play into the hands of Jacobite disaffection. Repeatedly, they urge the Whig establishment to legislate, especially on education, and thus, in their opinion, to slam shut the door against Jacobitism. Trenchard and Gordon believe such exhortation is both warranted and constructive.

Given the fact that "Cato" openly supports, in the late spring of 1723, the Whig government's effort to check Jacobitism, Gordon's contribution to Walpole's press campaign, from the spring of 1722, suggests, at least, an early conviction of the need to publicly defend the House of Hanover against Jacobite disaffection. Walpole and Townshend probably paid Gordon but they did not have to buy him. Like Trenchard, Gordon really feared counterrevolution. That fear is the overriding concern behind *Cato's Letters*. The younger man gives additional and considerable energy to a major government-sponsored press campaign to answer those opposition papers that were making the Hanoverian-Whig regime odious to the people and turning them against their King.

John Trenchard and Tory Disaffection

Trenchard's immediate response to the announcement of the conspiracy is relatively low-key. For some three weeks, pleading a desire to give the reader a "greater Variety," Trenchard discusses "Superstitions," a topic he had written on earlier in his career.[29] Thereafter, Trenchard deals directly with issues related to the public announcement of overt counterrevolution.

To Anglican Tories and their usual apprehensions of the "Church in danger" from a Whig ministry, he dedicates an entire essay, suggestively titled "The

28 November 1722 and the last issue was No. 120 (27 March 1724) where "Pasquin" (Gordon) bids farewell and explains that he played his role lightly because "Britannicus" (Benjamin Hoadly in *The London Journal)* was carrying out a serious one.

[28]*St. James's Journal*, No. XXXIX (19 January 1723); and *The Humourist*, 2, p. 162.

[29]*Cato's Letters*, Nos. 77, 78, and 79. Trenchard and Gordon's interest in witchcraft "was not in the quaint survival of an unimportant belief, or in a source of injustice to individuals. As John Wesley later wrote: 'While I live I will bear the most public

Established Church of *England* in no Danger from Dissenters." It is "wild," he tells them, "to fear that any Interest in *England* can shake an Establishment which so many Interests must concur to support" and he wonders, therefore, why "some Men [Tories] of good Understanding and unquestionable Integrity, apprehend any Danger to the legal Constitution of the Church." He cannot "guess from what Quarter they can fear it." The major "Ball of Contention" between Anglicans and Dissenters seems to be "the Sacramental Test" which excludes the latter from offices. But, asserts Trenchard, differences over that issue are groundless. Nothing would be altered by a repeal of the Test Act since the Dissenters always "qualify themselves, if they can get good Places, and take Advantage of the Law to keep themselves out of chargeable ones." Trenchard tries to calm Anglican fears, as he does in June and most of July, by underscoring the support Anglicans enjoy and can count on from the Crown and nobility. The King, who "by Act of Parliament, as well as Interest and Education" is a member of the Church of England, and most of the nobility, who are also of the Established Church, will naturally "give the Preference in all Preferments to those of their own Opinions."[30]

As far as Trenchard is concerned, since the issue of the Test Act is a question of "Party Puncto," the only ones who really find their "Account" in it are those who set themselves "at the Head of a Faction" to exploit and/or to capitalize on fears of the repeal of the Test Act for their own personal gain. Trenchard himself believes repeal justified. The "*Whigs*, who most desire it [repeal], would not have the Appearance of Persecution stand in the Law" and believe it is in "the Interest of the Clergy to gratify and oblige their dissenting Brethren in what costs them nothing." But Trenchard soothes fears by claiming it wiser to wait until Tory Anglicans "see the Advantage" in repealing the Test Act "themselves." Trenchard even admits that it would be imprudent to give the Tory Anglicans "any Cause of Jealousy, by doing it against their Consent."[31] This particular "Independent Whig" is now nearly side by side with Robert Walpole against anything that might provoke the nation's fear of their "Church in danger" from a Whig government.

Trenchard concludes this essay with a specific "Application to our National Clergy." He can understand, he says, how their predecessors "regretted the Diminution which they suffered of their former Revenues and Grandeur at the *Reformation*."

testimony I can to the reality of witchcraft. Your denial of this springs originally from the Deists; and simple Christians lick their spittle. I heartily set them at open defiance'" (Clark, *English Society*, p. 169 and John Wesley to Thomas Tattershall, 13th November 1785, in *The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, AM*, ed. J. Telford, 8 vols. [London, 1931], 3, p. 300, quoted in Clark, *English Society*, p. 169).
John Trenchard first published *The Natural History of Superstition* in 1709.

[30]*Cato's Letters*, No. 81, pp. 126 and 129.

[31]Ibid., p. 130.

But two hundred years have passed and for the present clergy to look back with "wishing Eyes" is folly. He also points out that past attempts to recover their lost status and authority had proved detrimental. The clergy cannot expect, on rational grounds, to recover their lost power from the Crown nor their lands from the nobility and gentry. Instead of fruitless longings, it is to

> their Interest to stand to their present Establishment, and be contented with the same Security for their own Possessions, as the rest of their Fellow-Subjects ... and join with them in the Defence of Liberty, and the Laws of the Land.

Many, Trenchard says he feels, are "falling into these Opinions." But he hopes many more will come to their senses. When the majority have accepted their own vested interest in the present Establishment in Church and State, "all religious Distinctions will soon be at an End, which are now kept up more by Party Animosities, than any essential Difference of Opinion." If, he adds, the High-Anglican Tories do not accept and support the House of Hanover and the Protestant succession, they should not be surprised if the Dissenters flee from them and support those who will protect them against potential High-Anglican oppression.[32]

In the previous essay Trenchard tells the Tories that it is obvious, after seven years of Whigs with the "whole Power in their Hands," that the Hanoverian-Whig government has "no intention to injure the Legal Establishment of the Church."[33] Trenchard tries to assuage Tory-Anglican fears of the Whigs and to defuse the party rage that religion always evokes. Walpole would have found "Cato's" efforts a welcome assist. "Cato" is not committing apostasy; he more worried than usual. Trenchard is, at this moment, as fearful of the explosive power of religion as Walpole had always been.

Surprisingly, Trenchard recommends Tories be given minor but lucrative jobs. He says there are "many *Jacobites* in *England*," but he professes not to believe that *large* numbers have a *principled* commitment to the House of Stuart:

> 'Ts [*sic*] too great a Compliment to pay our Adversaries, to suppose them to act upon a mistaken Principle against their real Interest; ... it is thinking better of them than they deserve, to believe that they will be so against their own Interests; and therefore, excepting the very Few who can hope to receive the Advantages of such a Revolution, the rest may be converted by shewing them that they can find better Protection and Security from the present Establishment, than by hazarding their Lives and Estates, and their Country's Happiness, in bringing their Designs to pass.

[32]Ibid., pp. 130-1.
[33]Ibid., No. 80, p. 121.

One method of discouraging Jacobitism was to refrain from legislative recourse to oppressive, and thus unpopular, counter-measures. Another was government employment. Instead of struggling contentiously "to overcome popular Opposition," Trenchard instructed the Whigs to think about the "many useless, and yet profitable Employments in *England*." He makes clear statements about "Great Men" doing well economically and how that is acceptable as long as it is legal. Trenchard seems to be saying to the Whigs that they will be much more secure in their top jobs if they bring Tories into secondary ones. Trenchard seeks to unite the nation politically. He wants to bring "the honest and wise Men of all Parties" together so that they will "concur in such Measures as will most effectually preserve our present Establishment."[34] Walpole did, at least, avoid the wholesale proscription policy of his predecessors, permitting Tories, on the local level, to hold their traditional sway without harassment or arrest.[35]

In addressing those who do "deal in *Revolutions*," Trenchard does not mince words. He bluntly accuses those who "would overthrow the present Establishment" of faction: men who "set up for Loyalty, and the Right Line" but who really mean a "Zeal" for themselves and "Money and Employments." They try, says Trenchard, "to get" power "by a Revolution, which they want Merit or Means to get without it." "Gentlemen who deal in *Revolutions*" are "Politicians"

> who are always Enemies to the present Establishment; not because it is an ill one, or because those who administer it betray their Trust, (which is a just and reasonable Ground of Complaint) but because they themselves are not in it: If they be so, all is well; but if they cannot be accepted upon their own Terms, or are afterwards turned out for Misbehaviour, then there is no Faith in Man, Fundamentals are struck at, no honest Man can serve, and keep his Integrity, and there is no Remedy but a total Change; and if that happen, and they can get into Power, nothing is mended but their own Faces and their Fortunes.

Men who think "of nothing but their "Fodder" merely *pretend* to oppose oppression.[36]

Trenchard doubts he can make the Jacobites "wiser" by demonstrating how impossible it is to bring "their wild Projects to bear." Still, he does try to show those who support a restoration that their hopes are vain. He warns that they are "taking

[34]Ibid., pp. 119, 123, 124, 122, 121.
[35]Black, "Introduction," p. 10.
[36]*Cato's Letters*, No. 82, pp. 133-4.

abundance of Pains, and running much Hazard, to attain what they will never catch." Your "Passions and Prejudices hurry" you away from what are your "real Interests, to pursue Shadows and Imaginations, and to make those [Whigs] whose greatness" you so "envy, yet much greater." The Whigs, Trenchard astutely cautions, will be the real winners. Those who side with the Pretender at the Stuart Court in exile will "sell their Master to those who can or will give most for him, which will be ever those who have got most by keeping him out." You will be told, as always, that "the Prince must submit to the Necessity of his Affairs; that his Enemies must be brought into his Interest, who may be otherwise able to perplex his new Government." (Trenchard says the Cavaliers were victims of just such an experience at the Restoration of Charles II but he could be thinking about 1689-90 when William III said he needed the Tories.) You Jacobites will find yourselves waiting for your turn

> after two or three Years daily Attendance, with old Coats new furbished, some good Words, now and then a good Dinner, and the Honour of whispering and joking with his Lordship, [you] ... will find [yourselves] ... just where [you] set out, only with less Money.

Then, Trenchard predicts, you Jacobites will have to become "new Malecontents" and form yourselves into a new "Faction" against the very government you ventured your lives to bring about.[37] To a certain degree, Trenchard is also describing his own political experience. He, like many radical Whigs who had hazarded their lives and personal fortunes for the Prince of Orange despised William III's employment of Tory "Knaves." after the 1688-89 Revolution.

Two of "Cato's" essays seem directed at Whig Jacobites, a political group that has only recently come to the attention of scholars of post-Revolution Britain. Comments about radical Whigs who take the Jacobite route are very limited. But Trenchard's letters against those who pursue the "Phantome of a Commonwealth" hint a belief that radical, Jacobite Whigs do exist. Apart from Whigs who dabble with Jacobitism--"Wildman, Monmouth, Bolton and Montague"--or intrigue with the Jacobites--"the duke of Marlborough, earl Cowper, the earl of Sunderland, possibly Lords Orford and Chesterfield"--there are few serious and sincere converts to the Pretender: "the young Lord Wharton and Lord Rialton," are two known examples of this curious but explicable political mutation:

> The marquess of Wharton, son of the Junto purist, and Viscount Rialton, grandson of the first earl of Godolphin, both argued in the 1720s that true whiggism must entail a rejection of the Hanoverian dynasty which had corrupted its party champions. 'The reasons which my Father gave for the

[37]Ibid., p. 140 and pp. 135-6. See also No. 83.

> supporting of the Hanover Succession', wrote Wharton, 'fall to the ground & those who follow the Maxims of the Old Whigs are obliged to resist such destructive Tyranny unless they forget their Principles'.[38]

Numerous radical Whigs did remain loyal to James II after the Revolution and constituted "the little noticed phenomenon of 'Whig Jacobitism'."[39] Whig Jacobitism remains unexamined and since it is not clear what, exactly, Whig Jacobites hoped to achieve through a Stuart restoration, it is impossible to know whether Trenchard is referring to them when he does, clearly, address whose who seek a popular form of government. Trenchard may, on the other hand, be trying to allay conservative fears of republicanism. He does, though, direct his discussion to those who "think that a Number of Men agreeing together, can make and hold a Commonwealth." It could, of course, be merely a pretence: under the guise of addressing "Commonwealthmen," "Cato," the radical Whig, disassociates himself from republicanism. Apart from the question of the actual intentions behind these two essays, Trenchard's response to would-be "Commonwealthmen" constitutes a very valuable discussion of "Cato's" perception of the nature of the British government.[40]

Trenchard insists that "Liberty may be better preserved by a well-poised Monarchy, than by any popular Government" in spite of the "Forms" of government that exist in the imagination of some men. He says he will show that the possibility of bringing about a popular form of government is nil. Given the existing distribution of property,

> we can preserve Liberty by no other Establishment than what we have; and in the Attempt to alter it, must run great Hazard of losing what we are in Possession of, or perhaps of falling into an Absolute Monarchy, or at best must return to the same Form again, as we have done once already by such Feats of Gallantry [he refers to the Restoration of 1660].[41]

All governments are, explains Trenchard, "limited Monarchies, simple Aristocracies, Democracies, or Mixtures of them." All types of government, including both their "Operations" and their "Continuance," depend "upon the Distribution and Alteration of the Ballance of Property." Trenchard, as previously indicated in chapter three, realizes property can and will change hands, as it had under the early Tudors. He speaks of the reality of some "floating of Property"--fluctuation and changes in wealth--and believed "the great Secret in Politicks" is to observe carefully socio-

[38]Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy*, pp. 49 and 201. See also *Cato's Letters*, Nos. 84 and 85.
[39]Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31 (March 1983), p. 77; and idem, "The Roots of True Whiggism," pp. 217, 224, and see especially 228-9.
[40]*Cato's Letters*, No. 85, p. 160.
[41]Ibid., p. 159.

economic changes and "to adjust" the political power to the natural power (wealth and authority in a condition of befitting correspondence) "by prudent Precautions and timely Remedies, and not put Nature to the Expence of Throws and Convulsions to do her own Work." For example, explains Trenchard, in a limited monarchy, "which cannot subsist without a Nobility," it may be necessary to augment the number of peers (Trenchard always objected to the peerage bill and his and Walpole's names compete for the authorship of a famous pamphlet against the bill)[42] in order "to ballance the great Weight of the People, and support the Crown." If, on the other hand, the nobles have more power "than is consistent with the Dependence [of the Nobility] upon the Monarch, it is right to create no more." And if the people, through

> Trade and Industry grow so fast, that neither Crown nor Nobles, nor both Together, can keep pace with them, then there is no way left but, to let the former [the people] enjoy all they can hope to get by a Struggle, and voluntarily to give up all odious Powers of doing Mischief, though miscalled Prerogative; which must ever be understood to be a Power of doing good, when ordinary Provisions fail, and are insufficient.[43]

Elizabeth is, as mentioned previously, Trenchard's prime example of how a monarch exercises prudent, astute moderation and beneficent conduct. She faced the fact that property rested, after the sale of the monastic lands, with the gentry and that they, thus, deserved an augmentation of their power in the House of Commons.

But the settling of a Commonwealth in England today, according to Trenchard, is impossible given the nature of the existing distribution of property:

> Now it is certain, that the Distribution of Property in *England,* is adapted to our present Establishment. The Nobility and Gentry have great Possessions, and the former have great Privileges and Distinctions by the Constitution, and the latter have them in Fact ... For their Birth and Fortunes procure them easy Admittance into the Legislature; and their near Approach to the Throne gives them Pretences of honourable and profitable Employments, which create a Dependence from the inferior Part of Mankind; and the Nature of many of

[42][John Trenchard], "The Thoughts of a Member of the Lower House, in Relation to a Project for Restraining and Limiting the Power of the Crown in the Future Creation of Peers," in *A Collection of Tracts,* 1, pp. 107-15. Plumb attributes this pamphlet to Walpole; see J. H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman* (Clifton, N.J.: August M. Kelley Publishers, 1973; first published in 1956), p. 276; but Sedgwick, ed., *The House of Commons 1715-1754,* 2, believes Trenchard is the author, see under "Trenchard, John." See E. R. Turner, "The Peerage Bill of 1719," *English Historical Review* 28 (April 1913), pp. 243-59; and John F. Naylor, ed., *The British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719,* Problems in European History: A Documentary Collection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[43]*Cato's Letters,* No. 84, pp. 153-5.

> their Estates, and particularly of their Mannors, adds to that Dependence. Now all these [Nobility and Gentry] must ever be in the Interest of Monarchy, whilst they are in their own Interest; since Monarchy supports and keeps up this Distinction, and subsists by it; for it is senseless to imagine, that Men who have great Possessions, will ever put themselves upon the level with those who have none, or with such as depend upon them for Subsistence or Protection, whom they will always think they have a Right to govern or influence, and will be ever able to govern, whilst they keep their Possessions, and a monarchical Form of Government, and therefore will always endeavour to keep it.[44]

All social, religious, and economic groups of any significance have to "be in the Interest of Monarchy" as long as they are "in their own Interest," which for "Cato" is, of course, perennial self-interest intrinsic to his vision of human nature. Men will always "govern and influence those whom they employ, feed, and clothe" and such is a "natural Power" which determines the political.[45]

Thus, given the "present Situation"--the distribution of property as it exists in England and the limited monarchy that corresponds to that natural power--Trenchard hopes no one has "a Head so wrong turned, as to imagine that any Man or Number of Men ... can ever get Power enough to turn all the Possessions of *England* topsy-turvy, and throw them into Average." Without just such an alteration in the distribution of property, the establishment of a Republican Commonwealth is, for him, sheer fantasy. Everyone supports the monarchical system. Apart from the nobility and gentry, the bishops, dignitaries, governing clergy, and "all who have good Preferments in the Church, or hope to get them, are in the Interest of Monarchy." Churchmen know very well "that a popular Government would take away all Possessions which it should think fit to call superfluous" and popular governors will "be apt to reason, that Christianity would fare never the worse if its Professors [the clergy] were less Politicians." (One notes in Trenchard's tone a certain attraction for that idea even though he feels absolutely obligated, given his mechanistic concept of the determinative relationship between property and power, to tell "Commonwealth-men" that monarchy in England cannot be dismantled.) "All great and exclusive Companies are in the Interest of Monarchy," no matter what "weak People have alledged to the contrary," because business corporations

> can much easier preserve their separate and unwarrantable Privileges by Applications to the Vices and Passions of a Court, than by convincing a popular Assembly; and for the same Reason, all Officers who have great Salaries and exorbitant Fees must ever be sure Friends to Monarchy.

[44]Ibid., No. 85, pp. 160-1.

[45]Ibid., Nos. 84 and 85 passim.

The merchant class as well and, indeed, says Trenchard, "all rich Men, will be equally in the same Interest," that of a monarchical form of government.[46]

Now Trenchard refuses to entertain the question whether a "limited Monarchy" or a "democratical Form of Government" is "the best Government in Theory." Instead, he states that

> I think I may safely affirm, that it is impossible to contend against all these Interests, and the Crown too, which is almost a Match for them all together; so that the Phantome of a Commonwealth must vanish, and never appear again but in disordered Brains.[47]

One cannot help suspecting the "disordered Brains" belong to High-Tories in whose heads spectres of radical-Whig republicanism dwell. Once more is known about Whig Jacobites, such questions as whether Trenchard is refuting extant "Commonwealthmen" or easing High-Tory fears of "Cato," may be resolved.

Trenchard offers additional cautions in the months before the commencement of the first session of the new Parliament. He discusses economic and foreign policies. He expresses some apprehension about the government making impositions and the Members of Parliament, totally dependent upon the ministry for protection against rebellion, conceding to them. The administration may try to extract from Parliament what would, under normal conditions, be difficult to obtain. Trenchard tells the future Parliament that true loyalty to the King--a "true Duty to his Majesty"--would be to oppose "in the most vigorous Manner" those "Measures [taxes] as threaten them all with Ruin." "Cato" wants Parliament to reject policies that would be, Trenchard believes, very unpopular.[48]

Trenchard warns those who soon will sit in the House of Commons to avoid foreign entanglements. When a "new Fire" seemed to be "kindling in *Italy*," Trenchard hopes England will "have Wit enough to keep out of its Reach" and like "some of our wiser Neighbours, lie still, and know how to make our Markets of the Follies and Misfortunes of others." He urges "the utmost Resentment against any ill-designing Persons, who would wickedly and traiterously sacrifice a great, free, and

[46]Ibid., No. 85, pp. 160-2.

[47]Ibid., p. 162. See No. 81, pp. 126-29, where Trenchard makes a conscious effort to dismiss talk about "the Danger of settling *Presbytery* in *England*"; such fears are, like the "Phantome of a Commonwealth," pure "Chimera."

> "Trenchard indeed condemned the Presbyterians for the democratic element in their polity which supported a claim of their church's independence of the civil power ... the same claim as that made by the Nonjurors" (Clark, *English Society*, p. 291).

[48]Ibid., No. 86, p. 175. See No. 85, p. 165; and No. 86 passim.

opulent Kindgdom [*sic*], to mad Whimsies, or the pitiful mean Interests of little States [Italy]."[49]

Trenchard does not know, presumably, that Walpole would soon be pursuing a peace policy, at any price, to help diminish the Jacobite threat. Trenchard is here recommending what will be Walpole's central foreign policy and for the same reasons. In fact, Walpole did avoid the cost and political tension that an assertive foreign policy would produce among Tory landholders already burdened with heavy taxes. Walpole's foreign policy reflected his desire to prevent provocative taxes and conspicuous Whig profits and thus deny Jacobites at home and abroad propitious conditions for a Stuart restoration that a foreign enemy would welcome and probably aid.[50]

The Whig Ministry and "Cato"

Before the arrest of Atterbury when there is still little concrete evidence about the plot, "Cato" conscientiously warns the Whig ministry not "to take Measures to keep" the Pretender "out, as will be more terrible to the People than letting him in, if such can possibly be." Those whose "Duty and Interest in the highest Manner" is to prevent counterrevolution are, explains "Cato," the very ones who can, in fact, and might, actually, "pave the Way" for the Pretender's "Return." "The only dangerous *Jacobites*" I really fear, "Cato" poignantly argues, are those who resort to "the same Methods to keep out the Son, as turned out the Father."[51] In another letter, "Cato" explains how, by way of comparison, Oliver Cromwell and his "Partizans" foolishly claimed absolutist measures were "the only Expedient to ballance Factions, and to keep out *Charles Stuart;* and so they did worse Things to keep him out, than he could have done if they had let him in." Thus it was that a Stuart restoration did, indeed, occur. "Cato" unveils, as well, a similar folly committed by those from the other end of the political spectrum:

> And, after the King's Restoration, when there was an Attempt made to make him absolute, by enabling him to raise Money without Parliament ... it was alledged to be the only Expedient to keep the Nation from falling back into a Commonwealth; as if any Commonwealth upon Earth were not better than any Absolute Monarchy.[52]

"Cato's" main objective is to caution everyone against recourse to arbitrary

[49]Ibid., No. 86, pp. 166 and 175.

[50]See Black, "Introduction," pp. 2-4; and idem, "Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole," pp. 145-69.

[51]*Cato's Letters*, No. 82, p. 140; No. 83, p. 141; and No. 80, p. 119.

[52]Ibid., No. 94, pp. 240-1.

actions that will only provide enemies with yet more, real grounds for criticizing the Hanoverian-Whig regime. Whig oppressions serve the Jacobites. Those who want a Stuart restoration are enabled to encourage and justify rebellion upon warranted accusations of Whig authoritarianism. "Cato" is anxious

> to convince better People, that they ought not to be bullied by the Sound of *Jacobitism,* and so diverted from concurring in the necessary Measures to serve their King, their Country, and themselves, by Bugbears and Phantoms.

He hopes, at the same time, that the "Nobility, Clergy, Gentry, rich Merchants, and the Body of the People" who are not Jacobites will "concur in such Measures as will most effectually preserve our Establishment" by aggressively endorsing severe punishment of "all who shall dare to interpose between the King and the Subject."[53] (Once Trenchard is, with the commencement of Parliament [9 October 1722], sitting in the House of Commons, he calls for the use of attainder against one of the Atterbury conspirators!)

In the late summer of 1722 when Walpole and the Whig ministry were highly vulnerable to accusations of raising the bogey of Jacobitism, Trenchard and Gordon write a very aggressive work on standing armies, accusing the government of taking advantage of a Jacobite scare to raise and station large numbers of troops at home. In that long and frankly devastating diatribe against the existing soldiers Trenchard and Gordon do accuse the Whigs of raising a bogey:

> what are we to keep up the Army now to do, unless to keep out the Small-Pox? Oh! but there is a better Reason than that, namely, a Plot is discovered, and we cannot find out yet all who are concerned in it.

This suggestively titled *Discourse of Standing Armies; Shewing the Folly, Uselessness, and Danger, of Standing Armies in Great Britain* first appeared as a pamphlet because the government took over *The London Journal* just at the moment that "Discourse" was scheduled to appear in that newspaper. Although "Cato" tells the Whig ministers that armies constitute "a preposterous Remedy" because they are, in contrast to the punishment of "the present Conspirators," a "Provocation" to new, additional hostilities, he does end his "Reasonings against Standing Armies" on a more accommodating note:

> By what I have before said, I would not be understood, to declare absolutely against continuing our present Forces, or increasing them, if the Importance of the Occasion required either; and the Evils threatened be not yet dissipated.

[53]Ibid., No. 82, p. 140; No. 80, p. 121; and see No. 83, p. 148.

> But I could wish, that if such an Occasion appear, those who think them at this Time necessary, would declare effectually, and in the fullest Manner, that they design to keep them no longer than during the present Emergency; and that, when it is over, they will be as ready to break them, as I believe the Nation will be to give them, when just Reasons offer themselves for doing so.[54]

But, in his next essay, "Cato" seems to be furious with the government.[55] Trenchard and Gordon express outraged indignation when the government usurps *The London Journal* in spite of the fact that their friend, Benjamin Hoadly, now contributes to that newspaper each week for Robert Walpole. Since February 1722, the government had been planning the purchase of *The London Journal,* but did not seem particularly anxious to take it over.[56] What, exactly, prompted the government to act that September is not clear. Perhaps, Walpole wanted to take advantage of its large circulation--10,000 copies at its height in 1721--to provide Bishop Hoadly with a popular journal the better to counteract High-Tory newspaper and pamphlet propaganda. Walpole and/or Townshend were far more aware of the proportions of the Jacobite plans and needed to obtain additional information to secure convictions against those prisoners they held and those they were about to arrest. If Trenchard and Gordon planned to publish their attack on standing armies in *The London Journal,* which was, most likely, their intention, the ministers probably considered the diatribe dangerously critical of the government. Parliament was about to meet and Walpole wanted full cooperation. He expected support for an immediate suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. With Trenchard and Gordon telling future Members of Parliament to avoid enactment of any oppressive legislation and questioning the need for troops, Walpole must have wanted to stop the publication of such a "Discourse" in the most successful newspaper of the time.

"Cato" now sends his letters to *The British Journal* and the first few editions of that newspaper carry, at its head, the following statement:

> The Managers of the London Journal having made some Difficulty to publish some of CATO's Letters, written upon the same popular subjects which they had publish'd for near Two Years together with no small Success; has made it necessary for him to publish these Letters hereafter in this Journal; where Care will be taken, that no such Remora's will be thrown in their Way. And the Publick is left to judge, whether there can be any other Objection against the Letters publish'd here, than against those publish'd heretofore in the

[54]Ibid., No. 95, pp. 254 and 257. See also No. 94.

[55]Ibid., No. 96.

[56]Realey, "*The London Journal* and Its Authors, 1720-1723," pp. 20-6; and Hanson, *Government and the Press 1695-1763*, pp. 106-7.

London Journal? And whether CATO has, in any Instance, chang'd his Conduct or his Politicks.[57]

In response to the government's takeover, Trenchard publishes two pertinent essays on "Libels" in which he asserts the right of private men to judge and censure the actions of their superiors. Men in positions of authority get carried away with their power and take "it into their Heads to call themselves the Government." These individuals, dizzy with their own sense of superiority, assume that others should "sit still, act as they bade them, and ... follow their Motions." They label all complaints, "*every* Opposition to their wild and ravenous Schemes, and *every* Attempt to preserve the People's Right," with "the odious Names of Sedition and Faction"; those who make those criticisms are charged "with Principles and Practices inconsistent with the Safety of all Government." The right or "Liberty" to judge and censure those in power is "approved or condemned by all Men, and all Parties, in proportion as they were advantaged, or annoyed by it." What are called "Libels" are merely criticisms which "undoubtedly," asserts Trenchard, "keep great Men in Awe, and are some Check upon their Behaviour, by shewing them the Deformity of their Actions, as well as warning other People to be upon their Guard against Oppression."[58]

Although Trenchard admits that complaints can be dangerously divisive, he dismisses the possibility in this case as outweighed by the promised benefit of constructive criticism. Gordon explained earlier that restraint of the press serves no good purpose and Trenchard says even more bluntly that it is particularly "mischievous ... to put the Press under the Direction of the prevailing Party." Trenchard articulates his viewpoint in terms that coincide with his aspiration for a nation of informed, thinking individuals:

> Whilst all Opinions are equally indulged, and all Parties equally allowed to speak their Minds, the Truth will come out; and even, if they be all restrained, common Sense will often get the better; but to give one Side Liberty to say what they will, and not suffer the other to say any Thing, even in their own Defence, is comprehensive of all the Evils that any Nation can groan under, and must soon extinguish every Seed of Religion, Liberty, Virtue or Knowledge.[59]

Yet, at the same time, explains Trenchard, "I would not be understood by what I have said, to argue that Men should have an uncontrolled Liberty to calumniate their Superiors." But there exist "good Laws to punish any Abuses."

[57]*The British Journal,* Nos. I-IV (22 September 1722-13 October 1722).
[58]*Cato's Letters,* No. 100, p. 293. See also No. 101.
[59]Ibid., No. 100, p. 295.

> The Independent *Whigs* think all Liberty to depend upon Freedom of Speech, and Freedom of Writing, within the Bounds of Manners and Discretion, as conceiving that there is often no other Way left to be heard by their Superiors, nor to apprize their Countrymen of Designs and Conspiracies against their Safety; which they think ought to be done boldly, though in respect to Authority, as modestly as can be consistent with the making themselves understood.[60]

A month before Trenchard's "Discourses on Libels," Gordon complains that the free exercise of one of "the legal and undoubted Liberties of *England,*" had been stigmatized as "Libelling." The "extravagant, arbitrary, and violent Methods" the government had taken against, presumably, *The London Journal* "to suppress the very Sound" of "Liberty" was his main target. In his reference to the "wild, fickle, and giddy," nature of man, he seems to have in mind the Whig ministers and their attitudes towards "Cato." ["We/"us"/"our" mean Whig ministers and "those"/ "their"/"them"/"they" refer to Trenchard and Gordon]

> We are enraged at those who will not renounce their Sense, to follow us in our Anger; and are angry at them for being Angry, when we have made them so ... We cannot forgive those who will not join us; and if they do, we do not forgive them when we change, if they do not change too.

But, five months later, "Cato" publicly apologizes for his pamphlet on standing armies and for his failure to recognize the reality and scope of Jacobite plans for a restoration. The authors of *Cato's Letters* "fancied" themselves "the only wise Men in the Nation" and ridiculed "the Alarm given on the first Discovery of a Plot." "Cato" had thought "it only a politic Step, a new Subject invented to drown ... the old One; and in short, a Plot to stifle our Resentments against the *South Sea* Transactions." Now, in the spring of 1723, "we see the Greatness of our Folly."[61]

"Cato" on Jacobitism

In their final essays, especially the last six "On the Conspiracy," Trenchard and Gordon speak very openly and bluntly about Jacobitism and unveil what had been, for more than three years, their major concerns. By the spring of 1723, Trenchard and Gordon have played out one of their primary roles. They no longer pay particular attention to ideas from the Lockean, radical-Whig canon because that effort--to transmit radical-Whig ideology and check antithetical doctrines and to lead men down legal, loyal paths of political protest and divert them from seditious solutions-

[60]Ibid., p. 299; and No. 101, p. 304.
[61]Ibid., No. 96, pp. 259 and 262-3; and "A Short View of the Conspiracy ... by Cato," p. 128.

-is no longer applicable to present circumstances. Since the conspiracy they always feared has surfaced, Trenchard and Gordon address themselves, directly, to the politicians, the clergymen, and the people who support a Jacobite rebellion that a Whig minister assiduously (albeit neurotically) combats. Trenchard and Gordon do, though, sustain their admonitory and advisory roles. They continue to address the government about policies and conduct that contribute to popular discontent. But "Cato" now suggests that the government's recourse to oppressive legislation constitutes a necessary Whig-government deterrence against the existence and dangers of Jacobite conspirators.

Trenchard and Gordon's discussions of Jacobitism offer, even if obliquely, suggestive insights into what was for them and other Whigs a highly problematical political conjuncture. "Cato" admits that Jacobitism plays havoc with sincere censurers, like himself. Out of an authentic concern for the need to secure popular allegiance, "Cato" aggressively exhorts the government to pursue proper measures but Jacobites also censure and even dress their censures in the rhetoric of "Liberty." Those who sincerely defend "Liberty" in a way that does "not bring a greater Inconvenience" pursue "commendable," "just Attempts" to improve matters, but Trenchard and Gordon make it clear that Jacobites only sound "the Cries of Liberty" to rouse the populace against the Hanoverian-Whig regime. What real commitment, asks "Cato," have Jacobites ever shown "to the Cause of Liberty?" He answers:

> It is plain that they have never taken the sacred Sound into their Mouths, but to profane it; nor pretended to cherish it, but in order to destroy it, and make it an unnatural Ladder to Tyranny. As often as Dominion has been in their own Hands, Liberty became a Crime, and a Sign of Sedition; and as often as they wanted to destroy Power, that is, as often as they were out of it, they prostituted the Spirit of Liberty to the Service of Treason.

The conspirators merely cry up "Liberty" in order, says "Cato" "to animate you against a Government that protected it, and under the Pretence of affecting Liberty, to introduce a Tyranny that would destroy Soul, Body, and Property." Trenchard and Gordon give very explicit expression to their awareness, implicit throughout "Cato's" letters, of political leaders intentionally encouraging disaffection in the name of "Liberty." "Cato" boasts about knowing the Jacobites' game and being able to use them for his own purposes, but he is forced to admit that those, like himself, "who laugh at their Follies, and are not afraid of being over-reached and out-witted" by the Jacobites, are frequently accused of being part of Jacobite "Designs."[62]

[62]Ibid., No. 82, p. 133; No. 129, pp. 203-5; and No. 82, p. 140. See also No. 128, pp. 194-5.

Trenchard and Gordon unravel what was, certainly, their political dilemma. On the one hand, "Cato" considers the government itself, to a significant degree, responsible for Jacobitism. Trenchard tells Walpole, in no uncertain terms, that if

> some Men ... had set themselves at the Head of the Prosecutions against the South-Sea Directors, and their Directors, Agents and Accomplices, ... the Name of *Jacobite* had been as contemptible as it is now dreadful; and a few Constables might possibly have saved the Charge of a great many Camps.[63]

Gordon is even more explicit about the South-Sea crisis opening the door to Jacobitism. The conspirators

> saw, that great Numbers, who had always hated them and their Pretender, were now, under heavy Misfortunes, and in the present Agonies of their Soul, brought to think not unkindly of him and his Cause, or to be entirely indifferent about it. They said they were undone, and could not be worse undone; and that nothing in human Shape, or in any Shape, could use them so ill as the Directors had; the execrable, rich, and unhanged Directors.[64]

On the other hand, the very existence of Jacobites intimidates men in Parliament; that is, Jacobitism forces men to protect the Hanoverian-Whig ministry. Trenchard, with poignant irony, tells the Jacobites that they were, in fact, "the only Friends in the Kingdom which some Persons of Figure [the South-Sea directors and men of rank, like Sunderland, involved in the South-Sea frauds] lately had, without intending to be so."[65] Those "who deal in Revolutions, are seldom Conjurers in politicks." Instead, such "doughty Politicians" fail to recognize the fact "that they are doing the Work which they pretend to oppose."

> It is certain, that their ill-digested Libels, without the least Notions of the Principles of Government, or shewing the least Disposition to mend it; their stupid Cant of a Right in Princes independent of the Happiness of the Society; their ill-mannered Reflections upon the Person of the Sovereign, whom most of them have sworn to, and their constant Invectives and Reproaches upon all Men, who are honester and wiser than themselves, do more Mischief to this Country, than their united Force, Counsels and Understandings could do Good, if they were inclinable to do it.[66]

Seditious divine-right men are the very ones who make it possible for the gov-

[63]Ibid., No. 97, p. 270.
[64]Ibid., No. 125, pp. 169-70.
[65]Ibid., No. 82, p. 140.
[66]Ibid., pp. 139-40.

ernment to obtain sufficient political support to acquit a guilty minister and to get oppressive legislation through Parliament. Repressive, anti-libertarian laws--the Riot Act, suspensions of Habeas Corpus, the Septennial Act--and other odious realities--a standing army, a large national debt, the use of public money to purchase political support--can be justified and seem, to some, warranted defenses against potential rebellion. Jacobitism thwarts the successful pursuit of proper measures that would serve to ameliorate discontent (for example, severe retribution against South-Sea directors and Whig peculators) and would, thus, help to make the House of Hanover deservingly popular. "Cato," who demands the government rectify economic injustice and considers resolution not only proper but necessary to avoid rebellion, realizes that the seditious exploitation of discontent frightens many and makes them unwilling, under such a conjuncture, to jeopardize the survival of the Whig ministry.

"Cato" addresses property-holders and tells them he approves of their "Love and Pursuit of Liberty" and is more than ready to lead them or follow them "in that virtuous and noble Pursuit," feeling he and they still possess "the Means left within our Constitution to save ourselves." Most of all, he points out, they enjoy, "in spite of Malice and Contumelies" to the contrary, an "excellent, meek, and benevolent Prince, who has in no one Instance of his Reign attempted to strain his Prerogative above the Laws." And he defies King George's bitterest enemies to say the same about even "the best of their favourite Kings, his Predecessors." But, emphasizes "Cato," "if we would make ourselves secure, we must make him secure." Yet, it is impossible, says "Cato," to make the Hanoverian monarchy secure in face of the "constant Conspiracies of Traytors." He explains just why. When "Corruption" (meaning the South Sea Scheme/Bubble/fraudulence) occurred, and there were, as "it cannot be denied but there have been," some evident "Excesses of Power," men loyal to the Hanoverian succession--"honest" men-- held back from "severe Animadversion" on public criminals and their crimes. Those "honest" Members of Parliament had to forego an aggressive denunciation of public corruption when they knew that "Traytors," in constant conspiracy, "rejoiced in those Crimes" and "pursued" those criminals "with no Design to rectify Abuses" but, instead, with a design "to inflame Discontents."[67]

Trenchard and Gordon always admit that complaints, although made falsely in the name of "Liberty" by conspirators, against taxes, "consuming pensions," suspensions of Habeas Corpus, a potential war policy, and the large standing army are warranted ones. They also recognize, of course, that the recent "hellish Management of the *South-Sea* Scheme" produced another Topick of Resentment and Complaint, and a just one, whatever unjust Uses the Conspirators made of it." The "tender and slow Prosecution of the execrable Managers" as well as "the gentle Punishment

[67]Ibid., No. 129, pp. 203-4.

inflicted upon them" gave further "Provocations to a plundered and abused Nation, and fresh Stimulations to the Conspirators."[68] Jacobitism flourished because the Whigs themselves had failed to provide the people with palpable evidence of justice. The South Sea crisis opened the door to Jacobitism just as "Cato" had always feared.

But, even though "Cato" can "freely own, that many Things have been done which cannot be justified," that many "Measures gave much Sorrow and Indignation to the best Friends of the Government," he does not doubt and deeply resents the "Pleasure and Hope" that the abuse of the public credit, suspensions of Habeas Corpus, pensions, bribery, debts, taxes, and standing armies gave "to the Disaffected."

> The Cry therefore of the Conspirators against unpopular Proceedings, was all Hypocrisy, and false Fire: They saw their mischievous influence and rejoiced in it: They thought that they were saved the Danger and Trouble of Plotting....[69]

It was to hold the door shut against the threat of Jacobitism that "Cato," for almost three years, had prevailed upon the Hanoverian-Whig ministry and Parliament to shun unpopular measures and to court, with proper policies, the nation's affections.

Now "Cato" confronts the terrible reality he had tried to deter. "Cato" does not limit his discussion of the Atterbury Conspiracy to a mere verification of what Trenchard and Gordon had warned against for sometime. These radical Whigs also admonish the credulous populace for its foolish attachments: you, the "People,"

> are blindly governed by certain Chiefs, who can have no View but to dispose of you; to make Sale of you for their own proper Advantage. By prating Pedants, and disaffected Monks, and by Party-Cries, and Party-Revelling, and Hogsheads of *October*, you are brought to adore this Duke, that Lord, and the other Knight or Squire; and to think the Publick undone, unless it be under the sole Management of these your Idols, who would effectually undo it. They once had Places: Had you then more Money, more Trade, or more Land and Liberty, by any wise or virtuous Conduct of theirs, than you have now? And did they not take that Opportunity of your generous Confidence in them, to betray you basely to *France* and the Pretender? And have they not ever since been labouring, by Plots and Rebellion, to accomplish that, which, from the Shortness of their Reign, and the sudden Change, they could not then accomplish by Power?[70]

[68]Ibid., No. 129, p. 204; and No. 125, pp. 168-70.
[69]Ibid., No. 125, p. 164.
[70]Ibid., No. 129.

"Cato" even holds the High-Tories, along with their followers among the populace, accountable for the very existence of "unpopular Proceedings." Those, in other words, who support a Stuart restoration are, rants "Cato," the very ones responsible for taxes, debts, standing armies, suspensions of Habeas Corpus, and costly pensions.

> They exclaim against Armies and Taxes, and are the Cause of both, rail at Grievances of their own creating.
>
> To whom, Gentlemen, do we owe all our present Debts and Misfortunes? Even to those who opposed all the Measures for raising effectual Supplies in the first War, and ended the second by a Scandalous Peace, which left us in Insecurity and Danger, and made more Taxes and more Debts necessary to our Security.
>
> Who make Armies necessary, but they, who would invade, and enslave or destroy us by Armies, foreign Popish Armies? Who make Taxes necessary, but they, who by daily conspiring against the Establishment which secures both, force us to give Part to save all.[71]

This reasoning about "Taxes and Armies" applies equally to "the Suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act" as well:

> They complain of the Suspension as a heavy Evil; and by their incessant Plots and Rebellions, make long and frequent Suspensions inevitable. By their eternal Designs and Attacks upon us, they force us upon the next Means of Self-Preservation; and then complain of Oppression, because we will not suffer them to oppress and destroy us. It is therefore owing to them, that the Subject is taken from under the Protection of the common Law, and left to the Discretion of the Court. Who says that this is desirable? But who makes it necessary, or gives a Pretence for it?

We owe, decries "Cato," not only taxes, debts, armies, and suspensions of Habeas Corpus but "so many consuming Pensions" to those who by "their constant Plots, Conspiracies, and Rebellions, have given Occasions, or Pretences, for these great Evils and Excesses."[72] (For "Cato," those measures still remain, though, major political "Evils.")

"Every other Complaint of the Conspirators" can, with equal ease, asserts "Cato," "be turned upon them." But instead of further discussion of that theme, he prefers to make another comment on the High-Tory conspirators. "Cato" does not mince words about how Tory-Jacobites lead their followers to sedition:

[71]Ibid., No. 125, p. 167; and No. 129, p. 204.
[72]Ibid., No. 125, pp. 168-9; and No. 129, p. 204.

> the Conspirators have, by the Assistance of malicious Calumnies, blind Prejudices, gross Ignorance, and constant Misrepresentations, misled and abused their Party, and governed them by abusing them: That they have wickedly taught them to hate a Government, which, with all the Faults, true or false, that their worse Malice can charge it with, does just as far excel that which they would introduce, as the Blessings and Beauties of Liberty transcend the horrid Deformities of Slavery, and the implacable and destroying Spirit of *Popish* Tyranny: That they have wickedly taught them to be weary of their present free Condition; which with all its Disadvantages, Debts, and Taxes, is easy and happy, greatly and conspicuously happy, in Comparison of any Condition of any People under any *Popish* Prince now upon Earth: That they have, by perpetual Delusion and Lies, worked them to a Readiness, nay, a Passion, to venture and sacrifice their whole Property, rather than pay a Part to secure the Whole; and to wish for a Revolution, a *Popish* Revolution, which will neither leave them their Property, their Conscience, nor their Bible.[73]

Although Trenchard and Gordon believe many High Tories constantly mislead the people and even admit some degree of Whig necessity in face of Jacobitism, Trenchard and Gordon continue to exhort the Whig government to take heed of disaffection and to avoid any actions and/or measures--taxes, standing armies, financial manipulation, suspensions of Habeas Corpus, expensive pensions--that provoke discontent and provide ammunition to conspiratorial leaders. "There is no Possibility of preserving our happy Establishment" in the long run except

> by gaining and caressing the People, by making them easy and happy, by letting them find their Account in his Majesty's Reign; and by giving no Handles for just Reproach, or Pretences for Contumely, to those who would make no other Use of them but to destroy us all.[74]

"Cato" does not consider a Whig Court the original agent of extant unpopularity towards Whigs, Whiggery, and the Hanoverian succession. Trenchard and Gordon believe, above all else, that the unwillingness of the Whigs to legislate against the Church of England, the real source of much disaffection in their opinion, forces the Whig government to depend upon policies and to pursue methods that permit politicians, especially factious disloyalists, to criticize the Hanoverian-Whig regime in the name of "Liberty." Failure to act against clericalism means the Hanoverian-Whig government must resort to measures that, given their inevitable unpopularity, serve the Stuart cause, that open the door to Jacobitism. Instead of controlling the

[73]Ibid., No. 125, p. 172.
[74]Ibid., No. 129, p. 206.

universities and High-Anglican influence in the charity schools, Whigs "disoblige all their Friends to gratify their Enemies, whom yet they cannot gratify."[75]

> They [the conspirators] could ... have made no dangerous Progress in this Mischief and Hypocrisy, if those who have always professed, and whose Interest it would have been always to have supported and practised free and beneficent Principles, had not deserted those Principles, and armed by that Desertion the Enemies to all that is good and virtuous, with an Opportunity of turning Liberty upon herself.[76]

As long as the "Principles of our Nobility and Gentry are debauched in our Universities, and those of our common People in our Charity-Schools,

> any one, without much Skill in Politicks, may safely affirm, That our present Establishment cannot long subsist. A free Government must subsist upon the Affections of the People; and if those Affections be perpetually debauched; if the Education of Youth be altogether inconsistent with the Nature of it; and if it [the survival of a free Government] must depend only upon Converts, Pensions, or Armies, its Duration cannot be long, without a constant Succession of Miracles.[77]

Naturally and very significantly, Trenchard and Gordon discuss the role of clergymen in their analysis of a Jacobite conspiracy headed by the Bishop of Rochester. In addition to two addresses "to those of the Clergy who are fond of the *Pretender* and his Causes," and numerous specific comments on the Church and Churchmen in their other four examinations "On the Conspiracy," the last seven "Letters" to *The British Journal* before "Cato's Farewell" (27 July 1723) echo the message of *The Independent Whig*. In fact "Cato" cites that work to support his critique of clerical claims to the "Indelible Character."[78]

"Cato" indicts the High-Anglican clergy for their inconsistency. He suggests the disaffected clergy are "a great Majority," then asks them, rhetorically:

> Are not you the Men who professed such blind, such unconditional Submission to Princes, the most oppressive and tyrannical Princes; and damned all who would not go your mad, your impious and your impracticable Lengths? And are not you the first to bring home your own Damnation to your

[75]Ibid., No. 133, p. 240.
[76]Ibid., No. 129, p. 205.
[77]Ibid., No. 133, p. 240.
[78]See *Cato's Letters*, Nos. 131-37. In No. 135 Gordon cites numerous issues of "the *Independent Whig*."

> own Doors, by shewing that no Obligation, human or divine, can with-hold you from rebelling against the most legal Government, and mildest Prince?[79]

"Cato" defines the disaffected clergy as the "ambitious Disturbers of Government." Trenchard and Gordon accuse all the conspirators, lay as well as clerical, of factious aims in their promotion of the Pretender.

> Nor was the Spirit of Faction ever more manifest, than in the present Conspiracy: What did the Conspirators want, but Plunder and Places?
>
> ... how can the Pretender think that you have any the least Regard to his Right, when you have so often and so solemnly sworn that he had none? Dispossess your selves, if you can, of the Spirit of Faction, and of groundless Displeasure and Revenge; and then try if you can find any divine, any unalterable Right in the Pretender. He has in truth no Right, but what your own unruly and restless Passions give him.[80]

"Cato" also states exactly why, in his opinion, High Churchmen seek a Stuart restoration:

> We all know what would cure you of your [divine right] Opinion of his Title, of your Fondness for his Person. The Constitution will not stoop to you; the Government will not be governed by you; you have not the Power; you have not the Revenues of the ancient Ecclesiasticks before *Henry* VIII's Days; nor would you, if the Pretender were here. And if you had not, in three Months you would be fierce for sending him abroad again, as you did his supposed Father; or using him worse. Of this I am certain, that if he ruled as his present Majesty does, you would treat him, and obey him, and honour him, just as you do his present Majesty. Plead no longer your Consciences, which you have so long, and so often, and so vilely prostituted, and still prostitute![81]

There was no evidence, since the 1688-89 Revolution, of any loyalty from High Churchmen. "Cato" challenges them to prove their loyalty and in the process underscores their essential disloyalty:

> If you would not be thought disaffected, shew by some particular Instances your Faith and Attachment to the Government, from the Revolution to this Day. What have you done to prevent or repress Plots, Assassinations, and Rebellions; to render them odious in the Ears of your People, or to satisfy the World that they were odious in your own? And is not this the Duty of

[79]*Cato's Letters*, No. 127, p. 181.
[80]Ibid., No. 125, pp. 177 and 165; and No. 127, p. 182.
[81]Ibid., No. 127, pp. 182-3.

> Christians and Preachers, and your sworn Duty? In a stupid Dispute about Grimace and Forms, or about paultry Distinctions and empty Words, you are all in Flame and Uproar, and fill your Pulpits, and your People, and the Nation, with your important Nonsense, and the Danger of Sense: But when Church and State were just going to be swallowed up by Popery and Tyranny, what Allarms have you rung? What Resentment, what Attachment to the Establishment and your Oaths have you shewn? What honest Testimony have you borne?[82]

Examples of clerical perjury, disaffection, and a "furious Spirit" are innumerable but "Cato" cannot resist mentioning the "one that is a Disgrace to our Nation; an Instance of a mean Priest, destitute of Name and Parts, tried and condemned for Sedition, yet almost deified for his Insolence and Crimes." "Cato" sounds the radical-Whig's resentment of the Sacheverell affair and voices as well his acute awareness of the enduring strength of divine-right theory, including the contradictory fact that clergymen do not practice what they teach.

> He asserted the Irresistibleness of all Governments, good or bad, though our own was founded upon Resistance. For his daring Offence he was impeached and tried, tried by one Part of the Legislature before the other, and condemned by all three....
>
> What Reverence might not have been expected to such a Tryal as this, what Acquiescence in the Issue of it, especially from those who contended daily and vehemently contended, from the Pulpit and the Press, for Submission, unlimited Submission to Governors, though Tyrants and Oppressors! But instead of this, as if they intended to publish to the World, that the meanest of the Order, how vile and insolent soever, is not to be touched for the most enormous Crimes, even in the most legal, open, and honourable Manner, even by the whole Legislature, the most solemn and august Judicature upon Earth; there was such a hideous Stir made; such a horrible Outcry and Spirit were raised; such Insolencies, Tumults and Insurrections ensued ... the avowed and hired Advocates for Religion and Order; who all the while they were thus reviling and resisting Authority, had still the Front to press and preach absolute Non-Resistance to Authority, and to reward what they themselves were doing with Damnation: unless it were safe and laudable to resist the most lawful Power, but sinful and damnable to resist that which is lawless ... the Rage and Uproar which they were in, even before the Sentence, were as great as if the Priesthood itself, nay, all Nature, was to have been overturned by the apprehended whipping of a profligate Priest.[83]

[82]Ibid., p. 183.
[83]Ibid., pp. 185-7.

Such ought, asserts "Cato," to be "a sufficient Lesson" to all governments that "this sort of Men" is not to be trusted with power and "a strong Proof to all Men how little Regard is due to the Opinions and Doctrines" of such clergymen. These are those High Churchmen who teach what they should not and do not practice what they should not have preached:

> these Men, who do not regard their own Doctrines! who teach what no Man ought to practise, and themselves will not! who are perpetually contradicting themselves, and one another, and yet are never in the Wrong![84]

The High Anglicans "would not suffer the meanest, or worst of their Order, to be subject to the united and original Power of one of the greatest States in the World!" "Cato" reveals the emotional grip the Sacheverell affair still held as well as Trenchard and Gordon's probable fears of similar outcries in favor of Atterbury.[85]

One additional and revealing preoccupation emerges from "Cato's" final letters. Trenchard and Gordon suggest that High Anglicans *remain* disloyal. Given the traditional power and influence of clergymen over the nation, "Cato's" perception of them as *still* disaffected is very serious.

What asks "Cato" have you done since the "Discovery of this horrid Conspiracy" to check the usual "Venom" you disperse from "lofty *Rostrums*," "Universities," and "Charity-Schools."

> What Detestation have you shewn against this monstrous Design; levelled at the Life of the Prince who protects you ... What Discourses have you printed? ... What has been done by the Governors of the Universities to promote Loyalty either in Tutors or Pupils, and to support the Principles upon which the *Revolution* stands? ... What Care has been taken in the licensing or approving of School Masters, who are almost all Jacobites! ... Is there a Contest any where between two Candidates, but the most Disaffected has the Vote and Interest of the Country-Clergy? And is not the same Partiality practised in most of the Colleges of the Universities?[86]

Except for "outrageous and brutal Resentments" of the clergy to the imprisonment and trial of Bishop Atterbury, a conspicuous and irresponsible "Silence" is the only clerical response. To the High Churchmen, "Cato" again rails:

> You indeed, make it more and more manifest, that your greatest Quarrel to the

[84]Ibid., p. 187.
[85]Ibid.
[86]Ibid., pp. 184-5.

Government, is, that it will not put Swords into your Hands to destroy it.[87]

Like the authors of *The Independent Whig*, "Cato" aggressively attacks the clergy as dangerous leaders who seek the destruction of English liberty and the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover.

Walpole enjoyed the support of these two famous journalists who wrote energetically and effectively in defense of a Whig ministry that had uncovered elaborate plans for an insurrection and Stuart restoration. In the spring of 1723, "Cato" (Gordon), tries to draw as many as possible toward the "present Establishment" since he believes, like Walpole, that Jacobitism is still very much alive. One of the main objectives of "Cato" in this pamphlet, "The Short View of the Conspiracy," is to convince "Old Whigs" that the dangers from counterrevolutionaries continue:

> But, say you, when the Chiefs are seized, and all their Projects countermined, what Need have we of an Addition of Forces? of what Service is an Army when our Enemies are defeated? New Taxes must surely be laid, in order to make a Provision for an additional four thousand men, and this is what the generality of the People so loudly complain of; and I suppose you would go farther, and say, Are our Liberties and Properties intirely safe, whilst there are such Numbers of Forces on Foot?
>
> Look a little backwards, and reflect on the loud Clamours which were lately made against a Standing Army, and to bear a Part in which we also were drawn. What was the Aim of the Jacobites in all this? To get the Army disbanded, which, if done, they had certainly compassed our Ruin, and subverted our Constitution, and we should not only have lost all that was dear and valuable, but should have been perpetually cursed with the tormenting Reflection, that we ourselves had contributed all that in us lay to our Ruin, and vigorously assisted the Conspirators in the Completion of it.
>
> I allow you, indeed, that a great Number of their Chiefs are taken up, and thereby, one would think, incapacitated to do further Mischief, but are we therefore safe? I wish I could say we were; but you will find by the Report, that a great many were engaged in the criminal Correspondence, whose Names are not yet discovered, and who, perhaps, are capable of doing the greatest Mischief.

"Cato" tells the "Old Whigs" that the Jacobites are still a restless "Faction"; they *continue* to sow "the Seeds of Discord." Even "under all Adversities," these "turbulent Spirits" manage "to keep up the Spirit of their Party, and with their Blessings endeavour to curse the Nation."[88]

[87]Ibid., p. 185; and No. 126, p. 175.
[88]"A Short View of the Conspiracy ... by Cato," p. 148.

Just a week after his "Farewell," "Cato" in another guise, as "Criton," but in the same newspaper, *The British Journal*, expresses his anger with High-Tory manipulation of "Cato's" writings. Although "they applauded Papers publish'd daily against the whole Administration, ever since his Majesty came to the Crown," and celebrated "Cato" during "these three Years as an unanswerable and only Defender of publick Liberty," they now calumniate him "for having defended the Administration against Popery and Popish Servitude." Thus, claims "Criton," he "would rather make bold with the *Whigs* than the *Tories*" since

> the former give fairer Quarter when they are in power, than the others do ever when they are out of it. Of this my Predecessor has lately found a very flagrant Proof [refers to the presentment against "Cato" by the High-Tory Grand Jury of Middlesex]: For tho' he had for some years taken a Liberty with his Betters, which I shall not venture to take, and which perhaps was never taken by any Man before him, yet I cannot find that he suffer'd in his Character, his Person, or his Fortune; but he no sooner touched *Aaron's* Bells, but you see what a Storm he raised about his Ears! A Storm from those very Men, who, while they thought that he oppos'd the Administration, had been crying him up ... But now they represent him as an Atheist, a Republican, and deserving to be punish'd....
>
> As to the Particulars of *Cato's* Crimes, he has given his Reasons why the voluntary Contributions to Charity-Schools, which are neither establish'd by Act of Parliament, nor by the King's Patent, are dangerous Liberalities, not conducing to the publick Good; that they are or may be applied to rear Seminaries of Superstition and Disaffection....
>
> *Cato* has likewise said, that the corrupt Part of the Clergy have promoted Principles inconsistent with the Establishment of the Church and State, and were ill affected to the present Government. I thought this had been no News; and I believe I can produce out of their own Writings, and from the Behaviour of particular Men amongst them, sufficient Materials to prove it....
>
> He likewise complains of the Mischief of giving Land and Revenues to Ecclesiasticks ... He says too, that the endowing of universities, and the building of Colleges, have been made use of to do great Mischief to the World, and enumerates some of the Mischiefs: And who denies them? Is any one so ignorant as not to know that Universities were first founded by the Popes, to preserve and increase their own Power over the Rulers and Princes of the Earth? and that they have contributed more to it than all other Methods? that our Universities joined with *Laud* to overturn Church and State? that they were the Fountains of slavish and despotick Doctrines in the Reigns of King *Charles* and King *James* II ... And how proper it is to inquire into their Behaviour since the Revolution; may possibly be some Time or other the Business of a Parliament of *Great Britain*.

> But these Considerations much better become *Cato's* Pen than mine; and I doubt not, if he is provok'd, but he will fully show to the World what is to be expected from those Men when they are in Power, who, while they are out of it, can treat thus outrageously such as have deserv'd better of them; from those Men who can find out Disaffection in the Papers writ with a Purpose to preserve the King and Kingdom; can discover Irreligion in Arguments design'd to promote the Principles of the Church of England; and can find an Intention to blacken good clergymen, in an Endeavour to reform and expose the bad.[89]

John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, like many radical theorists who base revolution on secular and consensual principles, find the very "People" they extol hostile to their libertarianism and to those who, like Trenchard and Gordon, advocate such religious and political heterodoxy. The problem is well-known; so is the solution. Radical Whigs in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were more than ready to use power, even authoritarian means, to achieve libertarian ends. The political proscription of Tories was a major radical-Whig demand in post-Revolution England. "Cato" complains that Queen Anne's Tory ministers are not firmly punished; but the impeachment of beloved Tory "peace-makers" causes much unpopularity towards the new Hanoverian dynasty. "Cato's" calls for government regulation of the educational system, if heeded, would constitute, for Anglican Tories, a despicable absolutism. In the House of Commons in early March 1723, it is Trenchard who calls for a vicious bill of attainder against one of the Atterbury conspirators even though he "also attacked ministerial suspension [passed in October 1722 and to endure a year] of Habeas Corpus."[90] Whig leaders objected to the death penalty Trenchard sought and "were for tempering justice with mercy as the prudenter way."[91] Trenchard did, though, succeed with his motion to impose fines on Nonjurors for their presumed sedition.[92]

Official suppression of the Anglican Establishment is a traditional, radical-Whig demand. Trenchard and Gordon, as the "Independent Whig" and as "Cato," and like John Locke before them, aim their critique against the High Churchmen because those orthodox spokesmen hold a tremendous sway over a large section of English society. "Priestcraft" is something Trenchard and Gordon really feared. But statutory

[89]"Criton," *The British Journal*, XLVI (3 August 1723). "Criton" was the pseudonym Gordon used in *The British Journal*.

[90]Sedgwick, ed., *The House of Commons 1715-1754*, 2, under "Trenchard, John"; and Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy*, p. 202.

[91]*The Parliamentary Diary of Sir Edward Knatchbull, 1722-1730*, ed. A. N. Newman, Camden Society, 3d Ser., XCIV (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1963) 29 March 1723, p. 18.

[92]Sedgwick, ed., *The House of Commons 1715-1754*, 2, under "Trenchard, John."

implementation of radical-Whig anticlericalism is, for Walpole and other Whigs, excessively provocative. Walpole's avoidance of volatile religious issues does not appeal to the "Independent Whigs" in principle but Walpole's accommodation to the formidable Anglican Church Establishment is, indeed, the more prudent policy in early Hanoverian England.

Trenchard's call for attainder, although rejected, and his successful motion for the imposition of fines against Nonjurors, like his and Gordon's persistent demand for Whig controls over the Anglican Establishment, especially education, are authoritarian resolutions. Such faith in the efficacy of severe retribution and in the propriety of state control over education should help us recognize the fact that early eighteenth-century Whig radicals, who are committed libertarians, depend (and probably have to depend) upon secular power, an enlightened despotism so to speak, to achieve what is, for most of the nation, unacceptable political and religious heterodoxy.

CONCLUSION

As "Cato" and the "Independent Whig," John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon write with "a View to the Quiet and Stability of this Free State." They are convinced High Churchmen successfully indoctrinate their parishioners and the nation's youth in subversive, divine-right, legitimist doctrines that undermine the 1688-89 Revolution and foster disloyalty. They also believe High-Anglican divines and High-Tory partisans fan and foment disaffection against the Hanoverian succession and, thus, seriously threaten constitutional and religious liberties. Industriously inculcated by High-Church divines and effectively carried out by High-Tory leaders, both lay and clerical, these doctrines and this agitation threaten the twin pillars of English domestic security and stability--English Protestantism and the House of Hanover. It is this menace of counterreformation and counterrevolution--a Stuart restoration to be brought about by High-Church/High-Tory propaganda and agitation--that forms both the background and the key to Trenchard and Gordon's writings of the early 1720s. Holding that Stuart loyalists and High-Church/High-Tory agitators are abroad in the land, Trenchard and Gordon educate the people in principles and instruct the Members of Parliament, the ministry, and the King in policies that will, they hope, head off this agitation and consolidate the Revolution, namely the Protestant succession now embobied in the House of Hanover.

It was primarily to counteract and neutralize High-Tory maneuvers and propaganda that Trenchard and Gordon published and circulated their popularly written articles. It was to combat and neutralize High-Church doctrines that Trenchard and Gordon urged their English readers to emancipate themselves from High-Church authority and to depend for spiritual direction and inspiration upon their own rational abilities. In sum, it was to combat the High Church's spiritual authority over laymen, to break the Anglican clergy's pernicious hold on the minds and emotions of Englishmen, and to save the nation and its fragile political and religious liberties from the destabilizing influence of counterrevolutionary sermons, education, propaganda and agitation, all aimed at bringing about a Stuart restoration, that Trenchard and Gordon wrote and published as "Cato" and the "Independent Whig."

If High-Church doctrines and clerical influence worried these two writers it was because their major concern was for the political stability and security of the House of Hanover. Trenchard and Gordon constantly popularize "Revolution Principles" at a time when most Whig supporters of the 1688-89 Revolution, uneasy about elections and waning popular support, were eschewing public avowals of contractarianism, right-of-resistance theory, and natural rights, principles that political enemies could turn against the Whigs. "Cato" vividly portrays the evils of absolute monarchy and contrasts them with the benefits and advantages of the free government Englishmen now enjoy under the constitutionally limited Hanoverian monarchy, a government recently established by "the people" and one, therefore, accountable to them. Monarchy under the Hanoverian King is both constitutional and free; under any restored Stuart King, monarchy would be both unchecked, tyrannical, and unconstitutional.

Moreover, as "Cato," Trenchard and Gordon instruct their Hanoverian King and his Whig ministers about how to improve, modify, and change their policies and conduct of government. Since the High Tories are ever on the alert to take advantage of popular grievances that many, mistaken government policies and conduct cause, Trenchard and Gordon feel they must educate the legislators and, especially, the men at the head of the government about what they should and should not do if they are to win the support of the English voters. A case in point is the government's handling of the scandalous South-Sea Bubble--an episode in which "Cato" strongly urged stern punishment for those, including Whig leaders, whom "Cato" held responsible. In addition, "Cato" tries, through calls for legal protest and through the celebration of "Revolution Principles," to guide and convey popular discontent into loyal, legal channels and to, thus, thwart the political ploys of High-Tory agitators who mouth libertarian principles in order secretly to promote High-Church and High-Tory aims, perceived, by Trenchard and Gordon, as the seditious goals of men guilty of priestcraft and faction.

Led by J. G. A. Pocock, historians today who study Trenchard and Gordon emphasize their complaints about Court corruption and oppressive Whig actions as evidence of a Country-opposition ideology. This view misses the full reality of Trenchard and Gordon's most important concerns and fundamental purposes. "Cato's" attack on the Hanoverian-Whig Court at the time of the South-Sea Crisis was not an expression of Country-opposition ideology. "Cato" employs the Country idiom and despises, like Country opponents, Whig peculation, but not as a Country-opposition ideologist. Unlike the latter, "Cato" is, both immensely and primarily, worried about the *dangers* a maleficent Whig government poses to the *survival* of the unpopular and, thus, very fragile Hanoverian succession. Trenchard and Gordon also use the Country idiom strategically to combat the menace of High-Tories, both laymen and clergymen, who, they fear, will turn the British political and religious world upside down through a Jacobite counterrevolution. Trenchard and Gordon's obsessive anticlericalism, a pervasive and informing feature in their writings, and their concomitant frustration with Whig accommodation to Church power, especially its failure to purge and control the universities and the charity schools, are not typical traits of the standard Country position. Strong, even repressive, countermeasures must be taken, they, in fact, exhort, if dangerous centers of High-Anglican disaffection and subversive doctrine are to be restrained and neutralized.

Because they publicly urge unpopular Lockean and libertarian political and religious principles, Trenchard and Gordon deserve to be restored to the ranks of those staunchly libertarian publicists and theorists where Caroline Robbins and David Jacobson first placed them. Trenchard and Gordon write as concerned, steadfast libertarians, not as spokesmen for a Country-opposition point of view. Their prime endeavor is to defend the Protestant succession as represented by the House of Hanover. Trenchard and Gordon aggressively counter the High-Tory agitation of widespread, popular, and often well-grounded discontent. They also actively encourage popular support for the free, Protestant, constitutional government incarnated in the Hanoverian establishment as against the religious and political tyranny that a restoration of the Stuart House presumably would bring.

Finally, a close reading of Trenchard and Gordon's works, within the political and religious contexts of post-Revolution and early Hanoverian England, discloses both how strongly felt were contemporary fears of a Jacobite return to power and how strongly such fears influenced the thought and action of many contemporaries. The dread of Jacobitism expressed itself, as recent scholarship shows, through Walpole's foreign and domestic policies and through the Whigs' reluctance to publicly endorse contract-and-resistance theory. As historians pursue this theme more closely, a new and different Hanoverian political and religious world emerges.