

The Peloponnesian War
Thucydides



The Complete Hobbes Translation

WITH NOTES AND A NEW INTRODUCTION BY

David Grene

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

VOLUME ONE

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the Thomas Hobbes Translation

Edited by David Grene

with an Introduction by Bertrand de Jouvenel

THUCYDIDES

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VOLUME ONE



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INTRODUCTION

by BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

“What happened?” Such curiosity cannot be equally addressed to what happened anywhere, at any time, to anybody: it would then be so thinly spread as to disappear altogether. Eager curiosity means concentration upon an object capable of exciting our mind or moving our heart or both. Selective curiosity sometimes merges into deep emotional involvement: in the realm of secular history, such involvement is very much a function of nationality. We all attach value and meaning to some moments of our nation’s past, marked by decisive and dramatic occurrences, the recounting of which so arouses us as to draw us into the picture, quivering if impotent participants. Thus the critical times of our national history assume almost the character of personal recollections: many Americans, I fancy, have vicariously applauded the proclamation of Independence and fought at Gettysburg.

No man can call himself a believer who is not shaken to his roots by dwelling upon the events basic to his Faith; no man can call himself a patriot who is not elated or saddened when remembering the glorious or evil days of his fatherland; in between, no man may call himself a humanist who remains ignorant of or indifferent to the major splendors or tragedies of civilization. Great tragedy befalling great splendor, that is the story of the Peloponnesian War.

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The scene is a small one: Greece, studded with a great many more "states" (*poleis*) than we count in the whole world to-day. Far the largest territory was that of Sparta, containing 3,200 square miles, the next was that of Athens (Attica), barely exceeding 1,000 square miles. Corinth, which plays an important part in the tale, had a territory of 330 square miles. The citizenry of Athens was the most numerous of any: on the authority of Thucydides it is estimated at 42,000 men. Women, children, resident aliens (*metics*) and slaves possibly made up a total of 400,000 inhabitants of Attica. This was regarded by thoughtful men as an excessive bulk, and for a characteristic reason: it did not allow each citizen to recognize his fellows by sight. It was in any case a quite exceptionally large population, and Athens was the major town of Greece, even though it held only some 10,000 homes, each harboring a much larger, less subdivided family than ours.

These few indications warn us that we must here think in numbers very different from those to which we are accustomed. Most cities indeed counted their fighting men in mere hundreds, and a city's contribution to a confederate army was sometimes less than a hundred. Nor should we picture Greek splendor in terms of high standards of consumption. What our economists call "private consumption" was very low: no heating, next to no lighting, very few vehicles other than ships, the same cloth serving as bedsheet and as dress, frugal fare. The luxuries the Greeks enjoyed were collective: beautiful temples, strong walls (though Spartans prided themselves on needing none), and public baths to which they resorted daily. Indeed personal luxuries were regarded as bad form. The Spartans of course went to the extreme, but even the pleasure-loving Athenians stood much nearer to the Spartan model than to what they regarded as the besotting indulgences of the Asians.

The Greeks would rank low in our statistical scale of "consumption per head." What they consumed with delight and discrimination was leisure: leisure spent in witty conversation, in healthy physical exercise, in watching a play, in attending an athletic contest. The famous conversations of Socrates were conducted with whomever he happened to meet in the street, and the mass amusements of the Athenians were the great plays

of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. There was no such thing in Athens as being unfit for war service, nor was there any such thing as being incompetent to decide a political issue or a legal case. On one day the Athenian would hear out, from sunrise to sundown, the orators arguing for and against political moves and decide between them; on another day he would sit on the judicial bench with many of his fellows and they would decide civil suits. Athens had its way of life which was not the pursuit of a high standard of life but of a high standard of achievement.

In 490 B.C. the Athenians defeated at Marathon a minor Persian venture, in 480 B.C. they had to deal with an all-out effort; leaving their very homes to the invader, they crushed his forces in the bay of Salamis. Having thus saved herself, and Greece of the many cities, from Persian domination, Athens fell at Chaeronea (332 B.C.) under Macedonian domination, which embraced all Greece. Only a century and a half elapsed between glorious Marathon and disastrous Chaeronea; "the glory that was Greece" is tightly packed within that short space of time: then flourished, from Aeschylus to Aristotle, the authors who have exercised a germinal influence upon Western culture. The men who then lived in what to us is "a small town" have given us our modes of expression of human feelings, tragedy and comedy (not the novel), our canons of beauty (architecture, sculpture), our procedure of argument, abstract (philosophy) and practical (oratory). It is around Plato and Aristotle that our philosophic arguments still revolve; Demosthenes is still the model of political and legal speakers.

What happened to such people moves our hearts because of their excellence and of our debt to them; but also it excites our minds because it displays the inherent precariousness of political achievement. Men of the seventeenth century, like Hobbes, or of the eighteenth, like Burke, did not for a moment doubt that history should be learned in order to learn from history, to acquire political prudence, short of which no political system can survive.

The Peloponnesian War, related by Thucydides, is the out-

standing account of political imprudence. It shattered the foundations of what we may call "the society of Greek city-states": it so damaged relations between cities and within cities that the whole edifice creaked and slipped during the ensuing sixty years, and easily collapsed under the Macedonian push. Therefore this Great War has remained for all times the classic illustration of the harm which a society of kindred states can inflict upon itself by driving its conflicts too far. The Greeks were not mild people: cities and factions were wont to clash quite roughly; but up to the Great War, prudence intervened in time; it then fell into discredit, and only fitfully recovered its sway while the prestige of ranters and "bitter-enders" established itself.

The idea of "A World Government" meets with such favor today that it is perhaps proper to stress the value of the Greek system of a great many self-governing city-states. The Greeks were well aware of another system which they had observed in Egypt and Persia. There, vast expanses of land and a great number of people lived under one government. This was to them "palatial" government. By the very nature of things, it is impossible, in a vast state, that all should participate in decision-making, and therefore understand the reasons for a decision and regard it as their very own. If and only if they so participate, they are citizens; when dimensions demand that decisions should be made in "the Palace" and conveyed to men, then they are subjects. This the Greeks held to be not only an undignified condition but a demoralizing one, as indeed the experience of the Roman Empire was to show.

Since much is made in the account of the war, of the contrast between democracy and oligarchy, it may be useful to stress that the difference between the forms of government prevailing in Greek cities was one of degree. All cities had a remnant of sacred authority: the two "kings" of Sparta still led the armies in the field (but not the fleet, which was an innovation); the archons of Athens still attended to religious discipline but had ceased to matter in politics, and Athenian generals were elected by the people. All cities had a council, "boule": in the extreme oligarchic system it replenished itself

by co-optation, in the extreme democratic system, at Athens, its members for the year were selected by lot from lists drawn up in the constituencies. In all cities, the final word belonged to the Assembly of the People, "ecclesia." The reader will find that the decisions of Sparta, like those of Athens, are taken by the popular assembly: there the ambassadors are heard, there the reply to their requests is adopted; the reader will notice that the advice given to the Assembly of Sparta by their King Archidamus was overruled.

All political regimes of Greece involved what we call "government by discussion"; all left the final word to the assembly of citizens, which was natural enough, since there were no professional servants of the state available to carry out decisions, but only citizens themselves. There was, however, a great difference in spirit between the oligarchic system of Sparta or Corinth and Athenian democracy.

Parentage counted a great deal in all cities: even in Athens Pericles himself was responsible for a law which struck from the registers of citizens those who could not prove their descent from both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother; however their great number (4,000) testified that the citizenry had been infiltrated by metics. Not so at Sparta. The Dorians who had conquered Peloponnesia some centuries ago had kept their ranks closed against the previous inhabitants. (Incidentally this made losses suffered at war especially exhausting for Sparta.) The importance of parentage also influenced the composition and status of the Council at Sparta: it was a preserve of the "great" families, whereas in Athens it was open to all, and the Spartan Council exercised a far greater influence upon the Assembly of citizens than in Athens where it functioned as merely a steering committee.

The prestige of lineage sat well with a traditionalism, in itself much admired by some Athenians, among them Xenophon. Rightly or wrongly, Socrates, his war record notwithstanding, was deemed an admirer of Sparta, certainly some of his favorite pupils behaved as such. With Spartan conservatism went a reluctance to venture, underlined by Thucydides.

The names appearing in Athenian history point up the social contrast with Sparta. With the exception of Pericles, they

are "new men": thus Cleon, who plays such a large part, was a wealthy tanner, Eucrates, Lysicles, and Hyperbolus were substantial tradesmen, Cleophon, whose name appears late in the war, was the first artisan (he was a lyre maker) to make his mark in politics. New men of that kind helped to give Athenian policy the proud, bold, venturesome character which it developed under and after Pericles. Even more ardent were the sailors of Piraeus; the port constituted the stronghold of "the left." Plato, a conservative, was to bemoan the damaging social and political influence of the sea.

It should be remembered that, at the time of the war, even in Athens three-fourths of the citizens were landowners who commuted between their farms and the city. The stolidity of farmers prevailed in the popular assemblies of the early fifth century; but as the enemy armies despoiled the land during the Great War, the population, increasingly cooped up in the town, grew into a mood of urban nervousity. The wholesale destruction of trees for shipbuilding sealed the decline of agriculture which transformed the social character of Athens.

The Great War broke out in 432 B.C., less than fifty years after Salamis. At the time of the great Persian invasion, the Spartans at Thermopylae, under Leonidas, had displayed heroism; but the Athenians at Salamis had demonstrated effectiveness. Naturally enough, they took the lead in the sporadic conflict which was pursued against the Persian Empire: they formed and led the Delian League, commanded its confederate fleet, and took charge of its confederate finances. The money was in fact spent by Athenian stewards, the suits brought by allies against Athenians were decided by Athenian tribunals. This was not to everyone's liking. Moreover the Athenians, flushed with pride, did throw their weight about in Greece, against the advice of Cimon, but often enough on the advice of Pericles. This explains how Sparta could play up the theme of "liberation." As the war proceeded, military expenditures were an increasing burden upon the allies and upon the wealthier citizens of Athens, which goes a long way to explain why, in the last lap, Athens was deserted by its allies and betrayed by its rich.

Its collapse in 404 B.C. was not pitied but applauded all over Greece.

Indeed while our sympathies cannot fail to lie with Athens, we must admit that the Athenians wantonly cast away the many opportunities which were afforded to them of concluding an honorable peace. Thucydides makes it clear that while Sparta was a republic of highly trained soldiers, it had no venturesome disposition; its conservative leaders knew that the chances of war are uncertain, and they even seem to have vaguely foreseen the corrupting influence of total victory. However much we prefer the Athenians, we have to confess that their disaster was not the outcome of a premeditated aggression by Sparta but the result of their own frenzy.

This tragedy has served as a major item in the education of would-be statesmen for more than twenty-four centuries. This is justified not only by the substance of the tale but by the manner of its telling. Thucydides is a great historian, possibly the greatest that ever was. He may have lacked initiative as a general: so the Athenians judged, when they banished him for his failure to reach Amphipolis in time; but as a writer he displays exceptional vigor, drawing admirably clear pictures with great economy of words. His facts have not been shaken by modern criticism; the speeches he "quotes" are of his own composition, but it should be remembered that the speakers were, in most cases, very well known to him (the late-comers on the Athenian political scene excepted); he was well aware of their interests, feelings, motives, and these he expounds in his made-up speeches. Such speeches indeed are the highlights of the whole book.

The story is altogether a sad one and strewn with horrible episodes. Thucydides does not inject into his account a display of his emotions of sorrow, indignation, or pity; he has often therefore been adjudged insensitive. Against this opinion should be quoted the fact that Demosthenes, who was a most emotional character, is said to have copied out Thucydides six times. Indeed men who write in times of great misfortunes are least prone to make a show of their feelings: to face and

chronicle bleak facts they clothe themselves in stern sobriety. This was also the case of Machiavelli, living amidst the wreck of all he cherished. Such an attitude of withdrawn dignity is misunderstood in happier days, and such men are then regarded as brutal realists, against the testimony of their unimpeachable personal conduct.

Into the tangle of events, Thucydides drives the cold steel of the anatomist, he cuts through to the essential articulations of causes and consequences. We are fortunate in having such a guide; we are doubly fortunate in enjoying a translation of his great work by so eminent a political scientist as Hobbes. Hobbes used his translation of Thucydides to train himself in political science; he stands surety to us that this book is required reading; but also we can rest assured that the Hobbesian version, an intellectual rather than a literary exercise, grasps the innermost meaning of the original.

Hobbes mentions this translation in his prose and in his verse autobiographies, both written in Latin. In the prose text, he speaks of himself in the third person, thus: "Among the Greek historians he loved Thucydides best; having achieved an English translation, little by little in his leisure hours, he gave it to the public, which received it with some applause, around the year 1628; this in order that the follies of the Athenian Democrats should be revealed to his compatriots." In the verse autobiography, speaking of himself in the first person, he says of Thucydides: "He made me realize how silly is democracy, and how much wiser a single man is than a multitude; I translated this author who would tell Englishmen to beware of trusting orators." These statements are clear: Hobbes learned from Thucydides to distrust Assembly rule and used Thucydides to warn his compatriots against it. This fits in with his later advocacy of monarchic government, urged, it should be stressed, in the interests of peace internal and external and of individual safety. It is a major distortion to represent Hobbes as the forerunner of totalitarianism: he wishes Authority to be unquestioned, not in order that it might serve a violent passion, but so that it could abate all passions. He conceived government not as driving men but as sheltering their various pursuits. In his eyes the uncertainty and perils attending the tussle

of competing political forces was the greatest social evil.

Naturally, and legitimately, British biographers have projected Hobbes' interest in Thucydides upon a background of waxing difficulties between Crown and Commons, which marked the end of the reign of James I and the beginning of the reign of Charles I: the Bill of Rights was passed in 1628. One may, however, conjecture that Hobbes had been impressed by the breakdown of civil order and security which had been occurring on the Continent since 1619, a drama which posterity was to call "the Thirty Years' War," the very name commonly applied to the Peloponnesian War. England rang in 1619 with the judicial murder of the virtuous and peace-loving Barneveldt, a victim of the fanatical war party of the United Provinces: then was the great Grotius condemned to life imprisonment from which he escaped, obtaining refuge and financial assistance from Louis XIII of France. That kingdom itself experienced civil strife; in 1620 there was a rebellion led by the Queen Mother; in 1621, the representatives of the French Protestants assembled in the fortified sea port of La Rochelle and there proclaimed a republican confederation. Worst of all was the general war which broke out within the Holy Roman Empire as a sequel to the Prague riot of 1618. The empire was in fact a complex political system of a great many practically independent states of very different dimensions. For that reason and also because the war between states was aggravated by conflicts within the political units, the situation must have suggested to Hobbes a parallel with the Peloponnesian disaster.

The study of history would be unnecessary for political education if the lessons to be drawn from great historic events could be summed up in a few trenchant sentences. We would then need no more than these final sentences. But political prudence does not consist in recipes which can be conveyed: it is a virtue which has to be acquired the hard way. The greatest possible economy of effort is achieved if a very competent guide takes you through the important experiences of others. He tells you just enough and not too much: why this step was taken and how it turned out to be disastrous. It is for you to think out why it turned out to be disastrous and how it might

have been avoided: it is only by such personal speculation that one gains political education; in that realm, as in all others, one only learns by thinking for oneself.

The reader need not draw from Thucydides the lesson which Hobbes so tersely summed up. But what he cannot fail to learn is the inherent precariousness of the political structures which ensure peaceful and rewarding human relations. This was true of the multi-state system enjoyed by Greece before the Peloponnesian War and by Europe before 1914: the diversity of governments was no obstacle to the ease and confidence of intercourse; such great benefits can be preserved only by temperate policies, they cannot withstand the imperious upsurge of national willfulness; and the violent recasting of such a system, however alluring the ideas applied, must prove unstable and lead to renewed convulsions eventuating in general weakness and abandonment to outside control. The precariousness is true also of an alliance, such as the Delian League, assembled because Athens had demonstrated in the Persian wars her will and power to protect, and shattered when she lost that power. It is true finally of a political regime, which lasts just as long as it proves capable to bear the strains it assumes.

It is not sufficiently realized what a task it is to maintain a political structure. At times this seems easy, and therefore it also seems harmless that weak or feverish hands should be applied. But events, which may or may not be the work of these hands, occur to tax the structure. Its fragility is then revealed and men learn too late, as it topples upon them, that they should have bolstered it with firm prudence.

HOBBS' TRANSLATION OF THUCYDIDES

by DAVID GRENE

It is neither for its rarity nor for its possible importance to Hobbesian studies that I would like to offer this book to the general reader, but because it is by long odds the greatest translation of Thucydides in English and Thucydides is a historian with a terribly immediate meaning for us today.

It is perfectly true that most translations have to be made anew every generation or so. As the words of the translator's language live on and change, those he has employed in his version express less adequately or misleadingly the ideas of the original. There are, however, a few translations which seem to have leaped across the boundaries of time and have rendered, in a new language, the movement and truth of the original in the same way in which the translated author created both. In such instances, the translation has a timelessness like that of the work which it translates. It is easy to describe such translations as attaining not only the meaning but the spirit of the original. This is only a dead phrase and if taken as a prescription it will usually ensure a translation which is both a dishonest rendering and in itself worthless. But it is true to say of a great translation that if one knows both original and translation one is

conscious of them as two independent and original creations. Of course, the originality is not to be interpreted in exactly the same way. Thucydides' history is naturally *original* in a sense in which Hobbes' translation of Thucydides is not. But there is the same feeling of independence and freedom in both. As far as English renderings of classical works go, I would be inclined to include in this class only Chapman's Homer, Hobbes' Thucydides, and T. E. Lawrence's *Odyssey*.

It is perhaps not accidental that the few very great translations possess exceedingly individual idiom, rooted in the personality of the author or the style of the period. Hobbes makes of Thucydides a seventeenth-century Englishman, but he does not falsify him in doing so. He renders Thucydides as the latter would have spoken had he lived in the time of the early Stuarts. It is the peculiar quality of our own age that in translations we try to render the past in something like its own terms. It is much better that we should do so. It corresponds with our much enlarged sense of history and goes together with our greatly enhanced power of knowing in detail how the past lived, spoke, and acted. But it is not productive of the great translation except when some strange affinity between a living man and one long dead encourages a translator temporarily to forget his sense of history and his self-consciousness and by some direct confrontation of souls to reproduce the life of the dead man's words. This is probably what happened in the case of Lawrence and the author of the *Odyssey*. For the rest of us who translate, it is much better that in an honest and workmanlike way we obey our sense of history and try to see the past in as near its own terms as we can manage. For Hobbes, apart from his enormous gifts and his particular understanding of Thucydides, the task of rendering Thucydides was easier, in that the seventeenth century, especially the earlier part of it, was more ready to reformulate the past in the words and sentiments of its own present. As a result the wings of Hobbes' greatness were not clipped by self-consciousness and the desire to attain a probably unobtainable historicity.

That this is in thought a very typical seventeenth-century version is made clear by Hobbes' dedicatory epistle to the young

Duke of Devonshire and his introduction for the general reader. Perhaps we ought not to take too seriously such statements as:

In history actions of honor and dishonor do appear plainly and distinctly which is which: but in the present age they are so disguised that few there be, and those very careful, that be not grossly mistaken in them.

This was then the proper thing to say of history to the young nobleman. Certainly we can only be amused by Hobbes' ostensible hesitation whether to commend the history to the Duke as the composition of a man "who had the blood of kings in his veins" or for its own sake as history. But in the introduction for the general reader we see him plunge into the old literary and moral controversy between the merits of Herodotus and Thucydides. And he argues the goodness of the history in the rhetorical terms of truth and elocution. These, as indeed, the entire introduction, are the sort of seventeenth-century criticism which does not concern us at all and seems to have little to do with what is important in Thucydides.

But if the flavor of the seventeenth-century thought has dated Hobbes' comments on Thucydides as much as the later accumulations of knowledge have rendered his classical map obsolete, the seventeenth-century speech of Hobbes has created the definitive grandeur of the translation. If it is possible to isolate its two most remarkable qualities they are concreteness and directness, and it is easy, by comparing Hobbes with the nineteenth-century versions, such as Jowett, to see how painfully complicated and feeble "scholarly" prose has later become. The following passage is from the Funeral Speech of Pericles. It is so well known that one would think it impossible to give every phrase a twist which would save it from a hackneyed flavor. And see the freshness and power of Hobbes' version:

And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonor when they were in the fight and by such men, as, though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto it a most honorable contribution. For having every

one given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulcher; not wherein they are buried so much, as wherein their glory is laid up, upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered for ever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulcher: and their virtues shall be testified not only by the inscription in stone at home, but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than any monument will remain with everyone for ever.

Translations of great works of the past appear when there is a demand for them. This demand seems to spring from some sort of understanding or communication between the two ages, however distant. We are very near to the world of fifth-century Greece, in spite of the tiny dimensions of their political organizations, of their armies or their wars. For, strangely enough, they faced something like our problems of the mass society—a society without respect for traditional standards of birth or conduct, with few restraints in religion or morality, with war past or war impending the most dynamic force in political life. Add to this a universal Greek rationalism—that is, the Greek's belief that the problems of the cosmos and the problems of political life could be solved by applying his brains to them, and that when one solution proved a failure another must instantly be sought. This way of thinking and acting consequentially was a uniform force throughout the Greek world in the fifth century. At the conference in Sparta at the beginning of the war the Corinthians blame the Spartans for their failure to understand this, the significant element of modernity. Throughout the history, both in Thucydides' own comments and in that of many speakers on both sides, it is emphasized that all situations are controlled by ultimate rational factors and the shrewd man and the shrewd state think only in such terms. The Spartan soldier's supposed invincibility is a myth; it is only a question of how much pressure is applied. The Spartan's standard of simplicity, austerity, and honesty is a myth; it is only a question of how much temptation he is subjected to. Let him take over the Athenian empire and he will prove if anything worse than his predecessors. The sea and the land, says Pericles, are elements of power. The struggle between states and the lawlessness of individuals within the state are alike due

to the permanent inner will to power inherent in all. Laws must be framed with only this in mind—how far this impulse can be effectually checked and held in balance while allowing for the continuation of the natural energy which permits of political and economic advance.

This is the world of which Thucydides wrote, with an analysis of surpassing clarity and penetration. The paradoxical thing is that its very self is expressed for us by a man of the seventeenth century, a century which would appear even further from the Greeks than ourselves.

To the study of Hobbes himself this version of Thucydides and his introductory and dedicatory essays present an interesting contribution. The translation was issued in 1628, when Hobbes was forty. He tells us that he had had it by him for some time before he gave it to the press and so we are not exactly certain when it was written, but presumably when he was between thirty and forty. It thus comes at a time well before he had committed any of his thoughts on political philosophy to paper. It is very probable that the intense study of the Greek historian which this translation necessitated had great influence on Hobbes' later political speculations. Certainly it is tempting to link together Thucydides' discussion of the nature of civil strife (*stasis*) in Book III, the arguments of Diodotus on the inevitable and invincible appetite of individual and state for power, the identification of the basic drives to empire as fear, honor, and gain—to link all of these with much in the *Leviathan*.

It would clearly be wrong to do so without allowing for the tremendous effect of the Civil War on Hobbes, coming as it did between the writing of the translation and the later works. But it is a suggestive combination: the ideas of Thucydides taken up earlier and the political events observed later as the source of much of Hobbes' political theory.

My aim in this edition has been in the main to let the Hobbesian Thucydides speak for himself. The Molesworth edition had a large variety of notes, archaeological or linguistic, but usually not worth reproducing. Hobbes himself includes a very few notes which, I think, I have invariably left as he wrote them. My own comments fall roughly into three classes. There are those concerned with passages where Hobbes has mistranslated

the Greek. These are rare but they do occur. For instance, when Pericles, speaking of the Athenians as posterity will see them, says, "they have established eternal memorials of good and bad everywhere," it is impossible to leave Hobbes unannotated when he translates "and set up eternal monuments on all sides both of the evil we have done to our enemies and the good we have done to our friends." Here Hobbes is clearly drawing on the discussion of justice in the first book of the *Republic*. The mistranslation comes from a decision by Hobbes that Thucydides means something which he didn't say and which Hobbes says for him. There are also instances scattered up and down the history where Hobbes condenses a passage slightly, where through impatience or forgetfulness he omits a name on a list or a detail such as "and they camped on the shore." These are unimportant and I have only commented on them where it appeared to me that the reader's understanding of the passage was seriously diminished by the missing detail.

The second sort of note deals with passages where Hobbes' seventeenth-century English might mislead a modern reader unacquainted with the Greek. The well-known passage in the Funeral Speech means "We are lovers of beauty but with cheapness." Hobbes renders, "For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift." Many readers today would misunderstand this.

Lastly I have written a few elementary notes on political and historical matters, for the benefit of those readers who know little of the life of the Greek state in the fifth century B.C.

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THE FIRST BOOK

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidaea.—The Lacedaemonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion.—The degrees by which that dominion was acquired.—The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta.—The demands of the Lacedaemonians.—The obstinacy of the Athenians, and their answer by the advice of Pericles.

1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot, with expectation it should prove a great one and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it; conjecturing so much both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision, and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened among the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered, yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I

do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, everyone easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear, neither by sea nor land, and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it without any stock of riches and planted nothing (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls), but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day, they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants, as that which is now called Thessalia, and Boeotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia, and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home, and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers.* From hence it is that Attica, from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people. And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said that Greece, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as, Attica being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in

* Perhaps a modern reader would understand this more easily if it were literally rendered from the Greek "and moreover they were plotted against by foreigners."

common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis and called in for their aid into other cities, these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes; and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general, nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis and were the first so called; but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part of Greece had now received.*

4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea, and both commanded the isles called Cyclades and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea or else inhabited the islands after once they began to cross over † one to another in ships, became thieves and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch

* The Greek says "But on that expedition they came together inasmuch as now they used the sea more."

† The Greek adds "began more often to cross over."

in maintenance for the weak, and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly inhabited,* rifled them and made this the best means of their living, being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not, as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the mainland. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called *Ozolae*, the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years laid away upon the same delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up

* The phrase is hardly fitly rendered "scatteringly." It means literally "lived in by villages." This is the phrase Thucydides applies to Sparta (I, 10) when he wants to differentiate its appearance from that of Athens. It means that instead of all the inhabitants living in a large city, usually ringed by walls, they lived in a collection of villages, each just separated from the other physically, and often distinguished by being inhabited by different tribes or clans. When Thucydides says that this was the fashion of life in Greece in the old times, he means before the population had settled into large cities.

by the Lacedaemonians, amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first that when they were to contend in the Olympic games stripped themselves naked and anointed their bodies with ointment; whereas in ancient times the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches, nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.

7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore, and have taken up isthmi [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea] both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others also that dwelt on the seaside, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times those people are planted up high in the country.

8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phoenicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands inhabited, a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians when in this present war they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead found that more than half of them were Carians, known so to be both by the armour buried with them and also by their manner of burial at this day. And when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea-coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings, of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of de-

sire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.

9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors of Helen bound thereto by oath to Tindareus as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts of the Peloponnesians say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Eurystheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleidae, Atreus, that was his uncle by the mother, and was then abiding with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus, and to whom Eurystheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Eurystheus came not back (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleidae, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenae, and of whatsoever else was under Eurystheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides. To which greatness Agamemnon succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear that he himself both conferred most ships to that action and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer (if any think his testimony sufficient), who, at the delivery of the scepter unto him, calleth him, "of many isles and of all Argos king." Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

10. Now seeing Mycenae was but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man

for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said and fame reported it to be. For if the city of Lacedaemon were now desolate and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts of Peloponnesus it possess two and hath the leading of the rest and also of many confederates without, yet the city being not close built and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited * after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture by the sight of their city that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy] nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power; but we are to think that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it but yet inferior to those of the present age, if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels, those that were of Boeotians carrying one hundred and twenty men apiece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all, but declareth that they who were in the vessels of Philoctetes served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes that they who were at the oar were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along except kings and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece were not very many.

11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men as

* See note on page 4.

of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight (which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision and with all their forces, eased of booty-haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise, but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report which, by means of the poets, now goeth of it.

12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions, and those which were driven out built cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Boeotians in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country which, now Boeotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy.) And in the eightieth year the Dorians together with the Heracleidae seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest and, shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily and also certain parts of the

rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies (for before that time kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary); and the Grecians built navies and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use, and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first galleys of all Greece. Now it is well known that Aminocles, the shipwright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos; and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end of this present war are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, and from that battle to the same time are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians' territory), and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates and, affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus, first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy, and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The Phocaeans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as

it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Median war and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans had of galleys any number. For these last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Aegina and the Athenians had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars apiece; and that so lately as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Aegina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.

15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all; and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home, because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones as subjects nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.

16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom after the defeat of Croesus made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the seaside and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent; and Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phoenician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own

families, they resided for the most part in the cities and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable nor the cities singly be adventurous.

18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedaemonians (for Lacedaemon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants; for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more that the Lacedaemonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that came the barbarian with the great fleet into Greece to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedaemonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship-board and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedaemonians, these two cities appearing to be the mightiest, for this had the power by land and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile; for afterwards the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, being at variance, warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] sometimes in peace some-

times in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert because their practice was with danger.

19. The Lacedaemonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy convenient to their own policy.* But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned over them and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war than when, in their flourishing time the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past, hard to be believed, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For men receive the report of things, though of their own country if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their accomplices had that day and at that instant discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians, as that the kings of Lacedaemon, in giving their suffrages, had not single but double votes, and that Pitonate was a band of soldiers so called there, whereas there was never

* Hobbes' rendering hardly seems accurate. The literal meaning of the Greek gives no ground for the "fair means" of the translation. It is "taking heedful care only that their constitutions should be oligarchic to suit themselves" (i.e., the Lacedaemonians).

any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

21. Now he that by the arguments here adduced shall frame a judgment of the things past and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung or prose-writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit, but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity: he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it, yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned.

22. What particular persons have spoken when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it were hard for me to remember exactly, whether they were speeches which I have heard myself or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me that knew what was nearest to the sum of the truth of all that had been uttered to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here.* But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors nor such as I myself did but think to be true, but only those whereat I was myself present and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty, because such as were present at every action spake not all after the same manner, but as they were affected to the parts or as they could remember.

* This sentence appears quite misconstrued. It is a very important statement of Thucydides' practice in regard to the speeches, and the meaning is "As each speaker appeared to me to say roughly what was required about the particular circumstance in which he was involved . . . this is how I have set it down, sticking as closely as I could to the entire content of what was actually said." Hobbes' version is wrong because he missed the usage of the middle voice of the verb *echein*, which means "clinging to" not "possessing" or "knowing," which is how he took it.

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find enough herein to make him think it profitable.* And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession than to be rehearsed for a prize.

23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long and the harm it did to Greece was such as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians and what by the Greeks warring on one another (and some cities there were that when they were taken changed their inhabitants), nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition, as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world and most violent withal; eclipses of the sun oftener than is reported of any former time; great droughts in some places, and thereby famine; and that which did none of the least hurt but destroyed also its part, the plague. All these evils entered together with this war, which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league which immediately after the conquest of Euboea had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same and their quarrels I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel,† though least in

* The Greek means, impersonally, "it shall be sufficient." It is more likely, in my opinion, that Thucydides meant "it shall be sufficient for me" than "it shall be sufficient for the man who desires to know." Thus the meaning would be "I shall be satisfied if . . ." and goes on, plausibly enough, "It has been composed as a possession forever rather than . . ."

† Hobbes' translation of this is hardly satisfactory. Thucydides is contrasting the *causes* which lie deepest, which were also least put forward at the time, and the alleged causes. The expression "truest

speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced were these.

24. Epidamnus is a city situated on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris. This was planted by the Corcyraeans; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians and others of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war was that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyraeans not to see them perish but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyraeans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

25. The Epidamnians, now despairing of relief from the Corcyraeans and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city to them, and declared how

quarrel" would be to modern ears better rendered "truest occasion" or "cause."

the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyraeans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyraeans, who being their colony yet contemned them and allowed them not their due honour in public meetings nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping, and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phaeaces who flourished in glory of naval affairs, which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

26. The Corinthians therefore, having all these crinations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyraeans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia. The Corcyraeans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same, and sailing presently thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished (for these banished men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyraeans to restore them) and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyraeans with forty galleys, together with the banished men (whom they pretended to reduce) and with the Illyrians, whom they had

joined to their part, warred upon them, and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army, and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges with those that were there before, and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyraeans, to aid them with some galleys, who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five; the citizens of Hermione, one; the Troezenians, two; the Leucadians, ten; the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money; of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms.

28. The Corcyraeans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and of the Sicyonians whom they took with them and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi, that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out

better friends * than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter; for before they could not honestly do it because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyraeans replied to this that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were and to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys and two thousand men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium (which is a temple of Apollo and ground consecrated unto him) in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them at Actium to forbid their coming on, and in the meantime manned out their fleet, and, having repaired and made fit for service their old galleys and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard. The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace but having their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail (for forty attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea and, arranging themselves,

* This, as Hobbes points out in a note, means the Athenians, of course. The Corcyrean position was one of limited blackmail. If the cause of dispute between themselves and the Corinthians could be settled by a supposedly neutral international authority (the Delphic oracle), all would be well. Otherwise there would be war, and for that war the Corcyreans would enlist the help of the Athenians, which, with the Corinthians and Corcyreans themselves, were the three major naval powers. Thus Corinth would find herself facing a dangerous combination of two great navies.

came to a battle in which the Corcyraeans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be ransomed and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

30. The battle being ended, the Corcyraeans, after they had set up their trophy* in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyraeans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas and infested the confederates of Corinth for the most part of that year, till such time as in the beginning of the summer following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis; and the Corcyraeans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lain quietly opposite all the summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

31. All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corinthians, being vexed at the war with the Corcyraeans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyraeans, having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear and (because they had never been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedaemonians) thought it best

* Hobbes' note on this word reads: "Turning, particularly the back. Trophies, monuments in remembrance of having made the enemy turn their backs. These were usual in those times, now out of date."

now to send to Athens to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyraeans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyraeans spake to this effect:

32. "Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours (as now do we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it; and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same; and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyraeans, being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go through,* and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece, it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice but error of judgment.

* The Greek word so rendered by Hobbes is more intelligible to a modern reader if translated "to be superior," "to get the better."

33. "Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence on our part of need will on your part be honourable for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befall you than that that power which you would have prized above any money or other requital should come voluntarily and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands, bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league that come not rather to receive strength and reputation than to confer it. If any here think that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error and seeth not how the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize, assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand either to weaken us or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your part,* we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

34. "If they object injustice in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they

* This is a disputed reading. Many authorities read the Greek word for "our part."

have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument not to be seduced by their demands and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.

35. "As for the articles between you and the Lacedaemonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there it is said * that whosoever is confederate of neither party may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places in your dominion, and we be denied both the league now propounded and also all other help from whencesoever. And if they impute it to you as a fault that you grant our request, we shall take it for a greater that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also in such manner as you shall think good yourselves, but especially by taking us into your league and so aiding us. Many commodities,† as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest: that whereas they are your enemies (which is manifest enough) and not weak ones but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial, league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay, rather your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but your-

* What is referred to here is the agreement between Athens and Sparta called the Thirty Years' Treaty, made in 445 B.C., in which, after an inconclusive end to the fighting which had lasted for about ten years and is sometimes referred to as the First Peloponnesian War, it was laid down that neither league might gain adherents from members of the other, but that states enrolled in neither might join which they pleased.

† Seventeenth-century English for "many advantages."

selves, or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.

36. "If any man now think thus that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken, let that man consider that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be feared. Let him also remember that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra, wherein he forecasteth none of the best (considering the present state of affairs) that makes a question whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot he should join unto it or not that city which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus thither, and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyraeans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone."

Thus spake the Corcyraeans, and after them the Corinthians, thus:

37. "The Corcyraeans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on, it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is that they took up that custom not from any virtue but mere wickedness, as being unwilling to

have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point, that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates; not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame when they took anything. But if they had been honest men (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their honesty appear.

38. "But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt, but now they also make war upon us and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them but to have the leading of them and to be regarded by them as is fit. For our other colonies both honour and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone, and that without some manifest wrong we should not have had colour to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.

39. "They say now that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for, but rather he that

before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial before they had besieged the city but after, when they saw we meant not to put it up.* And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves but to get in you, into their confederacy? no, but into their conspiracy, and to receive them in this name that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then when they were most in safety, not now when we have the wrong and they the danger, and when you that never partaked of their power must impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should communicate their power before hand that mean to make common the issue of the same, and they that share not in the crimes ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

40. "Thus it appears that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right, whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please, yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either, but only for those that, having revolted from neither part, want protection and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise) that receive them. For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows they must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyraeans (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyraeans you never had so much as a truce) and not to constitute a new law of receiving one another's rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion, but plainly alleged that it was reason that everyone should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates.

* I.e., "not to put up with it."

And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law not so much against us as against yourselves.

41. "These are the points of justice we had to show you conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice and claim of favour, which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you nor such friends as to surcharge you *), we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Aeginetae a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent to you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory against the Aeginetae and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but of victory. For even a man's domestic affairs are ordered the worse through eagerness of present contention.

42. "Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyraeans frightening you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals is a firmer power than that

* The Greek expression is somewhat ambiguous. Its sense seems to be: "This is our request and claim, not being enemies to hurt nor yet such as you can deal with as friends."

addition of strength which, puffed up with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.

43. "And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedaemon, that everyone ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering that now is that occasion wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy; and that you will not receive these Corcyraeans into league against our wills nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs."

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

44. Both sides having been heard and the Athenian people twice assembled, in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyraeans. But in the latter they changed their minds, not so as to make a league with the Corcyraeans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other (for then, if the Corcyraeans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians), but made it only defensive, that if anyone should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians, but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands.* And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyraeans into league, and when the Corinthians were gone,

* This is something less than the meaning of the Greek, which is "that they might go to war with the Corinthians (and others . . .) if necessary when they had been made weaker."

sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles, and had order not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded Corcyra or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs, which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in, and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles with four others. After they were all come together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elaeatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine, betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came the Corinthians and encamped.

47. The Corcyraeans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota; and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have been evermore their friends.

48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days' provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight, and about break of day, as

they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyraeans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyraeans were placed the galleys of Athens, and the rest being their own were divided into three commands under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyraeans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyraeans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.

49. The standard being on either side lift up, they joined battle, having on both parts both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskillfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the manner of a fight at land.* For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages through each other they made none but fought it out with courage and strength rather than with skill. Inasmuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder, in which the Athenian galleys being always, where the Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents, and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyraeans had the victory. But in the left wing where the Corinthians were them-

* This is Hobbes' rendering of the Greek which means "The fight was a sharp one but not as skillful as it was sharp. Indeed, it was rather like a land battle."

selves they were far superior because the Corcyraeans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyraeans were in distress, now aided them manifestly, whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then everyone fell to the business without making difference any longer; and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, stayed not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys that so they might tow them after, but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive, and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle for number of ships that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead, which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota where also lay the land forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves and made again to the Corcyraeans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining of the former battle together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song which they used to sing when they came to charge was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern, for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys sent from Athens to second the former ten for fear lest the Corcyraeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these gal-

leys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyraeans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight) descried them not but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern, till at last some that saw them said they were enemies, and then retired also the Corcyraeans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended in night. The Corcyraeans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyraeans in Leucimna. The Corcyraeans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they anchored there.

52. The next day both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle, both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet repaired, but took thought rather how to go home for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart.

53. They therefore thought good to send afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds for to sound them and to say in this manner: "Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles; for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us; if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies." Thus said they; and the Corcyraeans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take

and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: "Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyraeans; if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not, but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not suffer you."

54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyraeans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead which, carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands, and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy because in the battle they had the better all day, having gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other and taken no less than a thousand prisoners and sunk about seventy of the enemies' galleys. And the Corcyraeans set up a trophy because they had sunk thirty galleys of the Corinthians and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them; and lastly, for that when they went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit (this town was common to them and to the Corcyraeans), and having put into it Corinthians only, departed and went home. Of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred that were servants they sold, and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians, the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyraeans in

a battle by sea against the Corinthians with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy,* commanded the citizens of Potidaea, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi (magistrates so called) which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth, fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas and of the Corinthians they should revolt and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

57. These things against the Potidaeans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred upon them. And the cause why he did so was that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedaemon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidaea. And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace and with the Bottiaeans to revolt with them; for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas) both to receive hostages of the Potidaeans and to demolish their walls, and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities that they revolted not.

58. The Potidaeans having sent ambassadors to Athens to try

* This is more easily understood in its modern version, "suspecting their hatred."

if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them, by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedaemon, dealt with the Lacedaemonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia, and when the magistrates of Lacedaemon had promised them if the Athenians went to Potidaea, to invade Attica, then at last they revolted, and together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns and to go up and dwell at Olynthus and that one city to make strong, and unto those that removed gave part of his own and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when they had demolished their cities and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.

59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidaea and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet, conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out, and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas that had invaded the country from above.

60. In the meantime after Potidaea was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidaeans. And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidaea forty days.

61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people, who, hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the

places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys under the conduct of Callias,* the son of Calliades. These, coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme and were now besieging the city of Pydna; and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition and, having made a necessary league with Perdiccas (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidaea, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhoea, they attempted to take it; but when they could not do it, they turned back and marched towards Potidaea by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates, and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus and there encamped.

62. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto Olynthus and had the market kept for them without the city. And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas; for he fell off again presently from the Athenians and, having left Iolau governor in his place, took part with the Potidaeans. The purpose of Aristeus was to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians, and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus to stop those within from making any sally from the town, and then dislodging marched on towards Potidaea. When they were come on as far as the isthmus and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did

* The Greek adds "Callias . . . along with four others." Hobbes seems not to have noticed this. The Athenians very frequently put such commands into commission.

the like; and not long after they joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated and fled into the city.

63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidaea. In the end he resolved of the shortest way, and with his soldiers about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidaea, and with much ado got in at the pier through the sea, cruelly shot at and with the loss of a few but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began, they that should have seconded the Potidaeans from Olynthus (for it is at most but sixty furlongs off, and in sight) advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken down, they retired again, they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy and gave truce to the Potidaeans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidaeans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.

64. Presently upon this the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part toward the isthmus which they kept with a garrison, but the part to Pallene-ward they left unwallled. For they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a guard in the isthmus and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene, fearing lest the Potidaeans and their confederates should assault them when divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidaea was unwallled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius, who arriving in Pallene left his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidaea wasted the territory as he passed through. And when

none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene. Thus was Potidaea on both sides strongly besieged, and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys that came up and rode before it.

65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest, and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business * and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard, and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush before Sermylus and slew many of that city and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidaea, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiaean, and some small towns he took in.

66. These were the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians for besieging Potidaea and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt, and for that they had come thither and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidaea. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians.

67. But when Potidaea was once besieged, both for their men's sakes that were within and also for fear to lose the place they could no longer hold. But out of hand they procured of their confederates to go to Lacedaemon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Aeginetae, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any, alleging that they were not per-

* The Greek means "When he failed to persuade them, wishing to do what *was next best*."

mitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles they ought to have been. So the Lacedaemonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council of their own state commanded them to speak. Then presented everyone his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedaemonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.

68. "Men of Lacedaemon, your own fidelity both in matter of estate and conversation * maketh you the less apt to believe us when we accuse others of the contrary. And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states.† For although we have oftentimes foretold you that the Athenians would do us a mischief, yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it but have suspected rather that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates not before we had suffered but now when the evil is already upon us. Before whom our speech must be so much the longer by how much our objections are the greater in that we have both by the Athenians been injured and by you neglected. If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse when you see already that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others, and especially against our confederates, and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For else they would never have taken

* The Greek words so rendered are better understood by us in the form "constitution and social intercourse," i.e., public and private life.

† Hobbes' translation is hardly fair. The Greek means "By this conduct you attain *sophrosune* [to be rendered variously "moderation," "temperance," "self-restraint," perhaps most commonly what in English-speaking countries is meant by "decency"], but you are the more ignorant in your conduct of foreign affairs."

Corcyra and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidaea, whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.

69. "And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city and again afterwards to raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty not only the states by them already subdued but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same is most truly said to do it, especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece [as you do]. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question should not have been put whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all but come upon them whom they mean to oppress whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know not only that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they are the less bold; but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedaemonians, you are the only men of all Greece that sitting still defend others, not with your forces but with promises; and you are also the only men that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report to be sure, but yet it is more in fame than in fact. For we ourselves know that the Persian came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth before you encountered him as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand, choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion than to invade them, and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we know that the barbarian's own error, and in our war against the Athenians their own oversights more than your assistance, was the thing

that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some that, relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.

70. "Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it, especially on so great quarrels as these whereof you neither seem to have any feeling nor to consider what manner of men and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be that you are to contend withal. For they love innovation and are swift to devise and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own, not devise anything new, nor scarce to attain what is necessary. They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best. Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even what your judgment assures, and being in a danger never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your own. They, when they overcome their enemies, advance the farthest and, when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain anything, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present and enter presently into other hopes. For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy for continual getting of more; nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon

they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves nor suffer others is to say the truth.

71. "Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedaemon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time, not knowing that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries, but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same condition. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them.* Here, therefore, give a period to your slackness and by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidaea and the rest, lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to their cruellest enemies, and lest we and others be driven through despair to seek out some other league. Which to do were no injustice neither against the Gods, judges of men's oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them. For not they break the league who being abandoned have recourse to others, but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners than yourselves. Therefore, deliberate well of these points, and take such a course that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate than it was left unto you by your progenitors."

* Hobbes is not right here. The Greek means "That is why—because of their greater experience—there is far more innovation in Athenian practice than in yours."

72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedaemon upon their business,* when they heard of this oration thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedaemonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city, to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not, supposing that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedaemonians saying that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly, who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect:

73. "Though our embassy was not to this end, that we should argue against our † confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court not to make answer to the criminations of the cities (for to plead before you here were not to plead before the judges either of them or us) but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates in matters of so great importance, and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance, so must we have ours (if that be any benefit) in the

* The Greek is actually "There happened to be an Athenian delegation already in Lacedaemon concerned with other matters."

† This is almost certainly the wrong reading. The meaning is "*your* confederates."

commemoration. And we shall make recital of them not by way of deprecation but of protestation and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis, which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus and laying it waste city after city; for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself, who, when his fleet was overcome and that he had no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.

74. "Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things of most advantage, namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two-thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait whereby he clearly saved the whole business and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them, and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited and to the end you might still keep them so, and when you were afraid not of our danger but your own. Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves into danger for a city hopeless ever to

be again, saved both you in part and ourselves. But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted, or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.

75. "Therefore, men of Lacedaemon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is out of the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. For the revolts from us would all have been made to you. Now it is no fault for men in danger to order their affairs to the best.

76. "For you also, men of Lacedaemon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously or to have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three of the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity, a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength ever so far preferred

as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of commendation who following the natural inclination of man in desiring rule over others are juster than for their own power they need. And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt rather than commendation.

77. "For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates when, in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them considering that others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. For they that have the power to compel need not at all to go to law. And yet these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also they themselves cannot deny but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine, and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. Therefore, when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion, they bore it, but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason, for to men in subjection the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us if you should do again as you did for awhile when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours nor yet those of the rest of Greece.

78. "Deliberate therefore of this a great while as of a matter of great importance, and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you

enter how unexpected the chances of war be. For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity from which we are equally far off, and whether part it will light on is to be tried with uncertainty. And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths, but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us."

79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians and the Athenians' answer, they put them everyone out of the court and consulted of the business among themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done unjustly and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.

80. "Men of Lacedaemon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like, insomuch as you cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal strength and can quickly be upon them, yet against men whose territory is remote and are also expert seamen and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides, and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak; and if we will provide and prepare against them, it will require time. On our

money? But therein also we are more too weak; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute.

81. "But it may be some rely on this, that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping or take from them their revenue whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again will be no honour for us when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. As for the hope that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end, let that never lift us up; for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth, nor as men without experience to be astonished at the war.

82. "And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them, but only not yet to take up arms but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance; and in the meantime to make our provision and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money (nor are they to be blamed that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only but also barbarians for their safety), and withal to set forth our own. If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having their grounds unhurt and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as

long as we may, lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. For if, unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory, consider if in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again.

83. "Now let no man think it cowardice that being many cities, we go not presently and invade that one city. For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money by means whereof arms are useful, especially when it is a war of land men against sea men. And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them.

84. "As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will be the longer before you end it for that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of, and this which they object is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame; good counsellors in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws and by severity more modestly than to disobey them, and also in that we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly, but do think our neighbour's

cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech; and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man, but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties.

85. "Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions of our ancestors which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure, the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidaea; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather because they be content to refer the cause to judgment, and one that offereth himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy."

Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedaemonians in this manner:

86. "For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment, because they are not good as they were and because they are evil as they were not. Now are we the same we were and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates or defer to repair them, for the harm they suffer is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates not to be betrayed to the Athenians nor to be defended with words (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. Let no man tell

me that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lacedaemon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice."

87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians; and saying afterwards that he could not discern whether was the greater cry (for they used there to give their votes *viva voce* and not with balls *) and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war, he put it unto them again and said, "to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder," and withal he showed them a certain place, "and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side." So they arose and the room was divided, wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.

Then calling in the confederates they told them that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong; but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent. This done, their confederates went home; and so did also afterwards the Athenians when they had dispatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years for which a peace had been formerly concluded after the actions past in Euboea.

88. The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should

* Hobbes' note: "*Psephos*: properly lapillus, calculus; a little stone or ball, which he that gave his voice put into a box, either on the affirmative or negative part, as he pleased. The Athenians used beans, white and black. The Venetians now use balls; and the distinction is made by the box, inscribed with yea and no."

still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves was this.* After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale were there also utterly overthrown, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, stayed behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians. And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, everyone to his own city. And the body of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also and fetched thither their wives and children and such goods as they had from the places where they had been put out to keep, and went about the reparation of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

90. The Lacedaemonians, hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors—partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other

* The reader should notice that the following chapters, 89 to 118 inclusive, refer to the growth of the Athenian empire *before* the war, i.e., in the years 478 when the Persians left Greece and the League of Delos was formed to 432 when the new conflict broke out. The arrangement of Book I becomes clearer if one observes the following divisions: Chaps. 1-23, introduction, proving the greater size and importance of this war over the preceding. This part also contains Thucydides' discussion of his own presentation of the material, both narrative and speeches. Chaps. 24-88 treats of the *alleged* causes of the war, which are the incident of Epidamnos and the attack on Potidaea. Chaps. 89-118 deal with the underlying cause of the war, which was the growth of the Athenian Empire in the fifty years prior to the events at Epidamnos and Potidaea. Chaps. 119 to the end of the book recount the other actions, diplomatic and military, before the actual outbreak of hostilities.

had had walls, but principally as incited thereto by their confederates who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians—and entreated them not to build their walls but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing, not discovering their meaning and the jealousy they had of the Athenians but pretending this: that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes, and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedaemonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer, that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of to Lacedaemon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedaemon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height; and that all the men in the city, in the meantime, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedaemon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedaemon, he went not to the state, but delaying the time excused himself, and when any of those that were in office asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, “that he stayed for his fellow-ambassadors who, upon some business that fell out, were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already.”

91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and, having informed themselves, would re-

late the truth, which they also did. And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height); for he feared lest the Lacedaemonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles, coming now to his audience before the Lacedaemonians, said plainly, "that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within, and that if it shall please the Lacedaemonians upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys," he said, "they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them; and in common counsel the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in strength unequal men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore," said he, "either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us."

92. The Lacedaemonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them but, by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall; besides, they bare them affection then for their courage shown against the Medes), yet they were inwardly offended because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.

93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls, the structure itself making manifest the haste used in the building. For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts, and those in

some places unwrought and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres and polished stones were piled together among the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piraeus, for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens, as conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed the first man that dared tell them that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel also it was that they built the wall of that breadth about Piraeus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it was made all of great stones cut square and bound together with iron and lead. But for height it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth, and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land, and thought that Piraeus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians that, in case they were oppressed by land, they should go down thither and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.

94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedaemon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus, with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates, and making war on Cyprus subdued the greatest part of the same; and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium, which they besieged and won.

95. But Pausanias, being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians and especially the Ionians who had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came to the Athenians and requested them for consanguinity's sake to become their leaders and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. The Athenians, accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best to themselves. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians sent for Pausanias home to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedaemon, though he were censured for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit, especially of Medising,* the which seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army, whose command the confederates refused; and they, finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedaemonians sent no more, because they feared lest such as went out would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias, and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.

96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command by the confederates' own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order which cities should

* I.e., taking the part of the Mede or Persian. For many years after the departure of the Persians from Greece, any politician of high standing either in Athens or Sparta was apt to be accused of "Medism" if he fell from favor. Both Themistocles and Pausanias, who had jointly been commanders of the Greek army and navy against Xerxes, were later accused and condemned on this charge. Greece lived for a long time after 478 in the shadow of the fear of another invasion, and in the suspicion that her leading statesmen might be tampered with by the Persian king.

contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of treasurers of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute, for so they called this money contributed. And the first tribute that was taxed came to four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

97. Now using their authority at first in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws and were admitted to common council, by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. Which also I have therefore written both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians or that invasion only, of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic history, but briefly and without exact mention of the times), and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up.

98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege and carried away the inhabitants captives. Then the isle Scyros, in the Aegean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives and planted therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Euboeans, and those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city which contrary to the ordinance they deprived of their free estate; * though afterwards,

* What Thucydides refers to is the fact that Naxos was the first member of the Delian confederacy which tried to withdraw from the association and when subjugated was then reduced to subject status. Henceforth it contributed money, not ships, and had no further say in the policies of the confederacy.

as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.

99. Amongst other causes of revolts the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars. For the Athenians exacted strictly and were grievous to them by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms, and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For through this refusal to accompany the army the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to, by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates, and themselves unprovided and without means to make war in case they should revolt.

100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both and took or sunk all the Phoenician fleet to the number of two hundred galleys. After this again happened the revolt of Thasos upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace. And the Athenians, going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people unto the river of Strymon for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis, they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians that were enemies to this new-built town of the Nine-ways.

101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica, which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened,

they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots, and of neighbouring towns the Thuriatae and Aethaeans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians brought into servitude in former times, whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lacedaemonians now a war at Ithome. The Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to the Athenians upon condition to raze their walls, to deliver up their galleys, to pay both the money behind and for the future as much as they were wont, and to quit both the mines and the continent.

102. The Lacedaemonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians, who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that kind, whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force. And upon this journey grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedaemonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race, might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they stayed,* dismissed them alone of all the confederates, not discovering their jealousy but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians, perceiving that they were not sent away upon good cause but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter, and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedaemonians' hands, as soon as they were gone left the league which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persian and became confederates with their enemies the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.

103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out,

* A clearer and easier translation would be "fearing the audacious and innovating temper of the Athenians . . . lest, if they stayed, they might be convinced by the rebels in Ithome and make a revolt themselves."

in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedaemonians upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus and that they should no more return, and whosoever should be taken returning to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedaemonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedaemonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolae. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedaemonians and came to the league of the Athenians because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegae were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisaea and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.

104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammeticus, an African,* king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him, who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part called the White Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest.

105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory.

* Hobbes always renders the Greek words *Libyan* and *Libya* by "African" and "Africa."

After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Aeginetae, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Aegina, the confederates of both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory, and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Stroebus. After this, the Peloponnesians, desiring to aid the Aeginetae, sent over into Aegina itself three hundred men of arms of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians and with other forces seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara, supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans or, if they did, would be forced to rise from before Aegina. But the Athenians stirred not from Aegina; but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians, having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout * both slew those that were setting up the trophy and, charging the rest, got the victory.

106. The Corinthians, being overcome, went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them at the place by which they entered with their men of arms and, encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers, killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their army got home again.

* This is too literal in Hobbes. The word, which is used of a military sally, originally meant "raising the war cry." In such a passage as the present it has come to mean no more than "sallying out."

107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Piraeus. The Phoceans also making war upon Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians of whom the Lacedaemonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedaemonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisaeon Gulf, the Athenians going about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegae. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself but was also always guarded by the Athenians. They thought good, therefore, to stay amongst the Boeotians and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst they were there, there wanted not some Athenians that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government and to have demolished the long walls then building. But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city and a thousand Argives and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them; for there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedaemonians.

108. They fought at Tanagra of Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedaemonians, entering into the territories of Megara and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. Upon the two-and-sixtieth day after this battle the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Boeotians and overthrew them at Oenophyta and brought the territories of Boeotia and Phocis under their obedience, and withal razed

the walls of Tanagra and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages, and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Aegina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down and should deliver up their galleys and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedaemonians' navy, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.

109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt; and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedaemon to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia. And then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis. There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers.

110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years' war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene, but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king except only Amyrtaeus that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt for a supply of those that were there already, which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest, and being assaulted from the land by the army and from the sea by the Phoenician fleet,

lost the greatest part of their galleys and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.

111. Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Boeotians and Phoceans, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling) but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for but came back again without effect and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys that lay at Pegae (for Pegae was in the hands of the Athenians) under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head, and then presently took up forces in Achaia, and putting over made war on Oenias, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. Nevertheless they took it not but returned home.

112. Three years after this, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war and with two hundred galleys, part their own and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon made war on Cyprus. Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtaeus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army, they left Citium and when they had passed Salamis in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians and, having gotten victory in both, returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedaemonians took in hand the war called the holy war and, having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedaemonians were gone, came with their army and, regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phoceans.

113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Boeotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and certain other

places of Boeotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmaeus. And when they had taken Chaeroneia, they carried away the inhabitants captives and, leaving a garrison in the city, departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus and the Euboean outlaws and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia; and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Boeotia and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own laws.

114. Not long after revolted Euboea from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisaea. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Euboea; and the Lacedaemonians afterward brake into Attica and wasted the country about Eleusine and Thriasium under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and came no farther on, but so went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Euboea and totally subdued it: the Hestiaeans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands, but ordered the rest of Euboea according to composition made.

115. Being returned from Euboea, within awhile after they made a peace with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates for thirty years and rendered Nisaea, Achaia, Pegae, and Troezene (for these places the Athenians held of theirs) to the Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene; and the Milesians, being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians out of desire

to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys and set up the democracy there and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages, which, when they had put into Lemnos and set a guard upon them, they came home. But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening and first set upon the popular faction and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines.

116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phoenicians and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos), but with the forty-four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought with seventy galleys of the Samians (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers) as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle and besieged the city, which they inclosed with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles, taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phoenician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos and others out of other places to meet the Phoenicians.

117. In the meantime, the Samians, coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it and overcame the rest in fight, insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days to-

gether, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormio; and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyraeans and the Potidaeans and whatsoever other intervenient pretext of this war. These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedaemonians saw and opposed not, save now and then a little, but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them; till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was by the Lacedaemonians themselves decreed that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly; and also having sent to Delphi and enquired of Apollo whether they should have the better in the war or not, they received, as it is reported, this answer: "That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled."

119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again,

they were to put it to the question amongst them, "whether they should make war or not." And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury and desiring the war, as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities everyone severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect:

120. "Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians, they having both decreed the war themselves and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians need not be taught to beware of them, yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we in places of traffic on the sea side, to know that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not, but to make account that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us, and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet unless they have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition, and neither to swell with the good success of war nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill advised come to good effect against enemies worse advised, yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well

advised enemies. For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear.

121. "As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number; and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it both out of everyone's particular wealth and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic; whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude, and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief.

122. "We have also many other ways of war, as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper standeth

the firmest, and he that is most passionate oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest servitude, which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored, whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own but, claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.

123. "But to what end should we object matters past more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present labour for the future, for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom; for there is no reason that what was gotten in want should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself, and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit, are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.

124. "So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same, and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians, nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity and that this is the best advice; and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war groweth the confirmation of peace, yet for love of ease to refuse the war doth not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece is set up alike over all and reigneth over some already and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude." Thus said the Corinthians.

125. The Lacedaemonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least; and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently because they were unprovided and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary, yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded and the war openly on foot.

126. In the meantime they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. And first the Lacedaemonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva* for pollution of sanctuary. Which pollution was thus. There had been one

*Hobbes consistently Latinizes the names of the Greek gods, in the fashion of his time. Thus Minerva for Athene and Jupiter for Zeus.

Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon asking counsel at Delphi the God answered that on the greatest festival day he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore, having gotten forces of Theagenes and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus with intention to take upon him the tyranny, esteeming the feast of Jupiter to be the greatest and to touch withal on his particular in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica or in some other place, neither did he himself consider nor the oracle make manifest. For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius and is celebrated without the city, wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices not of living creatures but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place.* But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away, and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes. Now those that were besieged with Cylon were for want of both victual and water in very evil estate, and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the

* It appears that in some instances, where the worshippers were poor, not living animals were sacrificed, because of the expense involved, but images made of paste. Cf. Herodotus ii.47 for the same custom in Egypt.

sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe goddesses as they were going away. And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse; and Cleomenes, a Lacedaemonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition, banished them afterwards again, and not only so but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again, and there are of their race in the city unto this day.

127. This pollution, therefore, the Lacedaemonians required them to purge their city of, principally, forsooth, as taking part with the gods, but knowing withal that Pericles the son of Xantippus was by the mother's side one of that race. For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished as to bring him into the envy of the city, as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedaemonians, not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way but inciting them to the war.

128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedaemonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Taenarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca, which was thus. After that Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedaemonians, to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negotiate with the king, as he had before

begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium when he was there the first time (which, being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him which Gongylus carried wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: "Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If, therefore, any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the seaside by whose mediation we may confer together."

129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes, being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the seaside with commandment to take the government of the province of Dascylis and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before, and withal gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium and to show him the seal and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; wherein was written this answer: "Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered forever; and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be need-

ful to have them come. But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both."

130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority for his conduct at Plataea, became now many degrees more elevated and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country but went apparelled at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia, and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose, but in trifles made apparent beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access, and would be in such choleric passions toward all men indifferently that no man might endure to approach him, which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

131. When the Lacedaemonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices and, after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonae in the country of Troy practicing still with the barbarians and making his abode there for no good purpose, then the ephori forebore no longer but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale commanding him not to depart from the officer and, in case he refused, denounced war against him. But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward (for the ephori have power to do this to their king); but afterwards, procuring his enlargement, he came forth and exhibited himself to justice against such as had anything to allege against him.

132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings and at that present in great authority (for Plistarchus the

son of Leonidas being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin-german, had the tuition of him yet), by his licentious behaviour and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state. They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse:

*Pausanias, Greek General,
Having the Medes defeated,
To Phoebus in record thereof
This gift hath consecrated.*

But the Lacedaemonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripod and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so. This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in. They had information farther that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had, for he promised them not only manumission but also freedom of the city if they would rise with him and co-operate in the whole business. But neither thus upon some impeachment of the Helots would they proceed against him but kept the custom which they have in their own cases not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion and most faithful to him, who, being terrified with the cogitation that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias (to the end that if his jealousy were false or that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be discovered) and opened the letter, wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered.

133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth, the man being upon design gone to Taenarus into sanctuary and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him and from point to point discovered all the practice, saying that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all speed and not to frustrate the business in hand.

134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way, and knowing now the certain truth intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him what they came for; and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca and got in before they overtook him (now the temple itself was hard by) and, entering into a house belonging to the temple to avoid the injury of the open air, there stayed. They that pursued him could not then overtake him; but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house and, watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up and, leaving a guard there, famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was, out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Caeada where they use to cast in malefactors; yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedaemonians afterward both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died (so that he

lies now in the entry of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar) and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalcoeca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias.

135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedaemonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedaemonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias, and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism; and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedaemonians who were willing to pursue him with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him.

136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, fieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyraeans, alleging that they durst not keep him there for fear of displeasing both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent; and being pursued by the men thereto appointed asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in to Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife, and by her was instructed to take their son with him and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him and desired him that though he had opposed him in some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight, saying that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger, whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms; and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life, whereas, if he delivered him up (telling him withal for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having

heard him bade him arise together with his son whom he held as he sat, which is the most submissive supplication that is.

137. Not long after came the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians; and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea (a city belonging to Alexander) because his purpose was to go to the king, where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was and for what he fled, and said that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet of the Athenians, he arrived afterward at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: "I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more after once I with safety, he with danger, was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me," (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians' departure out of Salamis and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself) "and at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. But I desire to have a year's respite that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself."

138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court,

he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before, both for his former dignity and the hope of Greece which he promised to bring into his subjection, but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation the best discerner and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in he was able also to explicate, and what he was unpractised in he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life; some say he died voluntarily by poison because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia in Asia, in the market place; for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia which yielded him fifty talents by the year for his bread, and Lampsacus for his wine (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine), and the city of Myus for his meat. His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his own appointment and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians, for it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

139. And this is that which the Lacedaemonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassy touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.

After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidaea and to suffer Aegina to be free, but principally and most plainly telling them that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans, by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica and all ports within the Athe-

nian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act, but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds and for receiving of their slaves that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedaemon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont but only this, that "the Lacedaemonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws," the Athenians called an assembly and, propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth:

140. "Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion not to give way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself which they have when they are incited to it but change their opinions with the events), but also I see that I must now advise the same things or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty, which is also the cause that when anything happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedaemonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles] that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial themselves nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear them-

selves of their accusations by war rather than by words, and come hither no more now to expostulate but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidaea and to restore the Aeginetae to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle by not abrogating the act concerning Megara (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay), nor retain a scruple in your minds as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality.

141. "Resolve therefore from this occasion either to yield them obedience before you receive damage, or if we must have war (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour * without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience, for that the wars which they have had one against another have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because they must be far from their own wealth and yet by that be maintained and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the

* Perhaps a more significant translation in view of the context is "men that work their land with their own hands." A great many of the Peloponnesians (except the Spartans) did most of their farm work themselves, with a relatively small amount of hired labor. Consequently they were unlikely to be effective soldiers at times of sowing or harvest.

wars; and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined.

142. "But their greatest hindrance of all will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory, yet would not that be enough both to besiege us and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies. For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea than they have in sea service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply

themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men; but awed by many they will not stir that way, and not applying themselves to it will be yet more unskillful and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended at idle times and on the by, but requiring rather that while it is a-learning, nothing else should be done on the by.

143. "But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet, this indeed, if, going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell among us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship both more and better of our own citizens than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial would be found content to fly his own country and, withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days' increase of wages take part with the other side.

"In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians; whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and has many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus and they all Attica, yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy; whereas for us there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more; and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength;

for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses but of men's bodies; for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

144. "There be many other things that give hope of victory in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion and undergo other voluntary dangers (for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: 'that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports if the Lacedaemonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers,' for neither our act concerning Megara nor their banishment of strangers is forbidden in the articles, 'also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedaemonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedaemonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good; also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles and will not begin the war but be revenged on those that shall.' For this is both just and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies, and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies, and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity."

145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians, liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them, answering the Lacedaemonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken and generally, "that they would do nothing on

command, but were ready to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrament." So the ambassadors went home, and after these there came no more.

146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side before the war, which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles and matter of the war to follow.*

*Hobbes has not translated this passage correctly. There is no "but" in the Greek. Referring to the sentence before and its "not without jealousy," the Greek goes on, "For what had happened *was* a breaking of the truce and the occasion of the war" (i.e., and therefore they were naturally suspicious).



THE SECOND BOOK

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The entry of the Theban soldiers into Plataea by the treason of some within.—Their repulse and slaughter.—The irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica.—The wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet.—The public funeral of the first slain.—The second invasion of Attica.—The pestilence in the city of Athens.—The Ambraciotes' war against the Amphilochi.—Plataea assaulted, besieged.—The Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the Gulf of Crissa.—The same fleet repaired and reinforced, and beaten again by Phormio before Naupactus.—The attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis.—The fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the war.

1. The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now from the time they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it they warred without intermission. And it is written in order by summers and winters according as from time to time the several matters came to pass.

2. The peace, which after the winning of Euboea was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years. But in the fifteenth year, being the forty-eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis in Argos, Aenesias being then ephor at Sparta and Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his government to come, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and

odd Thebans led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, Boeotian rulers, about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Plataea, a city of Boeotia and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in and the gates opened unto them by Naucleides and his accomplices, men of Plataea that for their own private ambition intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupy Plataea, which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace and the war not openly on foot. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making a stand in their arms in the market place, they did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business and enter the houses of their adversaries, but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation and to induce the city to composition and friendship. And the herald proclaimed, "that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Boeotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he should come and bring his arms to theirs," supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side.

3. The Plataeans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered and had surprised the city, through fear and opinion that more were entered than indeed were (for they could not see them in the night), came to composition and accepting the condition rested quiet, and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm. But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Plataean commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter, and they united themselves by digging through the common walls between house and house that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew them to serve them instead of a wall, and every other

thing they put in readiness as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprise. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards the enemies, taking their time whilst it was yet night and a little before the break of day because they would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them and came quickly up to hand strokes.

4. And the Thebans, seeing this and finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure and beat them back in that part where the assault was made; and twice or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the Plataeans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them, the night having been also very wet, they were afraid and turned their backs and fled here and there about the city, ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which they should have been saved (for this accident fell out upon the change of the moon) and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in; insomuch as the greatest part of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a certain Plataean shut up again with the head of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt, so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves out and for the most part died. Some came to a deserted gate of the city and with a hatchet given them by a woman cut the staple and got forth unseen; but these were not many, for the thing was soon discovered. Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the wall, the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates of the city and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Plataeans, seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were by firing the house or else

resolve of some other punishment. At length both these and all the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Plataeans at discretion. And this success had they that entered into Plataea.

5. But the rest of the Thebans that should with their whole power have been there before day for fear the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the news of what was done by the way. Now Plataea is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. For the river Asopus was swollen so high that it was not easily passable. So that what by the foulness of the way and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till their men were already some slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Plataeans as were without (for there were abroad in the villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil happening unexpectedly and in time of peace), desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Plataeans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done and fearing their case without, sent a herald unto the Thebans whom they commanded to say that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly, and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive, which, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto them. Thus the Thebans say, and that the Plataeans did swear it. But the Plataeans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently but upon treaty if they should agree, and deny that they swore it. Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory; and the Plataeans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had practised, was one.

6. When they had done, they sent a messenger to Athens

and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead, and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Boeotians then in Attica and sent an officer to Plataea to forbid their farther proceeding with their Theban prisoners till such time as they also should have advised of the matter; for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second, when they were overcome and taken prisoners; but of what followed after they knew nothing. So that the Athenians, when they sent, knew not what was done; and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Plataea, victualled it and left a garrison in it, and took thence both the women and children and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.

7. This action falling out at Plataea and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king and to other barbarians, wheresoever they had hope of succours, and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedaemonians besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail and to provide a sum of money assessed, and in other things not to stir farther but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley at once till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, knowing that as long as these were their friends, they might with the more security make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus.

8. Neither side conceived small matters but put their whole strength to the war, and not without reason. For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there

were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two principal states in combat, but many prophecies were told and many sung by the priests of the oracles both in the cities about to war and in others. There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos, which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before, and was interpreted for and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after.

But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedaemonians, and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the Grecians' liberty. And every man, both private and public person, endeavoured as much as in them lay both in word and deed to assist them and thought the business so much hindered as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians, some for desire to be delivered from under their government and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war.

9. But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began it, were these. The Lacedaemonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans (for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; but afterwards all the rest did so likewise); and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping; the Boeotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen; and the rest of the cities, footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedaemonians. The Athenian confederates were these: the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries among those nations; also that part of Caria which is on the seacoast and the Dorians adjoining to them; Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace; all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east and all the rest

of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans found galleys; the rest, footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.

10. The Lacedaemonians, after the business of Plataea, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus and to their confederates without to have in readiness their forces and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the isthmus at a day appointed, two-thirds of the forces of every city. When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities and such as were in authority and most worthy to be present and spake unto them as followeth:

11. "Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only our fathers have had many wars, both within and without Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as at this present. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army that invade, but the state also is puissant that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our fathers nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion observing us, and through their hatred to the Athenians do wish that we may accomplish whatsoever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army and to have much assurance that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared but of every city, as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain, and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid.

For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy and more safety in fighting with him. But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself but a city every way well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though not now because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their possessions. For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider, with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in the others, for they think themselves worthy to have the command of others and to invade and waste the territories of their neighbours rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore, as being to war against a great city and to procure both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good or bad as shall be the event, follow your leaders in such sort as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness. For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order."

12. Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city nor presented him to the state; for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive from the Lacedaemonians neither herald nor ambassador as long as their army was abroad. Therefore they sent him back without audience with commandment to be out of their borders the selfsame day, and that hereafter if they would anything with them, they should return everyone to his home and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country to the end that no man should confer with him, who, when he came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words, "This day is the beginning of much evil unto the Grecians," and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus, perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged and marched on with his army into their territory. The Boe-

otians with their appointed part and with horsemen aided the Peloponnesians, but with the rest of their forces went and wasted the territory of Plataea.

13. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march before they brake into Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others was general of the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the Lacedaemonians to bring him into jealousy (as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, "that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state; and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth," and therefore desired "that for this he might not be suspected." Also he advised them concerning the business in hand the same things he had done before, "that they should make preparations for the war and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle but come into the city and guard it; that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates," telling them, "how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and store of money." Farther he bade them be confident, "in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents, and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coin," (for the greatest sum there had been was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred, out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses of the citadel and upon other buildings and for the charges of Potidaea) "besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings, and all the dedicated vessels belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents." He added farther that "much money might be had out of other temples without the city which they might use; and if they were barred the use

of all these, they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself"; and said that "the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety," he said, "they were to make restitution of the like quantity again." Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. "Men of arms," he said, "they had thirteen thousand besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls." For so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy, young and old together and strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined was thirty-five furlongs, and that part of the circumference which was guarded (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long wall and the Phalerian) was forty-three furlongs. And the length of the long walls down to Piraeus (of which there was a watch only on the outmost) was forty furlongs. And the whole compass of Piraeus together with Munychia was sixty furlongs, whereof that part that was watched was but half. He said farther, "they had of horse-men, accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; and sixteen hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred." All this and no less had the Athenians when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first in hand and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.

14. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words and fetched into the city their wives and children and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Euboea and into the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.

15. This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings down to Theseus the inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs and therein

their common halls and their governors, and, unless they were in fear of some danger, went not to the king for advice; but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars, as the Eleusinians who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the country in other respects but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall and one council-house, brought them all to cohabit in the city that now is; and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess and call it Synoecia. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An argument whereof is this: that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself or, if without, yet in that quarter, as that of Jupiter Olympius and of Apollo Pythius and of Tellus and of Bacchus in Limnae (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as the Ionians who are derived from Athens do still observe them), besides other ancient temples situated in the same part. Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain which, now the Nine-pipes, built so by the tyrants, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called *the city*.

16. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own country towns and, after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time as since till the Persian war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially for that since the Persian war they had already repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove.

It pressed them likewise and was heavily taken besides their houses to leave the things that pertained to their religion (which, since their old form of government, were become patrial) and to change their manner of life and to be no better than banished every man his city.

17. After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few and place of retire with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes, saving in such as were in the citadel and the Eleusinium and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicum also under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle in these words, "Best is the Pelasgicum empty," was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for. For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there, which war the oracle, not naming, foretold only that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately.

Many also furnished the turrets of the walls and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all; but afterwards they had the long walls divided amongst them and inhabited there and in most parts of Piraeus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.

18. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward came first to Oenoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in, and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall. For Oenoe, lying on the confines between Attica and Boeotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much time about it otherwise.

And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for

the war and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Oenoe. For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought that the Peloponnesians, marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without. So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before Oenoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand.

19. But after, when they had assaulted Oenoe and tried all means but could not take it, and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them, then at length arising from thence—about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans that entered Plataea, the summer and corn being now at the highest—they fell into Attica, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis and then in the plain of Thriasia, and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti. After this, leaving the Aegaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi,* and pitching there, both fortified their camp and stayed a great while wasting the country thereabout.

20. Archidamus was said to have stayed so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign with this intention. He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and, therefore, seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas. Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans, being a great

* Hobbes' note: "Burroughs." They are electoral districts of Attic territory.

piece of the city (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men; but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.

21. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thrius and as long as they had any hope it would come on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, when fourteen years before this war he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther (for which he was also banished Sparta as thought to have gone back for money), they stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely) in their sight, which the younger sort had never seen before nor the elder but in the Persian war, it was taken for a horrible matter and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, everyone made the interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them, but reviled him for that being their general he refused to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all their evil.

22. But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill advised and being confident he was in the right

touching not sallying, assembled them not nor called any council for fear lest being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error, but looked to the guarding of the city and as much as he could to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the scouts of the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Boeotians. Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse till such time as the Boeotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms; and then they were put to flight and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain, whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day without leave of the enemy. And the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an ancient league with the Athenians and consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Parasiens, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtionians, Pheraeans. The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city; of the Pharsalians, Meno; and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

23. The Peloponnesians, seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas wasted certain other villages between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus. Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus, the commanders whereof were Charcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigènes, who thus furnished weighed anchor and went their way. The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Boeotia, not the way they came in, but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens. And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and went every man to his own city.

24. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war, and made a decree to take out a thousand talents of

the money in the citadel and set it by so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other money, and made it capital for any man to move or give his vote for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city for necessity of that defence. Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best and captains to be appointed over them, which were to be employed for no other use than the money was and for the same danger if need should require.

25: The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus and with them the Corcyraeans with the aid of fifty sail more and certain others of the confederates thereabout amongst other places which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of Laconia, and assaulted it as being but weak and few men within. But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts, and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred men of arms. Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields, directly towards the town, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the Lower Elis together with other Eleians thereabouts that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked and sailed about the promontory called Icthyis into the haven of Pheia. But the Messenians and certain others that could not get aboard went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it. And when they had done, the galleys that now were come about took them in and, leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again. By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it, but the Athenians were now gone away and wasting some other territory.

26. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris, which were to serve also for a watch

about Euboea. Of these Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct and, landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages, and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.

27. The same summer, the Athenians put the Aeginetae, man, woman, and child, out of Aegina, laying to their charge that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Aegina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the Aeginetae were thus banished, the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it to live on, both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received at the hands of the Aeginetae in the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helotes. This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and reacheth to the seaside. So some of them were placed there, and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece.

28. Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the moon (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon happened an eclipse of the sun. The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent and withal some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness.

29. The same summer also, the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of Pythos, of the city of Abdera (whose sister was married to Sitalces and that was of great power with him), their host, though before they took him for an enemy, and sent for him to Athens, hoping by his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion was no kin to this Teres nor of the same part of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. And the fact of the women concerning Itys was done there; and by the poets,

where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man, for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other that was so many days' journey off as Odrysae. And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on the kingdom of Odrysae. Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be of their party. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces to be made free of Athens and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targeteers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcideans. Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the Athenians.

30. The Athenians, being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palaerenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the possession both of the town and territory. Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they drave him thence and joined the place to their league. From thence they sailed to Cephalonia and subdued it without battle (this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii, Samaei, and Pronaei) and not long after returned with their fleet to Athens.

31. About the end of the autumn of this summer the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Aegina, hearing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before,

the city being now in her strength and the plague not yet amongst them. For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidaea; and the strangers that dwelt amongst them and accompanied them in this invasion were no fewer than three thousand men of arms more, besides other great numbers of light-armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year during this war the Athenians often invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisaea.

32. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then, for a garrison against thieves, which passing over from Opus and other parts of Locris might annoy Euboea. These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

33. The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms to re-establish him, to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the seacoast of Acarnania; but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disembarked in the territory of the Cranii where, under colour of composition, they were deceived and lost some part of their forces. For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they got off with much ado and went home.

34. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war in this manner. Having set up a tent, they put into it* the bones of the dead three days before the funeral; and everyone bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own. When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress

* Literally it is "they expose to view the bones."

coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over for such as appear not nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a public monument which standeth in the fairest suburbs of the city, in which place they have ever interred all that died in the wars except those that were slain in the field of Marathon, who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were therefore buried thereright. And when the earth is thrown over them, someone thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit; which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial; and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same. For these first the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles the son of Xantippus, who, when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner:

35. "Though most that have spoken formerly in this place have commended the man that added this oration to the law as honourable for those that die in the wars, yet to me it seemeth sufficient that they who have showed their valour by action should also by an action have their honour, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state, and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter; and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed. The favourable hearer and he that knows what was done will perhaps think what is spoken short of what he would have it and what it was; and he that is ignorant will find somewhat on the other side which he will think too much extolled, especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears.

And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of everyone of you as far forth as I can.

36. "I will begin at our ancestors; being a thing both just and honest that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this kind. For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region, by their valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity hitherto in the state of liberty. For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more; for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own they have purchased this our present dominion and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a great part also we ourselves that are yet in the strength of our age here present have enlarged and so furnished the city with everything, both for peace and war, as it is now all-sufficient in itself. The actions of war whereby all this was attained and the deeds of arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass over. But by what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to these men's praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand and profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related.

37. "We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighbouring states (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us) which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies, yet in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the reputation not of his house but of his virtue, and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person as long as he can do good service to the commonwealth. And we live not only free

in the administration of the state but also one with another void of jealousy touching each other's daily course of life, not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public and are obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are written for protection against injury, and such unwritten as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors.

38. "We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour by public institution of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by private men, by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness. We have this farther by the greatness of our city that all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither, whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations than our own.

39. "Then in the studies of war we excel our enemies in this. We leave our city open to all men; nor was it ever seen that by banishing of strangers we denied them the learning or sight of any of those things which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by, not relying on secret preparation and deceit but upon our own courage in the action. They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise, and yet we that live remissly undertake as great dangers as they. For example, the Lacedaemonians invade not our dominion by themselves alone but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once both because we apply ourselves much to navigation and by land also send many of our men into divers countries abroad. But when, fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And yet when, from ease rather than studious labour and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake

any danger, we have this odds by it that we shall not faint beforehand with the meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling,

40. procuring admiration to our city as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind.* And we use riches rather for opportunities of action than for verbal ostentation, and hold it not a shame to confess poverty but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men a care both of their own and the public affairs and a sufficient knowledge of state matters even in those that labour with their hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein to be a man not that meddles with nothing but that is good for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake and apprehend it perfectly in our minds, not accounting words for a hindrance of action but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel others, daring to undertake as much as any and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards. And they are most rightly reputed valiant who, though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty. For we purchase our friends not by receiving but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn is ever the most constant friend because he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour but for a debt. So that we only do good to others not upon computation of profit but freeness of trust.

41. "In sum it may be said both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have everyone

* This is a magnificent seventeenth-century sentence, but liable to misconstruction by a modern reader. In our idiom the literal rendering is "We are lovers of beauty, but with cheapness; we are lovers of culture, but without softness."

in particular his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions we have obtained, maketh evident. For it is the only power now found greater in proof than fame, and the only power, that neither grieveth the invader when he miscarries with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the subjected states to murmur as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration for a power not without testimony but made evident by great arguments, and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it or any other such whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands and set up eternal monuments on all sides both of the evil we have done to our enemies and the good we have done to our friends.*

"Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, valiantly fighting have died. And it is fit that every man of you that be left should be like minded to undergo any travail for the same.

42. "And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such, are not equal as also to make known by effects the worth of these men I am to speak of, the greatest part of their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of the city hath by these, and such as these, been achieved. Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in many other of the Grecians as they do in these, the present revolution of these men's lives seeming unto me an argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof and in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse than the rest do nevertheless deserve that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their country they should be preferred before the rest. For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited

* Thucydides says only "Having set up everywhere eternal memorials of both good deeds and ill."

the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these that preferring the further fruition of his wealth was thereby grown cowardly, or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length and to attain to riches did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For their principal desire was not wealth but revenge on their enemies, which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to purchase wealth withal; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope, but for that which was before their eyes relying upon themselves in the action, and therein choosing rather to fight and die than to shrink and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and so in a moment whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear but in opinion of victory.

43. "Such were these men, worthy of their country. And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy, not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying may recount to you that know as well as he the many commodities that arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies, but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day performed and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight, and by such men as, though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For having everyone given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulchre not wherein they are buried so much as wherein their glory is laid up upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered forever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre; and their virtues shall be testified not only by the inscription in stone at home but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any monument will remain with everyone forever. In imitation therefore of these men and plac-

ing happiness in liberty and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal of their lives, but rather such men as, if they live, may expect a change of fortune and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit death, which is without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as after a tender life to be brought into misery.

44- "Wherefore I will not so much bewail as comfort you, the parents, that are present, of these men. For you know that whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calamities. Whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die honourably as these have done, and to whom it hath been granted not only to live in prosperity but to die in it. Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for the loss of that which the happiness of others, wherein you also when time was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring into your remembrance (for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted but for the privation of a good we have been used to); yet such of you as are of the age to have children may bear the loss of these in the hope of more. For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are slain and also doubly conduce to the good of the city by population and strength. For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to the state that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it. As for you that are past having of children, you are to put the former and greater part of your life to the account of your gain; and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same. For the love of honour never groweth old, nor doth that unprofitable part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of wealth so much as it doth in being honoured.

45- "As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you shall have a difficult task of emulation. For every man useth to praise the dead, so that with odds of virtue you will hardly get an equal reputation but still be thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in glory while they live,

but to stand out of their way is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition. And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue for you that are now widows, I shall express it in this short admonition. It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex and to give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good or evil, as you can.

46. "Thus also have I, according to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; and those that are here interred have in fact been already honoured; and further, their children shall be maintained till they be at man's estate at the charge of the city, which hath therein propounded both to these and them that live a profitable garland in their matches of valour. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest men. So now having lamented everyone his own, you may be gone."

47. Such was the funeral made this winter, which ending, ended the first year of this war.

In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the conduct of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamas, king of Lacedaemon, and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them. They had not been many days in Attica when the plague first began amongst the Athenians, said also to have seized formerly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos and elsewhere; but so great a plague and mortality of men was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first neither were the physicians able to cure it through ignorance of what it was but died fastest themselves, as being the men that most approached the sick, nor any other art of man availed whatsoever. All supplications to the gods and enquiries of oracles and whatsoever other means they used of that kind proved all unprofitable; insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over.

48. It began, by report, first in that part of Ethiopia that lieth upon Egypt, and thence fell down into Egypt and Africa and into the greatest part of the territories of the king. It invaded Athens on a sudden and touched first upon those that dwelt in Piraeus, insomuch as they reported that the Pelo-

ponnesians had cast poison into their wells (for springs there were not any in that place). But afterwards it came up into the high city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak according to his own knowledge. For my own part, I will deliver but the manner of it and lay open only such things as one may take his mark by to discover the same if it come again, having been both sick of it myself and seen others sick of the same.

49. This year, by confession of all men, was of all other, for other diseases, most free and healthful. If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this; if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding and being in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache in their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly, their throats and tongues grew presently bloody and their breath noisome and unsavoury. Upon this followed a sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after the pain, together with a mighty cough, came down into the breast. And when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit; and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation that physicians ever named. Most of them had also the hickyexe * which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased quickly but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor pale but reddish, livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks, but so burned inwardly as not to endure any the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them nor anything but mere nakedness, but rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water. And many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate thirst, ran unto the wells, and to drink much or little was indifferent, being still from ease and power to sleep as far as ever. As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not but resisted the torment beyond all expectation; insomuch as the most of them either died of their inward burning in nine or

* Krauss's note calls it an "empty hiccough," in which vomiting spasms continue after the stomach is already empty. Perhaps the nearest modern equivalent is "the dry heaves."

seven days whilst they had yet strength, or, if they escaped that, then the disease falling down into their bellies and causing there great exulcerations and immoderate looseness, they died many of them afterwards through weakness. For the disease, which took first the head, began above and came down and passed through the whole body; and he that overcame the worst of it was yet marked with the loss of his extreme parts; for breaking out both at their privy members and at their fingers and toes, many with the loss of these escaped; there were also some that lost their eyes. And many that presently upon their recovery were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, as they neither knew themselves nor their acquaintance.

50. For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression of words and both exceeded human nature in the cruelty wherewith it handled each one and appeared also otherwise to be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that use to feed on human flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied, either came not at them or tasting perished. An argument whereof as touching the birds is the manifest defect of such fowl, which were not then seen, neither about the carcasses or anywhere else. But by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was seen much clearer.

51. So that this disease (to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had differently from others) was in general such as I have shown, and for other usual sicknesses at that time no man was troubled with any. Now they died some for want of attendance and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any to say certain medicine that applied must have helped them; for if it did good to one, it did harm to another. Nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness, that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all was the dejection of mind in such as found themselves beginning to be sick (for they grew presently desperate and gave themselves over without making any resistance), as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation, for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forebore to visit them for fear, then they died forlorn;

whereby many families became empty for want of such as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the honestest men. For out of shame they would not spare themselves but went in unto their friends, especially after it was come to this pass that even their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered had much compassion both on them that died and on them that lay sick, as having both known the misery themselves and now no more subject to the danger. For this disease never took any man the second time so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy, and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.

52. Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city oppressed both them and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses but dwelling at that time of the year in stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; and dying men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men half-dead about every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents were all full of the dead that died within them. For oppressed with the violence of the calamity and not knowing what to do, men grew careless both of holy and profane things alike. And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals were all now broken, every one burying where he could find room. And many for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him would throw on his dead and give it fire. And when one was in burning, another would come and, having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again.

53. And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely, seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying and men worth nothing inheriting their estates. Insomuch as they justified

a speedy fruition of their goods even for their pleasure, as men that thought they held their lives but by the day. As for pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful and to be profitable to pleasure, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods nor laws of men awed any man, not the former because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship from seeing that alike they all perished, nor the latter because no man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought there was now over their heads some far greater judgment decreed against them before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.

54. Such was the misery into which the Athenians being fallen were much oppressed, having not only their men killed by the disease within but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages without. In this sickness also (as it was not unlikely they would) they called to mind this verse said also of the elder sort to have been uttered of old:

*A Doric war shall fall,
And a great plague withal.*

Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not *loimos* [plague], that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but *limos* [famine]. But upon the present occasion the word *loimos* deservedly obtained. For as men suffered, so they made the verse to say. And I think if after this there shall ever come another Doric war and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There was also reported by such as knew a certain answer given by the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when they inquired whether they should make this war or not: *that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory, and that the God himself would take their parts.* And thereupon they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica but the sickness presently began, and never came into Peloponnesus, to speak of, but reigned principally in Athens and in such other places afterwards as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.

55. After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champaign country, they fell upon the territory called Paralos as far as to the mountain Laurius where the Athenians had silver mines, and first wasted that part of it which looketh towards Peloponnesus and then that also which lieth toward Andros and Euboea. And Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle.

56. Whilst they were yet in the plain and before they entered into the maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about Peloponnesus and, as soon as they were ready, put to sea. In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms, and in vessels then purposely first made to carry horses, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with him with fifty galleys. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in Paralia; and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they wasted much of the country thereabout and assaulting the city had a hope to take it, though it succeeded not. Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories about of Troezen, Halias, and Hermione, places all on the seacoast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasiae, a small maritime city of Laconia, and both wasted the territory about it and took and razed the town itself. And having done this, came home and found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica but gone back.

57. All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness, both in the army and city, destroyed many, insomuch as it was said that the Peloponnesians, fearing the sickness (which they knew to be in the city both by fugitives and by seeing the Athenians burying their dead), went the sooner away out of the country. And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done anytime before and wasted even the whole territory, for they continued in Attica almost forty days.

58. The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias and Cleompompus the son of Clinias, who were joint commanders with Pericles with that army which he had employed before, went presently and made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace and

against Potidaea which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently applied engines and tried all means possible to take it, but neither the taking of the city nor anything else succeeded worthy so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them afflicted them mightily indeed and even devoured the army. And the Athenian soldiers which were there before and in health caught the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his sixteen hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcideans. And Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having of four thousand men in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty of the plague. But the soldiers that were there before stayed upon the place and continued the siege of Potidaea.

59. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians the Athenians, having their fields now the second time wasted and both the sickness and war falling upon them at once, changed their minds and accused Pericles, as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the Lacedaemonians, to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but they returned without effect. And being then at their wits' end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he, seeing them vexed with their present calamity and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for he was yet general) with intention to put them again into heart and, assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less dismayed temper. And standing forth, he spake unto them in this manner:

60. "Your anger towards me cometh not unlooked for, for the cause of it I know. And I have called this assembly, therefore, to remember you and reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry with me or given way to your adversity without reason. For I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men than if the private men themselves were in prosperity and the public wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and every-

one cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why should not everyone strive to defend it and not, as you now, astonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety and fall a-censuring both me that counselled the war and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I? And it is I you are angry withal, one, as I think myself, inferior to none either in knowing what is requisite or in expressing what I know, and a lover of my country and superior to money. For he that hath good thoughts and cannot clearly express them were as good to have thought nothing at all. He that can do both and is ill affected to his country will likewise not give it faithful counsel. And he that will do that too yet if he be superable by money will for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me somewhat above the rest, there is sure no reason that I should now be accused of doing you wrong.

61. "For though to such as have it in their own election (being otherwise in good estate), it were madness to make choice of war; yet when we must of necessity either give way, and so without more ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by danger, he is more to be condemned that declineth the danger than he that standeth to it. For mine own part I am the man I was and of the mind I was; but you are changed, won to the war when you were entire but repenting it upon the damage and condemning my counsel in the weakness of your own judgment. The reason of this is because you feel already everyone in particular that which afflicts you, but the evidence of the profit to accrue to the city in general you see not yet. And your minds, dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot constantly maintain what you have before resolved. For that which is sudden and unexpected and contrary to what one hath deliberated enslaveth the spirit, which by this disease principally, in the neck of the other commodities, is now come to pass in you. But you that are born in a great city and with education suitable, how great soever the affliction be, ought not to shrink at it and eclipse your reputation (for men do no less condemn those that through cowardice lose the glory they have than hate those that through impudence arrogate the glory they have not) but to set aside

the grief of your private losses and lay your hands to the common safety.

62. "As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long and we in the end never the nearer to victory, though that may suffice which I have demonstrated at other times touching your causeless suspicion that way, yet this I will tell you, moreover, touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem ever to have thought on nor I touched in my former orations, nor would I also have spoken it now * but that I see your minds dejected more than there is cause for. That though you take your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and the sea, you are of one of them entire masters, both of as much of it as you make use of and also of as much more as you shall think fit yourselves. Neither is there any king or nation whatsoever † of those that now are that can impeach your navigation with the fleet and strength you now go. So that you must not put the use of houses and lands wherein now you think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter into the balance with such a power as this nor take the loss of these things heavily in respect of it, but rather set little by them as but a light ornament and embellishment of wealth, and think that our liberty as long as we hold fast that will easily recover unto us these things again; whereas subjected once to others, even that which we possess besides will be diminished. Show not yourselves both ways inferior to your ancestors, who not only held this (gotten by their own labours not left them) but have also preserved and delivered the same unto us (for it is more dishonour to lose what one possesseth than to miscarry in the acquisition of it), and encounter the enemy not only with magnanimity but also with disdain. For a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous ignorance; but he that is confident upon judgment to be superior to his enemy doth also disdain him, which is now our case. And courage in

* Hobbes unaccountably has left out a clause in the Greek; the full statement runs "nor would I have employed it (the argument) now as it has somewhat too much the appearance of boasting."

† This is more imposing than the exact meaning of the Greek, which is specific: "Neither the King (of Persia) nor any other nation."

equal fortune is the safer for our disdain of the enemy where a man knows what he doth; for he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, and more to judgment upon certainties, wherein there is a more sure foresight.

63. "You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten for her dominion in which you all triumph, and either not decline the pains or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only. Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted by offence given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over (if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter *), for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved if it be not ranged with the active life, nor is it a life conducive to a city that reigneth but to a subject city that it may safely serve.

64. "Be not therefore seduced by this sort of men nor angry with me, together with whom yourselves did decree this war, because the enemy invading you hath done what was likely he would if you obeyed him not. And as for the sickness, the only thing that exceeded the imagination of all men, it was unlooked for; and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that, but unjustly, unless when anything falleth out above your expectation fortunate, you will also dedicate unto me that. Evils that come from heaven you must bear necessarily, and such as proceed from your enemies, valiantly; for so it hath been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to reverse. Knowing that this city hath a great name amongst all people for not yielding to adversity and for the mighty power it yet hath after the expense of so many lives and so much labour in the war, the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry (for all things are

* This is not quite the full implication of the Greek, which means "In case anyone at the present fearing this very thing wants to *play the honest man* and avoid involvement."

made with this law, to decay again), will remain with posterity forever. How that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have abided the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city. Now this he with the quiet life will condemn, the active man will emulate, and they that have not attained to the like will envy. But to be hated and to displease is a thing that happeneth for the time to whosoever he be that hath the command of others; and he does well, that undergoeth hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasteth not and is recompensed both with a present splendour and an immortal glory hereafter. Seeing then you foresee both what is honourable for the future and not dishonourable for the present procure both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no more heralds to the Lacedaemonians, nor let them know the evil present does anyway afflict you; for they whose minds least feel and whose actions most oppose a calamity both among states and private persons are the best."

65. In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction. But they, though for the state in general they were won and sent to the Lacedaemonians no more but rather inclined to the war, yet they were everyone in particular grieved for their several losses: the poor because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; but the greatest matter of all was that they had war instead of peace. And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first fined him in a sum of money. Nevertheless, not long after (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again and committed the whole state to his administration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled, and for the need of the commonwealth they prized him more than any other whatsoever. For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he governed the same with moderation and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he

therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death. For he told them that if they would be quiet and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all, and in such other things besides as seemed not to concern the war managed the state, according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well the honour and profit of it came most to private men, and what miscarried was to the city's detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude and was not so much led by them as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name a state democratical, but in fact a government of the principal man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves and affecting everyone to be the chief, applied themselves to the people and let go the care of the commonwealth. From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily, which was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people they both abated the vigour of the army and then also first troubled the state at home with division. Being overthrown in Sicily and having lost, besides other ammunition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition, yet they held out three years *

* This is a very vexed reading in Thucydides. The fact is that if he meant three years after the Sicilian expedition (i.e., 415 to 412) the passage cannot be correct. Athens did not fall till 404 B.C. Many editors have tried to read "eight" or "ten" instead of three.

both against their first enemies and the Sicilians with them and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the king's son, who took part with and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that time that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war.

66. The Lacedaemonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island lying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were a colony of Achaeans of Peloponnesus but confederates of the people of Athens. There went in this fleet a thousand men of arms and Cnemus a Spartan for admiral, who, landing, wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.

67. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus of Corinth and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagorus of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians, and Pollis of Argos, a private man, as they were travelling into Asia to the king to get money of him and to draw him into their league, took Thrace in their way and came unto Sitalces the son of Teres with a desire to get him also, if they could, to forsake the league with Athens and to send his forces to Potidaea, which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer, and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other side of the Hellespont to go, as they intended, to Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, who would convey them to the king. But the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus the son of Callimachus and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands that they might not go to the king and do hurt to the city whereof he himself was now a member. Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace to take ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them before they got to the ship by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameiniades with command to deliver them into their hands. And they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians, fearing Aristeus, lest

escaping he should do them further mischief (for he was manifestly the author of all the business of Potidaea and about Thrace), the same day put them all to death, unjudged and desirous to have spoken, and threw them into the pits, thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedaemonians that began it and had slain and thrown into pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates whom they took sailing in merchant ships about the coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedaemonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians or neutral, all alike.

68. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciotes, both they themselves and divers barbarian nations by them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia and against the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilochus the son of Amphiarus after the Trojan war, who, at his return, misliking the then state of Argos, built this city in the Gulf of Ambracia and called it Argos after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciotes, bordering upon Amphilochia; and then they first learned the Greek language now used from the Ambraciotes that lived among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were barbarians. Now the Ambraciotes in process of time drove out the Argives and held the city by themselves. Whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians who sent thirty galleys to their aid and Phormio for general. Phormio, being arrived, took Argos by assault and, making slaves of the Ambraciotes, put the town into the joint possessions of the Amphilochians and Acarnanians. And this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciotes therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, came in with an army partly of their own and partly raised amongst the Chaonians and other neighbouring barbarians now in this war. And coming to Argos, were masters of the field; but when they

could not take the city by assault, they returned and disbanding went every nation to his own. These were the acts of the summer.

69. In the beginning of the winter the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio, who, coming to lie at Naupactus, guarded the passage that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crisæan gulf. And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander they sent into Caria and Lycia, as well to gather tribute in those parts as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates lying on those coasts from molesting the navigation of such merchant ships as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phoenicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander, landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he had aboard, was overcome in battle and slain with the loss of a part of his army.

70. The same winter, the Potidaeans, unable any longer to endure the siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise and seeing their victual failed and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food, to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleidas, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by lying in that cold place and that the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege, accepted of it. The conditions agreed on were these: "to depart, they and their wives and children and their auxiliary soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes and every woman with two,* and to take with them everyone a certain sum of money for his charges by the way." Hereupon a truce was granted them to depart; and they went, some to the Chalcideans and others to other places as they could get to. But the people of Athens called the

* This is an amusing rendering of the Greek, which says "every man with one garment and every woman with two." The garment referred to was a *chlaina*, worn both by men and, in some cases, by women. It was a long, enveloping cloaklike garment and singularly ill-translated as "suit of clothes."

commanders in question for compounding without them, conceiving that they might have gotten the city to discretion, and sent afterwards a colony to Potidaea of their own citizens. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war, written by Thucydides.

71. The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not into Attica but turned their arms against Plataea, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, who, having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Plataeans sent ambassadors presently unto him with words to this effect: "Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, you do neither justly nor worthy yourselves and ancestors in making war upon Plataea. For Pausanias of Lacedaemon, the son of Cleombrotus, having, together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates and granted to the Plataeans this privilege: *that their city and territory should be free; that none should make any unjust war against them nor go about to subject them; and if any did, the confederates then present should to their utmost ability revenge their quarrel.* These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the clean contrary; for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by and the gods both of your and our country, we require you that you do no damage to the territory of Plataea nor violate those oaths, but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias."

72. The Plataeans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: "Men of Plataea, if you would do as ye say, you say what is just. For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you free and help to set free the rest, who, having been partakers of the same dangers then and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war is only for the deliverance of them and others, of which if you will espe-

cially participate, keep your oaths; at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet and enjoy your own in neutrality, receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of faction." * Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they had heard him, returned to the city, and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus: "that what he had advised was impossible for them to perform without leave of the Athenians in whose keeping were their wives and children; and that they feared also for the whole city lest when the Lacedaemonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands; or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it." But Archidamus, to encourage them, made this answer: "Deliver you unto us Lacedaemonians your city and your houses, show us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered; and depart yourselves whither you shall think good as long as the war lasteth: and when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again. In the meantime we will keep them as deposited and will cultivate your ground and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice for your maintenance."

73. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city and, having consulted with the people, made answer "that they would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would consent, they would then accept the conditions; till then, they desired a suspension of arms and not to have their territory wasted." Upon this he granted them so many days truce, as was requisite for their return, and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Plataean ambassadors were arrived at Athens and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: "The Athenians say thus: that neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injuries of any, nor will they now neglect us but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us by the oath of our fathers not to make any alienation touching the league."

74. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans

* Hobbes omits the following sentence: "And this will content us."

resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes and to suffer whatsoever misery could befall them, and no more to go forth but from the walls to make this answer: "that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians had required." When they had answered so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and heros of the country, saying thus: "All ye Gods and Heros, protectors of Plataeis, be witnesses that we neither invade this territory (wherein our fathers after their vows unto you overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in) unjustly now in the beginning because they have first broken the league they had sworn, nor what we shall further do will be any injury because, though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused; assent ye also to the punishment of the beginners of injury and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms."

75. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war.

And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisade about the town that none might go out. That done, he raised a mount against the wall, hoping with so great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down wood in the hill Cithaeron, they built a frame of timber and wattled it about on either side to serve instead of walls to keep the earth from falling too much away and cast into it stones and earth and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up. Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work between them for rest in such manner as some might be carrying, whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedaemonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities and had the charge of the work. The Plataeans, seeing the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall with wood which, having placed on the wall of the city in the place where the mount touched, they built it within full of bricks taken from the adjoining houses for that purpose demolished, the timber serving to bind them together that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and quilts both to keep the timber from

shot of wildfire and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast on the other. The Plataeans used also this device: they brake a hole in their own wall where the mount joined and drew the earth from it into the city.

76. But the Peloponnesians, when they found it out, took clay and therewith daubing hurdles of reeds cast the same into the chink, which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it away. The Plataeans, excluded here, gave over that plot, and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city by conjecture, fetched away the earth again and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being drawn away below and settling over the part where it was voided. The Plataeans, nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further. They gave over working at the high wall against the mount and, beginning at both ends of it where the wall was low, built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might resist and put the enemy to make another mount, and by coming further in to be at double pains and withal more encompassable with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the rising of their mount, brought to the city their engines of battery. One of which, by the help of the mount, they applied to the high wall, wherewith they much shook it and put the Plataeans into great fear. And others to other parts of the wall, which the Plataeans partly turned aside by casting ropes about them and partly with great beams, which, being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two other great beams jetting over and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart; and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains and letting their hands go, they let fall with violence to break the beak of it.

77. After this the Peloponnesians, seeing their engines availed not and thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege it. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it; for there was no

way they did not think on to have gained it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought faggots, they cast them from the mount into the space between it and their new wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled, and then into as much of the rest of the city as at that distance they could reach and, throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before made by the hand of man. For as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire; but it hath been by mutual attrition and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one, and the Plataeans that had escaped other mischiefs wanted little of being consumed by this. For near the wall they could not get by a great way; and if the wind had been with it (as the enemy hoped it might), they could never have escaped. It is also reported that there fell much rain then with great thunder and that the flame was extinguished and the danger ceased by that.

78. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army and dismissing the rest, enclosed the city about with a wall, dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus, they left a guard for one half of the wall (for the other was guarded by the Boeotians) and departed with the rest of their army and were dissolved according to their cities. The Plataeans had before this sent their wives and children and all their unserviceable men to Athens. The rest were besieged, being in number of the Plataeans themselves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to dress their meat.* These were all when the siege was first laid and not one more, neither free nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the city besieged.

79. The same summer at the same time that this journey was

* The Greek word actually means "to make their bread," which more accurately indicates what the Greek women would have done in this case. The Plataeans would have lived mostly on ground wheat, baked as bread and eaten as porridge, and the preparation of this, grinding and cooking, would be the task of the women of the garrison.

made against Plataea, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own city and two hundred horsemen made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiaean, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon the son of Euripides and two others. These coming before Spartolus in Bottiaea destroyed the corn and expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of some within. But such as would not have it so having sent for aid to Olynthus before, there came into the city for safeguard thereof a supply both of men of arms and other soldiers from thence. And these issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves into order of battle under the town itself. The men of arms of the Chalcideans and certain auxiliaries with them were overcome by the Athenians and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcideans and their light-armed soldiers overcame the horsemen and light-armed of the Athenians, but they had some few targeteers besides of the territory called Crusis. When the battle was now begun, came a supply of other targeteers from Olynthus. Which the light-armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength and also as having had the better before, with the Chalcidean horse and this new supply charged the Athenians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with the carriages.* And as oft as the Athenians charged, the Chalcideans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with their shot. Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up and, charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn their backs and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidaea and, having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcideans and Bottiaean, when they had set up a trophy and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went everyone to his city.

80. Not long after this, the same summer, the Ambraciotes and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to

* The Greek means "in charge of the baggage."

make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities and to send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania, saying that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, the Acarnanians of the seacoast being thereby disabled to assist the rest, having easily gained Acarnania they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephalonia and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus, and that there was a hope beside to take Naupactus. The Peloponnesians assenting sent thither Cnemus, who was yet admiral, with his men of arms in a few galleys immediately, and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciotes, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciotes were arrived before and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea undescried of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in his army of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king but were led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families eligible had now the annual government. With the Chaonians came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king. The Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. The Parauaeans were led by their king Oroedus; and under Oroedus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last were not yet arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march without staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argeia, they destroyed Limnaea, a town unwall'd. From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania, conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come easily in.

81. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered

their country already and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour Stratus but guarded everyone his own and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians to the end that, being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other barbarians in the middle, the Leucadians and Anactorians and such others as were with these on the right hand, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes on the left, each army at great distance and sometimes out of sight of one another. The Grecians in their march kept their order and went warily on till they had gotten a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians, confident of themselves and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for a camp but carried furiously on together with the rest of the barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this whilst they were yet in their way and imagining if they could overcome these thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city and, when the enemies approached, fell upon them both from the city and from the ambushes at once and, putting them into affright, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place; and the rest of the barbarians, seeing these to shrink, stayed no longer but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish because they were gone so far before to choose (as they then thought) a commodious place to pitch in. But when the barbarians came back upon them running, they received them and joining both camps together stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians, but used their slings against them and troubled them much that way (for without their men of arms there was no stirring for them); and in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent.

82. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army to the river Anapus, from Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched off the dead bodies upon truce the next day. And whereas the city Oeniadae was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours; and from thence went everyone home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the barbarians.

83. In the meantime the fleet of Corinth and the other confederates that was to set out from the Crisaeon gulf and to join with Cnemus to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper came not at all but were compelled to fight with Phormio and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set upon them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea but furnished rather for the land service in Acarnania and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys durst fight with theirs that were seven-and-forty. Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians as themselves sailed by one shore kept over against them on the other, and that now when they went off from Patrae in Achaia to go over to Acarnania in the opposite continent, the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus and also knew that they had come to anchor there the night before, they found they were then to fight of necessity directly against the mouth of the strait. The commanders of the fleet were such as the cities that set it forth had severally appointed, but of the Corinthians, these: Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in such manner as they made thereof a circle as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able with the stems of their galleys outward and sterns inward, and into the midst thereof received such small vessels as came with them and also five of their swiftest galleys, the which were at narrow passages to come forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge.

84. But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file went round them and shrunk them up together by

wiping them ever as they past and putting them in expectation of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight till he himself had given them the signal. For he hoped that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land, but that the galleys would fall foul of one another and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the midst. And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, he made account they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it was in his own election and would be most opportune on that occasion. When this wind was up and the galleys of the Peloponnesians, being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled, by the wind and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered them, and when one galley fell foul of another and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles and, through the noise they made keeping off and reviling each other, heard nothing neither of their charge nor of the galleys' direction, and through want of skill unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galley untractable to him that sat at the helm, then and with this opportunity he gave the signal. And the Athenians, charging, drowned first one of the admiral galleys and divers others after it in the several parts they assaulted and brought them to that pass at length that not one applying himself to the fight they fled all towards Patrae and Dyme, cities of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased them and taken twelve galleys and slain most of the men that were in them, fell off and went to Molycreium; and when they had there set up a trophy and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet went presently along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas and with him those galleys that were there and with which this other fleet should have been joined.

85. After this the Lacedaemonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council with command to prepare for another better fight and not to

suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason, and that it was not so much a defect of the fleet as of their courage, never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion. Who, being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys but commanded him that had the charge of them to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy, which he did to gratify the Polichnitae that bordered upon the Cydonians. Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete and together with the Polichnitae wasted the territory of the Cydonians, where also, by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.

86. In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene in order of battle sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycricum and anchored without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crisaean gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians and had lain six or seven days one against the other meditating and providing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea for fear of what they had suffered by it before, nor the other to enter the strait because to fight within they thought

to be the enemy's advantage. At last Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together and, seeing the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:

87. "Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For you know we were inferior to them then in preparation and set not forth as to a fight at sea but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things, and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness.* So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice, nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event; but we must think that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in anything by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant. And yet you are not so much short of their skill as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage will not be without a memory also to put what they know in execution; yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage availeth nothing. To their odds therefore of skill oppose your odds of valour, and to the fear caused by your overthrow oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater fleet and to fight on your own shore with your aids at hand of men of arms; and, for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every man in his order, not forsaking the place assigned him. And for us, we shall order the battle as well as the former commanders and leave no

* Hobbes does not add, as the Greek does, "as it was our first sea fight."

excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment; and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit."

88. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but fainthearted and observing they had consultations apart and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told them and predisposed their minds to an opinion that there was no number of galleys so great which setting upon them they ought not to undertake, and [also] most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves that being Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians, yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their courage and, having assembled the Athenians, said thus:

89. "Soldiers, having observed your fear of the enemy's number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys for that they were overcome before and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up, wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea. But in reason the odds must be ours in this as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not; and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be bold now than they. And the Lacedaemonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us) against their wills. For else they would never have undertaken a new battle after they were once so clearly overthrown. Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never

believe you would go about to resist unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them. For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength; but they that are much the fewer must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained. Wherewith these men now amazed fear us more for our unlikely preparation than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness and some also by timorousness, both which we ourselves are free from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf nor go in thither, seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit unless he have sight of the enemy afar off, or if he be himself over-pressed, again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily; and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. In the fight have in great estimation order and silence as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea; and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts. You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies or to bring the fear of the sea nearer home to the Athenians. Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once already; and men once overcome will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before."

90. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor and betime in the morning, having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast within the gulf, leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing. In this wing they

had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides. Phormio, fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly every-one as fast as he could upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. The rest they intercepted and, driving them to the shore, sunk them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew; and the galleys some they tied to their own and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already taken. But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them and fighting from the decks recovered them again after they were already towing away.

91. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory and overcame the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys which had avoided them when they turned and were gotten into the open sea. These flying toward Naupactus arrived there before the enemies, all save one, and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beakheads and put themselves in readiness for defence in case the enemy should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were paeanising as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas, being far before the rest, gave chase to one Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea a certain ship at anchor to which the Athenian galley first coming fetched a compass about her and came back full butt

against the Leucadian galley that gave her chase and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident they began to fear; and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water and hindered the way of their galleys (a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy was so near) and stayed for more company; and some of them, through ignorance of the coast, ran upon the shelves.

92. The Athenians seeing this took heart again and together with one clamour set upon them who resisted not long, because of their present errors committed and their disarray, but turned and fled to Panormus from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed and took from them six galleys that were hindmost and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk by the shore and tied astern of theirs. Of the men some they slew and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship was Timocrates, a Lacedaemonian, who, when the galley was lost, ran himself through with his sword; and his body drave into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians, falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk by the shore; and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crisaean gulf and to Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus. And the summer ended.

93. But before the fleet, gone into the Crisaean gulf and to Corinth, was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter instructed by the Megareans thought good to make an attempt upon Peiraeus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar, and that upon very good cause, con-

sidering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar, his cushion, and one thong for his oar to turn in should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens and, going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisaea, the arsenal of the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into Peiraeus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them; for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been discovered. As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward and, arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisaea and set sail, not now towards Peiraeus, as they intended, fearing the danger (and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a promontory of Salamis lying out towards Megara. Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys that kept watch to hinder the importation and exportation of anything to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them and, being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island.

94. By this time the fires signifying the coming of enemies were lifted up towards Athens and affrighted them more than anything that had happened in all this war. For they in the city thought the enemies had been already in Peiraeus, and they in Peiraeus thought the city of the Salaminians had been already taken and that the enemy would instantly come into Peiraeus, which, had they not been afraid nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole strength of the city into Peiraeus and launched their galleys and embarking in haste and tumult set sail toward Salamis, leaving for the guard of Peiraeus an army of foot. The Peloponnesians upon notice of these succours, having now overrun most of Salamis and taken many prisoners and much other booty besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisaea. And somewhat they feared the more for that their galleys had

lain long in the water and were subject to leaking. And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, went home and from that time forward looked better to Peiraeus both for the shutting of the ports and for their diligence otherwise.

95. About the same time in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace upon two promises, one of which he required to be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself. For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war, and for not restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, that was his enemy, which he never paid him. And Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians when he made league with them that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcideans of Thrace. For these causes therefore he made this expedition and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip (with purpose to make him king of Macedonia) and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business and Agnon the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the Chalcideans both with a fleet and with as great land forces as they could provide.

96. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those Thracians that inhabit on this side the mountains Haemus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Haemus he levied the Getes and all the nations between Ister and the Euxine Sea. The Getes and the people of those parts are borderers upon the Scythians and furnished as the Scythians are, all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains and are free states, all swordsmen, and are called Dii, the greatest part of which are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some went as voluntaries. He levied also the Agrianes and Laeaeans and all other the nations of Paeonia in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the

Graaeans and Laeaeans, nations of Paeonia, and to the river Strymon, which, rising out of the mountain Scomius, passeth through the territories of the Graaeans and Laeaeans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward Paeonia and are subject only to their own laws. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Treres make the bound of his dominion, and the Tilataeans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius and reach westward as far as to the river Oscius, which cometh out of the same hill Nestus and Hebrus doth; a great and desert hill adjoining to Rhodope.

97. The dimensions of the dominion of the Odrysians by the seaside is from the city of the Abderites to the mouth of Ister in the Euxine Sea; and is, the nearest way, four days' and as many nights' sail for a round ship, with a continual fore wind. By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the mouth of Ister eleven days' journey for an expedite footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea. Now for the continent: from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and to the river Strymon (for it reacheth this way farthest into the main land) it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey. The tribute they received from all the barbarian nations and from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes (who reigned after Sitalces and made the most of it), was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents by year. And presents of gold and silver came to as much more, besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture presented not only to him but also to all the men of authority and Odrysian nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give; and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny than to ask and go without. Nevertheless they held this custom long by reason of their power, for without gifts there was nothing to be gotten done amongst them. So that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power. For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians. For there is no nation, not to say of Europe but neither of Asia, that are

comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are able, one nation to one, to stand against the Scythians. And yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not like to other men.

98. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army and, when all was ready, set forward and marched towards Macedonia: first, through his own dominion; then, over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Paeonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly made with timber when he made war against the Paeonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Paeonians and on the left the Sintians and Medes; and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus in Paeonia. His army, as he marched, diminished not any way, except by sickness, but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace that came in uncalled in hope of booty. Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than a hundred and fifty thousand men, whereof the most were foot, the horse being a third part or thereabouts. And of the horse, the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves and the next most, the Getes. And of the foot, those swordsmen, a free nation that came down to him out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.

99. Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas. For there are in Macedonia the Lyncestians and the Elimeiotae and other highland nations, who, though they be confederates and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now Macedonia which lieth toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidae, who came out of Argos, were the first possessors and reigned in the same, having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians, which afterwards seated themselves in Phagres and other towns beyond Strymon at the foot of Pangaeum (from which cause that country is called the Gulf of Pieria to this day which lieth at the foot of Pangaeum and bendeth toward the sea), and out of that which

is called Bottia, the Bottiaean, that now border upon the Chalcideans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Paeonia near unto the river Axius reaching from above down to Pella and to the sea. Beyond Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia as far as to Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore, they drive the Eordians out of the territory now called Eordia (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca) and the Almopians out of Almopia. The same Macedonians subdued also other nations and hold them yet, as Anthemus, Crestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia and was the kingdom of Perdiccas the son of Alexander when Sitalces came to invade it.

100. The Macedonians, unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired all within their strongholds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded, which were not many then, but were built afterwards by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out the highways straight and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings that were before him. The Thracian army, arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first which had been the principality of Philip and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyntas the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also assaulted Europus but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia on the part that lies on the right hand of Pella and Cyrrhus; but within these into Bottiaea and Pieria they entered not but wasted Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them with their foot; but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience. And where they charged, none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen and well armed with breastplates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemies, they fought against manifest odds

of number so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

101. After this Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey, but had sent ambassadors to him with presents), he sent a part of his army against the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, wherewith, having compelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians, and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians, and all the Grecians as far as to Thermopylae were afraid he would have turned his forces upon them and stood upon their guard. And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose by virtue of their league. But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiaean, and Macedonian territories; and when he could not effect what he came for and his army both wanted victual and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his cousin-german and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes and promised him his sister in marriage and money with her; and Sitalces at the persuasion of him after the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea, retired with his army with all speed into his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

102. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus under the conduct of Phormio sailed along the coast to Astacus and, disembarking, marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys and four hundred more Messenians. With these

he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought they should not be able to make war against the Oeniades (who only of all Acarnania are the Athenians' enemies) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelōus, springing out of the mountain Pindus and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agraeans and the Amphilocheians, and through most part of the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Oeniades, which also it moateth about with fens, by the abundance of water maketh it hard lying there for an army in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinades lie just over against Oenia, hard by the mouth of Achelōus. And the river, being a great one, continually heapeth together the gravel, insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already; and the like in short time is expected by the rest. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous, but also the islands themselves stand thick, and, because the gravel cannot pass, are joined one to another, lying in and out, not in a direct line nor so much as to give the water his course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiareus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother, telling him "that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him till he had found out and seated himself in such a land as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen nor was then land because all other lands were polluted by him." Hereupon being at a nonplus, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelōus and thought there was enough cast up to serve his turn already since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore, seating himself in the places about the Oeniades, he reigned there and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it concerning Alcmaeon.

103. But Phormio and the Athenians, leaving Acarnania and

returning to Naupactus, in the very beginning of the spring came back to Athens and brought with them such galleys as they had taken and the freemen they had taken prisoners in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.



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THE THIRD BOOK

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Attica invaded by the Peloponnesians.—The Mytilenaeans revolt and are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league.—The Athenians send Paches to Mytilene to besiege it.—Part of the besieged Plataeans escape through the fortifications of the enemy.—The commons of Mytilene, armed by the nobility for a sally on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians.—The residue of the Plataeans yield to the besiegers and are put to the sword.—The proceedings upon the Mytilenaeans and their punishment.—The sedition in Corcyra.—Laches is sent by the Athens into Sicily, and Nicias into Melos.—Demosthenes fighteth against the Aetolians unfortunately, and afterwards against the Ambraciotes fortunately.—Pythadorus is sent into Sicily to receive the fleet from Laches.—This in other three years of this war.

1. The summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and there set them down and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where they thought fit and kept back the multitude of light-armed soldiers from going out before the men of arms and infesting the places near the city. And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they returned and were dissolved according to their cities.

2. After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians,

which though they would have done before the war and the Lacedaemonians would not then receive them, yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they stayed to have first straitened the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnaeans, and of the Mytilenaeans themselves certain particular men upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them that the Lesbians were forced to go all into Mytilene; that by the help of the Lacedaemonians and their kindred, the Boeotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt; and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be lost.

3. The Athenians, afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot and at the hottest, thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos, which had a navy and was of strength entire, should thus be added to the rest of their enemies, and at first received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned because they would not have them true. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mytilene and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves and undo their preparation, they then feared the worst and would have prevented them, and to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty galleys made ready for Peloponnesus with Cleïppedes and two other commanders. For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city and that to the celebration thereof the Mytilenaeans were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they might command the Mytilenaeans to deliver up their galleys and to demolish their walls; or they might make war against them if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mytilene which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league to aid them, the Athenians stayed and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the meantime a certain man went from Athens into Euboea by sea and then by land to Geraestus and, finding there

a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mytilene three days after he set forth from Athens and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis, as was expected, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports where they were left unfinished and placed guards to defend them.

4. When the Athenians not long after arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mytilenaeans what they had in charge, which not hearkened unto, they presently fell to the war. The Mytilenaeans, unprovided and compelled to a war on such a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight; but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley, desiring, if they could upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island.

When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mytilenaeans amongst others sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design, and had repented him after of the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them as not intending any innovation. Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedaemon, undiscovered of the fleet of the Athenians which was riding at anchor in Malea to the north of the city, being without any confidence of their success at Athens. And these men, after an ill voyage through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedaemon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence.

5. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne (for these, together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, aided the Athenians), prepared themselves for the war. And the Mytilenaeans with the whole strength of the city made a sally upon the Athenian camp and came to a battle; wherein, though the Mytilenaeans had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls nor durst trust to their strength but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces as (if any came) they were to have

from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city one Meleas a Laconian and Hermiondas a Theban, who, having been sent out before the revolt but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle entered the haven in a galley and persuaded them to send another galley along with them with other ambassadors to Sparta, which they did.

6. But the Athenians, much confirmed by this the Mytilenaeans' cessation, called in their confederates (who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than was thought they would have done) and, riding at anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their galleys before both the ports and so quite excluded the Mytilenaeans from the use of the sea. As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much; and the Mytilenaeans and other Lesbians, that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mytilene.

7. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys into Peloponnesus under the conduct of Asopius the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio for general into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia; and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself with twelve galleys went on to Naupactus. And afterwards, having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Oeniades and both entered with his galleys into the river of Achelōus and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the Oeniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces and sailed with his galleys to Leucas and landed his soldiers on the territory of Neritum, but in going off was by those of the country that came out to defend it and by some few of the garrison soldiers there both himself and part of his company slain. And having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bodies, they went their ways.

8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenaeans that went out

in the first galley, having been referred by the Lacedaemonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia to the end they might determine of them together with the rest of the confederates, went to Olympia accordingly. It was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor. And when after the solemnity they were set in council, the ambassadors spake unto them in this manner:

9. "Men of Lacedaemon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians. For they that take into league such as revolt in the wars and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason when they that revolt and they from whom the revolt is made are mutually like minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger.

10. "For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever without a mutual opinion of each other's honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherwise; for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions.

"As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business. Yet we entered not such a league as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct counsels unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell all but ourselves and the

Chians into their subjection. And we, having still our own laws and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable when they had subdued those whom together with us they took into league but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest.

11. "It is true that if we were now in liberty all, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill to deal on equal terms with us alone and, the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals. Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues. For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. Now the reason why they have left us yet free is no other but that they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy than by force. For therein they made use of us for an argument that having equal vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars if those against whom they led us had not done the injury: and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker and, reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by removing the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added to yours or to any other, it might have created them some danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out.

12. "What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this when we received each other with alienated affections: when

whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us; and when they had peace, we for fear courted them: and whereas in others good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear? So it was more for fear than love that we remained their confederates; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or other to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them and again to defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.

13. "Upon these pretensions, therefore, and causes, men of Lacedaemon and confederates, we have revolted, the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright, and compel us to take some course for our own safety, which we would have done before, when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Boeotians invited us to it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt, one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians and helping to set them free, and another from the Athenians, in breaking first and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league and send us the speedier aid, thereby the better at once both to defend those you ought to defend and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present. For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have many galleys to spare in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and land, but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet or be forced to come off from both our coasts. And

let not any man conceive that you shall herein at your own danger defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica but there from whence cometh the profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates, which, if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt; and all that is ours will accrue unto them, and we shall be worse handled besides than those that were under them before. But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of, and also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates because everyone will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.

14. "In reverence therefore of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mytilenaeans into league and aid us. And do not cast us off, who (though, as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own) shall bring a common profit to all Greece if we prosper and a more common detriment to all the Grecians if, through your inflexibleness, we miscarry. Be you therefore men such as the Grecians esteem you and our fears require you to be."

15. In this manner spake the Mytilenaeans. And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose the Lacedaemonians appointed their confederates there present to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly,

being busied in the gathering in of their fruits and weary of warfare.

16. The Athenians, perceiving all this preparation to be made upon an opinion of their weakness and desirous to let them see they were deceived as being able, without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out a hundred galleys and embarked therein generally, both citizens (except those of the degree of Pentacosimedimni and Horsemen *) and also strangers that dwelt amongst them, and sailing to the isthmus made a show of their strength and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedaemonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors, and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again, and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.

17. About the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most galleys (besides the beauty of them) together in action in these employments; yet in the beginning of the war they had both as good and more in number. For a hundred attended the guard of Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; and another hundred were about Peloponnesus, besides those that were at Potidaea and other places, so that in one summer they had in all two hundred and fifty sail. And this, together with Potidaea, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the men of arms that besieged the city had each of them two drachmes a day, one for himself and another for his man, and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first and remained to the end of the siege, besides sixteen hundred more that went with Phormio and came away before the town was won. And

* This refers to the two highest classifications among the Athenian citizenry.

the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money consumed and so many galleys employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

18. About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were in the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries, against Methymne in hope to have had it betrayed unto them and, having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus; and after they had settled the affairs of those places and made strong their walls returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnaeans likewise made war upon Antissa; but beaten by the Antisaeans and some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to Methymne with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof and understanding that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the land and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with a thousand men of arms of their own city, who, supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mytilene and ingirt it with a single wall, save that in some places, stronger by nature than the rest, they only built turrets and placed guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly besieged, both by sea and land, and the winter began.

19. The Athenians, standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves and sent thither two hundred talents of this their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and four others with twelve galleys to levy money amongst the confederates.* But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Maeander in Caria as far

* What Thucydides means here—which does not become entirely clear in Hobbes' version—is "Being in need of money the Athenians now for the first time levied a special tax on their own citizens and also sent special commissions to collect taxes among the allies." Normally there was no *eisphora*, or general tax, paid by Athenian citizens, and the allies made their regular contributions themselves at fixed times of year through their representatives instead of, as in this instance, being dunned by special Athenian collection agents.

as to the hill Sandius, was set upon there by the Carians and Anaeitans and himself with a great part of his soldiers slain.

20. The same winter the Plataeans (for they were besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians), pressed now with want of victual and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out and, if they could, to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt, were Theaenetus the son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas the son of Daïmachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards, by one means or other, for the greatness of the danger shrunk from it again; but two hundred and twenty or thereabouts voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner. They made them ladders fit for the height of the enemy's wall; the wall they measured by the lays of bricks on the part toward the town where it was not plastered over; and divers men at once numbered the lays of bricks, whereof, though some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just, especially numbering them so often and at no great distance but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied, and so by guess of the thickness of one brick took the measure of their ladders.

21. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built. It consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea and another outward in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen foot; and that sixteen foot of space which was betwixt them was disposed and built into cabins for the watchmen, which was so joined and continued one to another that the whole appeared to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower of a just breadth to comprehend both walls and reach from the outmost to the inmost front of the whole, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower but through the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm of rain, they used to quit the battlements of the wall and to watch under the towers, as being not far asunder and covered beside overhead. Such was the form of the wall wherein the Peloponnesians kept their watch.

22. The Plataeans, after they were ready and had attended a tempestuous night,* and withal moonless, went out of the city and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town and then came up close to the wall of the enemy, who, because it was dark, could not see them coming; and the noise they made as they went could not be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms, and were but lightly armed and not shod but on the left foot for the more steadiness in the wet. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders and placed them to the wall: then twelve lightly armed, only with a dagger and a breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the son of Coroebus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him went up into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed that carried the darts for whom they that came after carried targets at their backs that they might be the more expedite to get up, which targets they were to deliver to them when they came to the enemy. At length, when most of them were ascended, they were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers. For one of the Plataeans taking hold of the battlements threw down a tile which made a noise in the fall. And presently there was an alarm, and the army ran to the wall. For in the dark and stormy night they knew not what the danger was, and the Plataeans that were left in the city came forth withal and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to that where their men went over. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred that were appointed to assist the watch upon all occasions of need went without the wall and made towards the place of the clamour. They also held up the fires, by which they used to make known the approach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Plataeans likewise held out many other

* The Greek actually says "a stormy night with rain and wind."

fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy insignificant, and that the Thebans, apprehending the matter otherwise than it was, might forbear to send help till their men were over and had recovered some place of safety.

23. In the meantime those Plataeans, which having scaled the wall first and slain the watch were now masters of both the towers, not only guarded the passages by standing themselves in the entries but also, applying ladders from the wall to the towers and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot both from above and below. In the mean space, the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many ladders at once and beaten down the battlements passed quite over between the towers. And ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then last of all, and with much ado, came they also down to the ditch which were in the two towers. And by this time the three hundred that were to assist the watch came and set upon them and had lights with them, by which means the Plataeans that were on the further brink of the ditch discerned them the better from out of the dark and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts; for standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Plataeans the less discernible, insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north. And the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had very much increased the water, which they waded through with scarce their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.

24. From the ditch the Plataeans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand the temple of Juno built by Androcrates, both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way, which by Mount Cithaeron and the Oak-heads led to Athens.

The Plataeans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythrae and Hysiae and, having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater number. For some of them returned into the city before the rest went over, and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit and returned to their places. But the Plataeans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event * and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Plataea passed through the fortification of their enemies and were saved.

25. About the end of the same winter Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was sent in a galley to Mytilene and, coming first to Pyrrha and thence going to Mytilene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent, which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming, and that himself was sent afore both to let them know it and withal to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mytilenaeans grew confident and hearkened less to composition with the Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.

26. In the beginning of the summer after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty-two galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mytilene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mytilene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet in minority; and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted: and this was the sharpest invasion of all but the sec-

* I.e., the outcome.

ond. For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes and seeing their corn failed,* they retired again and were dissolved according to their cities.

27. The Mytilenaeans, in the meantime, seeing the fleet came not from Peloponnesus but delayed the time and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this occasion. Salaethus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city, who were before unarmed, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians. But they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates but, holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich men either to bring their corn to light and divide it amongst them all, or else, they said, they would make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians.

28. Those that managed the state perceiving this and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army with these conditions: "to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens and to receive the army into the city; and that the Mytilenaeans should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business; and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mytilenaeon." This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mytilenaeans as had principally practised with the Lacedaemonians, being afraid of themselves, when the army was entered the city durst not trust to the conditions agreed on but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches, having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, sent them to Tenedos to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa and took in that town and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

29. In the meantime those forty galleys of Peloponnesus

* I.e., not the corn they were burning, but the grain they carried with them for provisioning themselves.

which should have made all possible haste trifled away the time about Peloponnesus and, making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconus, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mytilene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus in Erythraea. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mytilene that they arrived at Embatus where, understanding the certainty, they went to council about what they were to do upon the present occasion; and Teutiaplus, an Eleian, delivered his opinion to this effect:

30. "Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded and to the sea (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger if we but think this: that all stratagems of war * whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which, if a commander avoid in himself and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success."

31. Thus said he, but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel that, seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia or Cume in Aeolia, that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt, whereof there was hope because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there; and if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue and withal put them to maintain a fleet against

* The reading of the Greek here is doubtful. The most likely version is the word *kainon*, which means "the novelty," i.e., "the surprises of war."

them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides that they thought they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus.

32. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to Myonnesus of the Teians and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus; and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anaea and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty to kill such as had not lift up their hands against him nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians but confederates to the Athenians by constraint, and that, unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends but many now friends to become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors he set the Chians and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty. For when men saw their fleet, they never fled from it but came unto them as to Athenians, little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia.

33. From Ephesus Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralus* (which by chance were then in their course for Athens) whilst he lay at anchor about Claros and, fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea, meaning by his good will to touch no land till he came into Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches from divers places, especially from Erythraea. For the cities of Ionia being unwall'd were afraid extremely lest the Peloponnesians, sailing by without intention to stay, should have pillaged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralus, having seen him at Claros, brought the news themselves. And Paches thereupon made great haste after and followed him as far as Latmos the island. But when he saw he could not reach him, he came back again and thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those galleys upon the wide sea that the same were not compelled, by being taken in some place

* These were the two state ships of Athens, used principally for sending embassies to Delphi, carrying envoys, collecting tribute, etc.

near land, to fortify themselves and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

34. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited after the town above, through their own sedition, was taken by Itamanes and the barbarians. (This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians.) They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians and barbarians, of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and there, with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered with them, they governed the city at their pleasure; and the other part, which went out from these and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He, when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again, and Hippias was thereupon come to him, committed him to custody, but without bonds, and withal, assaulting the wall on a sudden when they expected not, took it and slew as many of the Arcadians and barbarians as were within; and when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had promised, but, after he had him there, laid hold on him and caused him to be shot to death and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had medized. Afterwards the Athenians sent governors to Notium of their own and, having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

35. Paches, when he came back to Mytilene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus and, having found Salaethus the Lacedaemonian hidden in Mytilene, apprehended him and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army and with the rest stayed and settled the state of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought convenient.

36. These men, and Salaethus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Athenians slew Salaethus presently, though he made

them many offers, and amongst other to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from before Plataea, for it was yet besieged. But upon the rest they went to council and in their passion decreed to put them to death, not only those men there present but also all the men of Mytilene that were of age, and to make slaves of the women and children, laying to their charge the revolt itself in that they revolted not being in subjection as others were; and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst enter into Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree with command to put the Mytilenaeans presently to death. But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was that not the authors only but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mytilenaeans that were there present and such Athenians as favoured them understood, they wrought with those that bare office to bring the matter again into debate, wherein they easily prevailed, forasmuch as to them also it was well known that the most of the city were desirous to have means to consult of the same anew. The assembly being presently met, among the opinions of divers others Cleon also, the son of Cleaenetus, who in the former assembly had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and said in this manner:

37. "I have often on other occasions thought a democracy incapable of dominion over others, but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mytilenaeans. For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in your confederates and consider not that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth not to the winning of the affections of your confederates; nor do you consider that your government is a tyranny and those that be subject to it are against their wills so and are plotting continually against you, and obey you not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you exceed them in strength, and for no good will. But the

worst mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree shall stand firm and that we will not know that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws when they be not binding, and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance, and that the more ignorant sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser. For these love to appear wiser than the laws and in all public debates to carry the victory as the worthiest things wherein to show their wisdom, from whence most commonly proceeds the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another, and so, making themselves equal judges rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part well. We therefore should do the like and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit to give such counsel to your multitude as in our own judgments we think not good.

38. "For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the Mytilenaeans in question again and thereby caused delay, which is the advantage only of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas revenge, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows presently. I do wonder also what he is that shall stand up now to contradict me and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the Mytilenaeans are good for us or that our calamities are any damage to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence to make you believe that that which was decreed was not decreed or, moved with lucre, must with some elaborate speech endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the prizes to others; but the danger that hence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words and hearers of actions, beholding future actions in the words of them that speak well as possible to come to pass and actions already past in the orations of such as make the most of them, and that with such as-

surance, as if what you saw with your eyes were not more certain than what you hear related. You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain but backward to follow any tried advice, slaves to strange things, contemners of things usual. You would everyone chiefly give the best advice; but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come after with your opinion but rather, if anything be acutely spoken, to applaud it first and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken even before it be out, but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the contentions of sophisters than to men that deliberate of the state of a commonwealth.

39. "To put you out of this humour, I say unto you that the Mytilenaeans have done us more injury than ever did any one city. For those that have revolted through the over-hard pressure of our government or that have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon them. But they that were islanders and had their city walled so as they needed not fear our enemies but only by sea, in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys, and they that were permitted to have their own laws and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus, what have they done but conspired against us and rather warred upon us than revolted from us (for a revolt is only of such as suffer violence) and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing of their own power.* But these men would neither take example by their neighbour's calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us; nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery, but being bold against future events and aiming at matters above their strength though below their desires, have taken arms against us and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the

* The Greek says actually "than if gathering a power on their own they had warred against us."

victory but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity, it is usual to turn insolent; whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to the course of reason is more firm than that which cometh unhop'd for; and such cities, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy, fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mytilenaeans than to the rest of our confederates, for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to contemn those that observe them and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now therefore let them be punished according to their wicked dealing, and let not the fault be laid upon a few and the people be absolved. For they have all alike taken arms against us; and the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the few, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration your confederates; and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence, seeing that speeding they win their liberty and failing their case is not incurable? Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard, both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success we recover but an exhausted city and lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it; but miscarrying, we add these enemies to our former and must spend that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed to employ against the enemies we have already.

40. "We must not therefore give our confederates hope of pardon, either impetrable * by words or purchasable by money, as if their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again, I maintain that you ought not to alter your former

* I.e., obtainable.

decree nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire, pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As for pity, it is just to show it on them that are like us and will have pity again but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us but must also of necessity have been our enemies forever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great damage, but they for their well speaking must well have. Lastly for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter rather than towards such as being suffered to live will still be as they are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do that which is both just in respect of the Mytilenaeans and profitable for yourselves; whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against reason punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good without danger.* But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment nor be less sensible, you that have escaped, than they that have conspired, especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without precedent cause persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to, as jealous of the danger his remaining enemy may create him; for he that is wronged without cause and escapeth will commonly be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not therefore betray ourselves, but in contemplation of what you were near suffering and how you once prized above all things else to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the danger that hung over our own heads so lately. Give not only unto these their deserved punishment but also unto the rest of our confederates

* A more literal translation brings out the force of the sentiment better: "and be honest men from a position of no danger."

a clear example that death is their sentence whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies and fight against your own confederates."

41. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mytilenaeans to death, stood forth and spake as followeth.

42. "I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mytilenaeans to be again debated nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, haste and anger, whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness and the other with want of judgment.* And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise or doth it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future and not apparent things may be demonstrated otherwise than by words; interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumnia-tion. But they of all others are most intolerable that when men give public advice will accuse them also of bribery. For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place, he is still suspected; and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool but also void of honesty. The common-wealth gets no good by such courses for through fear hereof it will want counsellors. And the state would do their business for the most part well if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking, for they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him but rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a wise state ought not either to add unto, or, on the other side, to derogate from, the honour of him that giveth good advice, nor yet punish, nay,

* The Greek literally taken is "the other with want of education and narrowness of judgment."

nor disgrace, the man whose counsel they receive not. And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice deliver anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further honour and to please the auditory, nor he that doth not, covet thereupon by gratifying the people some way or other that he also may endear them.

43. "But we do here the contrary; and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth. And our custom is to hold good counsel given suddenly no less suspect than bad, by which means as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must get the same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound advice is forced by lying to get himself believed. So that the commonwealth is it alone which, by reason of these suspicious imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We, therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst these jealousies do give our advice have need to foresee further than you that look not far, and the rather because we stand accountable for our counsel, and you are to render no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.

44. "For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction in the business of the Mytilenaeans nor to accuse any man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have them put to death unless it be for our profit, [nor yet would I pardon them,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the commonwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon contendeth that it will be profitable for the

future to put them to death in that it will keep the rest from rebelling, I, contending likewise for the future, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice for the fair pretexts of his, which agreeing more with your present anger against the Mytilenaeans may quickly perhaps win your consent. We plead not judicially with the Mytilenaeans so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them which way we may serve ourselves of them to our most advantage hereafter.

45. "I say, therefore, that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not so great but far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves; nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice which he knew he could not go through with.* And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better furnished, either of themselves or by their confederates, than it is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand. They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors. And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old even upon the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress. And therefore, either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But hope and desire work this effect in all estates. And this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprize, that suggesting the success are the cause of most crimes that are committed, and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides these

*Hobbes' translation is misleading here. The Greek is "Yet exalted by hope they take the risk and no one yet has ever condemned in advance his success in the design and therefore has not gone to meet terror."

two, fortune also puts men forward as much as anything else. For presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose, and especially cities because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and amongst a generality, everyone, though without reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in particular. In a word, it is a thing impossible and of great simplicity to believe when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing that by force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.

46. "We must not, therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst against them nor make them desperate, as if there were no place to repent and, as soon as they can, to cancel their offence. For observe: if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did and endure the siege to the very last if to compound late and soon be all one? And how can it be but detriment to us to be at charge of long sieges through their obstinacy and, when we have taken a city to find it exhausted and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to be exact judges in the punition of offenders but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws but by the providence of our own actions. But we to the contrary, when we recover a city which, having been free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them. Whereas we ought rather not mightily to punish a free city revolted but mightily to look to it before it revolt and to prevent the intention of it, but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can.

47. "Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your cities the commonalty are now your friends and either

revolt not with the few, or, if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt; whereby when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mytilenaeans, which did neither partake of the revolt and as soon as they were armed presently delivered the city into your hands, you shall first do unjustly to kill such as have done you service, and you shall effect a work besides which the great men do everywhere most desire. For when they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people presently on their side, you having foreshown them by the example that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas indeed, though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it, to the end that the only party now our friend may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up an injury than justly to destroy such as we should not. And that same both justice and profit of revenge, alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together in the same thing.

48. "You, therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course, not upon compassion or lenity (for neither would I have you won by that) but upon consideration of what hath been advised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both good for the future and also of present terror to the enemy. For he that consulteth wisely is a sorer enemy than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly."

49. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the other, the Athenians were at contention which they should decree; and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal, but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not arriving before the former they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mytilenaeon ambassadors having furnished this latter with wine and barley cakes and promised them great rewards if they over-

took the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their oars and taking their refection of the said barley cakes steeped in wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept, and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against them; and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an errand, whereas the former proceeded in the manner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much as Paches had read the sentence and prepared to execute what they had decreed. But presently after came in the other galley and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the Mytilenaeans to the danger.

50. But those whom Paches had sent home as most culpable of the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death, being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also razed the walls of Mytilene and took from them all their galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute; but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnaeans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods.* And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess it of whom the Lesbians, at the rent of two minae of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns also as the Mytilenaeans were masters of in the continent, which were afterwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

51. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos the Athenians, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it and served themselves of

* All that this means was that these three hundred lots became the national property of the Athenian state, which usually let it to individual citizens subject to the payment of dues to the god concerned. What the passage seems to mean, in general, is that Athenian citizens, chosen by lot, were given possession of these lands in Lesbos. They did not work them themselves but made arrangements with the former owners to work them as tenants for a rent. The procedure would thus be roughly similar to many of the land grants made to Englishmen in Ireland in the seventeenth century.

the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island as being nearer and no more at Budorum and Salamis, to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried nor send out pirates as they had formerly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore, when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisaea, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the continent in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes; for it was not far distant from the main land. And, that being in few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself and, leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army back.

52. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Plataeans, having spent their victual and being unable longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but they within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Lacedaemonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedaemon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians with conditions of mutual restitution of such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Plataea, as having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable) but sent a herald to them who demanded whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and take them for their judges with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald, and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Plataeans food for certain days till the judges, which were five, should arrive from Lacedaemon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited; but calling them man by man, they asked of everyone only this question: whether they had done to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates in this war any good service. But the Plataeans, having sued to make their answer more at large and having ap-

pointed Astymachus the son of Asopolaus and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus (who had been heretofore the host * of the Lacedaemonians) for their speakers, said as followeth:

53. "Men of Lacedaemon, relying upon you we yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this but some more legal manner of proceeding; and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others (as now we do) but of yourselves only,† conceiving we should so obtain the better justice. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect both that the trial is capital, and you, the judges, partial, gathering so much both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer, and also from this, that the interrogatory is short and such, as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves and be easily convinced ‡ if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to try what we can obtain by pleading. For, for men in our case the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side. For if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony in things you knew not. Whereas now, all that we shall say will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves, to make that a crime, but lest you bring us to a judgment already judged to gratify somebody else.

54. "Nevertheless, we will produce our reasons of equity

* The Greek word is *proxenus*, one who stands for a foreigner. This was apparently a semiofficial position of a Plataean, in this case, appointed to act in Plataea for such Spartans temporarily resident in Plataea as had business with the Plataean state. It might be very roughly equated with the modern position of consul, with the difference that the proxenus was a citizen of the state in which the foreigner found himself. Thucydides explains later that one of Alcibiades' reasons for hating the Spartans was that they had not granted him the position of Spartan proxenus in Athens, which had been held by his grandfather.

† This glances at the presence of the Thebans, bitterest enemies of Plataea, among those who attended the "court."

‡ We would say "easily convicted."

against the quarrel of the Thebans and withal make mention of our services done both to you and to the rest of Greece, and make trial if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory, whether we have any way done good in this present war to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, or not, if you ask us as enemies, we say that, if we have done them no good, we have also done them no wrong; if you ask us as friends, then we say that they rather have done us the injury in that they made war upon us. But in the time of the peace and in the war against the Medes we behaved ourselves well; for the one we brake not first, and in the other we were the only Boeotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece. For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at Artemisium; and in the battle fought in this our own territory, we were with you; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength. And unto you, Lacedaemonians, in particular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the Helotes and seizing of Ithome,* we sent the third part of our power to assist you, which you have no reason to forget.

55. "Such then we showed ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is true, we have been your enemies since; but for that you are to blame yourselves. For when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off. Nevertheless, you neither have in this war nor were to have suffered at our hands anything that misbecame us. And if we denied to revolt from the Athenians when you bade us, we did you no injury in it. For they both aided us against the Thebans when you shrunk from us, and it was now no more any honesty to betray them, especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought their league and being made denizens also of their city.† Nay, we

* The battle of Ithome, 464 B.C.

† This refers to a kind of honorary Athenian citizenship earlier conferred on the Plataeans for their good service at the time of the Persian Wars. We are not exactly clear as to the nature of the rights associated with this citizenship.

ought rather to have followed them in all their commands with alacrity. When you or the Athenians have the leading of the confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable but you that lead to the evil.

56. "The Thebans have done us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon the day of our novilunial sacrifice, had surprised our city; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing enemy, and therefore there is no reason you should punish us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by your and their present benefit in the war, it will manifestly appear that you are not judges of the truth but respecters only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more profitable to you then when you were in greater danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side when you invade others; yet at that time when the barbarian came in to impose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice that with our present offence (if we have committed any) you compare our forwardness then which you will find both greater than our fault and augmented also by the circumstance of such a season when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes' power, and when they were most commended not that with safety helped to further his invasion but that adventured to do what was most honest, though with danger. But we being of that number and honoured for it amongst the first are afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction, as having chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly than you profitably. But you should ever have the same opinion in the same case and think this only to be profitable that doing what is useful for the present occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue of your good confederates.

57. "Consider also that you are an example of honest dealing to the most of the Grecians. Now if you shall decree otherwise than is just (for this judgment of yours is conspicuous, you that be praised against us that be not blamed), take heed that they do not dislike that good men should undergo an unjust

sentence, though at the hands of better men, or that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service should be dedicated in their temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter that Plataea should be destroyed by Lacedaemonians and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi, should now blot it out of all Greece to gratify the Thebans. For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity that if the Medes had prevailed, we must have perished then; and now the Thebans have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest friends, and have put us to two great hazards, one before of famishing if we yielded not, and another now of a capital sentence. And we Plataeans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned and left unrelieved by them all.

58. "But we beseech you for those gods' sakes, in whose names once we made mutual league, and for our valour's sake shown in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us and, if at the persuasion of the Thebans you have determined aught against us, to change your minds and reciprocally to require at the hands of the Thebans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not to kill and so receive an honest benefit in recompense of a wicked one, and not to bestow pleasure upon others and receive wickedness upon yourselves in exchange. For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to make the infamy of it cease will be work enough. For being none of your enemies but well-willers and such as have entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death with justice. Therefore, if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our persons and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission and with hands upheld (and it is the law among Grecians not to put such to death), besides that we have from time to time been beneficial to you. For look upon the sepulchres of your fathers whom, slain by the Medes and buried in this territory of ours, we have yearly honoured at the public charge both with vestments and other rites; and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land and confederates use to do to

those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by a wrong sentence you shall do the contrary of this. For consider this. Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground and amongst their friends. But you, if you slay us, and of Plataeis make Thebais, what do you but leave your fathers and kindred, deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover, put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty? And make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes? And destroy the patrial sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?

59. "These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedaemon, nor to violate the common institutions of Greece and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service for the hatred of another when you have received no injury from us yourselves, but to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion in contemplation not only of the greatness of the punishment but also of who we are that must suffer and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly. Which we, as becometh us and our need compelleth us to do, cry aloud unto the common gods of Greece * to persuade you unto producing the oath sworn by your fathers to put you in mind; and also we become here sanctuary men at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out upon the dead not to suffer themselves to be in the power of the Thebans nor to let their greatest friends be betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies, remembering them of that day upon which, though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking (which is as necessary so most bitter to men in our case because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after), for a conclusion we say that it was not to the Thebans

* The Greek means "Gods common to the Greeks and gods whose altars are common to the Greeks," i.e., gods worshipped at Delphi and Olympia. This appeal is meant to be, for instance, to Zeus and Apollo, as they were worshipped at altars common to all of Greece. They are to be distinguished from the same gods in the local habitat where, perhaps, they were really felt as almost different deities protecting peculiarly the community in which they lived.

that we rendered our city (for we would rather have died of famine, the most base perdition of all other), but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also we require you, men of Lacedaemon, not only not to deliver us Plataeans, who have been most zealous in the service of the Grecians especially being sanctuary men,* out of your own hands and your own trust into the hands of our most mortal enemies the Thebans but also to be our saviours and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians."

60. Thus spake the Plataeans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said that since the Plataeans had had the liberty of a longer speech (which they thought they should not) than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to speak, and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:

61. "If these men had answered briefly to the question and not both turned against us with an accusation and also out of the purpose and wherein they were not charged made much apology and commendation of themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak. But as it is, we are to the one point to answer and to confute the other, that neither the fault of us nor their own reputation may do them good, but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this, that when we had built Plataea last of all the cities of Boeotia, together with some other places which, having driven out the promiscuous nations, we had then in our dominion, they would not (as was ordained at first) allow us to be their leaders; but being the only men of all the Boeotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country when they should have been compelled to their duty, they turned unto the Athenians and together with them did us many evils, for which they likewise suffered as many from us.

62. "But when the barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Boeotians only also Medized not. And this

* More comprehensible would be the literal rendering of the Greek "being your suppliants."

is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves and most detract from us. Now we confess they Medized not because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless, when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Boeotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration withal what form of government we were in both the one and the other when we did this. For then had we our city governed neither by an oligarchy with laws common to all nor by a democracy; but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under and furthered the coming in of the barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself nor doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no laws [but were at the will of others]. But when the Medes were gone and our city had laws, consider now, when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece and this territory of ours with the rest wherein through sedition they had gotten many places already, whether by giving them battle at Coroneia and defeating them, we delivered not Boeotia from servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest, and find not more horses and more provision of war than any of the confederates besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our Medizing.

63. "And we will endeavour to prove now that the Grecians have been rather wronged by you and that you are more worthy of all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens for to be righted against us. Against us then only the Athenians should have come with you and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest, especially when if the Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you had the league of the Lacedaemonians made with you against the Medes, which you so often object, to have resorted unto, which was sufficient not only to have protected you from us but, which is the main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had pleased. But voluntarily and without constraint you rather chose to follow the Athenians. And

you say it had been a dishonest thing to have betrayed your benefactors. But it is more dishonest and more unjust by far to betray the Grecians universally, to whom you have sworn, than to betray the Athenians alone, especially when these go about to deliver Greece from subjection and the other to subdue it. Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable nor free from dishonesty. For you, as you say yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you against injuries; and you co-operate with them in injuring others. And howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited as to make such a requital, as though justly due cannot be justly done.

64. "But you have made it apparent that even then it was not for the Grecians' sake that you alone of all the Boeotians Medized not but because the Athenians did not; yet now you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the Grecians did, claim favour of these for what you did for the others' sake. But there is no reason for that; but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you in this trial. And produce not the oath of the former league as if that should save you now. For you have relinquished it and, contrary to the same, have rather helped the Athenians to subdue the Aeginetae and others than hindered them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily and having laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it as there did us, but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the shutting up of your city, to quietness and neutrality. Who can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general than you that pretend honesty to their ruin? And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be none of yours and made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary Medizing and your voluntary Atticizing.

65. "And for this last injury you charge us with, namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace and of your new-moon sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we

had done unjustly if we had assaulted your city or wasted your territory as enemies of our own accord; yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to discharge you of foreign league and conform you to the common institutions of all Boeotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress rather than they that follow. But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates and took us into the city as friends not as enemies with intention to keep the ill-affected from being worse and to do right to the good, taking upon them to be moderators of your councils and not to deprive the city of your persons but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your kindred, and not to engage you in hostility with any but to settle you in peace with all.

66. "And for an argument that we did not this as enemies, we did harm to no man but proclaimed that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the common form of all Boeotia, he should come to us. And you came willingly at first and were quiet. But afterwards, when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit to do without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate nothing in fact and then with words persuade us to go forth again, but contrary to the composition assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much; for they suffered by a kind of law. But to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this a horrible cruelty? You committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of another; first, the breach of the composition; then, the death that followed of our men; and thirdly, the falsifying of your promise to save them if we did no hurt to anything of yours in the fields. And yet you say that we are the transgressors and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. But it is otherwise. And if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your crimes at once.

67. "We have herein, men of Lacedaemon, been thus large both for your sakes and ours: for yours, to let you see that if

you condemn them, it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better appear. Be not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had, which, though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness because their offence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion when they cry out upon your fathers' sepulchres and their own want of friends. For we on the other side affirm that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them; and their fathers, partly slain at Coroneia in bringing Boeotia to your confederation and partly alive and now old and deprived of their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly; but, on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends they may thank themselves. For of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law hath been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully rather than judicially, in which point we shall now come short of requiting them; for they shall suffer legally and not, as they say they do, with hands upheld from battle but as men that have put themselves upon trial by consent. Maintain therefore, ye Lacedaemonians, the law of the Grecians against these men that have transgressed it, and give unto us that have suffered contrary to the law the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you; but set up an example to the Grecians by presenting [unto these men] a trial not of words but of facts, which, if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, compt orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority, as you have now, would collect the matter to a head and, according as any man should make answer thereunto, so proceed to sentence, men would be less in the search of fair speeches wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions."

68. Thus spake the Thebans. And the Lacedaemonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand well, namely, whether they had received any benefit by them or not in this present war, for they had indeed intreated them both at other times,

according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Median war, to stand neutral, and also a little before the siege the Plataeans had rejected their proposition of being common friends to both sides according to the same league, taking themselves, in respect of these their just offers, to be now discharged of the league and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth and, having asked them again the same question, whether they had any way benefited the Lacedaemonians and their confederates in this present war or not, as they answered not led them aside and slew them, not exempting any. Of the Plataeans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; of the Athenians who were besieged with them, twenty-five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for a habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own and to all those Plataeans which, living, were of the Theban faction. But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foundation, they built a hospital* in the place near the temple of Juno of two hundred foot diameter with chambers on every side in circle both above and below, using therein the roofs and doors of the Plataeans' buildings. And of the rest of the stuff that was in the city wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads and dedicated them to Juno, to whom also they built a stone chapel of a hundred foot over. The land they confiscated and set it to farm afterwards for ten years to the Thebans. So far were the Lacedaemonians alienated from the Plataeans, especially, or rather altogether, for the Thebans' sake, whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Plataea in the fourscore and thirteenth year after their league made with the Athenians.

69. The forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which having been sent to aid the Lesbians fled, as hath been related, through the wide sea chased by the Athenians and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed into Peloponnesus and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the haven of Cyllene with Brasidas the son of Tellis come hither to

* This is not what we would mean by hospital. It was a kind of large inn for the reception of visitors who came to worship at the temple of Hera.

be of council with Alcidas. For the Lacedaemonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined with their fleet augmented to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition (there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus), to the end they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

70. The sedition in Corcyra began upon the coming home of those captives which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus and released afterwards by the Corinthians at the ransom, as was voiced, of eighty talents for which they had given security to their hosts,* but in fact for that they had persuaded the Corinthians that they would put Corcyra into their power. These men going from man to man solicited the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyraeans upon audience of them both decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates on articles agreed on but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host † of the Athenians and that had been principal magistrate of the people. Him these men called into judgment and laid to his charge a practice to bring the city into the servitude of the Athenians. He again, being acquit, called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men saying they had cut certain stakes ‡ in the ground belonging to the temples both of Jupiter

* The Greek word is *proxenus*. See note, p. 187 above.

† See last note. Apparently in some states there were in addition to, or as a substitute for, the official consuls unofficial or voluntary consuls. It is not clear under what circumstances they were so chosen or what their privileges were.

‡ Actually, vine-poles. In all probability these men either rented from the state this land which was dedicated to Zeus, or it abutted on their property. The so-called *temenos*, or sanctuary, in Greece, when dedicated to the god, was usually not railed off in any way. Inadvertent or conscious infringement of some of the sacred rights of the *temenos* was a constant charge. It was particularly useful against public or private enemies because it was comparatively easy to find, as in this instance, that vine-poles had been cut without authorization or that some other minor infraction of the law had been committed. If proved, this could expose the persons guilty to exceed-

and of Alcinus, upon every of which there lay a penalty of a stater. And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples to the end, the sum being great, they might pay it by portions [as they should be taxed]. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the senate and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest and, armed with daggers, suddenly brake into the senate-house and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty persons; only a few of those of Peithias his faction escaped in the Athenian galley that lay yet in the harbour.

71. When they had done this and called the Corcyraeans to an assembly, they told them that what they had done was for the best and that they should not be now in bondage to the Athenians; and for the future they advised them to be in quiet and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens both to show that it was fit for them to do what they had done and also to dissuade such Corcyraeans as were fled thither of the other faction from doing anything to their prejudice for fear the matter should fall into a relapse.

72. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves as seditious persons and also all those Corcyraeans whom they had there prevailed with and sent them to custody in Aegina. In the meantime, upon the coming in of a galley of Corinth * with ambassadors from Lacedaemon, those that managed the state assailed the commons,† and over-

ingly serious penalties, since their offense was technically sacrilege. On the other hand, without some special motive for the question being raised, such practices could continue indefinitely without comment.

* Readers should notice the shift of scene here. "When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors . . ." refers to Athens, but at "in the meantime . . ." we are back again in Corcyra.

† What Hobbes here and elsewhere translates "commons" and "nobility" would more accurately be rendered "the democratic" and "the oligarchic parties." In Greek the words used are usually "the people"

came them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled into the citadel and the higher parts of the city where they rallied themselves and encamped and made themselves masters of the haven called the Hillaique haven. But the nobility seized on the market place (where also the most of them dwelt) and on the haven on the side toward the continent.

73. The next day they skirmished a little with shot, and both parts sent abroad into the villages to solicit the slaves with promise of liberty to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons, and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent.

74. The next day but one they fought again; and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of places and in number of men. And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses and enduring the tumult even beyond the condition of their sex. The few began to fly about twilight and fearing lest the people should even with their shout take the arsenal and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire on the houses in circle about the market place and upon others near it. Much goods of merchants was hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger to have been destroyed. When the people had gotten the victory, the

(*demos*) and "the few" (*oligoi*). Naturally, the division was roughly according to wealth or the want of it, and Aristotle in the Constitution of Athens refers to the factions indifferently as "the few and the many," "the best and the demos," "the rich and the poor." Plato speaks of the condition of all large Greek cities of his time as in fact each containing another within it, one city of the rich and one of the poor. In Athens, at least, the interests of the two factions crystallized around certain constitutional issues, such as the unlimited versus the limited franchise, the arming of the forces by state expense as against a system of volunteers with their own arms, the question of the public law courts, etc. Moreover, from early in this war Athenian conservatives (oligarchs or a conservative section of the democratic party) were for peace with Sparta, while the democratic party as a whole, or certainly the larger part of it, was for the prosecution of the war. In view of the political issues, long and short term, thus divided between the many and the few, I do not think it misleading to speak of two political parties with many of the present-day implications of the word. There was, of course, very little party organization comparable with that of a modern democratic state.

Corinthian galley stole away; and most of the auxiliaries got over privily into the continent.

75. The next day Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian men of arms from Naupactus; and both negotiated a reconciliation and induced them (to the end they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition (who presently fled) and to let the rest alone, with articles both between themselves and with the Athenians to esteem friends and enemies the same the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone; but the people persuaded him before he went to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyraeans and send with him. To this he agreed; and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies. But these, fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux. But Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them and spake to them to put them into courage. But when he could not prevail, the people, arming themselves on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention, took away their arms out of their houses and would also have killed some of them such as they chanced on if Nicostratus had not hindered them. Others also when they saw this took sanctuary in the temple of Juno, and they were in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation got them by persuasion to rise and, conveying them into the island that lieth over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.

76. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after the putting over of these men into the island arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage of Ionia they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty sail. Alcidas had the command of these as before, and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came on the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra.

77. The Corcyraeans, being in great tumult and fear both of the seditious within and of the invasion without, made ready

threescore galleys, and still as any of them were manned sent them out against the enemy; whereas the Athenians had advised them to give leave to them to go forth first and then the Corcyraeans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned to the enemy; and in others they that were aboard were together by the ears amongst themselves, and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys only; the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salamina and the Paralus were two.

78. The Corcyraeans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were on their part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number and doubting to be environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst but charged one end of them and drowned one of their galleys. And when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it endeavouring to put them into disorder. Which they that were fighting against the Corcyraeans perceiving and fearing such another chance as befell them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid and, uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all together. But they retiring rowed astern, intending that the Corcyraeans should take that time to escape in, they themselves in the meantime going as leisurely back as was possible and keeping the enemy still ahead. Such was this battle, and it ended about sunset.

79. The Corcyraeans, fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory should have come directly against the city or take aboard the men which they had put over into the island or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men into the temple of Juno again and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet durst not invade the city but, having taken thirteen of the Corcyraean galleys, went back into the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not unto the city no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright and though also Brasidas (as it is reported) advised Alcidas to it but had not equal authority,

but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna and wasted their territory.

80. In the meantime the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those in sanctuary and with the rest about how the city might be preserved but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition they manned thirty galleys in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered. But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting of their fields till it was about noon, went their ways again. Within night the Corcyraeans had notice by fires of three-score Athenian galleys coming toward them from Leucas, which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them under the conduct of Eurymedon the son of Thucles.

81. The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, keeping still the shore and causing their galleys to be carried over at the isthmus of Leucas that they might not come in sight as they went about. But the people of Corcyra, hearing of the Attic galleys coming in and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those Messenians which before were without and appointing the galleys which they had furnished to come about into the Hillaique haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on, and also afterwards threw overboard out of the same galleys * all those they had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence. And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary to refer themselves to a legal trial, all which they condemned to die. But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those that were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done, killed one another there right in the temple; some hanged themselves on trees; everyone as he had

* The Greek is not quite so picturesque. It says only "Taking out of the galleys the men they had persuaded to go on board them, they liquidated them." The Greek word literally means "used them up"; it is one of the unpleasantly neutral words in Thucydides for such executions and corresponds to the modern use of "liquidate" in a similar connection.

means made himself away. And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty galleys, the Corcyraeans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be their enemies, laying to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government. Amongst whom some were slain upon private hatred and some by their debtors for the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen; and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened at any time happened also then, and more. For the father slew his son; men were dragged out of the temples and then slain hard by; and some immured in the temple of Bacchus died within it. So cruel was this sedition and seemed so the more because it was of these the first.

82. For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to bring in the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace they could have had no pretence nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war and confederates to be had for either party, both to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration easily got them to come in. And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same, yet they are more calm and of different kinds according to the several conjunctures. For in peace and prosperity as well cities as private men are better minded because they be not plunged into necessity of doing anything against their will. But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master and conformeth most men's passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore being now in sedition and those that fell into it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything. A furious suddenness was reputed a

point of valour. To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty, and he that contraried such a one was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he. But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other was said to be a dissolver of society and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it was commended. To be kin to another was not to be so near as to be of his society because these were ready to undertake anything and not to dispute it. For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit but for rapine, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconciliation, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power; but upon opportunity, he that first durst thought his revenge sweeter by the trust than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course but, having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able than simple men honest, and men are ashamed of this title but take a pride in the other.

The cause of all this is desire of rule out of avarice and ambition, and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one, *the political equality of the multitude*, the other, *the moderate aristocracy*, though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention; and striving by whatsoever means to overcome both ventured on most horrible outrages and prosecuted their revenges still far-

ther without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite, and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side made account to have anything the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions, partly because they would not side with them and partly for envy that they should so escape.

83. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down; and it was far the best course to stand diffidently against each other with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all of them the more they considered the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success; for both their own defect and the subtlety of their adversaries putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in pre-insidiation, by their enemies' great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them with deeds. Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided and so the more easily slain.

84. In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first; and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed with pride rather than modesty by those on whom they take revenge were like to commit in taking it; or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty out of covetousness, chiefly to have their neighbours' goods would contrary to justice give their voices to; or which men, not for covetousness but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above

the law, showed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for the laws common to all men in such cases (which, as long as they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury), men desire not to leave them standing against the need a man in danger may have of them but by their revenges on others to be beforehand in subverting them.

85. Such were the passions of the Corcyraeans, first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city; and Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards, such of the Corcyraeans as had fled (for there escaped about five hundred of them), having seized on the forts in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the other side and from thence came over and robbed the islanders and did them much hurt; and there grew a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth concerning their reduction; and when they could get nothing done, having gotten boats and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed, awhile after, to the number of about six hundred into the island. Where, when they had set fire on their boats that they might trust to nothing but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up into the hill Istone and, having there fortified themselves with a wall, infested those within and were masters of the territory.

86. In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty galleys into Sicily under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus and Charoeadas the son of Euphiletus, for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities except the Camarinaeans, which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedaemonians but had not yet aided them in the war. The confederates of the Leontines were the Chalcidique cities together with Camarina. And in Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians as also for

that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys, for that the Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus and also to test the possibility of taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving at Rhegium in Italy joined with the confederates and began the war. And so ended this summer.

87. The next winter, the sickness fell upon the Athenians again (having indeed never totally left the city, though there was some intermission) and continued above a year after; but the former lasted two years, insomuch as nothing afflicted the Athenians or impaired their strength more than it. For the number that died of it of men of arms enrolled were no less than four thousand four hundred; and horsemen, three hundred; of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at the same time many earthquakes both in Athens and Euboea and also amongst the Boeotians, and in Boeotia chiefly at Orchomenus.

88. The Athenians and Rhegians that were now in Sicily made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Aeolus with thirty galleys. For in summer it was impossible to war upon them for the shallowness of the water. These islands are inhabited by the Liparaeans who are a colony of the Cnidians and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara; and thence they go forth and husband the rest which are Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion that in Hiera Vulcan exerciseth the craft of a smith. For it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the daytime and of smoke in the night. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi and Messanians but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields and saw they would not come in, they put off again and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter and the fifth year of this war written by Thucydides.

89. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, intending to have invaded Attica; but

by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened, they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time (Euboea being then troubled with earthquakes), the sea came in at Orobiae on the part which then was land and, being impetuous withal, overflowed most part of the city, whereof part it covered and part it washed down and made lower in the return so that it is now sea which before was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta, on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians' fort there; and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising of the water, but it brake not in; and a part of the wall, the town-house, and some few houses besides were overthrown by the earthquakes. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that the earthquake, where it was very great, did there send off the sea; and the sea returning on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me that without an earthquake such an accident could never happen.

90. The same summer divers others, as they had several occasions, made war in Sicily; so also did the Sicilians amongst themselves and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians or against the Athenians by the enemy.

Charoeades the Athenian general being slain by the Syracusians, Laches, who was now sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates made war on Mylae, a town belonging to Messana. There were in Mylae two companies of Messanians in garrison, the which also laid a certain ambush for those that came up from the fleet. But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush with the slaughter of the most of them and also, assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to render the citadel and to go along with them against Messana. After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their confederates, the Messanians compounded likewise and gave them hostages and such other security as was requisite.

91. The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alkisthenes and Proclus the son of Theodorus and sixty galleys more with two thousand men of arms, commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus, into Melos. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians were islanders and yet would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to subdue them. But when upon the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos and sailed to Oropus in the opposite continent. Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Boeotia. To which place, upon a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city of Athens came also forth with their whole forces, led by Hipponnicus the son of Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, and joined with them and, pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra and lay there the night following. The next day, they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians as came out against them and also certain succours sent them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain and erected a trophy, they returned back, the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris and wasted it, came home likewise.

92. About the same time the Peloponnesians erected the colony of Heracleia in Trachinia with this intention. The Melians in the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, Hierans, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians, being afflicted with war from the Oetaeans their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful to them, they sent to Lacedaemon, choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother nation to the Lacedaemonians, sent their ambassadors likewise with him with the same requests; for they also were infested with war from the same Oetaeans. Upon audience of these ambassadors the Lacedaemonians concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians and conceiving withal that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the Athenians, inasmuch as

they might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but short, against Euboea; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place.

First, therefore, they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi. And the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants thither, both of their own people and of the neighbours about them, and gave leave also to any that would to go thither out of the rest of Greece, save only to the Ionians, Achaeans, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Who, taking it in hand, built the city which is now called Heracleia from the very foundation, being distant from Thermopylae forty furlongs and from the sea twenty. Also they made houses for galleys to lie under, beginning close to Thermopylae against the very strait, to the end to have them the more defensible.

93. The Athenians, when this city was peopled, were at first afraid and thought it to be set up especially against Euboea; because from thence to Cenaeum, a promontory of Euboea, the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined; for they had no great harm by it, the reason whereof was this. That the Thessalians, who had the towns of those parts in their power and upon whose ground it was built, afflicted these new planters with a continual war till they had worn them out, though they were many indeed in the beginning. For being the foundation of the Lacedaemonians, everyone went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one. And chiefly the governors themselves, sent hither from Lacedaemon, undid the business and dispeopled the city by frightening most men away, for that they governed severely and sometimes also unjustly, by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus slew first certain garrison soldiers in Ellomenus, a place of Leucadia, by ambush. But afterwards with a greater fleet and with the whole power of the Acarnanians, who followed the army, all (but the Oeniades) that could bear arms, and with the Zacynthians and

Cephalonians and fifteen galleys of the Corcyraeans, made war against the city itself of Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted by them both without the isthmus and within where the city of Leucas standeth and the temple of Apollo, yet they durst not stir because the number of the enemy was so great. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expugned by a siege and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians that, seeing so great an army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Aetolians, principally as being enemies to Naupactus; and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged that though the nation of the Aetolians were great and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages un-walled and those at great distances, and were but light-armed and might, therefore, with no great difficulty be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defense. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after them the Eurytians (which are the greatest part of Aetolia, of a most strange language, and that are reported to eat raw flesh); for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow.

95. But he, induced by the Messenians whom he favoured, but especially because he thought without the forces of the people of Athens with the confederates only of the continent and with the Aetolians to invade Boeotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolae and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand till the descent thereof into the territory of the Phoceans, which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be forced; and upon the Phoceans bordereth Boeotia; putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed unto Solium by the shore. And there, having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of it because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephalonians, Zacynthians,

and three hundred Athenians, the soldiers of his own fleet (for the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away), warred on the Aetolians, having Oeneon, a city of Locris, for the seat of his war. Now these Locrians called Ozolae were confederates of the Athenians and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For being confiners on the Aetolians and using the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be a matter of great utility in the war to have them in their army for that they knew their manner of fight and were acquainted with the country.

96. Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter Nemeius (wherein the poet Hesiodus is reported by them that dwell thereabout to have died, foretold by an oracle that he should die in Nemea), in the morning betimes he dislodged and marched into Aetolia. The first day he took Potidania; the second day, Crocyleium; the third, Teichium. There he stayed and sent the booty he had gotten to Eupalium in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards (if they submitted not) in his return to Naupactus. But the Aetolians knew of this preparation when it was first resolved on. And afterwards, when the army was entered, they were united into a mighty army to make head, insomuch as that the farthest off of the Ophionians that reach out to the Melian Gulf, the Bomians and Callians, came in with their aids.

97. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that they had done before and, alleging that the conquest of the Aetolians would be but easy, willed him to march with all speed against them, village after village, and not to stay till they were all united and in order of battle against him but to attempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded by them and confident of his fortune because nothing had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that should have come in with their aids (for his greatest want was of darters light-armed), marched to Aegitium, which approaching he won by force, the men having fled secretly out and encamped themselves on the hills above it; for it stood in a mountainous place and about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Aetolians (for by this time they were come with their

forces to Aegitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates and, running down upon them, some one way and some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight for a good while was nothing but alternate chase and retreat, and the Athenians had the worst in both.

98. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows and were able to use them (for the Aetolians, by reason they were not armed, were put back still with the shot), they held out. But when upon the death of their captain the archers were dispersed and the rest were also wearied, having a long time continued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Aetolians continually afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at length to fly and, lighting into hollows without issue and into places they were not acquainted withal, were destroyed. For Chromon a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Aetolians, pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them quickly whilst they fled, being swift of foot and without armour. But the most of them missing their way and entering into a wood which had no passage through, the Aetolians set it on fire and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly and all kinds of destruction were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained with much ado got to the sea and to Oeneon, a city of Locris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men; these men of the very best died in this war. Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Aetolians under truce and were gotten again to Naupactus, they returned with the fleet to Athens. But they left Demosthenes about Naupactus and those parts because he was afraid of the Athenian people for the loss that had happened.

99. About the same time the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily sailed unto Locris and, landing, overcame such as made head and took in Peripolium, situated on the river Halex.

100. The same summer, the Aetolians, having sent their am-

bassadors, Tolophus, an Ophionian, Boryades, an Eurytanean, and Tisander, an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedaemon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus for that it harboured the Athenians against them. And the Lacedaemonians, towards the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates of which five hundred were of Heracleia, the new-built city of Trachinia. The general of the army was Eurylochus, a Spartan, with whom Macarius and Menedaeus went also along, Spartans likewise.

101. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolae both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians the Amphissians co-operated with him most, as standing most in fear for the enmity of the Phocaeans. And they first giving hostages induced others who likewise were afraid of the coming in of the army to do the like: the Myoneans first, being their neighbours, for this way is Locris of most difficult access; then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Oeantheans. All these went with them to the war. The Olpaeans gave them hostages but followed not the army. But the Hyaeans would give them no hostages till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.

102. When everything was ready and he had sent the hostages away to Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched, he took Oeoneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium because they refused to yield unto him. When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians being there already to join with them, they wasted the fields about and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycreium, a colony of the Corinthians but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes, the Athenian (for ever since the Aetolian business he abode about Naupactus), having been pre-advertised of this army and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians and with much ado, because of his departure from before Leucas, persuaded them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys a thousand men of arms. Which entering

were the preservation of the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make them good. Eurylochus and those that were with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence not into Peloponnesus but to Aeolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron and other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Aetolia. For the Ambraciotes coming to them persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania, saying withal that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the league of the Lacedaemonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assented and, dismissing the Aetolians, lay quiet in those parts with his army till such time as the Ambraciotes being come with their forces before Argos he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.

103. The Athenians that were in Sicily in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league and as many of the Siculi as having obeyed the Syracusans by force, or being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa, a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusans. And they assaulted the same; but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat, the Syracusans that were in the citadel sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians, and charging, put a part of the army to flight and killed not a few. After this, Laches and the Athenians landed some time at Locris and overcame in battle by the river Caicinus about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus, the son of Capaton, came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

104. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before; not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple. But now they hallowed it all over in this manner. They took away all sepulchres whatsoever of such as had died there before, and for the future made an edict that none should be suffered to die nor any woman to bring forth child in the is-

land; but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other] they should be carried over into Rheneia. This Rheneia is so little a way distant from Delos that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rheneia dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with a chain. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the keeping, every fifth year, of the Delian games.

There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about. For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus. There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities did severally set forth dances. Which things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:

*But thou, Apollo, takest most delight
In Delos. There assemble in thy sight
The long-coat Ions, with their children dear
And venerable bedfellows; and there
In matches set of buffets, song, and dance,
Both show thee pastime and thy name advance.*

That there were also matches of music and that men resorted thither to contend therein he again maketh manifest in these verses of the same hymn. For after he hath spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he endeth their praise with these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of himself:

*But well: let Phoebus and Diana be
Propitious; and farewell you, each one.
But yet remember me when I am gone:
And if of earthly men you chance to see
Any toil'd pilgrim, that shall ask you, Who,
O damsels, is the man that living here
Was sweet'st in song, and that most had your ear?
Then all, with a joint murmur, thereunto
Make answer thus: A man deprived of seeing;
In the isle of sandy Chios is his being.*

So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time, have continued still to send dancers along with their sacrificers; but the games and things of that kind were worn out, as is likely, by adversity till now that the Athenians restored the games and added the horse race, which was not before.

105. The same winter the Ambraciotes, according to their promise made to Eurylochus when they retained his army, made war upon Argos in Amphilochia with three thousand men of arms, and invading Argeia, they took Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea-side, which the Acarnanians had fortified and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of justice, and is distant from the city of Argos, which stands also on the sea-side, about twenty-five furlongs. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos; and with the rest they encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is called Crenae to watch the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus that they might not pass through to the Ambraciotes without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Aetolians, to come to them and be their general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus under the conduct of Aristoteles, the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, the son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciotes that were at Olpae sent a messenger to the city of Ambracia, willing them to come to their aid with their whole power, as fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to fight alone or else have an unsafe retreat.

106. But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon as they understood that the Ambraciotes were come to Olpae, dislodging from Proschion went with all speed to assist them; and passing over the river Achelōus, marched through Acarnania, which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now disfurnished. On their right hand they had the city of Stratus and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through

Phytia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon; then through Limnaea; then they went into the territory of the Agraeans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends: and getting to the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it and came down into Argeia when it was now night; and passing between the city of the Argives and the Arcarnanians that kept watch at [the] Wells, came unseen and joined with the Ambraciotes at Olpae.

107. When they were all together, they sat down about break of day at a place called Metropolis and there encamped. And the Athenians not long after with their twenty galleys arrived in the Ambracian gulf to the aid of the Argives, to whom also came Demosthenes with two hundred Messenian men of arms and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea before the hill upon which the fort of Olpae standeth. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilochians (for the greatest part of them the Ambraciotes kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle, and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for general of the whole league. He, when he had brought them up near unto Olpae, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow. And for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for the battle. The army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater; but Demosthenes, fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow way and fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred; which, in that part where the number of the enemies overreached, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush and charge them on their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes, with the Messenians and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians (as they could one after another be put in order) and those Amphilochian darters which were present, made up the other. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes were ranged promiscuously, except only the Mantineans, who stood together most of them in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it; for Eurylochus and those that

were with him made the extremity of the left wing, against Demosthenes and the Messenians.

108. When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with that wing overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush, coming in at their backs, charged them and put them to flight in such sort as they endured not the first brunt, and besides, caused the greatest part of the army through affright to run away. For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus, which was the best of their army, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes, pursuing them, dispatched the greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciotes that were in the right wing, on that part had the victory, and chased the enemy unto the city of Argos. But in their retreat, when they saw that the greatest part of the army was vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpae in safety. And many of them were slain, whilst they ran into it out of array and in disorder, save only the Mantineans, for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

109. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain), taking the command upon him and not finding how, if he stayed, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land and also with those Attic galleys by sea, or if he should depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure and for the receiving of the bodies of the slain. And they delivered unto them their dead, and having erected a trophy took up their own dead, which were about three hundred. But for their departure they would make no truce openly [nor] to all; but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow-commanders made a truce with the Mantineans, and with Menedaius and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they could, with purpose to disguard the Ambraciotes and multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred

with the Grecians of those parts as men that had treacherously advanced their particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as they could; and such as had leave consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

110. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciotes from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent to them before from Olpae [which was that they should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their aid], were already on their march (ignorant of what had passed here) to join with those at Olpae. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth to beset the ways with ambushment and to pre-occupy all places of strength, and prepared withal to encounter with the rest of his army.

111. In the meantime, the Mantineans and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather potherbs and firewood, stole away by small numbers, and as they went, did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were gotten far from Olpae, they went faster away. But the Ambraciotes and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops, seeing the others go quite away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran outright, as desiring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without a truce alike and pursued the Peloponnesians and threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them and for saying that they went away under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciotes only. And there was much contention and ignorance of which was an Ambraciote and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them, and the rest escaped into Agrais, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agraeans and their friend, received them.

112. The Ambraciotes out of the city of Ambracia were come as far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills, to the greater whereof came first undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent afore from the camp and seized it; but the Ambraciotes got first to the lesser and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes, after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof

himself took with him for the assault of the camp, and the other half he sent about through the mountains of Amphilochia. And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciotes whilst they were yet in their lodgings and knew not what was the matter, but thought rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them to speak unto them as they went in the Doric dialect and to make the sentinels secure, especially seeing their faces could not be discerned, for it was yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciotes to flight at the first onset and slew many upon the place; the rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset and the Amphilochians being well acquainted with their own territory and armed but lightly against men in armour unacquainted and utterly ignorant which way to take, they lit into hollow ways and to the places forelaid with ambushes and perished. And having been put to all manner of shifts for their lives, some fled towards the sea; and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore (this accident concurring with their defeat), swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear to be killed of those in the galleys than by the barbarians and their most mortal enemies the Amphilochians. The Ambraciotes with this loss came home, a few of many, in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians, having taken the spoil of the dead and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.

113. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciotes which fled from Olpae into Agrais to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead which were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciotes that came from the city, he wondered at the number, for he knew nothing of this last blow but thought they had been armours of those with them. Then one asked him what he wondered at and how many he thought were slain; for he that asked him the question thought, on the other side; that he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene. And he answered, about two hundred.

Then he that asked replied and said: "Then these are not the armours of them, but of above a thousand."

"Then," said he again, "they belong not to them that were in battle with us." The other answered: "Yes, if you fought yesterday in Idomene."

"But we fought not yesterday at all, but the other day in our retreat."

"But we yet fought yesterday with those Ambraciotes that came from the city to aid the rest."

When the herald heard that and knew that the aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into Aimees, and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his errand and required the dead bodies no farther. For this loss was greater than, in the like number of days, happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written the number of the slain because it was said to be such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know: that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of their voices. But they feared now that if the Athenians possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours unto them than the other.

114. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians' part was lost by sea. For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes [himself], and he brought them away with him. His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in Aetolia. And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to Naupactus.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the Oeniades to those Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthus and the Agraeans to retire, the Oeniades being gone over to Salynthus and the Agraeans likewise. And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a

league with the Ambraciotes for a hundred years, upon these conditions: "That neither the Ambraciotes with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciotes against the Athenians; that they should give mutual aid to one another's country; that the Ambraciotes should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields they held of the Amphilochians; and that they should at no time aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with the Acarnanians." And upon this composition the war ended. After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia under the conduct of Xenocleides, the son of Euthycles, who, with much difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the business in Ambracia.

115. The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily invaded Himeræa by sea, aided by the Sicilians that invaded the skirts of the same by land. They sailed also to the islands of Aeolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, [with certain galleys], come to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusans were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send into Sicily, conceiving that the war there would the sooner be at an end and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles, the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles, with the greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus, having now the command of Laches' fleet, sailed in the end of winter unto a certain garrison of the Locrians which Laches had formerly taken, and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.

116. The same spring, there issued a great stream of fire out of the mountain Aetna, as it had also done in former times, and burned part of the territory of the Catanæans, that dwell

at the foot of Aetna, which is the highest mountain of all Sicily. From the last time that the fire brake out before to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And it hath now broken out thrice in all since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war written by Thucydides.



THE FOURTH BOOK

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The Athenians take and fortify Pylus in Messenia.—The Lacedaemonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria, whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedaemonian fleet, do there besiege.—The Athenians and Syracusans fight in the Strait of Messana.—Cleon engageth himself rashly to take or kill the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria within twenty days and by good fortune performeth it.—The sedition ceaseth in Corcyra.—Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus.—The Sicilians, agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing upon that coast with their fleet.—The Athenians take Nisaea, but fail of Megara.—The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium.—The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedaemonians.—Truce for a year.—And this in three years more of the same war.

1. The ~~spring~~ following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the place to be commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of their war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from thence; but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians and desirous to make war upon them on both sides. The Locrians had now also entered the

lands of the Rhegians with their whole power, both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messanians and because they were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition and were unable for the present to give them battle, for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their land-forces; but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.

2. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyraeans that were in the city and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain, who, because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state. To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

3. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hastened to * Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance. And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great

* The Greek means "were for hastening on to Corcyra."

store of timber and stone and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasion. But they answered him that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places, because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedaemonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence and be also faithful guardians of the place.

4. When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies, he gave it over, till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it was needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling, making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedaemonians and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature and needed no fortifying at all.

5. The Lacedaemonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news did set lightly by it, conceiving that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone or easily take the place by force. Somewhat also they were retarded by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians, having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily.

6. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were

advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home; for the Lacedaemonians and Agis, their king, took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season. So as for many reasons it fell out that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

7. About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaean, that was their enemy, by treason, but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiaean that came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.

8. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta and of other the neighbouring towns went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedaemonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus, and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra, which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him for as much as the place was in danger to be lost. And according as Demosthenes' message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedaemonians in the meantime prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land, hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour. For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe and the entries straight, one of them,

nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden, in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows; and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns; but they which went over now last and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Eпитadas, the son of Molobrus.

9. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedaemonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the land, he placed them athwart the fort and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light-horseman* of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the

* Not, of course, literally a light-horseman. This was the name of a special kind of light boat.

land which were of most strength and commanded them to make good the place against the land-forces if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number and a few archers, came forth from the fort to the sea-side in that part where he most expected their landing, which part was of troublesome access and stony and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong; and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms and encouraged them with words to this effect:

10. "You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise and reckon every peril that now besetteth us, but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope and look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For I make account, the difficulty of their landing makes for us, which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough. For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disembarking, being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number. And for you, that be Athenians and by experience of disembarking against others know that if a man stand it out and do not fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of

himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort."

11. Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedaemonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land and with their fleet, consisting of three-and-forty galleys, in which was admiral Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected him. So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians, dividing their galleys into small numbers because they could not come near with many at once and resting between, assailed them by turns, using all possible valour and mutual encouragement to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas. For having the command of a galley and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen (the place being hard of access), when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and tender of breaking their galleys, he would cry out unto them, saying, "They did not well for sparing of wood to let the enemy fortify in their country." And [to the Lacedaemonians] he gave advice to force landing with the breaking of their galleys and prayed the confederates that in requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedaemonians and, running them ashore, to use any means whatsoever to land and to get into their hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort.

12. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by the Athenians put back, and after he had received many wounds, swooned; and falling upon the ledges of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea. Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconique

land, against the Lacedaemonians in galleys; and the Lacedaemonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot, and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled.

13. This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine for timber wherewith to make engines, hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looketh into the haven, which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the meantime arrive the forty Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus and four of Chios. And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth, not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present to the isle Prote, being near and desert, and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again with purpose to offer them battle if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined, but lying still on the shore manned out their galleys and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one.

14. The Athenians, understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedaemonian galleys, which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to flight; and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them and took five, whereof one with all her men in her; and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore. And the galleys which were but in manning out were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys and towed them away empty. Which the Lacedaemonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with

their aid [from the land], and entering armed into the sea took hold of the galleys with their hands to have pulled them back again, every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse wherein himself was not present. So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedaemonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from their galleys. But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedaemonians recovered all their galleys,* save only those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck, and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians, in the meantime, that were in the continent and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.

15. As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp to determine, upon view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done. These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content, and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could.

16. The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made in this manner:

That the Lacedaemonians should deliver up not only those galleys wherein they fought but also bring to Pylus and put into the Athenians' hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building were anywhere else in Laconia; that they should

* The Greek says "their *empty* galleys."

not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land.—That the Athenians should permit the Lacedaemonians that were in the continent to send over to those in the island a portion of ground corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic choenickes of meal and two cotyles of wine and a piece of flesh, and to every of their servants half that quantity; that they should send this the Athenians looking on, and not send over any vessel by stealth.—That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding of the island, provided that they landed not in it, and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.—That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce was then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors from Athens.—That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back.—That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received them.

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about three score; and the ambassadors were sent away, who, arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

17. "Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance. But the words we shall use we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant, but for a remembrance to you of what you know that you may deliberate wisely therein. It is now in your power to assure your present good fortune with reputation, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides, and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success, who through hope aspire to greater fortune because the fortune they have already came unhoped for. Whereas

they that have felt many changes of both fortunes ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all reason to be.

18. "Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who, being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give. And yet we are not brought to this through weakness nor through insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should, which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive that for your power and purchases fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity and not think that war will so far follow and no further as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also, seldom miscarrying because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us, and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune; whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

19. "The Lacedaemonians call you to a peace and end of the war, giving you peacem and alliance and much other friendship and mutual familiarity, requiring for the same [only] those their men that are in the island, though also we think it better for both sides not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege should be more in your power than they be. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better in the war brings him through necessity to take an oath and to make peace on unequal terms, but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions. For in this

case, his enemy being obliged not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And, naturally, to those that relent of their own accord men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak.

20. "But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. For they make war not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedaemonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it and are therein not forced but gratified. Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree."

21. Thus spake the Lacedaemonians, thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace and been hindered of it by them, and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, a popular man at that time and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: "That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedaemonians would make restitution of Nisaea and Pegae and Troezen and Achaia"—the which they had not won in war but had received by former treaty when the Athenians, being in distress and at that time in more need

of peace than now, [yielded them up into their hands]—"then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good."

22. To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who, by alternate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon came mightily upon them saying he knew before that they had no honest purpose and that the same was now manifest in that they refused to speak before the people but sought to sit in consultation only with a few, and willed them, if they had aught to say that was real, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedaemonians finding that, although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

23. Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; and the Lacedaemonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them, standing upon this, that it was said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedaemonians, denying it and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their power; the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the open sea; and that only when it was windy. (From Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to guard the island, so that they were in the whole threescore and ten.) And the Lacedaemonians made assaults upon the fort,*

* The Greek adds "The Lacedaemonians, *being encamped upon the mainland*, made assault."

and watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their men in the island.

24. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messana, instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land; and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by sea. For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium, both with their land-forces on the field side and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium, a promontory of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor there against them and make themselves masters of the strait. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana where Sicily is nearest to the continent, and is that which is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have passed through. Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.

25. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea-fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium, and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley and went speedily each [side] to their own camp at Messana and Rhegium; and the night overtook them in the action. After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians, and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to an anchor at Peloris and had their land-forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them and, finding their galleys empty of men, fell in amongst them; and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they lost that galley, but the men swam out. Upon this the Syracusians

went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messana the Athenians came up to them again; and the Syracusians, opening themselves, charged first and sunk another of their galleys. So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore and in the sea-fight, which were both together in such manner as is declared.

The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their borderer. The first day, having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine, which spoiled the country [as it went up the river], and with their land-forces assaulted the city. In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their assistance against the Messanians, which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart and, encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city and charged upon the Messanians and put them to flight with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, and the rest hardly escaping home. For the barbarians fell upon them and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at Messana not long after divided themselves and went to their several homes. Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened, and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven and the land-forces at the wall to the field. But the Messanians and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight and slew many. But the Athenians, seeing that, disbarked and relieved them and, coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the city. Then they erected a trophy and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.

26. All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedaemonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch was exceedingly painful to the Athenians in respect of the want they had both of corn and water, for there was no well but one and that was in the fort itself of Pylus and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel and drank such water as they were like to find there. They were also scanted of room for their camp, and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns some to stay ashore and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done, for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and having nothing to drink but salt water. The cause hereof were the Lacedaemonians, who had proclaimed that any man that would should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver; and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual, but especially the Helotes, who, putting off from all parts of Peloponnesus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily; for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore, for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money; and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm were intercepted. There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed; whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

27. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of

their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege, fearing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie anchor in against them, but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat. But that which they feared most was that the Lacedaemonians seemed to have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon, knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated or, saying the contrary, be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men; and glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach, saying it was easy, if the leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it.

28. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not presently put it in practice, and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would that they could give him and undertake it. Cleon, supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the

authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back and said that not he but Nicias was general, being now indeed afraid and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it and gave over his command [to him] for so much as concerned Pylus and called the Athenians to witness it. They (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to him and cried out upon Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage, and stood forth saying that he feared not the Lacedaemonians and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present and those targettiers that were come to them from Aenus and four hundred archers out of other places; and with these, he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out: either to be rid of Cleon (which was their greatest hope) or, if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedaemonians into their hands.

29. Now when he had dispatched with the assembly and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea. He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion because he heard that he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army, having suffered much by the straitness of the place and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle; confirmed therein the more for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they were before [the more] afraid and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood and their preparation could not so well have been discerned, whereas all the faults

of their own army should have been in sight, so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly in what part soever they had pleased, because the onset had been in their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedaemonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another.

30. These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Aetolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident, Demosthenes, the better discerning that the Lacedaemonians were more than he had imagined, having before, by victual sent unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had, and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also, with those forces which he had required, unto Pylus.

When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war.

31. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms, and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedaemonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch were about thirty men

of arms; the middest and evenest part of the island and about the water was kept by Epitadas, their captain, with the greatest part of the whole number; and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff and least assailable by land. For there was also a certain fort which was old and made of chosen [not of hewn] stones, which they thought would stand them in stead in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.

32. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins and as they were taking arms. For they knew not of their landing but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii: eight hundred archers, targetiers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid them, and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then, disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do or against what part to set themselves in battle and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light-armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

33. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array and went towards the men of arms of the

Athenians with intent to charge them; for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join with them nor any way make use of their skill. For both the light-armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not. Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back; but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert, so that the Lacedaemonians in their armour could not follow them.

34. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light-armed soldiers, seeing them less earnest in chasing them and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedaemonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them; and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air, so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedaemonians' side, for their jacks now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown stuck broken in them, so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for the greater noise of the enemy, but danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting.

35. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the last guard of the island and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground, then were the light-

armed soldiers much more confident than before and pressed upon them with a mighty noise; and as many of the Lacedaemonians as they could intercept in their retreat they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort and together with the watch of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place, but, assaulting them in the face, sought only how to put them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight and with thirst and with the sun, one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedaemonians defended themselves easilier now than before because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks.

36. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes that they spent their labour there in vain and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers to get up by such a way as he himself should find out and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedaemonians that he might not be discovered making his approach under the cliffs of the island where they were continual in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch, and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them, and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. And the Lacedaemonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylae. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path; and these now, being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer, but fighting few against many and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground; and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

37. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back the faster they would be killed by their army, stayed the fight and held in the soldiers, with desire to carry them alive to Athens in case their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this misery as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed that they should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians to be disposed of as to them should seem good.

38. Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers and shook their hands above their heads, signifying their acceptance of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the other side. For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law in case the others should miscarry. Styphon and those that were with him said they would send over to the Lacedaemonians in the continent to know what they there would advise them to. But the Athenians, letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent; and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedaemonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: "The Lacedaemonians bid you take advice touching yourselves such as you shall think good, provided you do nothing dishonourably." Whereupon, having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms. And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch; but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedaemonians sent over a herald and took up the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island was thus: There went over into the island in all four hundred and twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive three hundred wanting eight; and the rest slain. Of those that lived, there were of the city itself of Sparta one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was no standing fight.

39. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two days, of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth; and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he needed to have done. So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as it was, took effect; for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.

40. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedaemonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able, and would not believe that those that yielded were like to those that were slain. And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were valiant men, he answered that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate if it could know what was a good man, signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

41. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians), infested Laconia with robberies and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedaemonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some

greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.

42. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians, with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of their confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him. Betimes in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus on that shore above which standeth the hill Solygeius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Aeolians, and upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia and Leucadia; all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen and that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made haste to meet them.

43. Battus, one of their commanders (for there were two of them present at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophon with the rest charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly landed before Chersonesus; and afterwards they

charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot and at hand-strokes. And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians; and with much ado drave them back. But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Paean, came again close to them, whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at hand-strokes. But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing put the right wing of the Athenians to flight and chased them to the sea-side; but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophon fought against the left wing of the Athenians; for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia.

44. So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put to flight and retired to the hill, where they laid down their arms and descended no more, but there rested. In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain, and amongst others Lycophon, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill and there sat down. The Athenians, seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy and took up their own and presently erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia to watch the Athenians, that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid. So did also the old men of Corinth from the city when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys, carrying with them the booty and

the bodies of their dead, all save two, which, not finding, they left. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side, and from thence sent a herald and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind. There were slain in this battle Corinthians, two hundred and twelve, and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.

45. The Athenians, putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs; where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys, and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Troezen, and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Troezen, Halias, and Epidaurus. And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

46. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyraeans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city, and having assaulted their fortification, took it. But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground and thence made their composition, which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce and transported them to the island of Ptychia to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this plot. To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends and instruct them to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away;

and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyraean people.

47. When they were persuaded to do so and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of the Corcyraeans. It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out that they were nothing pleased that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Corcyraeans, having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice, from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips.

48. They had taken out of the room in this manner and slain to the number of threescore before they that remained knew it, who thought they were but removed and carried to some other place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians and said that if they would themselves kill them they should do it, and refused any more to go out of the room; nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyraeans any purpose to force entrance by the door; but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered the roof and threw tiles and shot arrows at them. They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but many also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room and with ropes made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having continued most part of the night (for night overtook them in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they [all] perished. When day came, the Corcyraeans laid them one

across another in carts and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they made bondwomen. In this manner were the Corcyraeans that kept the hill brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this far-spread sedition for so much as concerned this present war; for of other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation. And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

49. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus went forth with an army and took the city of Anactorium, belonging to the Corinthians and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this summer ended.

50. The next winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedaemon. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language * into Greek and read them; wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedaemonians, the principal was this: that he knew not what they meant, for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same thing; if therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian. But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. And there encountering the news that king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead (for about that time he died), they returned home.

51. The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new

* What the Greek says is "*Assyrian letters*," and this would seem to be right. Apparently the Persians used Assyrian characters for their language. Herodotus (iv.87) records that Darius erected two pillars on the Bosphorus and wrote on them, one in Greek and the other in Assyrian characters, the names of the tribes that had accompanied him to Scythia.

wall by command of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they intended some innovation, notwithstanding they had given the Athenians their faith and the best security they could to the intent they should let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter, and the seventh year of this war written by Thucydides.

52. The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change in the moon the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month happened an earthquake.

At this time the Mytilenaeon and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them residing in the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhoeteium, and for two thousand Phocaeon staters render it again without doing them other harm. After this they came with their forces to Antander and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actaeae, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenaeans, but subject to the Athenians; but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber, and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Aeolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.

53. The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, the son of Tolmaeus. This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedaemonians, of the same that dwell about them. And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate called *Cytherodikes*. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time to lie in the garrison there, and took much care of the place. For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mis-

chief. For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas.

54. The Athenians, arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to the sea, called Scandeia; and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea. The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resistance, but soon after turned their backs and fled into the higher part of the city, and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow-commanders that the Athenians should determine of them whatsoever they thought good but death. Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before, which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards were both the sooner and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did but remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were Lacedaemonians, and because the island lay in that manner upon the coast of Laconia. After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea-side. And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together.

55. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wheresoever there was need; and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state, as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war. In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And

if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted. Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them. And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle, and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.

56. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and as being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia and fringed in the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whom they also rifled of their arms; and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera. From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera, and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argeia and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the Aeginetae, after they were driven out of Aegina, both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedaemonians.

57. When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Aeginetae left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with them one of those garrisons which the Lacedaemonians had distributed into the several parts of the country; and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter with them into the town, though the Aeginetae entreated them, apprehending danger in

being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as finding themselves too weak to give them battle. In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Aeginetae, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens, amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patroclus, captain of such Lacedaemonians as were amongst them, was wounded and taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the islands; and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents should inhabit their own territory; that the Aeginetae, as many as they had taken (out of former inveterate hatred), should be put to death; and that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst those Lacedaemonians that were taken in the island.

58. In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans; but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves for making of a peace. Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who also prevailed with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:

59. "Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss. But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much worth to us

if we will follow them at this present. For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again.

60. "Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace than any words of mine; who, having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage. For if we enter into a war and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges and withal cut out for them the dominion here, it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection.

61. "Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours than for the impairing of what we already have; and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself. In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans. For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound

unto. Indeed, the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject; for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way and to be shy of such as assail. We are to blame that know this and do not provide accordingly and make it our first care of all to take good order against the common fear. Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble; and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

62. "And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both; or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope, knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable.

For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence.

63. "Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us and make an eternal peace amongst ourselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this: that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm; whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies and enemies to such as we ought not.

64. "For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite will I look to be followed as absolute in my will and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but I will also give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome by kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcidean of another of his own race, or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace by our own selves. But when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us to encounter them, inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians and of domestic war for the present, and to be inhabited by our-

selves with liberty and less insidiated by others for the time to come."

65. Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice and agreed amongst themselves that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinaeans should have Morgantina, paying for the same unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound and be comprehended in the same peace. And the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles, and laid a fine upon the third, which was Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was their fortune at that time that they thought nothing could cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprises with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength unto their hope.

66. The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara, pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegae, who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies, began to talk one to another how it was fit to call them home again and not to let their city by both these means to be ruined. The friends of those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly now than before, required to have it brought to council. But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry it against the other side, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Aripnon, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenian army, to deliver them the city, as esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed that first the Athenians should possess

themselves of the long-walls (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisaea their haven), thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, in which (the better to assure Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but they; and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above, which would the more easily succeed if that were effected first.

67. The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides and everything ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates, and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander, Demosthenes, light-armed Plataeans and others called peripoli, lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night. When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus: They had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand, and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea-side in a cart, and in a cart to bring it back again and set it within the gates, to the end that the Athenians which lay in Minoa might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according to custom as for the boat. And the Athenians seeing it (for so it was agreed on), arose from their ambush and ran with all speed to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open. And first those Plataeans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant, and fighting presently within the gates (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir), the Plataeans overcame those that resisted and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after.

68. After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one to the wall. And a few of the Peloponnesians

that were of the garrison, made head at first and fought and were some of them slain; but the most of them took their heels, fearing in the night both the enemy that charged them and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them. It chanced also that the Athenian herald of his own discretion made proclamation that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer, but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into Nisaea. As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened and to go out and give the enemy battle. Now it was agreed on between them that when the gates were open, the Athenians should rush in, and that themselves would be easily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them, for that they would besmear themselves with some ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety, for the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appointment were to come to them, having marched all night, were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight, for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so, or to put the city into so manifest danger, and said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be thereright. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they stayed at the gates, insomuch as the traitors could not perform what they intended.

69. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of Nisaea with a wall, which if they could take before aid came, they thought Megara would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons,

and whatsoever else was necessary. And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side Nisaea; and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was defective with a strong palisade. The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought; the next day about evening they had within very little finished. But then they that were in Nisaea, seeing themselves to want victual (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above), and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies, compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedaemonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the city of Megara and taken in Nisaea, prepared for what was further to be done.

70. Brasidas, the son of Tellus, a Lacedaemonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing of an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and lest Megara should be won, sent unto the Boeotians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris so called at the foot of the hill Geraneia; and he marched presently himself with two thousand seven hundred men of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius, six hundred of Sicyon, and those of his own all that he had yet levied, thinking to have found Nisaea yet untaken. When he heard the contrary (for he set forth towards Tripodiscus in the night), with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the Athenians that lay by the sea-side to the city of Megara, pretending in word, and intending also in good earnest if he could have done it, to attempt upon Nisaea,

but desiring to get into Megara to confirm it; and required to be let in, for that he was, he said, in hope to recover Nisaea.

71. But the Megarean factions, being afraid, one, lest he should bring in the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons out of this very fear should assault them, whereby the city, being at battle within itself and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still and attend the success. For both the one faction and the other expected that the Athenians and these that came to succour the city would join battle; and then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side, turn unto them that had the victory. And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army.

72. Betimes in the morning arrived the Boeotians, having also intended to come to the aid of Megara before Brasidas sent, as esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and were then with their whole forces come forward as far as Plataea. But when they had received also this message, they were a great deal the more encouraged and sent two thousand two hundred men of arms and two hundred horse to Brasidas, but went back with the greater part of their army. The whole army being now together of no less than six thousand men of arms, and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order about Nisaea and the sea-side, but the light-armed straggling in the plains, the Boeotian horsemen came unexpectedly upon the light-armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea; for in all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the Megareans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side that held long, wherein both sides claimed the victory. For the Athenians slew the general of the Boeotian horse and some few others and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to Nisaea; and having these dead bodies in their power they restored them upon truce and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assurance; but parting asunder, the Boeotians went to the army, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

73. After this, Brasidas with his army came down nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara, and having seized on a place

of advantage, set his army in battle array and stood still. For they thought the Athenians would be assailants, and knew the Megareans stood observing whether side should have the victory, and that it must needs fall out well for them both ways; first, because they should not be the assailant and voluntarily begin the battle and danger, since having showed themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour; and next, it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans, for if they should not have come in sight, the matter had not been any longer in the power of fortune, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived of the city as men conquered; whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without stroke stricken; which also indeed came to pass. For the Megareans—when the Athenians went out and ordered their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still, their commanders likewise considering, that if they should begin the battle against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprise was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard; and so for a while affronted each other, and, neither doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisaea, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set forth—then, I say, the Megareans, such as were the friends of the outlaws, taking heart because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities; and when they were in (those that had practised with the Athenians being all the while in a great fear), they went to council.

74. Afterwards Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former purpose to levy an army for Thrace. Now the Megareans that were in the city (when the Athenians also were gone home), all that had chief hand in the practice with

the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slept away; but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recalled them from Pegae, upon great oaths administered unto them no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city their best advice. These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms, and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city, picked out of their enemies and of those that seemed most to have co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons; and having constrained the people to give their sentence upon them openly, when they were condemned slew them, and established in the city the estate almost of an oligarchy. And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

75. The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the Mytilenaeans as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont (for Lamachus that was the third in that commission, was gone with ten galleys into Pontus), having notice of the preparation made in that place, and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there as it had done in Anaea over against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea by sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city and entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched to it; and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recovered the place again. And not long after, Lamachus that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calix in the territory of Heracleia, much rain having fallen above in the country and the stream of a land flood coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys and came himself and his army through the territory of the Bithynians (who are Thracians dwelling in Asia on the other side) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus, by land.

76. The same summer likewise Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys, presently after his departure out of Megaris, sailed to Naupactus. For certain men in the cities

thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Boeotian government and to turn it into a democracy according to the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates to betray unto him the estates of Boeotia, induced thereunto principally by Ptoeodorus, a Theban outlaw; and they ordered the design thus: Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphæ (Siphæ is a city of the territory of Thespiæ, standing upon the seaside in the Crissæan gulf); and Chaeroneia, which was a town that paid duties to Orchomenus (called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Boeotia), some others of Orchomenus were to surrender into their hands. And the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this and were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This Chaeroneia is the utmost town of Boeotia towards Phanotis in the country of Phocis; and some Phoceans also dwelt in it. [On the other side], the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place consecrated to Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, on the part toward Eubœa. All this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, to the end that the Boeotians might not oppose them with their forces united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own. And if the attempt succeeded, and that they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Boeotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that it could not stand long at a stay; but that the Athenians joining with such of them as rebelled, and the Boeotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid.

77. And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphæ to receive it by treason. And a day was set down betwixt them on which these things should have been done together. Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Oeniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation and had

himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first upon Salynthius and the Agraeans, and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to Siphæ.

78. About the same time of this summer, Brasidas, marching towards the cities upon Thrace with seventeen hundred men of arms, when he came to Heracleia in Trachinia, sent a messenger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to be guides unto him and to his army. And when there were come unto him Panaerus and Dorus and Hippolochidas and Torylaus and Strophacus, who was the public host of the Chalcideans, all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia, he marched on. There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly without a guide howsoever, but especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave is a thing that all Grecians alike are jealous of. Besides, that the people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. Insomuch, as if by custom the government of that country had not been lordly rather than a commonwealth, he could never have gone on. For also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others, of a contrary mind to the former, that forbade him and told him that he did unjustly to go on without the common consent of all. But those that convoyed him answered that they would not bring him through against their wills, but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas himself said he came thither a friend both to the country and to them; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians their enemies; and that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians whereby they might not use one another's ground; and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he, but [only] entreated them not to stop him. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying nowhere by the way. And the same day he set forth from Melitia he reached Pharsalus and en-

camped by the river Apidanus; from thence he went to Phacium; from thence into Peraebia.* The Peraebians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians situate at the foot of Olympos on the side towards Thessaly.

79. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him and came into the territory of the Chalcideans † and to Perdiccas. For Perdiccas and the Chalcideans, all that had revolted from the Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear; the Chalcideans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on them first, as having been also incited thereto by those cities amongst them that had not revolted; and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels, but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncesteans. And the ill success which the Lacedaemonians in these times had was a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily.

80. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular territory Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to maintain the army, having called it thither to help the Chalcideans in their revolt. And because also they desired a pretence to send away part of their Helotes, ‡ for fear they should take the oppor-

* Hobbes for some reason omits the following sentence: "And there his Thessalian guides left him."

† This is what the Greeks called Chalcidice. It denotes the peninsula in the Aegean which had been originally colonized from Chalcis in Euboea. It is sometimes also called in Thucydides "the parts Thracwards," and Hobbes sometimes renders it "Thrace" though in fact the territory is not Thrace at all.

‡ *Helot* is the general name applied to the people who cultivated the ground for the Spartans. As the latter lived entirely in barracks till the age of thirty and even after that were closely attached to the army, the farming of their estates had to be done by others. These farm workers were serfs, but not slaves. They were bound to the land but could not be sold, and they were paid a proportion of produce from the land they worked. They were of various races, being

tunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylus, to innovate. For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes, for the Lacedaemonians had ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedaemonians best service in their wars should be made free; * feeling them in this manner and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away; and no man knew how they perished. And now at this time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men along with Brasidas. The rest of the army were mercenaries, hired by Brasidas out of Peloponnesus. [But] Brasidas himself the Lacedaemonians sent out, chiefly because it was his own desire;

81. notwithstanding the Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in Sparta every way an active man. And when he was out, he did the Lacedaemonians very great service. For by showing himself at that present just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt; and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass that if the Lacedaemonians pleased to come to composition (as also they did), they might have towns to render and receive reciprocally.† And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas showed now, to some known by experience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedaemonians. For being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points for a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

82. Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice

composed of the people who had owned the land when the Spartans conquered it.

* The Greek adds "should *separate themselves out* to be made free."

† The Greek adds "and also a relief for the Peloponnesians from war."

thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this expedition, and reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts.

83. Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, marched presently against Arrhibaeus, the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a people of Macedonia, confining on Perdiccas his dominion, both for a quarrel they had against him and also as desiring to subdue him. When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to the place where they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibaeus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedaemonians. For Arrhibaeus had also made some proffer by a herald to commit the matter to Brasidas' arbitrement. And the Chalcidean ambassadors, being present, gave him likewise advice not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas,* to the end they might have him more prompt in their own affairs. Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedaemon, had spoken there as if they had meant to bring [as] many of the places about him [as they could] into the Lacedaemonian league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibaeus for the public good of their own state. But Perdiccas said that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should show him; and that it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army, for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibaeus, by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army. But from that time forward Perdiccas, instead of half, paid but a third part of his army, as conceiving himself to have been injured.

84. The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas, having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcideans, marched to Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. And there arose sedition about receiving him between such as had joined with the Chalcideans in calling him thither and the common people. Nevertheless, for fear of their fruits, which were not yet gotten

* More literally the Greek is "not to remove all danger for Perdiccas."

in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then, after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the multitude (for he was not uneloquent, though a Lacedaemonian), he spake to this effect:

85. "Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army abroad is to make good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians, which was that we meant to make a war for the liberties of Greece. But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there in the opinion we had that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not welcome. For we Lacedaemonians have undergone this great danger of passing many days' journey through the territory of strangers, and showed all possible zeal, because we imagined that we went to such confederates as before we came had us present in their hearts and were desirous of our coming. And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians' liberty, not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom I go to will be the less willing to come in, making difficulty because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city and being esteemed wise, have refused us. For which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to come weak and without power to maintain you against the Athenians. And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisaea, though more in number they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number against you as they had in their fleet there at Nisaea.

86. "I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians; and I have the Lacedaemonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws; and that we shall not hold you as confederates to us brought in either by

force or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to you that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me (especially having given you so good assurance), or think me unable to defend you, but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me. And if any man be unwilling so to do through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him cast away that fear; for I came not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here I should enthral either the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude. For to be governed so were worse than the domination of a foreigner; and there would result from it to us Lacedaemonians not thanks for our labours, but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those crimes for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in us than in them that never pretended the virtue. For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud than by open violence. For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by fortune, but the other with the treachery of a wicked conscience.

87. "But besides the oath which they have sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have is this: that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe that it is to our profit to do as I have told you. But if after these promises of mine you shall say you cannot, and yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us, or shall say that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any, then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this place that my counsel which you refuse was for your good, and will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to it. Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong, but have reason for it for two necessities: one, of the Lacedaemonians, lest whilst they have your affections and not your society, they should receive hurt from your contributions of money to the Athenians; another, of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their liberty by your example. For otherwise indeed we could not

justly do it; nor ought we Lacedaemonians to set any at liberty against their wills if it were not for some common good. We covet not dominion [over you]; but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other states in general we should tolerate you to cross us. Deliberate well of these things; strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece, to get yourselves eternal glory, to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most honourable title."

88. Thus spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had effectually spoken and partly for fear of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians, having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedaemonian magistrates took when they sent him out, namely, that what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedaemonians should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. And not long after revolted Stageirus, another colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

89. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Boeotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians, and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to Delium; having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward, Demosthenes went to Siphæ first, and having with him the Acarnans and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, [yet] lost his labour. For the treason was detected by one Nicomachus, a Phoecean of the town of Phanotis, who told it unto the Lacedaemonians, and they again unto the Boeotians. Whereby the Boeotians, concurring universally to relieve those places (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own several territories), preoccupied both Siphæ and Chaeroneia. And the conspirators, knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further.

90. But Hippocrates, having raised the whole power of the city of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them and all strangers that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium when the Boeotians were now returned from Siphæ;

and there stayed and took, in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a wall, in this manner: Round about the temple and the whole consecrated ground they drew a ditch; and out of the ditch, instead of a wall they cast up the earth; and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings; and by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon the same. There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens and wrought all the same day and all the fourth and the fifth day till dinner. And then being most part of it finished, the camp came back from Delium about ten furlongs homewards. And the light-armed soldiers went most of them presently away; but the men of arms laid down their arms there and rested. Hippocrates stayed yet behind and took order about the garrison and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

91. The Boeotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra; and when all the forces were come in that from every city were expected, and when they understood that the Athenians drew homewards, though the rest of the Boeotian commanders, which were eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Boeotia (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms,* were in the confines of Oropia); yet Pagondas, the son of Aioladas, being the Boeotian commander for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was, together with Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling them unto him every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner:

92. "Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have so much as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders that, because we find not the Athenians now in Boeotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a border-

* This only means "when they encamped."

ing country have entered Boeotia and fortified in it with intent to waste it, and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come doing the acts of hostility. But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence, in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own as may be used by them who, retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily invade the estate of another. And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and on your neighbour's ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians when they be borderers. For liberty with all men is nothing else but to be a match for the cities that are their neighbours. With these, then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? We have for example the estate that the Euboeans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in under them. And you must know that though others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished, shall have but one bound amongst us all, so that we shall no more quarrel about limits. For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories; whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when opportunity serveth. We have experience hereof in these same men. For after we had overcome them at Coroneia, at what time through our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Boeotia, which lasted till this present. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses; but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the

sacrifices we offered him appearing fair, to march against them, and let them see that though they may gain what they covet when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten.”

93. Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Boeotians to march against the Athenians, and making them rise led them speedily on, for it was drawing towards night. And when he was near to their army, in a place from whence by the interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand he put his army into order and prepared to give battle. When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Boeotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army, commanding them to be put in array. And not long after he came himself, having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place if it should be assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Boeotians when they were in fight. But for these, the Boeotians appointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all was as it should be, they showed themselves from the top of the hill, where they sat down with their arms in the same order they were to fight in, being about seven thousand men of arms, of light-armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targetiers. Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers; * in the middle battle were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the rest that dwell about the lake; in the left were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twenty-five in file; but the rest, every one as it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Boeotians.

94. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout; their horse they placed on either wing. But for light-armed soldiers, armed as was fit, there were none; nor was there any in the city. Those that went out followed the camp for the most part without

* The Greek word is *symmoroi*, and the people designated are allies that stood in a certain constitutional relation to the Theban state.

arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, there stayed few behind. When they were now in their order and ready to join battle, Hippocrates, the general, came into the army of the Athenians and encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

95. "Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with valiant men it hath as much force as a longer, and is for a remembrance rather than a command. Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that we therefore precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did not concern us. For in the territory of these men, you fight for your own. If we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the Boeotian horsemen. So that in one battle you shall both gain this territory and free your own. Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becometh the dignity both of his natural city, which he glorieth to be chief of all Greece, and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Oenophyta under the conduct of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Boeotia."

96. Whiles Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it over half the army,* but [could proceed] no

* From this and certain other passages it is clear that the Greek generals would deliver orations personally and frequently to their armies and obviously when numbers such as the present were involved the speech would have to be made more than once so that all soldiers should hear it. This detail is one of the many points which indicate that Thucydides is not inventing speeches for dramatic purposes, unless we conclude that he is designedly deceiving us in his record. Undoubtedly, however, in many if not all cases it was impossible for him to record the actual words of the speakers, which is what he tells us himself in Book i, Chapter 22. But he almost certainly in every case possessed notes or a few sentences reported to him which carried the gist of the speaker's oration. This he would expand and put into as forceful rhetorical periods as he could write. I take this to be the meaning of i.22: "I have set it down as each of them [the speakers] seemed to me to have spoken, saying the things that were required by their several circumstances, sticking as closely as possible to the whole tenor of what was actually said." It is quite certain on the basis of this passage and such passages as that commented on in this note that Thucydides cannot record speeches where none were made unless by such details as here mentioned he deliberately wished to mislead us.

further, the Boeotians (for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation and had there sung the Paean) came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, [so fast that] they met together running. The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both by one and the same cause; for certain currents of water kept them asunder. But the rest made sharp battle, standing close, and striving to put by each others' bucklers. The left wing of the Boeotians, to the very middle of the army, were overthrown by the Athenians, who in this part had to deal, amongst others, principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were placed within the same wing gave back and were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those Thespians that were slain were hewed down in the very fight. Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with inclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Boeotians were overcome in this part and fled to the other part where they were yet in fight. But the right wing, wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians, and by little and little forced them to give ground and followed upon them from the very first. It happened also that Pagondas, while the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill, whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put into affright; and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident and by the Thebans that continually won ground and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight. Some fled toward Delium and the sea, and some towards Oropus; others toward the mountain Parnethus, and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Boeotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came in after the enemy was already defeated, followed killing them. But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the easier saved. The next day those that were gotten to Oropus and Delium went thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium, which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained.

97. The Boeotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a

guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made on Delium. In the meantime, a herald sent from the Athenians to require the bodies met with a herald by the way sent by the Boeotians, which turned him back by telling him he could get nothing done till himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered unto them what the Boeotians had given him in charge, namely, that they had done unjustly to transgress the universal law of the Grecians, being a constitution received by them all; that the invader of another's country should abstain from all holy places in the same; that the Athenians had fortified Delium and dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places profane, and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice; that therefore the Boeotians, both in the behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the interested spirits, did warn them to be gone and to remove their stuff out of the temple.

98. After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians, denying that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter; for neither did they at first enter into it to such intent, but to requite the greater injuries which had been done unto them; as for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other but that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also, and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can: for also the Boeotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others and make them their own; that therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it, and for the part they were now in, they were in it with a good will and would not out of it, as being their own; that for the water, they meddled with it upon necessity; which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting against the Boeotians that had invaded their territory first, they were forced to use it; for whatsoever is forced by war or danger hath in reason a kind of pardon even with the god

himself; for the altars, in cases of involuntary offences, are a refuge, and they are said to violate laws that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress; that the Boeotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive; and they bade him say plainly that they would not depart out of the Boeotian territory, for that they were not now in it, but in a territory which they had made their own by the sword; and nevertheless, required truce, according to the ordinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead.

99. To this the Boeotians answered that if the dead were in Boeotia, they should quit the ground and take with them whatsoever was theirs; but if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do. For they thought that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay (for the battle was fought in the border between Attica and Boeotia), by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them off by force; and for truce that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none, but conceived it was a handsome answer to say that if they would quit the ground, they should obtain whatsoever they required. Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

100. The Boeotians presently sent for darters and slingers from [the towns on] the Melian gulf; and with these, and with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and with the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisaea, and with the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium and assaulted the wall. And when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, wherewith they also took it, made in this manner: Having slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides, and curiously set them together again in the form of a pipe. At the end of it in chains they hung a cauldron; and into the cauldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout of iron, having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the wood. They carried it to the wall, being far off, in

carts, to that part where it was most made up with the matter of the vineyard and with wood. And when it was to, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew. The blast, passing narrowly through into the cauldron, in which were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire, so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same and betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means taken. Of the defendants, some were slain and two hundred taken prisoners; the rest of the number recovered their galleys and got home.

101. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald, which not long after was sent again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing it, the Boeotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. In the battle there died Boeotians few less than five hundred; the Athenians few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed soldiers and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number.

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, that had been with his army at Siphæ, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agræans and four hundred men of arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already landed and chased them back to their galleys, having also slain some and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead. About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. And Seuthes, the son of Spardocus, his brother's son, succeeded him in the kingdom, both of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace as much as was before subject to Sitalces.

102. The same winter, Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace made war upon Amphipolis, a colony of the Athenians, situated on the river Strymon. The place whereon the city now standeth, Aristagoras of Miletus had formerly attempted to inhabit when he fled from king Darius, but was beaten away

by the Edonians. Two-and-thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same, and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many as would go; and these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus. In the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon, the son of Nicias, the Athenians came again, and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine-ways. His army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the seaside subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the river Strymon, five-and-twenty furlongs from the city. Agnon named this city Amphipolis because it was surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken it in with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about both to the sea and land.

103. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from Arnae in Chalcidea. Being about twilight come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe entereth into the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. The weather was foul, and a little it snowed, which also made him to march the rather, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians), and others, that contrived this, induced thereunto some by Perdiccas and some by the Chalcideans. But above all the Argilians, being of a city near unto it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered and Brasidas arrived (who had also long before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis to betray it), both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night as far as to the bridge of the river. The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the bridge then as there is now; but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge and was presently master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had that dwelt without.

104. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of

those without being slain, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in very great confusion at it; and the rather because they were jealous one of another. And it is said that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was that he pitched there and fell upon those without; and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still upon the place. But the contrary faction to the traitors being superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town, sent unto the other general, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace, and was now about Thasos (which is an island and a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requiring him to come and relieve them. When he heard the news, he went thitherwards in all haste with seven galleys, which chanced to be with him at that time. His purpose principally was to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis; but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion [before Brasidas' coming].

105. Brasidas, in the meantime, fearing the aid of the galleys to come from Thasos, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hasted by all means to get Amphipolis before he should arrive, lest otherwise at his coming the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates both from the sea-side and in Thrace, and relieve them, should thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end offered them a moderate composition, causing to be proclaimed that whosoever, Amphipolitan or Athenian, would, might continue to dwell there and enjoy his own, with equal and like form of government; and that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone and carry away his goods.

106. When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kinsmen of those that were taken without flocked together within. And in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation

reasonable; the Athenians thought it so because they were willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest, and withal, not expecting aid in haste; and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger, and withal to retain their city with the equal form of government. Insomuch that they which conspired with Brasidas now openly justified the offer to be reasonable; and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed received him. Thus did these men deliver up the city. Thucydides with his galleys arrived in the evening of the same day at Eion.* Brasidas had already gotten Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also; for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had been had.

107. After this Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it such as, according to the proclamation made, came down from Amphipolis. Brasidas with many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion and attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river; he assayed also the same at the same time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary. Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis and by Braures his own wife. And not long after Gapselus also, and Oesyne, colonies of the Thasians. Perdicas also, after the taking of these places, came to him and helped him in assuring of the same.

108. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear, especially for that it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys and in revenue of money, and because also, though the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to come against

* This is a very impersonal statement of Thucydides' great failure as a military commander. As he records later, he was disgraced for his failure to save Amphipolis and was banished from Athens.

their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further; which now they thought they might easily do, and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece. And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation, and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than safe forecast; it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing to reject. Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Boeotians, and because Brasidas had said (not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them) that when he was at Nisaea the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. But the greatest cause of all was that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the Lacedaemonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit. And Brasidas sent unto Lacedaemon to demand greater forces, and in the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon. But the Lacedaemonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

109. The same winter the Megareans, having recovered their long walls holden by the Athenians, razed them to the very ground.

Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confederates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. This Acte is that prominent territory which is disjoined from the continent by a ditch made by the king; and Athos, a high mountain in the same, determineth at the Aegean sea. Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the said ditch on the part which looketh to the sea towards Euboea; the rest are Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion, and are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages. Some few there are also of the Chalcidean nation; but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations that once inhabited Athens and Lemnos, and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians, and dwell in small cities. The most of which yielded to Brasidas; but Sane and Dion held out, for which cause he stayed with his army and wasted their territories.

110. But seeing they would not hearken unto him, he led his army presently against Torone of Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. He was called in by the few, who were ready withal to deliver him the city; and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from the city. So that to the rest of the city and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the traitors, knowing he was to come (some few of them being also privily gone to him), attended his approach; and when they perceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men armed only with daggers (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, seven only had the courage to go in; and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus); which, getting over the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and having slain the watchmen brake open the postern gate towards Canastraea.

111. Brasidas this while with the rest of his army lay still, and then coming a little forward, sent a hundred targetiers before, who, when the gates should be opened and sign agreed on be set up, should run in first. These men, expecting long and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronaeans within, which

helped the men that entered to perform the enterprise, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading to the market-place opened likewise by cutting asunder the bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side; and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the market-place.

112. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered into the city running. Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared timber-trees, which lay at the wall (which having been lately down was now again in building) for the drawing up of stone. Brasidas, therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the city to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places of advantage. But the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there without difference.

113. When the town was taken, the most of the Toronaeans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves presently with those that entered. The Athenians (of which there were about fifty men of arms asleep in the market-place), when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain upon the place, some by land, some by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus, which was a fort which they themselves held, cut off from the rest of the city to the seaward in a narrow isthmus. And thither also fled all such Toronaeans as were affected to them.

114. Being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made that those Toronaeans which were fled with the Athenians might come back, as many as would, to their own and inhabit there in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart out of Lecythus under truce with all that they had, as a place that belonged to the Chalcideans. The Athenians denied to quit the place, but the truce they desired for one day for the taking up of their dead. And Brasidas granted it for two, in which two days he fortified

the buildings near; and so also did the Athenians theirs. He also called an assembly of the Toronaeans and spake unto them as he had done before to the Acanthians, adding that there was no just cause why either they that had practised to put the city into his hands should be the worse thought of or accounted traitors for it, seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were hired thereunto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city; or that they which were not made acquainted with it should think that themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; for he came not to destroy either city or man, but had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the Lacedaemonians, they would show as much good will also unto them, or rather more, inasmuch as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only upon want of trial. Withal he wished them to prepare themselves to be true confederates for the future, and from henceforward, to look to have their faults imputed; for, for what was past, he thought they had not done any wrong, but suffered it rather from other men that were too strong for them, and therefore were to be pardoned if they had in aught been against him.

115. When he had thus said and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one, and from the houses such as had battlements, and for the first day kept them off. But the next day, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they intended to cast fire upon their wooden fences, and that the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted, the Athenians, having upon the top of the building erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and many men being also gone up into it, the building overcharged with weight fell suddenly to the ground, and that with so huge a noise that though those which were near and saw it were grieved more than afraid, yet such as stood further off, especially the furthest of all, supposing the place to be in that

part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea and went aboard their galleys.

116. Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned and saw what had happened, came on with his army and presently got the fort and slew all that he found within it. But the rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with their boats and galleys put themselves into Pallene.

There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva. And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had made proclamation that whosoever first scaled the wall should have thirty minae of silver for a reward. Brasidas now, conceiving that the place was won by means not human, gave those thirty minae to the goddess to the use of the temple. And then pulling down Lecythus, he built it anew and consecrated unto her the whole place.

The rest of this winter he spent in assuring the places he had already gotten and in contriving the conquest of more. Which winter ending, ended the eighth year of this war.

117. The Lacedaemonians and Athenians, in the spring of the summer following, made a cessation of arms presently for a year, having reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and that if this suspension liked them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time; the Lacedaemonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would, upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the willinger to compound, and with the restitution of their men to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they would fain have recovered their men while Brasidas' good fortune continued; and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas prospering and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out upon even terms and get the victory. Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

118. "Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it seemeth good unto us that whosoever will may without fraud and without fear ask counsel thereat, according to the laws of

his country. The same also seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates here present; and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Boeotians and Phoceans, and do their best to persuade them to the same. That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you, proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our several states; and that whosoever else will may do the same every one according to the law of his own country.

"If the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates touching the same think good thus:

"That the Lacedaemonians in Coryphasium stay within the mountains of Buphras and Tomeus, and the Athenians in Cythera without joining together in any league, either we with them or they with us. That those in Nisaea and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the gate of Megara near the temple of Nisus leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straightforward to the bridge that lies over into Minoa; that the Megareans pass not the same highway, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken, neither having commerce with other. That the Megareans keep what they now possess in Troezen and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and have free navigation, both upon the coasts of their own territories and their confederates.

"That the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall pass the seas not in a long ship, but in any other boat rowed with oars of burden not exceeding five hundred talents.

"That the heralds and ambassadors that shall pass between both sides for the ending of the war or for trials of judgment may go and come without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land.

"That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another's fugitives, free nor bond.

"That you to us and we to you shall afford law according to the use of our several states, to the end our controversies may be decided judicially without war.

"This is thought good by the Lacedaemonians and their

confederates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair or of more equity than these, then shall you go and declare the same at Lacedaemon. For neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their confederates refuse anything that you shall make appear to be just. But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us.—That this truce shall be for a year.

“The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the assembly. Phaenippus the scribe. Niciades overseer, and Laches pronounced these words: ‘With good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms is concluded, according as the Lacedaemonians and their confederates have agreed.’ And they consented before the people that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion, in which time the ambassadors and heralds, going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars; and that the commanders of the army and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council, touching the manner of embassy for ending of the war first; and the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year.”

119. The same articles the Lacedaemonians propounded and the confederates agreed unto with the Athenians and their confederates in Lacedaemon on the twelfth day of the month Gerastion. The men that agreed upon these articles, and sacrificed, were these, viz.: Of the Lacedaemonians, Taurus, the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus, the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, the son of Eryxidaidas; of the Corinthians, Aeneas, the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas, the son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians, Damotimos, the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, the son of Megacles; of the Megareans, Nicasus, the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, the son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas; of the Athenians, the generals [themselves], Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephe, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. This was the truce; and during the same they were continually in treaty about a longer peace.

120. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to

Brasidas. The Scionaens say that they be Pallenians descended of those of Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors, passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the Achaeans up and down, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. Brasidas, upon their revolt, went over into Scione by night; and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself followed aloof in a light-horseman. His reason was this: that if his light-horseman should be assaulted by some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that such a one would not assault his boat, but rather the galley, whereby he might in the meantime go through in safety. When he was over and had called the Scionaens to assemble, he spake unto them as he had done before to them of Acanthus and Torone, adding that they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended, inasmuch as Pallene, being cut off in the isthmus by the Athenians that possess Potidaea, and being no other than islanders, did yet of their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not through cowardliness till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good; which was an argument that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter to have their state ordered to their minds; and that he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the Lacedaemonians, and also otherwise do them honour.

121. The Scionaens were erected with these words of his; and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war; and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably and crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands and came to him as they use to do to a champion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over a greater army, with design by the help of those of Scione to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidaea. For he thought the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island, and desired to prevent them. Withal, he had

in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended, ready to undertake that enterprise.

122. But in the meantime came unto him in a galley Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone: and these men related unto Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedaemonians in Thrace approved of what was done; and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction. But for the Scionaeans, whose revolt by computation of the days he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The Lacedaemonians in the meantime sent ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce, and, upon Brasidas' word, challenged the city to belong unto them, offering themselves to the decision of law. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment, but meant with all the speed they could make to send an army against it, being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedaemonians by land. Besides, touching [the time of] the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves alleged; for the revolt of the Scionaeans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by force and to put them all to the sword. And, forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

123. In the meantime revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; and somewhat there was also which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendaeans had also been the bolder, as sure of the inten-

tion of Brasidas, which they might guess at by Scione, inasmuch as he could not be gotten to deliver it. Withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who, being once about it, would by no means give it over, but, fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclination to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both; and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans into Olynthus in Chalcidea, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms and three hundred Chalcidean targetiers, and for commander of them all Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Mende joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

124. In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibaeus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of the Macedonians, his subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcideans, Acanthians, and the rest, according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms were about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcideans, somewhat less than a thousand; but the other rabble of barbarians was great. Being entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both. But afterwards, the men of arms of the Lyncestians coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncestians to flight; many of which being slain, the rest retired to the hill-top and lay still. After this they erected a trophy and stayed two or three days, expecting the Illyrians who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire; and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibaeus one after another, and

to have sitten still there no longer. But Brasidas, having his thoughts on Mende, lest if the Athenians came thither before his return it should receive some blow, seeing withal that the Illyrians came not, had no liking to do so, but rather to retire.

125. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined themselves with Arrhibaeus. So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of these who were a warlike people; but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by reason of their variance. The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians (as it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown) being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas (their camps being far asunder), to be gone also. Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the middle, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy when they charged the army anywhere [with shot]; and he himself, with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy, fighting if they came close up. But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

126. "Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians and that the barbarians which come upon you are many, that you were afraid, I should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I do. But now, against this desertion of your companions and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the full. For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come from a city

where the many bear rule over the few, but the few over the many; and have gotten this for power by no other means than by overcoming in fight. And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Macedonians, and also by what I myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no great danger in them. For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden the other side; whereas, against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the boldest when he knoweth the least. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible offers; for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to this when with such as stand them they come to blows. For fighting without order they will quit their place without shame if they be once pressed; and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away, their valours are never called in question; and a battle wherein every one may do as he lists, affords them a more handsome excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and terrifying us afar off than in coming to hands with us; for else they would rather have taken that course than this. And you see manifestly that all that was before terrible in them is in effect little, and serves only to urge you to be going with their show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the battle; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous where they may do it safely."

127. When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led away his army. And the barbarians, seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them [did so, and]

met them which way soever they came on, and that Brasidas himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged close and endured the first brunt beyond their expectation, and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased the other retired, then at length the greatest part of the barbarians forbore the Grecians that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians which were fled, of whom as many as they overtook they slew; and withal prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him to have cut him off.

128. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easliest get up to, and try if they could drive down those barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with and overcame those barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched the more easily to the top. For this beating of them from the vantage of the hill made the barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal that they were now at the confines and already escaped through. Brasidas, having now gotten the hills and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa, of the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves, being angry with the Macedonians for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen or fardles fallen from any man (as was likely to happen in a retreat made in fear and in the night) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces and took the fardles to themselves. And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake, but being utterly fallen out with him about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these and be dislegued from the other.

129. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Mende; and therefore staying there (for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene and to recover Mende), he kept good watch upon Torone. For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyncestians, the Athenians, after all was in readiness, set sail for Mende and Scione with fifty galleys (whereof ten were of Chios) and a thousand men of arms of their own city, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targetiers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, the son of Diotrophes. These, launching from Potidaea with their galleys and putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched presently against the Mendaeans. The Mendaeans with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that came to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred men of arms, and Polydamidas their commander, were encamped upon a strong hill without the city. Nicias, with a hundred and twenty light-armed soldiers of Methone and sixty chosen men of arms of Athens and all his archers, attempting to get up by a path that was in the hill's side, was wounded in the attempt and could not make his way by force. And Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, going another way further about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was quite disordered; and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited. So for this day, seeing the Mendaeans and their confederates stood to it, the Athenians retired and pitched their camp; and at night the Mendaeans retired into the city.

130. The next day the Athenians, sailing about unto that part of the city which is towards Scione, seized on the suburbs, and all that day wasted their fields, no man coming forth to oppose them (for there was also sedition in the city); and the three hundred Scionaeans the night following went home again. The next day Nicias, with the one half of the army, marched to the confines and wasted the territory of the Scionaeans; and Nicostratus at the same time, with the other half, sat down against the city before the higher gates towards Potidaea. Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendaeans and their aids had their arms lying within the wall in this part) set his

men in order for the battle and encouraged the Mendaeans to make a sally. But when one of the faction of the commons in sedition said, to the contrary, that they would not go out and that it was not necessary to fight, and was upon this contradiction by Polydamidas pulled and molested, the commons in passion presently took up their arms and made towards the Peloponnesians and such other with them as were of the contrary faction; and falling upon them put them to flight, partly with the suddenness of the charge and partly through the fear they were in of the Athenians, to whom the gates were at the same time opened. For they imagined that this insurrection was by some appointment made between them. So they fled into the citadel, as many as were not presently slain, which was also in their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and at the town-side) rushed into the city with the whole army and rifled it, not as opened to them by agreement, but as taken by force; and the captains had much ado to keep them that they also killed not the men. After this, they bade the Mendaeans use the same form of government they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they thought the principal authors of the revolt amongst themselves. Those that were in the citadel they shut up with a wall reaching on both sides to the sea, and left a guard to defend it. And having thus gotten Mende, they led their army against Scione.

131. The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians, coming out against them, possessed themselves of a strong hill before the city, which if the enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the city with a wall. The Athenians, having strongly charged them [with shot] and beaten the defendants from it, encamped upon the hill, and after they had set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the city. Not long after, whilst the Athenians were at work about this, those aids that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch by the sea-side, came by night, and escaping most of them through the camp before Scione, put themselves into that city.

132. As they were enclosing of Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian commanders and concluded a peace with the Athenians, upon hatred to Brasidas about the retreat made out of Lynceus, having then immediately begun to treat of the same.

For it happened also at this time that Ischagoras, a Lacedaemonian, was leading an army of foot unto Brasidas. And Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing the peace was made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and partly because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians should come any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts in Thessaly, having in that kind ever used the prime men, and so stopped the army and munition as they would not so much as try the Thessalians [whether they would let them pass or not]. Nevertheless Ischagoras and Ameinias and Aristeus themselves went on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedaemonians to view the state of affairs there, and also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth to make them governors of cities rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. And Clearidas, the son of Cleonymus, they made governor of Amphipolis; and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

133. The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians, laying Atticism to their charge. And though they had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier, because the flower of their youth was slain in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who, having set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep, inso-much as all was on fire and flamed out before she knew. Chrysis, the same night, for fear of the Argives, fled presently to Phlius; and they, according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in her room, called Phaeinis. Now, when Chrysis fled, was the eighth year of this war ended, and half of the ninth. Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed; and the Athenians, having left a guard there, went home with the rest of their army.

134. The winter following nothing was done between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians because of the truce. But the Mantineans and the Tegeatae, with the confederates of both, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Orestis, wherein the victory was doubtful; for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent

of their spoils unto Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatae lodged all night in the place and erected their trophy then presently; whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion and set up their trophy afterwards.

135. The same winter ending and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. For coming by night, he applied his ladders and was thitherto undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders when the bell passed by, and before he that carried it to the next returned. Nevertheless, being discovered, he scaled not the wall, but presently again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.