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The Ethnic Origins of Nations



Anthony D. Smith

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When our narrow rooms, our short lives, our soon ended passions and emotions put us out of conceit with sooty and finite reality, here at last is a universe where all is large and intense enough to almost satisfy the emotions of man.

W. B. Yeats

There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality.

Emile Durkheim

In that day will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen, and close up the breaches thereof; and I will raise up his ruins, and I will build it as in the days of old; . . .

And I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them; they shall plant vineyards and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens and eat the fruit of them.

And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be plucked up out of their land which I have given them, saith the Lord thy God.

Amos 9

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Preface

Recently there has been a growing convergence of interests among historians and social scientists, and the subject of their concerns has been the origins and shape of the modern world. After some decades of archival empiricism, on the one side, and abstract theorizing about 'society', on the other side, several sociologically minded historians and historically concerned sociologists have felt the need to bring the concerns and findings of their respective disciplines together in a concerted effort to trace the various aspects of the rise and nature of the modern world of capitalism, secularism and bureaucracy. In the work of E. H. Carr, Seton-Watson, Hobsbawm, Kiernan, and Tilly, Skocpol, Barrington Moore, Wallerstein, Hechter, Gellner and Armstrong, among others, we find these concerns informing their individual contributions to the growth of an historical sociology and sociological history.

One vital aspect of these concerns is the growth of nations and states. More work has perhaps been done on the origins and nature of the specifically modern form of the state; but there have also been a number of attempts to grapple with the problems of 'nation-formation', both in the West and in the Third World.

The following pages are concerned with a few aspects of this larger debate and are offered in the hope of placing the modern and Western developments in a broader historical context. The aim of this book is to analyse some of the origins and genealogy of nations, in particular their ethnic roots. For, while attention may legitimately be focused on the constant elements of 'nationhood' in the modern world and the universal trends that govern their formation, the variations between nations are equally important, both in themselves and for their political consequences. My belief is that the most important of these variations are determined by specific historical experiences and by the 'deposit' left by these collective experiences. Hence the importance attached here to the various 'myths' and 'memories', 'symbols' and 'values', which so often define and differentiate nations. These in turn

require a study of pre-modern ethnic formations because it is here, above all, that we may trace the historical deposit of collective experiences, and because 'ethnicity' has provided, in a very general manner, a potent model for human association which has been adapted and transformed, but not obliterated, in the formation of modern nations. The 'roots' of these nations are to be found, both in a general way and in many specific cases, in the model of ethnic community prevalent in much of recorded history across the globe.

My belief in the importance of ethnic roots in the formation of nations was greatly stimulated and encouraged by the writings and lectures of the late Professor Hugh Seton-Watson with whom I had the good fortune to be able to discuss many of these issues and to whose memory this book is dedicated in profound gratitude. One of the foremost historians of nationalism, especially in Eastern Europe, Professor Seton-Watson did much to encourage the study of ethnicity and nationalism in the younger generation; his early death represents a great loss to the community of scholars interested in the problems of the historical roots of modern states and nations, the subject of his most important work.

I am also much indebted to the work of other scholars in the field, notably Professors John Armstrong, Walker Connor and Ernest Gellner. For the study of ethnic myths and symbols in premodern eras, the work of ancient historians like Henri Frankfort and Richard Frye as well as Armstrong's pioneering book, *Nations before Nationalism*, has been invaluable. My interest in the subject was also stimulated by a conference on 'Legitimation by Descent' organized by Susan Reynolds and her colleagues. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were presented in an early form to the 'Patterns of History' and the 'Nationalism' seminars at the London School of Economics and the Wednesday Evening Historical Sociology Society. I am grateful to the members of these seminars for their helpful comments, as well as to other members of my Department with whom I have discussed the issues that form the subject of this book. I need hardly add that responsibility for the views expressed, as for any errors and omissions, is mine alone.


Finally I would like to record my gratitude to Blackwells and Sean Magee for undertaking the publication of this work, and to Patricia Crone and John Hall for their helpful comments on the text. I should also like to express my appreciation for the forbearance of my family during the writing of this book, and to my wife for her assistance with the bibliography and maps. Without them, this book could not have been written.

Department of Sociology
London School of Economics


Dr Anthony D. Smith
January 1986

Note to Maps


The following maps indicate the rough location of many of the ethnic communities in the ancient Near East and medieval Europe discussed in the text, as well as their migrations and incursions. Apart from strictly geographical features, an attempt has been made to classify and denote by a distinctive typeface the peoples (*ethnie*), states, countries or areas and cities, which flourished in the relevant period. (Thus, *ethnie* are denoted by Roman capitals, states or kingdoms by italics, and so on). Inevitably, the categories overlap, since given proper names (for example Egypt, Assyria, Persia) may at different times signify *ethnie*, countries or states. This is particularly the case with ethnically designated areas or countries like Judah/Judea or Armenia, which took their names from *ethnie* which settled in the area and which gave their names to kingdoms; areas were often named after ethnic ancestors like Judah, the son of Jacob. In addition, Greek and Roman authors often designated areas at the periphery of their world by ethnic names, for example Germania and Britannia, particularly areas of unknown extent inhabited by 'barbarian' tribes and/or language groups. The reader is asked to bear this in mind in interpreting the information on the maps.



Map 1 The ancient Near East, c. 2200–1700 BC: ethnic communities and migrations



Map 2 The ancient Near East, c. 1500-1200 BC: ethnic states and invasions




3 The ancient Near East, c. 800–500 BC: ethnic communities under the Assyrian and Persian empires




people of the Persian Empire in this period
 ate at first, then a Roman province
 ate under the Ptolemies, then a Roman province


Mediterranean world, c. 200 BC–AD 300: ethnic communities and provinces under the Roman empire



Map 5 The end of the ancient world, c. AD 400–700: empires, ethnic communities and ethnic invasion.



Map 6 Western and Central Europe. c. AD 400-1000: ethnic kingdoms and migrations



Map 7 Russia and Eastern Europe, c. AD 1000-1500: ethnic states and invasions

Introduction

This book arose out of two concerns. The first originated in some conversations with the late Professor Hugh Seton-Watson on the differences between ethnic communities and nations. Everywhere groups of human beings were claiming the status of 'nations', even though they varied enormously in terms of economic and population resources, military and political strength, and cultural equipment and characteristics. The claim to nationhood is, of course, the claim to equality of international treatment, at least in theory; but could such a claim be countenanced for the many small, underdeveloped and culturally heterogeneous states in Africa and Asia, or the many 'tribal' groupings which lacked political weight and cultural facilities in several parts of the Third World? Could one establish a hierarchy of such groups (and hence their claims)? When did such a category or grouping of human beings become a recognizable 'nation'? Or, if not a nation, at least an ethnic community?

The second concern arose from the recent discussion of the formation of nations in the West in the early modern period in the work of historians like Seton-Watson, Tilly and Breuilly, and sociologists like Nairn, Benedict Anderson and Gellner. In contrast to an earlier generation of scholars and laymen, for whom the 'nation' (but not the ideology of nationalism) could be found even in antiquity, the new wave of social scientists and historians pronounced the nation a wholly modern creation with few, if any, roots in earlier epochs. But my own earlier work on the modern 'ethnic revival', particularly in the West, had suggested an important role for ethnic ties and sentiments in earlier periods of history. Once again, the question arose: what was the relationship between ethnic identities and nations? Was it merely chronological, or also typological? Was there, perhaps, a causal link between ethnicity and the formation of nations?

In a world of competing states and would-be nations, these are no mere academic issues. Large numbers of people are quite prepared to sacrifice their lives for the recognition of their national identities and the restoration

2 Introduction

of their 'historic' lands. New states, often top-heavy and fragile, are anxious to establish their 'national' credentials, especially when they lack any semblance of common ethnicity. Uprooted and homeless masses are equally eager to proclaim their allegiance to politically effective units to which they can feel (or be induced to feel) they 'belong'; and what better way of suggesting and inducing that sense of belonging than by 'rediscovering' submerged or lost ethnic roots in the mists of immemorial time?

It is fashionable for Western observers, securely ensconced in their own national identities forged in toil and blood several centuries ago, to pour scorn on the rhetorical excesses and misguided scholarship of nationalist intellectuals in nineteenth-century Europe or twentieth-century Africa and Asia. Those whose identities are rarely questioned and who have never known exile or subjugation of land and culture, have little need to trace their 'roots' in order to establish a unique and recognizable identity. Yet theirs is only an implicit and unarticulated form of what elsewhere must be shouted from the roof-tops: 'We belong, we have a unique identity, we know it by our ancestry and history.' It matters nothing that these are so many 'myths' and 'memories' full of deceptions and distortions. The 'self-evident' nature of English or French national identity is made up of such myths and memories; with them, the English and French are 'nations', without them, just so many populations bounded in political space.

Of course, there is much more to the concept of the 'nation' than myths and memories. But they constitute a *sine qua non*: there can be no identity without memory (albeit selective), no collective purpose without myth, and identity and purpose or destiny are necessary elements of the very concept of a nation. But this is also true of the concept of an ethnic community; it too must be felt to have an identity and destiny, and hence myths and memories. Is the nation, then, simply an enlarged ethnic community?

These issues have been brought sharply into focus by the recent work of John Armstrong, whose analysis of the elements of ethnic identity in medieval Islam and Christendom appeared to constitute a direct challenge to many of the presuppositions of the new generation of historians and social scientists. By focusing on these very elements of myth, symbol and memory, he has been able to encompass what has undoubtedly seemed the most perplexing feature of investigation into ethnic and national phenomena: the curiously simultaneous solidity and insubstantiality of ethnic communities and nations. In many ways it is easier to 'grasp' nationalism, the ideological movement, than nations, the organizational cultures. Even ethnic communities, so easily recognizable from a distance, seem to dissolve before our eyes the closer we come and the more we attempt to pin them down. It is tempting to conclude that 'ethnicity' is in the eye of the beholder, that it is all 'situational', a matter of time and context, shifting, fleeting, illusory . . .

This is where it is necessary to take account of the perspective of investigation, and that in turn depends on the problems under consideration.

Our object here is to enquire into the foundations and genealogy of nations. To do so, requires a perspective both broad and long. Inevitably, this requires us to endow nations and ethnic communities with more static 'solidity' than closer investigation at any point in time might warrant. To see the relationship between ethnic communities and nations as a whole and 'in the round', I shall have to treat them and their constitutive elements as possessing a greater tangibility and more precise definition than their specific instances would allow. But that is inevitable in an enquiry into the similarities and differences between ethnic communities and nations, and into the ways in which ethnicity and ethnic communities form the models and groundwork for the construction of nations.

In this enquiry, we shall have to depart from the assumptions of both the main schools of thought on the origin and formation of nations. While we can no longer regard the nation as a given of social existence, a 'primordial' and natural unit of human association outside time, neither can we accept that it is a wholly modern phenomenon, be it the 'nervous tic of capitalism', or the necessary form and culture of an industrial society. While the revolutions of industrial capitalism, the bureaucratic state and secular mass-education represent a watershed in human history comparable to the Neolithic transition, they have not obliterated or rendered obsolete many of the cultures and identities formed in pre-modern eras. They have certainly transformed many of them; others they have destroyed, yet others, amalgamated and revived. The fate of these cultures and identities has depended as much upon their internal properties as upon the uneven incidence of the modern revolutions. This is because the constituents of these identities and cultures – the myths, memories, symbols and values – can often be adapted to new circumstances by being accorded new meanings and new functions. Hence it becomes important to enquire into the 'state of cultural identity' of a given community on the eve of its exposure to the new revolutionary forces, in order to locate the bases of its subsequent evolution into a fully-fledged 'nation'.

It is these considerations which have determined both the method and the format of this enquiry. While 'objective' factors like population size, economic resources, communications systems and bureaucratic centralization obviously play an important role in creating the environment of nations (or, more usually, states, which then help to mould nations), they tell us little about the distinctive qualities and character of the national community that emerges. For that we must turn to more 'subjective' factors: not the more ephemeral dimensions of collective will, attitude, even sentiment, which make up the day-to-day fabric of ethnic consciousness, but the more permanent cultural attributes of memory, value, myth and symbolism. For these are often recorded and immortalized in the arts, languages, sciences and laws of the community which, though subject to a slower development, leave their imprint on the perceptions of subsequent generations and shape

4 Introduction

the structures and atmosphere of the community through the distinctive traditions they deposit. Only a more 'symbolic' approach based on historical comparison of the durable constitutive elements of ethnic communities and nations can help us to build up a general picture of the historical and sociological relationships between these communities and nations.

The opening chapter is therefore devoted to outlining in greater detail the strengths and limitations of the rival 'primordialist' and 'instrumentalist' approaches to ethnicity, and of the overlapping positions of 'perennialists' and 'modernists' with regard to the origins of nations; and to explain why it is necessary to reject many of their assumptions and embrace a different approach and position.

The book then falls into two parts: The first examines the nature and role of ethnic communities or *ethnie*; the second, the formation and characteristics of nations. The first chapter of Part I (chapter 2) analyses the main features of ethnic communities and traces their principal bases, economic, cultural and political. Chapter 3 explores various kinds of ethnic sentiment and movements in pre-modern eras, and the situations that typically give rise to them. Chapter 4 argues, against the 'modernist' contention, that a considerable number of elite cultures spread to other strata and regions of the community, and suggests a distinction between 'lateral' and 'vertical' communities in terms of popular mobilization and closure of the community. Chapter 5 takes up the large theme of ethnic survival: how and why some *ethnie* were able to perpetuate their cultures, albeit with changes, over centuries, even millenia, while others, some of them politically much stronger, dissolved and fell into near-oblivion. Here it is suggested that, among the complex of relevant factors, religious conditions of salvation and their texts, liturgies and clergies, were vital elements in the retention of ethnic forms among many communities.

The survival of many ethnic communities, fortified by their textual faiths and clergies, into the modern era forms the background to the formation of nations, considered in Part II. The first chapter here (chapter 6) starts out from the radical breaks introduced by the economic, political and cultural revolutions in the West, and then charts the two models and trajectories of nation-formation, the civic-territorial and the ethnic-genealogical. The interplay of these two concepts and routes is traced in Europe and Asia, and the growing influence of the ethnic model is illustrated; the concept of the nation is found to be inherently unstable and dualist. Chapters 7 and 8 elaborate on this dual character of the nation: chapter 7 sees nations as *Gesellschaften*, mobilized, activist, secular, territorialized, inclusive, based on the popular masses. Chapter 8 looks at the other side of the picture: the nation in search of its past. Needing a history and destiny to overcome death and futility, communities like nations must find them in the cults of nature and the heroic past. The returning intelligentsia, in particular, needs a living past into which it can re-enter, and it uses disciplines like archeology and

philology to reconstruct those poetic spaces and golden ages in which the 'nation' can and must locate itself. The monuments of nature and history, and the cult of heroes, help to keep 'disenchantment' at bay and shape the new nation through the ethnic 'maps' and 'moralities' they evoke.

The concluding chapter takes up the question of the opening and draws together the elements of the analysis by pointing up the inner 'antiquity' of nations as historical processes that possess continuity and require a serviceable past. It also underlines the potency of ethnicity-in-general, as well as of particular ethnic communities and ethnic mosaics. The *means* may have changed dramatically, but there is considerable continuity of *ends* between pre-modern *ethnie* and modern nations, as the continuing relevance of a re-interpreted past of ethnic identity in the maintenance of nations demonstrates. No enduring world order can be created which ignores the ubiquitous yearnings of nations in search of roots in an ethnic past, and no study of nations and nationalism that completely ignores that past can bear fruit.

1

Are nations modern?

Why are men and women willing to die for their countries? Why do they identify so strongly with their nations? Is national character and nationalism universal? Or is the 'nation' a purely modern phenomenon and a product of strictly modern social conditions? And what, in any case, do we mean by the concepts of the 'nation' and 'national identity'?

This study seeks some answers to these questions by focusing on one vital issue: the modernity, or otherwise, of the nation. In posing this question, I hope to uncover many of the elements and components of our concept of the nation, and by this means to elucidate the nature and intensity of national identities. Inevitably, this means reaching back into distant epochs well beyond what many take as the starting-point of nationalism (the late eighteenth century) to assemble such evidence of national ties and sentiments as the historical record suggests within a more general explanatory framework. These more general frameworks are at once historical and sociological: they propose both a temporal sequence or developmental series, and a comparative, explanatory perspective in which selected factors and processes are arranged in a coherent framework. The lack of clear-cut temporal sequences and comparative perspectives (or, at any rate, the failure to make these explicit) has often hampered the study of contemporary group identities and ideologies. It is often assumed that such identities or ideologies are either universal or quite recent, when confrontation with the historical record within a general framework will usually demonstrate the limitations of such assumptions. One of the main objectives of the present study is to locate national identities and ideologies within a long time perspective of group identities and sentiments.

But, beyond these considerations of method, there is the more fundamental substantive question of the meaning and prevalence of national identities and sentiments. Here, again, an analysis that is at once sociological and historical may help us to grasp these meanings in their social context and to discover some of the roots of the widespread sense and intensity of

national identity. To ignore these meanings as they leave their imprint in the historical record, because of their undue subjectivity or interpretive uncertainty, is to preclude any deeper understanding of the roots of contemporary national identities. We need to start out from, and take seriously (though not at their face value), such expressions of large-scale collective identity as present themselves in different epochs and civilizations, despite the obvious difficulties in tracing and interpreting popular consciousness and sentiments. Phenomena like ethnicity or national sentiment are so largely bound up with expressions of attitude, perception and feeling (even where they involve so much more), that purely structural approaches will inevitably seem remote from the objects of their explanations, even when they do not seriously mislead. At the same time, the 'meanings' imputed to group identities or ideals vary over time and with circumstance, although many identities and sentiments persist for generations. Hence, any study of the 'roots' of nations must try to lay bare the structure and cultures within which these meanings change and become transmuted.

'Modernists' and 'primordialists'

We are probably never so aware of phenomena and objects as when we are about to gain or lose them. Conversely, we never take them so much for granted as when we are assured in their possession. This is certainly borne out by an examination of attitudes, both popular and academic, to the idea of the nation. In the mid-twentieth century, whatever our attitudes to *nationalism*, there was a very widespread assumption in the public mind, echoed in much of the scholarly community, that the nation was something as 'natural' as the family, speech or the human body itself. Most people took national divisions, national character and nationalism for granted, even when they deplored its harmful effects. They may have yearned for a supra-national entity, even a world government, and pinned their hopes on the League of Nations and the United Nations; but, as this latter term tells us, the permanency of the nation and of a 'world of nations', was not seriously doubted. Even in the academic community, though there were dissenting voices, most scholars treated the nation as a human constant, even when they noted its changing forms over time and space, and hence sought to explain the wars that racked the world in terms of nations, their interests and aggressive instincts.¹

In the late twentieth century, however, a number of factors have helped to make us question these assumptions. While it is probably still true that most citizens of states in the industrial world continue to take the nation for granted and seek in 'national interest' the main explanatory force of foreign and defence policies, the rise to prominence of some Third World states which clearly cannot be termed 'nations', countries like Nigeria, India and

8 *Are nations modern?*

Indonesia, has undermined the near-universality of the modern belief in the 'naturalness' of nations. There is also the related difficulty of assimilating often smaller units like the African 'tribe' to the standard or 'classic' European 'nation', which again suggests that the nation may be a recent or even European phenomenon.² Then there is the often surprising revival of national sentiments and nationalist demands in communities which were regarded as integral and contented components of several Western 'nations' – among Bretons, Scots, Flemish, Basques and Québécois. Were there, then, nations within nations waiting their moment of destiny, or did the revived minority nations spell the dissolution of the older constituted political nations, and if so, what became of the unitary concept of a 'natural' nation?³

There are other grounds for doubting the popular assumption of the naturalness and universality of the nation. We have witnessed the growth of vast superpowers and their military blocs of client-states, each armed with huge arsenals of nuclear and conventional armaments. Even if the individual members of these blocs are still actuated by 'national' considerations, their freedom of action (except perhaps that of the two nuclear superpowers themselves) is severely restricted in the military and political fields and even, to a large extent, in the economic and ideological domains.⁴ The traditional concept of the 'nation-state' is also under attack from another direction; the growth of vast multi-national companies with enormous budgets, high technology, great expertise and skills, and the ability to plan and invest on a large scale over long time-spans, poses a real threat to many states and national communities, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. There is a real danger that medium-sized, let alone small, nation-states or state-nations, will simply become obsolete or be bypassed by the technological, military and economic transformations of the late twentieth century.⁵

All these doubts about the ubiquity and power of the classic (European) nation-state, resulting from pressures within and outside developments, have forced many people, particularly in the worlds of politics and scholarship, to question older assumptions about nationality and to propose a very different perspective for the understanding of nations and nationalism.

Briefly, this perspective holds that far from being a natural or necessary element in the fabric of society and history, the nation is a purely modern phenomenon, a product of strictly modern developments like capitalism, bureaucracy and secular utilitarianism. It is really a quite contingent phenomenon, with roots in neither human nature nor history, even if today it has become ubiquitous because its nationalism accords so well with contemporary conditions. Nations and nationalism, the argument continues, can be dated with some precision to the latter half of the eighteenth century, perhaps a little earlier or later; anything which appears to resemble it, either in antiquity or the Middle Ages, must be understood as purely fortuitous or exceptional. Methodologically, too, this view prescribes the point of separ-

ture for the study of nations and nationalism in the processes and conditions of modernity, for both the recent prevalence of the nation and its absence in pre-modern periods, are necessary correlates of the vast differences between modern industrial civilization and its agrarian predecessors. Conversely, any remaining assumptions about the universality of nations or nationalism can only be attributed to the hold of nationalist beliefs and ideals within the scholarly community itself, beliefs and ideals that are profoundly misleading for analysis and explanation, and perhaps for political action too.⁶

I propose to call the position set out above the 'modernist' view of nations and nationalism. There are, of course, different sub-varieties of 'modernism'.

One school of modernists departs from the economic bases of modern society to explain the ubiquity of modern nations. They argue that, ever since the sixteenth century, certain 'core' states were able to exploit their initial advantages of early market capitalism and a strong administrative apparatus at the expense of the periphery and semi-periphery. Thus Britain, France, Spain and Holland (initially) were able to bring first Eastern Europe, and then Central and Latin America, into a dependent peripheral relationship which contained the seeds of imperialism.⁷ After 1800, the Western bourgeoisies were able to impose a more direct economic and political imperialism on many countries in Asia and Africa, an action which soon evoked resistance by elites in these 'peripheral' zones. This resistance took the form of mass-mobilization. The elites, bereft of any other assets, were compelled to appeal to 'their' masses to counter the political threat contained in this uneven expansion of capitalism, since they wanted Western capital and technology without the political and economic domination that accompanied it.⁸ Nor were these 'peripheries' confined to overseas territories. Within their own boundaries 'at home', the core states were exploiting, over several centuries, ethnic hinterlands and peripheral communities, and such exploitation increased with the rapid growth of economic intercourse generated by industrialization. No wonder, then, that today we are witnessing protests and movements by communities like the Scots and Welsh, Flemish, Bretons, Corsicans, Basques and Catalans, intent on reaffirming and reasserting their identities in the face of economic and cultural threats.⁹

A second school of 'modernists' tends to include a more political dimension in their analysis. A number of recent students of ethnicity argue that ethnic and national units afford convenient 'sites' for generating mass support in the universal struggle of elites for wealth, power and prestige, and that, given a world of scarce resources but high levels of communication, ethnic symbols and boundaries are able to evoke greater commitment and easier modes of co-ordination of different sectional interests under a single banner. According to this view, ethnicity is fundamentally 'instrumental'. It serves purposes other than the cultural goals which its spokesmen proclaim to be its *raison d'être*, but it does so by combining economic and political

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interests with cultural 'affect'. For this reason, ethnic and national communities are often superior to classes in providing resonant bases for mobilizing and co-ordinating mass action in support of collective policies or the pursuit of power by rival elites.¹⁰ It is a view that owes much to the research of Fredrik Barth, the Norwegian social anthropologist, into the symbolic 'border guards' and 'boundary mechanisms' that separate and differentiate social groups in their attitudes and perceptions, and it is a standpoint to which I shall frequently return.¹¹

But perhaps the most interesting and forthright statements of the 'modernist' position come in two recent books by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. Anderson starts from the ever-present need to surmount death which the old religions had tried to grapple with and explain, and from the new modes of communication opened up by the flood of printed words under the novel technology of 'print-capitalism'. With the decline of religion and the rise of the printed word, it has become both possible and necessary to 'imagine' communities, at once sovereign and limited, through which a sense of immortality can be evoked and with which otherwise anonymous individuals can identify. Through the printed word, individuals who do not know each other can appear to inhabit the same homogenous, empty time and an identifiable space by belonging to an imagined community and posterity. Such 'imagined communities' or nations then come to serve vital psychological as well as economic needs under the peculiar modern conditions of secular capitalism.¹²

Perhaps the most cogent exposition of the view that nations and nationalism are purely modern phenomena is contained in the theory of Gellner, which hinges on the requirements of a growth-oriented industrial society. For Gellner, pre-modern 'agro-literate' societies had no place for nations or nationalism; their elites and their food-producing masses were always separated along cultural lines, and this type of society is unable to generate an ideology which could overcome this divide. Modern societies, on the other hand, require cultural homogeneity to function and they *can* generate the necessary ideology. Modern industry requires a mobile, literate, technologically equipped population and the modern state is the only agency capable of providing such a work-force through its support for a mass, public, compulsory and standardized education system. As industrialization and modernization proceed unevenly outwards from their Western heartlands, they necessarily uproot villages and entire regions, eroding traditional structures and cultures and throwing many people out of their environments into one dominated by the anonymity and conflicts of modern urban centres. The result is class conflict over scarce resources in the city, usually between longer-established and newly urbanized classes. But, if the urban melting-pot fails to assimilate the newcomers into the dominant literate culture through the educational system, if, that is, certain groups with special culture traits cannot be absorbed, then the likelihood is for two nationalisms to bring

two new nations into being. This often happens where the newcomers have a different colour or religion (particularly a textual religion); for these are visible and persistent diacritical marks and they tend to surface during the later stages of the industrialization process, generating bitter and protracted conflicts.¹³

What all these approaches share, then, is a belief in the contingency of nationalism and the modernity of the nation. Though they differ over the weight to be attached to different modern processes in stimulating the sense of national identity, they are in complete agreement about the periodicity of nationalism, and the direction of explanation of the modern nation. Quite simply, modernity (the complex of 'modern conditions') is in no way a mode of realizing national identity, much less a product of it, however indirect; the nation and nationalism is a correlate, and an offshoot, of modernity and modern civilization.

In a sense, the 'modernists' are right. Nationalism, as an ideology and movement, is a phenomenon that dates from the later eighteenth century, while a specifically 'national' sentiment can be discerned little earlier than the late fifteenth or sixteenth centuries in Western Europe.¹⁴ The 'nation-state', too, as a political norm is quite modern. If the system of European states came into being at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it was not until the nineteenth century that these states began to be converted into 'nation-states', and hence a system of nation-states came into being.¹⁵ Even the 'nation' and its 'national character' would appear to be modern: certainly, it was not until the early modern period in Europe (the late seventeenth century, to be precise), that the idea of populations being divided by 'national character' and possessing a common identity became widespread among the European educated classes.¹⁶

Yet there are also difficulties with this view. For we find in pre-modern eras, even in the ancient world, striking parallels to the 'modern' idea of national identity and character, in the way Greeks and Romans looked on people who did not share their cultures or come from their city-states; in the way in which ancient Egyptians looked upon Nubians and Asiatics; and in Mesopotamian and Biblical distinctions drawn between different 'peoples'.¹⁷ Again, in the ancient world, we find movements that appear to resemble modern nationalism in several respects, notably a desire to liberate territories conquered by aliens, or to resist foreign encroachments, like the Ionian resistance to Persian expansion in the late sixth century BC or the Gallic resistance to Caesar's campaigns.¹⁸ There is even an ancient analogue for the modern system of nation-states in the Tell-el-Amarna period of the fourteenth century BC, when a number of powerful states – New Kingdom Egypt, the Hittite Empire, the kingdom of Mitanni and Kassite Babylon – were engaged in a complex network of diplomatic and military alliances and conflicts, such as was much later to characterize Europe in the modern period.¹⁹ Even in the intervening period, we find a number of 'barbarian'

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kingdoms in early medieval Europe – Franks, Visigoths, Normans, Lombards – engaging in a network of political relations, albeit of a rudimentary kind.²⁰ Are we then really justified in regarding nations and nationalism as purely modern phenomena? If not, must we return to the older view that national ties and sentiments are the ‘stuff of history’ and a universal attribute of humanity?

This would seem to be the conclusion of ‘primordialists’. Taking their cue from the work of Edward Shils on the importance of ‘primordial’ ties based on language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory, proponents of this view claim that nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience. The sociobiological version of this argument asserts that ethnicity is an extension of kinship, and that kinship is the normal vehicle for the pursuit of collective goals in the struggle for survival.²¹ Sociological versions of the same viewpoint regard language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory as the basic organizing principles and bonds of human association throughout history. In that sense, they are truly ‘primordial’, in that they both precede more complex political formations and provide the bases upon which the latter can be built. Even more important, ‘primordial ties’ have always divided the human species, as naturally as have sex or geography, and will always do so. Hence, there is nothing particularly modern about nationalism, nor is it likely to disappear with any marked alteration of ‘modern conditions’.²²

Actually, these ‘primordialists’ are making two separable claims. They are arguing that nations and nationalism are perennial, and that they are natural. Of course, acceptance of the latter proposition entails acceptance of the former; but not vice versa. One can claim that nations and nationalism have always existed in the historical record, without having to agree that they are, in some sense, ‘natural’ – in the same sense as speech, sex or geography. It is then possible to argue that the units we call ‘nations’ and the sentiments and ideals we call ‘nationalism’ can be found in all periods of history, even when we camouflage the fact by using other terms to describe analogous phenomena. This means that the units and sentiments found in the modern world are simply larger and more effective versions of similar units and sentiments traceable in much earlier periods of human history; and that, given the characteristics of human beings, their propensity to kinship and group belonging and their need for cultural symbolism for communication and meaning, we should expect nations and nationalism to be perennial and, perhaps, universal.²³

This perspective, which we may term ‘perennialism’ in opposition to ‘modernism’ (and to distinguish it from the more radical ‘primordialism’), also has its problems. When the ‘perennialists’ rightly point to the antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments, their claim falls well short of any presumption that such ties and sentiments are universal (let alone ‘natural’, as primordialists assert). When perennialists allude to (universal?) human

characteristics like the need to belong or religious communion, there is little to link these alleged needs with the formation and persistence of nations or nationalism. Moreover, one can concede the antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments without assimilating them, retrospectively, to nations or nationalism, or suggesting that ancient or medieval collective units and sentiments are simply small-scale, primitive forms of modern nations and nationalism. There may be connections between the two, but, if so, these have to be established empirically. In the same way, variations in the scope, intensity, salience and political importance of collective cultural ties and sentiments need to be inserted into any 'perennialist' perspective, and this, too, can only be done through historical analysis of the forms and content of their symbolism and mythology, as well as their role in wider social processes.

Ethnic, myths and symbols

Considerations like these have led some scholars to study the rise of contemporary nations in the context of their ethnic background. This means, as we said, grounding our understanding of modern nationalism on an historical base involving considerable time-spans, to see how far its themes and forms were pre-figured in earlier periods and how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be established. In rejecting the claims of both the modernists, who say that there is a radical break between pre-modern units and sentiments and modern nations and nationalism, and equally of the perennialists, who say that the latter are simply larger, updated versions of pre-modern ties and sentiments, we look to the concept of the *ethnie* or ethnic community and its symbolism, to distance our analysis from the more sweeping claims on either side. On the one hand, rejection of the modernist standpoint immediately concedes a greater measure of continuity between 'traditional' and 'modern', 'agrarian' and 'industrial', eras which many sociologists are prone to firmly dichotomize. Even if the break is radical in some respects, in the sphere of culture it is not as all-encompassing and penetrative as was supposed, and this in turn casts doubt on the explanatory value of concepts like 'industrial society' or 'capitalism' outside their economic context. At the same time, in rejecting the claims of the perennialists, due weight is accorded to the transformations wrought by modernity and their effects on the basic units of human loyalty in which we operate and live. There have, indeed, been important changes within collective units and sentiments, even changes of *form*; but these have occurred within a pre-existing framework of collective loyalties and identities, which has conditioned the changes as much as they have influenced the framework.²⁴

Hence the need for a type of analysis that will bring out the differences and similarities between modern national units and sentiments and the collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras, those that I shall term *ethnie*. Of

crucial importance for such an analysis are the concepts of 'form', 'identity', 'myth', 'symbol' and 'communication' codes. Form is akin to style, in that, though the symbolic contents and meanings of communal creations may change over time, their characteristic mode of expression remains more or less constant. Of course, over very long time-spans, even forms may change (like artistic styles); but this was fairly rare in pre-modern periods, and it required major upheavals, like the Islamic conquest introducing new modes of architecture and law to earlier civilizations, or the Hellenization of the Orient after Alexander's conquests. For the most part, the characteristic 'moulds' of activity and creativity, once in being, form communally identifiable channels or conduits and culturally differentiated repertoires of collective expression. (These may, of course, be larger in extent than ethnic communities, embracing at times whole civilizations and culture-areas; but, more commonly, they are limited to such *ethnie*.)²⁵

The notion of 'identity' has received considerable attention, not least in political science and international relations literature. Here, however, it relates mainly to a sense of community based on history and culture, rather than to any collectivity or to the concept of ideology. In this, I follow the emendation proposed by Epstein to the literature on 'situational' ethnicity, in which the growth of a sense of the collective self is treated as an important part of group (especially ethnic) identity and solidarity. Only here, the sense of self is viewed through the prism of symbols and mythologies of the community's heritage. The need for identification with a community in order to achieve individual identity and self-respect, is in part a function of socialization experiences in the historic culture-community; and the modes and goals of identification are given by the group and its past experiences as they coalesce into a collective 'tradition'.²⁶

The other three concepts are closely inter-related. They indicate an approach which attaches importance to the shared meanings and experiences of individuals, and to their crystallizations over generations in such varied types of phenomena as sacred texts and languages, religious shrines and tombs, styles of dress, art and architecture, music, poetry and dance, legal codes, city planning, forms of hierarchy (civil, military and religious), modes of warfare and production technology, as well as the whole range of crafts and 'minor arts' that so frequently provide us with clues about thoughts, feelings and attitudes of communities. John Armstrong has made a pioneering and monumental contribution in this respect, relating otherwise diverse phenomena into a picture of the factors and dimensions that comprise 'ethnic identities'. He too employs a 'symbolic' analysis, though his approach is more phenomenological and, in the terms employed here, 'instrumentalist', since it follows the model of social interaction laid out by Barth. Hence Armstrong's emphasis upon various 'border guards', symbols that make the barriers between 'us' and 'them' (the strangers or outsiders) visible and, to a lesser extent, on the myths that explain and justify to

members their group identity. Interestingly, Armstrong's analysis casts doubt on some of the modernist positions, notably the idea that there could not be anything resembling nationalism or nations in pre-modern periods. In fact, his study of ethnic identities within medieval Islam and Christendom demonstrates how strong and widespread, if fluctuating, was the sense of ethnic belonging, so that, in a sense, it would be more correct to place him near the 'perennialists'.²⁷

It is, however, not entirely clear in Armstrong's and several other scholars' work as to whether and how far they would make a distinction between ethnic community and nation, and ethnic identity and nationalism.²⁸ In what follows, an attempt is made to distinguish these two sets of concepts, while charting their empirical connections. Hence, the first part is devoted to the concepts of ethnic community (*ethnie*), ethnocentrism and ethnicism, together with related notions of lateral and vertical *ethnie*, and of ethnic survival capacities and ethnic dissolution. Only in the second part do I consider the formation of nations, the two types of nation and route to nationhood, and the manner in which many modern *ethnie* are being transformed, more or less successfully, into nations, while at the same time retaining or reconstructing an 'authentic' and particularistic ethnic heritage. Our aim throughout is to trace the ethnic foundations and roots of modern nations, and thereby suggest an important modification of 'modernist' positions. It is with this object in mind, that emphasis is laid upon the cultural forms of sentiments, attitudes and perceptions, as these are expressed and codified in myths, memories, values and symbols.

What I shall be arguing is that the 'core' of ethnicity, as it has been transmitted in the historical record and as it shapes individual experience, resides in this quartet of 'myths, memories, values and symbols' and in the characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations. Which these 'configurations' are that deserve the epithet of 'ethnic' we shall outline in the next chapter, together with the characteristic 'shape' or structure of such *ethnie*. Special emphasis is laid on what is termed the '*myth-symbol*' complex, and particularly the '*mythomoteur*' or constitutive myth of the ethnic polity; both indicate the vital role of myths and symbols as embodying the corpus of beliefs and sentiments which the guardians of ethnicity preserve, diffuse and transmit to future generations.²⁹ In other words, the special qualities and durability of *ethnie* are to be found, neither in their ecological locations, nor their class configurations, nor yet their military and political relationships, important as all these are for day-to-day experiences and medium-term chances of survival of specific ethnic communities. Rather one has to look at the nature (forms and content) of their myths and symbols, their historical memories and central values, which we can summarize as the '*myth-symbol*' complex, at the mechanisms of their diffusion (or lack of it) through a given population, and their transmission to future generations, if one wishes to grasp the special character of *ethnic* identities.

Because, as I shall argue, ethnicity is largely 'mythic' and 'symbolic' in character, and because myths, symbols, memories and values are 'carried' in and by forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only very slowly, so *ethnie*, once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable under 'normal' vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming 'moulds' within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact. Only in quite exceptional circumstances do outside pressures, in concert with internal alterations, engineer a radical breakdown of the quality of ethnicity in particular instances, such that we may speak of 'ethnocide' or even 'genocide'. These are rare cases. It is much more common for *ethnie* either to alter their qualities of ethnicity to the extent that we may infer a change of ethnic community or for their forms and contents to become gradually attenuated in the face of both internal cleavages and external pressures of assimilation and absorption.

In the first case, demographic changes within the territory are less important than cultural ones. There may be an influx of new populations as a ruling minority, but the vital factor is a radical discontinuity in the 'myth-symbol' complex and *mythomoteur* of the majority population, such as occurred during the Islamization of Egypt after the Arab conquest, but not to the same extent after the Islamization of Iran. In the second case, demographic change is the major cause of cultural. The new immigrants overwhelm the old inhabitants, both physically and culturally, introducing a fairly radical break with ancient 'myth-symbol' complexes and *mythomoteurs*, such as occurred in post-Roman Greece under early Byzantine rule, though even here continuities were visible centuries later. The fact that, in all three cases, modern nationalisms are seeking to revive (or have sought to do so) the earlier 'myth-symbol' complexes and *mythomoteurs*, with varying degrees of serious intent and success, or to combine these with later complexes and *mythomoteurs*, sheds an ironic light on non-symbolic definitions of ethnicity, and suggests an even greater durability of ethnic forms and contents, in the heart of the modern era, than had been envisaged by recent 'instrumentalist' and modernist theories of nationalism.

The durability of ethnic communities

The underlying motif of this enquiry, then, is the nature and durability of ethnic forms and contents and the relationship between earlier ethnic identities and later national ones. This is not meant to suggest that ethnic and national identities form some continuum of necessary collective identities, or that the quest for 'identity', individual or collective, is a cultural universal. While it is true that the historical evidence would suggest the near-ubiquitous and temporally recurrent quality of ethnicity, *ethnie* appear-

ing in all continents and periods of which we have written records, this may well result from an inflation of that record, due to the frequent confusion of language with ethnicity and the special interests of literati in pre-modern eras in preserving their communal positions by promoting an ethnic heritage. Nevertheless, even when we have subtracted many dubious 'cases' of *ethnie* which turn out to be branches of other *ethnie*, or which were wrongly thought to constitute *ethnie* by the chronicler or epic poet, we are still left with a very large number of genuine ethnic communities scattered across the globe and spread out through every epoch of human history. While this does not of itself lend sufficient weight to a 'perennialist' thesis, it does require us to amend 'modernist' positions significantly. For it suggests that not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to 'nation-building'. This, in turn, requires us to re-think the nature and meanings of 'modernity' and 'modern society' in a manner adumbrated by a few of the classical sociological thinkers.

There is, of course, nothing novel in the suggestion that elements of older types of social structure and culture (whether we call these 'traditional' or 'pre-capitalist' or 'agrarian' hardly matters) persist within the most contemporary modes of social organization and culture. Durkheim had argued powerfully for this standpoint, and a number of writers on 'modernization', both in general and in specific instances (like the survival of 'caste systems', particularly in India), have supported him.³⁰ This standpoint, it should be noted, represents an intermediate position between those that I have termed 'perennialism' and 'modernism', and it seems to me that it most adequately captures the often subtle relationships between modern nations and older *ethnie*, and between modern nationalism and a more long-lived and ancient ethnocentrism. For it allows us to do justice to a variety of modern situations involving ethnicity and nationalism. On the one hand, there are well attested cases of nations emerging on the basis (in space and time) of enduring *ethnie*, which are accordingly 'transformed' and 'regenerated' from their perceived state of decay or subjection. On the other hand, we find a variety of cases where there was little in the way of a pre-existing *ethnie* in the particular area chosen for the site of a modern nation; perhaps some lingering memories of former greatness nearby and some cultural differences or 'markers' which modern elites could use to 'reconstruct' nations with a semblance of antique pedigree. There are even a few cases of 'invented *ethnie*', like the Bangala in the former Belgian Congo, where fortuitous missionary outposts became the site for a cleavage between members of *ethnie* who converted or congregated around the outposts and those who did not. But an extreme case like this is fairly rare. Usually, there has been some ethnic basis for the construction of modern nations, be it only some dim memories and elements of culture and alleged ancestry, which it is hoped to revive, as latter-day Occitanian

nationalists have tried to do. Even these cases, by their relative lack of success (to date), witness to the importance of a sense of ethnic heritage and ties in the project of proposing and elaborating the concept of a nation.³¹

One of the benefits, then, of adopting a standpoint intermediate to that of the 'perennialists' and 'modernists' is that it allows one to delineate different patterns of nation-formation, according to the degree to which an 'ethnic mosaic' persisted in the relevant area up to the eve of the era of nationalism. In arguing, however, for a greater measure of continuity between many *ethnie* and modern nations, we do not wish to reject some of the insights of the 'modernist' position, with its analysis of the modern and peculiar features of 'nations' and 'nationalism'. Nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon, even if, as we shall see, the 'modern nation' in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern *ethnie* and owes much to the general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the 'modern era'. What my analysis hopes to reveal is the wide range and durability of historical *ethnie* in pre-modern eras, at least in Europe and Asia (but probably also in Africa), a field of enquiry relatively neglected by sociologists; and secondly, the impact of this phenomenon on the shape and content of modern nations and nationalism, and one that sets limits to elite attempts to manipulate and mobilize populations in their strategies of national construction. If the analysis here proposed is correct, then it has profound implications for 'instrumentalist' approaches to ethnicity and nationalism. For it suggests that there are 'ethnic roots' which determine, to a considerable degree, the nature and limits of modern nationalisms and nations, and which elites must respect if they are to achieve their short-term objectives. The cultural forms within which we operate are themselves powerful determinants of both our goals and the means we can employ to attain them.

Part I

Ethnic communities in
pre-modern eras

2

Foundations of ethnic community

The English language possesses no term for the concept of an ethnic group or ethnic community. The loose and ambiguous term 'people' which is sometimes put forward, often carries connotations that are quite foreign to those of an ethnic community and suggests that they are always and inevitably 'popular'.¹ The Greek term covers a variety of usages: we hear of *ethnos etairōn*, a band of comrades, or *ethnos laōn*, a host of men, in the Iliad; of *ethnos Achaiōn* or *Lukiōn*, the tribe of Achaeans or Lycians, also in Homer, along with *kluta ethnea nekrōn*, glorious hosts of corpses/the dead, in the Odyssey; of *ethnea melissōn* or *ornithōn*, a swarm of bees or flock of birds, again in the Iliad; *ethnos anerōn* or *gunaikōn*, the race of men or women, in Pindar; and *to Mēdikon ethnos*, the Median people or nation, in Herodotus, as well as in the Attic orators. We also find the term used of a particular caste or tribe, as the caste of heralds (*ethnos kērukikōn*) in Plato, or of sex, as *to thēlu ethnos*, women, in Xenophon. Finally, the word came to be applied to the Gentiles (*ta ethnē*) by the New Testament writers and Church Fathers, that is, all national groups except Christians and Jews.²

In all these usages, the common denominator appears to be the sense of a number of people or animals living together and acting together, though not necessarily belonging to the same clan or tribe; Herodotus at least suggests at one point that such 'tribes' (*genos*) are sub-divisions of an *ethnos* (though he also uses *genos* to signify a people or nation or race, or even a breed of animals). Nor did Greeks appear to distinguish between tribes and nations, or between bands and races; but the term *genos* appears to have been reserved for kinship-based groups more than *ethnos*, the range and connotations of which are correspondingly broader and less obviously related to any kinship basis. In other words, *ethnos* would appear to be more suited to cultural rather than biological or kinship differences; it is the similarity of cultural attributes in a group that attracts the term *ethnos*.³

The nearest we get in modern Western languages to the common denominator of Greek usages is the French term 'ethnie', which unites an

emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of an historical community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders.⁴ It is, of course, a moot point how far this individuality is a purely subjective phenomenon, how far, that is, we are dealing with the *sense* of common ethnicity rather than any 'objective' ethnic reality. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, such 'reality' as we shall impute to *ethnie* is essentially social and cultural: the generic features of *ethnie* are derived, less from 'objective' indicators like fertility, literacy or urbanization rates (important though these are in given circumstances), than from the meanings conferred by a number of men and women over some generations on certain cultural, spatial and temporal properties of their interaction and shared experiences.⁵ As men and women interpret and express their collective experiences (including their conflicts) within any grouping or population thrown together by circumstances, these interpretations and expressions are crystallized over time and handed onto the next generations who modify them, according to their own experiences and interactions. In this way there arise certain ethnic features formed out of these shared interpretations and expressions, which in turn limit and condition the interactions and perceptions of succeeding generations through the temporal and spatial configuration of the collectivity and through the shared meanings which inform and guide the activities of its members. As a result, the features of any *ethnie*, whatever its distant origins, take on a binding, exterior quality for any member or generation, independent of their perceptions and will; they possess a quality of historicity that itself becomes an integral part of subsequent ethnic interpretations and expressions.⁶

If the French term appears to capture the peculiar cultural individuality and shared historicity of ethnicity, what are the chief features which distinguish *ethnie* from other collectivities of human beings and which enable us to recognize one when we come across it?

The dimensions of *ethnie*

A collective name

This is the identifying mark of an *ethnie* in the historical record. So important were names in antiquity, so crucial to potency, that to name a person or god was thought to be equivalent to identifying his or her 'essence', something that reverence and awe forbade. In later post-Exilic Judaism, for example, the sacred name of God could not be pronounced; its place was taken by expressions of God's power in general, and among the very Orthodox this sentiment and practice persists till today.⁷

Are there any unnamed *ethnie* (short of ruling them out by definitional fiat)? I do not know of any. The historical record is more replete with collective names than descriptions of the cultures and social structures of the populations to which they pertain (indeed, there are many more names than we can identify separate 'populations'). But it may be that some very small *ethnie* went unnamed (just as, conversely, loose coalitions of various groups or classes were given names by scribes or chroniclers who knew hardly anything about them, and mistook them for well-formed *ethnie*). In some African cases, small *ethnie* went unrecorded until modern ethnographers 'discovered' them and differentiated them from their neighbours by naming them; the already cited case of the Bangala is only the most striking, but the recent prominence of the Jewish 'tribe' called the Falashas or (by themselves) Beta Israel, raises interesting questions about collective naming. It would appear that for some members of this semi-segregated group, they were simply children of the house of Israel, cut off from the rest of the Israelites centuries and millennia ago, and looking to the land of Israel as their spiritual centre, whereas for the predominantly Christian Amharic, Tigre and Galla neighbours, they were singled out as 'exiles' or 'strangers' (the meaning of the term 'Falasha' in Amharic), but not given an otherwise identifying name.⁸

Perhaps, too, *ethnie* that were in process of formation went unnamed. An interesting example of this occurred recently in Yugoslavia, where the Muslims of Bosnia have decided to adopt the name 'Muslim' as an ethnic designation in the Yugoslav census which requires everyone to name their nationality. This, in spite of the fact that many such Bosnian Muslims no longer adhere to the beliefs and practices of Islam. Yet they identified themselves, and were identified by others, by reference to their religious origins (the fact that they *had been* Muslims) in a society where nationality and religious affiliation were closely intertwined, preferring this identity as their emblem than the name of the province they had so long inhabited. Yet only when their sense of community and difference had reached a certain point of consciousness and common awareness, under the pressure of Yugoslav social and political obligations, did the Muslims feel the need to adopt a census-name within a multi-national system.⁹

In general, however, collective names are a sure sign and emblem of ethnic communities, by which they distinguish themselves and summarize their 'essence' to themselves – as if in a name lay the magic of their existence and guarantee of their survival. Like talismans, collective names have taken on mystic connotations of potency; once again, the mythic quality of a name is far more important to the study of ethnicity than any sober account of its origins and practical uses would suggest. A collective name 'evokes' an atmosphere and drama that has power and meaning for those whom it includes, and none at all (or a quite different resonance) for outsiders. Even though a collective name may originate from a city or district rather than a

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personage or clan (*gens*) – Akkadians or Carthaginians – it acquires over generations an aura for members of the named community, especially when certain achievements and qualities are associated with that community. So, the name summons up images of the distinctive traits and characteristics of a community in the minds and imaginations of its participants and outsiders – as well as posterity – though these images may differ widely. Part of any study of ethnicity is to discover and grasp these different images of community which names evoke.

A common myth of descent

In many ways the *sine qua non* of ethnicity, the key elements of that complex of meanings which underlie the sense of ethnic ties and sentiments for the participants, myths of origins and descent provide the means of collective location in the world and the charter of the community which explains its origins, growth and destiny.

It goes without saying that I am concerned here, not with actual descent, but with the sense of imputed common ancestry and origins. A myth of descent attempts to provide an answer to questions of similarity and belonging: why are we all alike? Why are we one community? Because we came from the same place, at a definite period of time and are descended from the self-same ancestor, we necessarily belong together and share the same feelings and tastes. This 'explanation' brings together the twin elements of the Greek term *ethnos*, the ideas of living together and being alike in culture, but adds the secondary meaning of the term, namely, a sense of tribal belonging through common family ties, rather than any sense of genetic and blood ties.¹⁰

It is easy to dismiss such 'myths of descent' as so many *post hoc* collective self-justifications and rationalizations, much as some commentators and scholars treat Hindu theological principles and ritual rules as rationalizations of a caste system in India which is allegedly based on landowning and religious exploitation.¹¹ But, quite apart from the fact that intellectual consciousness and 'explanation' are more important elements of ethnicity than in the case of, say, class or regionalism, this is to miss the real purpose of myths of descent, which are more expressive and mobilizing than cognitive. There is also an important aesthetic dimension; ethnic symbols provide satisfying forms, and ethnic myths are conveyed in apt genres, for communication and mobilization. As they emerge from the collective experiences of successive generations, the myths coalesce and are edited into chronicles, epics and ballads, which combine cognitive maps of the community's history and situation with poetic metaphors of its sense of dignity and identity. The fused and elaborated myths provide an overall framework of meaning for the ethnic community, a *mythomoteur*, which 'makes sense' of its experiences and defines its 'essence'. Without a *mythomoteur* a group

cannot define itself to itself or to others, and cannot inspire or guide collective action.¹²

Myths of descent usually reveal several components and layers of legend. There are myths of spatial and temporal origins, of migration, of ancestry and filiation, of the golden age, of decline and exile and rebirth. It is only much later that these separate myth-motifs are brought together to form a fully elaborated mythology of origins and descent. Often this is the work of nationalist intellectuals in the modern era; but we also find quite elaborate sets of myth-motifs in pre-modern eras, as in the Homeric canon or the Bible or the Iranian Book of Kings. In each, a kernel of 'historical truth' is decked out with fantasies and half-truths so as to provide a pleasing and coherent 'story' of the ways in which the community was formed and developed. Often, there are variant tales and conflicting stories. Different generations recorded their experiences in alternative accounts using the same epic and poetic forms, the same artistic genres and, even, symbols. The result is a patchwork of myth and legend, and an accretion of materials which requires often painful sifting to arrive at any approximation to a 'scientific' account of communal history. But then the object of this profusion of myth was not scientific 'objectivity', but emotional and aesthetic coherence to undergird social solidarity and social self-definition.¹³

A shared history

Ethnie are nothing if not historical communities built up on shared memories. A sense of common history unites successive generations, each with its set of experiences which are added to the common stock, and it also defines a population in terms of experienced temporal sequences, which convey to later generations the historicity of their own experiences. In other words, historical sequences provide 'forms' for later experiences, channels and moulds for their interpretation. It hardly matters that a community's sense of shared history, of the events and personages that punctuated its progress, often fail to correspond with what later 'disinterested scholarship' discloses of that history in the light of multiple evidence, or suggests is of importance in the development of the community. For the participants, the very sense of their history which they share, itself a major datum of the record, must often 'fill out' and give coherence to what might otherwise seem a skeletal tale and sketchy and conflicting evidence. So the 'traditions' of the community themselves become an essential ingredient of that record, as where the Hadith of the Prophet are used to supplement the Qur'an, or the Exodus traditions of the twelve Israelite tribes have to be treated as a partly valid record of Israelite origins.

What matters, then, is not the authenticity of the historical record, much less any attempt at 'objective' methods of historicizing, but the poetic, didactic and integrative purposes which that record is felt to disclose.

'History' in this sense must tell a story, it must please and satisfy as narrative, it must be all of a piece, like the Homeric epics and Ossian.¹⁴ It must also educate. The heroes and heroines whose deeds it unfolds must embody the virtues held precious by the community and conform to its stereotypes – the Indian holy man, the Turkish warrior, the Jewish sage. New strata, as they emerge and take power, may add to the established stock of 'virtues' in accordance with the new values they espouse – the British entrepreneur, the Chinese peasant and the Russian factory worker, to take some latter-day examples. This may lead to conflict between two or more ethnic traditions for the monopoly of education and historical interpretation, as happened in nineteenth-century Greece, when Orthodox priests and the new intelligentsia and bourgeoisie competed in classroom and university for the monopoly of national interpretation of Greek history along Byzantine or Hellenic lines. Yet, even this competition had integrative functions. For the effect of rivalry in the interpretation of history is to create a heightened consciousness of ethnicity in a given population, and even a higher level of integration through conflict among competing pressure groups and classes of the same community, by suggesting common destinies founded upon shared pasts. In the short term, rival 'histories' may divide the community or sharpen existing class conflicts; but over the long term, the effect of their propagation and inculcation is to deepen the sense of shared identity and destiny in a particular community.

A distinctive shared culture

Over and above myths of descent and common memories, *ethnie* are differentiated by one or more elements of 'culture' which both help to bind members together and to separate them from outsiders. This is what Benjamin Akzin termed the 'similarity-dissimilarity' pattern, where members of an *ethnie* are similar and alike in those cultural traits in which they are dissimilar from nonmembers.¹⁵ The most common shared and distinctive traits are those of language and religion; but customs, institutions, laws, folklore, architecture, dress, food, music and the arts, even colour and physique, may augment the differences or take their place. The present unity among the Black population in the United States is based, not upon language or even religion, but upon pigmentation and the sufferings and prejudice which it has come to express and symbolize. In this case, 'passing' becomes difficult, and even though the Blacks lost much of their African ethnic heritages and have become culturally almost Americanized, yet a yearning for a Black American culture all their own, apart from the White ethnic cultures around them, persisted and latterly flourished to produce a counter-culture with its own special flavour and traits, such as jazz, Black studies and the cult of Black physical beauty.¹⁶ Among the Scots, language long ago ceased to play a differentiating and unifying role, once Lallans had

become the language of the Lowlands. Instead, institutions like the Presbyterian Kirk, the Scottish legal system and the Scottish system of education, have formed the social bulwark for a continuing Scots sense of ethnic identity, in which these distinctive elements of 'culture' augment and also embody the collective memories of independent statehood in previous centuries.¹⁷ In other cases, religion may coincide or cross-cut other features of shared culture, like language. In the Armenian case, religious community and language community coincide; whereas in Switzerland, in many respects an unusual case, language and religion cut across each other, especially in cantons like the Vaud, which display two languages and two versions of Christianity.¹⁸

Examples could be multiplied to show that language, long held to be the main, if not the sole, differentiating mark of ethnicity, is often irrelevant or divisive for the sense of ethnic community. The difference in speech between the Gaelic-speaking Highlands and the Lallans-speaking Lowlands did not impair the sense of Scottish identity, and English-speaking Welsh in South Wales may feel just as ethnically Welsh as their Welsh-speaking compatriots in northern Wales.¹⁹ In the Jura mountains the French language has been an important diacritical mark for the sense of Jurassien identity. But in the southern part of the Jura, where French-speaking Jurassiens also share their Protestant religion with the dominant German-speaking community of the canton of Berne into which they had been incorporated since 1815, protest against that incorporation was muted and the southern Jurassiens at first voted to stay in the canton of Berne. In Yugoslavia, the old enmity between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats is, in practise, one of religious community, since language differences are very slight; for all practical purposes, Serbo-Croat represents a unified language which affords no basis for two nationalisms.²⁰

Yet scholars persist in regarding language as the distinguishing mark of ethnicity, a standpoint that leads to gross simplification and misunderstanding of both ancient and modern periods of ethnic community. Without doubt, a peculiar and distinctive language, such as the Basque or Hungarian, often signifies a radically separate *ethnie*, which it reinforces, but other cultural elements play an important role and sometimes, as among the American Blacks, supersede it altogether. Besides, language is one of the most malleable and dependant cultural categories; apart from the great language fissures (for example, between Romance, Slavonic and Germanic language groups in Europe), particular linguistic formations are largely the product of the interplay of religion and political organization in a given area. Hence any delineation of the 'cultural' aspect of *ethnie* must include all manifestations of culture and look beneath the immediate and salient sign of communication which a shared language expresses, to the underlying life-styles and values of the community.²¹

Cultural uniqueness is also important for ethnicity. The *ethnie* in question

should appear to be, not only distinctive, but incommensurable, either by having a language which is unrelated to other languages, or a religious community entirely to itself, or because among a host of ethnic cultures it stands out by virtue of a cultural characteristic all its own, such as colour or institutions, or because the combination of its otherwise cross-cultural traits is unique. The first case is represented by the Basques; the second by the Jews and Armenians and Sikhs; the third by the Blacks in America or the Maori in New Zealand after White settlement, and the last case by the Bangladeshi, who share religion with the Muslims of India and Pakistan, but possess an Indian culture in a special language, Bengali, or the Flemish who share their Catholic religion with the Walloons but their language with their Dutch neighbours to the north. In fact, the greater the number of differentiating cultural ties and/or unique cultural traits, the more intense the sense of separate ethnicity, and the greater the chances of ethnic persistence.²²

An association with a specific territory

Ethnie always possess ties to a particular locus or territory, which they call their 'own'. They may well reside in that territory; or the association with it may be just a potent memory. An *ethnie* need not be in physical possession of 'its' territory; what matters is that it has a symbolic geographical centre, a sacred habitat, a 'homeland', to which it may symbolically return, even when its members are scattered across the globe and have lost their homeland centuries ago. *Ethnie* do not cease to be *ethnie* when they are dispersed and have lost their homeland; for ethnicity is a matter of myths, memories, values and symbols, and not of material possessions or political power, both of which require a habitat for their realization. It is even possible for an *ethnie* to exchange one homeland for another, as did the Turkish communities who migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia in the tenth and thirteenth centuries, or the Arabs, who left their peninsula to conquer and settle in distant lands, or the Norsemen who left Scandinavian fjords for France, England, Sicily and beyond.

Territory is relevant to ethnicity, therefore, not because it is actually possessed, nor even for its 'objective' characteristics of climate, terrain and location, though they influence ethnic conceptions, but because of an alleged and felt symbiosis between a certain piece of earth and 'its' community. Again, poetic and symbolic qualities possess greater potency than everyday attributes; a land of dreams is far more significant than any actual terrain.²³

This is well illustrated by three aspects of ethnic homelands: sacred centres, commemorative association and external recognition. Each homeland possesses a centre or centres that are deemed to be 'sacred' in a religio-ethnic sense. They become foci for pilgrimages, because the shrine of saint or god is closely associated with the *ethnie* which stands under his or

her protection, like the shrine of the Black Madonna at Yasna Gora in Poland, or the Kaaba in Mecca. Certain towns or cities may also be designated 'holy', because of a temple or cult or school of ethno-religious learning, like Qom and Mashad in Iran, or Echmiadzin in Armenia, or Musasir, the sacred city of ancient Urartu in what is now northern Kurdistan. Their symbolic and emotive attributes radiate outwards and draw outlying or exiled members of the community back to the fold, even if only in memory and prayer; for religious salvation is now anchored to a sacred territory around the centre and, by extension, to the community itself.

Second, when an *ethnie* and 'its' homeland are separated, perhaps by external power, there often remains an 'association' or tie between people and territory. This association itself becomes an essential part of the collective memory and identity of the community. The land becomes part of its lore and a focus for collective dreams. Concepts of heaven are articulated with reference to the much-loved features of the land, exiled communities are measured by their distance from it, designs for its recovery and restoration are imagined, and members identify themselves by their 'origins' in the land, mixing territory with genealogy even centuries after most physical ties with the territory have been sundered, as has been the case with the Jews and, to some extent, with the Armenian communities in exile.

Third, when outsiders identify members of the community, they often do so by reference to their territorial 'origins', so that the term 'ethnic' has acquired additional connotations of 'being from the same original homeland'. Thus, in the United States or Argentina, immigrants are 'placed' according to their 'land of origins' and ethnicity is assumed to incorporate this reference to the habitat of emigration. More generally, recognition is accorded to *ethnie* who still inhabit their 'original home', like the Bretons in Brittany, the Mongols in Mongolia or the Tibetans in Tibet. In other words, there is a popular assumption of symbiosis between a community and 'its' ethnic territory, despite cases to the contrary, like the Gypsies, where a community has been scattered across a wide area. But, for a piece of territory to become a 'homeland', it must be both 'associated' and 'recognized': felt by the community to belong to it, as they to the territory, and acknowledged by outsiders as rightfully belonging to the community which claims that territory. Herein lies part of the tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: in a dual association and dual recognition with a single piece of historic territory.²⁴

A sense of solidarity

An *ethnie* in my terminology is not just a category of population with a common name, descent myths, history, culture and territorial association. It is also a community with a definite sense of identity and solidarity which often finds institutional philanthropic expression. In the eighteenth century

and earlier, one would probably be justified in regarding, say, the Slovaks or Ukrainians as an 'ethnic category'; to an observer, they possessed many of the ethnic elements we have outlined, but little or no sense of community and solidarity. This was also true of the Hausa ethnic states of the nineteenth century, or the Ottoman Turkish tribes of the fifteenth century and beyond, though here even a collective name was ambiguous or doubtful. To an outsider attuned to ethnicity, such categorical groupings seemed potential *ethnie*; to the members, internal divisions into valley communities, clans and principalities seemed more important for identity. Few members seemed to be aware of a wider unity, for few had travelled beyond the narrow confines of their immediate unit of loyalty or been called upon to act in concert with similar units of the category, except in moments of crisis and battle. Perhaps, too, the collective memory had no mould in which it could assume fixed and characteristic form, and therefore was unable to bring to the fore that insistent, strong 'voice' which we call style. The lack of a written canon, or literature, was evident in the case of the early nineteenth-century Ukrainians, and the early twentieth-century Ewe, whose native Anlo speech was only set down and given literary form by Protestant missionaries.²⁵

To qualify, therefore, as an ethnic community or *ethnie* (as opposed to just an ethnic category), there must also emerge a strong sense of belonging and an active solidarity, which in time of stress and danger can override class, factional or regional divisions within the community. In practice, the sense of active solidarity and co-operation varies considerably, as it does in latterday fully-fledged and recognized nations. But, if we are to speak of a genuine *ethnie*, this sense of solidarity and community must animate at least the educated upper strata, who can, if need be, communicate it to other strata and regions in the community. It is quite possible for ethnic solidarity to be overlaid by other types of allegiance for certain periods, be they dynastic, congregational, class or regional; but, where an *ethnie* is concerned, we should expect the periodic re-emergence of ethnic solidarity and institutional co-operation in sufficient force and depth to override these other kinds of loyalty, especially in the face of external enemies and dangers.

The six 'components' of *ethnie* which I have isolated here afford a working definition of ethnicity, one which enables us to delimit the field from the adjacent ones of class and religious communities, and from territorial polities. In practice, some of the elements or components vary in degree of clarity, scope and intensity; myths of ancestry may be confused, historical memories may seem sketchy and the lines of cultural difference appear hazy and blurred. Nevertheless, enquiry into these six dimensions will generally reveal the extent to which we are dealing with an *ethnie* or an ethnic category, or simply some regional variation of an *ethnie*, or indeed a class or religious

community or polity. Similarly, we would claim that collectivities in the process of 'ethnic formation' will generally seek to augment their shared characteristics and differences along those of the six dimensions they appear to be deficient in – in so far as this is within their power. But, then, given the important element of subjective perception, will, symbolism and communication involved, it is not impossible for would-be *ethnie* to develop their cultural differences, find appropriate names, re-construct an appropriate history and pedigree, or even a mythical homeland, out of the hazy memories, existing cultural markers and sense of shared origins and community that have given an impetus to ethnic formation in the first place. In other words, if a group of people feel they are a community, because of shared memories and an association with a territory or a myth of shared ancestry, it will not prove impossible to find a name, extend their solidarity and gradually formulate their own culture (based on separate religion, or customs, or language, or institutions or colour), so as to become an *ethnie* in the full sense of the term. It is, I should add, far more difficult to create an ethnic community which possesses a territory and even some element of separate culture, but little in the way of historical memories or myths of descent. Herein lies the problem of new and revolutionary would-be nations.

Two 'absences' among these six criteria (or better, dimensions) should be noted. One is economic unity, or a unified division of labour; the other, common legal rights and a common polity. In fact, pre-modern *ethnie* rarely show anything approaching economic unity. They are usually made up of numerous clans or villages who practise nomadic pastoralism or a local, self-subsistent agriculture. Hence, local economic ties tend to be more important than wider ethnic ones. This is not to deny the presence of some long-distance trade, encouraged by the rulers of an ethnic kingdom; but, as several African historians have shown, rarely does such trade equal, let alone replace, the 'domestic' mode of production characteristic of most African societies and cultures. Even, the rarer feudal-type societies were economically localized; this is also true perhaps of the ancient world, outside the Roman empire.²⁶

Nor can one really speak of common legal rights, even where 'ethnic polities' appear, as in ancient Egypt or Solomonic Israel. Not only were these kingdoms class-divided, they were also regionalized, and there was no concept of common legal rights, let alone 'citizenship' in virtue of membership of the *ethnie* (though later in the Judean commonwealth, something approaching it may have been practised for the adult male population). Even less can one call such 'ethnic polities' 'nations'; as we shall see, they lacked these and other elements of nations, and also the ideology of nationalism, even though in certain other respects ethnic elements persist today. But here we anticipate. For the moment, the need is to establish the bases and diffusion of ethnicity, if we are to understand the modernity, or otherwise, of nations.

Some bases of ethnic formation

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, *ethnie* (ethnic communities) may now be defined as named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. I shall try to show that such communities have been widespread in all eras of history, at least since the onset of the Bronze Age in the Middle East and Aegean, when written records appear to recount communal exploits and chronicle ethnic vicissitudes, and that they still characterize many areas of the globe and are to be found even in the most modernized states of the industrialized world. I am not claiming that they have constituted the main mode of socio-cultural organization, let alone the sole one, even in pre-modern eras; only that they have been at least as important as other forms of organization and culture, and that we therefore neglect them at our peril. Even today they remain of significance in several culture-areas, notably Africa and parts of Asia, but also in the Soviet Union, Europe and North America. Nor would I claim that ethnicity, let alone *ethnie*, have been continuous, even if invisible. That would smack of the 'perennialism', even 'primordialism', which has been rejected. Instead, I hope to show that *ethnie* (different ones, usually) have emerged and re-emerged at different periods in several continents and culture-areas right up to the modern era; and that ethnicity has remained as a socio-cultural 'model' for human organization and communication from the early third millennium BC until today, even if not every 'society' has followed this model of organization. In other words, while making no claims for its universality, I am arguing for the widespread and chronic, if intermittent, appearance and persistence of this phenomenon. The paradox of ethnicity is its mutability in persistence, and its persistence through change.

To appreciate this paradox, and understand the remarkable resilience of *ethnie* and ethnicity, it is necessary to examine some of the recurrent factors that help to form and maintain *ethnie* and ethnic identity. Others are charted in Armstrong's far-ranging study; here I wish to single out and elaborate three sets of factors, the first two of which he highlights, albeit in somewhat different form, and the third, while not treated in its own right, hovers and explodes at various points in his discussion.

Sedentarization and nostalgia

In his last work, Rushton Coulborn postulated an immigration-crisis theory of the beginnings of civilizations. He argued that land dessication, in Russia and Central Asia, had driven late Neolithic communities south into the river basins of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and Indus, and east to the Yellow River. Here they took up a completely different mode of life from their

former pastoral or nomadic existence; even where they had already practised some early form of agriculture, their new environment with its very different crops, forced them to transform their mode of production and social organization. Coulborn goes on to claim that the process of immigration and forced adaptation *en masse* to a new mode of life was felt to be stressful and dangerous. There was always the fear of social breakdown and anarchy, if the crops failed and irrigation practices did not avert the river floods. To counter this possibility, new beliefs and practices arose on a far more organized and ritualized basis; a special stratum, the priesthood, was entrusted with ensuring crop fertility and the prevention of flooding, and a special locus was created, the temple, to act as economic as well as religious centre for propitiating the gods and securing their favours. In this way, a new kind of symbolic and organized religion with its rituals and pantheons arose to overcome the threat of social disintegration posed by the difficulties new immigrants faced in their economic adaptation to a different and unfamiliar environment.²⁷

The significance of Coulborn's thesis lies less in its materialistic interpretation of organized religion, than in the importance he assigns to the process and trauma of sedentarization, and the contrast he draws between the two life-styles, the nomadic and sedentary. For the purposes of ethnicity and ethnic persistence, three consequences of this process should be noted. The first is a new 'localism'. Instead of the fairly wide distances traversed by many nomads (though there are many short-distance nomadic groups), early agrarian cultures are composed of small village settlements, comprising a network of districts, exchanging products between their constituent villages or with a small local town. This type of production and residential pattern gives rise to distinctive local patterns of work and ties of loyalty; a scattered peasantry forms congeries of farming settlements under village headmen, who generally pay a fixed tribute to the chiefs or to the local officials of a provincial governor, who represents the ruler and his circle in the distant city. Trade, too, is localized and lack of communications impede any wider sense of political loyalty beyond the district.

Out of this economic pattern of local ties and local exchange, there developed characteristic 'folk rhythms' and Little Traditions studied by social anthropologists like Robert Redfield. These include local myths and legends, patois and dialects, rites and customs which tend to persist for generations in the countryside, and which complement the work patterns and residence patterns of the peasantry. This round of weekly, seasonal and life cycles, with their associated feasts and customs and *rites de passage*, comprises the religious and folk cultures of peasants and tribesmen in many ancient and medieval societies everywhere, cultures that have provided latter-day nationalists with many a motif for their constructions of the 'nation' of their dreams.²⁸

Third, one finds a specific 'nostalgia', to use Armstrong's term, associated with nomadic and sedentary life-styles, which embodies a yearning for a lost past, particularly on the part of sedentarized nomads. This nostalgia takes

many forms. It may focus on desert steppes or plains, on forests or mountains, the cradle of the community or the seat of its halcyon days. It may induce a desire to return to a homeland that has been lost, or a passionate attachment to the homeland that has been forged after migration. It may attach a community to its former, or adopted, life-style, more firmly than before when it was routinely accepted, and so help to differentiate the community more sharply from all its neighbours.

More important is the distinction between two broad types of nostalgia, that of kinship and that of territory. Some peoples evince a yearning for their lost clan organization and the semi-nomadic, simple life-style of their ancestors which contact with a sedentarized and, perhaps, more urbanized civilization has eroded; the Israelites in Canaan are an obvious example, and so are recurrent waves of the Arabs.²⁹ Other *ethnie* adopted territorial conceptions of community, after an earlier genealogical phase, and expressed their nostalgia as a yearning for a primitive past on a particular local terrain which formed the base of their first communal politics; Armstrong here cites the Western European 'barbarian' *ethnie* (Teutons, Franks, Visigoths, Normans, and so on) who adopted Greco-Roman concepts of *polis* and *patria* located primarily in space and articulated in territorial units. In practice, however, the two kinds of analytically separable nostalgia are frequently overlaid. Among Jews and Armenians, Kurds and Druze, to name a few Middle Eastern peoples, genealogical filiation is interwoven with fervent territorial attachments in myth, memory and symbolism; and, conversely, among the French nobility, Corsican glens and Magyar aristocracy, to name some European *ethnie*, strong territorial attachments in no way precluded an ardent sense of feudal or clan pedigree.

Perhaps as important is the opposition of the two kinds of life-style, nomadic and sedentary, in helping to differentiate communities and attach their members to particular symbols and areas. There is also the sense of historic development and drama, which a transition from one life-style to another promotes and which, as the experience of Iranians, Jews and Arabs attests, helps to shape their character as separate *ethnie*. Even communities which, like the short-distance nomadic Somali, retain their former life-style to a considerable degree, tend to identify themselves and are identified by others through this primal opposition between two life-styles. Here, then, the trauma of sedentarization and its consequent patterns have operated to separate those who have taken this path of development from the rest, and within the sedentary communities, have formed oases of folk culture and local ties to which the nostalgia for place and former life-style has become attached.³⁰

Organized religion

Several scholars have noted the importance of religion as both a symbolic

code of communication and focus for social organization among pre-modern communities. In the West, however, religion is commonly thought of as transcending ethnic and national boundaries, and it is true that salvation religions, at least, have proselytized across cultural and class barriers and even denied the validity of ethnicity in the quest for the true word of God. In practice, again, organized religions, particularly after the first 'enthusiastic' phase, have had to come to terms with existing economic and cultural divisions, especially if they have received some political expression; and as a result, we find 'religions' often reinforcing, if not igniting, ethnic sentiments with which they have coalesced to form distinctive religio-ethnic communities.

Again, it is helpful to single out three aspects of this fusion of religion with ethnicity. The first is the often close relationship between the origin myths of *ethnie* and their religious beliefs about creation and their location in the cosmos. Obvious examples are the Creation myths of the Greeks and Jews: the Greek myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha and their son, Hellen, is paralleled by the Jewish legend of Noah and his three sons, both families being the sole survivors of a catastrophic Flood and both serving as the distant ancestors of the religio-ethnic community. The same ideas (perhaps indeed the ultimate source) are found in the Sumerian Creation epic, *Enuma Elish*, and the Epic of Gilgamesh, who also survived a Flood. Sumerian kings also traced their descent from their city gods and acted as earthly vice-regents for the Sumerian pantheon. Even more important for ethnic identity than the claim to be acting for the gods was the implicit idea of divine selection and collective mission, the idea that 'we' constitute the first of the earth's communities, the special beneficiaries of divine activity, and that we are enjoined to lead a special life under the dispensation of a divinely ordained law-code, such as those of Ur-Nammu, Hammurabi and Moses. In this way, a special location in the cosmos lends to ethnic consciousness a sense of separation and superiority over other peoples.³¹

The rise of religious sectarianism provides a second fertile field for ethno-religious community. In the ancient world, religious communities generally coincided with *ethnie*, as in Egypt, Sumer, Assyria and, later, Persia. But the rise of monotheistic salvation religions, or their atheistic equivalents in the East, tended to override ethnic and political boundaries. In the early Christian era, especially, an ecumenical movement helped to break down class barriers and transcend existing ethnic divisions; but, shortly afterwards, the rise of various sects from the Marcionites and Arians onward, soon allowed ethnic symbols and ethnic ties to reassert themselves, and find new forms and contents. In fact, we find various schismatic movements becoming closely correlated with existing communities long conscious of their separate ethnic descent and heritage, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. Gregorian forms of Christianity, for example, which began as Orthodoxy, were acclimatized to Armenian rites and symbols, and

the growing separation of the Armenian kingdom, sandwiched between Byzantium and Sassanid Persia, and the struggle against Gnostic heresies, soon led to a more Monophysite type of Christianity becoming the norm in remote Armenia. The process was hastened by decisions of the Church Councils, especially at Ephesus in the fifth century; but, in fact, this provincial form of Christianity both reinforced and was itself supported by the peripheral status of the Armenian community and language.³² In Egypt and Abyssinia, too, Monophysite sectarianism gained a large following among the Coptic and Amharic populations, reinforcing the exclusive identities of those communities in the larger Christian world. Similar processes operated among Lebanese, Syrian and northern Mesopotamian communities, where Maronites, Druze and Jacobite Syrians gravitated or fled from persecution elsewhere. Here, sectarian, even heretical forms of Christianity and Islam became associated with remote provincial communities, whose earlier religious association gradually became ethnicized.³³

Nor is this process peculiar to the Middle East. The Sikh community began its existence through a religious schism; its holy books and temple priests in north-western India provided a focus for the growth of religious communal ties and sentiments, in much the same way as Druze holy writings and priesthoods had helped to focus and crystallize communal sentiments.³⁴ In Burma, Theravada Buddhism provides the emblem and identity-content for a sense of Burmese ethnicity, which harks back to the halcyon days of the Pagan dynasty in the Middle Ages, when Buddhism became a quasi-state religion, differentiating the community from neighbours.³⁵ Even in the southern Languedoc region of the early medieval era, heretical dualist tendencies found a receptive audience among the mixture of cultures around Narbonne and Toulouse, with its greater openness to different civilizations. Perhaps the Waldensian and Albigensian communities, left to themselves, would have congealed into a separate *ethnie* based on the spoken language of the area, the *langue d'oc*, (and headed by the Counts of Toulouse), as Mistral and latter-day Occitanian nationalism desire to resurrect. On the other hand, medieval Catholicism, unlike early Christianity and Islam, was able and willing to enforce religious conformity, at least until the Reformation, thereby helping to keep disaffected provinces and *ethnie* within the fold, and dissipate the propensity of sectarians to reinforce latent ethnic tendencies.³⁶

Thirdly, organized religion supplies much of the personnel and communication channels for the diffusion of ethnic myths and symbols. The priests and scribes not only communicate and record and transmit these legends and beliefs, but they also serve as the chief guardians and conduits of the symbolism which can link feudal or imperial elites to the peasant masses or food-producers and their Little Traditions. Priesthoods may be organized in various ways according to the needs of the populations they serve, but the effects may be similar. Thus we find highly centralized and hierarchical priesthoods, as in the Byzantine empire; more decentralized hierarchies

among the Armenian communities scattered across the Middle East and beyond; and quite localized tribunals and communal religious socialization among the Jewish diaspora. Yet all three were effective in uniting local traditions and rites, in disseminating common symbols, feasts, ceremonies and myths of heroes and holy men, along with a well-defined life-style and code of religious law. In this way, they preserved and intensified the common sentiments and ideals circulating in the community, adapting a wider religious doctrine and ethic to the special needs and interests of a culturally distinct and historically self-conscious population. Through their common training and ideals, priests are able to synthesize and re-interpret the peculiar rites and legends of local peasantries and incorporate them into a standard canon. It was they, too, who led the populace in reaffirming the identity of a named community with its homeland and its gods, and they who led the prayers for intercession and prosperity in such annual celebrations as the New Year Festival in Babylon, or the four-year Panathenaic festival. These great events served to impress the Great Tradition on an immigrant rural populace making its pilgrimage to the temple, as Jews did on Passover.³⁷

Priests and especially scribes also meet another need: to guard, codify and transmit holy texts and legal codes of the ethno-religious community. Through these books, the legends and lore of the community find expression and become standardized and diffused. It is no accident that, in eras of relatively low literacy, monks and priests from Bede to the author of the Vladimir Chronicle in early Kievan Russia, act as chroniclers of the communal past. In modern times, one finds them active in recording and standardizing indigenous languages of other communities; we mentioned that missionary Protestant pastors of Bremen in West Africa codified the Anlo language and gave it literary form, thus spurring a sense of Ewe identification among Anlo-speakers.³⁸ Not only were priests and scribes almost the only literate stratum in many pre-industrial societies; religion and society, which a later era separated, were so intertwined, that to become part of the people and live on its land was, *ipso facto*, to embrace its life-style and religion, as the message of the Book of Ruth so memorably reveals. It is interesting that in the Talmud, the conversion ceremony emphasized rebirth through joining with the Jewish people and sharing its burdens, along with the convert's material possessions; circumcision and ritual immersion expressed and sealed the conversion, the test of which was the convert's willingness to be reborn and to grasp what is entailed in joining the community with its joys, sorrows and obligations.³⁹ Here the priests act as sentinels of the community and agents of 'naturalization', by spreading a codified and standardized conception of the communal life-style and sentiments that mark it out from its neighbours.

Inter-state warfare

Though wars have occurred between every kind of group from the family to

the empire, it is those that have been waged between different kinds of political authority, using a fairly centralized corps of professional soldiers under monarchial and/or bureaucratic control, that have had the greatest impact upon ethnic formation and persistence. There are cases of war machines built up around centralized polities, like the Zulu kingdom, which have a single ethnic population at their core. More often, however, polities are formed on the basis of a few ethnic populations, one of whom is predominant, perhaps, and the frequency, intensity and duration of wars between rival polities is itself a significant factor in crystallizing ethnic sentiments among affected populations. Such populations include not only the 'core' ethnic elements of the warring states, but also *ethnie* who are dragged into the military arena, or whose territory becomes the habitual battlefield of imperial ambitions. The more members of the 'core' and adjacent *ethnie* are conscripted for seasonal campaigns (and the higher the proportion of members in any *ethnie* so conscripted), the more cohesive and 'ethnic' do such wars become. Similarly, the more imperial or city-state wars are fought across the territory of 'third-party' communities (who may or may not be compelled to do battle themselves), the more conscious of its communal identity does such a population become.⁴⁰

There are three main ways in which inter-state warfare helps to ignite and maintain ethnic sentiment. Physical mobilization for war is the commonest. Of course, the degree of indigenous as opposed to mercenary conscription is vital. Where a native peasantry or artisanate form the backbone of an army, as with the earlier Assyrian or early Greek and Roman armies, the act of mobilization itself, together with the shock of battle and the solidarity of an interdependent infantry, vividly convey the sense of a member's dependence upon the community and its welfare. One has only to read Aeschylus' description of the Persian Wars in which his brother was killed and he himself fought, to grasp the communal significance for the ethnic identification of each individual, of collective resistance on the battlefield through the activation of comradeship, teamwork and *esprit de corps* in moments of crisis. Along with these participant records, there are the more calculated exercises in political propaganda by the state, which aim to stiffen resistance or glorify exploits of monarchs and elites. As important as the habitual boasts of conquest and slaughter, are the recurrent denigrations of traditional enemies and the re-writing of military history by rival states, as occurred over the celebrated battle of Kadesh, which both Hittites and Egyptians claimed as a victory. The aim here is not simply to justify monarchial ambitions, but to ensure that the losses in lives and extracted resources from their own subject communities are seen as sacrifices in a higher cause which will bind all sections of the community together.⁴¹

This 'bonding' factor is even more importantly served by myth-making processes. Mobilization and propaganda are, after all, ephemeral. But the myths of war, set down in epics, ballads, dramas or hymns, possess a long-

term power to shape distant reactions that far outweigh and surpass the episodes themselves. A couplet by Simonides on the Spartan slain at Thermopylae, a speech by Shakespeare about the meaning of Agincourt, a lamentation by Jeremiah on the fall of the (first) Temple, even Tolstoy's account of Borodino, may be far more effective in the shaping of subsequent generations of ethnically conscious families than the events themselves, and far more potent agents of solidarity than victories or defeats which may at the time have done little to patch up internal factionalism and cleavage. Wars may not increase social cohesion; as Simmel says, they may even be catalysts of communal dissolution; but the myths and legends of heroism and resistance may, in the long run, enhance a weakened solidarity and revive flagging spirits.⁴²

There is also the geo-political location of communities. A community's 'locus' and the relations of polities with their neighbours often help to activate a sense of ethnicity among members. Relations of alliance and conflict help to sharpen a feeling of self-differentiation between communities involved in these political relations over a long period. Through the creation of chronic adversaries, usually endowed with negative stereotypes, warfare sets the pattern of relationships with significant collective outsiders; this kind of 'adversarial identity' finds its classical expression in those paired enmities which abound in the record – between Elamites and Babylonians, Assyrians and Urartians, Greeks and Persians, Romans and Parthians, Byzantines and Sassanids, Swiss and Austrians, English and French, Khmers and Vietnamese, Poles and Russians, Arabs and Israelis . . . While such pairs are by no means universal, they possess a momentum of their own and tend to suck other states (and their communities) into the orbit of their encounters. In that sense, it is not society or ethnicity that determines war, but conflict itself which determines the sense and shape of ethnicity. War may not create the original cultural differences, but it sharpens and politicizes them, turning what previously were 'ethnic categories' into genuine integrated *ethnie*, aware of their identities and destinies.⁴³

For, mediating between war itself and the community, stands the state, or any centralized, public authority which possesses control over the means of violence in a given territory. It is state-prosecuted wars that tend to enhance a sense of identity in a differentiated population, and to reinforce its centralizing drives, if the wars do not soon overwhelm the state apparatus. Simmel pointed out long ago that warfare generates an integrated and centralized command structure, which suppresses all rival power bases within its domain, so that the ultimate beneficiary of war is the state itself rather than any community.⁴⁴ Yet, by extension, dominant *ethnie* within the state must also reap advantages, not least the integration that comes from mobilization and centralized state structures of command; with a corresponding disaffection from subordinate or peripheral *ethnie* in a polyethnic state, which may express itself ultimately in desertion or rebellion (as

occurred among some Bretons and Ukrainians in the Second World War). It is the *ethnie* situated, geographically and politically, at the 'core' of a polity, like Frenchmen in the Île de France region or Persians in western Iran, that benefit disproportionately and have their ethnic self-awareness strengthened by their leading position in the state-at-war, while outer or minority *ethnie* feel relatively excluded and become alienated from the polity into which they have often been forcibly incorporated in the first place.⁴⁵

Of course, not all warfare states succeeded in integrating communities or even ensuring the survival of 'their' dominant *ethnie*. Rapidly expanding empires, like that of the Mongol Khans, may overstrain their resources. In exercising tributary suzerainty over huge expanses of Europe and Asia, the Mongol Khans divided their ethnic resources into competing territorial units. The Tatars in Russia built up a separate empire, localizing part of the Mongol manpower resources, while the ruling Mongol stratum in China and central Asia found itself culturally overwhelmed or severely debilitated by the existing civilizations it had subjugated. Only a segment of the original Mongol *ethnie* remained intact, albeit much altered by the experience of empire-building, in its original nomadic steppe homelands, developing separately from its Tatar kinsmen, who became increasingly fused with other Turkic-speaking populations and culturally metamorphosed by conversion to Islam. In other cases, protracted warfare may actually weaken the polity, as in Ptolemaic Egypt, while leaving some residual ethnic sentiment intact.⁴⁶

It remains true, however, that with a few exceptions prolonged inter-state warfare has crystallized and strengthened an incipient sense of common ethnicity in the dominant ethnic community of the state. The result has been that, even when 'its' polity has suffered defeat and dismemberment, the dominant *ethnie* has in most cases managed to survive and transform itself, while retaining some continuity of myth, memory, value and symbolism from its earlier existence. This has been the case with the Han Chinese, after their conquest by the Mongols who constituted the Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth century; with the Persians after their defeats by Alexander and much later by the Arab Muslim armies at Nihavand; with the Greeks after the Roman conquest, at least up to the time of the Slavic immigration; and, in more recent times, with the Poles after the Partitions of their fragile kingdom in the late eighteenth century. In each of these cases, inter-state warfare had moulded a sufficient sense of ethnic identity to allow the community to outlive political disaster for many centuries, and even in some cases experience an ethnic revival. Barring immediate and catastrophic defeat, prolonged warfare tends to strengthen the state and hence communal ties of the dominant *ethnie*, and in some cases, such as the Armenian and Judean kingdoms, of third-party communities over whose domains the territorial wars of the great powers have been fought. In

that sense, we may conclude that warfare between states serves to enhance and maintain ethnic identity in history.⁴⁷

Structure and persistence of *ethnie*

In identifying the 'bases' of ethnicity in the localism and nostalgia of a sedentary agrarian existence, in the organization and sectarianism of religious communities, and in the mobilization, myths and communal locations of inter-state warfare, we do not mean to imply anything about the archaic origins of *ethnie*. While a combination of these factors might, in given cases, lie at the root of their formation, it cannot account for the initial cultural difference – of religion, customs, language, institutions, colour and the like – from which *ethnie* can emerge or be constructed. The origins of ethnic differentiation itself are shrouded in obscurity, even if the veil is lifted in a few cases, particularly in more recent times. But, then, the modern act of classifying populations as *ethnie* is itself modelled on the ubiquitous presence and longevity of other ethnic communities, which we nowadays take for granted. The original 'tower of Babel' which allowed and encouraged the formation of *ethnie* cannot be elucidated from our meagre records. At the point where written history begins, in the mid-third millennium BC, *ethnie* are already in evidence, and named culture-communities appear as historical actors.⁴⁸

What can be explained, through the factors outlined above – and no doubt others – is the extraordinary persistence and resilience of ethnic ties and sentiments, once formed, as well as the processes by which 'ethnic categories' become crystallized and integrated as genuine 'ethnic communities'. For the durability, or chronic recurrence, of these 'bases' of ethnic persistence ensures their continuous self-awareness, as well as their significance for the identities and loyalties of their members. What has not yet been ascertained is the optimal degree and combination of these and other bases and factors – optimal, that is, for the salience and survival of a given *ethnie* or for ethnicity in general. Perhaps, too, in different areas and periods, such combinations of factors will vary with the development of the particular ethnic community. Well-formed *ethnie*, for example, may no longer need the cement of peasant mores and territorial nostalgia, or the mobilizing effects of inter-state warfare; commercially located diasporas or trading maritime city-state confederations can survive and flourish as self-conscious *ethnie* through their religious and literary cultures and arts, even in the absence of other bases, once their sense of community has become well crystallized. Alternatively, elements of organized religious culture and community may be subordinated to the needs of a warrior or knightly aristocratic *ethnie* engaged in the defence of its territorial space, and acting, as did the Hungarian knights, as the *antemurale* bulwark of a Christendom threatened by Mongol

and Ottoman steppe nomads. Again, however, such 'recombinations' of bases and factors only operate in cases of well-formed ethnicity and where the typical format and structure of the *ethnie* has operated for a few generations.⁴⁹

But, what is this 'typical' format and structure of *ethnie*? An 'ideal-typical' picture of pre-modern ethnic communities (allowing for significant variations) would, I think, include the following elements:

- 1 A large mass of peasants and artisans in villages and small market towns, subject to various restrictions on their freedom (corvée labour, serfdom, ghettoization, caste) and wedded to local 'folk cultures' (vernaculars, legends, rural customs and rites, dress, dance and music, crafts) influenced loosely by the nearest Great Traditions;
- 2 A small urban stratum of competing elites in the main towns – rulers and their courts, bureaucrats, noble landowners, military leaders – monopolizing wealth and political power, and centred loosely on an administrative capital and core area, and patronizing specialist trading and artisan client strata;
- 3 A tiny stratum of priests/monks and scribes claiming a monopoly of the community's belief-system, ritual and educational services, and acting as transmitters and conduits of its symbolism between the various urban elites and between them and the peasants and rural artisans, thereby seeking to incorporate the various Little Traditions of the latter into the central Great Tradition of which they act as guardians and agents of socialization;
- 4 A fund of myths, memories, values and symbols, often encoded, which express and explain the community's perceptions of itself, its origins, development and destiny, and its place in the cosmic order; all of these being manifested in a round of ceremonies, rites, artefacts and laws which bind the community to its celestial pantheon and its homeland;
- 5 Processes of communication, transmission and socialization of the store of myths, memories, values and symbols among both urban elites and their specialist clients, and where necessary outwards and downwards to the dependent peasantry; using mainly temple ritual and worship, dissemination of the precepts and morals of sacred texts, the use of symbols in art, architecture and dress, the elaboration of oral traditions, ballads, epics and hymns, but also the promulgation of legal codes and edicts, some rudimentary rote learning in local schools for selected members of various strata, and the use of military service and public works labour forces.

In constructing such an 'ideal-type' *ethnie*, we leave open the question of the degree of penetration of ethnic myth and symbolism among non-urban strata; this is a question which will preoccupy us later. For the present, it suffices that most of the urban strata are 'touched', in varying degrees by the forms and content of ethnic symbolic funds, and hence that they are open to one or more priestly monopolies of symbolic and mythic communication and transmission. As we shall see, the role of priests and scribes is, in many ways,

pivotal both as custodians of the ethnic fund and as transmission belts and conduits; indeed, in some instances, what we grasp as religious competition may equally well be understood as ethnic competition for the monopoly of symbolic domination and communication in a given population, whose 'ethnic' profile is as much *shaped* by priestly and scribal activities as it is reinforced. This is not to say that other agencies of ethnic socialization do not exist, and are of no importance. The role of politics themselves can, on occasion, be crucial, both in their civilian and military roles. Equally important is the family network, especially in ensuring the failure or success of ethnic socialization processes, something that ethnic leaders themselves fully comprehend; here the role of local aristocratic leaders and their families in spreading, by example and precept, the store of ethnic symbolism in the areas of their influence, is crucial.

There is, however, one important distinction that needs to be made in considering the structure and pervasiveness of ethnic communities in pre-modern eras, the distinction between ethnic polities and ethnic minorities which are incorporated into a wider polity. If the *ethnie* in question constitutes a majority of the population of the polity, if, for example, it constitutes a patrimonial kingdom or forms the core of a wider agrarian empire, then its ethnic myths and symbols will reflect the elements of political domination and kingship, and its conduits of ethnic communication will include officials, judges and officers alongside the priests and scribes which are common to all pre-modern ethnic communication. They will diffuse, along with other myths of origins and ancestry, myths of kingship and nobility, of royal lineage and political domination, as part of the ethnic fund, and the symbolism of the community will reflect the centrality of this political experience. Such was undoubtedly the case in ancient Egypt. The ruler became a god, his court, nobility and bureaucracy reflected Pharaonic patronage and glory, and royalty was placed at the apex of Memphite and Theban priestly mythologies. Despite some regionalism, the unique ecology of the Nile valley helped to diffuse the symbols of Pharaonic religion and royalty by a whole series of propaganda devices in artefacts and genres of painting, sculpture, pottery and jewellery, as well as royal and priestly inscriptions in the great temples and royal and noble tombs. During the more centralized periods of the three Kingdoms, Pharaoh and priests joined forces, with one brief exception, to expand their influence and incorporate every expression of rural regionalism and every peasant tradition from the Delta to Aswan; and the peculiar geography of the area enabled a greater degree of ethnic homogeneity to develop, despite internal breakdowns and external invasions (by Hyksos, Sea Peoples, Assyrians and Persians), than anywhere else in the ancient world, with the possible exception of the Jews. What characterized the content of both ethnic symbolism and ethnic social structure was exactly this identity between the ethnic community of Egyptians and the dynastic state.⁵⁰

In the case of incorporated *ethnie*, or ethnic 'minorities', on the other hand, no such identity was present. Here the ideal of a political kingdom and dynastic state is replaced by that of the ethnic homeland or territory of belonging. The Israelite tribes before their periods of unified monarchy, as well as afterwards; the Sumerian city-states before their unification by the dynasty of Agade and the third dynasty of Ur; the Phoenician and Greek city-states; the early Swiss cantons; and, later, the various subjugated Eastern European ethnic communities like the Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Greeks, Czechs and Slovaks; all relied for their sense of solidarity and continuity upon a real or alleged tie with an ancestral homeland and memories of a glorious past on its soil. Here, any burgeoning sense of ethnic unity expressed in political terms sprang, not from any pretensions of royalty or the impact of a conquest state and its dynastic rule, but from the pooling of more local loyalties in the face of common enemies and from a more or less vivid myth of common origins and common culture. Thus, in ancient Sumer and Akkad, the competing city-states had their own *ensi* (lord), gods, temples and priesthoods; though there was a ceremonial centre at Nippur, it seems to have had no power to regulate inter-city conflicts and resist marauding tribes from the desert or marcher regions. There was no other political agent of unity until Sargon's conquests; but this did not impede a growing cultural unity, based on common language and religious myths and rituals, a common script and literature, common building styles and arts, and common irrigation techniques. It was just such a religio-linguistic-literary unity on which the Third Dynasty of Ur and later the Amorite dynasty of Babylon could capitalize in their quests for a measure of political unification, even when Akkadian replaced Sumerian as the language of commerce, diplomacy and literature, and even when the Babylonian Marduk became the chief god in the Mesopotamian pantheon.⁵¹

Later we shall see how this difference between ethnic polities and divided and incorporated *ethnie* leaves its mark on the types of *mythomoteur* and modes of social penetration characteristic of the two types of *ethnie*. For the present, we need only note how both kinds of *ethnie* reveal otherwise similar structures and cultural features, and how frequently both are found in the historical record. For, whether politicized or not, whether as patrimonial kingdom or tribal confederation or city-state amphictyony, ethnic communities can be found playing active roles in human society and culture in most parts of the globe from at least the early Bronze Age, when writing first appears in the Near East, c. 3000 BC. Whether, indeed, *ethnie* antedated this era is hard to say. Pottery styles in Mesopotamia and Egypt during the fifth and fourth millennia BC suggest a succession of cultures, like the Halaf and al-Ubaid on the lower Tigris, but, in the absence of written records or archeological evidence, we have no means of ascertaining whether this stylistic succession expresses the presence of new ethnic migrations.⁵² Perhaps this period saw the formation of 'ethnic categories' with their

separate myths of ancestry, memories, religions and languages, as successive waves of migrants settled in fertile riverine zones. But it was with the emergence of the first city-states and patrimonial kingdoms in the early third millennium BC, and the first use of bronze weaponry in inter-state warfare, that we find a growing sense of a more-than-local ethnic consciousness and sentiment, notably among the Egyptians and Sumerians.⁵³

Certainly, from the later third millennium BC, a succession of states based on a core ethnic community – Elamites, Amorites, Kushites, Canaanites, as well as Egyptians and Sumerians – appear in the historical records of the Near East, along with other communities whose political framework is far more tenuous, if it existed at all – peoples like the Guti or Lullubi, or the ‘Harappans’ – all of whom flourished in the period, 2300-1700 BC. At this time, politics and *ethnie* do not often coincide; the more usual pattern is that of city-states uniting temporarily because of common culture or religion in the face of a general threat, or of confederations of tribes seeking to expand their influence or dominate cities or districts, as it appears the Aryan tribes did in the early second millennium BC when they fanned out from Afghanistan and Central Asia into the Indus valley and the Punjab, and gradually subjugated the darker-skinned indigenous Dasa of the Harappan civilization.⁵⁴ There is, at this stage, little ethnic cohesion or intense ethnic sentiments, except perhaps among the long-settled Egyptians and Sumerians.

By the later second millennium BC, more *ethnie* appear and evince greater self-awareness and cohesion. Apart from the Hittites and Mitannian Hurrians, Kassites, ‘Minoans’, Mycenaeans, Philistines, Arameans, Phoenicians, Assyrians and Canaanites are active for several centuries, some of them patrimonial kingdoms (Hittites, Mitanni, Kassites, Assyrians) built usually over an excluded and conquered indigenous population, some peaceful or warring city-kingdoms (‘Minoans’, Mycenaeans, Philistines, Phoenicians) and some tribal confederations (Arameans, Canaanites) who infiltrate and set up their own city-kingdoms. The degree of ethnic unity or consciousness varies, but to judge by the Biblical record of the Philistines and Syrian Arameans, it was greater than in earlier periods. We may surmise that the greater degree of inter-state rivalry and communications during the Tell-el-Amarna period (fourteenth century BC), may have brought cultures and communities into more direct contact, and heightened their self-awareness through juxtaposition with neighbours and enemies.⁵⁵

Certainly, from this time until the great expansion of China and Rome in the late first millennium BC, ethnicity became of greater political importance and cultural salience. Both Hebraic and classical cultures reveal the growing role of *ethnie* in social life, as in the Books of Ruth and Jonah and the earlier Books of Kings, the histories of Herodotus and Xenophon and the *Persae* of Aeschylus. In Assyrian and Persian friezes, in Greek sculpture, as in later Egyptian art, there is a growing awareness of foreigners and their alien

customs. In the Assyrian practice of deportations of the ruling elites and whole cities of conquered states and peoples, there are the first signs of an awareness of the force of cultural and historic bonds in sustaining resistance to imperial rule.⁵⁶

Since this early period, *ethnie* have vied or colluded with other forms of community – of city, class, religion, region – in providing a sense of identity among populations and in inspiring in them a nostalgia for their past and its traditions. In periods of grave crisis, it has even been able to arouse in them powerful sentiments of anger and revenge for what were seen as attacks upon a traditional life-style and identity. For the most part, however, *ethnie* have provided foci of identification with ancestors and thereby a means of confronting death, especially violent death at the hands of enemies. By invoking a collective name, by the use of symbolic images of community, by the generation of stereotypes of the community and its foes, by the ritual performance and rehearsal of ceremonies and feasts and sacrifices, by the communal recitation of past deeds and ancient heroes' exploits, men and women have been enabled to bury their sense of loneliness and insecurity in the face of natural disasters and human violence by feeling themselves to partake of a collectivity and its historic fate which transcends their individual existences.

The evidence for the pervasiveness and ubiquity of ethnicity exists not only in the presence of such names, images, stereotypes, rituals and recitations, but in the very differences of styles in dress and coiffure, in crafts and furnishings, in tombs, temples and palaces, in the portrayal of the human figure, in characteristic use of metals and jewels, pottery and woodwork, in the depictions of activities and personages that have survived, as much as in the languages and scripts, laws and customs that differentiate human populations at all periods everywhere. All of these materials furnish rich evidence of ethnic differentiation and cultural identity, even if they cannot tell us how far a community felt itself to be unique and cohesive, and how deeply its fund of myths, memories, values and symbols had penetrated the social hierarchy. They may, however, by their durability, suggest something of the persistence of ethnicity, its ability to withstand change and absorb outside influences, particularly if they can be allied to more conventional written records. Though not all cultural differences reflect ethnic differentiation, much less ethnic community (*ethnie*), the persistence over centuries of separate styles attached to particular peoples in certain areas, does point to the longevity and widespread incidence of *ethnie* in all periods. Along with politics, religious organizations and class, ethnicity provides one of the central axes of alignment and division in the pre-modern world, and one of the most durable.

3

Ethnie and ethnicism in history

To establish the presence and durability of *ethnie* is one thing; to gauge their potency and forms of self-renewal quite another. Here I want to outline the general form and the particular sub-types of bonds that created such powerful identities among populations in the ancient and medieval worlds. What concerns us are those 'sentiments of prestige', to employ Weber's term, that have animated their collective endeavours and outlooks.¹ For this purpose I use two related concepts; *ethnocentrism* to characterize the general nature of pre-modern group sentiments, and *ethnicism*, to analyse the various forms of their collective activity in defence of their *ethnie*. Together, these concepts refer to a wide spectrum of ethnic sentiments and responses to characteristic situations; and the variety of activities included under the rubric of 'ethnicism' points to the need for more refined typologies.

Uniqueness and exclusion

While ethnic communities can be ranged along a continuum from those that are fairly open to outsiders and external influences to those that are more or less closed, it remains true that all pre-modern *ethnie* combine, in varying degrees, a sense of collective uniqueness and centrality. To the members, the group stands at the centre of their physical and moral universe. The sentiments and attitudes of group members are normally focused on the group itself to the exclusion, more or less explicit, of outsiders, and there is a corresponding disdain or fear of external life-styles. Hence the term *ethnocentrism* to describe these exclusive attitudes, the sense of group centrality, the feelings of cultural uniqueness and the attitude of superiority towards other peoples and their mores. It is true that an encounter with a vastly more advanced (technologically or politically) civilization can compel some members of the ethnic community to treat the significant Other as a reference group, even a model; but even here this apparent deference is

accompanied by an inner conviction of indigenous moral superiority, summed up in the slogan 'Western arts, Eastern morality' which so many developing countries have used in spiritual self-defence.² This was typically illustrated in earlier times by the tenacity with which conquered peoples would try to hold onto their native gods and customs; ancient Babylonians held on to their pantheon and language when laid under the Assyrian, and even the Persian, yoke, and so did the Canaanite city-states who fell under Egyptian or Hittite influence in the second millennium BC.

This widespread sense of group centrality and uniqueness embodied a twin assumption. On the one hand, the myths of origins, the historical memories, cultures and homelands of a given *ethnie* were felt to be 'natural' and 'proper'; they possessed 'value' and 'holiness', and therefore 'our heritage' was in some sense genuine. On the other hand, the myths, memories, cultures and homelands of others somehow lacked value and truth, and were therefore temporary and defective. The light of divine truth might shine forever on 'our' land and community; but other *ethnie* 'walked in darkness' and spoke 'barbarian' tongues. Not only Greeks with their sense of superiority to 'barbaroi' or Jews with their contempt for pagan idolators, but every people of antiquity and after has opposed its own sense of 'right' and worth to the rude and unintelligible ways of other communities, whether it be the Egyptians with their disdain of Asiatics, the Babylonian or Chinese sense of being at the centre of the universe, or the Muslim Arab belief in the Dar-ul-Islam's superiority to every other civilization and revelation.³

Behind this widespread ethnic outlook stood a conception of history which was particularistic and genealogical. However much some groups evolved territorial dimensions or even transcendental visions, they remained ultimately confined to an ascriptive view of group relations which centred on the differential worth of particular *ethnie* and which explained those differences in terms of pedigree and myths of ancestry. It is true that late sixth-century Greeks began to evolve a sense of political loyalty based upon the territory of the city-state. Yet, even in Athens, Cleisthenes' celebrated reforms introducing the territorial *deme* for purposes of voting and taxation, did not apparently entirely supersede or abolish older kinship structures such as the *genoi* or *phratries*. Fifth-century Athens remained a democracy led by aristocratic families and it is more than possible that even the reforms of the Areopagus of 462 BC, which limited aristocratic supervision of the constitution, did not intend to undermine the familial basis of political loyalties, and that one of Aeschylus' aims in the *Eumenides* (458 BC) was to reconcile Athenians to the two levels of attachment represented by the Chthonian deities and the Olympians under Zeus and Athena, the one genealogical and familial, the other civic and territorial.⁴

To say that ethnocentrism is the normal condition of every *ethnie*, and that it is based upon a genealogical and particularistic world-outlook, may appear to state the obvious, but it entails an almost solipsistic attachment to the

communal heritage, with its peculiar myths, memories, values and symbols. This means that the sense of ethnic identity emanates from a commitment and attachment to the shared elements which unite the members of a group, rather than from the differences which debar outsiders. Exactly because *ethnie* are so 'family-centred' and, in fact, embody the sense of being a large, unique family, the members feel so knit to each other and so committed to the cultural heritage which is their family inheritance. Because the ethnic life-style and culture was that of their forefathers in each family within the *ethnie*, there is a strong disposition (other things being equal) to retain and acknowledge that culture and life-style by every present generation. But, equally, it is through these shared elements of culture and life-style, and above all the myths, memories, values and symbols, that present members are made aware of their familial inheritances.

If this is true, then we cannot regard the various collective symbols and values that so visibly differentiate communities as mere 'boundary mechanisms' or 'cultural markers' which divide 'us' from 'them'. Nor can we found our conception of ethnicity on the widely attested sense of the 'alien' and 'unintelligible'. The fact that outsiders are 'strangers' to us, that we cannot communicate with them and that 'their' ways seem incomprehensible to us, derives its meaning and significance from an already existing sense of shared experiences and values, a feeling of community, of 'us-ness' and group belonging, which in turn derives from the mirroring of family inheritances in a wider composite tradition and life-style which shapes and constrains those family legacies and self-perceptions. It is this wider tradition and life-style that provides an image and language of 'our community' and whose profile is sharpened by contact with 'other communities'. All the elements of that tradition and culture – the myths, symbols, values and memories encoded in laws and customs, institutions, religions, art, music, dance, architecture, family practices and language – help to bind families together in a community of ancestry; a totality of expressions and representations (and not just the linguistic codes that for some scholars form the symbolic 'border guards' of the group against the stranger), a totality that gains with every generation and evokes a veneration and a respect for ancestors and the past.⁵

From the outside, the various symbols of collective life – dress, etiquette, diet, art, music, rituals, language and the like – do indeed serve to differentiate members of *ethnie* from outsiders and so 'guard' the 'borders' of the community in different ways according to time and place but nevertheless durably. But these symbols are perhaps even more important internally. For symbols are constant reminders of a common heritage and fate. They recall us to our lines of descent, they call to memory our common distant ancestors. They inculcate in, and attach, new generations to the mores and traditions of their fathers and mothers. They signpost the common way of life and institutions of the community. They act as visible spurs to emotions of awe and nostalgia. They bring us back to our family inheritance and lead

us forward to a common destiny. And in these ways, ethnic symbolism charts and illuminates those decisive myths and memories of collective endeavour and experience from which each family that makes up the ethnic community draws its sustenance and faith.⁶

Ethnic resistance and renewal

The desire to protect a cultural heritage and tradition inspires not only a sense of superiority and uniqueness and a belief in the rightness and value of the *ethnie's* revelation and life-style. It also provides an incentive for various movements of ethnic resistance and cultural restoration which I propose to include under the term *ethnicism*. Ethnicism is more than a heightened and active sense of ethnocentrism, though the latter's attitudes and beliefs naturally enter into it. Ethnicism is more a collective movement, whose activities and efforts are aimed at resisting perceived threats from outside and corrosion within, at renewing a community's forms and traditions, and at reintegrating a community's members and strata which have become dangerously divided by conflicting pressures. In these endeavours there is always a summons to communal action and a crude but clear programme for restoring aspects of the community's culture and territory; and this goes well beyond the often complacent and static, sometimes unself-conscious, sentiments of ethnic centrality, superiority and uniqueness that characterize ethnocentrism.

Like ethnocentrism, ethnicist movements are by no means confined to the pre-modern world. They are typically found at the intersection of currents of civilization, particularly where a backward society is exposed to social and cultural change through the impact of a more developed society. Thus, in mid-nineteenth century China, the T'ai P'ing (Supreme Peace) rebellion (1850-65) may have started as a peasant revolt against exploitation fuelled by the growing involvement of China with Western capitalism, but it soon acquired strong millennial and ethnic overtones. Its leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan 'mixed Christian ideas with those of ancient China and proclaimed to his (peasant) followers a doctrine that promised the kingdom of God on earth'. Some Christian ideas in matters of property and women's rights entered into the doctrinal mixture, but Hung took far more from ancient Chinese thought, which gave the movement a strongly anti-Manchu bias and hence turned it into a crusade against foreign rule and foreign intervention.⁷ In the early twentieth century, several millennial movements in Africa and Asia have drawn on nativistic sentiments, even if their ideals were apocalyptic. Not only Chilembwe's rising in Nyasaland in 1915 which was inspired by Watchtower missionaries, but even more the movement led by Simon Kimbangu in 1921 in the (Belgian) Congo against Belgian rule was animated by anti-colonial sentiments that had nativist roots.⁸ On the

one hand, Kimbangu used the missionary language of evangelical Christianity and appealed to a native God against a foreign Caesar; on the other hand, his aim of sweeping away Belgian rule was founded on the dream of restoring the lost kingdom of the BaKongo people.⁹

It is, however, with pre-modern varieties of ethnicism that I am mainly concerned here. Broadly speaking, ethnicism has manifested three broad aims in antiquity and the Middle Ages: territorial restoration, genealogical restoration and cultural renewal. Though in practice there is considerable overlap between these sub-types, I shall exemplify them separately.

Movements of territorial restoration

This is the most straightforward of the three. It involves, on the one hand, primary resistance to invasion conceived as a defence of the community and its culture; and, on the other hand, a movement to re-acquire lost territory thought to belong to the community. Examples go back to early antiquity. Thus in late third-millennium Sumer, the city-state of Uruk led a general resistance to the rule of the Guti, mountain tribes from the Zagros who had helped to destroy the dynasty and empire of Agade. Uruk's *ensi* (lord), Utu-hegal, rose against the 'stinging serpent of the hills' and defeated their king, Tiriqan. We read: 'Utu-hegal sat down; Tiriqan lay at his feet. Upon his neck he set his foot, and the sovereignty of Sumer he restored into his (own) hands.'¹⁰ From subsequent events, notably the ensuing rise of Ur in the name of all 'Sumer and Akkad' to establish a new Sumerian empire, we can infer a definite ethnic tinge to this movement of territorial resistance. Similarly, when a few centuries later a Theban prince, Kamose, led his southern dynasty in a divided Egypt against both Kush and the Asiatic Hyksos, we find him couching his resistance in the language of territorial ethnicism with the cry:

One prince rules in Avaris, another in Ethiopia, and here I am, associated with an Asiatic and a Negro. Each has his slice of Egypt, dividing up the land with me . . . None can rest in peace, despoiled as all are by the imposts of the Asiatics. I will grapple with them, and cut open their belly: I will save Egypt and overthrow the Asiatics!¹¹

The defeat of Kush and the expulsion of the Hyksos in the mid-sixteenth century BC marked the restoration of Egypt in its full extent and the revival of its fortunes in the New Kingdom.

We could cite many other examples of movements of ethnic territorialism. These include the movement led by Dmitri Pozharsky and Minin in AD 1610 on behalf of a 'Russia' wracked by peasant revolt and Polish invasions and pretenders, which sought to restore Russian territory lost in the 'time of troubles';¹² the movement to drive out the English feudal lords and their Burgundian allies from 'France', symbolized by the coronation of Charles

VII at Rheims in 1429 under the auspices of Jeanne d'Arc;¹³ and the Catalan Reconquista, which drove the Muslims out of Barcelona and later all Catalonia in the ninth and tenth centuries.¹⁴ How far such territorial movements were in the service of a definite ethnic consciousness and ideal is open to doubt, particularly in the Catalan case with its dependence on the Carolingians; but myths which hung around these ethnic claims, rapidly sprang up to legitimate the resistance. In those cases where ethnic consciousness was already pronounced, wars of territorial resistance and liberation only served to intensify the ethnic character of the communal tradition; the Greek mission to liberate Ionia from the Persians and the Jewish ideal of recovering the Lord's land from Seleucids and Romans, are only the best-known ancient examples of an aggrieved ethnic territorialism.

Movements of genealogical restoration

This type of movement usually mingles ethnic with family (dynastic or aristocratic) legitimations. Thus, well after the Norsemen under Rollo had settled in Normandy, their dukes began to feel the need to justify their rule by inventing and extolling an ancient lineage.¹⁵ In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the scribal efforts of men like Dudo and Orderic traced the noble pedigree of the later dukes in order to establish their title-deeds and the antiquity and propriety of their rule. The Norman myth was essentially restorative. It aimed to re-ground the authority of the Normans and their ruling house (this identification of community with ruling house was typical) by reference to an original treaty of acquisition of 911 with Charles the Simple. The dynasty thereby became legitimated as a duly constituted feudal *regnum* of common origins and customs as the Norse settlers inter-married with and became acculturated to the French-speaking natives.¹⁶

Movements of genealogical restoration may also seek to revive the ancient ethos of a decaying polity. In Babylon under the Chaldean dynasty of the sixth century BC, the usurper Nabonidus presided over a religious and antiquarian revival of Old Babylonian myths, epics, rites and customs – although it is doubtful whether the later Chaldeans were related to the Amorites who founded the Old Babylonian kingdom of the early second millennium BC. The purpose of Nabonidus' restoration was perhaps more than genealogical: he sought to re-ignite ancient Babylonian pride at a time when Medes and Persians were threatening her empire. His attempt was in vain; Babylon fell to Cyrus and the Crown-Prince, Belshazzar, was slain at its fall in 539 BC.¹⁷

Another usurping dynasty, the Ptolemies, also sought to legitimize their rule by means of a genealogical exercise. They commissioned an Egyptian priest, Manetho, to chronicle the history of the Egyptian kingdoms of which theirs would be a natural successor, despite its Greek and Macedonian basis.

The result was an inventory of the Egyptian state from Menes to the Persian conquest, divided into thirty dynasties, which has remained the point of departure for ancient Egyptian chronology. Whatever Manetho's personal feelings, this attempt to graft their rule onto an ancient and honoured pedigree was only a limited success from the standpoint of the Ptolemies; despite these and other efforts, the Ptolemies were only half accepted, and Egyptian sentiment remained strongly suspicious of Greek influence.¹⁸

Perhaps more successful was the recovery by an Ethiopian dynasty of its alleged 'Solomonic' heritage in AD 1270. Moving the old Aksumite kingdom south to Amhara territory, they laid claim to the Monophysite heritage of Aksum by tracing their line to the descendants of Solomon and Sheba and by stressing their Judaic origins. In fact, this *antemurale* dynasty produced some of the greatest rulers and a revival of Monophysite culture on the Ethiopian plateau, in the face of surrounding Falasha and Arab Muslim threats.¹⁹

Movements of cultural renewal

As our previous examples show, movements of genealogical restoration usually involve an element of cultural renewal. But cultural movements are more thoroughgoing and all-embracing. They are not confined to the ruling house or nobility, those with pedigrees to vaunt and protect, but seek a revival of the culture of the whole community. They also go beyond territorial liberation, which sometimes appears as a means and a prelude to the renewal of an ethnic heritage in the face of external threats.

Such a self-conscious renewal of a cultural ethnic heritage took place under the eighteenth dynasty after the whole of Egypt had been liberated from the Asiatic Hyksos. The Pharaohs of the New Kingdom sought to renew the glories of the Old and Middle Kingdoms, and even to expand Egyptian cultural influence into Palestine and Syria. The capital was returned to Thebes, a new centre of worship of Amon-Ra was erected at nearby Karnak, and the land was re-organized and embellished with temples. This was accompanied by an administrative and educational re-organization, especially for high officials and the nobility.²⁰ We find a similar conscious revival of a specifically Persian ethos and culture, and a return to the Mazdean religion of the Achaemenids, under the early Sassanid monarchs. In part a reaction to all things Western and Roman under the later Arsacids, this revival was particularly marked in city building, with the founding of new towns like Gundeshapur and Bishapur, and in the reforms of Zoroastrian orthodoxy by the priest, Kartir, who came to prominence during the reign of Shapur I (c. 240–72 AD). The spread of this re-organized religion with its fire-temples and its hierarchy of *mobadhs* and *herbadhs* did not, however, prevent the Sassanid state from becoming prey to civil and religious discord and decay; it required a major movement of cultural

renewal under Chosroes I (AD 531–79) to arrest external dependence on the eastern Hephthalite tribes from central Asia, and to reform the social hierarchy by giving more power to the lesser nobility, and tying them to the crown through a national revival in ritual, learning and literature. Frye sums up this sixth-century revival, not as one of innovation, but

Rather the period in a truer perspective might be characterized as a summation of the past, of gathering-in and recording, when history becomes important as a justification for the state and the religion. The past which was revived in epic, in traditions and in customs, however, was a heroic past of great and noble families and of feudal mores, not of a centralized, bureaucratic state which Chosroes wanted to establish.

Under Chosroes and his successors, there seems to have been an 'antiquarian renaissance'; books of protocol, mirrors of princes and other writings codified social behaviour, old titles like *Kavi* (*Kay*) were revived, and stories and legends, including probably the Book of Lords, were compiled during this period. A whole society with its gradations and etiquette was crystallized in the presumed image of an heroic past, but it failed ultimately to arrest the inner decay which afflicted the Sassanid state.²¹

The movement of territorial resistance led by Uruk in late third millennium BC Sumer against the Gutians also soon became a wider movement of Neo-Sumerian cultural renewal. Led by the Third Dynasty of Ur (c. 2113–2006 BC), it soon became a pan-Sumerian renaissance. Under the dynasty's founder, Ur-Nammu (c. 2113–2096 BC), commerce was restored, canals dug and agriculture revived. City walls were rebuilt and an impressive series of *ziggurats* erected in Ur, Uruk, Eridu and Nippur, symbolizing, perhaps, the bridge between men and the gods, but certainly the earthly splendour of an imperial Sumerian dynasty. Under Ur-Nammu's successors, the empire expanded to include the middle Tigris area, spreading Sumerian cultural influence across the fertile crescent, long after the demise of the Third Dynasty of Ur. It was in this period, with its conscious re-working of older Sumerian myths and rites, that a self-conscious pan-Sumerian sentiment permeated the upper classes and inspired a desire to preserve its religious culture.²²

External threat and ethnic response

The different kinds of ethnicism vary considerably in intensity and duration. Some are dramatic but brief, others more shadowy but long-lasting. Some are confined to the priesthoods and the upper nobility, others mobilize wider strata, at least temporarily. Some last a decade or generation, others come in creative waves over centuries. What they all have in common is their myth-making quality: they create myths and preserve memories of a glorious past,

while themselves becoming the stuff of later memories and myths of a 'golden age', now lost.

Ethnicism is fundamentally defensive. It is a response to outside threats and divisions within. It seeks a return to the *status quo ante*, to an idealized image of a primitive past. It emerges when the group's sense of ethnicity is attenuated and impaired, or when it is challenged by shattering external events. The Israelites and Judahites were being constantly enjoined by their prophets to return to a primitive semi-nomadic simplicity. From Elijah to Ezekiel, they were called back to their earlier tribalism before the confederation had settled in Canaan and adopted lax urban mores and the beliefs of local idol-worshippers, which had impaired their ethnic solidarity and faith.²³ We find similar, if more nostalgic, portraits of old-Roman simplicity and Italic virility in the poetry of Vergil and Horace, as they lament the intrusion of Eastern luxury and corruption at the expense of the old virtues of honesty, fortitude and frugality.²⁴ Similarly, the late Byzantines in Comnene Trebizond and Paleologan Constantinople sought to restore the days of Orthodox and imperial glory so rudely shattered by the Fourth Crusade.²⁵

If ethnicism is defensive and restorative, which factors help to incite this renewal of ethnic ties and sentiments? We saw that ethnicism appears when a significant segment of the community perceives a double threat to their status and heritage: internal divisions and decay, and external challenges and influences. These threats take a number of forms. They include:

1 *a military threat*: An attack on, or conquest of, one's territories is the most obvious spur to defensive ethnicism. But it need not be, unless other threats become apparent. The Mongol conquest of China and the Arab conquest of Egypt, did not evoke a corresponding ethnicism, at least not of a political or military nature. By no means all conquests in history evoke a response, and not all responses to attack are ethnicist; indeed, the more sudden and unexpected the onslaught, the less likelihood is there of mounting an ethnic response. This is because, in the nature of things, an ethnic movement requires gestation and organization; and that, in turn, requires some kind of cultural preparation.

2 *a socio-economic challenge*: Here we might include a rapid changeover from one mode of production and distribution to another, perhaps as the result of contact with an economically more developed society; from a nomadic and pastoral to a settled agrarian mode, or from a peasant and domestic mode of production to one based on commerce. We may also include here the rapid expansion of trade and the growth of market opportunities with their new networks, which constitute a profound threat to a routine, sedentary and self-subsistence economy. Economic dislocations by market forces or a new form of dependent labour can easily appear like some 'foreign' threat to the solidarity of traditional agrarian ties and communities – as occurred in late second century (BC) Rome and Italy, when the eastern

conquests brought in massive booty and slave-gangs to work the great vine and olive plantations of southern Italy and Sicily for the senatorial class.²⁶

3 *culture contact*: A crisis of confidence often develops in a less developed community when it comes into prolonged cultural contact with a more developed power. Imperial expansion, for example, carries an almost magnetic attraction for the threatened or conquered peoples in its path; they soon feel the need to adapt their beliefs and mores to those of the imperialists. Quite often parties of 'cosmopolitans' and 'nativists' emerge, the one pressing for cultural adaptation to the mores and life-style of the advanced civilization of the conqueror, the other seeking to resist foreign cultural encroachments and preserve their ancient ways. Something of this dilemma faced the early Romanovs in the middle and late seventeenth century, when under the patriarch Nikon, the Church became subject to Western influences and sought to reform its liturgy and ritual; this soon caused a major rupture among the Orthodox, with a large minority rejecting the changes as foreign to the spirit of the Russian church and remaining committed to the ways of the Old Believers.²⁷ In pre-modern societies, culture contact is not separable from religious challenges. Thus, as we saw, Kartir and his *mobadhs* strengthened Zoroastrian orthodoxy, partly as a response to the challenges of Western religions like Christianity and their Iranian offshoots, the Manichaeans; religious renewal was essential to ethnic restoration.²⁸

All these threats are present in a classical instance of ethnicism in the ancient world, the Jewish movements of resistance to Seleucid and Roman rule. At first sight, this is a simple matter of territorial liberation. But, in fact, the Seleucids and the Romans (and the Ptolemies before them) had been territorial overlords of Palestine for some decades before there was any sign of concerted resistance. In the Maccabean case, resistance only broke out under Antiochus IV (Epiphanes), not Antiochus III (the Great), and only when he attempted to introduce Hellenic religious practices within the Temple itself. Until that time, an influential section of the Jerusalemite elite had adopted Hellenic mores and customs, and had welcomed the wider horizons opened up by contact with the Hellenistic world. This is quite plain from the influence of Greek philosophy and culture on Jewish Wisdom literature, like Ecclesiastes and Ben Sirach. As long as Antiochus confined himself to promoting Hellenization in such spheres as town planning, theatre, language, sports and the arts throughout his realm, there were only mutterings of discontent. Though many small farmers and artisans in Judea were affected by their growing involvement in a Mediterranean commercial economy, and though this commerce had produced a small class of wealthy traders like Tobias and his family across the Jordan, there was no real sign of disaffection until the measures of Antiochus reached Jerusalem's shrine.²⁹ True, the Hellenizing party which emerged under Antiochus had flaunted their cultural collaboration at the expense of strict adherence to the sacred

Law, and this provided isolated protests (like that of Eleazar who refused to eat pork); but it was only when the assimilationists acquiesced in Antiochus' desecration of the Temple (when he introduced Hellenic cults and statues of Zeus) that the traditionalist or nativist party began to organize. When similar altars were commanded to be set up in the surrounding villages and towns, a priest, Mattathias, 'zealous for the law', cut down the Jewish Hellenizers who wanted to obey the Syrian command to sacrifice on the altar of Modi'in, his hometown, and with his five sons took to the hills, defeating the Syrian forces sent after them.³⁰

Essentially, the Chassidim were cast in the prophetic mould in their desire to return to the purity of the Law and cleanse Judea of Hellenism. The 'abomination of the Temple' symbolized for them a whole process of cultural degradation and inner social decay, in which Jews would lose their religious and ethnic identity by merging culturally with the surrounding alien peoples. The later Zealot movements were equally committed to cultural purity and the preservation of ethnic identity; indeed, Josephus regarded them as a particularly fanatical and political species of the broader Pharisaic movement.³¹ They differed, however, from other Jewish movements of the time, in arguing that cultural renewal requires territorial liberation, and that only when the Lord's land is restored to Him and the Romans expelled, can a truly Judaic commonwealth flourish, under a divinely inspired theocracy. There was, in the minds of Zealot leaders, no divorce between religious renewal and territorial restoration, and their analysis made sense in the context of Roman financial oppression and the mismanagement of successive Roman governors after Herod's death.³² Though the recovery of the sacred land became paramount for the Zealots, they saw it as an instrument for the implementation of their wider religious restoration. In this respect, they are typical of many socio-religious movements whose goals are mixed, but whose underlying inspiration is the desire to return to an idealized sacred past.

Historic culture and ancestral homeland, then, are the twin goals of ethnicism. Their recovery, intact from alien threat and inner corrosion, is the ideal for which ethnic nativism strives and for which its adherents are often prepared to sacrifice their lives. Though different movements, responding to varying circumstances, focus more on one or the other aspect of the lost or threatened patrimony, be it land or pedigree or culture, they all aim to re-discover the well-springs of communal identity and by returning to them revitalise and restore the community 'as in days of old'.

Two types of ethnic *mythomoteur*

At the centre of every *ethnie* and its peculiar ethnocentrism, as we have seen, stands a distinctive complex of myths, memories and symbols (or 'myth-symbol complex') with peculiar claims about the group's origins and lines of

descent. These claims and this complex provide the focus of a community's identity and its *mythomoteur*, or constitutive political myth. The conditions which activate an ethnicist movement *ipse facto* heighten the sense of common origins and bring the *mythomoteur* into play; though they may remain implicit and assumed, these convictions of common origins and the political mythology which emanates from them endow the movement with shape and direction, defining the nature of the unit for which its members are striving and guiding them towards prescribed goals and ideals.

There are, however, various kinds of 'myth-symbol complex' and *mythomoteur* which in turn give rise to different types of ethnic culture and life-style. In the modern period, for example, it is possible to make a vital distinction between those cultures and 'myth-symbol complexes' which derive communal solidarity from alleged ties of kinship and genealogical descent, and those which trace their cultures by means of an ideological affinity to allegedly similar cultures in archaic eras of communal history. This distinction between 'genealogical' and 'ideological' types of descent myth and culture becomes important when nations are created on the basis of competing mythologies and symbolisms often attached to different classes or regions.³³ But in the pre-modern eras which concern us here, the distinction between biological and cultural modes of tracing descent and customs is much fainter and less significant; yearnings for a return to certain spiritual values and life-styles are frequently bound up with the ideal of restoring particular lineages, as in the desire to restore a 'Solomonic' dynasty in medieval Ethiopia or the Davidic line in ancient Israel. Conversely, the tracing of certain ancient pedigrees often serves to validate and restore particular sets of values and culture, as occurred in fifteenth-century Russia among the principalities of the Volga-Oka region which sought to legitimize themselves by restoring a 'Kievan' lineage, particularly in Muscovy.³⁴

A more relevant set of distinctions relates to the type of polity and hence the kind of 'bearers' of the 'myth-symbol complex' and its culture. Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between a *dynastic* and a *communal* type of polity and 'myth-symbol complex'. Within the latter, we may further distinguish a more *political* kind of culture and symbolism from a more *religious* variety; but this is a matter of degree and the division is often blurred, as religious ideas and practices frequently suffuse and colour a people's perceptions of their origins and culture in pre-modern eras. The first distinction remains important, however, because it throws light on the different kinds of ethnic formation discussed later.

Dynastic mythomoteurs

As one would expect, the *mythomoteur* here is attached to the office of the ruler and by extension to the ruling house and dynasty. This is well illustrated by the tendency for scribes and chroniclers to identify the

community with the princely house, as we saw in the case of the Norman chroniclers.

Typical dynastic *mythomoteurs* and cultures are encountered in the Frankish realm under the Merovingians and Carolingians. The Merovingians after their conversion to Christianity under Clovis (c. AD 496) soon adopted a 'Trojan lineage' tracing their line to Aeneas and his wandering band of exiled Trojans and ancestor of the Romans; this put them on a par with other 'barbarian' kingdoms whose rulers also realized the functions of an ennobling classical pedigree which would make their rule more acceptable to their Romanized populations.³⁵ Soon, this 'Trojan myth of descent' was challenged by and fused with Catholic legitimations, which the usurping Carolingians found especially useful. In AD 754, Pope Paul legitimized Pepin's usurpation in return for Frankish aid against Lombard nobles; Pepin became the chosen of God and his realm '... a new kingdom of David. The Frank people,' he said, 'had a special place inscribed in heaven because of its aid to the church, similar to the place the people of Israel had held.'³⁶

Here was the seed of a potent dynastic *mythomoteur* with strong religious overtones. It was reinforced by the Papal coronation of Charlemagne in AD 800, in which rhythmic acclamation was accompanied by sacral anointing, and then applied by the French bishops, notably the archbishop of Rheims who backed Hugh Capet's nomination in 987 AD, to the Carolingian and Capetian successors of Charlemagne in the partitioned Western kingdom of 'Francia'. This 'holy dynasty' was matched by a clearcut 'sacred territory', a compact realm bounded by the Scheldt, Meuse, Saône and Rhône, which undoubtedly helped to fix the idea of a 'French' people, separate from an emergent German realm and standing through its dynasty in a direct relationship to God, in the minds of participants and observers. The Capetians indeed took over the special aura of Charlemagne's heritage and projected back a specifically 'French' leadership role onto his campaigns against the Saracens. But it was, in the last resort, the special link between the French hereditary monarchy and the episcopal organization of Francia, under the auspices of the archbishopric of Rheims and its coronation ceremony, that ensured the survival and individuality of the French realm and people, despite severe early military reverses. A final element in the dynastic *mythomoteur* emphasized the special status of the French as a 'chosen people' living in a free kingdom which resembled the Heavenly one, and ruled by a truly Christian monarch, who, because of his Trojan ancestry, owed nothing to the Papacy and stood outside the Papal 'Constantinian' domain. This position was sanctioned by Pope Boniface at the end of the thirteenth century: '... like the people of Israel ... the kingdom of France (is) a peculiar people chosen by the Lord to carry out the orders of Heaven'.³⁷ Certainly this trinity of holy dynasty, land and people was a crucial element in the subsequent emergence of a French ethnic state, and

greatly facilitated the rise of bureaucratic incorporation of adjacent *ethnie* in the late medieval period.

Such religio-dynastic *mythomoteurs* have a long history. They are, of course, prominent in the ancient Egyptian identification of Pharaoh with divinity in the pantheon, one of the chief supports of a distinctive Egyptian identity over nearly three thousand years; but the rupture with the Theban priesthood in Akhnaton's reign reveals the duality of the *mythomoteur* and the limitations on the ruler's powers.³⁸ As first sight, Mesopotamian 'myth-symbol complexes' accord a lesser role to the dynast; but this is counterbalanced by the Sumerian and Babylonian notion that terrestrial empires reflect the cosmic realm ruled by an assembly of gods under Enlil (later the Babylonian Marduk). The imperial ruler, therefore, acts on behalf of the gods to ensure that his domain resembles the heavenly one as closely as possible. The monarch, therefore, became the head of the clergy and was anointed by the high priest, and in Assyrian times was given the 'crown of Asshur and sceptre of Ninlil'. In both Babylonia and Assyria, he played an important part in the New Year and New Moon festivals, and no king could make important political decisions without first consulting the diviners and royal astrologers. The Assyrian kings were certainly proud of their hereditary dynasty and royal lineage which they traced back to the mythical ancestor-hero Adapa; but the state they ruled so imperiously was held in partnership with the great nobles and officials, and was hemmed in by the myths and ritual of temple priesthoods modelled on those of Babylonia. Yet the overwhelming impression gained from the Assyrian records and sculptural remains is the dominating presence of the dynastic monarch – far more than in, say, the Hittite kingdom.³⁹

Dynastic *mythomoteurs* are, of course, political in intent, if not in form. Though often couched in religious language and ritual, their prime purpose is political propaganda: to legitimate the deeds of the ruler and his house and pave the way for a smooth succession, perhaps in response to some internal challenge or external threat. The Byzantine *mythomoteur* was certainly designed to embody a universalist Christian mission, but it was inconceivable without a secular ruler identified as Christ's vicar on earth. This is already shown in the art of the period of Theodosius and, later, Justinian, in which the Emperor appears as double the size of his courtiers and where the *Pantokrator* image of Christ gave theological and artistic expression to the dual role of the Byzantine emperor as high priest and priest-king, at once a Judeo-Christian and a Judeo-Hellenistic (and hence Roman) set of motifs.⁴⁰ The carriers of this Caesaro-Papism, if such it really was, were the highly educated Court and administration versed initially in Latin, through which the emperors maintained their links with the West and their Roman imperial pedigree. But the Greek language was also permitted in the lower bureaucracy; by the eighth century, Greek had become the language of state, and Byzantium no longer commanded any power in the Western provinces,

including Italy. The result, as we shall see, was a Hellenization of the Orthodox Byzantine *mythomoteur* in the direction of a more ethnic imperialism. Administrative and ecclesiastical diffusion of the imperial Byzantine 'myth-symbol complex' carried within it the seeds of a powerful ethnic identity for whose restoration it proved an unexpected vehicle.⁴¹

Communal mythomoteurs

In contrast to *dynastic mythomoteurs*, the locus of which is the ruling house and the bearers of which are typically aristocratic or official personnel of the ruling stratum, *communal* 'myth-symbol complexes' are nurtured by other strata and focus on an image of the whole community rather than a privileged lineage or state institution. We find this type of *mythomoteur* in a number of socio-political systems: city-state amphictyonies, tribal confederations, sectarian or diaspora communities. What matters is the wider focus of the 'myth-symbol complex': the cultural and social system of a whole community, as opposed to that of neighbouring communities, forms the object of a special symbolism and descent myth.

City-state *mythomoteurs* lie at the more *political* end of the communal spectrum. Here it is a political system and a civic culture that is the object of communal celebration and explanation. In the Italian city-states like Florence, Verona or Venice, we find a strong local patriotism which involves the surrounding villages and countryside, and which over the generations induces a sense of political separateness and historical difference.⁴² That this never took an extreme form in medieval and Renaissance northern and central Italy, with the possible exception of Venice, is due in part to the legacy of a united Roman past, to the influence of a fairly uniform Catholic culture (despite the political divisions occasioned by the Papal states), and to the humanist culture diffused through the Tuscan Italian of Dante and Petrarch. It was inevitable that the few schemes for Italian unity during the Renaissance, such as those of Macchiavelli and Muzio Justinopolitano, took the existing city-states and regions as their point of departure, and for that very reason were doomed to political impotence; but this is not to exclude a wider sense of Italian political fate, only too clear in the laments on the easy success of the French invasion of 1495 and the many subsequent invasions by the competing European powers. The difficulty was that the common Roman and Christian (and linguistic) heritage had been overlaid by centuries of regional culture and political division, which tended in some cases to produce 'sub-ethnic' loyalties and identities which persisted into the modern era.⁴³

We have already outlined the relations between the city-states of Sumer before and after the dynasty of Sargon of Agade. But here too it is possible to detect, albeit in religious guise and format, a communal *mythomoteur* which starts from the separate myths and symbols of the component city-

states with their individual gods and *ensis*. Indeed, the subsequent evolution of an imperial and cosmic 'myth-symbol complex' can be seen as a transfer from the separate *mythomoteurs* of the individual city-states, whom finally Lugal-zaggisi and then Sargon united. In some ways, Sumerian culture was more unified than medieval Italian culture; a common heritage of myths and symbols, memories and values, informs their architecture and religious practices, urban planning and legal codes, arts and literature, beyond any differences between Ur and Lagash, Eridu and Kish, Uruk and Umma. In the Neo-Sumerian renaissance of the Third Dynasty of Ur in the late third millennium BC this cultural unity was given political expression, though by this time the proto-democratic character of the city-state with its assembly of elders had withered, much as that of the Italian city-republics had been superseded by the *signoria*.⁴⁴

But perhaps the best-known example of a civic and political communal culture and *mythomoteur* comes from the ancient Greek city-states. We shall never know whether and how much the earliest cities based on their defensive *acropoleis* succeeded, or preceded, the emergence of a unitary Hellenic culture and 'myth-symbol complex'. By the time we have any knowledge of that culture, in the eighth century BC, the city-states have already shed their kings for aristocratic oligarchies, and the peculiar features of an Hellenic heritage are in place. These include: a common Olympian pantheon which celebrated the triumph of the sky-gods and goddesses over the earlier Chthonian deities; a series of oracles at Delphi, Dodona, Didyma and the like, with their associated rites; a family of closely related Greek dialects – Aeolian, Boeotian, Ionian and Dorian – whose speakers also possessed myths of separate Greek lineages and hero-ancestors (with Heracles serving as the Dorian hero *par excellence*); and the possession of a common literary heritage of Homeric poems and epics celebrating an earlier, Mycenaean civilization and its war against Troy, and supplemented by creation and other myths recorded by Hesiod and others. All these, and the various Games (Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian) and colonies then being founded, served to bind Greeks together and set them apart from those around them; they formed the patrimony of every educated Greek, even if the peasants were more attached to local gods and customs of the countryside, to Pan and Hephaistos rather than Zeus and Apollo.⁴⁵

Within this broad Hellenic ethnic circle, we find two other competing sets of identities and 'myth-symbol complexes'. The first is the separate linguistic migrations of Dorians, Ionians and Aeolians (and later Boeotians) which produced contrasting styles of architecture and art, different customs and heroic ancestors, and separate geo-political spheres of influence. In some cases, as in Sicyon, these sub-ethnic divisions even led to intra-city antagonism.⁴⁶ More serious for political unity were the inter-city conflicts, since the *polis* furnished the average Greek with his basic political concepts and economic well-being. Within each city there were recurring struggles

between well-to-do oligarchs and the poorer classes whom democracy served, conflicts which wider inter-city amphictyonies and alliances underpinned. The result was that Greek city-states often failed to unite when exposed to external threats, though a temporary alliance was forged between the Spartan-led (Dorian) league and Ionian Attica in the face of the gravest threat, from Persia, despite the medizing of several Greek cities and the Delphic oracle.⁴⁷

One effect of the great Persian invasion was to transform a latent Hellenic ethnocentrism into an overt politico-cultural movement. Inevitably, as in Italy and Sumer, any unity that might be forged was based on the co-operation of city-states which guarded their sovereignty against neighbours and great (Greek) powers like Athens or Sparta, and sought to maximize their commercial gains through inter-city competition. But, given the magnitude of the Persian threat, and the new pan-Hellenic consciousness which unexpected victory on this scale stimulated, the leading city-states were soon drawn into a competition for the sponsorship of a pan-Hellenic drive against Persia. At first, Sparta and Corinth, Plataea and Euboea, joined Athens and her Delian confederates in their counter-attack; a great new temple to Zeus was erected at Olympia; new colonies were planted and Games instituted; and dramatists, philosophers and artists, many from Ionia itself, flocked to Athens and other mainland cities. Indeed, in 449 BC Pericles sponsored an anti-Persian crusade culminating in the Peace of Kallias, by which Athens assumed the leadership of Greece both in culture and politics, while the Peloponnesian powers fell away in anxious jealousy of Athens' growing power.⁴⁸

Fifth-century Hellenic ethnicism, then, was predominantly civic and communal in character. Its image of Greek unity was shaped by the political institutions and myths of the component city-states; and its aspirations amounted only to an alliance of sovereign city-states competing for leadership of a militarily united Greece. Even under Agesilaus and the pan-Hellenism of Isocrates in the fourth century, there was no thought of undermining that sovereignty in the interests of a unified Hellas, and therefore the unity that eventually came was an externally imposed one which destroyed the liberties of its city-states. On the other hand, in the realm of political culture, the Persian threat had galvanized a sense of Hellenic unity into a cultural efflorescence which only reinforced the sense of Greek superiority and uniqueness over Persian 'servitude' and 'barbarian' illiteracy.⁴⁹

A closely related type of communal 'myth-symbol complex' centres around the image of a sacred people with a special relationship to the deity. Typically, this *mythomoteur* posits an ideal past in which that relationship was harmonious and natural, when the community of the faithful lived out God's dispensation in true faith and understanding. Today's generations may have lost their way, but it is their duty to return to the ideal epoch of their history and become once again God's chosen emissaries on earth.

While all peoples in antiquity entertained an ethnocentric conception of their role as special protégés of the deity, the peculiar missionary and restorative elements characteristic of sacral *mythomoteurs* and religious 'myth-symbol complexes' are most readily apparent in later Jewish self-conceptions. It is true that prophetic Judaism contained strong universalist components: 'Did I not bring up Israel from the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Arameans from Kir?', demands God in Amos' vision; while Jeremiah calls for submission to Nebuchadnezzar, because Yahweh had given every land to 'the king of Babylon, my servant'.⁵⁰ But this is counter-balanced by a strong sense of ethnic peculiarity leading to a separate fate; in the words of Micah: 'For all the peoples walk each in the name of its god, but we will walk in the name of Yahweh our God for ever and ever'. It was a conception that received practical expression in Ezra's reforms of the mid-fifth century, especially his attempt to prohibit inter-marriage with the rival Samaritans (and others) and his congregational innovations, notably the revival of the priesthood and the reading of the *Torah* to the assembled populace of Jerusalem.⁵¹

From that moment the Jews, bereft of kings and governors of their own, and centred on a Temple priesthood, began to evolve a communal and sacred *mythomoteur* which was subsequently diffused through the synagogue both in Judea and the diaspora. In their myths of origins and descent, the Jews laid stress on the early patriarchs and the line of Levi through Moses and Aaron to the priests (*Kohanim*), while the royal line of Judah to Jesse and David was accorded a lesser role, depending on the political circumstances. When the Synagogue took over the functions of the Temple, the democratization of religious self-conceptions was complete; the rabbi was a teacher and expounder of the *Torah*, not an intermediary, and the Oral Law, embodied in the Mishnah, was designed for the whole community of believers. Similarly, any restoration of the Exile became increasingly geo-communal rather than geo-political: it involved the return of the whole community of Israel to Zion, its sacred centre, more than the restoration of the rule of the house of David in Palestine, and the messianic era was centred less on the person or agency of the anointed one than on the universal justice and peace which Israel's restoration would bring. Priestly and prophetic denunciation of the institution of monarchy had paved the way for a theocratic and communal conception of the basic *mythomoteur* of the Jewish people.⁵²

A similar theocratic and geo-communal *mythomoteur* emerged among another diaspora *ethnie*, the Armenians. They too retained an intense attachment to their original mountain kingdom and its sacred Gregorian centre, Echmiadzin; while the defeat and destruction of their royal Arsacid and Bagratid dynasties left institutional and spiritual power in the hands of the Gregorian hierarchy. It is true that Armenian distinctiveness gained from the peculiar economic niche they tended to occupy in their far-flung diaspora, and which in fundamentally agrarian economies placed them in the

same socioeconomic 'pariah' position under Islam as the Jews came to occupy in medieval Europe, though the Islamic rulers were far more tolerant of the Peoples of the Book.⁵³ But this only served to reinforce a pre-existing sense of communal identity founded on the participation of the whole community in the sacred ethnic mission of a truly Orthodox faith. To diaspora Armenians, as to Jews, the golden age was located in the distant past of their sacred centre: the era of Gregory and Narses and the early Gregorian church, whose rites and liturgy have held Armenians together and whose sacred literature has inspired the subsequent renaissance of the early modern era.⁵⁴ In their sacred *mythomoteur*, Armenians saw themselves as a chosen people, their heroes as Old Testament warriors like Judas Maccabeus, and their late Arsacid rulers (and Bagratid nobles) as of Jewish lineage; sharing the role of ancient Israel, the unique Gregorian-Armenian community of the faithful stood out as the true repository of orthodoxy. Religion and *ethnie* converged to provide, as we shall see, a dynamic impetus to communal survival over the centuries and millennia.⁵⁵

The concept of a 'community of the faithful' has also inspired the Arab sense of ethnic identity. Here, too, we encounter a high degree of religious ethnocentrism, though there were periods when Arab ruling classes were favourably disposed to Muslim non-Arabs within their realms, and indeed made little distinction from Arab Muslims. But, from time to time, the 'Arab' dimensions of the Islamic revelation have found strong expression; conversely, the religious and communal nature of the Arab identity has always been stressed, even in today's more secular environment.⁵⁶ The fact remains that Muhammad preached his universal revelation and mission to fellow-Arabs, and made it his primary business to unite into a religio-political community the Arabian tribes. The Arabs therefore became the Prophet's chosen instrument, and their rich language was chosen to be the sacred tongue of the holy Qur'an, a vital emblem and unifying bond for scattered Arab polities and tribes. It was, in the first place, Arab ethnic elites who effected the initial conquests of *jihad* and provided the earliest rulers; which accounted for subsequent Arab resentment and even contempt of later rulers like the Ottoman Turks. It is this sacral quality of Arab identity that draws Sunni Arabs back to the golden age of the Companions and the early Ummayyads even today.⁵⁷

Several other communities have adopted a religio-communal self-definition and *mythomoteur*. The Irish, after their subjugation by the English, developed a specific Catholic and monastic 'myth-symbol complex', locating Ireland as an *insula sacra* of piety and Christian virtue in an ocean of Protestantism and materialism. In the nineteenth century, various Anglo-Irish and Irish-Catholic revivalists looked back to the surviving remnants of the Gaeltacht in the west to champion the essentially popular, Catholic and Gaelic civilization of an Irish Ireland as a special community of the faithful with its distinctive sacred myths and symbols.⁵⁸

In the case of the Byzantine Greek community after the fall of Constantinople, Orthodoxy came to define their sense of separate identity, with the Church exercising a powerful hold over the political as well as the spiritual fortunes of the scattered Greek communities and preserving such Greek ethnic identity as had already begun to emerge in the last two centuries of the shrunken Byzantine empire. For the loss of most non-Greek-speaking territories in the West and later in the East and Anatolia, meant that the empire was reduced to its Hellenic-culture and Greek-speaking core, at the very moment when its elite in Constantinople was becoming exclusively Greek-speaking and was falling back upon a still potent Hellenic classical culture. At the same time, the Church and orders were exerting great influence on the populace against both the Latins and the Turks, strong enough to reject the terms of the projected re-unification of the Churches at the Council of Florence in 1439.⁵⁹

Subsequent events only strengthened the role of the Greek Orthodox church and its Byzantine dreams. Under the *millet* system, the Ottomans accorded communal recognition and extensive powers to the Patriarchate and thereby strengthened the identity of the Greek-speaking community with their Church. Given the restorative *mythomoteur* of the Church, the Greek *millet* became increasingly identified with the belief in the ultimate liberation of the Greek community as oppressed bearers of the Christian truth which must ultimately triumph. But, interestingly, there occurred an important transference in the process: no longer was the sacred truth vested in the office of an emperor, or even of the Patriarch, it was increasingly attached to the community of the faithful as such, with the promise of *their* eventual restoration to freedom and dominion over the infidel.⁶⁰

In fact, the Byzantine dream was for a time realized only in Orthodox Russia. Here we encounter a fascinating fusion of communal with dynastic *mythomoteurs* which proved nevertheless to contain fatal tensions. It is possible to exaggerate the degree to which Ivan III's Muscovy felt itself to be the spiritual heir of Byzantium, though Greek influence was undoubted, particularly against so-called 'Judaisers' at the turn of 1500. But there is little doubt that the Church in Russia conceived its role as heir to the Byzantine church, and Moscow as a 'Third Rome' and Ivan III as a 'second Constantine'.⁶¹ The growth of the sacral authority of the Tsar, after Ivan IV had officially adopted the title, though it had weaker parallels in Western absolutisms, embodied a messianic quality that only the Orthodox Byzantine emperor had possessed.

But the Tsar had a rival in the popular consciousness of Russians and their sacred imagery. This was the community of the faithful ministered to by the Orthodox priesthood, and it was necessary for the Tsar to identify with this image and construct a sacred *mythomoteur* of himself as protector and redeemer of his people. This Ivan IV and his successors did by directing their (and the people's) attentions against the rapacity and wealth of the

boyars and attracting to their service a lower gentry and civil-service class, and by a vigorous foreign policy of resistance (and expansion) to the Poles, Tatars and Swedes. By identifying the state in the person of the Tsar, the people and the Orthodox faith, the rulers were able to create an effective sacred *mythomoteur* which was in effect limited to a Russian community claimed to descend from Vladimir I of Kiev and ultimately Rurik, even though the Tsarist empire soon expanded to include non-Russian and non-Orthodox peoples. It was this 'Kievan' heritage with its constant wars against steppe peoples like the Pechenegs and Cumans (or Polovtsii) that elevated the military ruler, and was thus admirably suited to the colonizing, frontier principalities of north-eastern Russia (Rostov, Tver, Suzdal, Moscow), fighting wars on two fronts.⁶² But this military-autocratic myth was married to a sacral myth which turned the autocrat into a vice-regent of Christ on earth guarding the Russian *zemlya* or territorial people and renouncing any universal mission. In the end, the Tsar supplanted the Church (Peter I abolished the Patriarchate) and took over its mystical qualities, so that Slavophiles looked back to the image of a pre-Petrine era in which Tsar and people assumed an 'organic' fatherly community, as in a holy monastery, an ideal to which a modernizing, European-involved Russia should revert.⁶³

Anticipating our theme, we can see already that of all the types of ethnocentrism and their characteristic *mythomoteurs*, those suffused with sacred elements and religious fervour and imagery are the most intense and persistent. In this we may include the peculiar Russian fusion of dynastic and communal-religious *mythomoteur* which undoubtedly paved the way for territorial consolidation around an Orthodox Russian Slavic core and hence the growth, through bureaucratic incorporation, of a national state in the early modern era. In the other cases cited, a sacred liturgy and mythology has provided the community with its *raison d'être* and its inner resources. Among religiously inspired communal 'myth-symbol complexes' and their cultures, we find repeated movements of cultural renewal in the face of external threats or inner divisions, which revitalise the sources of their communal energy and cultural power. Taking the ideal community as their focus and concern, sacral *mythomoteurs* and their cultures inject a popular, dynamic element into communal consciousness which is lacking in the more dynastic or even political kinds of 'myth-symbol complex'. By locating the ideal community in a specific place and archaic time, the religious 'myth-symbol complex' gives the members of the *ethnie* a sense of destiny which stems from a transcending historical perspective beyond immediate events and vicissitudes. That allows oppressed *ethnie* sustained by sacral *mythomoteurs* to entertain hopes of a 'status reversal' by which they will be restored to their former state of grace.

In a subsequent chapter we shall examine in more detail the survival potential of different kinds of ethnic formation, and especially ethnic

minorities sustained by sacred cultures and *mythomoteurs*. For the present we need only note the power of religiously inspired ethnic cultures and their ability to carry the community through dangers and crises, and the correlation between strong ethnic ties and sentiments and powerful religious revclations and missions. Of the three types of *mythomoteur* – the dynastic, the communal–political and the communal–religious – the latter has undoubtedly the greatest impact on the membership of the community and its propensity for ethnocentrism and ethnicist movements of renewal and restoration. A similar conclusion emerges when we turn to consider the degree of social penetration of the *ethnie* by such ‘myth–symbol complexes’; for, with certain exceptions, religious *mythomoteurs* are associated with certain types of ethnic formation. It is to these differences in ethnic communal formations that we now turn.

Class and *ethnie* in agrarian societies

For the 'modernist', nations and nationalism are fairly recent phenomena, the products of purely modern processes dating from the eighteenth century in Europe, or perhaps a little earlier. Pre-modern eras were unable to accommodate nationalism or nations. Indeed, everything in agrarian societies – the nature of culture, the structure of power, the nexus of economic ties – conspired to prevent the emergence of nations. In particular agrarian societies were so stratified and so immobile, as to ensure that cultural heterogeneity was the social norm. Kingdoms, empires and principalities were the product, not of any drive towards cultural unity, but of the need to secure the wealth and privileges of small ruling classes living off the specialist services of subordinate strata and the labour of peasant food producers. Because of this need to keep the upper classes distinct, culture inevitably played a stratifying role: it reinforced, and made visible and permanent, the primary socio-economic divisions. Literacy remained the preserve of this small elite and especially the priesthoods, and the peasantry were sub-divided into a host of vernacular cultures expressing the localism and subsistence economy that was their lot. The Great Tradition remained firmly tied to the main cities and nobility; the various Little Traditions of the countryside existed side by side, but were relatively impervious to the culture of the rulers.¹

It is for this reason that Gellner has tied his theory of nationalism to the transition out of such agroliterate societies to modern industrial ones. As we have seen, this still leaves open the question of the extent and durability of ethnicity and *ethnie* prior to the modern era. The evidence so far presented, would suggest that cultural homogeneity, while never a political end in itself, *was* achieved in many instances, and that ethnic communities expressing a clear cultural unity persisted for long periods in several parts of the world. How can we square this evidence with Gellner's argument about class and culture in agrarian societies? Is it true that upper-class culture was generally of an utterly different character from the many cultures of the peasantry, and

that therefore there could be no sense of shared identity between the classes in any area or polity? Conversely, just how deep-rooted and socially penetrative were the various pre-modern ethnic ties that persisted over so many centuries?

The problem of 'social penetration'

In answering these questions, we are faced by the obvious difficulties inherent in any attempt to uncover popular subjective ideas and sentiments in antiquity or the Middle Ages. There is a paucity of records on the subject of popular beliefs and sentiments, and such documents as have been transmitted to us are generally the product of the literati, or at any rate urban elites. Even when there are records, they usually pertain to limited regions; outlying areas away from centres of wealth and power, have rarely left any direct trace of the loyalties and ideals of their populations. At best we are reduced to uncertain inferences from the art and architecture or archeological remains of the area, supplemented, perhaps, by stray references in the writings of foreign travellers and historians like Herodotus and Strabo. Nor can we assume that, because of the generally poor state of communications in pre-modern eras, there was a low level of communal sentiments everywhere; this may be true of 'outlying areas' (though even here 'tribal sentiments' are known to have been significant), but it can hardly obtain for the well-connected centres of civilization in the Middle East, North Africa, Southern and Western Europe, or India and China. In each case, it is a question for empirical investigation how far peasants evolved cultural ties with their gentries or local towns, and whether tribal groups and confederations were able to achieve a measure of cultural unity.²

We can illustrate these general difficulties by considering a typical case from antiquity, the problem of the Elamites in southwestern Iran. Their name is first found in Sumerian inscriptions of the mid-third millennium BC. It reappears at the time of the Third Dynasty of Ur (c. 2150–2000 BC), when the 'Elamites' administered the *coup de grâce* to the tottering empire. Documents from Babylonian and Kassite times often mention Elam and Elamites, and in roughly 1175 BC Shutruk-Nakhunte, their king, captured Babylon and carried off to his capital (Susa) much booty and a diorite stone with Hammurabi's code inscribed on it. Again, the Assyrian inscriptions frequently mention Elam, and in about 636 BC Ashur-bani-pal finally destroyed their kingdom, sacking Susa and razing its celebrated ziggurat. Thereafter, they disappear from the historical record, though their language remains, and it is to be found on Darius' Behistun inscription.³

To what extent can we designate 'Elam' an ethnic community? How far did sentiments of 'Elamiteness' penetrate down the social scale? It could be argued that we are dealing simply with a polity, consisting of first governors,

then kings, who manipulated a coalition of tribes for political ends, and that tribesmen and peasants of the ragged area known as Elam had no attachments to, or consciousness of, any ethnic unity of Elamites. Indeed, linguistic scholars have been uncertain over the boundaries between the Elamites and related (linguistic) populations like the Kassites, Lullubi, Guti and even Urartians.⁴ But this concern betrays its origins in the linguistic German Romantic theory of nationality. The area of Elam was quite clearly demarcated in the ancient consciousness, to the north-east of Sumer (and east of Babylon) but beneath the Iranian plateau (though it included its foothills). The existence of a polity, too, was not in doubt. Nor was the uniqueness of its political system, in which brothers of kings played an exceptional part and where sons were designated governors of Susa, the capital. Its customs were also unusual, in the freedom they accorded to upper-class women, in their matrilineal dynasties, brother-sister marriages and dynastic descent through brothers. This accorded well with Elamite religion, with its important role for a mother goddess; and with the uniqueness of the language, which was neither Semitic nor Indo-European.⁵

Given these distinctive cultural traits, given the durability of the kingdom of Susa and Anshan (as Elam was often titled) over two millennia, it seems incredible to imagine that there was no continuity of ethnic community, with its name, descent myths, culture, history and territorial homeland. On the other hand, we shall never know to what extent the sense of being Elamite penetrated the peasantry, or how far they identified with the fortunes of Elam's state and dynasties. We can only infer a measure of allegiance in the very persistence of the state until its final demise and the arrival of the Persians in the area; and in the long and protracted resistance to Sumerians, Babylonians and Assyrians, which inevitably mobilized wider sections of the population and made them conscious of their community.⁶

What is true of the Elamites applies in equal measure to many of the better-known peoples of antiquity: the Arameans, Hurrians, Urartians, Philistines, Kassites and Amorites. As these communities or tribal confederations emerge from a better knowledge of their material remains or the discovery of more inscriptions, their sense of ethnic community and identity may well be better attested. But in most cases it is likely to have remained socially restricted; or at least the records we may uncover are not likely to throw much light on the social penetration of ethnic sentiments documented for the cities or ruling elites.

In the early Middle Ages, too, the extent of ethnic sentiments in the population is open to dispute. It was often thought that the spread of Roman civilization, followed by a universal Christendom and Islam, extinguished decaying ethnic sentiments until their revival in early modern Europe.⁷ As we have seen, there are significant exceptions to this picture. Indeed, recent scholars have directed attention to the emergence of *regna* in early medieval Europe – among Visigoths, Franks, Normans, Scots, Lombards, Saxons,

and so on – whose legitimations focus on common customs and myths of heroic descent which trace their pedigrees back to Noah or Aencas. Admittedly, the writers who purvey these myths belong like Isidore of Seville, Bede or Orderic Vitalis to the literati, often the clergy. Yet they attest to the existence of broader popular loyalties and rationales for these dynastic *regna*, and clearly ruling houses found it necessary and worthwhile to reconstruct a noble ancestry myth to underpin their powers and title-deeds.⁸

It would be quite wrong to suggest that these myths of descent were the medieval equivalent of the later myths of nationalism. For one thing, they were not nearly as widespread or necessary as they are today. For another, they rarely served to mobilize populations for social change or even for war, at least until the later Middle Ages. But the new ‘barbarian kingdoms’ soon had to base themselves on the existing populations and their cultural heritages. These included both the Germanic customs like *Geblütsrecht* of the *comitatus*, and the indigenous languages and practices of the Romanized populations. By adopting the ‘orthodox’ Catholic Trinitarianism of the Gallo-Roman population, Clovis’ Franks were able to establish their *regnum* on firmer foundations than most, especially in its western parts (later Neustria); and their conversion was bolstered by adoption of the myth of Trojan descent.⁹ In Eastern Europe, too, various Slavic tribal communities were converted by Cyril and Methodius at the end of the ninth century, and then built up dynastic ethnic states in the Balkans on the basis of alleged ties of descent and historical memories. How far these myths and cultures penetrated down the social scale is difficult to gauge; but two factors must have increased the ethnic self-awareness of peasant communities included in these ethnic states, the local Orthodox hierarchies and liturgies in the Slavonic tongue and the frequent wars in defence of much-prized territory in an Eastern Europe that was rapidly ‘filling up’ with competing populations.¹⁰

Against this ethnic pattern from antiquity and the early medieval era, we find cases in the later medieval period where, as Gellner claimed, culture only reinforces class divisions, rendering permanent and visible the social chasms dividing agroliterate societies. Eastern Europe in the early modern period evolved patterns of horizontal cultural stratification in which nobles and clergy shared one aristocratic culture along with their privileges, while the corresponding peasantry and artisanate were excluded from this culture and were sometimes sub-divided into overlapping local cultures, which ‘froze’ their status and in a sense their latent communal identities.¹¹ Polish nobles and clergy formed caste-like estates above their Polish and Ukrainian peasantries, and similarly with Magyar lords for their Croat and Slovak dependants; earlier, Czech nobles exploited a Slovak-speaking peasantry – if we can so designate the network of dialects spoken by the peasants of the Carpathian valleys.¹² In the eighteenth century, hardly anyone regarded the inhabitants as an ethnic category, let alone a community. In Rumania, too,

the aristocrats and clergy of Wallachia and Moldavia constituted a separate 'caste' from the mass of peasants who worked their estates. When Archbishop Micu pleaded for the rights of the Wallachian 'people', clergy and aristocrats alike rejected his proposal. They did indeed concede the existence of a Wallachian people (or *ethnie*) speaking a single language, but denied the right of other strata to be part of the nation or enjoy representation in any national assembly.¹³

A similar pattern could be found elsewhere in the Balkans. In both Greece and Serbia, aristocrats and rich merchants and higher clergy formed estates and classes apart from herdsmen and peasants; there was little to link the Phanariots of Constantinople with villagers of Epirus or the Morea – except religion. Religion was the visible emblem of difference between Orthodox Greeks or Serbs and Muslim Ottomans (and even Muslim Bosnians), and at the same time the bond that united, however tenuously, merchants of Odessa with peasants in the Morea. In this sense, several cultures co-existed within a single historic (Orthodox) *ethnie* – regional cultures, class cultures, status cultures – yet all drawing on a fund of common myths, memories, symbols and values, from which each drew sustenance and whose variant strands could be woven anew to create the new Greek (or Serb) 'nation', which remains an uneasy amalgam of these cultures.¹⁴

This pattern of regional and class culture within a broader ethno-religious or ethno-linguistic community persisted into modern times, and not just in Eastern Europe. In England, the historic division between north and south, dating from the Northumbrian kingdom and then the Danish realm, persisted through the fusion of Saxon with Anglo-Norman cultures in the late Middle Ages into Tudor and Stuart times; and, with the onset of industrial capitalism, was accentuated in the nineteenth century and remains a fairly salient feature of social and economic life in England up to the present time, so that the terms 'two nations' and 'working-class culture' have lost none of their resonance, despite the assumption of a wider cultural and historical unity. In France and Italy, regional cultures have persisted from medieval and Renaissance times up to the twentieth century; in France, social unity, as opposed to political unification, was not really achieved before the beginning of this century, while in Italy, political unification simply masks a persistent regionalism, especially in the South, which presents a grave impediment to national cohesion, if not national consciousness.¹⁵ Clearly, we should not overestimate the degree of cultural homogeneity even of modern nations.

Military mobilization and ethnic consciousness

In chapter 2, the importance of warfare between states in forming and maintaining the sense of common ethnicity was briefly considered and

described. There it was claimed that battle myths are even more crucial for maintaining ethnic sentiments in later generations than the initial events, and that a community's geo-political location, its relationship with other communities and polities, and especially the nexus of states in which it finds itself, helps to feed and keep alive the members' sense of their common destiny. We can extend these observations by noting the effect of protracted wars on the sense of common consciousness of non-elites. For not only are the great set-piece battles fought through the involvement and inter-dependence of representatives of the different strata; the myths that these turning-points generate are habitually inter-class and solidaristic, whatever the reality may have been.

Broadly speaking, we can divide most pre-modern encounters on the battlefield into mass and professional engagements. These are not mutually exclusive categories, since the mobilization of conscript masses is usually carried out under professional, elite supervision; or, as in ancient Sparta, the citizen 'masses' (all 9000 of them) are transformed into a professional corps. Indeed, in many ancient Greek city-states it is difficult to draw a clear line between the hoplite masses and their 'professional' generals (*strategoi*) or commanders. The same was originally the case in the Roman peasant conscript army, or the Macedonian. In all these cases, infantry formations required a high degree of both mobilization and training, an expertise moreover that depended for its effect on the strictest discipline and comradeship in battle.¹⁶

In other polities and communities, the distinction between mass involvement and professional elites makes better sense. At one extreme there are the gentlemanly professional engagements of early modern Europe, where dynastic succession or territorial adjustments were at stake, rather than the fate of whole communities; or the engagements of mercenaries led by condottieri on behalf of the warring city-states of early Renaissance Italy. At the other end of the scale there are the amorphous encounters of whole communities, or of citizen conscript armies, like those of the Swiss cantons or Arab tribesmen. Here, the battle skills are either part of a way of life, as with the cavalry skills of the Mongol clans, or are learnt in and through protracted warfare with neighbouring communities and polities, as in the case of Israelites and Philistines, or Romans and Carthaginians. In these cases, a large part of the manpower of the whole community is mobilized in repeated seasonal campaigns; and the sense of involvement, of personal and family fortunes being bound up with success in battle, inevitably instils a lively sense of ethnic consciousness. If this involvement can be harnessed to a conception of cultural difference and religious mission, if also there emerges a clear sense of an alien and opposed life-style, which it is the duty of the community to resist or even conquer, then the conditions of protracted mass mobilization will give rise to the most powerful and lasting myths of ethnic community and symbols of ethnic cohesion.¹⁷

Some of these conditions could be found in a number of pre-modern ethnic relationships. The fact, for example, that the early Assyrian army was largely composed of peasant levies from the Assyrian heartlands, guided by an impressive professional corps of commanders and siege specialists, the fact that Assyria as polity and community faced a number of perennial enemies (notably Urartu, Elam and finally Egypt, each of which possessed quite different life-styles and religions), the fact that the military campaigns of the Assyrian state and community were, at least initially, closely bound up with a sense of religious mission (fighting for Asshur and his dominion), all helped to generate in the artisans, peasants and traders a sense of identification with the Assyrian 'myth-symbol complex', embodied in the state religion and the monarchy.

Economically, too, the Assyrian peasant's participation in the booty of the annual razzias for land and plunder conducted by the state, only served to increase his commitment and sense of solidarity – at least until the gulf between nobles and peasant serfs widened and the army reforms of the later empire diminished the role of the native peasant infantryman.¹⁸

Protracted warfare had similar effects on the lower strata in Rome and Carthage. Though such conflicts in no way diminished the antagonisms between patricians and plebeians (if anything, its effects fuelled the conflicts), they undoubtedly strengthened their identification with the community as a whole in its relationships with other polities. Naval battles with an expanding Rome in the third century BC induced a heightened sense of Carthaginian solidarity and Phoenician origins during the First Punic War, and Hamilcar and Hannibal were able to exploit these sentiments to carry the war to Rome's gates. The long and terrible campaigns of the Second Punic War in turn united the Roman community, which was of mixed ethnic origin, creating, perhaps for the first time, a sense of common ethnicity and a myth of inter-class cohesion that in later socially divisive epochs became the very touchstone of heroic solidarity and community.¹⁹

Of course, not all wars and not every case of protracted mass mobilization can by itself sustain a sense of ethnic community; and conversely, it is not necessary for every community or polity to engage in protracted warfare to achieve and maintain lasting sentiments of ethnic solidarity. The Mongol expansion in the thirteenth century is a striking example of the failure of regular campaigning and a communal life on the battlefield to ensure long-term ethnic solidarity. Admittedly the unification of the rival Mongol clans was achieved on the very eve of expansion by Temuchin himself; as Chingis Khan, he had very little time or preparation to create those traditions and communal self-images which, particularly for short-distance nomads, are needed if cohesion and ethnic self-awareness are to be maintained. In the event, the vast distances traversed by relatively small numbers of men, the very extent and speed of their conquests, above all, their inability to oppose, let alone impose, an indigenous clan and shamanistic (with Buddhist

trappings) culture onto the often ancient and deep-rooted cultures of the societies they conquered, spelt an inevitable fragmentation, symbiosis or dissolution of such sense of common ethnicity as they had carried with them or formed in the common fortune and danger of battle.²⁰

On the other hand, a Russian identity was forged, discontinuously, through significant myth-making encounters rather than protracted warfare. Starting with the destruction of the Chazar kingdom in the late tenth century by Sviatoslav (c. AD 965) by the emergent Norman state of Kievan Rus, Eastern Slavs converted to Orthodoxy were involved in frequent encounters with steppe nomads like the Pechenegs and Cumans (Polovtsii); one of these assaults on the Cumans in 1185 proved disastrous, but left its mark in the early epic of Igor's Host, to inspire subsequent generations intent on recreating a Slavic Russia. Other legendary encounters with invaders included the Battle of Lake Peipius in 1242, when Alexander Nevsky defeated the Catholic Teutonic Knights on a frozen lake; the siege of Tatar Kazan in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible, which ended the domination of the former Golden Horde; the battle of Borodino in 1812 which ejected another would-be Western conqueror; and the siege of Stalingrad in 1942, the last of those epic landmarks which sum up stages of ethnic crystallization and help to bind together a Russian community of fate.²¹

This example illustrates how the equality of battle conditions, the human need to compensate for the gruesomeness of war by idealizing its positive aspects, and the symbolism with which the fate of the community is mirrored on the battlefield (as may its reality), make mass mobilizing wars and the myths they create among the most unifying elements in society. Yet wars that mark communal turning-points only sustain a sense of common ancestry and destiny if they are incorporated into a definite ethnic tradition which convincingly interprets them for all members in a moral framework.

Two types of *ethnie*

The distinction between the two types of pre-modern military engagement into 'elite professional' and 'conscript mass', suggests a similar distinction between two kinds of ethnic community. The first is lateral and extensive, the second vertical and intensive. In the first, we find communities that rarely penetrate deep in the social scale, but extend in ragged and imprecise fashion in space. Typically, '*lateral ethnie*' are aristocratic, though usually clerical and scribal strata are included, along with some of the wealthier urban merchants. Equally typically, '*vertical ethnie*' are urban-based, priestly, trading and artisan in their composition, with their ruling strata often thrown up from the wealthy and powerful factions in the towns; alternatively, they are loose coalitions of tribesmen under their clan chiefs, united for battle and later amalgamating, or co-existing with a dominant if primitive state and its

monarch. In either case, the bond that unites them is of a more intensive and exclusive kind than among the lateral, aristocratic *ethnie*; hence its often marked religious, even missionary, quality.

This distinction between the two types of *ethnie* helps us to order the many variations between ethnic communities in a preliminary fashion, and to limit and specify arguments that tend to oppose pre-modern *ethnie* to modern nations in terms of social inclusiveness. Unlike the pure 'modernist' position, these arguments concede the antiquity and prevalence of *ethnie* in pre-modern eras, but tend to limit their social range and hence their importance in comparison with modern nations. The argument holds that modern economic and political conditions are alone able to bind classes together into culturally unified nations, whereas in previous eras the absence of capitalism, centralized bureaucratic states and massive military machines prevented the diffusion of elite cultures to 'their' lower strata. The aristocratic state simply did not have the technical and administrative means to mould its populations into culturally homogenous and subjectively similar, let alone politically unified, units. They did not have the means to create citizens. As a result, *ethnie* were inevitably class-bound. They tended to remain, with a few exceptions like ancient Egypt (for special reasons), largely upper-class preserves, from which the mass of the population, the peasantry, was excluded through lack of technical means and political will.²²

The evidence so far presented lends considerable support to these arguments. But they, too, are over-generalized, and will not do justice to different kinds of ethnic community in pre-modern eras. What this view describes is what I have called the 'lateral' or aristocratic type of *ethnie*, where culture was stratified and elite culture was weakly diffused. Apart from the Court and bureaucrats, only the nobles, gentry and clergy had access to the Great Tradition which united them loosely, while dividing them from the mass of the population, particularly in the countryside, who remained embedded in vernacular folk cultures.

But this view takes no account of the many 'vertical' or 'demotic' *ethnie* in which a single ethnic culture permeates in varying degrees most strata of the population, even if its base remains urban and outlying rural areas exhibit local variants of the culture. The tendency in such *ethnie* is for a periodic oscillation between waves of reformist zeal sweeping the whole population into a crusade of communal activity, and long periods of lethargy which may lead to gradual dissolution of ethnic ties under external cultural and economic pressures. Yet persecutions or wars which mobilize the masses, can swiftly renew the original sense of mission and exclusiveness which normally accompanies a demotic type of ethnic identity. In a demotic *ethnie*, the indigenous culture cannot remain the preserve of any class, even if its producers and transmitters come from particular strata and institutions.

Of course, the 'audience' of their ethnic message can vary considerably. Muhammad's revelation was addressed in the first place to his kinsmen, and

the Meccan traders, and later the quarrelling tribes of Medina and ultimately of the whole of central and northern Arabia. Though universal in its austere monotheism, Muhammad's message exalted the desert purity of the Bedouin Arabs and their simple life, and sought to create out of the unruly Arab tribes a community of the faithful, or *umma*, which could transcend the divisions of clan descent.²³ Similarly, the various versions of Zoroastrianism, though in principle universal, were at first addressed to Iranian courtly circles, perhaps in the East, and then possibly taken up by the later Achaemenid kings. Under the later auspices of the Parthians and especially the Sassanids, Zoroastrian fire-worship and rituals were diffused throughout the Iranian realm as a 'national' religion. An elaborate hierarchy of priests and temples sought a monopoly of faith in Iran, especially against Christianity and the Manichean 'heresy' which nevertheless acquired a widespread following among the lower urban classes.²⁴ In quite a different setting, as we have seen, pan-Hellenic sentiments were able to inspire different strata in the Greek city-states, despite their uses for the upper classes in their political struggles. For even the poorest Greeks considered themselves superior to the most powerful 'barbarian' and clung to their gods, ancestry myths, language and Homeric heritage.²⁵

It may be objected that many of these demotic *ethnie* such as the Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Sumerians, Irish, Swiss and Catalans are relatively small in size and extent, and lack the capacity for real class differentiation and vigorous political action. All the really important *ethnie* in history were lateral and aristocratic. In fact, the latter contention fails to distinguish lateral *ethnie* from another type which often originates from them, namely, the bureaucratic ethnic state. The former contention, that demotic *ethnie* are too small for internal differentiation and political influence, is also too narrow in focus. Even if the important *ethnie*, meaning the largest and most powerful, were mainly lateral and aristocratic (Hittites, Medes and Persians, Romans, Parthians, later Arabs and Turks, early English, French, Castilians, pre-modern Poles and Hungarians), this would still leave a large class of demotic communities whose social and cultural impact has been profound, and whose political actions have sometimes been decisive in historical perspective. The most obvious examples are Greek resistance to Persia and Jewish resistance to Seleucids and Romans; in both cases, early military and political success led to crucial cultural or religious developments which, through other polities and religions, affected the course of history. Other demotic and small *ethnie* include the Sumerian city-states, the Phoenicians and the Armenians, all of whom have left important cultural legacies; while small demotic *ethnie* like the Swiss, Catalans and Dutch have revealed severe class differentiation and shown themselves capable of dramatic, if localized, political action. One might also legitimately include that most staggering of all examples of military and political action undertaken by tribal confederations which we shall include under the rubric of demotic *ethnie*; I refer to the

Arab and Mongol conquests in their early phases, before lateral extension brought geographical divisions and aristocratization of the Muslim Arab elites and the Mongol/Tatar khanates.

In all these cases, we find clear class divisions or internal stratification by wealth and status, especially in the later stages of ethnic stabilisation, but this did not impair their sense of ethnic identity and uniqueness, nor their capacity for decisive political action.

Let us now consider in turn the two main kinds of *ethnie* and summarize their features and historical role.

Lateral-aristocratic ethnie

The first thing to notice is the strength and durability of lateral *ethnie*. Even where the sense of common ethnicity was confined mainly to nobles and clerics whom it united in a broad, inclusive manner by concepts of blood affinity, arranged marriages and common rituals, it retained considerable social significance and durability. Aristocratic ethnic cultures persist exactly because their identities form part of their status situation; culture and superiority fuse to create a sense of distinct mission. Their limited social penetration in no way undermined the sense of common origins and descent, nor entailed their rapid dissolution as an *ethnie*.

On the other hand, lateral *ethnie* often failed to create a clear and compact location. Their boundaries often became ragged and indeterminate. For example, on one level, we might legitimately designate very large-scale collectivities at particular periods such as Latin Christendom, Greek Orthodoxy and Arab Islam, though all three were sub-divided culturally and politically. Armstrong suggests that these lateral, upper-class identities with their common languages and rituals reveal the impossibility of defining *ethnie*, as they 'slide' so easily into class or religious identities, or both. But closer inspection shows that these three 'identities' were dissimilar. By the time of the Crusades, the Orthodox identity had become predominantly Greek-speaking, and among the elites Hellenic in orientation. The Latin and Islamic 'identities' were much looser, more like coalitions of ethnic or political collectivities – Franks, Normans, Venetians, or Fatimid Egyptians and Seljuk Turks – together with a motley of smaller feudal principalities, city-states and tribal groups.²⁶

More germane for our purposes are the Hittite nobles. This warrior aristocracy penetrated from the north onto the Anatolian plain in the early second millennium BC and by 1750 had set up the Old Hittite Kingdom, a loose confederate state of Hittite feudal nobles dominating native peasant 'Hattian' and 'Kaneshite' populations. The subjugated peoples, along with other commoners, were excluded from the Hittite *pankush* (the term means 'the whole community', but, as so often happened, in practice it was composed only of nobles, royalty and priests), and it was the *pankush*, or

assembly of notables, which had the sole power of conferring authority on the Hittite king, or divesting him of it.²⁷

The Hittite kingdom gradually extended its authority south and east, raiding Babylon in 1595 BC. From about 1500 to 1200 BC, this Indo-European warrior aristocracy (albeit with some Hurrian admixture) built up an impressive empire which, along with the Egyptian New Kingdom under the eighteenth dynasty, dominated Near Eastern politics for three centuries. In no way did their failure (if 'failure' is the right term) to penetrate their subject peoples and diffuse their culture and sense of identity, hamper their political activities or diminish their caste-like sense of their own distinctiveness, as long as their polity survived. The key to their political and ethnic longevity lay perhaps in their 'feudal' institutions combined with only a rudimentary bureaucratic polity in which lay also the seeds of their ultimate demise.

Hittite feudalism at home was recreated externally in a kind of 'conquest federalism' by which subjugated peoples or city-states were bound through legal and contractual treaties to their Hittite overlords, but which left untouched the distinctive religions and cultures of the conquered populations.²⁸ Similarly, in religious matters the Hittites exhibited what some scholars have termed a 'spiritual federalism': they incorporated into their own mountain religion with its storm-god, borrowed perhaps from the neighbouring Indo-European Hurrians, all manner of deities, replete with their temples, rites and priesthoods, while holding fast to their central open-air shrine at Yazilikaya, near Hattusas, the capital.²⁹ The Hittites thus display the advantages and defects of aristocratic *ethnie*. Their loose organization and cultural inclusiveness enabled them to learn from their Egyptian, Mitannian and Babylonian-Kassite neighbours; and their chariot war-formations induced a sense of common destiny in the constant danger of battle. But this very advantage carried with it the temptation to succumb to more advanced or older cultures. Despite their imperial ambitions, their typically feudal institutions, their Indo-European speech and religion, their massive architecture, and the stylistic conventions of their sculpture – elements that mark out clearly their ethnic profile and bear the stamp of their ethnic identity – the Hittite *ethnie* failed to survive long after the breakdown of their empire. In the final phase of Hittite culture, their centre of gravity shifted to a number of small city-states around Carchemish in north-western Mesopotamia, which flourished and produced a remarkable set of closely related cultures from c. 1100–850 BC before being engulfed by an expanding Assyria and the waves of Aramaic migration.³⁰

A more successful case of lateral ethnic survival and influence was that of the *Arya* in northern India. The Aryan invasions from central Asia occurred slightly later than the similarly Indo-European Hittite incursions, but over a longer period. By the beginning of the first millennium BC, the *Arya* warriors had fanned out over the northern Indian plains and subjected the indigenous

darker-skinned *Dasa* population to their feudal overlordship. According to the early Vedic hymns, the *Arya* were already sub-divided into warriors (Kshatrya), priests (Brahmin) and farmers and traders (Vaishya), though here pastoralists predominated; the subject native populations were assigned a servant (Shudra) role, at that time outside the community.³¹ It was only very slowly that Vedic and Upanishadic Brahmin myths and rituals were diffused throughout central, northern and (later still) southern India, by which time the Mauryans had temporarily united India after Alexander's incursion. Indeed, the final stages of that Hindu penetration of Sanskrit ritual only took place during the period of Mughal and especially British rule, when communications and bureaucracy allowed a swifter penetration of Brahmin culture.³²

It is conceivable that the *Arya* would have gone the way of the Hittites, ultimately absorbed in the medley of cultures and religions on the Indian subcontinent, but for the peculiar status and culture of their priests and holy men, whose original function was the performance of sacrificial rites on behalf of the princes, but who gradually expanded and transformed their functions along with the development of a sacred Sanskrit language, religious scriptures and ablution rituals. Though decentralized and lacking the organization of the Catholic or Iranian priesthoods, the Brahmin scholars and holy men, by their temples and settlements, their acquisition of land grants, and the respect their learning earned, were able to elaborate and spread the teachings of their sacred books and confine and even drive out rival religions like Buddhism and Jainism from the subcontinent. Where the military machine of the Kshatrya failed to penetrate, as in southern India, it was settlements of landowning Brahmin who gradually won the pagan south over to Hinduism and incorporated it into an ethnic Hindu culture.³³ In this way, a loose and tolerant sense of Hindu ethnicity was generated, which was able to mobilize against the Muslim conquerors or later against the British, but which none the less included within its boundaries a number of linguistic ethnic sub-cultures – Bengali, Andhran, Marathi, Gujerati – which expressed strong regional variations of the overarching Hindu culture. The absorptive capacity of the Aryan Hindu *ethnie*, with its typical segmental *jati* and *Varna* differentiation, meant that ultimately an upper-stratum culture was able to pervade the entire population and reach down into the village cultures of the regions.³⁴

Other well-known aristocratic *ethnie* were able to survive long enough to create more enduring polities and social structures. The Persian Achaemenids, successors to a tribal confederation of Medes and Persians, especially the latter, formed out of their related groupings a dual *ethnie* which provided the Court, bureaucracy, nobility and clergy ruling over the largest empire of the ancient Near East. Their Iranian culture is clearly visible in their distinctive art and architecture (which carries to their furthest point of development Assyrian and Urartian designs and motifs), their easily recog-

nizable dress, their Indo-European language and the efficiency of their imperial organization. But, like the Hittites, Iranian religion of the period is mixed with all manner of pagan cults surviving from earlier periods. Though Darius seems to have adopted the worship of Ahura-Mazda and though Artaxerxes I (465–25 BC) made Mazdaism the official religion of the ruling house, there was extensive toleration of other religions and cultures, not only in the empire but even in Iran itself.³⁵ This in turn corresponds to the loose feudal structure of Iranian society and the autonomy conceded by the ruling Persian officials and aristocrats to their subject peoples and their customs.

Once again, the ragged boundaries of a lateral *ethnie*, the lack of an exclusive and missionary faith, the failure at this period to reduce their sacred traditions to scriptural canons which could be elaborated, and the lack of social penetration of the Iranian peasantry, contributed to the collapse of the Persian dynasty and community under the onslaught of Alexander and his successors. When a native Iranian dynasty did manage to take power, it came not from the province of Fars or Pars (the home of the Persians), but from the more easterly Parthian Arsacids (250 BC to AD 226). Only when Ardashir of the Sassanid house, who traced his lineage to the Achaemenids and who came from Pars, overthrew his Parthian overlord and founded the Sassanid empire were definite attempts made, through the religious reform of Kartir and other measures, to stabilize and crystallize a Persian ethnic state.³⁶

Among the Magyars and Ottomans, too, an original tribal confederation became sedentary far from their original habitat, and their warrior chiefs and nobles assumed the tasks of a missionary civilization expanding or defending the religious culture to which their ruling houses had been converted against invading infidels. The medieval Hungarian knights not only tried to resist the Mongol hordes in 1241, they bore the brunt of the later Ottoman advances in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, acting as a 'frontier' *ethnie* protecting Latin Christendom against the Islamic invasion. Conversely, an Ottoman identity came near to being forged out of the warrior Turkic tribes from central Asia; but the very extensive range of their conquests and Islamization inevitably diluted any ethnic Turkic homogeneity along with the imperial expansion, despite the *millet* organization of their realm. Only the dissolution of the European part of their empire, which went hand in hand with the rise of Christian ethnic nationalisms in Armenia and the Balkans, pushed the core Turkic element of their domain step by step into the foreground. Once the Arab revolt and the British conquests of the Great War had wrenched the last non-Turkic provinces from Ottoman rule, the empire contracted to its Anatolian heartland, now thoroughly Islamized except for its Greek-speaking, Orthodox western areas and coastlands, and a pan-Turkic ideology, itself in part a reaction to Christian nationalisms, presented a demotic and vertical alternative to the lateral Ottoman *ethnie*.³⁷

In all these cases, lateral ties of ethnicity persisted over several centuries before suffering dilution and dissolution, or alternatively transformation into

demotic *ethnie* and incipient nations. In either case, aristocratic *ethnie* have left a permanent imprint in the cultural record.

Vertical-demotic ethnic

In contrast to the more fluid and open aristocratic type of *ethnie*, demotic or vertical communities emphasize the ethnic bond that unites them against the 'stranger' or 'enemy'. This entails a marked emphasis upon sharp boundaries, with bans on religious syncretism, on cultural assimilation and even on inter-marriage. All this stands in acute contrast to lateral communities, with their 'class' rather than religious or kinship bonds. Although some aristocratic communities may shoulder a quasi-religious mission, theirs is an assumed role; whereas in the more demotic types of *ethnie* the missionary and sacred aspect is part of their defining 'essence'. Hence their ability to mobilize powerful sentiments of attachment and self-sacrificing action on behalf of the community. Hence, too, the often important role played by charismatic leaders and holy men who are felt to embody the unique characteristics of the whole community. In these cases also, frequent wars play a large part in cementing the community; but here the effect is one of mass communion for collective survival, and interdependence of each on his neighbour in battle and with the community as a whole, rather than the glorious individual exploits of armed knights or chariot-borne warriors. For this reason we must expect greater oscillations and instability among demotic *ethnie*, with significant transformations of ethnic 'character', depending upon the interplay of their material and political fortunes with their religious interpretations of those vicissitudes.

In practice, demotic *ethnie* fall into definite sub-types (though given cases may fall at different periods into more than one category). These include:

1 *City-state amphictyonies*: In ancient Sumer, Phoenicia and Greece, we find two kinds of sentiment side by side, a political loyalty to the individual city-state, and a cultural and emotional solidarity with one's cultural kinsmen, as this is interpreted by current myths of origin and descent. Typically, deep conflicts between two or more such states – Uruk and Lagash, Isin and Larsa, Tyre and Sidon, Sparta and Athens – prevented all attempts at greater political union. But such deep-seated rivalries co-existed with strong pan-Sumerian, pan-Phoenician and pan-Hellenic sentiments based on a common heritage of religion, language, art and literature, political institutions, dress and forms of recreation. In ancient Sumer, the ceremonial centre of Nippur gave ritual expression to a southern Mesopotamian sentiment which lasted beyond the Sumerian decline into the Babylonian and Chaldean periods, that is, from the mid-third millennium to the mid-first millennium BC. Indeed, inter-city rivalries actually spurred the growth of a pan-Sumerian sentiment, expressed in the attitudes of the city-states to

neighbouring tribes who cast an envious eye upon their wealth, and in their religious literature, which expressed common ideas of their origins and pantheon.³⁸ In Phoenicia, too, a common Canaanite fertility religion, common language and alphabet, seafaring activities and colonies, temple construction and geographical location on peninsulas, all provided the basis for common sentiments among different strata and city-states in defence of their life-style.³⁹ Finally, among the ancient Greeks, despite the rifts between their city-states, their incessant wars and even treachery to the Persian invaders, the very rivalry for leadership in Hellas, cultural and political, which Pericles expressed so plainly, bred a heightened sense of pan-Greek ethnicity and marked feelings of superiority to foreigners, who could not speak Greek and did not possess Greek 'liberties'. This sentiment of cultural solidarity prevailed even in the face of strong city-state political loyalties, which some might characterize as 'ethnic', and of 'sub-ethnic' Ionian, Dorian, Boeotian and Aeolian linguistic cultural sentiments.⁴⁰

2 *'Frontier' ethnic*: Though not all 'frontier' *ethnie* are demotic, as the Magyar case indicates, the protracted nature of their defence and their strategic position tends to draw in strata beyond the ruling urban elites. 'Frontier' position may be geo-political or strategic-economic, or both; the community may be placed between two larger and contending units, two civilizations like Rome and Persia contending over the Armenian kingdom, or ancient Israel between Assyria and Egypt, or it may occupy a strategic economic area or route, like the Swiss, Kurds or Czechs. In the first case, Armenians in their homeland and Catalans during the Reconquista may act as spearheads or forward defences of a whole civilization, and because of recurrent danger and crisis involve considerable numbers of the ethnic population in battle and hence in collective awareness. Though a stratification of status and property divides the community (as it does city-state *ethnie* within each city-state), repeated encounters with enemies of 'alien' culture engineered by the ruling houses on each side promote, if not social cohesion, at least a wider ethnic self-consciousness. In the process of conflict, self-images and stereotypes of neighbours and enemies are generated, which become crystallized in legends and symbols embroidered around unglamorous political jostlings and military engagements. These legends and symbols later form the stuff of ethnic chronicles and epics, which in the modern era then provide sources for the paintings, poetry and music that form the peculiar cultural heritage of each nation.⁴¹

We see this process at work with particular clarity in the case of the Swiss Confederation. Very probably, the motive forces behind Stauffacher's original revolt of three forest cantons against the Habsburg attempts to withdraw their privileges, were economic and strategic: the defence of vital new trade routes around the recently opened St Gotthard pass.⁴² But as other cantons joined the Confederates and renewed the original pact signed

in the Rütli meadow in 1291, as the early attempts of Rudolf and Gessler to suppress the revolt were defeated at Morgarten and later at Sempach by the Swiss pikemen, more and more peasants in their mountain valleys were drawn into the ceaseless struggle and became aware of their differences with the cultures and kingdoms to the north-east and the west. Not only could they not fail to grasp the issues at stake, notably the refusal to countenance judges who were not born in the valleys, but victories must soon have endowed the poorest peasants with a certain pride in their collective achievements, the routing of a vastly superior monarchy, and a sense of 'true' values and superior worth bred by their hardy mountain life. Not surprisingly, the characteristic myths that embodied these values and memories and inspired later sentiments and solidarity, were largely battle-motifs: Stauffacher and the Rütli, Tell and Gessler, Morgarten, Sempach and Arnold von Winkelried, Grandson and Morat, the very fact that legends proliferated around these wars, testifies to their wide impact and meaning for every peasant household.⁴³

3 *Tribal confederations*: Again, by no means all such tribal federations remained demotic in character, the very fighting in which much of their early history was passed throwing up a warrior nobility, as among the Ottoman Turks, Persians and, to a lesser extent, the Arabs. Yet we also find tribal confederations which retained their popular bonds: these include the Zulu warriors united into a formidable military machine and centralized state by Shaka, the Hausa-Fulani tribes (though later under their separate emirates they took on a more aristocratic character), the Mongol hordes under Chingis Khan and his immediate successors, the Kurdish tribes in their mountain fastnesses and the Israelite confederation which invaded Canaan. Here again frequent military encounters, together with a clan segmentation of a wider religio-cultural unit, crystallized and maintained the sense of separate ethnic identity. Even political divisions along tribal lines failed to eradicate this popular ethnic identity. The Irish tribes, though unable to unite in common resistance to the Anglo-Norman invaders from the late twelfth century onwards, were nevertheless able to retain their common monastic and Catholic traditions and sacred lore, infusing the Catholic peasantry with deep millennial resentments against the later Protestant incursions and Anglo-Scottish settlements. Right up to the nineteenth century, these religiously based sentiments, fanned by persecutions, massacre and famine, and still smouldering under the repressive Penal Laws, permeated the countryside and ensured the retention of a 'sacred' Irish identity, on which later nationalists could build a broadly based movement for independence.⁴⁴

Though these originally tribal units reveal cultural variations, like those of the city-state *ethnie*, they nevertheless form a recognizable ethnic community, marked off from neighbours not only by 'objective' cultural characteris-

tics but also by myths, symbols, memories and values which frequent wars and subjugations (or conquests) turn into the heritage and property of the whole population. Alternatively, religious movements, social discrimination or even a certain territorial location may, over time, bind the clans and tribes together into a compact *ethnie*, even without the action of a centralizing state.

4 *Diasporas and sects*: Among the most 'popular' of the vertical *ethnie* are those 'stranger' communities, which because of appearance, language and especially religious rituals, are treated by the larger society with reserve, if not outright hostility. This is true of exiled Greeks and Lebanese traders in West Africa, of Indians in East Africa, of Jews and Armenians, and of the many overseas Chinese communities in south-east Asia, who, even before the hey-day of colonialism, migrated from China and gradually occupied the commercial positions in the host society. The Chinese, like the Jews and Armenians, maintained their family life and customs, their special religious rituals (the Chinese New Year, and so on) and their linguistic culture. In their business dealings with the 'host' society, virtually every member of the community could not but be reminded of his communal attachments and separate identity; so that though the term 'plural society' was coined (by a British colonial official) to describe Western colonial states in south-east Asia, the separation of cultures really antedated and was independent of particular, divisive colonial policies.⁴⁵

Residential patterns reinforced this sense of separate ethnicity. Living in semi-segregated but interlocking quarters, or enclaves, of the host society, diaspora communities like the Jews and Armenians and Chinese were compelled to cultivate their myths and memories, their family rituals and values, to keep alive a sense of collective dignity which the peculiar mixture of cultural autonomy, social scorn and political disability demanded for survival, given the difficulty of assimilation. Travel between the various enclaves inevitably strengthened the perception of diaspora cohesion and common destiny, while trade and intellectual exchange bound the various enclaves into regional networks and ultimately a near-global ethnic community. Hardly suprisingly, we find the concept of a collective historical destiny most fully formulated and elaborated by diaspora communities, as Weber noted of the Jewish case.⁴⁶

In the case of more localized sectarian *ethnie* like the Druze, Parsees and Maronites, migration myths and an esoteric cult helped to foster an inter-class cohesion, fuelled by outside hostility and nurtured by family and clan ties. True, in other cases like the Copts in Egypt and the Nestorian Assyrians in Iraq, migration played little part (though the Copts expanded southwards to Nubia and Ethiopia in the fourth and fifth centuries AD and the Chaldeans and Nestorians to Mesopotamia and Iran); rather it was the experience of subordination to culturally alien polities that, after the initial period of enthusiastic missionary expansion; turned these provincial

churches, first into denominations, and then into religiously defined *ethnie*. Of course, an ethnic element was present from the beginning: the word 'Copt' derives from 'gypt', from the Greek word for Egyptian, *aigyptos*, (Ha-Ka- Ptah, in hieratic Egyptian script), and simply meant Egyptian.⁴⁷ Today, the Nestorians call themselves 'Assyrians', claiming descent from the ancient Assyrians, near whose centres some of their original churches were founded in the fifth century AD.⁴⁸ Clearly, the link with a territorial centre, a 'homeland', forms an essential part of the 'sect-to *ethnie*' trajectory: witness the crystallization of the Sikh religion around its cultic centres, especially Amritsar. But, just as important, is the centrality of a book, and preferably a sacred tongue, in which the centre(s) may be exalted and ceaselessly remembered. It is through these instrumentalities of land and religious book that collective memory is continually fed, and without memory, there can be no ethnicity.

It may be objected to the above typology that there is a good deal of overlap in practice between the different kinds or sub-types of *ethnie* which I have distinguished, and that even the distinction between lateral-aristocratic and vertical-demotic *ethnie* represents a continuum rather than a hard-and-fast distinction. These are valid objections. As we have seen, ethnic identities are durable but shifting, and it is inevitable that a given ethnic community will, at different periods of its history, reveal varying characteristics in response to changing needs and experiences. Thus we saw how a 'tribal confederation' manifesting at its first appearance in the historical record a 'demotic' character, in which clan chiefs or tribal warriors are closely linked to their dependant followers in those great unifying experiences, war and migration, gradually loses that popular element as it becomes sedentarized and stable, particularly if it succeeds in throwing up a polity which widens the gap between warriors and serfs, except in moments of great communal danger. Within city-states, too, the demotic element may be severely curtailed by oligarchic patrician rule, particularly if the indigenous peasantry no longer fill the infantry or naval roles of the early republic, and this in turn will have repercussions for the popular character of the ethnic amphictyony as a whole, as occurred in the Latin League and the Spartan confederacy, or the Sumerian religious network based on Nippur.

Therefore we need to define the aristocratic and demotic elements within various ethnic communities or ethnic confederacies at different periods in their history. At the same time, the basic lateral-vertical distinction provides a useful rough guide to the different kinds of *ethnie*, and a corrective to the view that in antiquity and the medieval era, culture was too class-bound and secondary to provide the cement of whole communities, or that because it was class-based, all *ethnie* were inevitably lateral and aristocratic. Our demotic sub-types cover a large number of important, if perhaps smaller, *ethnie*, in which communal sentiments result as much from popular partici-

pation in battle and migration, and which then periodically re-emerge among tribesmen, peasants or artisans in response to cultural reforms and religiously inspired resistance, to be codified and transmitted for subsequent generations by the powerful specialist corps of priesthoods and scribal schools. In all these sub-types, through which a given ethnic community may 'progress' over time, mass mobilization for defence as the standard method of warfare is closely, and probably causally, linked to the retention of its demotic character. Thus, where the conditions of war have changed, or the military and social system has evolved to the point of undermining this initial cultural cohesion, or an influential external cultural system (the Catholic Church, for example) has thrown its weight behind the evolving new stratification of this social system, or all three – then we are likely to witness a transformation of the vertical, demotic *ethnie* into looser, estate-based cultural communities, as occurred in the period of High Feudalism.⁴⁹ Unless, of course, the peculiar traditions of an *ethnie*, handed down by a powerful indigenous priesthood, counteract these divisive military and social tendencies; or the *ethnie* in question is debarred from military participation and remains in a 'frozen' social and political condition over the centuries. These are questions I propose to explore in the next chapter.

What has so far emerged is that there is a need to keep apart the issues of social penetration of ethnicity, and those of ethnic survival. It would appear from this survey that lateral-aristocratic *ethnie* can survive as socially significant actors for several centuries, even when, like the Hittites or Philistines, they make no attempt to imbue wider strata with their sense of common ethnicity. Given favourable military, social and cultural conditions, aristocratic *ethnie*, like the Hungarian nobility or the Ottoman Turks, can perpetuate their ethnic identities into the modern era of nationalism, even if it requires a measure of transformation (more so in the Ottoman case) to turn this identity into a modern nation.

But then the same is true of more demotic *ethnie*: the process of self-transformation into modern nations, though requiring different tasks, is equally painful and radical. In general, it is not their degree of social penetration of ethnic culture that is problematic, nor their internal divisions. Demotic *ethnie* may be just as stratified and hence subject to internal conflicts as any unit, ancient or modern; but, like the class systems of modern nations which permit a high degree of internal conflict while preserving a fairly homogenous culture, citizenship and division of labour, their internal hierarchies do not impede those mobilizing sentiments of ethnicity and those common attachments to various ethnic symbols that unite the populations of demotic and vertical *ethnie*.⁵⁰

This does not mean that modern scholarship is simply confirming nineteenth-century historicism and retrospectively viewing the ties and sentiments and conflicts of antiquity and Middle Ages through the distorting lens of modern nationalism. What is being argued here is quite different

from the older view of scholars like Walek-Czernecki and Koht that 'nations' and 'nationalism' constituted the norm in antiquity, declined during the Roman empire and received a powerful stimulus for rebirth during the 'barbarian' irruptions.⁵¹ It is *ethnie* rather than nations, ethnicity rather than nationality, and ethnicism rather than nationalism, that pervades the social and cultural life of antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe and the Near East. These *ethnie* existed within or alongside various polities, and were quite often divorced from politics and the state or, in becoming politicized, acquired dominion, like the Persians and Medes, over many other *ethnie*. Alternatively they constituted culturally diverse enclaves within the large empires of antiquity and the Middle Ages, persisting independently of any congruent state formation.

Ethnic polities

Although this lack of congruence between *ethnie* and polity was typical of antiquity and the Middle Ages, there were significant exceptions. In a number of cases, a rough congruence emerged between the culture of a community and the territorial extent of its polity. Ancient Egypt furnishes the classic instance. The peculiar character of the Nile, the narrow strip of cultivable land on either side, the barriers of the Sinai and Western deserts, all made Egypt relatively inaccessible to attack, except from the south, and forced the population along the river banks to submit more fully to the impositions of centralized states which could easily take advantage of the economic helplessness of the peasant cultivators. In the pre-dynastic periods, there seem to have been a number of cultures in upper and lower Egypt, but the union of the two kingdoms, and the powerful religious influence of Memphis' priesthood, soon subordinated any regional cultures to the all-Egyptian culture of the rulers. There is perhaps no other example of so uniform and homogenous a cultural profile in antiquity, where the culture of the upper strata so profoundly penetrated the social and economic life of the dependent strata. But then, in few other areas was there so lasting an indigenous ruling stratum and its native culture.⁵²

Elsewhere, there are very imperfect examples of ethnic states. In Egypt itself, its native dynasties ousted by successive invasions, the Ptolemies signally failed to graft their own Hellenistic culture onto that of the indigenous population, and similarly with the Romans and Byzantines. The Arabs were, in the long run, more successful; but there remained a large Coptic minority, and in the medieval era an influx of different ethnic minorities, some of whom provided the rulers and military corps for long periods. A similar situation occurred in Iran under the Parthians and Sassanids; religious and ethnic minorities flourished, albeit with many setbacks, and the Zoroastrian predominance waned. Yet, as in Egypt, the

ruling Persian dynasty attempted to unite its populations around the ruling stratum's Zoroastrian culture, and though the attempt ultimately failed, it had the effect of including different regions and strata within an Iranian political community. When the Persian cultural and political revival took place in the late tenth century, after the Arab conquest, it could do so in Islamic garb, without fearing any loss of Persian identity. Again, after the Seljuk interlude, the Safavid revival had the unintended effect of reinforcing the ethnic identity of Persian people around the Shi'ite culture of the mainly Turkish rulers.⁵³

What these examples show, albeit very imperfectly, is the manner in which aristocratic *ethnie* (whether originating from more demotic tribal confederations or not) can impose and filter down their ethnic culture to the dependent populations, and thereby to some extent infuse them with the selfsame, if less vivid and intense, sense of common ethnicity. This does not mean that in a pre-literate age, every Iranian peasant was conversant with the epic of Firdausi or identified with the law of the state, only that an Iranian identity was also present in many areas, alongside the more immediate ties of village and kin, and the larger Islamic allegiance. Even in Muslim Egypt, with its succession of imposed dynasties, there remained a shadowy sense of 'Egyptian-ness' in the Coptic villages, which the Muslim rulers and geographical isolation continually reinforced. Among the Muslim Arabized population, a very imperfect ethnic state emerged, with a territorial identity and at least a minimum of religious culture, which marked it off from its neighbours. Similarly, the long-run effect of the repeated administrative actions of the always contracted late Byzantine state, brought the Greek-speaking masses under the influence of the increasingly Greek and Hellenic culture of the nobles, clergy and Court. Here again, it is state action, the use of administrative, judicial, fiscal and military means to standardize imperial practices and provide cohesion, that helps to mould the unit into a more congruent ethnic polity.⁵⁴

Perhaps the most striking case of an ethnic state, albeit highly imperfect, created by military and administrative action, is provided by medieval France. Here, successive Frankish kingdoms gradually amalgamated Gallic, Roman and Germanic elements from the fifth century, and by the time the Capetians began to extend their sway, in the twelfth century, over areas adjacent to their centre in the Île-de-France (first northwards to Normandy and Picardy, and then south to the Auvergne, Languedoc and Provence) they had the military and administrative means once again to subordinate the neighbouring cultures and incorporate them into their Parisian French state culture. Yet significant cultural enclaves remained until the nineteenth century – in Brittany, Bearn, Alsace, Nice, Gascony. Such regional cultures haunted the revolutionary dream of an indivisible republic, just as the original cleavage between a 'Frankish' nobility and a 'Gallo-Roman' people

(or *Tiers Etat*) could be used to proclaim the imminent triumph of the bourgeois-controlled French 'nation'.⁵⁵

In England, Sweden, Russia and Spain, attempts were made in the late medieval and early modern periods to homogenize the population and produce an 'ethnic state', with varying degrees of success. Similarly, in Japan, the Kamakura, Muromachi and especially the Tokugawa Shogunates tried to give Japan a similar cultural unity and control minorities and foreigners in the interests of feudal state unity.⁵⁶ None of these attempts was motivated by nationalism, or by ideas of cultural autonomy. They stemmed from the needs of rulers and factions of the ruling classes to preserve their positions against rivals, internal and external, and to provide a loyal base in the mass of the population. Yet as a by-product of these concerns, the growth of definite ethnic polities is evident, that is, polities whose majority is formed by a single *ethnie*, one that to varying degrees incorporates some of the lower and dependent strata into the culture and symbolism of the dominant elites. In this process, administrative and religious elements of these elites play a vital role of diffusion and penetration; in this way, they help to stabilize the polity, and enable it to weld the population together in a manner that favours the territorial integrity of the state. It was from this base that nations and nationalism emerged.

Ethnic survival and dissolution

So far I have considered the ubiquity of *ethnie* and ethnocentrism, the frequency of ethnicism as a movement of resistance and restoration, and the degree of social penetration of specific ethnic 'myth-symbol complexes' and cultures. Though the evidence is necessarily sketchy and fragmentary, it suggests that *ethnie* and ethnicism were widespread and recurrent phenomena in antiquity and the Middle Ages, especially in Asia and Europe, even if in many cases ethnic ties and sentiments were more extensive and lateral than intensive and demotic.

But this is to take a rather synchronic approach. Turning away from analysing a cross-section of *ethnie* at given moments in time and adopting a more diachronic perspective, brings to light many instances of distinctive *ethnie* 'changing their character' and others progressively eroded and submerged and even vanishing altogether from the historical record. In the first category of 'character' change there are a number of cases, of which the English, Greeks and Egyptians are best-known. Here invasion, demographic influx and new religions or ideologies radically transformed the cultures, sentiments and 'myth-symbol complexes' of the original *ethnie*. In the second category, of erosion and dissolution, we may include the Hittites, Phoenicians and Philistines, the Frisians (almost), Sorbs and Provençals, who all went into economic and political decline until they were submerged and absorbed by newcomers. Perhaps the most striking example of total ethnic dissolution is furnished by the Assyrians; and their case merits closer attention.

What then are the main factors that encourage the survival, transformation or dissolution of ethnic communities? Can any valid generalizations be made, given the vital role of chance and political accident which accompanies the interplay of culture and politics? The very magnitude of the question raises innumerable possibilities; and it is therefore necessary to select a few key factors which recur in the literature of *ethnie* and politics in history, even though most of that literature fails to address the specific question of decline and dissolution.

Location and sovereignty

Perhaps the most obvious and recurrent factors cited for the survival or dissolution of *ethnie* are geo-political. Broadly speaking, 'location' and 'sovereignty' constitute for many observers the key to ethnic survival. Freedom from external interference in a compact and defensible territory exceeds all other variables in importance for ensuring the survival of distinct communities.

Leaving aside the nationalistic assumptions contained in this view, the validity of these contentions may be questioned. It is quite true that the Poles suffered from a poor geo-political location on their broad plains across which the armies of other, greater powers could freely roam and destroy; but it is too static a factor to explain why it took so many centuries for these other powers to become strong enough to partition their neighbour in the late eighteenth century. Moreover, loss of independence, coupled with unfortunate location, has in no way diminished the Polish sense of identity and uniqueness; if anything, it has increased it.¹ Similarly, the Armenians in their natural fortress on a plateau cut across by huge mountain chains around Ararat, were continually conquered by larger neighbours; and if it is argued that their location acted as a magnet for expansionist powers (and hence was 'unfortunate'), then again it only helped to augment the sense of Armenianness felt by the inhabitants.² If the Swiss were helped by their location in mountain fastnesses, the Czechs and Kurds were not; if the Japanese were aided by their offshore islands, the Britons and later the Anglo-Saxons were not. Yet, all survived as *ethnie* into modern times; whereas the Phoenicians in their peninsular city-states and the Visigoths in their large peninsula did not, and even the Egyptians, relatively protected and independent as they were, failed to keep that independence or hold onto their Pharaonic culture and outlook. At the other extreme, diaspora communities which have lost their homelands and independence, can maintain themselves for centuries, even millennia.

This is not to say that either location or sovereignty (or better, autonomy) are unimportant. By helping to maintain the polity in existence, they provide a shield for the *ethnie*, even if they also act as a target for would-be conquerors. It would appear, however, that geo-political location is more important for ethnic survival than autonomy, provided that we underline the symbolic and sociological aspects of location. What has mattered to *ethnie* is the possession, or at least association with, a 'homeland' – a territory which they and others recognize to be theirs by historic right and from which they are felt to stem. This is more important than compactness of territory and defensibility of frontiers (a concept more fitted to modern political realities). What mattered to the Judean exiles in Babylonia was Cyrus' recognition of their association with a homeland around Jerusalem, rather than the extent

or defensibility of the obliterated former kingdom of Judah.³ Similarly, what concerns many current ethnic 'autonomy' movements is recognition by the state and dominant *ethnie* of the historic association and special needs of peripheral ethnic communities with their homeland and its particular resources, with which they have been identified for centuries, or even millennia in the case of Bretons and Basques.⁴

These examples demonstrate the importance of location in the sense of social recognition rather than mere geo-political territoriality. Not that the latter is without significance. Under its heading we may include:

- 1 size and extent of population and terrain, in relation to neighbours;
- 2 compactness of territory and defensibility of borders;
- 3 distance from centres of wealth and power;
- 4 special resources and economic assets (ports, trade routes, water supplies, minerals, and so on).

The overall significance of territorial location, however, depends in the last instance on the economic and political regional networks of communities and states in which the particular *ethnie* is inserted, and the changing patterns of warfare and military and political fortunes of the members of the inter-state system in that area. This is very much the burden of several recent analyses of the factors that conduce towards ethnic mobilization in the modern world; and there is no reason why we should not also apply similar concepts and approaches to studies of regional networks on a more limited scale in antiquity or the medieval world. These approaches draw on Stein Rokkan's work on the systemic properties of regional networks and states, particularly in Europe, and Tilly's analysis of the factors that have helped to maintain particular state formations while others, lacking the relevant combinations of factors (urban wealth, political and military leadership, protected positions, homogenous populations and, especially, success over the long term in warfare), have found their locations eroded or their existence as independent units terminated.⁵

Perhaps the most systematic attempt to treat recent European ethnic 'autonomy' movements through such geo-political and systemic approaches has been that of Andrew Orridge. He argued that we need to separate the 'preconditions' of autonomist nationalisms from 'triggering' factors, and to set both within the context of the European inter-state system. This allows us to look at different types of location at different levels: in terms of the social foundations, regional economy and state system, and international warfare, all of which help to shape the core territories and distinctive cultures that form the structural preconditions of ethnic movements. Thus, the 'major fracture lines' of linguistic geography between Romance, Germanic and Slavonic language groups, and minor fractures in Finland, Hungary, the Basque country, Brittany and the Celtic areas of Britain and Ireland, coupled with the 'frontier position' of certain areas in Spain and south-east

Europe, have shaped the initial bases of community in many areas of Europe. But these have been modified by international economic, and more regional and local economic, pressures which prevented, for example, the unification of a Scandinavia which could control the Baltic trade, or by centralizing pressure which provoked religious revolts in areas like Bohemia and Ireland, while homogenizing others like Spain and France (expulsion of Moriscos and Jews, and of Huguenots).⁶

This type of analysis moves well beyond any simplistic notions of territorial location as the key to ethnic survival and mobilization. It includes the other aspects of location, notably social recognition of a bond between a given *ethnie* and its homeland, and the place of the state in which it finds itself incorporated, within the overall European state system. This ties in with our earlier contention (chapter 2) of the importance of wars between states in moulding and maintaining the sense of common ethnicity in affected populations which had initial cultural differences; and with the importance of habitat and folk culture within a wider network of traditions and regions in preparing the ground for later ethnic (and nationalist) movements.⁷

In fact, there appears to be an optimal sequence for the maintenance and activation of ethnic consciousness in a population over the long term. This would start from the emergence of a population in a given area (or migrating to a particular terrain) with certain initial common cultural characteristics (religion, customs, language, and so on). Our incipient *ethnie* would be gradually united from a congerie of tribes, usually through intermittent warfare with neighbouring confederations or city-states, and would then undergo some degree of political centralization either of itself, or through external conquest. At some stage, the unified *ethnie* would attain to a state of cultural achievement and political self-rule, even if only briefly, which would then become a model for subsequent development. Such a state would preferably endure for long enough to ensure the dissemination of its central 'myth-symbol complex' and associated memories and values to the upper strata and beyond; so that, even if it subsequently lost all independence within its homeland, the long and politically and culturally fruitful association of the community with a particular terrain would ensure it against further military and cultural depredations. Even in decline and exile, the memories, myths and values of the homeland would continue to operate as guarantors of ethnic survival in the absence of any hope of restored sovereignty or autonomy.

Yet, just here, in the assumption of an easy guarantee of survival for exiles, provided they carry their myths and memories with them, the 'optimal sequence' portrayed above seems to falter. What exactly were the inward mechanisms that allowed some sets of exiles to survive for centuries while others were absorbed or transformed? Why also did some *ethnie* gradually, or suddenly, dissolve, after long centuries of sovereignty and even mastery in

their homelands and beyond? Why did the Philistines and Assyrians vanish without trace, while the Jews and Armenians survived? What, in fact, do we exactly mean by 'ethnic survival'?

Demographic and cultural continuity

The simplest and most obvious answer to these questions lies in the field of population studies. So long as a community can reproduce its members sufficiently from generation to generation, demographic continuity will ensure ethnic survival with only minor alterations of cultural contents over time. Loss of demographic continuity, on the other hand, either through gradual infertility or through admixture with immigrant populations in sufficient force or through partial genocide, will erode or interrupt ethnic persistence and threaten survival. The Slav immigrations into Greece and the Balkans, and the Aryan infiltration of northern India, both altered the ethnic character of the indigenous populations through massive admixture of new culture-bearing, if inchoate, ethnic categories of population.⁸ Even if the newcomers bring no distinctive culture of their own, but only a medley of composite life-styles and myths, their physical preponderance may finally terminate the independent culture and social life of a community already in decline, or of much smaller communities struggling to maintain themselves, like the Chazars overwhelmed by the Varangian Rus or the Nabataeans absorbed by waves of desert Arabs.⁹

Yet, as these examples make clear, what actually is terminated is not the physical existence of populations, but their distinctive cultures and life-styles and their sense of independent community. Neither ancient Greeks nor 'Dravidian' Dasa, neither Judaic Chazars nor Hellenized pagan Nabataeans, were physically uprooted; their cultures and life-styles were absorbed and their myths and symbols ceased to exercise any hold over populations in those areas. Even in the case of genocide, unless it were total, physical destruction does not entail cultural death; quite apart from the still flourishing Armenian and Jewish communities, not even the destruction meted out to Red Indian, Aboriginal and Gypsy populations has extinguished their ancestral cultures. Though 'genocide' signifies an intention to destroy 'in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group', it is paradoxically less dangerous to the survival of *ethnie* than either government policies of 'ethnocide' designed to root out a group's culture and its transmission, or the unforeseen consequences of conquest and/or immigration.¹⁰

What concerns us here is the survival capacity of the specifically 'ethnic' elements and these have been defined as consisting not in physical populations so much as their attitudes, sentiments and perceptions as these are encoded in myths, symbols, memories and values – in short, their

collective traditions and cultural forms. The fact that particular populations are characterized by certain forms and traditions, that certain myths, memories and symbols are attached to them, irrespective of their content which is subject to periodic change, entitles them to be described as persisting *ethnie*.

Wherever we find such 'myth-symbol complexes' and their associated networks of memories and values, we may speak of 'ethnic categories' and 'ethnic forms' which distinguish populations and bind them internally; and wherever these are attached to units of population, or strata within them, so that the members are actuated by distinct sets of attitudes, sentiments and perceptions, we may speak of living 'ethnic communities'.

This means that the concept of 'ethnic' survival unites demographic reproduction to cultural patterns. Unlike the Barthians, who see *ethnie* as shifting bundles of attitudes and sentiments which define social boundaries and the cultures within them, the approach adopted here defines *ethnie* as clusters of population with similar perceptions and sentiments generated by, and encoded in, specific beliefs, values and practices. Here the demographic element is important, but secondary to the cultural. For *ethnie* are viewed as consisting in:

- 1 symbolic, cognitive and normative elements common to a unit of population;
- 2 practices and mores that bind them together over generations, and;
- 3 sentiments and attitudes that are held in common and which differentiate them from other populations.

The differentiating aspect follows from the integrative one, which in turn presupposes the underlying symbolic, cognitive and normative elements.¹¹

This approach allows us to treat both the durability of ethnic *forms* and traditions and the transformations of ethnic *contents* and traits. We can talk about both the continuity of, say, Iranian traditions and forms (of art, architecture, language, customs, family structure, legal procedures, religious literature) and the transformations of their *particular* symbols, myths, memories and values within the broad stylistic and historical conventions of Iran. Or about the changes, even 'inventions' of tradition in Britain – new festivals and ceremonies, new sports and dress, new types of art and architecture, new legal provisions, changes in language and accents – while observing the continuities of an 'English style' and English myths and memories, symbolism and values in their broad forms in at least some of these spheres, forms that make the sense and 'feel' of English art, village life, local mores, legal procedures, religious and domestic architecture, music and crafts, so very different from those of France or Italy and so identifiably English, despite changes in fashion and art-historical period.¹² Only when these basic collective 'forms' and traditions disappear, does ethnicity become

attenuated and the population appears culturally indistinguishable from neighbours, that is, absorbed.

Hence 'ethnic survival' consists ultimately in the continuity in sufficient numbers and force of those ethnic forms and traditions which can exert a binding and distinguishing influence on the outlook and sentiments of a population, and which, though their specific contents may change, are yet able to replenish themselves among that population. Forms must have significance for at least a section of the population unit, and traditions must live and thrive among them, if the sense of ethnicity is to be diffused and transmitted to future generations. If the forms lose their meaning, if the traditions become ossified and cannot be developed anew, the *ethnie* falls into cultural decline, however prosperous and powerful its individual members or their polity may be. Conversely, even in external situations of great threat, deprivation and persecution, *ethnie* may flourish provided their forms and traditions can be replenished and extended, or reformed and re-directed. Even when a population exchanges its indigenous religion for that of its conquerors as in post-Sassanid Iran or post-Coptic Egypt, provided that its artistic, legal, social and familial forms continue to be developed, so that they can act as vehicles of the novel ideas and practices of the new religion, its ethnic continuity can be maintained and its sense of historic community can remain intact.¹³

While, therefore, any large-scale admixture of populations by conquest, colonization or immigration will produce considerable changes of cultural symbols, traits and life-styles, it is only when these are so great as to destroy the existing indigenous ethnic forms and traditions more or less completely, that we may speak of ethnocide and the final dissolution of old *ethnie*. This can only be accomplished where the new immigrant culture is so much more technologically and educationally advanced (and distinct), and the immigrants so much more numerous and/or powerful, that they can submerge the older culture and with it the *ethnie*. This has happened with many small 'tribal' cultures faced by imperial expansion from the days of Rome and China to our own, though many others have managed to survive for long periods, some to the present day. In other cases, like the Mongol conquest of China, the culture of the subjugated but far more numerous population, has submerged (more or less) that of the conquerors.¹⁴ In yet others, a host of separate ethnic cultures such as those of the ancient Near East, have become attenuated and diluted by an influx of new immigrants and their linguistic cultures, as with Arameans and Greeks in antiquity.¹⁵

Dissolution of *ethnie*

What then are the specific factors that help to ensure the survival, or dissolution, of ethnic communities over the long term? It is possible to start

by considering some instances of ethnic dissolution in which the culture of a particular unit of population has been absorbed by others to the extent that it retains no residuum of distinctive culture itself.

One such case is that of the Phoenicians. At first sight, it might appear that a distinctive Phoenician *ethnie* was absent, since they were originally only the coastal branch of the Semitic Canaanites who spread through Syria and Palestine in the second millennium BC. They spoke a Canaanite dialect, closely allied to old Hebrew and Moabite; their gods were variants of a common Canaanite stock with some Mycenaean admixture; their cult practices were influenced by the Babylonians; and their religious architecture by the Egyptians who dominated Palestine and Syria during the mid-second millennium BC. Even their trading and seafaring proclivities they seem to have owed to the influence of Mycenaean traders and explorers.¹⁶

Yet, from what can be gleaned of their practices, and from what later foreign writers tell us, everyone regarded the Phoenicians as a distinct ethnic community, albeit divided into warring city-states. Pomponius Mela, a Spaniard writing in Latin in the first century AD, tells us that 'The Phoenicians were a clever race, who prospered in war and peace. They excelled in writing and literature, and in other arts, in seamanship, in naval warfare, and in ruling an empire.'¹⁷ It is also known that the Persians relied upon their fleets in their wars against the Greek city-states. Earlier, their kings, especially of Tyre, had entered into relations with surrounding states, including Solomon's Israelite empire, and their cities – Tyre and Sidon, Aradus and Byblos – became wealthy and populous on their protected peninsulas, and featured large and important sanctuaries, like Solomon's Temple.

Perhaps here we have an *ethnie* that has failed to differentiate itself sufficiently from its neighbours and which has relied too much on their cultures. Apart from the West Phoenicians in Carthage and Spain, little is heard of the independent actions of the East Phoenicians after Alexander's reduction of Tyre in 332. But, unlike Carthage, we know of no population evictions, no deportations. Why then did not a Phoenician religion persist under Seleucid rule, as it did in neighbouring Judea? Why was the Phoenician alphabet and language ultimately superseded by Aramaic and Greek, and why have no written records (apart from inscriptions) been found in Eastern Phoenician sites in the Phoenician language from which to infer their outlook and consciousness?

It would appear that internal strife – Phoenician city-states were perennially at war with each other – and an insufficiently delineated culture and sense of solidarity were the main factors contributing to the eventual dissolution of a Phoenician sense of common ethnicity. It is interesting to compare the Phoenician with the Greek city-states. The latter, too, were chronically at war with each other, but they subscribed more openly and

self-consciously to a common Hellenic culture and ancestry myth, and they were therefore able to hold onto their ethnic distinctiveness for several centuries after Chaeronea. Perhaps the possession of a distinctive Olympian religion, enshrined in the heritage of the Homeric poems in a distinctive set of languages, enabled Greeks to cultivate and cherish and transmit their sense of common ethnicity in ways that the Phoenicians lacked. Perhaps, also, the fact that Phoenicians shared with other Canaanites their Baal Melqarts and Astartes, and later their script with other neighbours and their crafts with Assyrians, diluted any consciousness of separate culture and ancestry. We do not know. We can only speculate in the light of analogous cases, like that of the northern Israelite kingdom, which also failed to evolve a distinctive culture in time to save it from the disaster that befell it in 722 BC. But this will be discussed later.¹⁸

The Phoenician case highlights the importance of religious and cultural syncretism in the ancient world as a major cause of ethnic absorption and dissolution. It is difficult in this context to avoid tautological language and *ex post facto* reasoning. We are often reduced to saying that a given *ethnie* failed to develop a 'sufficiently distinctive culture/religion/sense of solidarity', to avoid eventual dissolution through syncretism and assimilation. The degree or kind of distinctiveness and individuality of a group's traditions and cultural forms which can enable it to resist the attractions and pressures of external social forces and cultural patterns cannot be measured. Nevertheless, as far as pre-modern *ethnie* are concerned, it may safely be argued that lack of religious and cultural individuality over the longer term is more important for ethnic survival potential than even conquest or eviction from the homeland. The failure of the Burgundian court to instil a common culture among the elites of its mixed territories and populations – despite shadowy relics of an ancient Burgundian royal house not so far away – and its lack of a peculiar and distinctive style (International Gothic being widely diffused, even into Italy) did more to account for the dissolution of any incipient sense of common Burgundian ethnicity than the Swiss pikemen at Grandson and Morat in 1476.¹⁹

But perhaps the most striking case of syncretism and acculturation helping to dissolve ethnic bonds is provided by the fall of Assyria. As a documented and recognizable ethnic community, the Assyrians are known as far back as c. 1900 BC, when a colony of their merchants is found at Kanesh in Anatolia. Shortly afterwards, the Old Assyrian kingdom of Shamshi-Adad I (c. 1750 BC) is located on the northern reaches of the Tigris at Assur; but with the advance of Hittites and Mitanni, it was subjugated.²⁰ In the fourteenth century BC, Ashur-uballit and Adad-Nirari I founded the first Assyrian empire, but it was really later on in the ninth century with Ashur-nasir-pal II (885–60) and Shalmaneser III (860–25) that the Assyrian empire became the dominant power in the Middle East. From that time until the late seventh century, the Assyrian war machine dominated military politics while

the monarchs created the most centralized polity hitherto, together with a monumental culture and cosmopolitan society. Yet, within a few years of the formation of an enemy coalition of Babylonian city-states and Median tribesmen, the Assyrian empire collapsed, Nineveh being destroyed in 612 BC and the last Assyrian prince, Ashur-uballit, being defeated at Harran in 609 BC. Thereafter, no more is heard of the Assyrian state or people. There are references to the 'land' of Assyria now and again, but when Xenophon marched through it in 401 BC he found all the cities deserted with the exception of Erbil.²¹ No one henceforth claims to be 'Assyrian', except a small and persecuted sectarian community of Nestorians in northern Iraq today and in a far-flung diaspora.²²

What accounts for this sudden denouement which obliterated, not just an empire, but the very sense of Assyrian community and culture? One obvious reason is their exposed position next to the Jazirah steppe, which laid their cities open to both attacks and cultural influences along the trade routes through Mari and Harran to the north-west. On the other hand, Assyrian cities occupied a compact territory with fairly fertile terrain on the middle Tigris beneath the foothills leading to the Zagros range, and this location greatly facilitated the formation of a centralized state able to strike out at Babylon, Syria and Urartu. A strategic location is, however, often two-edged; and it has been suggested that Assyrian expansion, its continual razzias into ever more distant regions, was the result, less of a need for certain raw materials (though this was important) than of defence of a homeland which was so exposed and so strategic in geo-political terms.²³

A second allied reason is Assyria's sudden and catastrophic military defeats from 614 to 609 BC. Military expansion had overstrained her economic and manpower resources, and raised up a host of enemies whose combined forces were in the end too much for the depleted Assyrian war machine. But these are reasons for military defeat and political demise, not for ethnic extinction. Other, lesser powers have suffered catastrophic defeat, have even experienced captivity and exile; yet they have survived. (One thinks of Persians, Judeans, Egyptians; or Irish, Catalans, Russians, Poles and Hungarians). Neighbouring Babylonia lost her independence to Cyrus in 539 BC; but Babylonian ethnic sentiment lingered on for some decades, after the revolts of 482 BC, when the Persians destroyed some of the Babylonian temples and dispersed their priesthoods.²⁴ Why did the Assyrians so immediately and completely cease to regard themselves, or be regarded, as a separate community?

Perhaps a more potent reason lies in that field of demographic and cultural continuity which has been briefly considered. Later Assyrian imperial policy called for the deportation and intermingling of the elites and urban classes of many *ethnie*; the ten Israelite tribes are only the best-known of many examples. The result was a considerable degree of ethnic mixing and dilution, both in Palestine and Syria, and in Assyria itself, so that the

imperial heartlands around the middle Tigris became increasingly heterogenous and cosmopolitan in culture. At the same time, for commercial and administrative reasons, the Assyrian state encouraged the use of the simpler, less cumbersome Aramaic tongue as the popular and business *lingua franca* – a practice taken over by the Persian empire. This followed a great influx of Arameans and proliferation of Aramean city-states after about 1000 BC, and the effect was once again to ‘internationalize’ the former Assyrian ethnic polity.²⁵

This would perhaps not have been so serious for ethnic continuity and individuality, had it not been accompanied by severe social and political strains in the Assyrian heartlands of the later empire. The peasantry who had earlier formed the bulk of the Assyrian army became increasingly dependent on their landlords from whom the chief state dignitaries were recruited. As their estates grew larger, these landlords brought in large numbers of *hupshi*, agricultural workers or regular soldiers, as well as slaves recruited from the influx of prisoners of war. The social gap between an upper class living in the seventh century in luxurious courts on large estates in growing corruption, and the vast mass of dependent and over-taxed peasantry and artisans, was, if anything, increased by the latter’s growing exclusion from later Assyrian armies, after the reforms of Tiglath-Piliser III (745–27), when they tended to be replaced by contingents from the Assyrian dependencies. If this helps to explain the subsequent swift demise of the Assyrian army, it also suggests why it left no trace in the historical record. Inter-state warfare and a peasant army which had formerly helped to endow the Assyrians with a strong ethnic consciousness, now, with the change in the composition of an army controlled by a small corps of noble officers and relying more on foreign personnel and expertise, facilitated the downfall of the state and the cleavage between the Assyrian upper classes and their peasant base, a striking confirmation of the claim made earlier (chapter 2) that inter-state warfare maintains ethnic identity provided conscription is largely indigenous.²⁶

This may well account for the ‘falling away’ of a peasant base from the Assyrian *ethnie* after the downfall of her empire, but it does not explain why we hear no more of a sense of Assyrian identity among her elites after 609 BC. Her cities, it is true, were destroyed, and there may have been evictions of some of her elites. As the conquering Babylonian monarch, Nabopolassar, put it:

I slaughtered the land of Subarum (Assyria), I turned the hostile land into heaps and ruins.

The Assyrian, who since distant days had ruled over all the peoples and with his heavy yoke had brought injury to the people of the Land, their feet from Akkad I turned back, their yoke I threw off.²⁷

But neither conquests nor deportations are necessarily fatal for ethnic identity, and so the question of the dissolution of all Assyrian identity

remains. One possibility is the concomitant demise of the Assyrian religion. Unlike Babylonia or Egypt, the destruction of the Assyrian state entailed the end of any organized Assyrian religion. True, Cyrus readmitted the ancient Assyrian gods to the Babylonian pantheon in 538 BC, which suggests some lingering ethnic sentiment in Assyria; but nothing further is heard of Assyrian temples or priests anywhere. It appears that Assyrian religion was so closely tied to the state and became so much identified with the interests of state dignitaries and monarchs, that when the latter collapsed, Assyrian religion had nothing material or spiritual to fall back on, and no power to bind any other stratum of the population together.

There is an allied reason. Later Assyrian religion, originally centred on the worship of Asshur, Adad and Dagan in the religious centre of Assur, became increasingly dependent on Sumerian and Babylonian models. By the time of Ashur-bani-pal (668–26 BC), there was a full antiquarian revival, but it had no indigenous roots; the scribes of Ninevah were set to copying out faithfully Sumerian, Babylonian and Akkadian literary and religious texts, and the temple priesthoods modelled themselves on their more prestigious Babylonian counterparts in Nippur, Sippar and Babylon. Rather than evolve their own religious myths, they appear to have demoted the position of Assur as a religious centre and to have appropriated the ancient Mesopotamian mythologies which helped to perpetuate a sense of Babylonian, rather than Assyrian, ethnicity.²⁸

A similar picture emerges from the study of Assyrian art and architecture, and of the royal inscriptions with which it was closely linked. All three served, almost exclusively, the state's political propaganda and the glorification of the monarchy. The most impressive architecture has been that of the royal palaces – of Tukulti-Ninurta I at Kar-Tukulti-Ninurta, of Ashur-nasir-pal II and Shalmaneser III at Nimrud, of Sargon II at Khorsabad, and Ashur-bani-pal I at Nineveh – with their larger than life-size winged bulls and sculptured reliefs, usually of royal campaigns and sieges, or of royal hunts, in which the kings were depicted almost above the gods, reflecting the aggrandizement of the state, especially in the sphere of religion.²⁹ This was a political art, designed to inspire in ambassadors and tributaries fear and awe of the Assyrian state. Though the kings were bound by the annual religious round, by dreams, portents and divination, like their Babylonian predecessors, they had considerable freedom of action outside the religious sphere, and as head of the clergy could manipulate tradition for state ends. The royal inscriptions make it clear that what concerned all dignitaries was the conduct of military campaigns by the kings, and provided the king had the co-operation of the *mar banuti* (the 'sons of creation'), to whom he had to present his successor, he could rest assured in the prestige of his lineage traced back to the mythical hero, Adapa, and devote himself to military pursuits and state affairs.³⁰

It would appear, then, that Assyrian ethnic dissolution (as opposed to political demise) was due to a combination of factors, among which internal

social divisions, state aggrandizement at the expense of other institutions, and the dependence of Assyrian religion on external models, coupled with a growing cultural cosmopolitanism and ethnic dilution in the Assyrian cities and army, were particularly crucial. Cultural assimilation and religious ossification were especially damaging for the urban elites; with the fall of the empire, there was little to differentiate Assyrian from neighbouring Babylonian elites in terms of culture, since their values and memories, symbols and myths, had become infused with Babylonian ones, and their rituals and priesthoods took Babylon as their model. In the end, Assyrian traditions became hardly distinguishable from those around, except in their intimate dependence on a state that now no longer functioned.

There is, perhaps, one other reason for the rapid dissolution of a lingering Assyrian identity: the universal hostility of the surrounding *ethnie*, because of the brutal Assyrian policy of uprooting and deportation of ethnic elements among the conquered peoples. It is hardly surprising that deported peoples should applaud the destruction of Assyria, as did Zephaniah at the time or Ezekiel half a century later; and we catch something of the feeling of the subjugated populations in the hymn of vengeance of the prophet Nahum, exiled to Elkosh, north of Nineveh:

Behold, saith Yahweh of hosts, I am against thee, I will strip thee of thy clothing and show thy shame to the nations. Filth I will cast upon thee and disgrace thee, I will set thee up as a warning, all who see thee shall flee, shall cry: 'Desolate Nineveh, who shall bewail her?'

The shepherds are in slumber, thy nobles have found rest; thy people are scattered in flight on the mountains, none is there to bring them together. For thy hurt there is no healing, thy wounds are all mortal, all that hear of thy fate smite their hands in rejoicing, for on whom hath not thy iniquity constantly fallen?³¹

In later times, the term 'Assyria' remained only as a geographical expression, a region of northern Iraq, where much later Nestorian Chaldeans congregated and took the name, claiming descent from its ancient and illustrious inhabitants.³²

Assyria is only the most striking case of ethnic dissolution following hard upon the destruction of an ethnic polity. Many other well-known cases from antiquity and the Middle Ages – Kassites, Philistines, Gutians, Elamites, Visigoths, Burgundians, Normans (in Normandy), Avars, Cumans, Chazars, Hephthalites in Iran – have created dynasties or polities for decades or centuries, only to disappear with, or soon after, their polities, while others have lost 'their' states or the states they dominated, like the Poles, Greeks, Armenians and Hungarians, yet survived either intact or transformed, but nevertheless identifiable ethnically. Then there are the many cases of smaller *ethnie* that could hardly sport their own states, particularly in Russia or Africa, yet their very isolation helped them to survive within larger empires

or at their peripheries, while others have vanished from the record, from the Lullubi to the Brahuis or the Szeklers.³³

Short of examining the circumstances of each case, it is clearly impossible to provide more than general pointers and clues to the sheer variety of factors involved in ethnic erosion and dissolution.

Ethnic survival

1 *Ethnic states*

The same is obviously true of those cases where circumstances were favourable to long-term ethnic survival, often over centuries, even millennia. In examining such instances of ethnic potential for persistence, it is necessary to return to the distinction between demotic and aristocratic *ethnie*, and combine it with the other important differences noted in chapters 2 and 3, between dynastic and communal *mythomoteurs* and cultures, and between ethnic states (*ethnie* with their 'own' states) and ethnic minorities (*ethnie* which lack their own states). Let us start first with ethnic states and see how lateral-aristocratic *ethnie*, often with dynastic cultures, can prolong themselves and ultimately turn themselves into nations.

Normally lateral-aristocratic *ethnie*, though they may persist for some generations, even centuries, tend to die out with the demise of their political power; and this is particularly true of those whose *mythomoteurs*, like the Assyrian, become increasingly dynastic. But this outcome may be averted, if the aristocratic *ethnie* and its rulers use their state power to establish incorporating bureaucratic institutions which will penetrate down the social scale and reach out from the urban centres. This can be done both by a native aristocracy and dynasty or by invaders over long periods. The process starts by the dominant *ethnie*'s aristocracy setting up bureaucratic institutions to tie the mass of the population to the state, often aided by protracted warfare; and it ends by producing a state culture in which the mass of the population participates, albeit unevenly. This is what occurred under Frankish Merovingian and Carolingian rule, as the invading aristocracy gradually succeeded in incorporating the Gallo-Roman population in northern France (not so much in the southern half of the Roman province). This allowed the Capetian and Valois dynasties to expand a northern French culture southwards, paving the way for the creation, during and after the Hundred Years War, of a French national state and ultimately a national culture. Of course, given the poverty of communications and the low levels of technology in most pre-industrial societies, few ethnic states were able to implement the goals of incorporation and cultural homogenization; and, as we saw with the Hittites, Poles and Hungarians, by no means all lateral *ethnie* thought it necessary or desirable to do so, until the era of nationalism.

There is no evidence that Philistine lords or Mongol Khans thought it necessary to incorporate and homogenize their conquered populations through bureaucratic institutions that would root them more firmly in a territorial 'homeland'.

Only in a few cases – in Iran, ancient and medieval Egypt, Japan and early modern Russia – did a lateral-aristocratic *ethnie* attempt to use state institutions to consolidate a cultural realm and weld other strata lower down the scale (though rarely the peasant masses) into a compact and self-conscious ethnic community through bureaucratic incorporation. Here it is the drive for clearcut boundaries of the realm, and for stable political order within those boundaries, that produces a growing sense of ethnic solidarity among other strata of the population, who come to benefit from internal stability and external protection. In this 'bureaucratic mode' of ethnic incorporation, the ruling dynasty becomes identified with the state as guarantor of order and protection, and the state gradually becomes identified with the protected and ordered community. This is what occurred in France under the Bourbons and in England under the Tudors and, less successfully, the Stuarts. By acculturating middle and lower urban strata at least, the aristocratic *ethnie* broadens its base and prolongs its social life and its mores, together with the myths, symbols, values and memories that the aristocracy have cultivated over the generations and which now are fed into the heritage and repository of an enlarged proto-nation.³⁴

By no means all attempts at bureaucratic incorporation prove successful. In the medieval period, the Solomonic dynasty of Ethiopia made strenuous efforts to safeguard its realm and transform its Monophysite Christian kingdom into a more bureaucratic state, fighting off both southern Muslims and northern Falashas and building up a national Church and culture, but it ended in failure.³⁵ So did the Sassanid attempt to weld Iran into a national Persian state, though here they left a more lasting cultural heritage to their Islamic successors. In both cases, the experience strengthened ethnic bonds in the long term. The difference was, of course, that Sassanid Iran was located in a strategic culture area along the east-west trade routes and therefore attracted more hostility. The early and medieval history of Iran is a history of incessant warfare and periodic reorganizations of the state backed by the religious authorities, particularly the Sassanid revival under king Shapur I (AD 241–71) and Kartir, the Zoroastrian religious reformer, which spread Zoroastrian fire-worship and temples, partly to counter the inroads of Buddhism, Christianity and Manichaeism.³⁶

Despite this restoration, there was considerable internal dissension in the Sassanid realm between monarch, aristocracy, Zoroastrian priests and the urban strata, and it manifested itself in the wide appeal of religious syncretism and the fluctuations in royal religious policies, with king Kobad (AD 488–96, 498–531) protecting the Mazdakite radical sect and his successor, Chosroes I (AD 531–79) suppressing it and restoring Zoroastrian

Orthodoxy.³⁷ It was in this latter period that an antiquarian cultural restoration movement took place and, as we saw, the traditions of the national epic were perhaps first compiled under Chosroes' rule. It is easy to deride these achievements as mere 'conscious archaism' and to claim that,

As with other urban civilizations that lacked real roots in the countryside, the results were grand and artificial, in theology as in architecture; and Moslem conquest cut off the entire tradition in the seventh century, just as Alexander's victories had earlier disrupted the high culture of the Achaemenids.³⁸

But the fact remains, that as with the Achaemenids, a name, an example and an inspiration remained within an identifiable unit of population and a particular culture area; remained to shape the special Iranian nature and course of Islam in that country, and strengthen the sense of common ancestry and history among Persians.³⁹

Similar transformations of an erstwhile aristocratic *ethnie* into a largely ethnic state, able to safeguard a sense of unique community, can be found in Egyptian history. Even the conquests by Assyria (671 BC), Babylon (598 BC) and Persia (525 BC) did not destroy the Pharaonic culture or mythology, and it was only the suppression of the serious revolt in 343 BC that led to the destruction of the Pharaonic temples. Egyptian welcome of Alexander reflected the continuity of the sense of Egyptian community, and the Ptolemaic and Roman eras saw a spate of temple building – at Dendera, Edfu, Esna, Kom Ombo and Philae – and veritable courting of Pharaonic religion by the rulers.⁴⁰ At the same time, despite some syncretism, Egyptian priestly circles practised a conscious religious archaism and displayed clear xenophobic tendencies, seeking to preserve in complex hieroglyphic script the ancient rituals from the profanation of foreigners and protect an Egypt that was a 'temple of the whole world'.⁴¹ Yet, Egyptian popular religion, centred on Sarapis and Isis, and diverging more and more from the aristocratic temple mythology, prepared the way for gradual acceptance of a form of Christianity, the Monophysite Coptic (that is, Egyptian), that was more expressive of everyday needs of the people under Roman rule and heavy taxation. Greek, Jewish and Roman ethnic elements had not succeeded in diluting the sense of Egyptian difference, but it had changed its course 'from below'. Coptic Christianity, indeed, persisted long after the Arab conquest and the edict of Abd-al-Malik in 705 making Arabic the official language in all state transactions; even the transition to a Muslim (Fatimid) cultural domination did not eradicate a lingering sense of Egyptian identity.⁴²

In many ways, the history of late Pharaonic and post-Pharaonic attempts to create an ethnic state illustrates the difficulties of an aristocratic ethnic culture, wedded to a dynastic *mythomoteur*, in maintaining and diffusing its particular mythology and symbolism outside the upper strata and temple devotees, once they were challenged by new cultures operating in new urban

centres beyond their control. Yet the urban poor in Ptolemaic and Roman times had imbibed certain basic sentiments and assumptions from the long history of Pharaonic Egyptian separateness: the attachment to the land (of Ptah) which was theirs exclusively, a sense of cultural difference, manifested in periodic riots against foreign ethnic communities, and a vague but keen feeling of common origins, descendants of an historic culture hitherto unmixed with foreign elements.⁴³

In some ways, the Byzantine upper strata proved more successful in creating an ethnic state, although this was by no means their primary intention, if it was one at all. From the start the Byzantine imperial *mythomoteur* was dual, at once dynastic and religious. As vice-regent of God and heir of the universal Roman empire, the Byzantine emperor was more than another dynastic ruler; he carried the nostalgia of the classical world and the messianic hopes of Orthodox Christianity into battle on behalf of the community of the faithful. But that community became more and more Greek in speech and outlook. Though Latin long held sway in Court and bureaucratic circles, the cultural cement of the empire's core populations was Greek and its education was in the Greek classics and tongue.⁴⁴

Imperial tradition, Christian Orthodoxy and Greek culture became even more the bases of Byzantium and her Hellenic community, after she had lost most of her western and Asiatic possessions in the seventh century – to Visigoths and then Arabs in Spain and North Africa, to the Lombards in much of Italy, to the Slavs in the Balkans and to Muslim arms in Egypt and the Near East. Political circumstances, and the resilience of Greek culture and Greek education, made her predominantly Greek in speech and character.⁴⁵ After the sack of Constantinople in 1204 and the establishment of a Latin empire under Venetian auspices, the rivalry of the Greek empires based on Nicæa, Epirus and Trebizond to realize the patriotic Hellenic dream of recapturing the former capital further stimulated Greek ethnic sentiment against Latin usurpation. When in the face of Turkish threats, the fifteenth-century Byzantine emperor, Michael Palaeologus, tried to place the Orthodox church under the Papacy and hence Western protection, an inflamed Greek sentiment vigorously opposed his policy. The city's populace in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, their Hellenic sentiments fanned by monks, priests and the Orthodox party against the Latin policies of the government, actually preferred the Turkish turban to the Latin mitre and attacked the urban wealthy classes.⁴⁶

But the Turkish conquest and the demise of Byzantium did not spell the end of the Orthodox Greek community and its ethnic sentiment. Under its Church and Patriarch, and organized as a recognized *millet* of the Ottoman empire, the Greek community flourished in exile, the upper classes of its diaspora assuming privileged economic and bureaucratic positions in the empire. So Byzantine bureaucratic incorporation had paradoxical effects: as in Egypt, it helped to sunder the mass of the Greek community from the

state and its Court and bureaucratic imperial myths and culture in favour of a more demotic Greek Orthodoxy; but, unlike Egypt, the demise of the state served to strengthen that Orthodoxy and reattach to it the old dynastic-messianic symbolism of a restored Byzantine empire in opposition to Turkish oppression.⁴⁷

It was really only in the West that we find cases of successful bureaucratization of an aristocratic *ethnie*, able to transform itself into a genuine 'nation'. The English case is particularly instructive. Island location and the distinction between flat lowlands suited to intensive large-scale arable farming, and hilly highland zones in Wales, Cumberland and Scotland, provided a geopolitical and economic basis for the formation and maintenance of a distinctive ethnic identity in England. But other factors tended to 'confuse' this trend: dynastic and kin arrangements which spanned the Channel, regionalism inherited from the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, the cultural divide between a Wessex-dominated south and a more Danish north, and the later class-bound differences in linguistic culture – between English spoken in villages and small towns, Anglo-Norman in the castles and cities, and Latin in churches and abbeys.⁴⁸

It was not really until the long wars with French kings and nobles of the fourteenth century, which by degrees began to assume ethnic, and even 'national', overtones, that a measure of political and linguistic centralization was achieved. By the time of Chaucer, state administration required greater legal and linguistic standardization, and this meant filtering elite culture downwards through an amalgamation of tongues. It also meant the creation of British mythologies and the rewriting of history, starting with Geoffrey of Monmouth in the late twelfth century.⁴⁹ Even then localism and regional tradition together with the lack of a powerful state priesthood, with its own literary heritage and mission, impeded the growth of an English nation. This, of course, was supplied later, with Henry VIII's reversal of the subordinate and provincial religious position of England as a Papal 'fief', and by the subsequent tide of Puritan ethnic nationalism. Interestingly, the period of confirmation of an English 'nation' is also the moment when a dynastic *mythomoteur* cedes place to a more popular, island symbolism, in which England is endowed with a cultural mission and sense of community.⁵⁰

2 *Ethnic minorities*

Turning to ethnic minorities, many of whom are vertical and demotic in character and have communal *mythomoteurs*, we find that the sacred and religious factors assume even greater importance than in dynastic ethnic states. Whereas in the latter, priesthoods and their sacred texts buttressed the process of bureaucratic ethnic incorporation by an aristocratic community, in ethnic minorities they act as guardians and transmitters of the 'myth-

symbol complex' and its historic culture. In some cases, the role of priesthoods and sacred texts is played out within, and on behalf of, a geo-political location and an ethnic homeland. In others, it comes near to taking the place of that location. In the first case, that of resident ethnic minorities, the priesthood and its symbolic lore is grounded in the land which the community possesses and in which it lives out its daily existence; in the second, that of diaspora communities, the priesthood and its sacred texts substitute an imaginary homeland, rooted in an ancient land, yet elaborated in the visions of exiles.

The most obvious condition favouring the survival of resident minorities within an ethnic state is a fairly secure and compact location. The Bretons and Basques not only have a fairly compact and visible location, they are generally recognized as having inhabited 'their' home since time immemorial. They are seen as permanent components in a polyethnic society, even when the state becomes an increasingly ethnic one through the domination of a given *ethnie*. While they may be subjugated, neglected, oppressed or even denied their basic cultural rights in their own territories, there is no attempt to deny their historic association with a given area of the state.

But if this geo-political recognition protects ethnic minorities from the worst external pressures, it does not prevent inner erosion and decay. When the Welsh finally lost their independence after 1282, there began a long process of acculturation, particularly of the elites, to English society and culture, accelerated by the Act of Union of 1536; by the nineteenth century, the 'Welsh gentry were thoroughly anglicised, Anglican in religion, English in speech and usually in educational background . . .', and hence it was left to other strata and other institutions to keep alive a sense of Welsh community in the face of political incorporation and social and geographical fragmentation.⁵¹ Among these institutions the bards and chapels occupy, at different times, pride of place; the bards and their competitions in the medieval era, competitions which eighteenth-century intellectuals like Iolo Morgan and Thomas Jones tried to restore and imitate in their *eisteddfodau* from 1789 onwards, though with many differences; and the preachers in the Methodist and Baptist chapels of the eighteenth century which revived a sense of Welsh community and ancestry through meetings, choral singing and bible readings in Welsh. To this must be added the fund of legends and myths retained from the days of independent kingdoms and infused with Arthurian fantasies of Celtic antiquity, to which advancing literacy gave wider currency from the sixteenth century onwards.⁵²

Island location did little to help a strategically placed Ireland from invasions and repression by government and settler communities. Though there was recognition of the Irish as rightful inhabitants, there was even less appreciation by the English of their culture and identity, especially after growing religious divergences in the wake of the Reformation. In the meantime, the divided and leaderless Irish tribes and village communities

had fallen back on their Gaelic and Catholic heritage, born of a long and illustrious tradition of monastic Celtic Christianity (imported from Roman Britain in the late fourth and fifth centuries) which had been diffused throughout Scotland and northern Britain and Wales, at a time when Christian and classical learning was at a low ebb in Western Europe.⁵³

The result had been a special and determining role for the clergy in the Irish communities, together with a prestige and influence for Celtic Catholic traditions in defining the subsequent content of Gaelic Ireland and its English-speaking successor which no amount of British repression and Puritan missionary endeavour could erode. To the initial strategic location, which made it imperative for Britain to control Ireland, were added deepening religious divisions and the denial of access to wealth and prestige, let alone power, of the former Irish Catholic elites; the result was that by the eighteenth century the Catholic peasant masses were driven back on their Catholic fastnesses and pinned their hopes to a Gaelic Catholic revival, defining Irishness increasingly in terms of Catholic allegiance and maintaining the influence of the Catholic hierarchy in the countryside. With the decline of the Gaelic language (though not a Celtic culture), a deeply embedded Catholicism and a dominant Catholic clergy were left as the main support and symbolic definer of Irish identity; persecution and discrimination merely served to reinforce the religious, even messianic, content of Irish ethnicity.⁵⁴

The key role of priesthoods and sacred texts in maintaining ethnic identity for long periods in the face of both severe external hostility and internal disunity is even more evident in a number of Near Eastern communities, some of whom have survived for centuries, and even millennia. The origins of the Druze al-Hakim cult can be traced to the Wadi al-Taym in southern Lebanon near Mount Hermon in about AD 1016. By the early Crusades the Druze communities under their 'feudal' families (Tanukhs, Arslan and then Ma'n) were playing an important military role in attacking Crusader fortresses at Montfort and Belfort. By the sixteenth century, the Ma'n family was recognized by the Ottomans as feudal lords of southern Lebanon, a position taken by the outwardly Sunni tribe of Shihab in the eighteenth century. Only in the mid-nineteenth century did foreign involvement and Ottoman policies create tensions and civil war between Maronites and Druze in Lebanon. While periodic repression, combined with their mountain fastnesses and the independent spirit of mountaineers, has reinforced Druze separatism, their morale and the unity of Druze families and villages stemmed more from endogamy and the rites and customs of a secret religion. This secrecy originated from a fear that new converts would betray the religion to its persecutors, as well as a refusal to proselytize now that the 'day of grace' had passed with al-Hakim's death. This meant that after the death of the last great Druze teacher, Baha'al-Din (d. AD 1031), 'no one could be admitted to the Druze fold or permitted exit from it. The Druze

religion then ceased to be simply a religion and its followers became a distinct nation'.

The Druze faith became hereditary, a sacred privilege in a profane world, turning its adherents inwards:

'This self-centralisation, which makes its votaries shun all attempts at increasing their number, coupled with the inviolable secrecy with which they practise their religion, and the readiness with which they ever hold themselves to profess any dominant religion that happens to throw its shadow across their way, has enabled the Druze community to maintain a stable and homogenous existence for upward of nine centuries.⁵⁵

Though this verdict may exaggerate their stability, given their original ethnic heterogeneity (with Persian, Kurdish and Arab elements), the vivid persistence of their religio-ethnic identity, once formed, must derive in large part from the hold over the lay community of a priesthood initiated into the study of an esoteric doctrine through abstruse sacred texts of great antiquity.⁵⁶

Some of the Jewish sects have been even more long-lived, albeit in very much reduced numbers. Some thirty thousand Falashas today, once possessed an autonomous kingdom of their own, which engaged in fierce battles with the reigning Solomonic dynasty and Monophysite faith of Shoan Amharic Ethiopia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; but their survival is more the result of their peculiar amalgam of early Judaism with Ethiopian customs and language (Ge'ez is their sacred language), so that: 'Like their Christian fellow Ethiopians, the Falashas are stubborn adherents to fossilised Hebraic-Judaic beliefs, practices and customs which were transplanted from South Arabia and the Horn of Africa'.⁵⁷

To this must be added their isolation, their 'frozen' stratification half outside mainstream Ethiopian society in Gondar, their role as cultivators and craftsmen, and the intermittent hostility of their mainly Christian neighbours fanned by religious prejudice and reinforced by the rigorous retention of their Judaic practices.⁵⁸

The Samaritans of Nablus (who, with those of Holon near Tel-Aviv, number some 400 souls) trace their descent to the schism between Uzzi and his rival for the high priesthood at Shechem, Eli, in the pre-monarchical Israelite era; Eli established a rival cult at Shiloh, which was subsequently moved by David to Jerusalem. It is interesting that the chief bone of contention between Jews and Samaritans since has been the focal 'sacred centre'; for the Talmud, the Samaritan heresy has been their faith in the sanctity of Mount Gerizim.⁵⁹ In the Persian period, to which Samaritan origins are sometimes traced, the Ezraic reforms and Nehemiah's conflict with the governor of Samaria, Sanballat, undoubtedly sharpened the Samaritan sense of difference; as a result, until the severe Byzantine repression of non-Orthodox religions, Samaritans rarely made common cause with the Jews of Palestine.⁶⁰ The Samaritans, though frequently

decimated by invaders and rulers of the area, have clung to the earliest stratum of Judaism, adhering to a rigid interpretation of the Pentateuch; but, except in Damascus, their settlements abroad never took root, and only by some inter-marriage with Israeli Jews, have they been able to revive today in Holon and Nablus.⁶¹

Christian ethnic communities have also maintained themselves locally in the Middle East for well over a millennium. The real founder of the Maronites, St John Maron (patriarch from AD 685–707), organized the community of this mountain people (*Ahl-al-Jabal*) around the Qadisha Valley of central Lebanon with a Syrian liturgy and rites.⁶² Its monasteries, often perched on high ridges, became both forts against persecutors and centres of learning; while their ecclesiastical union with the Roman Church, begun in AD 1182 and completed only at the Synod of AD 1736, afforded a measure of political protection, even if it did not penetrate down the social scale. As a result, Gibbon could assert: 'Yet the humble nation of the Maronites has survived the empire of Constantinople, and they still enjoy under their Turkish masters a free religion and a mitigated servitude.'⁶³

Much the same was true of the Copts, who did not enjoy the Maronite advantage of a mountain seclusion, but came instead to occupy a distinct social niche in Islamic Egypt as scribes, tax collectors and magistrates. But, although undoubtedly useful to successive Islamic dynasties as sources of revenue and instruments of government, the Copts ultimately owed their preservation to their Church and liturgy in which Coptic functioned as a sacred language even after it died out in Upper Egypt in the early modern era.⁶⁴ The influence of its early monastic traditions was also vital in preserving and reviving loyalty to Monophysite Christianity and Coptic identity; in the nineteenth century, Patriarch Cyril IV (1854–61), a great educational and religious reformer, like many others began his career as a member of a monastery, becoming abbot of St Antony's before initiating those measures that helped Copts to play a leading role in the modernization of Egypt in the early twentieth century.⁶⁵

In Western Europe, too, ethnic communities have been preserved by similar combinations of circumstances, in which religion and its sacred texts play a pivotal role. Basque identity in the last five centuries has been fostered by ancestry myths and historical memories of Basque nobility and Basque *fueros*; but equally by its distant, mountainous location and, latterly, differential economic development. Yet, here too, the local clergy after the Counter-Reformation were especially close to the populace and often acted as community leaders.⁶⁶ Moreover, in the nineteenth century, Catholic inspiration of Carlism in the Basque country was echoed in the first manifestation of Basque nationalism, for Sabino Arana's sketch of 1894 revealed his overwhelming desire to defend the Catholic nature of Basque society.⁶⁷ Breton Armorica, too, first settled by British Celts in the fifth century, became a stronghold of traditional Catholicism, especially after the

Union with the French Crown in 1532. By the time of the Revolution, Brittany had become a bastion of regional particularism and counter-revolution; in the next century, it was regarded as a distant refuge for neo-traditionalist intellectuals in search of the ancient rhythms of a peasant life and a 'sad Celtic religiosity'.⁶⁸

Many other examples of the profound cohesive power of religious beliefs, ritual and texts could be cited from Europe and Asia – among Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Georgians, Sikhs, Karen and Sinhalese – all of whom reveal its influence on the preservation of the forms of ethnicity and a revival of its spirit. It is only in the modern period that this influence wanes, and perhaps first among maritime and trader peoples. Thus, in the early Middle Ages, Catalan Catholic religiosity was as evident as elsewhere; witness the fervour of its mission of Reconquista against the Muslims, and the size and number of its churches in Barcelona and abbeys like Ripoll, Poblet and Montserrat.⁶⁹ Only after its incorporation into the Castilian–Aragonese monarchy were its memories equally directed towards the glories of its former maritime empire and its aspirations to the retention of its Generalitat or self-governing institutions. Yet, early Catalan nationalism was undoubtedly influenced by a romanticized Catholicism, and only at the turn of the twentieth century, in a fast industrializing Barcelona, did language and a secular literature come to replace religion as the cultural cement and symbolism of a modern Catalan nation.⁷⁰

3 *Ethnic diasporas*

The peculiar role of religious factors is even more sharply delineated by the fate of diaspora communities which have lost both their homeland and their autonomy. In many ways, this double *loss* conditions their subsequent lot and self-perception as 'people-to-be-restored'. But, as restoration is ever postponed, something must substitute for the loss, and that something is a peculiarly ardent salvationist faith, hedged about by a panoply of law and ritual to maintain that faith among the many harrassed little communities of a diaspora. Religion here plays a dual role, at once conservative as with resident *ethnie*, and innovatively adaptive to meet a variety of changing conditions while retaining its central promise.⁷¹

Of course, each of the classic diasporas has occupied a specific socio-economic niche in the stratification pyramid of the agrarian estate societies where they have (been) settled. We saw how Orthodox Greeks, organized as a *millet* in the Ottoman empire, secured a special place in the economy and administration, notably the Phanariots of Constantinople and the merchants in western Asia Minor and the Black Sea.⁷² The latter in fact came to favour the dreams of the westernized diaspora intelligentsia for a rationalist culture and western-style society through a return to ancient Athenian ideals and Hellenic education. The intelligentsia in cities like Venice, Vienna and

Amsterdam also contributed to the resurgence of a Greek sense of common ethnicity, through their university teaching and printing ventures, which led to the revival of a purified Greek language.⁷³ But, in the final analysis, it was the dream of a restored Byzantine Orthodox empire that most sustained the Greek identity among the poor peasants and shepherds. For it was backed by the dense network of priests in the villages, by the perennial daily ritual of the Church, by its sacred liturgy and texts to which the priests alone had access, and by the long association of the Church hierarchy with political power even under Ottoman rule. Even when the Church was subordinated to the independent Greek state in the 1830s (since the upper hierarchy and Patriarchate had condemned the uprising), its deeper influence in the countryside was long maintained, and its political ambitions became the state's, in the form of the *Megalē Idea* for the reconquest of Greek Ionia to form a Greater Greece in the image of Byzantium.⁷⁴ The Byzantine identification of religion and politics, its Caesaro-Papist policies and its long wars with Zoroastrian Persians and Muslim Turks, have all coloured and shaped the direction of an emergent Greek nation, while preserving and infusing with a sense of mission the conquered Greek ethnic community which had dominated the Byzantine empire.

The Armenians of the Ottoman empire were also organized as a *millet* under their *catholikos*, and again their diaspora, dating to the late Byzantine and Arab eras, and embracing even more distant lands like India and Russia, secured a special niche as traders and artisans.⁷⁵ Like the Greeks, these diaspora communities looked back with equal fervour to their sacred centre (Echmiadzin as opposed to Constantinople) and homeland, in which, until the nineteenth century, probably the majority of Armenians were still resident.⁷⁶ That in itself gave the scattered Armenian enclaves a certain cohesion and organizational purpose. Yet the framework of these organizations was fundamentally religious and the education they received was mainly ecclesiastical. This had been the case, within Armenia, since the invention of the Armenian sacred script, by St Mesrop-Mashtoz in the early fifth century, had created a new barrier to assimilation and a powerful weapon for religious education and evangelical work.⁷⁷

It is instructive in this respect to gauge the effect of Armenia's conversion in AD 301 to Christianity, at the hand of Gregory the Illuminator, and her invention and use of a sacred script, by comparing the Armenians with a more southerly neighbour who did not do either, the Nabataeans. Like the Armenians, the Nabataeans can be dated to the early Persian period; and like the Armenians under their celebrated king, Tigranes the Great (95–55 BC), they were organized as a kingdom by the late second century BC and engaged in frequent warfare with Egypt and Seleucid Syria, as the Armenians did, sandwiched between Rome and Parthia and later Sassanid Iran.⁷⁸ In both, there is evidence of an ethnic identity, at least among the upper classes, at this time; yet, by the late Byzantine period the Nabataeans were in

decline, their kingdom having been long annexed by Trajan (AD 106), and were heard of no more, while the Armenians, though losing their kingdom on the field of Avarayr (AD 451), were able to maintain their lands and even revive their kingdom under the Bagratuni dynasty (AD 856–1071) and the subsequent principality in Cilicia.⁷⁹

The Nabataeans, as far as we can tell, appear to be of Semitic origin and spoke and wrote in Aramaic, though with many Arabic words. As they moved north-west into southern Palestine and Trans-Jordan, they became increasingly Hellenized and their tribal organization gave way to a sedentary and trading existence. Their chief deity, Dushara, was identified with Dionysus, under the supreme deity, Zeus-Haddad, a Mesopotamian fertility god, and his consort, Athena-Allat, was connected with Atargatis, another fertility goddess; the Nabataean festivals also shifted from nomadic spring ones to harvest autumn feasts. Yet, by the time of Augustus, Orientalizing features appear in Nabataean culture and art, with the loss of their Syrian possessions; and it has been suggested that we are dealing with a composite community, composed of Hellenizing Arab traders and Orientalizing Aramean-Edomite peasants tilling the soil and growing wheat, oil and vines.⁸⁰ Whatever the truth, it is clear that, unlike the Armenians and Jews, the Nabataeans were unable to evolve a distinctive culture and religion around their own sacred texts, and thereby introduce that conjunction of mobilizing communal sentiment with conservative ritual forms which has so often ensured ethnic persistence.

For, undoubtedly what saved a precarious Armenia was Tiridates III's timely conversion to Christianity, and its evolution along local lines during a period of political partition between Rome and Persia after AD 387. This evolution led Armenian Orthodoxy into opposition to Chalcedon (AD 451) and to the severing of Armenian ecclesiastical ties with Constantinople at the second Council of Dvin (AD 554), paving the way for persecutions and deportations of Armenians by Byzantine emperors who reconquered the homeland from Persia.⁸¹ There is no doubt that, both organizationally and emotionally, the ethnic Church provided exiled and migrant Armenians with a tangible expression of their identity, a framework for community and a latent political goal, the restoration of an Armenian kingdom or state.⁸²

Much the same can be said of the Jews, the third, classical diaspora. Indeed, they provide the best documented instance of all the factors that have been discussed, with some additional unique features. Unlike the Greeks and Armenians, most Jews lived in diaspora communities, from the period of the Bar-Kochba revolt (AD 132–5); after the Crusades, only small enclaves continued to reside in Palestine, mainly in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Galilee.⁸³ Periodic persecution was also at times more intense in the Jewish case, especially in Crusader Europe and late Tsarist Russia; the Holocaust was even more devastating than that of the Armenians in 1915.⁸⁴ Caste-like restrictions were also more 'frozen' and institutionalized than for

other diasporas; not only were the Jews forced into petty trading and money-lending activities condemned in Christendom, they were compelled to wear special dress and badges and reside separately, ultimately in ghettos. Of course, other ethnic minorities, especially the wandering Gypsy communities, were equally outcast and despised. Yet in agrarian societies like those of medieval Eastern Europe, many small ethnic communities like the Serbian Tsintsars, Polish Kashubs, Gaugauzi, Vlachs, Bulgarian Pomaks and Turks, could find a marginal niche; poor communications and lack of political homogenization in 'estate' societies foster the proliferation of minorities, as well as socially depressed *ethnie*, like the Ukrainians and Slovaks.⁸⁵

If the Jewish situation was only a more concentrated expression of this ethnic fragmentation and proliferation, the solidarity which the widely dispersed Jewish communities maintained over nearly two millennia was more intense and dynamic than that of any other diaspora. For one thing, the severance of Judaism from its territorial roots at an early stage encouraged an ethos of wandering and an idealization of the homeland of the restoration which was much more marked than among other peoples, and this in turn allowed successive centres of Jewry to flourish as replica 'homelands' with varying degrees of autonomy; in turn, Babylonia, the Rhineland, Spain and Poland, and latterly America, have acted as magnets for smaller, distant Jewish enclaves. For another, language was allowed to engender a much closer bond at an earlier date than for many other peoples. Not everyday language which varied from Aramaic to Arabic and Yiddish, but the sacred language of the scriptures and synagogue, with its unique script evolved from the old Hebrew preserved by the Samaritans. Not only was the language made to bear the full weight of religious ideals and emotions, as in Islam; it also became the key to mutual comprehension between culturally divergent Jewish communities, bridging to some extent, the gulf between Jews of the Sephardi and Ashkenazi synagogal rite, not only in daily religious worship but also in intellectual and poetic endeavour.⁸⁶ If the linguistic element taken by itself is paralleled by the Armenian and Greek experience, the peculiar edifice of Talmudic law and exegesis, the product of rabbinical commentaries on the Mishnah (c. AD 250) which were codified in Palestine and Babylonia in the fifth and sixth centuries, provided a unique framework for coping with every social and religious need within an integrated community bound by a common life-style and ethic. In the Talmud, as opposed to the Mishnah, the needs and aspirations of small-town traders and artisans were given more prominence, enabling the ritual expressions and legal framework of earlier Biblical ideals and Mishnaic precepts to incorporate and 'carry' more urbanized and commercialized Jewish communities in Europe and the Near East, as far indeed as India and China.⁸⁷

Each of these elements – segregation, de-territorialization, persecution, a sacred language and an encompassing religious law – finds parallels in other

communities, taken by themselves. Their conjunction, in the service of a salvationist but collectivist ethical monotheism, is surely unique; for, while messianic salvation religion can be found among Shi'ites and Sunnis, Protestants and Catholics, Orthodox, Armenians and even Buddhists, these millennialisms rarely linked their apocalyptic visions with so particular a territorial expression, albeit idealized, or the desire for a reversal of their status with so detailed an observance of religious law as a fulfilment of the injunction to be a 'holy people' and so hasten the coming of the messianic kingdom. Nor was the ultimate restoration of the community (of Israel) in its own land so intimately linked in other millennial faiths to an era of universal peace and justice. Given the chronic persecution suffered by the community for the sake of its religion, the messianic element assumed an urgency, at least from the time of the Maccabees, which ensured periodic renewals of the ethical and religious drive when the community threatened to become moribund, but always within an overall ethnic continuity and identity.⁸⁸

The Jewish diaspora calls attention to one other facet of ethnic survival: the role of historical memory. Though Jews did not begin to write secular histories until the eighteenth century, their religious thought and literature was impregnated with a sense of temporal succession and linear purpose; the connection between common ancestry and future destiny is made quite explicit already in God's promise to Abraham as much as Moses' speeches to the Israelites and the prophetic promises.⁸⁹ The rabbis embroidered the tale of historical origins and the promise of chosen destiny in many a midrash; just as the annual festivals recalled to the average Jew historical events in the life of the community in ancient times. In the modern period this historical sense has been used to bring before Jew and non-Jew the vicissitudes of the Jewish experience, including the Holocaust, in the manner and temper of Western historiography but with a Jewish and sometimes a Zionist purpose which suits a nationalist era.⁹⁰

The source of this historicist religion must be sought in the Deuteronomic movement in late seventh century Jerusalem, and in the movement of historical prophecy in Judah and Babylonia in the eight to sixth centuries BC. From the time of David, priests and prophets (Zadok and Nathan) emerged as powerful forces, critical of both king and notables, and working largely in harmony to control kings of David's house, as the relationship between Isaiah and Hezekiah illustrates.⁹¹ As a result, the traditions of Judah became attached to the Temple in Jerusalem and to the whole of Judah rather than to the dynastic principle and the state; moreover, the priests, the representatives of Aaron, rather than the kings, descendants of David, became the guardians and transmitters of the Mosaic *mythomoteur* and Temple rites. So while a messianic Davidic royal myth survived in late Israel, the monarchical principle was subordinated to both land and priesthood, and the reform Deuteronomic movement provided the impetus for ethnic survival and codification of sacred texts in the Babylonian Captivity. To this core were

added the prophetic denunciations and promises of restoration, which imparted a strong future orientation amid present disaster and provided an exemplar for all the catastrophic periods of Jewish history ever after.⁹²

The Jewish case, like the Greek and Armenian later, stands in the strongest possible contrast to the Phoenician, Nabataean, Norman and, above all, Assyrian experiences in which more or less strong ethnic states were destroyed and their inhabitants absorbed, without ethnic posterity. It illustrates our main thesis; namely, the central role of religious traditions and distinctive priesthods and rites in maintaining ethnic identity. While not denying the importance of both location and autonomy, it is clear that priesthods are more important than politics and homelands in safeguarding ethnic identity and securing ethnic survival over centuries. It is the complex of 'religious factors' that is most likely to maintain the sense of ethnic individuality and community in premodern eras.

Ethnic socialization and religious renewal

But religious factors play a complex and equivocal role. It was not for want of 'religion' *per se* that ancient Egyptian and Iranian *ethnie* were eroded and their sense of identity impaired, only to be restored by a new creed and its rites and hierarchy. In Egypt, traditional Theban temple religion suffered gradual ossification and dilution under the late Saites, while the revival under the Ptolemies was too elitist and state-sponsored to revive the common Egyptian's sense of religious identification.⁹³ A similar ossification beset late Sassanid Zoroastrianism, despite state-orchestrated fire-worship and temple rites. Deep internal divisions and state exhaustion in the Byzantine wars paved the way for the final defeat by the Arabs at Nihavand (AD 642) and left the Zoroastrian religion and community in decline. The Zoroastrian literary revival came too late, for by the ninth century Pahlavi had become the preserve of *mobadhs* for the composition of Zoroastrian texts like the *Denkart*; meanwhile the new elites in the villages, the *dihqans*, began to embrace Islam as their main avenue of political advance, and an Arabized New Persian language spread shortly afterwards from the east under the Samanids. Zoroastrian religion and literature had lost out to the new Islamized Persian culture.⁹⁴

I have cited the Pharaonic and Zoroastrian cases because, unlike say Assyrian religion, these were quite distinctive and autochthonous religions and yet they did not assure the automatic survival of the *ethnie* with which they were associated and to which they were confined. In the case of ancient Egyptian religion, loss of indigenous Pharaonic authority under Persian and Ptolemaic rule, the influx of new religions and cultures, and the failure of state elites and temple priests to cater to the needs of urban classes and

peasants alike, contributed to the loss of efficacy of the old gods in the sight of the average Egyptian. Even more, loss of political stability undermined the religious conservatism of urban strata; the lack of any messianic element in Pharaonic religion meant that, unlike the new cults of Sarapis and Isis, the older gods could not minister to a growing desire for personal salvation, which in turn undermined the old communal order guided by the state and its god-king. It was left to an Egyptianized form of a personal salvation religion from Judea to fill the gap left by a receding state and its old cosmic order.

The Zoroastrian case is rather more difficult to explain. As an arm of the Sassanid state, official fire-worship was bound to suffer with its extinction. But the fact that a Zoroastrian community persisted in Iran, and as Parsees in India, indicates a more dynamic, personal dimension in the worship of Ahura-Mazda, capable of inspiring a community of salvation. Compared to the far greater mobilizing zeal and inclusive activism of Islam, however, and its greater simplicity of doctrine and practice, the often esoteric ritual and beliefs of Zoroastrianism, especially its speculations on the nature of time, were really only significant for a cultured elite. As the religion of a defeated state which had not been able to rationalize disaster in communal terms like the prophets of ancient Israel, it offered few opportunities for social advancement and little prospect of a sudden status reversal for the humiliated Persians. Moreover, Islam had from the start the supreme advantage of an accessible and portable sacred text, while the mainly oral Zoroastrian traditions were not reduced to writing, or much diffused, till the ninth and tenth centuries, by which time an Islamized Persian artistic and literary renaissance was just commencing in Iran.⁹⁵

These examples reveal the sterility of an orthodox religion that can offer scant satisfaction of personal and communal needs for salvation, and whose sacred texts, if it has any in written form, become the esoteric preserve of an archaizing elite. The religion may be indigenous, but if it becomes petrified within and strangled by state management from without, it can no longer act as guardian and renewer of communal identity. From this it may be deduced that what matters for ethnic persistence and survival is the ability of any religious tradition (a) to renew itself and adapt to different conditions, and (b) to transmit and spread its message of holiness and salvation to non-elite strata, particularly in the towns, and to socialize new generations of adherents.

Taking the first of these conditions, it is interesting to see how the ancient 'archaic' religions of the Old World became extinct not long after the great watershed of the sixth century BC. This was the great age of the first 'salvation religions' – Buddhism, Jainism, Judaism and Zoroastrianism – and these were soon followed by Taoism, Christianity, and, somewhat later, Islam.⁹⁶ Though these world religions soon fragmented along pre-existing ethnic lines, and helped to create new *ethnie* through local and provincial

sectarianism, they superseded and eliminated most of the old 'archaic' religions; the latter could not renew themselves in the changed conditions or compete with the more dynamic and personal salvation religions. Unable to hold back the flood of 'mystery religions' in late antiquity, they could no longer underpin the ethnic communities and states which they had formerly held together; their priesthoods and scribes had become classes apart, their rites had become official and civic, their sacred texts matters of largely antiquarian interest, in a period of unprecedented economic exchange and cosmopolitan classical culture. With the fall of the old gods and their rites, ethnic memories, myths and symbols are gradually dissolved, for these were premissed, emotionally and cognitively, on the frame of meaning and fervour of the old communal religion.

The tide of the salvation religions did not utterly sweep away the older structures of ethnicity; in the Persian, Jewish and Arab cases, they created or unified the community, as did Buddhism in Sinhala and Pagan Burma.⁹⁷ It is also true that Islam and Christianity took over, and re-directed, many of the assumptions, customs and symbols of older tribal religions, especially in northern Europe and Africa. The many 'barbarian' tribal confederations of Celts, Teutons, Slavs and Turks, once they had accepted Islam or Christianity, were transformed in consciousness and symbolism, but did not disappear; a vivid, if distorted, memory of their 'heroic' pagan past lingered on to furnish many a latter-day nationalist drama with the unique colour and martial atmosphere needed to challenge and compete with a modern world state system.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, only the dynamic salvation religions proved their staying power as repositories of ethnic symbolism and mythology and bulwarks of ethnic sentiments, values and memories. The ancient and medieval history of surviving *ethnie* and nations today is invariably a religious history, because a salvation religion has furnished the inspiration and forms of their communal experience, as well as the modes of their self-understanding and self-renewal. It was the peculiar power of the major world religions for self-renewal, by schism, new movements, changed policies and new interpretations, to suit the local needs of particular communities under changing circumstances, that ensured both the persistence of the religious traditions themselves and of the *ethnie* which they helped to sustain and renew through all vicissitudes.

This brings us to the second condition, the mode of socialization and diffusion of the religious message. As we have repeatedly seen, there is nothing automatic about ethnic survival, and the same can be said of religious traditions. Their propagation and transmission requires continual activity and realistic identification of means to that end in varying conditions. This is where symbolism plays so large a part. Muhammad's choice of the Kaaba in Mecca, rather than Jerusalem, was designed not only to accord primacy to his fellow-Arabs in the propagation of his message, but also to symbolize the unity of the Arabian tribes around an already revered object.

But to this Muhammad added the necessity of the *hajj* as a religious duty of every pious Muslim, thereby binding the *umma*, the community of the faithful, in a visible and arduous act of pilgrimage.⁹⁹ The need to instruct the young in Hebrew, a sacred language among Orthodox Jews, not spoken for everyday use, has the further purpose of ensuring a religio-linguistic bond for Jews with vastly different cultures and speaking mutually incomprehensible everyday languages; but it also ensures the socialization of the young into the religious tradition through study of sacred texts, and thereby the inculcation of a sense of unity with other Jews and apartness from non-Jews who do not understand Hebrew. Hebrew has become a means of 'inner' communication, but also a symbol of antiquity, unity and difference.¹⁰⁰ Special dress, like priestly vestments; special religious objects, like croziers, chalices, menorahs, prayer mats; special ceremonies and feasts, for saints, heroes and historical events; and particularly, home practices like sacred meals, ablutions, prayers and blessings, and abstinence and diet prescribed by law; all these create those myriad bonds and activities by which new generations are socialized into reverence for, and participation in, the beliefs and rites of a religion which can offer hopes of salvation through the rehearsing of ancient memories and myths in ritual and custom.

In some respects, rites and practices within the home are the most effective, and democratizing, means of transmitting the religious message; and it is hardly surprising that persecuted diaspora peoples have carried these methods to their furthest point, and that therefore we find here the greatest identification of people with religion, of ethnic community with a distinct annunciatory tradition. Other persecuted religious minorities such as Catholics in Protestant countries after the wars of religion, were also compelled to practise their religion at home in moments of crisis; and their loyalty to a transnational religion outweighed all ethnic attachments. In time, however, if not already expelled, like the French Huguenots, they either become themselves an ethnic community or make their peace with the dominant *ethnie* among which they are settled, continuing to practise their communal religion in private once conditions become more tolerant. But, where intolerance prevails, the new religious sect or denomination is soon forced to assume an ethnic profile, even if the content of their message is explicitly universal and their sources of inspiration are eclectic, and here home practices may assume greater importance; the case of the Bahai religion in Iran and outside, well illustrates this progression from breakaway sect to proto-*ethnie*, despite a disavowal of ethnicity.¹⁰¹

In the long run, however, home practices must be guided by public rituals and liturgies, if observance is not to lapse or become idiosyncratic; to avoid a breakdown into individualistic cults, specialized religious personnel must supervise the rules and rites of any religious community. So family observance must be supervised by a whole series of educational and religious institutions – temples, seminaries, schools – and these form a network of

communal activity, whose vitality is an important index of the extent and solidarity of religio-ethnic communities. For, though most salvationist religions aimed to transcend ethnic boundaries, there was a fairly extensive convergence of religious traditions and ethnic sentiments and identities; and it was through the network of secondary religious associations, and the need for public rehearsals of religious rites and liturgies to reaffirm the essential message of the community's faith, that this convergence took place. In addition, the growth of home practices and symbolism provided an extension in depth of the public rites and their salvation message, and this is a second index of the vitality and solidarity of a community whose religious cohesion has usually buttressed its sense of common ethnic identity, and whose socialization practices have sustained among the rising generation the sentiments of attachment and belonging.

In other respects, too, the adoption of a salvation religion helps to reinforce, or even create, a sense of historic community. Such religions are exclusive and dominant; they seek the monopoly of religious control in a given territory or state, they reject any form of syncretism (at least in theory) and they seek to control the lives of all their members in their totality. This extends to the choice of marriage partners; by insisting on religious endogamy, they contingently reinforce ethnic endogamy, once the salvation religion has been 'ethnicized' (or provincialized). As was seen with the Druze, there was neither entrance to nor exit from the religion and hence an ethno-religious community came into being. Even where there remains free entrance to the religion, religious communities created by the salvation message and its rites restrict exit, and when the specific version of the religion has been adapted to the needs of particular *ethnie*, religious community inevitably reinforces ethnic differentiation by refusing to sanction marriage partners from outside the ethnic religion. Alternatively, a salvationist religion may so far forget its source of inspiration as to sanction an existing ethnic status quo, by which exogamy is forbidden; endogamy will henceforth be doubly virtuous.

There is also the missionary aspect of salvation religions. These may, of course, be trans-ethnic and trans-state, but in practice they tend to operate within existing ethnic or state definitions, as 'missions to the English' and so on.¹⁰² Once an elite is converted, the mission is extended to other strata and regions, and this in itself helps to bind populations together, in some cases creating demotic *ethnie* like the Armenians and Copts. Through this intensive religious activity different parts of the ethnic population become conscious of their attachments and the fund of myths, symbols and memories which define their ancestry and origins, and their historical experiences. Quite often, the heroes of the religion become those of the *ethnie*, and vice versa (one thinks of St Denis, St Joan and St Louis, and their significance for Catholic Frenchmen); self-sacrifice for the community becomes religious martyrdom, and religious apostasy is regarded as ethnic

betrayal; while inter-marriage is regarded as both a sin and a communal disgrace. Above all, salvation becomes increasingly equated with a vision of ethnic destiny; according to this vision the world will be saved when the community, at once religious and ethnic, is once again great and glorious and free.

In this discussion, religious factors have been singled out as the pivotal elements in crystallizing and maintaining ethnic identity. Two qualifications are required here. The first is that, as the detailed analyses made clear, religious factors operate within the context of other crucial forces, some of which have only been touched upon. These include: the geo-political location of the community, the degree to which it could exercise autonomy (and for how long), the impact of warfare and heroic battles in creating a sense of mobilized interdependence; the place which it occupied in the stratification system, the degree of hostility it encountered and the ability to uproot culture from a particular territory while focusing upon sacred centres; the role of sacred languages and scripts, special life-styles and especially the presence of historical records and an historical outlook. All these have exercised varying degrees of influence on the chances of ethnic survival; but none has been so crucial as the presence and influence of a communal salvation religion with its rites, liturgies, customs, sacred language and sacred texts, and its organized priesthoods. The second qualification is that the *social* aspects of religion are more crucial for ethnic survival than the purely doctrinal and ethical; even the ability to satisfy salvation needs takes a collective form and goal in most cases. Ethical monotheism is important for ethnic survival to the extent that its message becomes the property and inspiration of distinct communities, which agree to live out their daily lives in accordance with its detailed precepts and rituals. For long periods, these rituals and ordinances even take precedence over the originating message, at least in pre-modern eras; though too mechanical and rigorous an observance can lead to petrification and decay.

Because religious traditions and rites played so large a part in maintaining ethnic communities, we are less surprised by the 'limpet-like' persistence of certain smaller *ethnie*, whom one might otherwise have reasonably expected to disappear. Unlike the fluctuating factors of politics and economic cycles, of territorial extent and even technological advance, religious traditions by their nature, and especially those codified in laws, rehearsed in rites and ceremonies, and recorded for all in sacred texts and languages, can both create and maintain over centuries culture communities of history and destiny, provided the agencies of socialization and diffusion, public and private, remain intact. It is only when these begin to decline systematically that ethnic unity and identity are imperilled, and the community faces possible extinction.

It is really only in the modern era that the forces of secular change have succeeded in disrupting religious traditions and their guardians to the extent of threatening the *ethnie* which till then they had underpinned and helped to

maintain. Until this era, however, the conditions of society and the currents of culture alike were conducive to the proliferation and maintenance of ethnic communities and identities in all parts of the globe; so that the advent of modernity saw a world divided as much by *ethnie* as into territorial polities, and resounding with the clash of ethno-religious solidarities as much as any other allegiance. It was into this world of *ethnie* and ethnocentrism that nationalism was born and nations arose, and it is the consequences of this massive conjunction that must now be explored.

Part II

Ethnic and nations in the
modern era

6

The formation of nations

To say that the modern world is a 'world of nations' is to describe both a reality and an aspiration. The legitimating principle of politics and state-making today is nationalism; no other principle commands mankind's allegiance. Even federations are always federations of nations. At the same time, few states today are full 'nation-states', in the sense of being congruent and co-extensive. Not only are the ethnic populations of most states 'mixed', for most states have significant ethnic minorities and many are deeply divided; but the boundaries of these states do not often coincide with the extent of a single ethnic population. Within these states, moreover, there are both *ethnie* and nations: on the one hand, fully-fledged nations like Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders, and on the other hand ethnic communities like the Galicians in Spain or the Sorbs in Eastern Germany. In between, come those *ethnie* which aspire to become full nations, with or without a separate state of their own. Thus the Kurds of Iraq and Iran aim to form a single nation out of their *ethnie*, even if this falls short of independent statehood; so do the Naga, the Druze, the Sikhs, the Tigre, the Moros, and in Europe the Welsh, the Occitanians, the Corsicans, the Bretons, Alsatians and perhaps the Sicilians. In yet other cases, ethnic communities are content to remain as such, but seek to maximize their influence and privileges within a larger political community or nation-state; one thinks here, especially, of the white *ethnie* or ethnic fragments in the United States, and to a large extent of the Black and Puerto Rican communities in America, too.¹

The picture that emerges is, therefore, a mixed and confusing one, in which it becomes difficult to draw a neat line between *ethnie* and nations, but in which, nevertheless, the power of nationalist aspirations has transformed the nature and relations of all states, on the one hand, and the aims and properties of many *ethnie*, on the other hand. To the nationalist, the world is a world of nations, each with its peculiar and unique character; and all political power comes from the nation alone. In his eyes, the nation is a

seamless unity, fixed but always evolving, constant, but full of diversity. Because this vision of political reality has prevailed to a great extent all over the globe, all sorts of ambiguities and tensions emerge in the relations between states and *ethnie*; so that many people, as a result of the nationalist drive, find themselves divided in their allegiances between loyalty to the state to which they belong, and a lingering but explosive solidarity to the *ethnie* of their birth and upbringing. Similarly, the rise of the nation has created fertile soil for separatism, as many *ethnie* aspire to become nations.

Western revolutions

How did this state of affairs come about? Why has the 'nation' come to embody the ideals of mankind, or the majority of men and women, when there was no inevitability in the very emergence of nations? Also, why do many *ethnie*, but not all, feel the need to become nations, when for centuries their members appeared quite content with their status and lot?

To answer these questions, we must briefly turn back to the twin routes to the formation of modern nations, and the dual concept of the nation which emerged from these successive trajectories.

The origins of the transition to nationhood are shrouded in obscurity. In principle, they can be traced back to the gradual unification by Saxon and Frankish kings of the territories which later became known as 'England' and 'France' in the early Middle Ages. Similarly, one can point to the growth of unified Spanish, Swedish and Polish states during the first half of the second millennium AD, with Russia and Hungary and Holland emerging in their wake.² Something like centralized states also existed in the Islamic world – in Fatimid Egypt, Savafid Iran and to a lesser extent, the Ottoman empire. Even the Mughal empire, like the Ming, boasted a central administration. Yet, all these 'centralized states', even when they were not polyethnic empires, differed in no way from the earlier Middle and Far Eastern states which had existed in those areas since the late third millennium BC. So that administrative unification of territories such as gradually took place by conquest, alliance and marriage throughout medieval Europe, cannot in itself be held responsible for the formation of nations. At most, such unified territories provide the shell and framework – a possibility, no more – for their subsequent emergence.

As Tilly and his colleagues argue, there was nothing inevitable about the rise of either nations or rationalized states. In Renaissance Europe, any number of political units could be found, ranging from city-states like Florence and Geneva to cantons, ecclesiastical principalities, empires and a few genuine emergent modern states.³ Tilly himself lists a whole series of factors and preconditions of the success of the 'state' form of polity – protected European geo-political position, early capitalism and trade, a fairly

uniform culture area (Christendom), decentralized political structure and a landlord-peasant social base. It was only the conjunction of these and other factors that allowed the 'modern state' form to win out over other types of political competitor in Europe; and it was only the huge military and economic success of the European state that stimulated a desire by non-European elites to carve out analogous states for themselves.

What made the formation of nations so desirable was the impact of a triple Western revolution, or, more accurately, three types of revolution that made their first appearance in the West, albeit over long periods and not necessarily in the same place. These were a revolution in the sphere of the division of labour, a revolution in the control of administration, and a revolution in cultural co-ordination.

The first has received most attention. Commonly dubbed 'the transition (from feudalism) to capitalism', it marked a much higher degree of economic integration than hitherto, but also one punctuated by harsh discontinuities. As Wallerstein argued, the rise in the late fifteenth century of a core area of strong states controlling major economic exchanges within their territories, between their realms, and with peripheral and semi-peripheral areas, meant a much higher degree of economic integration throughout Western Europe, but also and even more within the nodal states. This, in turn, strengthened the sinews of state in the form of receipts from taxes and monopolies and customs, from control over key resources like mining, and in the regulation of trade and commodity exchange.⁴ Even more important was the mercantile wealth accruing to state elites in the handful of Western seaboard polities, and the growth in productivity that expanding population and wealth demanded, coupled with state-supervised communications between centres of production and supply. By the seventeenth century, state mercantilism greatly accelerated inter-state rivalries and spurred on large-scale economic integration within the territories of France, England, Spain and other states.⁵

The effect of this heightened, but concentrated, state activity was to force particular economic centres to form links with each other within the territory under state control, and so bind various regional and urban elites to each other in a common economic fate. This in turn led to the gradual formation of a single territory-wide occupational system, albeit in embryo at this early stage, and the erosion of persistent regional divisions.⁶ Henceforth, at least in theory, merchants and artisans could ply their trades throughout the royal domain and expect to find similar economic conditions and remuneration; in practice, it was not until the nineteenth century that regular communications and determined state policies combined to produce standardized conditions and a single legally recognized occupational system with a potentially mobile workforce throughout the territories of the state. Even in late nineteenth-century France, it required nationalistic integrative policies by the leaders of the Third Republic to bring the very diverse economic and occupational

conditions and customs of the various regions of France into a unified economic system covering the whole territory of the state.⁷

Closely interwoven with this economic revolution was the spectacular transformation of military and administrative methods of control. The growth of a specialist professional military force under absolutism greatly expanded the territorial and political dominion of the European dynasties, a development greatly aided by the revolution in artillery and planned warfare in the latter half of the seventeenth century.⁸ Advances in engineering and logistics promoted a new class of military professional with a high degree of training and expertise in science and technology; these in turn required the services of trained bureaucratic personnel, which monarchs were increasingly forced to recruit to ensure adequate resources and supplies for their armies and navies. Not only did this entail a growth in staff colleges and military academies; it also encouraged the development of institutes of higher education, scientific societies and technical academies, and the expansion of upper echelon posts in central administration and finance.⁹ The rise of the bureaucratic state, in which technical expertise was increasingly utilized to maximize resources at minimum cost, was a gradual process from the late fifteenth to the eighteenth century in France, England, Spain and later Prussia, Sweden and Russia; but, as Tilly points out, the evident superiority of the new kind of 'rational state' and its *raison d'état* ensured its appeal and success over other surviving political formations, including such earlier successes as Venice.¹⁰

The sheer ability to concentrate economic and political resources by means of the relatively streamlined military-administrative machine of state with its trained intelligentsia vastly exceeded the capacities and performance of other polities, including the most powerful empires – Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese. Only those empires which adopted the Western state model, as to a certain extent, did the post-Petrine Romanov empire, could hope to survive and retain their territories.¹¹ Although some feudal elements were retained in the composition of state elites and their exploitation of the peasantry, notably in Eastern Europe, the new type of bureaucratic state encouraged the growth of a wealthy bourgeois class and an allied intelligentsia, often in opposition to the nobility, so that when the monarchy was curtailed or supplanted, it was this new stratum that inherited the traditions and concepts of statecraft built up during the preceding centuries, as well as the machinery of state with which to implement their interests and policies.

The administrative and military revolution was not the work of the bourgeoisie, although their talents were indispensable for carrying it out; instead, they inherited and intensified the *étatiste* policies of their predecessors, thereby underlining the decisive territorial division of Europe and the inter-state order which earlier dynastic treaties had established. In other words, the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia upheld and used the pre-existing territorial and political units for their own ends of maximizing their profits

and prestige, and in doing so, became the victims of the system of states and the warfare it engendered, even when it led them to the abyss. Though the industrial bourgeoisie in Britain and Germany favoured an aggressive economic and colonial policy, it is questionable whether their ends were best served by the ultra-nationalist policies into which the intricate inter-state nexus inexorably led the leadership in each of the European states in 1914; but the system had a logic of its own, to which the imperialism of the businessmen only provided a catalyst of its self-destruction.¹²

Finally, there was the cultural and educational revolution, one in which ecclesiastical authority and tradition were replaced by a whole new conceptual apparatus in which the sovereign state itself took the place of the deity with a promise of practical salvation, at once limited and visible, and where the instruments of that terrestrial salvation were exercised for the creation of a community of citizens and equals. Here again, the bureaucratic 'rational' state played a central role: not just as the *ersatz* deity, but as the active principle of cultural change. At the outset, monarchs were bent on securing religious conformity, on controlling the church and clergy and on freeing state policy from ecclesiastical and traditional constraints. To this end, they encouraged the growth of an intelligentsia schooled in the classics and versatile in secular learning, but owing primary loyalty to the dynasty and state, and receiving rewards in the form of bureaucratic offices. Identification of this new stratum with the state and with the territorial domain it controlled, helped to secure the congruence of state, territory and cultural community through the turbulence of social revolutions. For in the process of identification, the bureaucrats were gradually welding together the disparate classes and regions of France, England (and later Britain), Spain (with exceptions), Sweden, Holland, Hungary and Russia, though ethnic heterogeneity proved too great an obstacle in the last two cases.

In the West, however, territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization. Administrative languages played a vital role in producing a standard mode of communication, not only at the practical level of state regulations, but more subtly by making it possible for the educated classes to imagine their unity and homogeneity. As Anderson so vividly illustrates, the technology of printing and the vast outflow of books and newspapers it spawned, published in the standardized administrative languages of centralized bureaucratic states, turned the shadowy framework of sovereign states into a living reality of limited communities, imagined rather than seen.¹³

From the late eighteenth century, starting with the national education projects of La Chalotais and the Abbé Gregoire, the reforms of Joseph II of Austria, and more indirectly, the growth of academies, galleries, museums and universities fostered by Prussia, England, France, Spain and other states, we find the state adopting an educator role *vis-à-vis* the middle classes, seeking by means of a standardized and patriotic culture to form a

committed and politically conscious citizenry.¹⁴ This is most obvious during the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, where the state sponsored fêtes, processions, rallies, music, theatre, artistic and architectural projects, for the glorification of *la patrie*, liberty and equality.¹⁵ But the attempts to secure linguistic conformity by Barère and the Abbé Gregoire were no less important, for they pointed to that drive for cultural homogeneity in terms of an historic solidarity and an historic territory, which allowed no internal rifts in the popular consciousness of citizens of the new state. The Jacobin centralists simply assumed the heritage of Francia; they were perfectly logical in seeking to implement that assumption by breaking down, not only obsolete tolls and customs, but antique dialects and patois, in the various regions of France. The indivisibility of the state entailed the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of its citizens.¹⁶

In fact, the state really only came into its educator role in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when mass compulsory primary education became the norm in most Western countries. Eugene Weber's study of French political and social development in this period shows how it was only with the growth of mass conscription and mass education that most Frenchmen came to feel their 'Frenchness' and began to place loyalty to the state – or rather the nation-state – above their various local and regional allegiances. Only then, too, was it possible to complete the process of secularization in politics through the disestablishment of the church and place education firmly under the control of state bureaucrats bent on homogenizing the population into consciously French citizens.¹⁷ Similarly, the *Kulturkampf* in Bismarck's German Reich revealed the homogenizing drive of state elites hammering out a unified national consciousness in the variegated and newly acquired German-speaking territories.¹⁸

These three revolutions, then, revolved around the fashioning of centralized and culturally homogenous states; and by the early twentieth century, the whole European continent was divided into a network of bureaucratic 'rational' states, and the concepts and practices of state-making were being deliberately transplanted overseas to the various colonial territories. It was within this crucible – the European and colonial inter-state system – that nationalism emerged and nations were formed.

Territorial and ethnic nations

But, because these three revolutions were highly discontinuous, because their effects were felt at different times in different areas, and because they arose within very varied social and cultural milieux, the 'nation' that was gradually 'formed' revealed differences in both content and form. Not only were there religious and secular, bourgeois, aristocratic and proletarian, conservative and socialist, bureaucratic and populist nationalisms and

nations; there were also two quite distinctive forms and concepts of the 'nation', territorial and ethnic.

The first type, as the name suggests, takes its basis from a sense of territory, and from the effects of interaction within clearcut geographical boundaries. The state is a territorial entity with a jurisdiction that, although sovereign, is also strictly bounded; and the sense of boundness, of inclusion and exclusion, is vital to the definition of the community of citizens. This is partly what Benedict Anderson has in mind, when he defines the nation as an 'imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'.¹⁹ It is also what the Encyclopedists had in mind when they asserted that a nation was a group of people inhabiting a given territory and obeying the same laws and government.²⁰ In fact, this was the first, and for some time, the sole, concept of the nation, and it remained to furnish the rationale for many later 'nations' – those territorial nations-to-be that colonial rulers and their African and Asian successors sought to create out of a diversity of cultures.²¹

A second feature of this concept of the nation is its legal aspect. The nation is a community of laws and legal institutions. Its members are bound by a common code and have uniform rights and obligations. There are, in principle, no exceptions on grounds of 'race, colour or creed', age, sex or religion. The laws emanate from a single source, the territorial state as the expression of the nation, and their uniformity, their standardization, reflects the sovereignty of the nation-state. This was because, as a matter of historical fact, this concept of the nation emerged within populations possessed of a sovereign state claiming exclusive jurisdiction within its boundaries. Indeed, the territorial concept of the nation is difficult to conceive outside the realization of sovereign statehood; African nationalists fighting against colonial oppression became wedded to the legal concept of the nation (as opposed to an absent genealogical sense) through their struggle to take over the colonial state and its bureaucratic apparatus. In other words, the terms 'territorial nation' and 'legal concept of the nation' also signify a route for attaining nationhood, for creating or forming nations. This was, historically, the first and most influential route for doing so. By copying the Anglo-French model of 'state-to-nation', African and Asian nationalists hoped to emulate the development and military successes of the West, and create homogenous, compact nations imbued with patriotic fervour and solidarity.²²

It was soon found, however, that two other features inhered in the Western territorial model. The first was citizenship. This was, of course, far more than a matter of passports, oaths and legal identity, far more even than common rights and duties *vis-à-vis* government and administration. That was just the outer shell of citizenship, what was conveyed by (until recently) the English term 'nationality'. It was also more than a question of residence, or even parents' residence, though here we are approaching the nub of the

matter. Essentially, 'citizenship' conveyed the sense of solidarity and fraternity through active social and political participation. Now, in practice, only those who possessed the rights, duties and relevant documents could participate; and only those who were resident, and whose parents had been residents, were likely to make use of those rights and so participate. But, even more, there grew up the assumption that the will to participate, to partake of Renan's 'daily plebiscite', was predicated upon an attachment to the land and an affiliation with the community, a sense of brotherhood which could only be found among those whose parents (and perhaps grandparents, even ancestors?) had done so. In other words, the newly arrived, though formal citizens, could never be part of the *pays réel*, of the solidary community of residents by birth; and just as in ancient Athens, laws had been passed to limit citizenship to those whose parents had been Athenians, so the first Revolutionary impulse in France to grant citizenship on the basis of an ideological affinity (as exemplified by the case of Tom Paine) later gave way to a growing sense of historical, even genealogical, community, based on long residence and ethnic ancestry.²³ In either case, however, citizenship spelt absolute membership, and legal equality of rights and duties as befits a resident member and active participant. As a result, citizenship exercised a levelling influence, binding classes and strata into a common community of theoretical equals and insiders.

The other feature was common culture. Again, it was found that the 'state-to-nation' route only worked in the context of implicitly shared meanings and values, with common myths and symbols. Where these meanings, myths and symbols ceased to strike a responsive chord – because of other competing ones, perhaps – there stood the cultural boundaries of the nation. Where there was no possibility of communicating these myths, values and symbols, where a 'language' for doing so did not exist, it would have to be invented or fashioned out of unlikely peasant vernaculars and rural legends, as did the Slovak intellectuals like Ludovít Štúr, recalling a greater Moravia and forming a Slovak language for disseminating these latent memories and myths.²⁴

In practice, this meant that territorial nations must also be cultural communities. The solidarity of citizenship required a common 'civil religion' formed out of shared myths and memories and symbols, and communicated in a standard language through educational institutions. So the territorial nation becomes a mass educational enterprise. Its aim is cultural homogeneity. Men and women must be socialized into a uniform and shared way of life and belief-system, one that differs from those round about, which marks them off from outsiders who lack empathy with the national symbols and myths, and for whom the national values and memories hold no meaning. That was the Rousseauian ideal, when he advised Corsicans and Poles to accentuate their peculiar cultural characteristics and native institutions as the key to ethnic survival and hence national regeneration.²⁵ It

marks the point where the cultural revolution of the educator-state completed the economic and political revolutions of the West, and joined hands with the second route to, and concept of, nationhood: the ethnic 'nation-to-state' concept found mainly in the East.

In this second route, nations were gradually or discontinuously formed on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and ethnic ties, so that it became a question of 'transforming' ethnic into national ties and sentiments through processes of mobilization, territorialization and politicization. In general, this produced a rather different conception of the nation, one that emphasized elements like genealogy, populism, customs and dialects, and nativism.

For this more 'folkish' conception of the nation, presumed descent ties retained a certain importance. An assumption of common origins and descent, mirrored in chronicles or genealogies, can be found in many ethnic nationalisms among communities which increasingly saw themselves, and began to be seen by others, as 'nations'. Several African *ethnie* – Ibo, Zulu and Kikuyu, among others – reflect this retention of imputed ancestry ties and genealogical myths, even during the modern phases of the independence struggle. Age groups, symbolic brotherhood rituals and ideas of sacrificial leadership have been apparent among *ethnie* like the Ibo and Kikuyu in their independence struggles. In Eastern Europe, too, among Greeks, Bulgarians, Hungarians and others, genealogical myths played an important part in the fashioning of what Kohn and others have called 'organic' and 'mystical' concepts of the nation.²⁶

By 'populism' here, I have in mind the sort of coalition Nairn speaks of when he writes that the 'new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history', though whether they actually always did so, or only talked about the role of the 'people', is a moot point.²⁷ In either case, the ethnic concept of the nation as opposed to the territorial one, tended to be demotic and plebeian – in theory, if not in practice. (In practice, it was the educated strata – lesser nobility, lower clergy, traders and entrepreneurs, minor officials and clerks, shopkeepers, teachers, writers and artists, journalists, lawyers, doctors and so on – which formed the actual popular constituency, at least until the early twentieth century in Europe, and later outside). The important point is that the route towards nationhood proceeded through 'popular mobilization', that is, by taking ethnic demography as the basis of the unit in question, and activating its more educated and aware sectors. In this way, the ethnic conception produced a counterpart of that ideal of citizenship to which territorial nations had resorted.²⁸

Third, ethnic concepts of the nation tend to substitute customs and dialects for the legal codes and institutions that provide the cement of territorial nations. Of course, this does not mean that ethnic nations, in practice, lack standardized codes or institutions; simply, that these do not figure prominently in their concept of the nation or provide the ideological bond for its members. Instead, ethnic nationalists appeal to the existing

customary and linguistic ties which they then set out to standardize and elaborate, elevating customs into rules and laws, and turning dialects (some of them) into languages. Much of the early nationalism of Balkan and East European intellectuals was devoted to philological, lexicographical and ethnographic researches into the existing cultures of their chosen 'folk', whose mass vernaculars were now viewed as the repository of national uniqueness and a rich deposit for delineating and fashioning the nation-to-be.²⁹ In Asia and Africa, religion was drawn into the service of ethnic nationalism, wherever (as was often the case) the customs and vernaculars were embedded in a traditional ethnic religion (Indian Hinduism, Burmese Buddhism, Filipino Catholicism, Iranian Shi'ite Islam, Arab Sunni Islam, various African syncretisms) which had so long served to identify communities and their cultures.³⁰

Even the common culture and 'civil religion' of territorial nations had their equivalent in the ethnic route and concept of the nation: a kind of missionary nativism, a belief in the redemptive quality and unique inwardness of the ethnic nation. As the intellectuals elaborated it, nativism became an instrument of historicism. The folk assumptions of indigenous rootedness and native value were transformed into the self-conscious idea that each community evolves according to its own inner rhythms and that its self-expressions and destinies are radically different, even unique. In the ethnic conception of the nation, 'history' becomes the counterpart of 'culture' in territorial conceptions of the nation. But not history-in-general, with its universal laws of human development, but the separate histories of particular communities; only the latter can bind human populations and fulfil the promise of progress.

Nation-formation

1 *Western 'territorialism'*

As many historians have pointed out (notably Hans Kohn in his celebrated dichotomy of 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalisms), these two conceptions of the modern nation, the territorial and the ethnic, embody and reflect different historical experiences of the early waves of nation-formation. The earliest cases occurred in the West, in England, France, Spain, Holland, and later, Sweden and Russia. Here 'ethnic states' were gradually transformed, through the impact of the triple revolution, into genuinely 'national states' through the unification of the economy, territorial centralization, the provision of equal legal rights for more and more strata, and the growth of public, mass education systems.³¹

This does not mean, of course, that the circle of the 'nation' always corresponded with that of the territorial state. In most of these cases, there remain significant ethnic minorities often incorporated against their will and

subsequently exploited. Nevertheless, the historical predominance and cultural-political domination of the state's core *ethnie* has been so great that it has largely dictated the forms and content of the social institutions and political life of the whole population within the borders of the territorial state. Through their cultural influence and political-economic domination, the English, French and Castilian *ethnie* stamped their outlooks and lifestyles, myths and symbols, on the state and traditions of the whole population, but without destroying the traditions and myths of incorporated ethnic minorities. This was, of course, the result of the way in which the original ethnic state expanded from a much smaller area and began to incorporate through bureaucratic means outlying populations. As was discussed in chapter 4, other ethnic states had followed the same course of bureaucratic incorporation, with varying degrees of success. The 'national state' is simply the same process carried out through the instruments made available by the triple revolution, and the length of time it took to perfect the process testifies to the massive economic, political and cultural transformations involved.

As these original ethnic polities of England, France and Castilian Spain expanded in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, they inevitably incorporated other *ethnie* in a subordinate or auxiliary status.³² Yet the dominant culture of the expanded state remained that of the original core *ethnie*, even if outlying areas were allowed to retain their local character, and subordinate *ethnie* their cultures, until the advent of the age of nationalism. In the process, a new concept of community arose: that of a population bound by ties of politically delimited territory, of allegiance to identical sovereigns and of membership in a common political culture. This new conception was essentially urban and civic. It presupposed the natural domination of the countryside by the city, and the legal equality of the urban classes. So long as this domination and equality was assured, the emergent urban 'national state' did not at first concern itself overmuch with the cultures of the periphery. But, as European inter-state rivalries grew, and as new methods of production and administration superseded traditional ones, the new urban nation found itself compelled to call upon manpower and resources from the provinces, and to subordinate and standardize even more firmly the rural and peripheral populations, thereby threatening the integrity, and even the existence, of their ethnic cultures, as happened in the Gaelic Highlands, in Languedoc and Brittany.³³

As a result of the triple revolution and of these internal and external pressures, these western European ethnic polities were gradually transformed into territorial nations within and through the operations and agencies of their states. In this way, they became 'national states', though never 'nation-states'. The other *ethnie* were drawn into the dominant ethnic culture of the state, and accepted to some extent its history as their own (though never completely); those that were not so acculturated, were left in a

neglected and subordinate position. Out of this drawing together, there emerged a wider political culture and a new territorial political community, that of Britain, France and Spain (in the British case, this transition was signalled by a change of name).³⁴

Analogous territorial nations and political communities emerged shortly afterwards in late eighteenth-century America and later in Latin America. Here, too, the ethnic empires of Spaniards and Portuguese, and the colonies of Englishmen, were bound by political ties and territorial residence. In the American case, though there was a tradition of vernacular ancestralism, tracing the American community back to the original English Protestant refugees and their settlements, by the late eighteenth century, the great socio-economic divisions (south–north, slave–free, plantation–commerce) and geographical spread of the colonies meant that any unity sought between them had to take territory, residence, civic rights and legal codes as its main features; in other words, the components of a territorial nationalism. Though a Christian ethic was still relevant, any common culture among the colonies resided in their common speech, the literacy of their middle classes, a common settler life-style and separate political institutions from those of the mother-country.³⁵ The new political community that emerged was not without its presumed ties of ancestry or messianic vision. But, for reasons that had to do with the circumstances of its struggle against Britain, it was the civic, republican, legal and territorial elements that could alone bring a measure of unity to the often conflicting interests of the allied colonists.³⁶

The creoles of Latin America also shared their ancestry ties and culture, as well as their religion, with their Spanish and Portuguese masters. Here too, any emergent community had to rely on territory and political culture for its self-definition. Viewed from inside, these had been aristocratic *ethnie* linked in a vast polyethnic empire with an overarching religious culture. Transforming such loose *ethnie* into 'national states' and nations meant carving out clear-cut territorial units from the Spanish provinces and spreading creole political culture to other classes and regions outside the main urban centres. This might have been possible without a separatist struggle, but for the reactionary interventionism of the Spanish government prior to 1808; but circumstances soon combined the formation of upper middle-class nations with the forging of separate, co-extensive states, whose apparatus and patronage was thereafter used by successive regimes to extend the political community of the nation to other classes.³⁷

2 *Eastern 'ethnicism'*

Without insisting too strongly on an 'East–West' opposition in terms of nation-formation, it remains true that the situation in early nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe, and later the Middle East, bore little

resemblance to Western developments. Not only did the triple revolution arrive much later, and very unevenly at that; the existing polities were quite different, being largely home-based polyethnic empires made up of a host of separate ethnic communities and cultures subordinated to a core *ethnie* exercising political domination – Russian, Ottoman and Austrian – and placing dynastic allegiance before other loyalties. In Austrian Italy and Germany, these dominant *ethnie* either divided the geographical area with other powers or in the German case, provided a (Prussian) variant that shared the area with a host of other principalities. The ‘area’ in question was defined neither by political nor ethnic criteria, though attempts were made to do so, using both criteria. ‘Italy’ had the benefit of its geography and former Roman unity, but was deeply divided into regions with separate histories and identities.³⁸ ‘Germany’ was not aided by its ragged geography, nor really by its Holy Roman imperial polity, since here, too, the boundaries fluctuated and political memories were vague. Hence the increasing recourse to ethnic, especially linguistic, criteria, crossed however with historical memories of former statehoods in the area.

So the ethnic concept of the nation mingled with the territorial to produce, in the German case especially, those sudden mutations of strategy and policy which have had such massive political repercussions. In both cases, the impact of the three revolutions – socio-economic, military-administrative and cultural-educational – was territorially uneven and rapid; together with the lack of cultural-political congruence, this posed grave problems for the territorial delimitation of the nation and its cultural integration, and produced strong movements of German and Italian irredentism and deep regional cleavages in both nations. Here, then, different concepts of the nation, ethnic and territorial, sprang out of their mixed routes to nationhood from politically fragmented ‘ethnic areas’ or categories, with little diffused sense of historic community, but an abundance of myths and symbols and a variety of political memories.³⁹

In Eastern Europe, and parts of the Middle East, ethnic concepts of the nation play a much larger role, though territorial ideas, premised on memories of medieval statehood, are also found. This was particularly true of Poland and Hungary, and to a lesser extent Croatia, Bulgaria and Rumania. The first two *ethnie* had preserved their polities until the eve of the nationalist era; in the Polish case, the Court, clergy and *szlachta* formed an aristocratic *ethnie* ruling over a culturally mixed peasantry, with significant German and Jewish trading and artisan minorities in the towns forming semi-autonomous enclaves.⁴⁰ The magnates and minor nobility occupied an equally important and culturally stratified position in Hungary; even though the kingdom had been incorporated into the Habsburg empire much earlier. Like the Poles, the struggle for more autonomy or even independence, that is, for a congruent state, went hand in hand with the territorialization, economic unification and social participation of other strata, through

enforced Magyarization, if necessary. In other words, the process of turning a largely aristocratic and lateral *ethnie* and former polity into a full political nation entailed a thoroughly conscious programme of mass education and propaganda by the new faction of nationalists, and required the overleaping of former class boundaries and the Polonization/Magyarization of peasants and artisans within the 'historic' territories by a reluctant aristocracy and the intelligentsia. The external struggle for statehood proceeded alongside, yet as an integral part of, the internal transformation of aristocratic *ethnie* into politically participant nations.⁴¹

But this inevitably bred a reaction among more educated sections of the culturally different lower strata within Poland and Hungary, as well as in other Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman territories. This was, in part, the effect of nationalist ideals themselves, circulating among the intellectuals abroad and the intelligentsia at home, but equally of the examples of neighbouring national struggles and, perhaps most important, the growing pressure of centralized government upon hitherto neglected areas of their polyethnic empires. Among Croats, Czechs, Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Slovaks and Ukrainians, as well as other *ethnie* in the Tsarist empire, these pressures and contacts had the opposite effect from that intended by the cultural homogenization programmes of central governments or aristocratic *ethnie*. Resistance was not confined, however, to those upper or middle strata *ethnie* which had clearly retained their ethnic ties and historic myths, like the Croats, Serbs and Czechs (the Greeks again were in a different 'trader/diaspora' category), and whose cultural elites were therefore able, in 1848, to propose political programmes based upon the reviving unity of their culture-communities.⁴²

The pressures of state centralization, the ideas of nationalism and the examples of neighbouring national struggles, together with incipient urbanization and improved communications, spurred a new consciousness of ethnic separateness among intellectuals and others in respect of Catholic peasants who spoke Slovak dialects and Orthodox peasants who spoke Ukrainian dialects. In either case, there were also lingering historical memories and myths of descent: memories of Svatopluk and a Moravian kingdom given new expression by Ludovit Stur in mid-nineteenth century Slovakia, and memories of the Don Cossaks and their Hetmans among the Ukrainians. It was under the impulsion of these myths and memories that Stur and Shevchenko and their fellow-intellectuals began to create unified languages and literatures and endow ethnic categories of peasants with a new consciousness of their ethnic community, which in turn became the basis of their struggle for statehood and nationhood.⁴³

In the Middle East – among Iranians, Arabs, Turks, Kurds and Armenians – ethnic ties and sentiments had also persisted, in varying degrees; but, with the partial exception of Iran, they had by the nineteenth century neither territorial expression nor political manifestation. In Iran, it is true, the Shi'ite

movement of the Safavids (1501–1722) spread the identification of Persians with Shi'ism (which had not really existed till then), and the use of the Persian Court bureaucracy kept the Persian identity alive, even under the Afghan Qajar dynasty (1796–1925), despite the inroads of tribal elements and the presence of Sunnis and several ethnic and religious minorities. Growing foreign economic encroachments and the supine response of the dynasty to British and Russian demands did, in the end, produce a strong national response by a rising class of merchants and intelligentsia supported by the independent *ulema*, first against the tobacco concession in 1891, and then in the Constitutionalist movement of 1905–6. But, because Iran included many non-Persian and non-Shi'ite communities, the succeeding Pahlavi dynasty tended to import Western territorial concepts of the nation, despite the dominant position of the Shi'ite Persian *ethnie* during this century and its increasingly militant nationalism.⁴⁴

In Anatolia and the Arab Near East, the lack of congruence between *ethnie* and polity and of co-extensiveness between *ethnie* and clearly demarcated territories was much greater, with the result that the clash between ethnic and territorial concepts of the nation was more pronounced. In the Ottoman empire a Turkic-speaking, Islamic core in Anatolia was surrounded by Arab, Armenian, Greek Orthodox and other *ethnie*, which made it difficult for Ottoman elites to envisage a 'Turkish' nation, at least until the empire had shrunk considerably in Europe and the territorial national ideals of the French Revolution had penetrated the social consciousness of rulers and intelligentsia. Only in the last years of the Hamidian reaction was the concept of 'Turk', a term used derogatorily of Anatolian peasants, re-invested with positive ethnic potential and harmonized with a very Western concept of the territorial nation.⁴⁵ The dilemmas inherent in this transformation were soon acted out in the policies and wartime adventures of Enver Pasha and his associates, after they had taken over the Young Turk movement of 1908; their quest for pan-Turkic ethnic unification revealed their insecurity over an ethnic heritage which had so long been submerged in a class-bound aristocratic Ottoman *ethnie* in which lower-class 'Turks' had no share. In the end, Ataturk turned his back on extra-territorial ethnic Pan-nationalism and substituted a territorial citizen-nationalism with pre-Islamic ideological memories (or myths and theories) in place of the Ottoman lateral, aristocratic *ethnie*, since only on this basis could a Western-style 'nation' be evolved.⁴⁶

Arabs faced a different problem: not incorporation within an indefensible, unwieldy empire, but dispersion across several contiguous units, mainly provinces of the Ottoman empire and later colonial territories. Geographical extent and separate political histories, both before and after the Ottoman conquest, presented a dual difficulty for any attempt at forming an Arab nation: on the one hand, application of a Western-style territorial concept of the nation inevitably spelt the permanent fragmentation of Arab ethnic

community, and on the other hand, the project of realizing an ethnic concept of the Arab nation encountered all the geographical, economic and political problems of any 'Pan' movement.⁴⁷ Even Islam has proved insufficient to counter these geo-political cleavages, not only because of the Christian presence among Arabs, especially in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, but also as a result of the deep Sunni-Shi'ite divisions and the desire of some Arab intelligentsia for a more secular ideal of nationalism. Language, too, cannot provide the necessary cultural cement. Classical Arabic is not identical with the various demotic versions of the spoken language, and the latter provide only an instrument and vocabulary of communication by which other differences can be more easily felt and expressed. The glaring lack of political-ethnic congruence and territorial-ethnic co-extensiveness has prevented a clear movement along either the territorial or the ethnic trajectories of nationhood, despite the presence of a common enemy and the enveloping sense of comparison with Western civilization. The one exception, Egypt, has had the advantage of longer state direction and its territorial tradition of compact political community, and was therefore able to move at a relatively early date towards the ideal of a citizen-community possessing its own territory and distinctive political culture.⁴⁸

The ethnic model

Without moving further into the twentieth century, it is already possible to gauge both the new qualities of 'nations', as opposed to *ethnie*, and the influence of the latter on the former.

To take the qualities of nations first. Historically, the nation and nationalism were Western concepts and Western formations. The first steps, the first trajectories, towards nationhood, were also Western. Hence we should expect the influence of that 'Western model' of the nation to be considerable for all subsequent formations and trajectories. It would indeed not exaggerate the matter to say that what distinguished nations from *ethnie* are, in some sense, 'Western' features and qualities. Territoriality, citizenship rights, legal codes and even political culture, are features of society that the West has made its own. So is the realization of social mobility in a unified division of labour. While these features of society are easily generalized (and have been), they bear a strong Western cultural imprint. They remain ideals as well as practices, and these ideals, even if they originated before the early modern era in the West, have been appropriated by certain Western societies and turned into their underlying social and political assumptions. As such, they have, in this very Western form, been diffused, along with bureaucracy, capitalism, machine-power technology and Christianity, to other parts of the globe. This peculiarly 'territorial' form of nation-formation and nationalism, because of its earlier appearance and inclusion in the first successful modern

societies (England and France), seemed to provide a blueprint for the transformation of the geo-political and social map of the world in the image of the first 'nation-states'.⁴⁹

The Western national formations and concepts have in turn been adopted, and adapted, by political elites in Asia and Africa in their attempts to create nations, although to date they have, for the most part, been unable to achieve their national goals on the basis of a colonial legacy of territorial states. Even where these states have secured the necessary monopolies of coercion and extraction within their domain, even where centralized, autonomous and differentiated public institutions have managed to suppress all rival centres of power, and the population has been accorded the participatory rights of citizenship, there remains a vast distance to traverse before this population can become a homogenous nation.⁵⁰

This is where the influence of the alternative ethnic model of the nation, with its emphasis upon descent, populism, vernacular culture and nativism, begins to be felt. The very gap between the ideal of the civic model of the nation, found in the West, and the reality of 'states without nations' in Asia and Africa, makes it inevitable that political elites in the new states look for alternative models of the nation, and different modes of national integration. This is true even where the alternative ethnic model poses severe problems of integration, and where the attractions of the Western 'civic' model of territorial nationalism are greatest, as in India today.

Already, our brief survey of nineteenth-century nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East, revealed the growing influence of *ethnie*, and ethnic models of the nation, on the trajectories and concepts of nationhood. Although in each case appeal was made to historic territories and political memories of former independence, it had to be supplemented by the rediscovery and revitalization of ethnic ties and sentiments – by the tracing of alleged pedigrees (often through kinship, chronicles and philology), by popular mobilization, by the elevation of vernacular culture (religion, language, customs and institutions), and by a rewriting of history from a 'nativist' standpoint (emphasizing the unique collective past and destiny, and the autonomous collective will).

In nineteenth-century Greece, for example, the territorial concept and civic model of the nation which Greek intellectuals like Rhigas, Korais and Katartzis inherited from the French Revolution, was increasingly overlaid by the ethnic and demotic concept and model deriving from Orthodox Byzantium and its sacred linguistic *ethnie*. Greek intellectuals and traders might recall the territorial extent of ancient Greece of the city-states and the political memories of their former glories, but what mattered to the Orthodox clergy, artisans, shepherds and peasants (not to mention village notables) was their Greek Orthodox descent and local cultures, their popular revolts (of the klephts) and their local histories which opposed Orthodoxy to Islam. The subsequent history of the Greek state after 1833 can be understood as a

conflict of two ideals of the nation, the territorial and the ethnic, and two models of national integration, civic and genealogical-cum-religious.⁵¹

What was true of Greece during the last century, has proved even more persistent further east. In India during the first half of the century, Western territorial concepts and civic models failed to mobilize strata outside the small upper middle-class Brahmin circles of lower officials and lawyers, supplemented by some Kshatrya landowners and Vaishya merchants and traders. It was the work of Tilak and Aurobindo which began to extend the concept of an Indian nation outside these strata, but it was no longer a civic model they employed. Instead, the new radicals had to appeal to a Hindu India, with its Sanskrit, Vedic and Aryan culture, which inevitably excluded Muslims and Sikhs from the new genealogical-cum-religious nation.⁵² The Indian case is especially interesting, in that we cannot talk of ready-made *ethnie* to hand for the construction of the new Indian nation, in the sense of conscious institutional communities. What existed around 1900 were congeries of ethnic ties and sentiments, usually on a more localized level (Bengal, Maharashtra), together with a general Sanskrit culture of caste and Varna, and a host of Hindu myths and symbols (with many local variations) which could be worked up into a coherent 'myth of origins and descent' such as we find elsewhere. What helped the radical nationalists was the survival of sacred texts like the Gita, the widespread belief in deities like Kali and Shiva, and the existence of well-known symbols and rites of an ancient Hindu culture like the cow, the Ganges and ablutions. The more emphasis was laid upon the Hindu 'myth-symbol complex', and the more Hindu religion provided the *mythomoteur* of the new Indian nation, the greater the influence of ethnic models in India became.⁵³

I have cited the Indian case because it suggests that there does not have to be a pre-existent institutional ethnic community in place for what I call the 'ethnic model' to make itself felt. This is even true of African attempts to form nations out of their post-colonial states. There the difficulties are as formidable as in India, perhaps more so. In Nigeria, for example, there are three major *ethnie*, and a host of smaller ones. The state created piecemeal by the British was immediately subjected to two *coups d'état* in 1966, followed by a bloody civil war stemming from Biafran succession, and a whole series of attempts, military and administrative, to defuse ethnic and regional economic rivalries. In no sense can one talk of a Nigerian 'nation', though it is legitimate to refer to a Nigerian 'nationalism' among a small minority of politicians, civil servants, officers and intelligentsia. It is, however, difficult to envisage the emergence in Nigeria of that 'civil religion' which we saw must attach itself to any territorial community of participating citizens obeying the same laws, if a solidary nation is to be formed and survive internal cleavages and external threats. Nigeria, like other African countries, lacks the long span of time and the protected geo-political position enjoyed by multi-lingual Switzerland, which allowed her citizens to create a solidary nation by

means of a civil religion or 'political culture'. Short of prolonged and intense application of centralized force, the only way of securing that solidarity and creating that civil religion, is through a potent myth and common symbols. The difficulty for Nigeria is that in the region's past there is no common ethnic experience, no usable *ethnie*, whose political memories, however dim, and ancestry ties, however dubious, might serve the required purpose. Quite simply, Nigeria will have to invent ethnic ties and sentiments, perhaps by rewriting ethnic histories and conflating ethnic cultures, if the state is to form a nation out of itself.⁵⁴

This is what several other African states are busy doing. In Ghana, an ancient empire of that name (though it existed some three hundred and fifty miles to the north-east), has been 'annexed' to provide a common and glorious political past; and though secure Western nations may look askance, there is little doubt that it serves the necessary requirement for a civil religion for an otherwise culturally divided, and ethnically heterogeneous, population. Similarly, in Zaïre, General Mobutu's regime has been welding its aggregate of *ethnie* into a more composite whole by formulating an elaborate Zairian national religion formed out of various ethnic symbolisms built around the central political institutions and the leadership. Alternatively, the drive towards a one-party state, as in Zimbabwe or Kenya, expresses the need for a single political religion which will permit no institutional cleavages in the 'nation-to-be'.⁵⁵

Now what this suggests is that even for the most recently created states, ethnic homogeneity and cultural unity are paramount considerations. Even where their societies are genuinely 'plural' and there is an ideological commitment to pluralism and cultural toleration, the elites of the new states find themselves compelled, by their own ideals and the logic of the ethnic situation, to forge new myths and symbols of their emergent nations and a new 'political culture' of anti-colonialism and the post-colonial (African or Asian) state. If the nation is to become a 'political community' on the Western territorial and civic model, it must, paradoxically, seek to create those myths of descent, those historical memories and that common culture which form the missing elements of their ethnic make-up, along with a mutual solidarity. It must differentiate itself from its closest neighbours, distinguish its culture from theirs, and emphasize the historic kinship of its constituent *ethnie* and their common ties of ideological affinity. This is done by creating or elaborating an 'ideological' myth of origins and descent. If one cannot point to alleged filiation and imputed common ancestry for all citizens, one can at least trace one's cultural pedigree back to some antique exemplars which, allegedly, embodied the same qualities, values and ideals that are being sought by the 'nation-to-be' today. The *tiers état* in the French Revolution did no less: they traced back their lines of ideological descent to the original Gallo-Roman inhabitants, and by extension, to early republican Rome and Sparta, whose spiritual descendants and heirs they claimed to be.

The Whigs in early nineteenth-century England claimed a similar spiritual kinship with their Anglo-Saxon forbears on whom they fathered the English love of liberty and parliamentary institutions. The Greeks opposed to the clerical-notable-peasant myth of 'genealogical' descent from Orthodox Byzantium a classical myth of 'ideological' descent from ancient Hellas, in which the values of the Enlightenment that the Greek intelligentsia espoused, were regarded as latter-day versions of the original truths of the classical Greek world.⁵⁶

By these means, the tracing of either 'genealogical' or 'ideological' myths of descent, most nationalisms after 1789 became increasingly influenced by an 'ethnic model' of the nation. Once nationalists had set out on the road to nation-formation, the problem of cultural and social integration became paramount, along with that of ethno-political congruence. To achieve integration and legitimate a set of borders and a 'homeland', myths of descent were needed, not only for external consumption, but for internal mobilization and co-ordination. These myths might, or might not, make sense to outsiders, depending on their prior attitudes; far more important was their role in fostering internal solidarity and the sense of territorial 'rootedness'. National unity requires both a sense of cohesion or 'fraternity' and a compact, secure, recognized territory or 'homeland'; all nationalisms, therefore, strive for such fraternity and homelands. But, since neither are born overnight or *ex nihilo*, both presuppose a long history of collective experience. So 'history' becomes the focal point of nationalism and nation-formation. The 'rediscovery' or 'invention' of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter of national honour and collective endeavour. Through the tracing of our history, 'we' discover (or 'rediscover') who we are, whence we came, when we emerged, who our ancestors were, when we were great and glorious, who our heroes are, why we declined . . . But the rediscovery of the 'national self' is not an academic matter; it is a pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, which spells life or death for the nationalist project of creating the nation.⁵⁷

Because of this urgent and deep-seated need, modern nationalisms have had to resort increasingly to unifying ethnic myths, even when there are competing *ethnie* from which the new national culture must be forged. It is true that ruling elites, fearful of importing a 'Balkans' situation into Africa, have tried to suppress what they term 'tribalism', and have equated *ethnie* with what European colonialists called 'tribes'. But their pronouncements have rarely been matched by their actions. In practice, they have had to allocate resources on ethnic grounds, assign administrative posts according to ethnic population proportions, and even render to each ethnic culture its due in the areas where the majority are from particular *ethnie*. Of course, this has not been a voluntary or even-handed policy. Dominant *ethnie* have usually reaped advantages greater than those of the minority *ethnie*, and in some cases, like Kenya, have occupied most of the strategic political positions.

At the same time, such a one-sided recourse to the traditions and personnel of the dominant ethnic community, itself a tilt towards an 'ethnic model' of the nation, carries grave dangers. The alternative strategy is to construct a new 'political culture' out of the various ethnic traditions within the territorial state, by combining myths and symbols, seeking common denominators in the past (colonialism, racial discrimination) and even inventing a distant common origin or 'age of heroism' such as other nationalisms have admired. In effect, this means that the new territorial nation-to-be must acquire ethnic dimensions and characteristics, if it lacks them; in Rousseau's words, it must be given a 'national character'.⁵⁸

Ethnic solidarity or political citizenship?

The upshot of our brief account of the formation of nations in the modern world is that all nations bear the impress of both territorial and ethnic principles and components, and represent an uneasy confluence of a more recent 'civic' and a more ancient 'genealogical' model of social and cultural organization. No 'nation-to-be' can survive without a homeland or a myth of common origins and descent. Conversely no 'ethnic-aspiring-to-become-a-nation' can achieve its goals without realizing a common division of labour and territorial mobility, or the legal equality of common rights and duties for each member, that is, citizenship. Of course, given nations will exhibit ethnic and territorial components in varying proportions at particular moments of their history. The original Western nations could take their ethnic elements for granted, and hence their nationalisms emphasized territorial models. Later, internal divisions and external pressures forced both England and France to reconsider their ethnic bases. In later nineteenth-century France, especially, a strong 'integral nationalism' emerged to reassert the cultural and historic unity of France against minorities and ideologies that were thought to be subversive of that unity; no wonder Clovis, Louis IX and Jeanne d'Arc became popular cult figures again, after a long period of relative neglect. This was not simply a counter-revolutionary clerical monarchism and militarism in the face of the Prussian annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; it was also a populist, anti-Semitic and vernacular ethnic movement, seeking to re-define 'France' as an ethnic nation.

Conversely, demotic, ethnic movements in the eastern half of Europe and the Middle East turned towards a more 'territorial' conception and a 'civic' model. As we saw, Atatürk and his party turned their backs on ethnic pan-Turkism and its adventures, and attempted to build a territorial nation – with a compact territory, citizenship rights, a common code of law and a secular, political culture or civil religion – on specifically Western lines. So, in a sense, did Tito. Though they recognized the ethnic distinctiveness of

Yugoslavia's six nations, and institutionalized it, the Communists also tried to bind them together in a territorially defined 'Illyrian' homeland, with its common division of labour, common citizenship rights and common laws – and even a shadowy common culture of 'Yugoslavism', with its non-alignment, self-management and confederalism.⁵⁹

This dualism at the very heart of the concept of the 'nation', has inevitably resulted in a profound ambiguity in the present-day relations between *ethnie* and the states in which they are so often incorporated. There is an inherent instability in the very concept of the nation, which appears to be driven, as it were, back and forth between the two poles of *ethnie* and state which it seeks to subsume and transcend. Very few of today's nations have succeeded in subsuming the two poles and making the *ethnie* co-extensive and fully congruent with the state. Even where such co-extensiveness and congruence is attained, as today in Greece (if Cyprus is excluded), the tension between an ancient ethnic community and a modern territorial state still helps to destabilize the 'nation' and its self-conception. 'Civic' and 'genealogical' models of the nation still bear witness to the dual route by which a nation like Greece emerged out of its ethnic diaspora community, even if the 1922 disaster in Ionia spelt the end of pan-Greek irredentism.⁶⁰ Today, older class dualities in the conception of the nation, whether in Greece or Poland or Portugal (all now mono-ethnic states or genuine 'nation-states'), have given way to new cleavages; but each class or party espouses a different ideal of the nation, which in turn leans more to the territorial or ethnic, the civic or genealogical, models of the nation. At least part of the present ideological conflicts in these and other 'nation-states' stems from the dualism inherent in the ideal and reality of the nation.

It is when the far more numerous polyethnic states which also claim to constitute nations are considered, that the dualism and instability become endemic and divisive. Typically, polyethnic states are dominated by a single strategic *ethnie* which seeks, to a greater or lesser extent, to incorporate, or influence, the surrounding smaller or weaker *ethnie*. Even in immigrant societies, like Argentina, Australia and the United States, one ethnic community antedated, and so influenced by its normative patterns and economic location succeeding ethnic waves of immigrants. In the process, the earlier dominant community tried to forge a wider 'political culture' by extending, and perhaps attenuating, its own traditions, or by universalizing them to include the new ethnic migrants or the new incorporated *ethnie*. Sometimes this was backed up by coercion, but usually economic sanctions and institutional constraints sufficed. Typically, members of newly incorporated *ethnie* or ethnic immigrants were offered citizenship and mobility within a single division of labour in return for assimilation into a common political culture and the shedding of old attachments and vernaculars. Many *ethnie* and ethnic migrants (who may in this context be seen as 'ethnic fragments') did not aspire to nationhood for themselves; they did not see

themselves as constituting a separate 'nation', yet they (or many of their members) were loath to dissolve their *ethnie* and lose their ethnicity. So they accepted the offer of citizenship and mobility, but retained a 'primordial' ethnic attachment. In this way, there arose a familiar modern phenomenon: the sundering of citizenship from solidarity.⁶¹

What this means is a dual attachment: on the one hand, loyalty to the political unit, the state, expressed in terms of citizenship rights and obligations; on the other hand, a sense of affiliation and solidarity with the ethnic community into which one's family was born and socialized. In this way Catalans can express their loyalty to the Spanish state of which they are citizens, while retaining their emotional bond of kinship with fellow-Catalans and their attachment to the culture and history of Catalonia. In this situation, two kinds of 'myth-symbol complex' and two sets of allegiances (the so-called 'dual loyalties') operate: one public and political with its official symbolism and all-embracing mythology (for example, the United Kingdom and its British 'myth-symbol complex' or the Soviet Union and its socialist symbolism), and one semi-private and cultural for each ethnic community. This is the contrast, familiar to many minorities, between the 'home' and the 'world', between the enclosed, warm but narrow, networks of familiar *ethnie* and the broad, open but impersonal ties of citizenship in the state and its public community and the professional world of work.⁶²

For, however hard it tries, the political community finds it difficult to take on the attributes and significance of older *ethnie* which it has incorporated and seeks to supplant, particularly where the old *ethnie* continue to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of many of their members. The result is a state of vacillation in which many ethnic members remain deeply attached to their communities while seeking to organize their lives and careers according to the norms and practices of the national state, and conversely refuse to give up the rights and benefits of the incorporating state while at the same time striving to enhance the culture and political influence of their *ethnie*. Hence the tendency to try to combine the claims of citizenship with the inner demands of ethnic solidarity.⁶³

Generally speaking, citizenship and ethnic solidarity operate in separate spheres, public and private, political and cultural, so there is little friction or unease between them. But there are circumstances where a clash is unavoidable and where painful choices have to be made. An ethnic minority, citizens of a given state, may have strong ties of emotional solidarity with other ethnic fragments in other states or with a core *ethnie* struggling to obtain its own state or possessing a state of its own which is at war with its neighbours. In these cases, a new situation of 'vicarious nationalism' may be generated. In this case, an ethnic minority or fragment, having renounced the quest for nation status or a nation-state for itself, desires it on behalf of another, 'sister-fragment' or for its own core community. That has been the case with the Greeks, Jews and Irish in America who support the struggles of

their ethnic kinsmen overseas. Much the same can be said of American and Canadian Poles and Ukrainians, or the American Black community in relation to the liberation struggles in Africa. In each case, their 'vicarious nationalism' helps to compensate for their own self-transformations during and after immigration and the consequent partial loss of their ethnic heritage and institutions. By involving themselves in this extra-territorial political commitment, they hope to lessen the pain and costs of sundering political citizenship from ethnic solidarity in an era of nationalism.⁶⁴

In fact, very often this kind of 'vicarious nationalism' is really only a symptom and symbol of their pain and loss. Quite often, ethnic members who are citizens of a state dominated by another *ethnie* find they must choose between the loyalties of citizenship and the solidarities of ethnicity, especially where government policies of the incorporating state come into conflict with the interests of the overseas ethnic state or ethnic minority. Greeks in America have on occasion had to express concern and dismay at what they often see to be the self-interested pro-Turkish military and political policies of some American administrations; but there are clear limits to their 'vicarious nationalism' if they wish to remain loyal citizens of the United States. The same occurred in the 1946–8 period in Britain, when Jews in that country came into sharp conflict with the prevailing policies of the Labour government, and found their loyalties to Britain challenged by their strong emotional sympathies and cultural solidarity with the Palestinian *Yishuv* and the survivors of the Holocaust.

Of course, this kind of 'dual loyalty' is common in all complex societies with their many cross-cutting ties and different objects of attachment. In fact, a state which is usually polyethnic but claims to be 'national' and homogenous, must encourage such multiple loyalties; for the state is a public, ultimately coercive institution, while the nation is a fundamentally social and cultural solidarity shot through with ambiguities.⁶⁵ As a modern formation and conception, the 'nation' must accept the legacy of the triple revolution and become a territorially centralized, politicized, legal and economically unified unit bound by a common civic outlook and ideology. But as a solidary, mobilizing force, the 'nation' must take over some of the attributes of pre-existing *ethnie* and assimilate many of their myths, memories and symbols, or invent ones of its own. This dual orientation – to political future and cultural past – is the subject of any examination of the main features and trends in the creation of nations in the modern world.

From *ethnie* to nation

One of the major themes of classical sociology has been the inevitable transition from small, face-to-face communities or *Gemeinschaften*, to large, complex and impersonal societies, or *Gesellschaften*. It was long assumed that as technology, population and the division of labour expanded and intensified, earlier small-scale communities would be absorbed and dissolved in ever larger, more centralized and rationalized units like today's 'nation-states'. This perspective dominated early social theory from St Simon and Comte to Spencer and Durkheim, and was later revived by British anthropological and American normative functionalists from Radcliffe-Brown to Parsons. With it, of course, went the belief that ethnicity was a thing of the past and that 'tribal ties' were (or had been) dissolved in the great enterprise of 'nation-building'.¹

For a variety of reasons, theoretical and empirical, this whole paradigm of 'modernization theory' has been largely discredited. We no longer consider notions like 'tradition' and 'modernity' to be unproblematic, nor the idea of an inevitable and irreversible transition to be self-evident. Clearly, the classical perspective tried to encompass too many diverse aspects of social life in a single framework, and its notions of 'tradition' and 'modernity' were plainly derived from a highly ethnocentric reading of Western history. With this loss of confidence in the validity of modernization theory, due weight could now be given to such trends as the implications of an 'unexpected' resurgence of ethnic ties and sentiments in the West itself.²

There is, however, a danger that the widespread desire to destroy the last vestiges of this all-embracing evolutionary perspective may lead us to overlook the utility of certain aspects of concepts like 'tradition' and 'modernity'. The fact is that subjectively, in the minds of many participants, 'tradition' and 'modernity' represent very real choices and processes. When it comes to analysing the ways in which nations are created, these concepts (or at least certain aspects of them) retain a utility not apparent in trying to account for economic development. For, essentially, 'tradition' and 'modernity' are

cultural constructs like 'nation-formation' itself. In this chapter, therefore, I want to look at some dimensions of the formation of nations which can be regarded as novel and 'modern'; in the next chapter, I shall explore other aspects which depend upon people's understanding of 'the past', 'history' and 'tradition'.

Politicization of *ethnie*

In the last chapter I sought to show how more and more would-be 'nations' had to adopt an ethnic model and take on some ethnic components.

The converse is also true: more and more *ethnie* are trying to take on territorial components and adopt a civic model, as they seek to become 'nations'. Of course, not all *ethnie* are bent on attaining nationhood. Even if we refuse to adopt a linguistic criterion of ethnicity, on the ground that an *ethnie* requires myths of descent, historical memories, a territorial association and a sense of solidarity, over and above any shared cultural attributes, there are clearly still many more *ethnie* in the world which are potential nations, than have manifested – to date – any aspirations for nationhood. In some cases, this is a matter of size: the members consider their community too small in numbers and scale to warrant a claim for nationhood, though it must be said that such examples as Anguilla, the Bahamas and the Sivai in New Guinea, suggest that 'size' by itself is not a definitive barrier to such aspirations. It is only one of several factors that enter into a deliberate calculation of benefits and possibilities. Quite large *ethnie* may decide that the quest for national sovereignty would bring unacceptable costs politically or economically. Thus nations like Scotland and Catalonia opt to remain within wider states, and even welcome two circles of national loyalty; and similarly, *ethnie* like the Kurds of Iraq have, on the whole, opted to remain autonomous communities within a larger state, given the political barriers to national unity, let alone full independence, for the Kurds of Iraq and neighbouring countries.³

Nevertheless, political and economic calculations notwithstanding, the pressures for *ethnie* to move towards nationhood (but not necessarily independent statehood) are extremely powerful. In Eastern Europe in the last century, more and more *ethnie* (that is, communities who had retained or revived a sense of their distinctiveness and solidarity) felt compelled to stake out claims for autonomy as would-be 'nations'. In practice, this meant a triple movement: from isolation to activism, from quietism to mobilization and from culture to politics. The same threefold movement can be traced in *ethnie* from many parts of the world in this century.

By 'isolation' I do not mean a complete lack of contact with other *ethnie*. Even the most segregated communities had regularized business contacts with wider 'host' communities. Nevertheless, before the onset of the triple

revolution – economic, administrative and cultural – and before the rise of nationalism in the late eighteenth century, such contacts were confined to predictable, routine operations, hallowed by long-standing social norms. There was little or no interference in the internal life and institutions of other communities by the state or by host societies. Together with strong tendencies towards endogamy within the *ethnie*, this meant that the stable mosaic pattern of ethnicity in Europe and the Middle East (and perhaps the Far East also) was virtually undisturbed from the sixteenth century onwards (after the Ottoman conquests). To a certain extent, the mosaic pattern was ‘frozen’ socially and territorially, until the radical changes in the state system and ideological perspectives introduced by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.⁴

As a result of changes in commerce and trading patterns, in the nature of administration, warfare and inter-state relations, and in the rise of secular intelligentsia and mass culture and education, which I summed up as the ‘triple revolution’, more and more *ethnie* outside Western Europe became attracted to the message of nationalism evolved in the West; and more and more *ethnie*, or their intelligentsia, began to see their often declining communities as would-be nations. As a result, the intelligentsia increasingly proposed an active role for the community, in which their frozen ‘isolation’ would be exchanged for a radical intervention in relations between states. Both Czech and Slovak spokesmen of the mid-nineteenth century proposed a growing involvement by their communities in the shaping of their own destinies within the framework of central European state relations. This in turn required a far more active role by communal leaders in the delineation of ethnic boundaries and claims to territory, in representation on political institutions and in control over the life-chances and cultures of communal memberships.⁵

This in turn meant a new attitude and new practices within the community. Most of the *ethnie* concerned had adopted, as part of the cost of self-preservation, a quietist sentiment and outlook. Except in crises, communal leaders aimed to accommodate their communities to wider social and political frameworks and dictates. Acceptance and a spirit of resignation was often bred in these circumstances, particularly among the smaller *ethnie*, whose situation was often precarious. Even among dominant *ethnie*, only their ruling classes displayed a more adventurous and enterprising attitude; the peasant masses, often excluded in Eastern Europe, were rarely needed, and an ethnic passivity generally accompanied their economic subjection.

But, with the onset of the triple revolution (or a part of it) and the rise of nationalism, the political mobilization of lower strata, even of peasants, became a necessary element in the project of creating nations. Communal leaders had now to change the quietist outlooks of both middle classes and peasantry, and turn political pariahs into mobilized citizens. Old ethnic sentiments which favoured conservation and accommodation had to be broken down. Hence the frequent wars of sons against their fathers, of

inter-generational strife, which accompanied the transition from ethnic conservation to national mobilization. It is no accident that such conflicts occur at the very moment of ethnic transformation.⁶

To mobilize formerly passive objects of history into citizens and subjects of history requires in turn a new attitude to power. It means forsaking the realm of culture and entering the political arena. But, even more important, it entails the conjunction of culture with politics, a key element of nationalism itself. It no longer suffices for members of the community to conserve their culture; it is no longer possible to tend one's cultural garden without influencing the distribution of power and making political claims. In pre-modern eras, the business of politics could be carried on with little reference to the culture of one's subjects, though from time to time ethnic and religious affiliations and movements did influence the course of political power and inter-state alignments. In modern times, not just ethnic origin and religion, but nearly every cultural difference and historical continuity has political implications. In former eras, it helped a kingdom or state to have a measure of cultural homogeneity; today it has become a near-necessity to have an overarching public culture in which all citizens can share and participate, whatever their practices 'at home'. Those states that lack such a political culture are at a clear disadvantage in the inter-state arena and find their political life riddled with cleavages and tensions.⁷

Any *ethnie*, then, that aspires to nationhood, must become politicized and stake out claims in the competition for power and influence in the state arena. One can go further: even *ethnie* that have no intention of becoming nations, that regard themselves as ethnic 'fragments' in a wider *ethnie* the core of which lies elsewhere, even these must enter the political arena both for themselves and for the core to which they feel they are attached. By doing so, they hope to influence the policy of the state in which their fragment is incorporated, to pursue policies favourable to their ethnic core. Even if they have no core, they soon find that the competition of neighbouring *ethnie* within the same state requires a commensurate effort by themselves. In the United States and Canada, for example, ethnic competition has forced nearly all *ethnie* and ethnic fragments to jockey for influence and secure for themselves an 'appropriate' slice of welfare expenditure, posts and other resources like housing and education, despite the fact that many ethnic immigrants were not averse to losing or at least attenuating their ethnic identities in favour of the new American nation. The rate of such attenuation was too slow, and the class position of different *ethnie* too variable, to allow other dimensions of power and status and wealth, like class, to replace ethnicity as the determinant of privilege and power. So that even in societies where *ethnie* generally do not entertain national expectations, the politicization of ethnicity has proved inevitable.⁸

Moreover, once entered, it becomes almost impossible for *ethnie* to extricate themselves from the political arena. This is obvious in the case of

ethnie seeking independent statehood as nations. But it applies also to *ethnie* which remain within a larger state, and even to those which do not seek 'national status'. This is because of the 'feedback' effect of ethnic arithmetic and vicarious nationalism. As each *ethnie* claims a slice of the state budget, of bureaucratic and professional posts, of housing and schooling and welfare benefits, and as each *ethnie* tries to influence the state to favour its ethnic kinsmen abroad, so the other *ethnie* are inevitably drawn into the political arena in like manner, forcing the first *ethnie* to redouble their efforts, and so on. Moreover, such is the pervasive influence of the inter-state system, that it raises the level of competition, and even conflict, between rival *ethnie* within a state, if they display vicarious nationalism for opposing *ethnie* outside, since rival states in the system can play on the internal antagonisms within other states by manipulating the external conflict. The many permutations of ethnic alliance and conflict consequent on the entry of *ethnie* into politics, greatly facilitates and enlarges the scope of such manipulation, thereby habituating *ethnie* to a political role (usually as pawns in a great power game) and blocking any movement on their part to quit the political arena.

In one very important sense, then, the old classical notion of a transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* finds confirmation in the more limited but vital sphere of ethnicity: in the modern era, *ethnie* must become politicized, must enter and remain in the political arena, and must begin to move towards nationhood, even if they have no intention of becoming full nations themselves. That is to say, they are forced to forsake their former isolation, passivity and cultural accommodation, and become activist, mobilized and politically dynamic. In order to survive, *ethnie* must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model; to that extent, they take on some of the attributes of *Gesellschaft*, with its features of rational political centralization, mass literacy and social mobilization.

The new priesthood

There is a second sense in which the old *Gemeinschaft*-*Gesellschaft* distinction receives some partial confirmation: the rise of the intelligentsia – the new priesthood of the nation.

In previous chapters, it was shown how central the role of priests and scribes was in transmitting and disseminating the communal memory, and in celebrating the sense of common identity. In societies where formal systems of education were lacking or deficient, temples and their votaries and ministrants assumed a pivotal role in ensuring the perpetuation of ethnic lore and ritual, and in elaborating and interpreting the collective myths and symbols and memories which provided the axis of identification and entitlement for successive generations of the community.⁹

Because of their organization and position in most *ethnie*, priests, scribes, bards and other spiritual figures, were able to disseminate their religious culture beyond the Court and bureaucracy. Not only were the merchants and artisans in the capital and main cities within reach of the temple and church organization, the frequent presence of lower clergy in the small towns and villages enabled them to act as a conduit to and from the peasantry, and to influence peasant culture and customs through the religious ritual and conceptions of the Great Tradition which they represented. In practice, this influence was a two-way process: the Great Tradition certainly influenced and 'reinterpreted' the many Little Traditions, but they in turn absorbed and adapted elements of the Great Tradition, making it their own. The degree to which the priesthood penetrated the countryside varied considerably with the type of ecclesiastical organization and religious self-conception. Missionary salvation religions and decentralized autonomous priesthoods proved generally, as discussed above, more dynamic and influential across wide territories and among the unlettered peasantry. Their messages, though sited in certain textual revelations, were easier to communicate and understand; and the relative freedom of local teachers and doctors of the law, especially in Islam, though it encouraged syncretistic adaptation to pre-existing folk mores, was nevertheless better suited to nomadic tribesmen and scattered peasant communities than earlier, more urban and centralized temple priesthoods with their arcane rites and incomprehensible liturgies.

Again, religions and priesthoods operating within demotic *ethnie* stood a better chance of reaching outlying villages and scattered merchants and artisans; temples or churches tied into a more lateral, aristocratic *ethnie* tended to be unable and unwilling to expand the social area of their class-bound cosmology or translate it into terms and concepts that would appeal to non-aristocratic strata. That was one reason why Pharaonic religion and temple priesthoods, with their hieroglyphic and hieratic scripts and liturgies, became increasingly remote from the mass of Egyptian peasants, once they were divorced from the bureaucratic political incorporation of lower strata under the Greek-speaking and Hellenistic Ptolemies; and why a more missionary, decentralized and simpler Christianity was able to secure many lower-class converts outside the ancient religious centres.¹⁰

With the onset of the triple revolution in various parts of the world, the role of priesthoods and religion in general changed radically. On the one hand, the growing emancipation of market forces and the state from religious presuppositions weakened the powers and role of churches, and in some cases led to their disestablishment. Religious organizations lost many of their political and educational functions and much of their lands and wealth, often through forcible confiscations, as the state bureaucracy and political leaderships expanded the scope of their operations. But, because the impact of the three revolutions was very variable and uneven, different

societies and religious organizations within those societies reacted in different ways; so that, even in this limited political sense of secularization, there are a wide range of accommodations between religion and the state to this day. One has only to recall the influence of priesthoods and religious organizations in countries like Ireland, Poland, Iran and Argentina, and the growth of Islam again in the Turkish countryside or of Judaism among a significant minority in Israel today, to realize the misleading nature of easy assumptions of the imminent 'death' of religion.¹¹

When one turns to the much more difficult and ambiguous areas of intellectual and emotional secularization, the evidence becomes even more conflicting and doubtful. Even if statistics on church attendance and ritual performance could be regarded as adequate indicators of belief and emotional commitment, the patterns of church-going in the United States would alone upset easy predictions of inevitable religious decline. Nor can it be assumed that religious knowledge provides a safe indicator of religious emotion, since on that account many a devout peasant would be pronounced irreligious or areligious. Secularization itself contains an ideology of irreligion, which colours our interpretation of evidence which, in the nature of things, is likely to be elusive.¹²

Of the many reasons for the persistence of 'religion' in some form, and the continuing role of priesthoods in some countries, ethnic 'coloration' must figure prominently. It is noticeable how closely such priesthoods and religions are interwoven with ethnic identity and national goals. In Poland and Ireland, the priesthood has become almost the guardian of a political community and identity in the face of both internal challenges and external pressures. But these very examples indicate certain changes in the priestly role and in the rationale for 'religion' today. Not only are the priests involved in politics (it is arguable they always were, especially in societies where 'politics' and 'religion' were never separable); not only does the Church as a whole enter the political fray as a 'faction' in the political game; the definition of religion which they must uphold is itself an increasingly ethnic and national one. Religion now has become an outgrowth, even a manifestation, of the national spirit and genius; its pretensions may be universal, but what counts is its coloration and 'atmosphere'. This is what gives it force and life in the community; and its increasing identification with a particular communal culture, lends it an almost irresistible appeal as a peculiar national institution. In Poland, the church hierarchy, as several incidents have shown, is treated with a reverence reserved for the most holy national symbols, and its influence corresponds to its own, and its adherents', perception of identity with Polish history and culture. A similar radical 'nationalization' of religion can be found in Iran, Ireland and Pakistan, as it had been in U Nu's Burma and now in Libya. Such 'nationalization' inevitably means a new focus for the religious organization and its local priesthoods; they become political weapons and

national mobilizers, over and above their traditional role as ethnic repositories and transmitters.¹³

Alongside this change in the role and focus of organized religion and priesthoods in modern society, the triple revolution, to the extent that its impact is felt, encouraged the emergence of new classes among which the small circle of intellectuals and the larger stratum of professional intelligentsia are particularly prominent and relevant. As the former central position of the priesthood declined, along with the power and meanings of the old ethnic myths and symbols (prior to their frequent revitalization in the modern era), new circles of humanistic intellectuals emerged, fed by a revival of secular learning and stimulated by a return to classical Greco-Roman philosophy and literature. At first, both in Renaissance Europe and later outside, the first waves of humanists operated within the framework of a re-worked Christianity or Islam; but, soon, the rise of science as an alternative form of cognition, and of its technological applications to social problems, prompted a new secular outlook among the growing circles of intellectuals bent on the self-imposed task of social education along rationalist lines. In the eyes of these *philosophes*, 'society' became a malleable entity, to be formed and recreated in accordance with Nature, or first principles, by using the new techniques which science was opening up.¹⁴

It was the new stratum of intelligentsia which formed the channel for disseminating the new ideals of rational planning and social education. They were, after all, the experts and teachers. They alone knew how to use the techniques, to apply the paradigms of the enlighteners and turn them into social reality. The rapid growth of cities, the state's need for educated men and technical expertise, and the consequent expansion of the educational systems (often by the state to meet its needs), exposed much larger numbers to secular learning and rational, critical discourse. Universities and technical institutes were set up or expanded in new places and in their halls a whole new generation of potential communal leaders received their training. As a result, a new type of society emerged, led by a state that relied increasingly on scientific expertise in its bureaucratic operations; and the new type of society required a new breed of leadership, one that combined secular expertise with literacy and a confident rationalism.¹⁵

It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find the centre of ethnic memory and experience shifting from the temple and its priesthood to the university and its scholarly community. The tremendous expansion of literacy and the need to couch collective symbolism in the language of critical discourse, puts a premium on the activity of intellectuals and their professional followers and rivals. The new motor of ethnic revival is generated by the historical, philological and anthropological researches of the scholars, and the literary and artistic achievements of the poets, musicians, dramatists and painters. Though in some societies priesthoods retain a hold over the affections of the lower strata in a way no scholar or poet can hope to achieve, yet they too

must increasingly couch their message in the universal language of critical discourse and bind their religious organization and promise of salvation to the new ethnic myths and symbols unearthed or invented by often obscure intellectuals. Increasingly, their annunciation of eternal salvation becomes relativized and curtailed by the national message of temporal fulfilment through posterity; so priests gradually become mouthpieces and adjuncts, sometimes highly vocal and effective, of the new myth and symbolism of the nation generated by the scholar and poet.¹⁶

Here, too, we find a radical transformation of older ethnic communities in the direction of nationhood. The old pivot of *ethnie* is in decline, or forced to alter course; the ancient priesthoods and their temples either fall into sterile emptiness, or find a new role in political ethnic activity and save their temples only by a radical change of course. At the same time, their place is increasingly filled by secular intellectuals committed to critical discourse, and by successive waves of professional experts bent on transforming society in the image of the 'scientific state' and its cost-efficiency, and leading it into a 'new world' of their imagining. For this, they need a blueprint. It is provided by the romantic vision of the scholar-intellectual, redefining the community as a 'nation' whose keys are unlocked by the 'scientific' disciplines of archeology, history, philology, anthropology and sociology, and whose contours are expressed in the 'new' literary and artistic genres of novel, play, symphony, opera, ballet, 'history' and landscape painting – genres and disciplines that aptly express the spirit of the new *Gesellschaften*.

Autarchy and territorialization

According to the classical social perspective, *Gesellschaften* manifest a complex division of labour and highly centralized administration which co-ordinates the activities of all the members of the society. This aspect of the classical model is often interpreted as a reference to market capitalism and citizenship in the bureaucratic state; and it is then pointed out that modern societies may contain mixed or even socialist economies based on planning mechanisms rather than the market, and that the rights of legal citizenship may vary from state to state and even between classes of persons in the same bureaucratic state. Again, a more limited reference to specific modern changes may overcome the danger of over-generalization to which the classical model was prone; by reformulating these changes as part of a movement from *ethnie* to nation, it is possible to use its suggestions to throw light on particular trends in the modern world.

I said earlier that more and more *ethnie* were adopting the civic model of nationalism and taking on territorial components. This is obviously true of *ethnie* that aspire to nationhood in the full sense, but it is also found, in more limited manner, among *ethnie* that are content to remain as recognized

communities within a wider state structure. If the state itself is becoming more centralized, interventionist and visible, the *ethnie* into which its population is divided are also staking out political claims on the basis of a particular territory. They aim to create the concept of a territorial 'homeland' and the formation of a compact space in which to control their destinies. This takes various forms.

On the one hand, there is concern for boundaries and internal communications. One of the Breton complaints against French central government and the French *ethnie* is the failure to delimit its extent according to 'historic' boundaries during the Middle Ages, when Brittany was an independent duchy. Another is that the main arterial routes are dictated by the interests of Paris, the need to transport goods to and from Breton ports along the northern or southern routes, leaving the interior of the peninsula unconnected with its peripheries and hence economically neglected.¹⁷ Czech disputes with the Sudeten Germans had a territorial dimension: Czechs wanted a compact, rounded western border in which the Bohemian and Moravian heartlands would receive recognition. They also wanted defensible frontiers. Given their territorial elongation and internal ethnic division, their crossroads location made them highly sensitive to the territorial aspects of ethnicity.¹⁸ Defence also figured strongly in the Swiss and Israeli cases. The need for compact shapes and defensible frontiers against enemies using their crossroads location, bred a strong concern for the territorial basis of nationality. In the Swiss case, this has meant a policy of armed neutrality and a resistance to foreign land-purchasers (and foreigners settling permanently); in the Israeli case, it has led to a concern for territorial security that sometimes breeds pre-emptive conditional expansion, so as to make the homeland more compact and hence more defensible.¹⁹

We also find the trend towards a 'territorialization' of ethnicity in the cultural appropriation of the sites and borders of the homeland. In Wales, members of the Welsh Language Society attack the second homes of Englishmen in the Welsh domain, and even sometimes paint out English-language signs on roads in favour of the Welsh names.²⁰ In Zimbabwe, the government and tourist authorities argue with scholars over the uses and national meaning of the ruins of Great Zimbabwe as a symbol of the territorial nation with its roots in the historic soil, and as a national monument and site for Zimbabweans and foreigners.²¹ Even the Hittites and their capital, at Boghaz-Koy, have been appropriated by westernized Turks to provide a cultural lynchpin for the territorial shift from Istamboul to Ankara and the underpinning for a secular, territorially defined Turkey.²² The use of the Bible to define an Israeli homeland 'from Dan to Beersheba' is yet another example of the need to re-root the *ethnie* in a clear territorial format, and to redefine it as a territorial nation; just as the uses of archeology in the lands of the Middle East help to invest even recently arrived populations with the sense and aura of deep territorial roots in the succession of civilizations.²³

Of course, the need for a 'homeland', a national space of one's own, is a central tenet of nationalism. Indeed, nationalism is always, whatever other aims it may have, about the possession and retention of land; for it is only in and through such possession that the practical business of nation-building can be carried on. Only in and on a homeland, too, can ethnic members come to feel their political fraternity and social cohesion. Only in and on a homeland can states or elites mobilize 'citizens'; so that a precondition of the nation is the acquisition of a homeland, as so many diaspora or divided and subordinated communities like the Armenians, Kurds, Ewe and Somali have found.²⁴

But homelands have other uses besides the political and symbolic. They afford bases for economic autarchy, the quest for self-sufficiency which has been an ideal of nationalists since Rousseau and List.²⁵ They had argued that a truly healthy and prosperous nation will be economically self-sufficient. Latter-day nationalists tend to couch their quest for greater autarchy in the language of 'dependency', and analyse the detrimental consequences of close economic links with the metropolises of capitalism. Interestingly enough, dependency theories proper, though they originated from the revisions of Marxist perspectives on imperialism by Hilferding, Luxemburg and Lenin, were first applied to such communities as American Indians and Blacks in the United States, and only thereafter to Latin American nations. They were then transported back, as it were, to the West, and have now become one of the staple operational theories of minority *ethnie* within Western states. In its academic form, the model is one of 'internal colonialism'; in its more popular forms, it represents the desire for community in a world of impersonal states and large-scale bureaucratic *Gesellschaften*.²⁶

In other words, the defence of culture and community in a rapidly changing larger society, has accepted the need to come to terms with the modern world by making its cultural concerns territorial ones, and by illuminating the dire economic consequences of a loss of community. The model of 'internal colonialism' is used by ethnic nationalists to bolster the autonomist case, by pointing to such consequences as governmental neglect, central exploitation of the periphery's resources, unequal and one-sided exchanges of goods, the emigration of valuable skills and manpower, transport and communications systems that favour the centre, one-sided trading patterns, unequal allocation of services, including education, and the growth of a stratification system in which ethnic minorities tend to occupy lower-status roles. The implication is that autonomous ethnic control over the homeland's resources and budget would restructure the economy to support the interests of, and so preserve intact, the community which otherwise would suffer further decline and assimilation or deprivation.²⁷

Even if economic autarchy remains an utopian dream for most *ethnie*, there is little doubt that, coupled with trends towards politicization and

professionalization, the quest for greater control over ethnic resources by communal leaders themselves has moved many *ethnie* in the direction of nationhood, even if they have no intention of seeking outright independence. It has forced ethnic members to think of their community as a territorial unit with special economic problems and peculiar resources rather than simply as a culture of routine folkways and a repository of collective memories and symbols. Once again, territorialization and the associated quest for self-sufficiency has thrust *ethnie* into the world of political and economic calculation, in which states, classes and *ethnie* jockey for power as the 'true' representatives of the 'nation'. Basques and Bretons, Scots and Croats, Kurds and Eritreans, are compelled to conceive of their communities as potential or actual 'territories' with particular economic interests. The *ethnie* has today become a pressure group and a base for mobilizing resources and power, as 'instrumentalists' maintain.²⁸

In fact, this new role of *ethnie* as pressure groups and replacements for classes, is relatively recent. It is enhanced by the competition of *ethnie* for scarce resources, especially in the rapidly expanding cities. Urban ethnic competition increases the drive for control over various facilities; if the ethnic community has a territorial base, it fosters demands for a redistribution of resources in favour of the 'homeland', so as to make it more self-sufficient and less dependent on the centre, and to give the *ethnie* a stronger territorial profile through 'home rule'. If the *ethnie* or ethnic fragment does not have any territorial base (except perhaps an overseas or far away core community), then urban ethnic competition leads to demands for communal control over resources in those areas or cities where the ethnic community has its heaviest numerical representations, as has occurred among the Black communities in the United States during the 1970s. Here, too, the underlying drive is towards economic autarchy, though this time without any accompanying territorialization; there is, even here, an incipient move towards nationhood, but because of fragmentation and deep culture conflict within the community (in the Black case, between American culture and a desire to revive aspects of a lost African past, or pasts), this movement is halted in its tracks. Only those *ethnie* with homelands, or real chances of obtaining a homeland of their own, can seriously pursue the route towards nationhood.²⁹

The larger point, however, is that growing competition between ethnic nationalisms for scarce urban resources, and the 'demonstration effect' of other successful *ethnie*, sharpens the struggle to achieve that territorialization and economic autarchy which are so integral a part of what is meant by 'nationhood'. Those that cannot, in the nature of their historical situation, hope to gain a homeland, are at a grave disadvantage; however shrilly their leaders may stake a claim to nationhood, however violently they may react against a more successful *ethnie* in the competition for scarce resources, they are unable to move their fragmented communities further along the road to

the widely desired goal of the 'nation'. Those who have, or can obtain, a homeland, stand in a position to exploit ethnic competition in the long run and push their community along that road; even if present political or economic circumstances throw up successive barriers, the potential is there, and the momentum may later be renewed, as has happened in Catalonia and the Basque country. In the process, the *ethnie* is gradually transformed from a semi-isolated but often dependent community, bent on preserving its old folkways and traditions from outside contamination, to a political community aiming to develop its territorial resources and territorial sentiments as a would-be nation in a world of nations.

Mobilization and inclusion

Central to the concept of the nation is citizenship. During the French Revolution, on the eve of the meeting of the Estates General at Versailles in May 1789, the *cahiers de doléances* repeatedly couched the specific demands of the Third Estate and the wealthier peasants in terms of the rights of the 'citoyen' of a nation; and the concept became the corner-stone of subsequent legislation by the National Assembly and the National Convention. Thereafter, the drive for citizenship became one of the key indices of the institutionalization of the nation; even if, as in France itself, there was a time-lag between the initial granting of the legal rights and duties of citizenship, and the full realization and use of those rights by the lower classes and the outlying regions. But this is only another example of the need to separate the legal institution of nations from the social processes of nation-building.³⁰

In pre-modern eras, membership of *ethnie* was rarely given overt political expression, and even more rarely in terms of the legal concept of citizenship. It is true that in some ancient Greek city-states, notably Athens, and in some medieval Italian communes, membership of the *polis* or *reppublica* was expressed in terms of citizenship; but these city-states were fragments, in the Greek case at least, of a wider Hellenic (or Ionian, Dorian, Aeolian or Boeotian) ethnic community. One could not be a citizen of Hellas (or Ionia or Boeotia). A sense of common territory was present, but not highly marked, for both 'Hellas' and 'Italy'; in neither was there anything approaching economic unity, a common division of labour or mode of production throughout the area, which might support a sense of common citizenship of Hellas or Italy. Hence citizenship sub-divided the sense of common ethnicity, as in all the other cases of city-states.³¹

It is only in the modern era that *ethnie* have felt impelled to restructure their internal relations in terms of a common legal citizenship, and thereby make a giant step towards nationhood. Such a formulation suggests, of course, that nations must have their own states, whereas there are several

cases of units widely acknowledged to be 'nations' which are in some way incorporated in wider unitary or federal states. In these cases, the rights and duties of 'citizenship' are divided between the ethnic nation and the territorial-political nation; a distinction that incarnates the two concepts of the 'nation' which permeate the modern world, as described in the last chapter. Spain, again, affords a good example. The Catalans are undoubtedly a nation today, just as they were an *ethnie* in the pre-modern world. Not only do they inhabit their historic territory (more or less), they are now able to teach in their own language and fund a mass, public, standardized education system in Catalan and in Catalonia. They also have a communal economy, even though it is closely linked to the wider Spanish economy. But, over and above this, their members have rights and duties as Catalans, including the right to tax their own members and to formulate communal policies in various internal spheres, excluding defence. At the same time, Catalans, like other nations or *ethnie* in Spain, are Spaniards; not only do they have Spanish legal citizenship, they also share certain common sentiments with other Spaniards and a wider political culture.³²

This example shows up a common feature in modern political life: the concurrence of two (or more) levels of inclusion and mobilization, *both* of which may be legitimately termed 'national', even though the one is ethnic, the other territorial-political at root. Quite simply, many individuals today belong simultaneously to two 'nations' – Catalan and Spanish; Breton and French; Croat and Yugoslav; Scots and British; even Yoruba and Nigerian, perhaps.³³

The important point here is that for an *ethnie* to become a 'nation', it must turn its members into 'citizens', but this does not entail having a state of one's own. One can obtain many of the rights of legal citizenship, without having outright independence, particularly in a federation. What is vital is turning a lateral *ethnie* into a cross-class nation; and, in the case of a demotic, vertical *ethnie*, mobilizing the included membership for a common *political* goal. In other words, what matters for would-be nations is inclusion and mobilization.

To take inclusion first. This affects the lateral *ethnie* in particular. They do, after all, by definition, exclude most middle and all lower classes. To become a 'nation', they must include them; or, if they do not have middle and lower classes of their own, they must 'find' them. Thus Hungarian magnates and lower nobility and intelligentsia in the nineteenth century had to Magyarize Croatian and Slovak peasants, as well as encourage a middle class in the expanding towns. Polish *szlachta* and landowners, again with a small intelligentsia, had to Polishize the Catholic peasantries of various regions of a divided Poland, excluding (or converting) Ruthenian and other peasantries, and promote Polish culture in the rapidly expanding industrial centres of the late nineteenth century.³⁴ In Wallachia and Moldavia, the nobility and clergy were scornful of their peasantries until the early

nineteenth century; but later found it useful and necessary to join with a rising middle class and mobilize and unify the peasantry around a Dacian myth and Rumanian language.³⁵

Whatever the motive forces for this changeover to an inclusive mode of communal organization, the effect was to broaden the *ethnie's* base and root it to a specific territory and resources, a 'homeland'. It also meant important legal concessions to the lower classes and their parties as a consequence of the grant of citizenship. For the ideology of nationalism under which the transition from a lateral, largely aristocratic *ethnie* to an inclusive vertical, inter-class nation was effected, underwrote the concept of universal citizenship: the 'nation' is, after all, the goal of citizen loyalties and the expression of the common will of the citizens.

By the act of inclusion of what come to be seen as 'one's own' citizens to the exclusion of outsiders, lateral *ethnie* are required to circumscribe themselves, ethnically and territorially, far more sharply than hitherto. Upper classes which habitually contracted alliances and marriages with high status outsiders whom they vaguely assimilated to their culture, are now compelled to relate primarily to lower status 'insiders', and even to recognize the peasantry as 'their own', to which they therefore owe special responsibilities. This does not mean that lateral *ethnie* must first turn into vertical, demotic ones before they can become nations. Though lateral *ethnie* are now 'compressed' territorially and socially, they may still retain control (perhaps with a small middle class) and acculturate 'their' peasantries or artisanate. Because the nation is inclusive, but looser and usually larger than *ethnie*, it can accommodate a greater measure of class difference within an overall common ethnic culture, and peasantries can retain their variants of the common ethnic pattern being gradually imposed by nationalists through the movement or the local state or government. It is through the legal bonds of citizenship that a loose but definite inclusion occurs.

Of course, there may be new classes – notably the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie – who challenge the leadership of lateral *ethnie* and its aristocratic cultural patterns, by utilizing some of the vernacular peasant myths and cultures to create a broader, alternative 'national' culture-community. In this, there is a clear demotic, exclusive intent. The resulting nation may, then, represent a fusion of lateral, aristocratic, and vertical, demotic elements, as in Greece or France. In many ways, this is what occurred in England, where the culture of the landed gentry was fused with the new norms established by the entrepreneurs and professionals, and together they penetrated into the emergent working-class culture through the Tory working men's clubs, music hall and sports culture, creating cross-class linkages based on a growing sense of English exclusiveness which was fuelled by colonial empire and late nineteenth-century jingoism. The result was that the concept of a British (sometimes English) nation was diffused down through the class structure. Disraeli, Randolph Churchill and Joseph

Chamberlain inaugurated a tradition of cultural bonding through sentiments generated by leisure and recreational activities; these and the exclusion of outsiders and colonized peoples were used not just for party purposes, but to create a sense of shared citizenship beyond the work-place, and hence of nationality before and beyond class.³⁶

In the case of vertical, demotic *ethnie*, the sense of inclusion is widely diffused, but often inert. What is required is a sense of political purpose to mobilize members and create the new bond of citizenship. A number of factors may impede such mobilization. Demotic communities like the Ibo may be widely dispersed with segmental lineage structures which make it difficult to realize a common purpose, despite some more general and overarching concepts of Ibo community. A new ideology which allows Ibo clans to see themselves as fragments of a wider 'nation' in which each member has rights and duties, irrespective of lineage affiliations and descent, because they share an Ibo history, culture and identity, must emerge and fire sufficient high status, Westernized men and women, before more general mobilization for the creation of a nation of citizens can begin.

In the case of some sectarian and diaspora communities, like the Armenians, Copts, Druze, Sikhs and Maronites, the impediment is mainly religious and ecclesiastical. In some ways, a community of the faithful (*umma*) may look like a proto-nation; but, as its purposes differ so fundamentally, so do its results. The mobilization of the religio-ethnic community in pre-modern eras, aims to restore the culture or territory of the community, or both; it is an ethnicism rather than an ethnic nationalism. The mobilization of a religio-ethnic community some of whose members aim to transform it into a 'nation' is predominantly political: it aims to achieve a measure of secular power for the community in a world of nations, and to ensure its survival and prosperity by turning a passive 'object-community' into an active 'subject-nation'. Thus Maronites, Sikhs, Armenians and Jews may in pre-modern eras have ensured their survival over the centuries through quietistic postures appropriate to communities which were acted upon and constituted an 'object' for successive rulers' policies. But today their members have all armed themselves with a new vision of what survival and success entail in the modern world of nations, and are no longer content to suffer these effects of rule by members of other *ethnie*. That in turn means an internal revolution, in which the guardians of a quietist tradition and its 'survival kit', the sacred texts, are pushed aside by new intelligentsia preaching an activist message of practical communal salvation. Hence the struggle to mobilize the peasants and workers behind the intelligentsia and against the ecclesiastical organizations of older priest-hoods, a battle which spreads from the schools and colleges to the press and the courts, and ultimately into the assemblies and the streets.³⁷

In the case of 'city-state amphictyonies' and 'frontier' *ethnie*, the traditional rivalries between the component units continue to dog all attempts to

mobilize for nationhood. In Switzerland, the Helvetic Republic of 1798 attempted to overcome cantonal and city-state disunity on the French Jacobin model, but was too short-lived to break down the traditional localisms and their associated cantonal liberties. To these older sources of rivalry, were added new foci of antagonism supplied by the addition of Italian and French-speaking cantons to the Confederation after 1815, which came to a climax in the religio-political cleavages of the 1848 Civil War.³⁸ In northern Italy, too, what little ethnic unity had been achieved during the Renaissance by the independent city-states, was severely obstructed even after political unification in 1808 and again in 1870 by the localism and regionalism of traditional loyalties which persist to this day, within a wider official cultural-historical unity.³⁹ Localism is even more marked in 'tribal confederations' like the Hausa-Fulani or Kurdish tribes. Here, clans and lineages have taken control of particular savannah kingdoms or mountain valleys, and any new classes find the combination of kinship with territorial cleavages a peculiarly infertile base for political mobilization on a pan-ethnic basis, though in both cases some movement has occurred in this direction, under the pressure of external threats and rivalries.

Hence it is misleading to imagine that demotic, vertical *ethnie* provide more favourable ground for the transition towards nationhood. The very fact of inclusion may make internal divisions more salient, or native traditions more resistant to change. For, inevitably, the creation of nations, by turning kinship members into territorial citizens, involves both a power struggle and a redefinition of traditional values and images of the community; and imagining a new type of community is usually a long-drawn-out process of conflict between successive generations.

The new imagination

What is the goal and content of these new imaginings? Benedict Anderson, in his sensitive study, has defined the new nation of our imagination as a sovereign but limited community, an essentially abstract mental construct. In the many novels he cites to give body to our constructs (and the novel is the form, *par excellence*, of an *imagined* but 'realistic' community), there are generalized images of individuals who stand for, 'represent', collectivities existing in time and space. We are induced to identify with such general individuals through certain conventions of the novel: notably the depiction of a homogenous chronological and empty time. This corresponds to the linear conception of history which nationalism espouses, and through which it seeks collective immortality. At the same time, individuals are located in a well-defined, limited, but generalized, space, such as the 'homeland' evokes in the hearts and minds of individuals who may never have travelled far beyond their villages. All kinds of realistic devices are used to 'fix' the

sociological solidity of a particular type of community: the use of events that link many people who cannot know each other; the precise dating of such events; the inclusion of the reader(s)'s everyday life into the events related by the novel; the use of plurals to typify institutions which are comparable with similar ones in analogous communities; the use of careful, but general detail to describe the social landscape; and the frequent reference to general, often unnamed heroes of the novel and to messages from distant and anonymous but realistic, sources (newspapers, telephone, radio, and so on).⁴⁰

Apart from the new vision of calendrical time and limited, but detailed space, the new imagination pictures the nation as a homogenous body of individuals, who are generalized equals or 'citizens', and whose connections are impersonal but fraternal. That is to say, individuals in a nation are essentially substitutable. Their links are certainly 'organic' in Durkheim's sense of the term; that is, they occupy complementary roles with mutual expectations based on a complex division of labour.⁴¹ At the same time, the incumbents of those roles are interchangeable and expendable *qua* individuals. Their individual idiosyncrasies and temperaments may be picturesquely interesting, but they hardly affect the operation and survival of the nation. Similarly, in the new imagination, regional, class, religious or other differences are felt no longer to characterize 'citizens' or divide the community; in novels and plays, operas and landscapes, the characteristic forms of the national era, such differences represent 'survivals' from previous eras, which we (readers or spectators) can now correctly interpret.

Thus a composer of historical opera like Mussorgsky can present us with pictures of Old Russia with all its sectarian, social and regional antagonisms, yet suggest to the spectator that he or she is part of this evolving historical community and shares in its vicissitudes and destinies. In *Boris Godunov*, the clash of Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia and the conflicts between boyars and populace are summed up and generalized for *our own* calendrical time and homogenous space by the final lament of the holy simpleton and the reflections of Pimen, the chronicler-monk. In *Khovanschina*, it is Marfa who, by her clairvoyance, generalizes the theme of pride and fall to include princes as well as humble beggars, new Westernizers as well as Old Believers, the Streltsy Guards as well as Peter's new order. All are included in the new historical drama of interacting parts of the national community, since all are equally 'citizens' caught up in social evolution, the 'movement of history' through chronological, empty time in a clearly defined part of the globe. As several commentators have noted, the 'hero' of both operas has become the people themselves (but in a sense this is true of many other examples in the new national genres of drama, novel, opera or landscape painting where particular areas evoke images of the unique habitat of the community).⁴²

In the new imagination, the 'masses' are given for the first time definite form and a clear role. They are no longer occasional crowds necessary, as in

Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, for the execution of the heroes' designs. They play a part in their own right, perhaps the central role of historical inauguration, even if their influence is sometimes invisible. They form the final court of appeal, and increasingly the goal of individual striving, since 'they' represent posterity, as well as ancestry, and posterity today alone conveys a sense of outliving a transient life. Just as in politics, elites must woo the 'masses' and compete for their votes, so the new imagination pictures the community as belonging to numerous, nameless, faceless but essentially identical men and women who embody the culture and meaning of these analogous but unique communities. In the conception of the masses as the motive force of history, the new vision endows the nation with a power and majesty such as no *ethnie* possessed.

But how, in the new vision, are the masses integrated into the nation? How are these numberless, faceless individuals interrelated? By the new modes of communication and by the new cognition, science. Unlike the old, priestly and scribal codes of communication, the new modes are open and technical. They are not limited to ascribed groups, nor are they the preserve of 'insiders' who know the sacred lore. Though they require a specialized technical knowledge, this is, in principle, open to all with a minimum of general education – literacy and numeracy. What is required is knowledge of the medium of instruction, that is, language in the formal sense, and more important, intimacy with the inner language of the ethnic community. For the first type of language is insufficient to act as an integrative force. It may facilitate communication by the government to the populace, or by large-scale economic or educational organizations. But this is a one-way system: 'the masses' cannot easily return the messages, much less use the language to communicate their experiences to each other. In this 'inner' or 'Herderian' sense of language, ethnicity places limits on communicability. That is to say, collective historical experiences find a peculiar and unique medium of expression, a 'language' or 'style' all their own. This may be a resurrected and renovated ancient tongue, or a style of dress, furnishings and architecture, or a special music and dance, or peculiar customs, institutions and manners, which bind those who possess and practice them.⁴³

But it is not just the rediscovery of 'inner languages' in this wider sense that binds the masses to their would-be nation. There is a corresponding return to the experiences themselves which the inner languages encapsulate, but in a 'modern', scientific form. That is to say, the ancient experiences are no longer simply retold as in the epic of former times; they are subjected to 'interpretation' and scrutiny, using present-day assumptions and the new scientific approaches and disciplines of philology, archeology, anthropology, sociology and history. These disciplines are necessary tools of modern social solidarity and citizenship, for they enable us to 'make sense' of our collective location in space and time, the limited

space and calendrical time of the new era of nationhood. Without such 'science', there can, in a very literal sense, be no nation.

This may seem an odd statement to make, in view of the gulf between the essentially romantic concept of the nation, especially its ethnic variety, and the increasingly mechanistic and rationalized nature of these modern, scientific disciplines. The techniques used today in a discipline like archeology for dating animal and human fossils, or for analysing buildings or diet in ancient civilizations, would seem to be utterly remote from images of national awakening and efflorescence with which elites seek to galvanize and inspire 'their' masses in the drama of nation-building. Yet, it is just such techniques, just such patient and meticulous analysis, description, classification and correlations of finds from excavations, layer by layer, that enables the nationalistic archeologist to build up his or her (and 'our') picture of the nation's ancient past, such as Yadin uncovered at Hatsor or Masada.⁴⁴

It, of course, part of the assumptions and the drama of the nation that 'the past' is 'there', waiting to be uncovered and celebrated. That is the promise made to hundreds of volunteers who flock to help in the task of uncovering it, amid the heat and dust, like pioneers and discoverers; and to the thousands of tourists who, after them, will make the pilgrimage to each site, each monument and each museum, hungry for meanings that only the well-presented past can satisfy. The presentation is all-important, and so is its 'scientific accuracy'. For we live in a secular, mechanistic age, in which the medium becomes as important as the message (even if it never outstrips or absorbs it, as it has in some avant-garde artistic production). This means that the 'nation' can only be imagined through the medium of science; hence sociology and anthropology becomes the prism and perspective for understanding the 'masses'. Only through a sociological understanding can the fraternity of a nation be grasped; and so, in turn, it is hardly surprising if one of the central preoccupations of sociology has been with social cohesion and types of community, and the ways in which social change, particularly modernization, has undermined or facilitated new kinds of community.

No wonder, too, that most sociological theories are premised on a dichotomous view of history (trichotomous, if one goes back beyond the Neolithic revolution); a 'traditional' (complex agrarian and religious) era or type of society is contrasted with a 'modern' (industrial, capitalist and secular) type, in which the 'nation' and the 'masses' become defining and necessary features of modernity, part of an inevitable and universal account of social development towards ever larger units of territory, technology and population.⁴⁵ Just as 'nation-states' and the division of mankind into nations are necessary frameworks for a comparative sociology and a diachronic, cross-cultural study of groups and institutions; so are the temporal perspectives and conceptual series of evolutionistic social theory essential for national self-realization and an identification of elites with 'their' (historically affiliated) masses in the territorial unity and ethnic fraternity of 'the nation'.⁴⁶

This, then, is the goal and content of the new national imaginings: to present a vision of ethnic fraternity of elites and masses through a historical drama in which a unified past is uncovered and re-presented, in the fashion of a museum, and thereby to evoke deeper meanings of collective destiny and community in the face of the dangerous fragmentation and alienation that modern industrialism and science unfold.

8

Legends and landscapes

Nostalgia and posterity

One of the paradoxes of contemporary society is its appetite for innovation coupled with a deep nostalgia for the past. Great numbers of men and women today, however committed to social change and new ideas, cling to traditions and values that embody personal and collective memories of a former way of life from which they are loath to be wholly sundered, and to some aspects of which they even yearn to return. This can be seen in the swift succession of 'revivals' in literature, art, music and fashion, all of which recreate for us 'lost worlds' of childhood memory. Though many people have lost this sense of the past, these successive revivals and fashions, though fed by commercialism, these revivals of *art nouveau* and Victoriana, the nostalgia for country life and a vanished aristocracy, the fascination with archeology and ancient monuments, all point to a deeper and more widespread attachment to past epochs and their values.¹

How can this widespread nostalgia for irrecoverable pasts be explained? Is it something that flourishes only today, when materialism and commerce render so much of the past obsolete? One answer is the need to control the pace and scope of social change. All societies have to legitimate their innovations, and the rate of contemporary change makes it all the more necessary to appeal to the past for precedents. That is why we find so many Third World leaders looking into the pasts of their peoples for sanction for their new policies and innovations; archaizing is the concomitant of rapid change.² But this only begs the question: why *do* societies need to legitimate their innovations by returning to the past, and why 'their' particular pasts? In a 'traditional' society, too, one might expect a concern with precedent and custom; but why the pressing need for it in 'modernizing' innovative societies?

But it has already been shown in Part I that ethnicism fed on a similar kind of nostalgia. One could even say that *ethnie* and ethnicity itself contain

an element of 'nostalgia', a desire to revert to the simpler ways of an alleged golden age in an earlier life-style, one which has been irretrievably lost. This suggests a more universal need, or at any rate one that goes beyond the modern era and its need for 'legitimations'.

There is another standard reply to the questions about nostalgia for tradition and the past that has gone. This is that modern conditions, notably capitalism and bureaucracy, have corroded individuality and induced powerful feelings of estrangement and homelessness.³ The social structure of modern industrial capitalism, too, is one of alienation; our own products and creations, like our work, become alien 'objects' standing over against us and inducing feelings of fragmentation.⁴ Alternatively, modern societies are regarded as peculiarly liable to *anomie*: rapid change deregulates our lives and throws our passions out of line with our opportunities.⁵ Hence, the urgent need for antidotes, which will reintegrate and re-root us in a satisfying social framework, one that preserves liberty and individuality while anchoring both in social justice and solidarity. This means, in turn, linking a modern type of society and social order with collective traditions and native habitats: in other words, with a group's history and homeland.

The difficulty here is that 'native history' hardly encourages a satisfaction of the need for both social integration and individual liberty. Nor is it clear why any vision of social justice and solidarity needs to be confined to local habitats; revolution knows no borders. One answer to these problems has been provided by Régis Debray: the nation with its stress on a beginning and flow in time, and a delimitation in space, raises barriers to the flood of meaninglessness and absurdity that might otherwise engulf human beings. It tells them that they belong to ancient associations of 'their kind' with definite boundaries in time and space, and this gives their otherwise ambiguous and precarious lives a degree of certainty and purpose.⁶ But, then, this means that the problem of alienation becomes universalized. In *this* sense, nations or human associations bounded in space and time, have always existed in varying degrees, and this would suggest a more or less universal need to overcome meaninglessness, which is by no means confined to modern times.

There is another possibility. Nostalgia for the past, especially the ethnic past of 'one's own' people, has indeed been a feature of society in all ages and continents, because people have always sought to overcome death and the futility with which death threatens mortals. By linking oneself to a 'community of history and destiny', the individual hopes to achieve a measure of immortality which will preserve his or her person and achievements from oblivion; they will live on and bear fruit in the community. Now, as long as the community was seen as a vessel and embodiment of a religious way of life, linked to the attainment of salvation (usually in the next world), nostalgia for an ethnic past only surfaced in periods of acute crisis, when the values and life-style of the religious community were under threat. As long as the individual, by living according to communal traditions, could hope to

attain salvation in another world or state of being, the need to revive the past was muted. Besides, in a 'traditional' society, one was expected to fashion one's life-style and ambitions in terms of collective traditions, so that there was little need to yearn for a past that was being continued. Only when new developments within or pressures from outside undermined that practice and sense of continuity, was there any need for an 'ethnic revival'.

But the rise of science, utilitarian philosophies and acquisitive materialism, has eroded traditions and promoted a secular conception of history. With the waning of beliefs in heaven and hell, the privatization of beliefs and the reaction against 'meaningless rituals', the ethnic past of the community has been sundered from its religious anchorage; and men and women have had to look elsewhere for that immortality which so many desire. Many have found it in the idea of posterity. It is in and through offspring that deeds live on and memories are kept alive. But these deeds and memories only 'make sense' within a chain of like deeds and memories, which stretch back into the mists of obscure generations of ancestors and forward into the equally unknowable generations of descendants. Perhaps this accounts for both the quest for family roots and the yearning for communal histories and destinies, so characteristic of our otherwise matter-of-fact modernity. In any case, nostalgia for one's ethnic past has become more acute and more widespread and persistent in the modern era, with the decline of tradition and salvation religions. In this sense, ethnic nationalism becomes a 'surrogate' religion which aims to overcome the sense of futility engendered by the removal of any vision of an existence after death, by linking individuals to persisting communities whose generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and identities.

The virtue of this approach is that it does justice to both pre-modern instances of 'ethnic' nostalgia and the more widespread modern examples of 'national' nostalgia. The causal difference between these two forms lies in the transformation of our conceptions of time and space as a result of the decline of religious beliefs and traditions concerning an after-life or a reality beyond our empirical universe. Earlier implicit beliefs in such supra-empirical realities relativized mundane events and experiences, including death itself, by placing them in an 'eternal' and 'space-less' perspective which was felt to constitute a more genuine form of 'reality'. This conferred a measure of identity and security on individuals and groups alike, by locating them confidently in metaphysical realities or a divine plan. In this way, they became integral parts of the cosmos and no longer alone.⁷

But secularization of beliefs and the introduction of new conceptions of finite space and homogenous, calendrical time, have undermined this cosmic solidarity and returned individuals to their 'pre-religious' isolation. Their identities are now threatened by a lack of continuity between their earthly and supernatural existences, and their sense of security is destroyed by the seeming finality of death. All that is left is memory and hope, history and

destiny. But these memories and hopes are collective and inter-generational; they are *'our'* history and *'our'* destiny. Nostalgia is so often linked with utopia; our blueprints for the future are invariably derived from our experiences of our pasts, and as we travel forward, we do so looking backwards to a past that alone seems knowable and intelligible and which alone can *'make sense'* of a future that is forever neither.

The sense of *'the past'*

But is the *'past'* really so intelligible? Are we faced by a single coherent past, or by multiple pasts which we must reconstruct? Or is the *'past'* we yearn for, a mere invention designed to meet our present needs?

Recently, several scholars and studies have emphasized the role of present needs in our interpretations of the past, and of fairly recently *'invented traditions'*. For example, the Scots tartan and kilt, long held to be an immemorial emblem of Scots nationality, turns out to have been *'invented'* in the mid-eighteenth century, in the wake of the Jacobite rebellions and the growth of a Highlands tradition.⁸ Slightly later, the first Welsh Eisteddfodd was established by learned Welsh societies searching for their *'authentic roots'* in the bardic past; but the new bardic contests had quite different meanings and content from the old, medieval ones.⁹ Even the British coronation ceremony was a nineteenth-century invention; though it incorporated motifs from earlier periods, its present form and content is modern and answers to modern needs.¹⁰

This is very much in line with recent evaluations of nationalism itself. It too is credited with creative powers of reconstruction and outright invention. Thus, late nineteenth-century Hungarian patriots decided that the year AD 896 was Hungary's official foundation date, and erected the Millennium Monument in Budapest, with the archangel Gabriel perched high on a column at whose foot the Magyar conquerors ride on horseback.¹¹ In Poland, in the 1960s various publications celebrated a thousand years of the Polish state and its conversion to Christianity in AD 966.¹² The National Museum in Belgrade depicts the first Serbian uprising against the Ottomans under Karageorgevic in 1804–13 as an example of Serbian nationalism, though it is doubtful if this pig-dealer and his peasant followers had any concept of a Serbian nation or any intention of forming one.¹³ But then that is just another example of the way in which nationalism writes its own history.

But does nationalism write its history as it pleases, or is it also constrained by tradition and the *'past'* which it records? Is that past, in other words, *'full'* or *'empty'*? It seems to me fuller than is often thought; sometimes so full, nationalists must prune it for their purposes and use a very selective memory for the tale they wish to impart. There are, of course, straightforward bits of

pure invention – in the sense of fabrication – as in all periods of history. (One thinks of the fabrications by the Tudors of the myth of the wicked king, Richard III, around a kernel of truth, or the legends that sprang up around King Solomon). But in most cases, the mythologies elaborated by nationalists have not been fabrications, but recombinations of traditional, perhaps unanalysed, motifs and myths taken from epics, chronicles, documents of the period, and material artefacts. As inventions are very often such novel recombinations of existing elements and motifs, we may, in this restricted sense, call the nationalist mythologies ‘inventions’. Such novel recombinations are pre-eminently the work of intellectuals in search of their ‘roots’.¹⁴

Yet, there are very clear and very specific limits to their activities. These are provided both by the existing criteria of historiography of the time, and by the texture and inner coherence of the myths and motifs themselves. In other words, a recombination must be ‘in character’. It must intuitively ‘belong to’, or cohere with, a particular traditional past and its peculiar flavour. That is why we can immediately tell Greek history and the Greek past from the French past and its history. The type of hero-figures, the degree of sacredness, the atmosphere of key events, the aroma of the habitat, all differ systematically; together they form a specific ‘historical configuration’, a constellation which, while susceptible of valid comparison analytically, nevertheless is quite distinctive in quality and flavour.¹⁵

Here an important qualification needs to be made. History is ‘full’ where the *ethnie* is fortunate enough to have retained its memories and records in sufficient quantity. This sounds tautological, but it leads to the vital point that historically ‘full’ *ethnie* are the pace-setters and models for historically ‘drained’ ones. Thus, Slovak historians had to disentangle their specific records and myths from the Bohemian-Moravian ones current in the early nineteenth century; they had to invest shadowy kings and remote events with a vivid tangibility in keeping with the romantic nationalism they espoused, and with the neighbouring Czech model which was in a better state of ‘historical’ preservation. In other words, the ‘past’ that is to serve modern purposes must not only be ‘full’, it must be well preserved – or it must be ‘reconstructed’.¹⁶

We may therefore usefully distinguish between those *ethnie* with full and well-preserved pasts and those whose pasts are either lacking or hidden from view by subsequent accretions. In the first case, it is more a case of selective memory ‘rediscovering’ the past; in the second, a more conjectural ‘reconstruction’ of the past from such motifs and myths as can be unearched. So that, depending upon the state of preservation of the ethnic past, we can speak of either historical ‘rediscovery’ or ‘reconstruction’. Only in rare cases need we speak of pure fabrication.

There is a further point to be made about such rediscoveries and reconstructions. In the nature of things, the ‘past’ that is handed down is multi-layered and susceptible of different interpretations. It also often

contains quite different strands of tradition. Very rarely, is it possible to speak of a 'single' past of any *ethnie*; rather, each *ethnie* possesses a series of pasts, which modern secular intellectuals attempt to interrelate in a coherent and purposive manner. The fact that they rarely achieve their goals, at least in the eyes of significant sections of the population, testifies to the 'multiple' nature of the 'past' with which they grapple. Indeed, there are significant and systematic variations of interpretation and of tradition which intellectuals from different strata and regions may select for their needs and purposes. I return to this problem later; for the moment, it is only necessary to underline the multiplicity and flexibility of ethnic pasts, within the limits described above. There is, at least in the case of historically well-preserved *ethnie*, a choice of motifs and myths from which different interest groups and classes can fashion their own readings of the communal past to which they belong.

Romantic nationalism as an 'historical drama'

There have been two main criteria by which modern *ethnie* and nations have sought to 'rediscover' or 'reconstruct' their communal pasts: the didactic and the dramatic. In the modern world, history has become both a moral teacher and a temporal and terrestrial drama of salvation. The two aspects are closely interwoven.

If we try to pin down the specific criteria that intellectuals have used in fashioning their rediscoveries or reconstructions of the national past, we find certain recurrent aims. The first is a kind of 'naturalism'. The past that they seek to unfold should be as organic and natural as conceivable, and our histories interpreted as if they were extensions of the natural world in which communities obeyed similar kinds of 'laws' to those governing the natural world. In other words, societies were subject to the same laws of birth, growth, flowering and decay – and renewal – as plants and trees, and fed by analogous elements. Lack of any of these nurturants spelt decay, and it was the task of nationalist educators to re-supply them.

In line with this evolutionist vision went a sense of growth and development. The community never stood still, it was always subject to mutations, and no stage could last. But the trends of development which it obeyed were peculiar to the community; these dictated the pace, scope and intensity of the changes to which it was subject. Hence, the past that had to be rediscovered and reconstructed was one which exhibited change and growth; and this principle in turn helped to shape the pattern into which specific events and personages were inserted at different stages of development. The principle of growth in turn gave rise to two other criteria: those of coherence and unity, and of wealth. In the first place, any past must appear seamless and unified; the different strands in the story must cohere to form a single pattern. There might be doubt over details, but most events and personages

must fit into and exemplify the overall pattern of growth and underline the sense of wholeness and significance of communal history. But the story must also be 'rich'; it must contain an abundance of exciting events, a rich tapestry of vivid detail. The task of the intellectual is to fit the many pieces of this jigsaw together into a clear and harmonious pattern which will do justice to all the often conflicting motifs and myths in the community's records.¹⁷

Beyond these abstract criteria there is a more overriding concern. This is to breathe life into the past, to create a truly living past. It is never mere antiquarianism that inspires historical rediscoveries, never a distinterested enquiry into the past 'as it really was', but a yearning desire to re-enter into a living past and make it respond to our needs. That is why nationalist histories are so full of tableaux of the past: William Tell shooting the apple off his son's head, Alexander Nevsky slaughtering the Teutonic Knights on the ice of Lake Peipius, Jeanne d'Arc crowning the Dauphin at Rheims, the Jews by the waters of Babylon, the last Welsh bard lamenting on a crag above King Edward's advancing army. What counts is the peculiar atmosphere evoked by these traumatic events in a highly distinctive setting, one associated with a particular people and no other, one which sets them apart in their own memories and in the life-style which they have adopted in response to such events and experiences.

Romance, mystery, drama – this is the stuff of any nationalist salvation-drama. It is important, because it helps to teach us 'who we are', to impart the sense of being a link in a chain which stretches back over the generations to bind us to our ancestors and our descendants. It is also important, because it teaches us 'where we are' and 'who we should be', if we are to 'recover ourselves'. By conveying the atmosphere and drama of past epochs in the life of the community, we 're-live' the lives and times of our forbears and make ourselves part of a 'community of fate'.¹⁸

How can one achieve this life-like reconstruction? How can one truly re-enter the past? This is where modern, scientific disciplines like philology, anthropology, history, sociology, archeology and folklore studies can help. They are able to translate the idealized images of the ethnic past into tactile realities, according to modern canons of knowledge. Archeology has been, perhaps, the most useful of these disciplines in recovering communal pasts. Of themselves, archeological methods and instruments merely date, describe, locate and classify material remains or ancient monuments. But this apparent neutrality breaks down the moment one embarks on interpretation, as it did originally when the sites and monuments were selected for examination. We explain the megaliths of the Orkneys or Brittany, the palaces of Knossos and Great Zimbabwe, the temples of Karnak and Angkor Wat or the sites of Middle Eastern *tells*, in terms of a 'story' or pattern of discovery about our or other communities and their habitats. Through our archeological rediscoveries and interpretations we locate 'ourselves' and dignify 'our communities' by reference to an ancient pedigree and time-

honoured environment. The material remains uncovered bring home to us, as only tactile objects can, the physical immediacy of former eras and archaic peoples, lending vivid substance to the records of chronicles and epics. For a 'returning intelligentsia' bent on rediscovering its 'roots', this physical presence confirms on the ground its re-entry into a living past; for a secular intelligentsia, committed to rationalism and empiricism, archeology and philology provide the surest basis for their reconstructions.

It is interesting to see how this desire for physical tangibility and verisimilitude invaded European intellectual and aesthetic consciousness in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Among Western scholars, critics and artists, there was a growing awareness of the differences between heritages and pasts that had previously been conflated. From the 1760s a controversy raged between partisans of the 'Roman' past with its imperial grandeur as the repository of didactic classicism and a purer, linear 'Greek' aesthetic heritage and its Hellenic background; Piranesi, David and Adam favoured the Roman ideal, but soon the Hellenic contribution was elevated to first place by writers like Winckelmann and Goethe and artists like Fuseli and Flaxman.¹⁹ By the time of Napoleon's expedition, a new appreciation of the Egyptian heritage was surfacing, to be followed quickly by a re-evaluation of the medieval Gothic pasts in Germany, England and later France.²⁰ These changes in 'taste', which began as a local western revolt against French Rococo and rationalist hegemonies, soon became vital crystallizations and stimuli for the quest for a vivid and tangible past which would answer to present needs.

Not only archeology and art, but also philology and lexicography were pressed into service by the 'returning intelligentsia' with its vision of a didactic past and of history as a salvation-drama. The art of tracing verbal roots, and explicating the meanings and synonyms of words and phrases, 'made sense' within a larger evolutionary framework in which language was seen as having an intimate and revelatory position within the collective memory and experience. This was a view that had been popularized by Herder and his German and Slav followers, but its close links and dependance upon what Anderson calls the 'capitalism of print-technology' and the consequent flow of printed books and newspapers, succeeded in elevating linguistics and philology to equivalent status with archeology and the arts as key instruments and methods for the task of historical 'rediscovery' and 'reconstruction' upon which so many intellectuals had embarked. To this day, there remains a Eurocentric bias in favour of language as the medium and vessel of ethnicity, and as the surest guide to national contours and cleavages, even though recent studies would tend to depreciate the explanatory role of language in shaping *ethnie* and nations.²¹

In contrast, anthropology and sociology have been accorded an ambiguous status with regard to collective historical rediscovery. On the one hand, the more ahistorical schools of anthropology and sociology that flourished in the

inter-War and immediate post-War periods, notably functionalism, turned their backs on all genetic enquiries and all interest in collective memories, myths and symbols, in favour of synchronic, institutional and role analyses; while Marxist historicism turned away from ethnic and national problems, and every particularistic endeavour.²² Despite some early interest, therefore, in collective psychology and the shaping of 'national character', sociology and anthropology as academic and 'scientific' disciplines proved unattractive throughout much of this century for an intelligentsia that sought to re-enter a living past and reconstitute its destiny.²³ On the other hand, members of this intelligentsia did have frequent recourse to sociological materials and ethnographic analysis, to compensate for the lack of historical evidence in so many areas about which more knowledge was desired. In making their reconstructions and rediscoveries, intellectuals were perforce drawn to recent statistical and ethnographic materials, as Durkheim was in his study of the 'primitive' (and hence 'early?') totemic religions of the Australian tribes, in order to lend some retrospective plausibility to their conjectures about more archaic eras. In this respect, an 'anthropology of the Ibo' or a 'sociology of the Poles', albeit based on fairly recent evidence, could serve as a basis for reconstructing those areas of the histories of these *ethnie* for which historical records might be deficient.²⁴

In general, then, we may say that historicist intellectuals bent on rediscovering or reconstituting an ethnic past, have felt no compunction about pressing the latest techniques or scientific methods into the service of an unashamedly romantic venture. They have used 'science' to systematize and 'verify' poetic metaphors of collective life, and construct images and mythologies of a dramatic and inspiring past.²⁵

An historical drama that gives us our identities and values, must do two things: it must *define* the entity or unit of which it narrates the drama; and it must *direct* the entity or unit towards a visionary goal. On the one hand, it must supply a history and metaphysic of the community, locating it in time and space among the other communities on the earth; on the other hand, it must generate an ethic and blueprint for the future. The drama which it unfolds must stir us as a collectivity into action for the attainment of communal ends. It must contain a 'message' of revival through moral activity, but at the same time comfort and console us for our lot among the nations. Since every community experiences moments of decline and even subjugation, the drama-mythology must 'explain' the trajectory of growth, decline and rebirth; and the first task is to situate and describe the community 'as it was' in its 'pure' or 'unmixed' state. It is to this state that we must return, if we are to partake of the collective re-birth. By returning to 'basics', by purifying ourselves of the dross of an uninspiring and ambiguous present through a return to the glorious past and its heroism, we can shed our mediocrity and enter upon the 'true' destiny of our community. Identification with an idealized past helps us to transcend a disfigured and

unworthy present, and endow our individual lives with a wider significance in a union that will outlive death and dispel futility.²⁶

There are two ways in which the community can be located and its 'true state' revealed: through poetic spaces and golden ages. The first involves the uses of landscape, the second the uses of history. The one roots the community in its distinctive terrain; the other charts its origins and flowering in the age of heroes. Both together provide a history and metaphysic of the individuality of the community, from which an ethic of regeneration issues to lead it forward.

Poetic spaces: the uses of landscape

Communities are inseparable from particular habitats. This is true even of diaspora peoples whom persecution, commerce and adventure scatter across many communities. Even they once possessed a landscape of their own which continues to suffuse their collective consciousness by its imprint on their liturgy, education or oral traditions. In their new settings, they evolve a supplementary spatial poetry, as did the Jews in the ghetto and the Armenians in their trading outposts. So that here a complex dual landscape provides the milieu for their millennial mythologies.²⁷

In the majority of communities, the bulk of their populations remained in the area of their original or adopted territory, and the passage of generations has wedded them to the land, both in fact and in their (and others') perceptions. Their modes of production, patterns of settlement and folk cultures spring from their diurnal round of work and leisure, itself formed out of their ceaseless encounter with a particular environment. Swiss peasants may encounter a rather different 'nature' in their mountain valleys than, say, Breton fishermen on their rugged coasts or Catalan or Chinese overseas traders. But for all what counts is their internalization of certain territorial features and life-styles, and its contribution to an individual atmosphere and tradition in which successive generations are steeped. While crude geography may set limits to certain ways of life and encourage particular modes of production and patterns of settlement, national identity and 'national character' is more directly influenced by collective perceptions, encoded in myths and symbols, of the ethnic 'meanings' of particular stretches of territory, and the ways in which such stretches (and their main features) are turned into 'homelands' inextricably tied to the fate of 'their' communities.²⁸

The first thing to notice about this association between a given *ethnie* and 'its' territory is its frequent antiquity. In the myths of the community its origins reach back into a mysterious and primordial time. This is matched in the ethnic imagination by the remote inaccessibility of the ancestral terrain. The zones of origin are inherently mysterious. In some cases, they even lie

far from the present lands of the community, like the fabulous land of 'Turan' in Central Asia, rediscovered and extolled by pan-Turkist historians, linguists and poets. It was from this far away cradle, harsh, rugged and pagan, a fitting environment for primitive warrior tribes, that successive waves of Seljuk and Ottoman Turkish tribes had migrated and then fought their way into Anatolia and the Balkans, only to adopt Islam and embrace a sedentary peasant and city existence; so that by the nineteenth century, when this myth of semi-nomadic Turanian origins was elaborated, it had to be dredged up as a literary and didactic device which found little echo in the agrarian and urban consciousness of the average 'Turk'.²⁹

In other cases, even this literary memory was lost. In Hungary, there is little evidence and no memory of a period before the invasion of the Magyars in the ninth century; and in Croatia or Serbia, only meagre traces, from linguistic evidence, of the emergence of the Yugoslav tribes from the Russian forest. The Scandinavian origins of the Varangian Rus are similarly shadowy, and the Hindu Indians have only inferences from the Rig-Veda to indicate the character and steppe provenance of the conquering Aryans.³⁰

If these distant 'lands of origin' evoke few chords of nostalgia, it is otherwise with 'zones of origin' within the territories which the community continues to occupy. Nineteenth-century German *Völkisch* writers portrayed the ancient Germanic tribes as emerging from the forests east of the Elbe, within German territories or influence, so enhancing the traditional German *Drang nach Osten*. According to this ideal, Germans were 'cultivators' in their homesteads and settlements, like their ancestors; so a German rebirth demanded German settlement on the Eastern plains, where a collective existence in nature and on the 'soil' would regenerate Germany.³¹ In Ireland, the 'zones of origin' were hazier. Different epic traditions placed them in the west or north, in the agrarian heartlands of a pagan Gaelic tribal culture.³² The Jewish vision looked back, not to Ur or Harran in Mesopotamia, but to the blue hills of Judea and Samaria and the plains of Sharon; not deserts and nomadic nostalgia, but the return to the life of the arable farmer drew the latter-day Jewish populists away from their small-town, trader and artisan existence, to a terrain sanctified by generations of their forefathers and their autonomous commonwealth.³³

These examples illustrate how tangible and practical is the nationalist spatial vision. It demands a terrain on which nations can be built. But the vision also contains an unearthly note, an element of archaic mystery, particularly where the environment yields up vestiges of a pre-history that antedates the community. When Breton poets rediscover their ancient dolmens, and Israeli archeologists unearth an early Bronze Age Canaanite hoard of copper ibex standards, modern communities are excited and dignified by their association with prehistoric civilizations, but also uneasy at the thought of their extinction and the sheer passage of time to which these landscapes and their material remains bear silent witness. An attitude of fear

and veneration emerges, and this spills over into the romantic obsession with nature which ends as a cult of nature-worship.

This leads to the second point: the fusion of community and terrain through the identification of natural with historical sites. On the one hand, natural features become historicized; they become actors in the reconstructions of the past which nationalist intellectuals elaborate. Mountains like Olympus or Meru in Burma, the abode of the gods, become symbols of the sources of national genius and creativity; or like the Jungfrau or the ranges of Snowdonia, they are invested with a special ethnic poetry symbolising the unattainable purity and noble grandeur to which the nation aspires. Lakes and rivers may also become part of the nationalist hagiography. To the Swiss, the *Vierwaldstättersee* occupies a special place; it saw the birth of their *Eidgenossenschaft* in 1291, when the three forest cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden swore the Oath of the Rütli to rid their valleys of the Habsburg oppressor, and where, in nearby Atdorf, Tell made his heroic stand against Gessler.³⁴ For Egyptians, the Nile literally and figuratively is the giver of life, and therefore to this day helps to define the community that lives on its banks and from its waters, despite the changes wrought by the Aswan Dam and modern industry, and despite the strongly urban ethic of Islam.³⁵

In Russia also the whole landscape has become the partner of Russian history and people in nationalist imagery. The birch trees, the great river Volga, the endless plains, the distant steppe and long, severe winter have all left their mark on the outlook and cultural products of the Russians, notably the landscape painting of artists like Ivan Shishkin and Isaac Levitan with their wide open spaces and vast forests set beneath distant, lonely skies. The same 'landscape' has entered into the melancholy spirit of their music, in Borodin's *In the Steppes of Central Asia* or Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring*, whose programme was inspired by the folklorist and archeologist-painter, Nicolai Roerich, and celebrated the pagan primitivism and great upsurge of spring in tribal Russia.³⁶

This union of community with nature is achieved by a conscious pursuit of what Burke had termed the 'intimate' and the 'sublime'. These categories induce sentiments of comfort and awe, which are associated with different aspects of 'nature' and which evoke in us alternating emotions of the quiet intimacy or the remote grandeur and inaccessibility of our natural surroundings. The latter can be found in the Swiss, German and British Alpine painters, or the Russian landscape painters like Shishkin and Savrasov; whereas the Dutch outdoor painters, and the golden age Danish townscape and landscape painters, convey the charm of a tamed and homely nature – its fields, lanes, cottages and houses – which soothes and relaxes the spectator and evokes the comforts of a bourgeois society in which the community is felt to be in harmony with its surroundings and nature has become domesticated.³⁷

There is a reverse side of the coin: the naturalization of historic sites and monuments. If anything, this is more common. Practically every type of building or monument can be naturalized and turned into a component of the community's environment. Long barrows in Wessex, stone circles in Brittany or the Orkneys, kreml-fortresses in Russia, temples in Greece and Italy, *tells* in Iraq and Syria, have all entered the imaginative fabric of the community over the centuries, by appearing to fuse with a surrounding nature and become one with the habitat. There is a particular fusion of medieval castles and manors with the landscape. Norman and Crusader castles dot the landscape from Spain to Poland and Palestine, scenes of rival orders, and have been assimilated, perhaps as enemy emblems, into various ethnic traditions and imaginations – grisly memorials to a proud but cruel and embattled communal past of struggle.

Even more have been the 'native' castles built by the ethnic aristocracies within the territory concerned – Windsor and Warwick, Stirling, Blois and Amboise, Kronborg, Wawel and Warsaw, the castles on the Rhine and the fortresses of feudal Japan. Some of these are 'national monuments' which, like the castle in Warsaw's old town, have been lovingly rebuilt after Nazi demolition; others evoke ambivalent feelings from different classes, yet remain part of the ethnic consciousness because they are inseparable from the habitat and landscape of that community. They have 'grown' into nature, become indispensable components of our imaginative landscapes, and therefore essential 'foundations' for the revived life of the *ethnie*.³⁸

This is also true of the ruins of abbeys, monasteries, palaces and temples. Whatever a sober modern historical account may make of these ruins and their builders, they have infiltrated the consciousness of many generations of communal members who have lived their lives in their shadow. Around them have grown legends, ballads, poems, and finally attempts to lay their ghosts in modern literature, like Forster's evocation of the mysterious caves of Malabar or Lampedusa's of the Baroque palaces of Sicily. The cult of ruins has been especially potent in romantic novels and paintings; a whole artistic genre of abbey ruins grew up in late eighteenth-century England, where water colourists, among others Turner and Girtin and Cozens, cultivated the atmosphere of piquant mystery in decaying chancels and aisles, often overgrown by a luxuriant nature.³⁹ Moonlit ruins by mysterious lakes were favourite motifs of composers, particularly of opera and ballet; and productions of nineteenth-century masterpieces like *Swan Lake* or *Lucia di Lammermoor* or *Aida* attempted to reconstruct the ethnic atmosphere and accessories of their subject-matter.⁴⁰

Some 'ruins' possess exceptional importance for the self-definition and title-deeds of ethnic homelands. These may be strictly sacred, or semi-secular. Among the latter are the Pharaonic monuments of pyramids and temples, especially at Gizeh and Karnak and Thebes. Their effects have been multiple. At the most obvious level, they furnished a manifest self-

definition in the early twentieth-century 'Pharaonism' of writers like Taha Hussein, used to distinguish Egyptians from other Arabs, and point up the 'Pharaonic-Coptic' ancestry of modern Egyptians. At a more subtle level, Western scholarly (and tourist) interest in the grandeur of ancient Egypt inevitably revived and legitimated a sense of Egyptian national pride in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even more elusively, the Egyptian sense of a millennial past and of a mighty pre-Islamic civilization, endows the community with a special sense of its 'fit' with its age-long habitat along the Nile, and of the distinctive character of its setting and territorial identity. Indeed, in ancient days, Egyptians saw themselves simply as 'inhabitants' of 'the land' (of Ptah), other peoples being mere nomads or barbarians. To this day, Egyptians preserve a vivid sense of their unique status among the Islamic and Arab nations.⁴¹

The monuments, then, bear witness to and express a sense of unique identity based upon a claim to a valued terrain in virtue of age-long residence and possession. Similar claims can be made by Greeks, though with far less success. The temples and ruins of ancient Ionian cities, where Greeks have dwelt since the early first millennium BC, also testify to a distinctive Greek identity and claim. But in this case the title-deeds were effectively challenged by a rival culture, Islam, and a hostile polity, Turkey, while the Greek heritage was seriously undermined by the bifurcation in the Greek consciousness between Byzantinism and Hellenism. In Greece proper, this posed less of a problem. It was quite feasible to graft the earlier classical culture which the many temple and city ruins of Corinth, Mycenae, Olympia, Delphi and the Acropolis in Athens made so visible, onto a later, but more living Orthodox culture. Once again, Western Philhellenism enhanced a sense of national pride by linking present-day Greece with an exalted ancient civilization, even if the secularism which its proponents espoused conflicted with ethno-religious preoccupations and assumptions. It was even possible to construct a modern polity upon the Western principles that owed so much to ancient Hellenic ideals and models, despite tensions with religious traditions and institutions. But the attempt to complete the ethnic circle and redeem all areas of Hellenic civilization and landscape was unable to withstand the nationalist imperative of a 'compact state'. A cultural landscape might inspire communal loyalties and enhance a sense of separate identity, but it could never, given its strategic location, outweigh the political and military realities of ethnic state-building.⁴²

It is, of course, interesting that on the Turkish side, despite Kemal Atatürk's secularism, the resistance to Greek invasion was also seen as a victory for Islam, in other words, as a sacred war for the ethno-religious community's homeland.⁴³ Perhaps this helps to account for the Turkish success. If so, the Jewish case would appear to support this view. Though much was buried in *tells* like Megiddo, Lachish and Hatsor, there were enough 'ruins' and sacred sites to draw Jews back periodically to the Holy

Land; the Western or Wailing Wall, in particular, never ceased to exert its spiritual influence over both religious Jews and agnostic Zionists. Equally potent, of course, on the other side was the attraction of the el-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock for religious Muslims; the Temple Mount and Cave of Macpelah in Hebron, the traditional site of Abraham's tomb, are equally sacred to both Muslims and Jews. But, for Jews, archeology has been allied to religious zeal in defining the homeland of Israel, in demarcating its boundaries ('from Dan to Beer-sheba') and in fusing the human monuments with 'their' landscape, thereby uniting a people to 'its' homeland. To discover Bar-Kochba's letters in the caves of Nachal-Hever, or Solomon's stables at Megiddo, is not simply a major contribution to historical knowledge, but a revelation of the indissoluble bonds that link the ancient monuments of a people with their natural environment, and therefore the community with 'its' homeland. By naturalizing the monuments, the community is defined in space and time. We are told 'where we are'.⁴⁴

All kinds of sacred sites, buildings and natural features can delimit and 'locate' a community in a landscape. They do so by recalling symbolic crises, dramatic events or turning-points in the history of the community and by endowing it with foci of creative energy. Such today are the holy cities of Qom and Mashad, centres of creative energy and faith in Shi'ite Iran, just as the Golden Temple of Amritsar marks the holy centre and present focus of energy for militant Sikhs in their struggle to turn the Punjab into a separate state.⁴⁵ In many ways, if in lower key, the shrine of the Black Madonna at Yasna Gora (Czestochowa) in the south, acts as a sacred centre and focus of Catholic patriotism for Poles; much as the sacred monasteries and palace of Lhasa continue to do for modern Tibetans. Angkor-Wat in Kampuchea, Borobudur in Java, the temples of Pagan in Burma, also mark the focal points of past or present creative energy and glory in the history of the community, and their brooding presence serves to define and demarcate the ethnic experiences of historic communities in southeastern Asia. An interesting parallel in Africa is afforded by the mysterious stone ruins of Great Zimbabwe, and particularly the Elliptical Temple, about whose functions there is still much academic dispute. Though the monument appears to have 'grown out of' its natural environment, yet the skill and sophistication of the construction of the great walls with their smooth, unmortared stone slabs, testifies to the presence of a great medieval African civilization which modern Zimbabwe, taking its name from the indigenous appellation for the site, is anxious to reclaim from the depreciation and misrepresentation of earlier White racial theories. For modern nationalist Zimbabwe, this great complex of ruins holds up a model and provides an inspiration for the much-desired regeneration of African culture and society in the new state; at the same time, it seems to suggest that harmony between the nation and its habitat, between man and nature, which alien rule and Western influences had disrupted.⁴⁶

Holy places of man-made or natural origins are crucial for identifying *ethnie*, both in the past and today, because they evoke forces greater than the individual and induce feelings of awe and reverence by their historic associations and symbolic meanings. We can trace these processes in the various cultures and sites throughout the British isles. The New Grange megalithic culture of northern Ireland, which had its counterparts in Spain and the dolmens of Brittany, spread throughout the British isles; we find it in the grave-chambers of the Orkneys, the cromlechs of Wales and Cumbria, and above all, the Windmill Hill complex of Wiltshire, which includes Avebury, West Kennet long barrow, Overton sanctuary and the man-made mound of Silbury Hill. Whatever their other purposes, all these monuments, and especially the Windmill Hill complex, reveal a desire to leave a collective human imprint on nature and to 'mould and remake the landscape on a grand scale', particularly in the causewayed camps. The length of the period over which these monuments were constructed, and the rites of the Great Goddess which they may have served, suggests a continuity of ethnic cultures within Britain, that was only superseded when Iron Age peoples arrived.⁴⁷

Successive Celtic invasions in the later first millennium BC, especially of tribes bearing the La Tene culture, have left important sites and monuments in England and Ireland, particularly around Glastonbury and at Tara and Uisnech in central Ireland. The lake village culture of Glastonbury had an important bearing on the development of British and early Welsh cultures in the late-Roman periods and after, especially when the legends of Arthur and Joseph of Arimathea were linked to produce a Celtic Christian civilization opposed to the pagan Nordic mythologies of the invading Anglo-Saxons. In the abbey, tomb and Tor of Glastonbury, and the hill-fort of South Cadbury (?Camelot), the legend of King Arthur and his Knights was interwoven with that of the Holy Grail brought by Joseph to Britain, and the victory of a Romano-British chieftain in 494 at Mons Badonicus over the Anglo-Saxon pagans was transmuted into the defence of a receding Celtic community and its Christianized culture around the sacred isle of Avalon.⁴⁸

In the Celtic culture of Tara and Slane Christianized by St Patrick around 433, a similar fusion of sacred places and cultures occurred. Patrick's heroic victory over the Druid centres, and his ascent of Croagh Patrick, is still commemorated by Irishmen in the pilgrimage they make up the steep slope on the last Sunday in July, or to Station Island in Lough Derg, Donegal; these centres of spiritual energy marking the turning-points in the life of a community, are symbolized by impressive natural features like mountains and islands. Like the island of Iona, to which St Columba fled in 563 and which became a centre for spreading a Celtic Christianity in the northern parts of the British isles, these sources of spiritual concentration and inspiration derive their power to evoke community and a sense of solidarity from the symbolism of unusual natural features (mountains,

promontories, islands, groves) combined with the memory of holy persons and events; and this conjunction of a remarkable nature and extraordinary humanity can, through its dual symbolism, evoke in subsequent generations those sentiments of belonging and uplift which a returning nationalist intelligentsia often elaborates into a myth of national regeneration.⁴⁹

But not only the extraordinary in nature can serve the purposes of a latter-day historicism. Ordinary nature and ordinary people in their habitual landscapes are also grist to the nationalist mill. For one cultural aspiration of a returning intelligentsia and middle class is the yearning for the spiritual wholeness represented by the countryside and the 'natural' life, as an antidote to the materialism and competitive individualism of city existence. There are several facets of this urban 'populism' of the intelligentsia: the rediscovery of the 'common man' and peasant life; the rediscovery of fields and rivers and forests, man's natural habitat; and a return to rural folkways as the embodiment of purity and truth. The first has produced all those histories and dramas written from the standpoint of the 'common man' from Michelet and Pushkin onwards; here the labouring classes and peasants form the real 'people', as in the operas of Mussourgsky and the paintings of Millet or the Russian, Surikov, who re-casts Russian history in terms of the struggles of popular groups and individuals.⁵⁰

The rediscovery of fields and forests appears already in Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony (with its inscription) or Wordsworth's retreat to the Lake District, in the growth of urban 'returns to nature' from country-walking and the *Wandervogel* to seaside and mountain holidays, and the quest for artistic integrity in remote peasant cultures such as French artists of the last century sought in Brittany, with its sad, solemn Celtic religiosity; all bespeak a recurrent 'populist' impulse that rediscovers in peasant life and its natural environment a 'lost past' which must be recovered if our integrity is to be restored to us.⁵¹ As for rural folkways, whether in Brittany or Finland or among Russian peasants who for Levin in *Anna Karenina* represented the 'simple' truth, it is their immemorial simplicity that appeals to a complexity-laden participant in the brash urbanism of fiercely competitive and often anarchic cities. Hence the appeal of museums of folklore. Their display of ethnic cultures, of peasant costume, rural customs, village architecture and furnishings, evoke for the blasé or anxious city-dweller images of the holy simplicities and dignities of an unhurried and tranquil existence lived in and by a community of like-minded and close-knit families, of a kind that city life has all but destroyed.⁵²

In these ways, even the ordinary landscapes which lack holy places and monuments acquire an ethnic significance in the increasingly urbanized consciousness of modern generations; for they are witnesses and reservoirs of the authentic and simple life-styles and ideals that belonged to former epochs in the history of the community.

Golden ages: the uses of history

Of these epochs, two stand out for subsequent generations. The first is that of the founding fathers who presided over the origins of the community, and who communed with the gods themselves. The second is the 'golden age' of communal splendour, with its sages, saints and heroes, the era in which the community achieved its classical form, and which bequeathed a legacy of glorious memories and cultural achievements. Though it is this second type of epoch that will concern us most, it can only be understood in the context of a whole mythology of heroic origins and descent.

Central to this modern ethnic mythology is the idea of linear development. Communities exist in nature, as it were, and obey the same laws of birth, growth, maturation and decline – and rebirth. The development is linear rather than cyclical, because the period of decline is regarded as 'unnatural', a matter of 'betrayal' from within, or 'subjugation' and decay from without. As Minogue has put it, these myths resemble the motif of the Sleeping Beauty, pricked by external forces of evil and put to sleep until the nationalist dawn arrives to restore the community to its true self in a new 'golden age'. There is an element of predetermination about the pattern of development: efflorescence, decline and rebirth can all be predicted from an analysis of communal origins. They are written into its 'genetic code'; the complex culture can be traced *in nuce* in its earliest and most rudimentary forms, at the outset of its career.⁵³

To deduce from this that these latter-day romantic national mythologies are evolutionist in both form and content, is not only to date them, it is to demonstrate again how historicist intellectuals press 'science' and scientific method into the service of poetic constructs. For these, often elaborate, mythologies are reconstructions of the communal past, which mix genuine scholarship with fantasy, and legend with objectively recorded data, in the service of an ethic of regeneration. This is what is understood here by 'national mythologies' and 'myths of ethnic origins and descent'. These are terms for a systematic editing and reconstruction of much earlier motifs, themselves composed of objective records and legends elaborated around these primary data, which are combined into a unified account of the community's history and destiny, and which imply and entail definite courses of action. With some exceptions, historicist intellectuals fail to conform to later canons of historiography and scientific method; indeed, objectivity is not their main concern. Their aim is to retail the 'past', in such a way as to 'explain' the lot of their community and prescribe remedies for its ills. To this end, historicists must collate different versions and strands of communal traditions and produce a single, unified 'past' which gives a convincing and emotionally satisfying account of the present situation of their ethnic kinsmen. There must be no loose ends, no doubts or conflicting versions,

which can blur and erode the 'native hue of resolution'. Divergent readings of 'history', the chance of multiple histories, can only weaken and stifle a sense of identity which external events have succeeded in 'awakening'; a unified history and a single account can 'make sense' of and 'direct' that aroused consciousness.

Typically, we find a series of motifs or elements in any national mythology or myth of ethnic origins and descent. These include:

- 1 a myth of origins in time; i.e. when the community was 'born';
- 2 a myth of origins in space; i.e. where the community was 'born';
- 3 a myth of ancestry; i.e. who bore us, and how we descend from him/her;
- 4 a myth of migration; i.e. whither we wandered;
- 5 a myth of liberation; i.e. how we were freed;
- 6 a myth of the golden age; i.e. how we became great and heroic;
- 7 a myth of decline; i.e. how we decayed and were conquered/exiled; and
- 8 a myth of rebirth; i.e. how we shall be restored to our former glory.

Apart from the second, and perhaps the fourth motif, all these elements require the mediation and inspiration of superhuman agents, or 'heroes'; or, in motif 7, their absence or decrease. For though the basic pattern is laid down in the community's 'genetic code', it requires human, and superhuman, agency to bring it to fruition. The achievement of its various stages requires assistance from voluntary agents; otherwise the community could well remain in an arrested state at an early stage of its trajectory. The basic identity code sets the pattern and direction; but humans and heroes alone can 'realize' it. That is why the legends are personalized, and why the golden age is also the age of 'heroes'. The 'uses of history' are the virtues of great men.⁵⁴

In fact, there is no great city today in any part of the world that does not commemorate – in buildings, statues, tombs or memorials – the virtues of the renowned heroes of the community's past. Streets and squares named after ancient heroes and geniuses, recall to present generations their cultural and moral heritage. Plaques on buildings remind them of the presence of past greatness in our midst. Some cemeteries, like Père Lachaise in Paris, and some churches like Westminster Abbey or S. Croce in Florence, have become veritable collective monuments to the famous dead. Few capitals do not boast tombs to the Unknown Warrior or monuments to the glorious dead, who have become latter-day communal heroes, worthy descendants of their mighty forebears who like them sacrificed their lives for 'king and country'.

This impulse to ethnic commemoration is not new. 'Let us now praise famous men', wrote the author of Ecclesiasticus in the first century BC; and great kings and nobles from those of Egypt and Assyria to the Normans and Russians have chronicled the exploits and valour of their ancestors. New are the forms which the commemorative impulse has taken, and the collective

objects which its symbols, more or less openly, evoke. These objects are no longer individuals or families of the upper classes, but the whole community in its various guises. The modern cult of great men expresses our attachment to our nations, and the national genius is fulfilled in the great heroes of intellect and culture.

It was towards the end of the eighteenth century that this cult of great men as exemplars of the community and its virtues became explicit, especially in France. Already under the *ancien régime*, architects and painters were commissioned to produce works that commemorated in allegory and symbol the virtues of their community under its royal tutelage. Thus in 1774 the Comte d'Angiviller, Louis XVI's newly appointed Surintendant des Bâtiments, began to commission a series of paintings from the leading artists which would depict key events in France's medieval royal history, especially episodes from the life of St Louis and the Anglo-French wars. These were clearly intended as propaganda statements in the Crown's struggles with a recalcitrant nobility, and were directed towards the rising bourgeoisie; the implication was that French greatness could be revived through a modernized administration under royal auspices, as had been the case in the past.⁵⁵ In the same vein, the Pantheon was secularized and turned into a mausoleum for France's more recent 'great dead' at the onset of the Revolution, when Voltaire's remains were brought from Sellières and solemnly re-interred there in 1791.⁵⁶ As the Revolution proceeded, more and more great men of France's recent and distant past, as well as of her 'Roman antecedents', were commemorated, along with more explicit monuments to *la Patrie* in the shape of fêtes, altars and allegorical statues. The genre of famous recent personages like Rousseau and Diderot, begun by Houdon, multiplied in the Napoleonic era, as did the spate of contemporary 'histories' in painting like David's *Coronation of Napoleon* (Sacre) or Gros' records of Napoleon's battles. The message was clear: the national revival was at hand, and Napoleon was a latter-day St Louis or Francis I.⁵⁷

A similar cult of national genius in the shape of the famous swept through England, Prussia and Italy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, producing monuments to the dead of Leipzig, portrait busts of famous composers like Handel and Beethoven, and frescoes recalling Roman glories by Appiani and Camuccini in Italy.⁵⁸ Each community, as its intellectuals became self-aware, began to appropriate its past and above all the heroes who summed up its conception of itself. In the cult of genius, was reflected the sense of a people's creativity and mission to the world. Indeed, a community that could not appropriate or produce any genius or hero was likely to be denied its claims, for its individuality resided to the full in its great men.

Such heroes were, of course, treated as historical personages, since no great distinction was made between objective historical fact and poetic myth or tradition. Every attempt was made to 'authenticate' them, to place them in

their appropriate historical and ethnic setting. They were assigned to a period and a community by their dress, speech, habits, physiognomy and accessories; sculptors and painters like David and Canova recreated the heroes of classical antiquity as much by attention to archeological detail as by the aura of nobility with which they invested them.⁵⁹ By the mid-nineteenth century, events from medieval history of the community concerned and the heroes who presided over those epochs, had become part of the language of 'official' nation-building. Daniel Maclise's series of portrayals of critical moments in English history on the walls of Barry's reconstructed Houses of Parliament (1849) epitomizes that spirit of burgeoning national pride and identity which Surikov and Mussoury in Russia, Vryzakis and Korais in Greece, Matejko and Chopin in Poland, and Lönnrot, Gallen-Kallela and Sibelius in Finland, each expressed in fresco, epic or music, crystallizing the ideal of an heroic age which could inspire fresh glories in a renewed nation.⁶⁰

For the hero is never solitary. He may be a 'lone genius', but in the nationalist view, he is a vessel of the community's creativity and therefore part of the flow of national life. Above all, he is part of, or closely related to, the golden age. He is its exemplification. He may well have no historicity at all, and that is all to the good, since what counts for subsequent generations is his mythopoeic qualities. We need not accept the earlier theses of Raglan that such heroes are everywhere the same, much less that they derive from ancient Middle Eastern ritual and religious dramas, to appreciate their overriding symbolic and mythic dimensions. Whatever spurious authenticity latter-day nationalist historians may lend the heroes of the golden age, their appeal resides not in any 'scientific' basis for their existence and deeds, but in their ability to stir the imagination by presenting a pageant and panorama of antique nobility and by inspiring an ambition to emulate their qualities and deeds. Whatever the historical basis of heroes like King Arthur or William Tell or Achilles, there is no denying the potent effects of these ethnic archetypal figures in conjuring before the imagination visions of valour and splendour which extend to a whole era and its society. For each of these heroes has meaning only within the context of his (or her) milieu; even if they pose challenges for later generations, they epitomize a heroic era and a community of noble qualities which can be emulated, but not transplanted to another habitat or epoch. In fact, their 'heroism' has grown with the distance travelled by subsequent generations, and the heroes, whether they had any basis in fact or not, have become merged in myths and traditions which substitute for genuine records or memories.⁶¹

It is interesting to see how certain heroes come to the fore at different times. King Arthur and his Round Table became immensely popular in the fifteenth century as the era of feudal chivalry waned and a new, more centralized and bureaucratic order emerged; and again his appeal was renewed at a similar moment of transition in the nineteenth century, when

he also began to be appropriated by 'Celtic' Welsh nationalism as part of a resurgent 'Brythonic' culture.⁶² William Tell likewise achieved popularity in the late eighteenth century with plays by Lémierre and Schiller, paintings by Vincent and Schall, and Rossini's later opera, though peasant risings in the seventeenth century had already invoked his name. The fact is that, irrespective of his historicity, Tell shooting the apple off his son's head at the behest of the foreign tyrant, Gessler, perfectly captured the spirit of radical rebellion, and has continued to do so in our century – in Switzerland. Tell is 'dated' to the period of Swiss struggle against Habsburg intervention, along with Stauffacher, the Rütli, Sempach and Morgarten, and his legend is inconceivable outside that temporal and spatial (Alpine) context.⁶³

In the same way, the popularity of ancient Greek heroes like Achilles derives from a particular context, a special golden age to which other, modern European nations looked back with nostalgia. If the Greeks themselves had to re-appropriate his memory and myth with difficulty, other eighteenth-century European nations found it much easier to allocate him to a period of their own pristine youth. In the 'Homeric revival' of Hamilton, David, Appiani and Flaxman, the self-renewing Western European nations sought a common epic ancestry that was at once antique and classical, yet also an inspiration for modern endeavour, at once Greek and Mediterranean, yet also imitable by Northern peoples filled with the desire to 'do great things'. As the very type of the hero, the sorely-tried Achilles came to act as an exemplar for heroism nearer home, and a challenge from a remote but ancestral civilization.⁶⁴

This contextual role of the hero can be most vividly appreciated by considering the appeal of Cuchulain. When O'Grady and Lady Gregory began to recover the myths of Ireland's pre-Christian heroic age in the sagas of the Ulster Cycle, their followers in the Gaelic League and similar organizations were particularly drawn to the figure of the Irish 'stranger' who helped King Conchobar of Ulster to resist the incursions of Queen Maeve from Connaught. Cuchulain and his exploits and qualities – early valour, miraculous feats, generosity, self-sacrifice, beauty and loyalty – evoked an archaic epoch of nobility and liberty, in which the full potential of Irishmen was realized.⁶⁵ From that golden era of High Kings, saints and warring heroes, there stretched the long inevitability of decline and subjugation to the English yoke. Only a liberated and rurally based Celtic nation, such as the aristocratic golden age of *fianna* (warrior bands) and *filid* (poets and intellectuals) seemed to embody, could reverse this inner decay and restore Ireland to her rightful place of cultural and social leadership in the comity of nations. The rediscovery and appreciation of early Celtic art and literature that took place in the nineteenth century simply enhanced the nationalist mythology of a broken linear development and its summons to communal regeneration: a people once capable of producing treasures like the Ardagh Chalice, the Tara Brooch and the Book of Kells must have the potential for

future creativity and greatness, at present atrophied by the climate of foreign oppression. Thus Cuchulain and Fin Mac Cool and their bands of heroes came to symbolize what is 'ours' and what lies 'within us' and which no foreigner could hope to understand. The return to the golden age of a distant past was the royal road by which communities could discover themselves.⁶⁶

Whatever the similarities in motif that we may uncover in all the legends of heroes in different cultures, the significance of the hero in his own land and among his own community lies in his particular virtue and his unique context. This virtue is peculiar to a specific group of descendants, the context is relevant only to a single community and its habitat. The hero is an exemplar. At certain times, his example may be appropriated by groups who cannot claim any 'genealogical' descent, only a more fluid 'ideological' kinship or affinity; but his being and qualities have special meanings for any group that claims 'genealogical' descent from him and his associates in the heroic age which they symbolize. The myth of putative descent from the heroes of the golden age, irrespective of any basis in fact, exerts a powerful appeal for embattled communities which feel they can trace their lineages and lands back to that epoch. The hero assumes importance not because of some recent attachment to abstract virtue (or virtues), but because he exemplifies a golden age of communal achievement in the past, which moderns hope to emulate and for which he and his associates offer inspiration and direction. He sums up an atmosphere and a milieu which by its splendour and challenge can help to unite and mobilize those who claim him as their spiritual and kin ancestor. Above all, he embodies in a pure form the allegedly 'real' qualities of the community, which modern complexity has obscured and tainted. By immersing ourselves in his achievements and those of the golden age of heroes, we can at last break free from the 'fetters' of a baleful fate and mould modernity in the image of an authentic and autonomous community.⁶⁷

It may be objected that not even the most visionary nationalist envisaged an actual return to a golden age or the imitation of any hero under quite different modern conditions. Even the most determined heroic populist conceded the need to organize modern society along lines that were quite alien to 'our forefathers'. But such objections betray their underlying instrumentalism. The 'golden age' myth was part of an elaborate nationalist mythology, which sought to reconstruct out of received motifs a complete 'national trajectory' in which continuity and identity with a distant past were the main characteristics. At the same time, the evolutionist model which most nationalists adopted made that continuity and identity subject to continual development. No Norwegian nationalist prescribed a return to any feature of the country's Viking Age; what impressed latter-day nationalists was the spirit of independence and adventure (and craftsmanship) which marked out these 'ancient Norwegians' from other Nordic peoples, and

which pointed towards linguistic and political autonomy for modern Norway.⁶⁸

Similarly, no modern Finnish intellectual prescribed a return to the activities of gods and heroes in the *Kalevala*, which was first compiled by Lönnrot in 1835. Heroes like Lemminkainen, who became widely known through the tone-poems of Sibelius and the paintings of Akseli Gallen-Kallela in the 1890s and 1900s, seemed to embody the natural individuality of an emergent Finnish culture which sought to free itself from Swedish cultural and Russian political constraints. They spoke of distant times and misty places, yet by their qualities and exploits suggested a proximity of inner emotion and a spiritual kinship that bound Finns together, while separating them from their Nordic and Russian neighbours. What the legends of the *Kalevala* evoked was a pristine golden age of Finnish culture attained by a free society in its natural environment of lakes and forests, one which might therefore be revived when Finns were granted an autonomy commensurate with their sense of identity and difference.⁶⁹ Neither the free-trading liberal and westernising followers of Mechelin and Runeberg, with their harmonious pastoral idyll of an ancient people in its beautiful landscape, nor the populist, radical Fennomans of Yrjö-Koskinen and Snellman, who appealed to the clergy and farmers by stressing the continuity of rural life as a buttress for a Finnish national culture and language, wanted to return to the life-style and ideals of warrior heroes and tribal conflicts portrayed in the national epic. Rather, the didactic and atmospheric element in the poems, and the sheer fact that there had been (or so it seemed to them) an early period of truly Finnish civilization and literary culture, caught their imaginations and inspired a programme of nation-creating.⁷⁰

It was the same faculty of imagination that Yeats invoked on reading Lady Gregory's book on the exploits of Cuchulain, published in 1902, and it was the same appeal to great and intense emotions that he contrasted with the narrow confines of our rooms and our lives.⁷¹ For the intelligentsia of the smaller *ethnie* aspiring to become nations, the rediscovery of a golden age of heroes worthy of the classical ages of Greece, Rome and Israel became both a status symbol and an inner need. Little wonder that the Ossianic epics forged by Macpherson, and conjuring up visions of distant sagas of Fin Mac Cool and Oisín, but transplanted to Scotland's Highlands, so stirred the European imagination that writers and painters in many lands sought to portray and extol the ancient Celtic heroes.⁷²

Outside Europe, too, colonial intelligentsias dreamt of recovering a history that would stand comparison with those of European nations and provide the unifying and mobilizing inspiration which it was furnishing in Europe. Thus Hindu Indian intellectuals in the late nineteenth century returned to the study of their Vedic heritage initiated by Max Müller; the heroes of the Ramayana and Mahabharata soon turned into historical figures who had presided over a classical golden age of Gangetic free city-states and set

enviable standards of civilization and religious culture for their descendants to emulate after winning their independence.⁷³ A succession of Arab intellectuals from al-Afghani and Rashid Rida to Sati al-Husri and Aflaq have also sought to recover for a self-renewing Arab nation the glories of the Prophet and the Age of Companions (and perhaps the Umayyad or Abbasid Caliphates), not with any view to returning to that type of society, but of seeking lessons and inspiration for the guidance of a Muslim Arab nation today. Their many attempts to show the Qu'ranic derivation of modern socialism and liberalism reveal a need to find an ethnically and religiously specific basis for universal ideals, one that harmonizes with a communal sense of solidarity and distinctiveness.⁷⁴

Sometimes, indeed, there is a choice of golden age from which to draw inspiration and moral guidance. In modern Iran, one could look back with the Pahlavis to the days of Achaemenid glory and model social and individual ideals on an 'Aryan' morality and specifically Persian culture. Alternatively, one may dismiss the Achaemenid and Sassanid heritage to embrace a specifically Shi'ite and anti-Umayyad Muslim historical outlook, such as the clerical regime under Khomeini adopted; the morality here is one of suffering and martyrdom in the service of the community which, though it reaches beyond Iranian borders, nevertheless remains wedded to, and embedded in, an Iranian worldview and Iranian institutions.⁷⁵ The same choice has presented itself in modern Greece and Egypt, and it is hardly surprising if the older heritage, the classical and the 'Pharaonic', remains largely confined to an intellectual elite, in the face of the far more popularly diffused Orthodox Byzantine and Arab Muslim cultures. In this respect, secular Hellenism has fared better than a secular Egyptianism which only briefly flourished with Taha Hussein and Abd-el Raziq in the inter-war period; yet, the periodic swing back to a purely Egyptian (rather than pan-Arab) outlook remains a viable emotional option for Egyptians.⁷⁶

In each of the golden ages, modern intelligentsia and middle classes in search of legitimacy and pedigrees and driven by a yearning for a secure identity, found a world to re-enter that was poetic and grandiose and intense. A world of mystery and imagination that lured businessmen, industrialists and diplomats to the distant past in Knossos and Troy, Ur and Nineveh, and drew professionals and clerics, traders and teachers, into prolonged studies of the imagined early medieval past of their own communities, which henceforth cast a spell over their minds and transformed their outlooks and lives. The cult of an heroic past became a powerful antidote to the 'disenchantment of the world'.

But middle classes and their intelligentsia need something more than magic in a routinized world. They also want moral guidance. This, too, the world of heroes can supply. When painters like Brenet and Durameau depict the continence of Scipio and the valour of Du Guesclin or Bayard, they are exhorting their countrymen to emulate the ancient heroes if they wish to

recover the greatness and nobility of the golden ages of republican Rome or medieval France.⁷⁷ When Benjamin West depicts the sorrowing Agrippina carrying back her husband's, Germanicus, ashes from Brundisium, and two years later (1770) General Wolfe dying in battle on the heights of Quebec in 1759, he is suggesting the possibility of a new age of British glory worthy of ancient Rome, if the British will follow Wolfe's (and Germanicus') spirit of self-sacrifice.⁷⁸ A host of critics and writers in late eighteenth-century France exhorted their countrymen to emulate the virtues of antique Romans – along with their art and architecture – because that way they could ensure a glorious revival for France, Rome's heir and spiritual successor.⁷⁹ In India, a century later, Tilak and Aurobindo drew for modern Hindus the moral of the lessons which Krishna imparted to Arjuna in the Bhagavad-Gita over two millennia ago, and urged Indians to be warlike and loyal in their struggle for freedom.⁸⁰

It is, of course, possible to abstract the 'virtues' required for the tasks nationalists have set themselves. They are remarkably similar everywhere. They include martial valour, generosity, temperance, self-sacrifice, endurance, loyalty, and, above all, patriotism. All these go to make up the quality of 'nobility' which is the quintessence of a hero. But closer inspection reveals that, while a good deal of what Rosenblum has called 'historical mobility' is permitted in the definition of heroic subject-matter by writers, artists and statesmen – Robespierre and other revolutionaries had various lists of famous men they invoked – the meaning of the virtues which the hero exemplifies varies according to the historical context both of the subject-matter and of the audience to whom the moral exhortation is addressed.⁸¹

On the whole, other communities' heroes – Achilles, King David, Brutus the consul – have been filtered through the lens of a given community's own tradition of heroes, and the 'virtues' that have been admired by later generations were not necessarily those thought worthy by the hero's contemporaries. (One has only to think of the 'virtues' attributed to David or Solomon through the ages, both among Jews and non-Jews.) Since the nationalists' tasks are specific, and since the myths they unearth are culture-bound, any understanding of the kind of moral guidance and inspiration furnished by the community's ancient heroes and golden age is also particular; a list of abstract virtues required for freedom struggles cannot catch this moral specificity. History may be a moral teacher, but only by depicting for us 'our' peculiar virtues and vices in the person of culture-bound heroes and villains: a mischievous German Till Eulenspiegel, a sad and whimsical Spanish knight Don Quixote, a humorous youthful Finnish Lemminkainen, a dreamy bardic Oisín of Ireland. History becomes a quarry, not of a generalized morality, but of particular moralities expressing unique pasts.

We may summarize the uses of legends about the golden age and its heroes as follows:

- 1 Ancient heroes, like man-made monuments or unique natural features, are not sought out for themselves, nor because there is any desire to return to them or their ways. They are of interest because they symbolize a golden age of heroism and glory which, like a shining beacon, furnishes a model for communal regeneration.
- 2 The ancient heroes are not of interest simply as repositories of abstract virtues, nor is history an undifferentiated quarry of morality. The heroes, like the history, can only be understood and appreciated in their temporal and spatial contexts, as epitomizing and crystallizing the presumed virtues and qualities of the particular community.
- 3 The cult of golden ages and heroes can only be grasped in the context of nationalist mythologies of communal pasts, in which they serve as focal points of comparison with the present, and with Significant Others, within the framework of an evolutionary reconstruction of ethnic history.
- 4 Similarly the commemoration of renowned past heroes and the cult of genius derives its meaning and popular appeal from their appropriation by 'the nation'. For, in the greatness and sublimity of the hero and genius is symbolized and crystallized the creative power and unique virtue of the community which they reveal.
- 5 The historicity of heroes and golden ages alike is quite secondary. What matters for posterity is their ability to evoke a lost splendour and virtue, and to act as stimuli and models for a national self-renewal today. Hence, that hero and that golden age which can, at any juncture, best conjure up the appropriate vision and exert the greatest leverage on the majority of the literate classes, will be most sought after and will have the greatest influence in shaping the moral direction and tone of the national revival.

Myths and nation-building

If it is true that those units stand the best chance of forming nations which are constructed around an ancient ethnic core, then both 'history' and 'landscape' become essential vehicles and moulds for nation-building. But their greatest influence is indirect: through the myths and symbols of community which they evoke. Herein lies their 'community-creating' potency, and here too we find the roots of their directive capacity. For, once unearthed and appropriated, the mythology and symbolism of poetic spaces and golden ages casts its own social spell.

It is, of course, easy to appreciate the uses of history and nature in the task of nation-building. To turn a motley horde of people into an institutionalized nation, to give them a sense of belonging and identity, to unify and integrate them, to give them a sense of authenticity and autonomy and fit them for self-rule, all require a symbolic framework in and through which they can be

mobilized and stabilized. This is just what the mythology of the past, and the poetry of nature, can provide. It enables leaders to set goals for the community by referring to the great era of heroism as a model of action and achievement. It gives the people a sense of anchorage and stability during a period of dislocation and upheaval. It confers upon often downtrodden populations a sense of their (former) dignity and antiquity; and it brings together disparate groups and classes into a solidary unit through its myth of common descent.

All this is true and important. What it misses, however, is even more important: the ways in which such myths and symbols, values and memories, *shape* the nation-to-be. They are not simply 'instruments' of leaders and elites of the day, not even of whole communities. They are potent signs and explanations, they have capacities for generating emotion in successive generations, they possess explosive power that goes far beyond the 'rational' uses which elites and social scientists deem appropriate. Evoking an heroic past is like playing with fire, as the history of all too many *ethnie* and nations locked in conflict today, can tell. The fires generated by these mythical pasts burn for several generations, long after the events that first stimulated their acceptance. It is for this reason that some attention must be devoted to the forms of ancient myths, and the symbolism of holy places, in the present construction of nations. One may learn as much about the 'spirit' and 'shape' of modern nations by an investigation of their myths of golden ages and their poetry of nature, as by any analysis of social institutions and class formation.

In making such an assertion the specific features of particular nations must be distinguished from the general features of 'the nation' as a type of social formation. In the life of the populations that make up modern nations both are equally important and closely linked. Education systems, for example, can be described and analysed in generic terms, and their main features and functions generalized; but the differences between the English, French and German systems are readily apparent and quite as vital for the participants, as the problems of exchange witness. Differences of tone, emphasis, scope and intensity, which can be described but not so easily generalized, permeate the various educational systems; while wide differences in curricula, examinations, teaching practices, and even institutional structure (English public schools, German gymnasia, French lycées and grands écoles) shape the very different ensuing outlooks and achievements of the younger generations. Such examples can easily be multiplied from diverse spheres like industrial relations, parliamentary practices, church – state relations, leisure and consumption patterns, and family and marriage relationships.

The many differences spring from the very diverse histories and cultures of nations before industrialization, as well as their varying trajectories of modernization.⁸² These historical divergences are inseparable from the specific features of ethnic groups which form the core of modern nations.

Institutional and even class differences between neighbouring nations often owe much of their particularity to the whole complex of myths, symbols, memories and values that compose the ethnic profile or pattern of emergent nations. For example, the highly centralized nature of French administration and education owes much to the *étatiste* tradition of the monarchy and the need to evolve a Paris-based royal French mythology and symbolism, to combat the centrifugal tendencies of localism and provincialism with its often non-French societies and cultures. Even when dynastic continuity was broken in 1793, centralizing *étatisme* flourished as part of a wider French linguistic and cultural drive for homogeneity; from the Abbé Gregoire to the educationalists of the Third Republic there is an unbroken concern for the centralist Jacobin conception of a unified French culture and society at the expense of Breton, Alsatian, Provençal, Basque and other local cultures. In contrast, the decentralized nature of Indian parliamentary and political life and institutions reflects both the 'structural' divisions of caste, region and language (and religion), and the 'cultural' mythologies and symbolisms of Hindu (and non-Hindu) India, whose particularity resides in its capacity for tolerating diversity in social and cultural life and practice. As the various histories of the Indian subcontinent were explored, their holy sites catalogued, their heroes commemorated and their golden ages rediscovered and eulogised, this very plurality of its antiquities and beliefs subtly permeated and guided the shape and content of modern Indian national society, as much as its diversity of cleavages and institutions.⁸³

At this point it becomes clear why these mythologies are resurrected and why these symbolic codes and historical memories regain their potency in new ways. Mythology and symbolism have always provided 'maps' and 'moralities'; today, ethnic mythologies and national symbolisms can furnish the maps and moralities of modern nations, once they have been reconstructed and reinterpreted to meet modern needs. A community's golden age can chart an *ethnie's* future and even furnish a blueprint; its natural features, monuments and terrain can locate it and give it boundaries in the comity of nations; while its holy places and heroes can inspire and teach members of the modern community how to be true to the inner laws of a living nation.

Above all, in the confusion and rootlessness of the modern world, ethnic mythologies and symbolisms can restore the collective heritage and explain 'who we are' to ourselves and to others, by clearly demarcating what is authentically 'ours' from what is alien, in much the same way that traditional religions distinguished the sacred from the profane. Similarly, ethnic nationalisms generate their own ritual and sacred practices, their feasts and celebrations, monuments and memorials, parades and pilgrimages, which commemorate and extol critical moments and exemplary persons in the life-story of the nation.

But, how exactly do these elaborated mythologies chart and locate modern nations? This is best seen by considering some examples of ethnic map-

making and morality. First, Greece: for modern Greeks, as I intimated, the future could mirror 'the past' in more than one way, since there was a clear split in that past. One school argued for the Byzantine roots and glory of Greece. They pointed to the massive influx of Slavic immigrants in the sixth and succeeding centuries throughout the Balkans and Greece, and claimed that this had weakened the links with a decayed Hellenic (or Hellenistic-Roman) culture. What was Byzantine was essentially Orthodox Christianity; only the Greek language and liturgy retained any connection with a pre-Christian past. In the Orthodox *millet* of the Ottoman empire, Christianity had kept a Byzantine Greek *ethnie* alive, as in a chrysalis, ready to be transformed under the impact of Western ideas and commercialization in the late eighteenth century.⁸⁴ For the Byzantine-Orthodox clergy and their flocks, for the notables in the Morea and Phanariots in Constantinople, this grandiose dream of a restored Byzantine empire under Greek control located the re-nascent Greek people and charted their future in the Aegean and Ionia. It also pointed the way to a restored agrarian society of peasants, notables and clergy, essentially smallholders, but led by educated Orthodox elites under the Patriarch.

Another school opposed this dream with its summons to military adventure in Anatolia, and took its blueprint from a Western reading of classical antiquity. While conceding the demographic break with the ancient Greek world, the westernized intelligentsia claimed a continuing spiritual affinity between modern Western, secular ideals and those of classical Athens. Locating the modern Greeks through their cultural heritage of classical antiquity along an east-west axis that stretched from Paris and London to Athens and Constantinople, the 'Hellenic' map differed profoundly from the 'Byzantine' one; for the latter had a north-south axis from Moscow to Constantinople and Egypt, which aligned a re-nascent Byzantine Greece with Orthodox Russia as the protector of Eastern Christianity. There was a similar contrast in ethnic moralities. While the Byzantine conception of Greek revival envisaged a renewal of the Orthodox Christian virtues and ecclesiastical controls, the secular Hellenic vision advocated a 'return' to the qualities of rational enquiry, self-control and reflective choice which seemed to sum up the ethical message of ancient Greece.

These differences in moral vision and map-making bred, in turn, conflicting institutional needs and social policies, within the constraints of an under-developed economy and society in terms of Western standards. Though both were 'backward-looking', the hierarchical and theocratic Byzantine ideal with its cultural affinity to Orthodox Tsarism, lent itself to a rural and patriarchal society whose political institutions would be subordinated to the religious controls of the clergy and their supporters among the notables; their suspicions of the West would be compensated by the eastward drive inherent in the *Megale Idea* and its dream of a restored Byzantine empire in Anatolia and the Aegean. Whereas the Hellenic vision,

though it too could act as a brake on technological advance and economic progress through its emphasis upon the 'gentlemanly' ideals of a literary classicism in education and legal institutions, tended to orient Greek social and political policies towards a Western outlook and enlightenment path of state-guided social progress.⁸⁵

Second, India: here too there was a considerable range of historical options. Vedic, post-Vedic classical, and Mauryan pasts all lent themselves to map-making and social morality among Hindus. Certainly, the reformist attempts of first the Brahmo Samaj and then the Arya Samaj in the mid-nineteenth century took as their models a reconstruction of classical India in the pre-Mauryan period, and sought to prune Hinduism and hence the caste system of all its later accretions. A vision of the city-states of northern India around the Ganges plain at the time of the Buddha provided both a spiritual location (and a physical centre) for an emergent 'India' and a locus of moral inspiration. In this respect, Tilak's appeal to the moral imperatives of the Bhagavad-Gita, which I mentioned, were designed to anchor a social ethics in the assumed virtues of 'our ancestors' and 'ancient heroes', in strong contrast to the overly secular and rationalistic ethics imported from Western sources.⁸⁶ This had the important political consequences, not only of severing the large Muslim community with its Mughal golden age and Indus-based religious landscapes, but also of lending a strongly neo-traditionalistic and populist tenor to Indian nationalism, in contrast to the more reformist, secular Congress approach. The interplay between these two forms of Indian Hindu nationalism has coloured both the self-conceptions of the emergent Indian nation, and the bases of social integration of the Hindu community that forms the core of the Indian polity.⁸⁷ It has also profoundly influenced the rate of domestic political violence and communal conflict, as well as the oscillations in Indian policies towards Pakistan.

Third, Israel: here there are equally radical divergences in the basic orientations provided by ethnic symbolism and mythology. While there remains a general, unifying commitment to 'the Jewish people' as a whole, quite different interpretations of their identity and destiny have emerged in the modern era. Though stimulated by responses to a perceived challenge from the West, these interpretations have crystallized around different conceptions of the homeland, the golden age and its heroes. On the one hand, there is the Orthodox Mosaic conception which was filtered through the Talmudic heritage, and which subordinated the land to the Torah and looked back to the twin heroic eras of the Exodus and the Temple as seen through the lens of the Mishnah. In the latter, the Torah of Ezra was adapted to the needs of small cultivators through a compendious legislation on all aspects about which the much earlier Pentateuch was silent, but on which a divinely sanctioned Oral Law had been transmitted. Though Palestine provided a pivot for this rabbinic conception of Judaism and Jewry,

the later codifications of the Gemara (Talmud) were adapted to the life of Babylonian urban communities, and thus subordinated the homeland to the Law and its rabbinic sages, who emerge as Jewry's real heroes.⁸⁸ As a consequence, the diaspora retains its significance even when a homeland has been re-established in Israel today, and even when the Biblical location of that homeland is pressed by nationalist returnees to Orthodox Judaism (Gush Emunim). There is a split in the Orthodox ranks over territorial claims, but less so over the essentially theocratic vision espoused for the state of Israel; the ideal of a truly 'Jewish state' is premised on the autonomy of the religious community under its rabbinic sages as it was found in Mishnaic Palestine.⁸⁹

The ethnic map-making and morality of secular Jewry is quite different. Though there are divisions along ideological (and social) lines, a secular conception of Jewish history and destiny views it as a revival of the glory of the Jewish kingdom under David and Solomon, in which a mythical social order of roughly equal pastoralists, cultivators and townsmen was able to throw up great poets and prophets and curb social excesses in a basically egalitarian and progressive social order.⁹⁰ For some secularists, any revival of Jewry's fortunes can therefore only take place through settlement and agricultural return to the homeland, the rich 'soils' of which bore such creative fruit; Zionism and *aliya* are the prerequisites of normalization and regeneration, but they are closely linked to a Western social and political orientation with definite territorial (small-Israel) and political (secular-state) consequences and a clear conception of heroic models in the kings and judges (military leaders and statesmen) of old.⁹¹ For other secularists, the revival of Jewry will be accomplished by a renaissance of Judaism, once it has been pruned of later Talmudic accretions. What is needed is a return to the 'original' Prophetic tradition, which will provide moral inspiration for both Jews and non-Jews, and a spiritual location for Israel among the nations.⁹²

Finally, England. As an 'old, continuous nation', it might seem as if England needed no ethnic map-making and moral inspiration. But this is far from the case. At least since the Norman invasion, if not earlier, myths were circulated and symbols promulgated by chroniclers and clergy which echoed and explained an emergent Anglo-Norman or English identity, in contradistinction to Welsh, Scottish and, later, Irish identities. Geoffrey of Monmouth, in particular, put forward an influential mythology about Brutus and his sons landing in Albion which became a potent framework for political claims by the English monarchy: Brutus, great-grandson of Aeneas who escaped from Troy, on reaching Albion's shores, divided his kingdom between his three sons, with the eldest, Loqrinus, receiving England, Kamber, the second son, Wales, and the youngest, Albanactus, Scotland. On this basis, the Plantagenet and later the Tudor monarchies claimed seniority and feudal hegemony by England over Scotland and Wales; this was backed by an acceptance of a version of the Arthurian legend which also

saw Wales and Scotland as feudal tributaries of that fifth-century prince, and inspired a confident, aggressive sense of English nationality in the sixteenth century.⁹³

Later myth-making and morality-generating activities occurred in both the seventeenth and later eighteenth centuries, the first stressing the myth of the Norman Yoke, especially during the Civil War, the second Blakean ideals of a home-grown egalitarian Christianity focused on Joseph of Arimathea and Arthurian Glastonbury.⁹⁴ This in turn was linked to a renewed interest in the Druids and Celtic Britons, seen as an idyllic golden era of peace and harmony with nature, when Britain acted as the cultural centre for Gallic and other Celtic peoples, as Caesar suggested.⁹⁵ But there was also a parallel interest in the Anglo-Saxons, following the revolt against the 'Norman Yoke'; themes like Rowena and Vortigern, Elfrida, Earl Godwin and Queen Emma, and the life of Alfred, surface in the 'history paintings' of the late eighteenth century. The Loyal Associations, founded by Arthur Young in 1792, traced the origins of English liberties and parliamentary evolution through the Glorious Revolution, the growth of Parliament, back to the 'free' institutions of Angles and Saxons, in contrast to Tory and Disraelian images of the medieval aristocratic heritage and its paternalism.⁹⁶ Archeology, too, tended in the nineteenth century to lend support to a purely English identity based on Saxon origins, within the wider British and imperial framework. The work of men like Kemble and Wright in England and Germany boosted an English self-image in poets like Housman and the Georgians, composers like Vaughan-Williams and Bax and the folksong revival of Cecil Sharpe, and this still provides a guiding thread for many Englishmen beyond the circles of the Right and the populist Left.⁹⁷

In these brief resumes, we can see that 'nation-building' is not simply a matter of establishing the appropriate institutions or generating a complex class structure around a communications infrastructure.⁹⁸ Nor is it a once-for-all affair. Creating nations is a recurrent activity, which has to be renewed periodically. It is one that involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions; each generation must re-fashion national institutions and stratification systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the 'past', which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and institutions. Hence that activity of rediscovery and re-interpretation is never complete and never simple; it is the product of dialogues between the major social groups and institutions within the boundaries of the 'nation', and it answers to their perceived ideals and interests.

At the same time, this 'nation-building' activity operates within a definite tradition; it is not made over entirely anew by each generation, but inherits the mythologies and symbolisms of previous generations. A new generation

may come to reject the interpretation of its predecessor, and question its values, myths and symbols, forsaking its holy sites for new ones and replacing its golden ages and heroes by others; but all this questioning and replacement is carried on within definite emotional and intellectual confines, which constitute far more powerful and durable barriers to the outside than any physical boundaries. This is because a social magnetism and psychological charge attaches to the 'myth-symbol complexes' of particular *ethnie* which in turn form the basis of a nation's core heritage. It is not only a question of their often considerable antiquity, though that is potent, but of their proven capacity to create bonds and generate a 'society' in the past, through the mythical and emotional union of kin groups sharing a common 'history and destiny'.

Each generation, therefore, constructs its own social maps and chooses its special ethnic moralities, but it does so within a limited matrix formed by a strong social attachment to specific 'myth-symbol complexes', particular landscapes and unique ranges of epochs and personages, for these constitute the intrinsic ethnicity of particular *ethnie*. Hence, it is not only necessary to become conversant with the histories of particular *ethnie* if we wish to gauge their range of map-making and moralities in our era; we need also to grasp the histories of their successive rediscoveries and reconstructions, to see what each generation has made of the heritage it received.

All this powerfully qualifies the 'modernity' of nations. Not only must nations be founded upon ethnic cores, if they are to endure; they must also have, or find, a living past into which successive social circles of the educated may re-enter and whose legends and landscapes can locate the nation and direct its future. In this recurrent activity, successive generations of intellectuals and intelligentsia, often frustrated in their status ambitions, are drawn back to reconstructions of 'the past' which exert a strong fascination and provide an antidote to their arid professionalism.⁹⁹ The images they piece together and disseminate through the education system and media become the often unconscious assumptions of later generations in whose social consciousness they form a kind of rich sediment; like all those assumptions about Stonehenge and the Druids which modern Englishmen carry around with them as a 'taken-for-granted' background to their sense of collective identity and environment, or the equally powerful symbols of the Temple and Jerusalem that, even secular, Jews have imbibed, and which not all the scholarly myth-exploding studies will ever quite destroy.¹⁰⁰ Even more important, the often-fictitious genealogies and the myths attaching to heroes and monuments have, by the time they are exhumed and dissected, done their work; in *their* day, they helped to shape the nation, locate its borders and chart its destiny. Hermann and his Cherusci, Arthur and his Knights, Oguz Khan and his tribe, the Lion of Judah and the Amhara, Tell and the Swiss Confederates, have at one time or another encapsulated for successive generations the 'forest' German-ness of a much-sought Germany, the Celtic

Briton-ness of Wales (and of Britain!), the Central Asian quality of the Anatolian Turks, the Biblical antiquity of the Ethiopians and the sturdy peasant identity of a fast-industrializing Switzerland.

All these myths and genealogies 'explain' an historical identity; but they also symbolize it to the members and outsiders, and point out a national destiny (sometimes fairly literally, as in the case of pan-Turkism). It is never sufficient to see in such myths and symbols obsolete compensations for much-feared social change. William Tell does not simply compensate for the loss of agrarian innocence in an industrial Switzerland of huge multinational corporations; he points the Swiss back, and forward, to that independence of spirit which is a condition of both their liberties and their prosperity, as the Jungfrau symbolizes for many Swiss the eternal values of a free people beneath the enchainments of the banking and industrial sectors.¹⁰¹

This brings me back to my point of departure. The return to the past is necessary because of our need for immortality through the memory of posterity which the seeming finality of death threatens. In our descendants' memory lies our hope. That requires our story to be set down, to become 'history', like the stories of our fathers before us. In this sense, history is the precondition of destiny, the guarantee of our immortality, the lesson for posterity. Since we must live through *our* posterity, the offspring of our families, that history and its lesson must belong to us and tell our collective tale. Hence our myths, memories and symbols must be constantly renewed and continually re-told, to ensure our survival. The nation becomes the constant renewal and re-telling of our tale by each generation of our descendants.

9

The genealogy of nations

It is now possible to gather up the threads of this analysis: Part I examined the 'pre-history' of nations, the nature, role and persistence of ethnic communities in antiquity and the medieval world. Part II explored the nature and rise of nations in the modern world, and their ambivalent relationship to the ethnic past. Chapter 6 revealed two quite distinct conceptions of the nation and two routes to national status: the civic-territorial and the ethnic-genealogical; the first moulded by dominant bureaucratic states into territorial units of law and citizenship, the second reacting against these states to form demotic and vernacular communities. Chapter 7 outlined the ways in which modern nations attempt to move beyond ethnic models to a more territorial and civic type of political unit. Through such processes as politicization and territorialization, through the leadership of the intelligentsia and the extension of the franchise, through economic unity and autarchy, and, above all, by mobilizing all members and establishing new modes of communication binding elites to masses, a new model of human association emerges to replace or subsume the older, more localized loyalties and identities. But these new 'nations' need histories, and chapter 8 dwelt on the ways in which nations through their intelligentsias have to recreate and reconstruct a 'past' which will ensure a minimum solidarity and furnish a distinctive identity in the face of assimilating pressures of modernity. By locating their community in space and time, by lovingly recreating poetic spaces and reconstructing golden ages, intelligentsias and their audiences are driven back to whatever ethnic foundations they can feel and convince themselves and others to be 'their own'. These in turn provide the 'maps' and 'moralities' of modern nations.

In this last chapter, I want to suggest why it is important to study modern nations and nationalism in the context of their ethnic roots, and why scholars and statesmen who neglect these dimensions do so at their, and our, cost.

Parmenideans and Heraclitans

In the study of ethnicity, two broad trends can be distinguished. The first, represented by the 'primordialists' and 'perennialists', is largely essentialist and static. It starts out from the postulates of Parmenides, that the state of existence is not subject to change: what is, is, and one cannot logically add to or subtract from 'being'. Of course, no latter-day primordialist would subscribe to an unchanging *ethnie*. What he would assert is that the quality of 'ethnicity' inheres in all human association, even if its manifestations and intensity change and fluctuate. Ethnicity is seen as a given attribute of humanity, even if its proportions in any particular segment of humanity vary. The second trend I would call Heraclitan. Not only does everything flow, not only are particular *ethnie* subject to trends of emergence and dissolution, but ethnicity itself is a highly variable and dispensable resource. Under close inspection, it may vanish completely, or be found only in select coteries. If, on occasion, the masses may be fired by ethnic sentiments, on others they may be quite oblivious of any collective cultural attachments.

In one sense the argument is irresoluble; but in another sense we find that different kinds of Parmenideans and Heraclitans are really looking at different types of phenomena. Heraclitans have their eyes fixed on attitudes and sentiments expressed on particular occasions or over short time-spans; or they are concerned with the impact of these sentiments and aspirations on politics through nationalist movements or national loyalties. Parmenideans tend to turn away from particular manifestations of ethnic sentiments and attitudes, expressed in social and political movements, to the more unchanging cultural dimensions that unite and mark off groups of human beings – religion, customs, language, historical memories. Noting that collectivities tend to form around these dimensions throughout history, they treat these attributes as 'primordial' and inherent in human nature. As we have seen, this is an unwarranted assumption, as is their conclusion that ethnic ties and sentiments are universal and natural. Yet the perennialist is correct in regarding 'ethnicity' as a recurrent feature of history and specific ethnic bonds as durable and persistent. All things may flow, but some do so very slowly and imperceptibly. The contents of particular ethnic mythologies and symbolisms may gradually alter and their meanings change, but forms are more durable and preserve earlier contents as models and inspirations in the quest for new meanings. In no period of world history has ethnicity been altogether absent or *ethnie* played no social role.¹

The fact, however, that *ethnie* can be revived, that nations must reconstruct ethnic mythologies and symbolisms, and that *ethnie* can even be 'invented' in certain circumstances, suggests the malleability of *particular ethnie*. There appears to be nothing in human nature or experience, not

even kinship selection, that *demand*s the division of humanity into *ethnie*, much less that they furnish the sole basis for political units.

To accept this is not to embrace a Heraclitan standpoint. *Ethnie* and nations are not fixed and immutable entities 'out there' (not even the nationalists thought so); but neither are they completely malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force. To interpret them as masks and channels of 'real' social forces or the cultural surface of anatomical structures beneath, is to miss the independent role and originating power of ethnic identities and ethnic cleavages. Above all, instrumentalists of all persuasions omit the potent influence of myth and history on human belief and human action. This remains as true in the modern world as in previous eras. Not only are the social environments of modern generations shaped by those created by the generations of their predecessors; the widespread need for a 'community of history and destiny' which will ensure us against oblivion, and which takes on more overtly ethnic and national forms in a secular age, becomes a powerful determinant of modern social and political life. Powerful, but often unpredictable and explosive. Hence the need to take the ethnic roots of modern nationalism seriously, and give due weight to those myths, memories and symbols that can ignite populations and mobilize them for assault on the precarious balance of forces that hold the regional systems of states together.

It follows then that neither a Parmenidean belief in the immutability and fixity of things, nor a Heraclitan commitment to eternal flux, can do justice to the variety and complexity of ethnic phenomena and to the recurrence and persistence of ethnic ties and sentiments. We approach the latter best by a 'symbolic' perspective, one that seeks for the clues to the nature and role of ethnicity in the 'myth-symbol complexes', and the associated values and memories, which unite and divide populations, and which direct their attitudes and sentiments. By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and 'fault lines' of religion, customs, language and institutions, we run the risk of treating ethnicity as something primordial and fixed. By concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of specific *ethnie* or ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb and flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependant 'tools' or 'boundary markers' of other social and economic forces. But, by eschewing these alternatives and attending to the complex of myths, symbols, memories and values that are handed down the generations of collectivities and which define them to themselves and those outside, we can treat *ethnie* as both mutable and durable at the same time, and ethnicity as both fluctuating and recurrent in history. Ethnicity and *ethnie* are no longer purely static attributes of humanity; but neither are they instruments of other forces or boundary mechanisms of otherwise fluid cultures. The study of ethnicity through ethnic myths, symbols, memories and values allows us to grasp the dynamic and expressive character of ethnic identity, and its long-

term influence on human affairs, while allowing for its changing content and meanings.

The 'antiquity' of nations

When we take this 'symbolic' approach, with its strong historical emphasis, we are led to certain conclusions about modern nations which, though they seem paradoxical, make sense in the light of our previous analysis.

Put simply, modern nations are not as 'modern' as modernists would have us believe. If they were, they could not survive. By this I mean a number of things:

First, nations are not static targets, to be attained once-for-all. They are processes, albeit long-term ones. These processes of mobilization and inclusion, territorialization, politicization and autarchy are never concluded and always subject to redefinition in each generation. Being always elaborated and revised, they presume a 'national past' against which advances can be measured and back-slidings corrected. Nations do not exist in a timeless present. They are long-term historical processes, continually re-enacted and reconstructed but within definite limits. Hence the 'modernity' of any nation is being continually qualified by its historical roots and its accretions in each generation.²

Second, nations require ethnic cores if they are to survive. If they lack one, they must 're-invent' one. That means discovering a suitable and convincing past which can be reconstructed and re-presented to members and outsiders. The first European nations were constructed around strong, cohesive ethnic cores, and their states were able to incorporate, even acculturate, neighbouring *ethnie*. Many later states in Eastern Europe and the Middle East were designed expressly to fit such ethnic cores, in Poland, Rumania, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, despite the fact that they often had significant ethnic minorities. Colonial rulers in south-east Asia and sub-Saharan Africa had a similar ethnic model in mind; but here it proved much harder to select the *ethnie* which could provide the socio-cultural base of the new colonial state. In south-east Asia, the new 'plural society' that evolved soon tended to favour a dominant *ethnie*, as in Burma and Indonesia, with ensuing secessionist tendencies in outlying ethnic communities like the Karen and Achinese. In Africa, dominant *ethnie* have emerged in a few states like Kenya and Zimbabwe, but in most the ethnic balance is too even or too complex to allow any one *ethnie* to furnish the basis of the state. The result is that African states are likely to face serious problems in trying to create 'territorial nations' without the benefit of ethnic cores and a common historical mythology.³

Third, much of the missionary zeal of modern nationalism in new states takes its content and inspiration from the 'demotic' type of *ethnie* analysed in

chapter 4 above. Modern conditions have extinguished the 'lateral' type of aristocratic *ethnie*, unless it managed to transform itself into a more bureaucratic ethnic polity, but they have actually stimulated the smaller, 'demotic' type of *ethnie*. This leads to a paradox. In the military and industrial spheres, competition between the great 'nation-states' has been the motor of modernization and industrial capitalism; but in the social and cultural spheres, it has been the culture-bearing demotic *ethnie* with its closed, missionary religion that has become the model for most small and breakaway, would-be nations, so that today the world of nation-states bears their social and cultural image, and their greater cross-class mobilization generates a more democratic participation which influences the internal affairs of even the largest states. I shall return to this state of affairs later.

Fourth – nations need homelands. Not just terrain on which to nurture their identities, unities and autonomies, but historic territories in which 'our ancestors' lived and which 'we carry in our hearts'. That is why the monuments and sacred sites which embody 'our' ancestral title-deeds and memories, are so crucial for engendering a sense of common nationality. For example, in 1903 it was theoretically possible to re-settle Russian and Polish Jews in Uganda or Argentina; but the Jewish delegates to the Zionist Congress, like their kinsmen, did not know of any ancestors in Uganda and did not carry Argentina in their hearts. They did not even need their prayer books to tell them where their feet should carry them. The myths and memories that surround such sites as Tara and Armagh, Yasna Gora and Gniezno, Amritsar, Echmiadzin and Jerusalem, the passion for archeology in new states, and the celebration of native scenery and monuments, reveal the need for continuity with an 'unchanging' past that can be 'rediscovered' beneath centuries of change. Homelands help to build nations around past endeavours and environments are a precondition of their 'rebirth'.⁴

Finally, nations need heroes and golden ages. The heroes may be modern revolutionaries – a Robespierre, Lenin, Mao or Nasser – who will soon pass into the mythological pantheon, or be consigned (temporarily?) to oblivion while other more ancient heroes are rehabilitated. But it helps if they don antique dress, like Washington and Saint-Just, or can be linked to ancient national traditions like Nkrumah, the socialist Buddhist U Nu, or even Stalin with the Tsars. For heroes exemplify an 'age of gold', which embodies the ideals to which present-day leaders aspire and which matches the advanced civilizations of the West; and the golden age assures each generation of its distinctive heritage against the assimilative pressures and temptations of modernity, which might otherwise swamp them. The incommensurability of nations requires a distinctive culture, and this is best founded upon a heroic past. Similarly, the competition of modern nations requires the activation of their populations and that is best served by the spur of a golden age which must be revived.⁵

Herein, then, lies the 'antiquity' of modern nations, their rootedness in a past that their members, or significant sections of them, presume to be distinctively theirs, one that expresses their uniqueness. One often hears about the Janus-headed quality of nationalism. But my argument goes much further. Not only in spirit but in structure, modern nations and not only nationalism, turn out to be Janus-headed – and this is necessary. If there was no model of past ethnicity and no pre-existent *ethnie*, there could be neither nations nor nationalism. There would only be states and *étatisme* imposed from above, a very different phenomenon. The role of the state in homogenising populations and stimulating their cultures and sentiments was considerable, but it could never have produced the results it did without ethnic cores and ethnic models for mobilizing grass-roots aspirations and solidarities. The novel trends inaugurated by the triple revolution cannot by themselves account for the distinctive qualities of nations, their activation of the population, their sense of unique identity and destiny, and their cultural solidarity. Modern conditions and trends have undoubtedly been responsible for spreading the idea and model of the nation as the sole legitimate political unit, but they needed the general inspiration of ethnicity as a model of socio-cultural organization and particular instances of strategic *ethnie*, to bring nations and nationalism into existence. Without *ethnie* and ethnicism, there could be neither nations nor nationalism. For nations need myths and pasts if they are to have a future, and such pasts cannot be forged out of nothing, nor can myths that will have resonance be fabricated. Even revolutionary myths presuppose a past, much of which must be cast away; but usually a kernel, a golden age of equality and simplicity, is salvaged and extolled. These pasts and their myths are inevitably ethnic: they pertain to this or that culturally bounded and historically defined population. So that the most modern of nations are defined and located by their roots in an ancient ethnic past, and the most revolutionary of myths recall a primordial and archaic epoch that has been lost and must be recovered.⁶

Transcending ethnicity?

But cannot nations transcend ethnicity? Do they not forsake their reconstructed ethnic pasts, once the latter have served their purpose?

The suggestion is plausible enough. After all, we saw how *ethnie* were mobilized and politicized through economic and administrative revolutions. Priestly power and functions were eroded, to be replaced by secular intelligentsia wedded to the new scientific discourse. The territorialization of nations prompted a new quest for autarchic and compact 'homelands' with defensible borders and a diversified economy to support an expanding population. The nation is far more inclusive than any *ethnie*; all members become (gradually) enfranchised, and, in theory, class, region, family, sex

and colour become irrelevant to citizenship. As a result, nations are far more politicized; they are active in inter-state relations in ways that few *ethnie* were before, influencing history directly. In the nation, the masses at last find their voice, speaking in their vernacular, locating themselves in historical time and engaging in scientific discourse.

All this sounds very novel and revolutionary – and, in a way, it is. But it is also possible to see these changes as a revolution in the means of communication and association rather than in their ends.

The means have quite patently changed. Formerly, priests and scribes were the guardians and conduits of ethnic ‘myth–symbol complexes’, of ethnic memory from generation to generation. Now it is more likely to be intellectuals and professionals who rediscover and transmit to future generations the myths and symbols of modern nations, with the bourgeoisie and military replacing aristocracies as the power underpinning ethnic expansion and penetration.

The nation is far more inclusive and far more able to mobilize its membership than any *ethnie*. Demotic *ethnie* could mobilize the entire male population for battle, as did many city-states; but only for short wars. Only the male population benefited by way of citizenship. Modern nations can fight protracted wars with citizen conscript armies, and involve the whole population. In the two World Wars, women provided invaluable logistical, and manufacturing, support, and kept up morale on the ‘home front’.⁷ The most prolonged wars in Greece and Rome, the Peloponnesian and Second Punic Wars, allowed most citizens to go about their daily business till the very last years, despite some temporary political repercussions in Athens. In antiquity, too, *ethnie* sought to maintain themselves within fairly compact borders and utilize their mineral and agricultural resources; Sumerians, Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks, Jews and Romans were all convinced of their superiority and the advantages of their terrain, and Pliny the Elder thought the people of Rome outstanding, *populus victor gentium*.⁸ The only difference with modern nations in this respect is their greater ability in harnessing the homeland’s resources and putting and keeping themselves politically ‘on the map’. Putting oneself ‘on the map’ has today become a near-universal goal, where before it was the preserve of a few select *ethnie*.

So far, then, modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of *ethnie* associated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human association and communication.

Even in the realm of ‘new imaginings’ and new thoughts, there is less novelty than one might have expected. Take the idea of the golden age, a mark of modern national reconstruction of its past. The concept can be found in ancient Greece and Rome, in Hesiod, Herodotus, Plutarch and Strabo; the Syrian Greek, Posidonius, extolled the primitive ‘righteous’ Druids, and Pliny looked back nostalgically to the sunny land and pious

harmony of the mythical Hyperboreans.⁹ Already in the Han empire, the Chinese looked back with veneration to the classical era of Confucius in the later Chou era; while in Wales and Ireland, the High Kings of Tara and the Knights of Arthur evoked visions of a golden age long before any nationalist dreamt of resurrecting Wales and Ireland in the modern era.¹⁰

Perhaps ancient *ethnie* and their upper-class spokesmen are less flattering about 'the masses' and less ready to include them; they were pilloried by Aristophanes and despised by Plato and Juvenal. But in Rome there was some ambivalence: the masses were *plebs ingenua*, but also *populus Romanus*, much superior to foreign tribes. In Mishnaic Judea, the religiously ignorant were despised, but Israel was still a 'holy people' for Jews and early Christians, in the tradition of the prophets.¹¹

Apart, then, from the question of attitudes to the 'masses' and their inclusion in the community, it is clear that modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments. That is a Western mirage, reality-as-wish; closer examination always reveals the ethnic core of civic nations, in practice, even in immigrant societies with their early pioneering and dominant (English or Spanish) culture in America, Australia or Argentina, a culture that provided the myths and language of the would-be nation.¹²

In terms of ends, as opposed to means, there is a remarkable continuity between nations and *ethnie*, nationalism and ethnicism; continuity, but not identity. Pre-modern ethnicism, for example, wanted every distinctive community to be left intact and free from outside interference; modern nationalists believe that every culture community should have its own state, or at least 'home rule' within a federation, and that every state should have a single homogenous culture. On the other hand, there is much continuity between ethnic and national attitudes to culture. Ethnic movements aimed to renew their cultures and control their homelands and its resources so as to retain the culture of their ancestors; nationalism simply makes a fetish of the unique culture and does more effectively what pre-modern ethnicists tried to do, that is, keep out foreigners and diffuse to their kinsmen the traditions and myths of their ancestors, using the modern mass education system.

This continuity of ends between *ethnie* and nations extends to the basic impulse to solidarity and regeneration. The guardians of ethnic identity and destiny sought from time to time a greater social cohesion and harmony to counter outside threats. They felt the need to infuse in the members of their community greater self-respect and restore a sense of dignity by a return to an idealized past. They too sought to remind different sections of the community of their fraternal ties in the great family of the community. Cohesion; social harmony; self-respect; dignity; fraternity: these are ends

sought by every nationalist, and ideals of every nation. The scale has changed, so has the context; and the means at the nationalist's disposal are much more 'scientific' and effective. But these are changes in the means, not the ends. What the nation and nationalism have done is to extend the ends and give them a larger content, by linking them to the quest for political autonomy and economic autarchy. The result is that restoring one's dignity or renewing one's culture today, are tasks of a quite different order and magnitude than in pre-modern eras. They involve a radical change in relationships between culture and politics, and between the ethno-national constituents of the inter-state political order, in order to attain the broadly similar ends of solidarity and regeneration.

A world of small nations?

There is a further reason why nations transcend their ethnic bases only in their means, and rarely in their ends; that is, the impact of the small nation.

Western histories and sociologies are largely those of 'great nations', what Marx called the 'leading nations'. Smaller nations or societies are usually treated as 'peripheries' of oppressive or neglectful 'centres'. Great Western nations colonize and assimilate small Eastern or Southern nations; advanced industrial societies hold up to small developing ones the image of their own future; and so on.¹³ The trouble with this 'great nation' perspective is not only its crude ethnocentrism, but its persistent failure to see that the difference in size and scale matters. Small nations (or formations or societies) have different problems and different solutions. Worse still, they have acquired the habit of bringing these problems into world politics and staking their claims, if necessary, by violence. In the eyes of the small nations their own cultures matter, however second-rate they may appear to others, usually Western or great power elites. They are prepared to fight for them, whatever the inconvenience and disruption to themselves and others.

Now, as a matter of fact, small nations form a majority of all nations and states. By their sheer number and variety, small nations have given a new lease of life to the old demotic *ethnie*, and there are simply too many of them to be boiled down into neat regional variations on a common theme. Even the cosmopolitan Marx sensed that national cultures would survive the withering away of nation-states. The very existence of small ethnic nations helps to perpetuate their cultures in a manner that is not true of the large and powerful nations. For small nations, their culture and history have become both means and ends of their existence, and the more they feel threatened by the technological superiority and economic dominance of large nation-states, the more salient and vital is their distinctive culture. For it defines their very *raison d'être* as a separate unit.

Inevitably, too, the assertion of its rights by one would-be nation must encourage other similar self-assertions, and ethnic claims in one area must soon reverberate in others. In a world of a few large nations and many small ones, nationalism inevitably produces a new cultural Babel.

But has this not always been the case? History has, after all, revealed the same composition of collectivities many times; a few great empires surrounded by, and incorporating, many small principalities, city-states and *ethnie*. Quite often, too, technical advance and cultural innovation has stemmed from small, open communities of history and culture: Sumer, Phoenicia, Greece, Judea, Holland, Elizabethan England, the city-states of Renaissance Italy. It is a useful reminder to the latter-day hubris of modern 'great nations' and their elites.

Today, at any rate, most nations are modelled on the image of the demotic, vernacular *ethnie*, and nationalism has been largely appropriated by small nations and *ethnie*. Cultural pluralism has turned into political pluralism on a world scale.

What has this meant for individual nations and their members? What have been the implications for world security and peace?

Let me start with nations and their members. A pluralist world of small nations ensures, in the first place, the retention and uniqueness of vernacular cultures, which give each community its rationale for an independent political existence. To retain their viability, these small political nations must continually reconstruct for each new generation a distinctive culture founded upon a unique and heroic past. If an *ethnie*, or its spokesmen, can present a distinctive culture and believable history of its own, there is a *prima facie* case for according it the status of a 'nation' and re-organizing society to transform it into an inclusive and mobilized nation with its own territory and economy. Conversely, the failure to present such a unique culture and rediscover a convincing past, is likely to doom an ethno-nationalist movement from the outset; the failure of several 'micro-nationalist' movements in New Guinea (apart from the North Solomons 'Bougainvilleans') is evidence of this lack of clear ethnic cores and unique histories for movements like the Highlands Liberation Front at the University of Papua New Guinea or the provincial Papua Besena movement.¹⁴

Does the continual cultivation of one's ethnic past imply a social conservatism? Certainly a concern with tradition and the past may be a useful lever in the hands of threatened elites, and encourage false and comforting notions about the community which may impede progress and prevent radical change. But there are other possibilities. Elites can use the 'past', or a part of it, as the Meiji reformers did, to overthrow aspects of the present which they deplore and legitimate technological and economic innovations. This is equally true of small nations. Czechs, Israelis, Norwegians, Ibo and Catalans have all cultivated their pasts and unique cultures, while participating in radical social change. They have not become less distinctive or

nationalistic for doing so, but have reinterpreted their pasts within the limits set by their historic cultures.

It is, of course, easy to contrast a 'past-as-known' with a 'past-as-wished-for'. Liberals and socialists are just as much given to 'soft' idealizing primitivism as their conservative counterparts, despite their suspicions of the latter's 'backward-looking' attitudes. The fact is that in every era an idealized vision of the past has helped both to arrest and to inspire social change. The 'past-as-wished-for' may be full of comforting illusions, but it is more likely to inspire emulation and spur innovation than induce a fatalist complacency. As we have seen, the idealizing of Saxon liberties, classical city-states, Vedic kingdoms and Israelite commonwealths, have provided models and heroic exempla for guiding and inspiring social change in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England, Greece, India and Israel.¹⁵

It is for these reasons that small nations turn back towards their pasts. If they have a rich past, this is a resource to be cultivated and used. These nations are not as helpless in their economic dependency as is commonly supposed. They have something beyond a population: the myths, symbols, values and memories that can turn even a shadowy *ethnie* into a compact, purposeful nation, a 'community of history and destiny', in charge of its political fate and determined, in concert with other small nations, to secure a more equitable distribution of the earth's resources and skills.

How does this political pluralism of purposive small nations affect the members of those nations? Broadly speaking, a world of small nations tends to produce cohesive and distinctive bodies of citizens, together with a large stream of exiles, refugees and stateless persons. Internal as well as inter-state pressures have compelled all nations to homogenize their citizens culturally, but this trend has been particularly marked in smaller nations which have often resorted to a more closed type of society and authoritarian regimes. For the citizen, this has sometimes meant restrictions on travel, inter-marriage, birth control and leisure activities; these have been more marked in religiously oriented regimes, like pre-War Ireland, or Khomeini's Iran, but mobility and political restrictions are features of communist and military regimes of all kinds.

There has, on the other hand, been a growing trend towards equality of the citizen-members of nations in the name of social integration and ethnic fraternity. Apart from semi-theocratic regimes, there has been a lessening of barriers between sexes, classes and regions within the 'family' of the nation, as more sectors of the population are mobilized for the tasks of development and defence. Indeed under 'mass-mobilizing' regimes which commonly lack a credible unifying past to under-pin the new polyethnic states in Africa and Asia, the Party and State must 'make history', and through its activities and symbols galvanize the citizenry into collective self-sacrifice for the common good. Here, the dependence of the generally small state-nation, combined

with its internal heterogeneity, tends to throw up more restrictive and mass-mobilizing regimes, particularly where one *ethnie* seeks to dominate the rest and mould the state in its image, as in Burma and Ethiopia, and, to some extent, Kenya and Zimbabwe.¹⁶

Members of smaller nations, especially recently founded ones, are subject to analogous restrictions and exposed to new opportunities in other spheres. The European emphasis on language as a criterion of the 'genuine' nation has erected new barriers within and outside the community. But it has also given new opportunities for hitherto despised and depressed minority communities. This is seen most obviously in Canada, Belgium and Yugoslavia, where the formerly depressed communities of Flanders, Quebec and Macedonia are now accorded greater respect and have been able to take advantage of new opportunities and openings. At the same time, these three states are good examples of the heightened inter-ethnic tensions generated by cultural pluralism seeking political expression. Language introduces a new and powerful dimension of identification and community, but it also becomes a barrier to mobility, especially for the vernacular intelligentsia and their rivals (in both directions), and a new principle of cleavage and antagonism, superimposed on other cultural differences.¹⁷

In education, too, the impact of political pluralism has been ambivalent for the members of nations. On the one hand, nationalists have promoted secular education, often for both sexes; one thinks of the early reform or 'jadid' experiments of Ismail Gasprinski among the Tatars, or the westernization programmes of early Indian nationalists like Roy and Dayananda.¹⁸ They have also used the school system to inspire a new self-respect among formerly despised communities. But they have done so at some cost to society and objectivity. Later nationalism, especially, has generally rejected any expression of individualism and sought to impose an 'official', often blinkered, version of 'truth' in history, literature and the social sciences, in the interests of fostering national consciousness. So the great expansion of education under the auspices of political pluralism and a competitive nationalism, has proved to be a mixed blessing for its consumers.

So has the rapid unification of ethnic kinsmen on a single terrain and in a single division of labour. Economic autarchy as an ideal has undoubtedly spurred greater degrees of labour commitment, just as ethnic homogeneity in labour and production has opened up occupational niches, formerly the preserve of ruling elites or minorities, to all citizens and especially indigenous populations. But in polyethnic states such rapid indigenization of labour and management has brought many problems, not least shortages of skills in crucial areas and intensification of ethnic rivalries; a combination of both factors in newly independent Nigeria formed the background to the victimization of Ibo traders in the Hausa North, and to the expulsion of many Asian businessmen from Kenya and Uganda. There is also the danger of economic protectionism, with its disruption of trade and production and its

concomitant insularity, a phenomenon found as much in older nation-states as the new states; the repercussions for the international order have been even more serious than for the citizen-members of ethnic nations.¹⁹

Ethnic mobilization and global security

When we turn to the implications of political pluralism in a world of great powers and many small nations and would-be nations, we are faced by even greater paradoxes and problems.

In assessing these, we need to bear in mind the historical relationship between the world inter-state order and nationalism. Broadly speaking, each regional system of states ante-dated the emergence of nationalism in the relevant area. Being already in place, the constituent bureaucratic states and their elites looked with suspicion on any principle and sentiment that might threaten their vested interests and institutions. The inherent drive towards 'national congruence', that is the drive to make the state, the 'homeland' and the ethnic culture and population co-terminous and homogenous, inevitably destabilizes the regional systems of states that were sometimes established without much reference to cultural-historical units of population.²⁰

The trouble is that nationalism, which combines the drive for socio-political emancipation with the need for identity and solidarity to produce a vision and ethic of collective regeneration, arose in a world already well populated by states and *ethnie*. In seeking to match *ethnie* with their own homelands and, preferably, states, nationalism encounters the suspicion, if not hostility, of powerful state elites intent on upholding the prevailing pattern of bureaucratic states linked by networks of economic, diplomatic and military ties; so the fragmentation and bias towards small nations inherent in nationalism, renders it 'unpredictable' and 'explosive'.

There are several aspects to the ensuing confrontation. The first is simply that the number of would-be nations is liable to be larger at any one time than presently constructed regional systems of states with their economic rationales of scale, can accommodate. A world of small nations is a decentralised world, and, as a model, decentralization flies in the face of much accepted economic theory and social planning. It also flies in the face of the so-called 'realities of power', founded on state maximization of territory and resources, including man-power, and now regarded as almost sacrosanct, even if state sovereignty is cloaked with the legitimation of popular, that is, national, consent. In this struggle state elites employ the tactic of 'bureaucratic nationalism': they claim that their state constitutes a 'nation', and the nation is sovereign and therefore integral and alone legitimate, with the result that nationalism becomes an 'official' doctrine and the nation is taken over by the territorial and bureaucratic state.²¹

Inevitably the result of turning nationalism into an 'official' state ideology is to deny the validity of claims by any community which cannot be equated with an existing state within the regional system of states. The aspirations of smaller *ethnie* within the boundaries of a modern state constituent of a regional system can be belittled, and the claim of any community to be admitted to the concert of 'nation-states' can be refused. Having missed out on the crucial moment of state formation in their area, communities like the Druze, Palestinians, Kurds and Armenians which call for 'territorial revision' encounter the opposition, not only of particular threatened states in the area, but of the whole regional state system and even the aggregate of those systems known as the 'international community'.²²

Another aspect of the confrontation between nationalism and the various state systems focuses on territorial claims by existing states, themselves actuated by a mixture of ethnic and political motives. These include Israel's claim to the West Bank, on the ground that it constitutes the biblical Judea and Samaria, Spain's claim to Gibraltar and Argentina's claim to the Falklands, or Malvinas, as well as Pakistani claims to Kashmir. Aggrandizing their homelands through the mobilization of ethnic sentiment among kinsmen outside the 'homeland' was the mark of many a European irredentism in the last century and later, as it is today of Somali nationalism in the Ogaden and northwest Kenya; and it has often led to sharp conflicts and even full-scale wars which threaten the stability of regional inter-state systems and attract great power involvement.²³

There is also the allied difficulty of reconciling loyalties to a polyethnic state and solidarity with ethnic kinsmen, especially those resident overseas or in their own 'homeland' states. We saw in chapter 6 how such ambiguities can lead to a 'vicarious nationalism', but the international consequences in terms of financial aid, moral support and even terrorist refuges are no less important; one thinks of Jewish and Greek aid for the cause of their kinsmen's homelands, and of the Irish for their motherland, all of which have consequences not only for the states like America in which sizeable minorities reside, but also for the balance of power in delicately poised areas like the Eastern Mediterranean or Middle East.²⁴

More common are the conflicts between state loyalty and national solidarity within state boundaries. A state can become remote from its 'core' *ethnie*, as occurred in France in 1789 or Ottoman Turkey in 1908, and this can produce a 'renewal' nationalism which mobilizes the *ethnie* around a re-fashioned ethnic mythology and turns it into a political nation. The consequences of both the French Revolution and the *coup* by the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress are well-known, and they caused severe disruption to the European and Near Eastern regional state systems for decades. But out of the chaos there also emerged a new type of state order in which the compact 'nation-state' became the ideal, if not often the practice.²⁵

Even more frequent is the conflict between state loyalty and ethnic solidarity of a minority intent on becoming a nation. The state is clearly at a disadvantage in this competition: its bureaucratic elites are often remote and distrusted, its economic plans tend to mirror the needs of the central 'core' *ethnie* or nation, and its values, memories and symbols are usually those of that core. If the state does not itself possess long and inclusive traditions, its dominant ethnic community is liable to seek to impose its traditions on the rest of the state's population, and this usually ignites the fires of separatism among neglected or oppressed ethnic minorities, particularly if they have significant historical traditions and economic resources of their own. *Ethnie* like the Tigre in Ethiopia, the Ndebele in Zimbabwe, the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, have reacted violently to states and their dominant core *ethnie* seeking to impose central loyalties from above; while even in well-established states like France and Spain, Bretons and Basques have resisted the imposition of an official nationalism based on the dominant French-Parisian and Castilian ethnic mythologies and symbolisms. Though these movements have not threatened the European inter-state system like those of the Third World, they have caused some re-thinking of the nature of modern state loyalties and the distribution of economic and political powers.²⁶

In view of these multiple strains and conflicts, we might well expect a break-up of one or more regional state systems, and the fact that this has not occurred to date (despite the turmoil in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East) suggests a relative weakness of ethnic nationalism in the face of entrenched bureaucratic interests and inter-state networks. Particular nationalisms may be weak or undeveloped, either because the communities on whose behalf they operate are very small in population, or scale, or both, and have few material or cultural resources; or because the intelligentsia itself is too small and uninfluential to spread their ethnic nationalism in the wider community, as has been the case in Occitanie to date. But the 'weakness' of particular nationalisms in either sense is relative: it implies the strength of other nationalisms, usually among neighbouring *ethnie*. The world of nations is a jealous one. It is also pre-emptive. The earlier nationalisms in a given area tend to be the most favoured. They do not easily tolerate derived or secondary nationalisms nearby or within their desired borders. So the possibility of an infinite regress of ever smaller ethnic nationalisms, that is, the nationalisms of ethnic enclaves within peripheral *ethnie* and their nationalisms, what Hobsbawm has dubbed the 'Shetlands effect', is unlikely to cause more than local frictions. Location, size, resources, lateness, all conspire to contain fissiparous ethnic tendencies.²⁷

In fact, it is not so much the power and hostility of the 'international community' and the superpowers (who are quite ready to fish warily in troubled waters) to ethnic separatism, that sustains regional state systems – there are, after all, plenty of current secessionist wars in the Ogaden, Burma,

Philippines, the Sahara, Eritrea and Tigre, and Kurdistan – but the uneven incidence and timing of identities and movements fired by explosive ‘myth-symbol complexes’. This unevenness has given some *ethnie* a head-start over others in the area; and it has allowed a network of states based on core and dominant *ethnie* to extend their jurisdictions over an entire area. Once the area is ‘filled up’, once social space has been ‘hardened’ to squeeze out any power vacuum, any late-comer ethnic identity will have great difficulties in gaining recognition and breaking out of the existing state system. This poses acute problems where ancient and persistent identities are at stake; the cases of Armenia and Kurdistan are only the most obvious examples of *ethnie* which, by historical accident or design, failed to establish their claims at the critical moment of regional state-formation. The Armenian case, especially, illustrates the difficulties for a divided community of establishing itself as part of a regional system of states under the shadow of a much more powerful and state-backed ethnic nationalism which was prepared to use extreme methods to prevent the claims of the incorporated *ethnie*.²⁸

But these are atypical cases. It is more common to find *ethnie* within new and old states seeking more autonomy, and sometimes independence, by constitutional and violent means. They have developed a strong sense of their distinctive identity based on separate historical mythologies, only to find the door to political recognition locked. While only a minority of ethnic movements actually threaten regional state systems, many more are forcing a re-definition of the role and powers of the state, often in the direction of greater federalism; India, Canada, Belgium and Yugoslavia afford well-known examples, and new ethnic orders are clearly being sought in Ulster, Cyprus, Spain, Iraq, Sri Lanka and the Punjab. It is clear that ethnic movements for national reconstruction are active and fairly widespread; and it is hardly accidental that some of the most intractable international problems and sensitive global issues focus on ethnic conflicts such as Kashmir, the Ogaden, the Middle East (West Bank and the Gulf) and Berlin, which in turn spring from incompatible interpretations of history and identity with their conflicting claims to ‘title-deeds’ in the disputed areas.²⁹

Even this brief recital of the problems and antagonisms of ethnic nationalism faced by any attempt to construct a regional or global order of states committed to peace and development, suggests the urgent need to study the roots of identity conflicts in their historic ties, ethnic mythologies and symbolisms. Too often, statesmen and scholars have fastened on the immediate political and economic causes of ethnic antagonisms which, though important in exacerbating and intensifying divisions, rarely account for the depth of feeling and direction taken by ethnic nationalisms. Too often, state elites and their advisers have denied the aspirations of would-be nations and belittled their security fears and identity needs, exactly because of their ignorance (compounded often by an unwillingness to learn) of the

different myths, symbols and memories and distinctive values of minority *ethnie*. The power interests and lack of knowledge and imagination characteristic of many inter-state organizations inevitably frustrate the hopes of regenerated *ethnie*, with the result that the fires of their aspirations waste themselves in vain upon the iron grid of inter-state systems and fall instead upon neighbours and competitors in bitterness and internecine wars. Also, because the 'international community' can only recognize duly constituted 'nation-states', it is often forced to tolerate all manner of brutality committed by the 'legitimate' regimes of states that have been to date admitted to the concert of (nation-) states, while refusing all legitimacy to the claims, reasonable or not, of aggrieved and excluded would-be nations.³⁰

Does this suggest the bleak prospect of an era of 'wars of the nations'? Must we espouse the claims of the 'peoples' against their governments and risk the dissolution of many states? It is actually possible to envisage a state of affairs in which both sets of claims could be, on the whole, satisfied, though in practice there would be many problems of adjustment. One could, for example, ensure the stability of something like the present regional state systems by including within their orbit the most persistent and excluded ethnic nationalisms through the greater use of federal or confederal states. This means, of course, halting the present trends towards ever greater centralization and state intervention. In principle, the rise of federal and confederal states would make it possible to de-link ethnic and national aspirations from statehood and sovereignty, so permitting *ethnie* at present denied all social and political recognition to achieve a broad cultural and economic autonomy within 'joint' or 'overarching' states. In return, ethnic nationalisms would have to give up their quest for 'national congruence' and perhaps develop a higher-level 'civic nationalism' without sacrificing their more immediate and tangible ethno-national identities.

In many ways, all this must remain a utopian dream. A world of nations whose identities are respected and protected by 'umbrella' states is at present a remote possibility. Of more immediate importance is the need to strike a balance between the aspirations of submerged and unrecognized *ethnie* and the interests and anxieties of state elites and their core *ethnie*, if the cycle of ethnic terror and violence is to be broken. This is, in fact, being accomplished in several Third World states through various techniques of ethnic conflict reduction and containment, even where federal solutions are not considered desirable or feasible. In other states federal arrangements help to minimize ethnic antagonisms and ensure political recognition for territorialized identities and cultures.

At the same time, in a world of very uneven political and economic resources, we must expect continued inter-ethnic conflicts, especially in backward areas where, for one reason or another, political recognition of powerful ethnic sentiments has been withheld. This in turn prompts intensified inter-ethnic competition for scarce resources and promotes sharper

ethnic profiles and self-identifications. In these circumstances more and more peoples will fall back for comfort and inspiration upon those ethnic ties and symbols, memories and myths that have so often in the past supported and guided the historically separated populations of our planet. Failure to understand the inner meanings and appreciate the force of those myths, memories and symbols which underpin ethnic identity, can only prevent us from coming to grips with the ethnic antagonisms that bedevil relations between states and individuals in the modern world.

Notes

Chapter 1 Are nations modern?

- 1 Especially under the influence of social psychological theories of Le Bon, Fouillée, Trotter and MacDougall from the 1890s until the Second World War. A modern, sophisticated treatment in this vein can be found in Doob (1964). Similar assumptions underlie Popper's *Open Society and its Enemies* (1962, vol. II, pp. 49–58) and Simmel's *Conflict* (1964). On the links between war and nationalism, cf. Z. Barbu: 'Nationalism as a source of aggression', in CIBA (1967).
- 2 There is much debate on the definition of the concept of 'tribe'. For a recent review of the African literature, cf. King (1976). W. J. Argyle: 'European nationalism and African tribalism', in Gulliver (1969) has urged the basic similarities between European nationalism, especially in Eastern Europe, and African 'tribalism', but it is still more usual to contrast the two by reserving the term 'nationalism' (arbitrarily, in my opinion) in sub-Saharan Africa for state-based identities and movements; cf. W. A. Lewis (1965) and Neuberger (1976).
- 3 There is a large literature on the 'ethnic revival' in the West, notably Connor (1973), S. Berger (1972) and the essays in Esman (1977), not to mention the many studies of individual movements in Western Europe and North America, such as Brand (1978) and the essays in C. Williams (1982); cf. also Allardt (1979) for European linguistic movements today.
- 4 For a forceful statement of nationalism's continuing role in post-1945 state policies, cf. Benthem van den Berghe (1966); cf. also Seton-Watson (1978).
- 5 On the forces which might undermine the nation-state, cf. Said and Simmons (1976), Introduction; and Deutsch (1969).
- 6 On these nationalistic assumptions among scholars, and their defects, cf. Sathyamurthy (1983, ch. 1). The logical contingency of nationalism is forcefully argued in Gellner (1964, ch. 7); but he stresses its *sociological* necessity in modern industrial societies.
- 7 This is the approach of Wallerstein (1974, p. 149): 'The creation of strong states within a world system was a historical prerequisite to the rise of nationalism both within strong states and in the periphery.'

- 8 A full theory along these lines is propounded by Nairn (1977, chs. 2 and 9); for an application of a 'centre-periphery' model to Africa, cf. Gutkind and Wallerstein (1976, ch. 1).
- 9 For the British case of development, cf. Hechter (1975) which has sparked an important debate on the economic origins of ethnic nationalisms in industrial societies; for an amended version of the 'internal colonialism' model, applicable to other Western, industrial societies, cf. Hechter and Levi (1979). For a critique of these economic theories, cf. A. D. Smith (1981a, ch. 2) and the incisive article by Connor (1984).
- 10 A view forcefully outlined by D. Bell: 'Ethnicity and social change', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975). A similar 'instrumentalism' can be found in other influential American studies like Enloe (1973) and Brass (1974) and (1985), but less in Horowitz (1985).
- 11 Barth (1969), Introduction.
- 12 B. Anderson (1983), who is one of the few to recognize the relationship between nationalism and religion as cultural systems grappling with problems of suffering and death (*ibid.*, pp. 17–25); cf. also Klausner (1960).
- 13 Gellner (1983) for the fullest statement; for earlier expositions, cf. Gellner (1964, ch. 7) and Gellner (1973). Though there are interesting differences between the three statements, there is a fundamental continuity, based on the conviction that nations and nationalism are both wholly modern phenomena, and can only appear in a 'modern' era with its specific socio-economic traits.
- 14 This is the consensus of most historians (e.g. Hertz (1944) and Shafer (1955)), though they differ over the exact date; for some it emerged with the second partition of Poland in 1775, with others in America in 1776, and with yet others in the course of the French Revolution. The most important study of the rise of nationalist *ideologies* remains that of Kohn (1967a, 2nd edn) which suggests the period of 1775–90 as the moment of nationalist efflorescence in Europe and America. But the important analysis of Kemilainen (1964) underlines the long period of 'gestation' of nationalist assumptions and ideas among the European educated classes from the late seventeenth century. This period is extended back to the sixteenth century by Marcu (1976), but her arguments are critically reviewed by Breuilly (1982, pp. 4–6) who argues for a late eighteenth-century date for the *ideological movement* of nationalism, while conceding some degree of national consciousness among earlier literati. There is also the problem of 'nationalism' in seventeenth century Holland and England, which both Kohn, (1967a, ch. 4) and Snyder (1976) concede, cf. the illuminating study of English national sentiment by Kohn (1940). Kamenka in Kamenka (1976) claims that 'Nationalism . . . is a modern and initially European phenomenon, best understood in relation to the developments that produced, and were symbolised by, the French Revolution of 1789' (p. 4); so does Kedourie (1960) who however dates the full doctrine to 1806, the date of Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* in the wake of the Prussian disaster at Jena. In each case, different definitions of 'nationalism' are being employed.
- 15 Cf. Tilly's Introduction to Tilly (1975); also the essay by Tivey in Tivey (1980).
- 16 Kemilainen (1964), and Tipton (1972).
- 17 For a fascinating portrait of ethnic and racial sentiments in the ancient world, cf. Snowden (1983); Roman attitudes are briefly explored in Sherwin-White (1952).

- 18 On the Ionian revolt, cf. Andrewes (1956, pp. 123–7); there were rebellions in Gaul in 52 BC, as well as AD 21 and 69, cf. Wells and Barrow (1950, pp. 68–9, 113, 131, 155–7).
- 19 On the Tell-el-Amarna age, cf. *Cambridge Ancient History* (1973, II/1, x, § 6).
- 20 For a general account of this era, cf. Dixon (1976); also Lasko (1971).
- 21 Cf. van den Berghe (1978); and for a critical review, Reynolds (1980). A fuller statement can be found in van den Berghe (1979).
- 22 The two seminal essays on 'primordial ties' are Shils (1957) and C. Geertz: 'The Integrative Revolution', in Geertz (1963a). For a more recent statement, cf. Fishman (1980).
- 23 On this 'Weberian' need for meaning and symbolism, cf. C. Geertz: 'Ideology as a cultural system', in Apter (1963a). For a balanced critique of the 'primordialist' position, cf. P. Brass: 'Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia', in Taylor and Yapp (1979). For a fuller discussion of both the 'primordialist/instrumentalist' and the 'modernist/perennialist' debates, particularly in the recent work of Gellner and Armstrong, cf. A. D. Smith (1984c); cf. also the synthesis proposed by McKay (1982).
- 24 A good example of retrospective assimilation of ancient to modern ideas and assumptions in respect of nationalism can be found in the interesting account of Greek city-state conflicts in Levi (1965, ch. 2).
- 25 On cultural forms as 'styles', cf. Kroeber (1963, pp. 3–4, 24–7, 36–40, 71–4), though he applies a fine-arts stylistic indicator to whole civilizations or to different activities, rather than specific culture-communities (with some interesting exceptions like ancient Egypt and Greece).
- 26 Epstein (1978); for some comments on the approaches of Epstein, Barth and others, cf. Okamura (1981).
- 27 The title of Armstrong's book, *Nations before Nationalism*, is misleading, since it is ethnic identities and sentiments that Armstrong goes on to analyse in the body of the work, and their role in the formation of modern nations (as his remarks in the last chapter reveal). For further comments on this massive and seminal study, cf. chapter 3 of this book and A. D. Smith (1984c).
- 28 This applies to the aforementioned works of Gellner, Snyder and even Kohn, though the latter provides much evidence for the distinctions between *ethnic* and nations (1967a, chs. 2–3). The distinction has, however, been recognized by Connor (1978) and by Krejci (essay in Giner and Archer (1978)) and Krejci and Velimsky (1981), as well as by Seton-Watson (1977).
- 29 The term *mythomoteur*, is one frequently employed by Armstrong (1982, pp. 8–9, 129–67, 293) and is taken from Ramon d'Abadal i de Vinyals, notably his 'A propos du Legs Visigothique en Espagne', *Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alt. Medioevo*, 2 (1958), pp. 541–85.
- 30 Cf. Durkheim (1964, pp. 277–8) and Nisbet (1965); cf. also Eisenstadt (1973).
- 31 On the Bangala, cf. V. Turner: 'Congo-Kinshasa', in Olorunsola (1972); on the Occitanians, cf. Coulon and Morin (1979).

Chapter 2 The foundations of ethnic community

- 1 There are several objections to the term 'people'. Ethnic communities, as we shall see (chapter 4 in this book), may be of the 'lateral' and aristocratic type;

socialist and Marxist ideologies have appropriated 'people' for 'lower' or 'working' classes or 'toiling masses'; and dictionary definitions include a host of synonyms, such as commonalty, enfranchised citizens, workpeople, king's subjects, and persons belonging to a place, forming a company or class, or composing a race, community or nation, or even persons in general! The connotations of the terms 'ethnic' and 'ethnie' are wide enough, not to compound our difficulties with an even looser and chameleon-like term.

- 2 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott: *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 6th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1869, under 'ethnos'; cf. Herodotus I, 101, also I, 56; and as a caste or tribe, Plato, Republic 290C.
- 3 Herodotus I, 101 for *genos* as a sub-division of *ethnos*; for *genos* as a clan, *ibid.* I, 125; as a stock or family, Homer, *Iliad* 13, 354. On the analogues with *natio* and the differences between *natio* and *populus*, see under 'natio' in C. T. Lewis and C. Short: *A Latin Dictionary*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1879, first edition, in reprint of 1955. For useful analyses of changes in the concept of 'natio', cf. Zernatto (1944) and Hertz (1944, ch. 1): *gens* tended to be used by the Romans for large civilized peoples, *natio* for distant, backward communities, and *populus* was reserved for the Roman people themselves. This sense of *gens* as a great people was continued into the Middle Ages, for example, *gens Anglorum*; this is in many ways the opposite of the classical Greek usage of *ethnos* and *genos*, though one should add that no great consistency can be discerned in classical usages.
- 4 The same stress on history and culture can be found in Schermerhorn (1970, p. 12), where the ethnic community is defined as 'a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. . . . A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group'; *ethnie* here are still treated as minorities, whereas in the present account *ethnie* may also constitute majorities or indeed the sole community in a given territorial state. Cf. also the writings of Guy Héraud, notably Héraud (1963), though his stress is more on language than history.
- 5 A 'symbolic' approach that stems, in part, from Weber's interest in historical memories and customs, rather than blood ties or language, cf. Weber (1968, I/5). Weber's approach to nations and nationalism is briefly discussed in A. D. Smith (1983b), and in Beetham (1974).
- 6 Ethnicity is therefore a Durkheimian 'social fact', and yet Durkheim rarely confronted the problems of ethnicity and nationalism; but cf. Mitchell (1931). Dimensions of identity that derive from shared history and culture are interestingly discussed by Isaacs (1975), and ethnicity as cultural tradition by Lal (1983).
- 7 As in the prayer book use of 'Adonai', Lord. On Biblical Israelite religion, and the name of God, cf. Kaufmann (1961, pp. 127–31, 163–5, 295–8).
- 8 On the Beta Israel (Falasha), cf. the brief resume in Parfitt (1985), who regards them as Judaized 'emigres' (another meaning of the name, Falasha) from southern Arabia to the ancient Ethiopian kingdom of Aksum in the first centuries of the first millennium AD.
- 9 The current position of nationalities in Yugoslavia is outlined in Schöpflin (1980) and Krejci and Velimsky (1981, chapter 10). Gellner (1983, pp. 71–2) discusses

the recent choice by Bosnian Muslims of the *ethnic* name of 'Muslim' in the Yugoslav census but does not ask how far they had come to feel they constituted a well-formed and established *ethnie* which simply lacked recognition as a separate community – and a name. The same may well be true of Turks in Bulgaria who persist in their ancestral ways and customs despite attempts to 'homogenise' them, cf. Horak (1985, pp. 300–304). Poland's name, too, was only gradually acquired in the late first millennium AD, as the *Polane* 'tribes' were consolidated into a territorial kingdom; *Polane* was turned into *Polacy* (Poles) and *Polska* (Poland), cf. Gieysztor et al. (1962, ch. 1).

Already in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* (Act II, scene 2), naming was treated as crucial to personal identity; Romeo's 'essence' lay in his family name for all the participants in the drama, and the youthful yearnings of Juliet were part of the tragedy that inevitably engulfed her and her lover.

- 10 The differences between 'race' and ethnicity are discussed in van den Berghe (1967, ch. 1) and Kuper (1974, p. 44); but cf. the view of Horowitz (1985, pp. 41–50). For our purposes, 'race' in the *social* sense of an attribution (by self or others) of certain 'innate and immutable physical characteristics', is treated as a sub-type of wider ethnic phenomena. But the 'myth of common ancestry' is purely subjective and should *not* be equated *tout court* with this attribution of innate and immutable *physical or genetic* characteristics.
- 11 For example, B. Barber: 'Social mobility in India', in Silverberg (1968) and the debate on Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus* (1970) in Madan (1971).
- 12 On these *mythomoteurs*, cf. Armstrong (1982, p. 8–9, 293–7) and Tudor (1972). On the components and functions of these ethnic mythologies, cf. A. D. Smith (1984b) and chapter 8 in this book.
- 13 For some political mythologies, cf. Tudor (1972, chs. 3–4). For Indo-European myths generally, cf. Oosten (1985) and Ellis Davidson (1984); and on the uses and meanings of myth, cf. Kirk (1973).
- 14 For analysis of the poetic and metaphoric qualities of this kind of history, cf. Nisbet (1969); on the Romantic vogue for Homer, Ossian and the Bible, cf. Honour (1968, esp. ch. 3).
- 15 Akzin (1964, pp. 30–31).
- 16 On Black culture, cf. Cruse (1967); on the growth of colour-consciousness and a pan-Negro sensibility, cf. Legum (1962) and Brotz (1966).
- 17 On which, cf. Hanham (1969) and Webb (1977).
- 18 For an incisive analysis of cross-cutting allegiances that held (and hold) the Swiss together, cf. Siegfried (1950); and Warburton (1976).
- 19 For the Welsh case, cf. Morgan (1971). Weber made a point of this insufficiency of language as the necessary component of nationality, cf. Weber (1947, pp. 171–9).
- 20 On the problems of the Jura, cf. W. Petersen: 'On the sub-nations of Europe', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975); on the Serb–Croat division, cf. Schöpflin (1980), and Singleton (1985).
- 21 On the dependence of 'language' as a factor on politics and religion, cf. Armstrong (1982, ch. 8) and A. D. Smith (1982). Yet its importance even in medieval Europe should not be underrated, cf. Bloch (1961, II, pp. 431–7).
- 22 For a detailed analysis of the Belgian case, cf. A. Zolberg: 'Splitting the difference: Federalisation without federalism in Belgium', in Esman (1977); and

Petersen, in Glazer and Moynihan (1975). In fact, the further east one travels, the more religion predominates over language in defining the sense of shared ethnicity, whatever Western-educated scholars may deem to be an 'objective' criterion. Thus, in his otherwise brilliant *The Heritage of Persia* (1966), Richard Frye delimits *ethnie* in terms of strictly linguistic criteria which tend to obscure the role of religion and customs in Iran (and elsewhere in the Middle East). As we shall see, a host of Middle Eastern, Asian and even European (Poles, Serbs, Croats, Greeks, Irish) *ethnie* regard their distinctive religious practices and communities as more vital to their sense of identity than any accompanying language distinctions. Classical and Near Eastern scholars, often themselves linguists and sometimes influenced by a mild linguistic nationalism, or at least serving a long apprenticeship in often extinct ancient languages, quite often opt for a purely linguistic criterion of ethnic differentiation, instead of treating language as one criterion among others.

- 23 On the stimulus provided by a land 'of one's own', a 'patriotism of place', cf. Doob (1964); and for its importance in Eastern Europe, Pearson (1983, chs. 1 and 4).
- 24 The above points are elaborated in chapter 8 of this book; cf. also Smith and Williams (1983).
- 25 On the Ukrainian case, cf. Armstrong (1963) and Szporluk (1979, esp. ch. 3); on the lack of written traditions among many African *ethnie*, and the ways in which this hampered collective memory and identity, cf. Mazrui (1985).
- 26 On these African societies and their 'domestic' mode of production, cf. C. Coqueiry-Vidrovitch: 'The political economy of the African peasantry and modes of production', in Gutkind and Wallerstein (1976).
- 27 Coulborn (1959, esp. ch. 5); for the archeological evidence on the rise of the first civilizations, cf. Daniel (1971) and Braidwood and Willey (1962).
- 28 The classic study of peasant society remains Redfield (1960). For more up-to-date analyses, cf. Shanin (1971) and, on the various pre-capitalist modes of production, Marx (1964). There is an interesting case-study of early settlements by the Germanic tribes in England, in R. Hodges: 'The Anglo-Saxon migrations', in L. Smith (1984).
- 29 On the uses and types of 'nostalgia', cf. Armstrong (1982, ch. 2). Arab nostalgia for the virtues of tribal life and its solidarity (*asabbiya*) is most explicit in Ibn Khaldun's sociology, on which cf. Hall (1985, pp. 91–8); it reflects Arab yearning for a primitive desert life and religion. On Israelite nostalgia for its tribal semi-nomadic origins, cf. Weber (1952) and Kohn (1929, p. 23), where the Wahabite movement in Saudi Arabia is likened to the ancient Rechabite sect and to Amos and Elijah who 'stood for the ancient austerity of the primitive desert religion as opposed to the emasculating influence of Canaan's city civilisation and the abuse and idolatry which had crept in in consequence. It seems that the Rechabites aimed at a like return to the ancient ideal; they were Puritan nomads who scorned wine and the cultivation of the soil. But at the same time this early prophetic movement involved a national protest against alien ways.'
- 30 On the Somali, cf. I. Lewis (1980, ch. 1–2); and on feudal aristocracies still evincing a strong genealogical nostalgia well into the Middle Ages, with kinship still an active political force, cf. Bloch (1961, I/3, esp. pp. 139–41).

- 31 For the Jewish creation myth, cf. Genesis 11: 10–27; for the Hellenic creation myths, cf. Hesiod, *Theogony* 211–32, and *Works and Days* 109–201, with the Five Ages of Man, the Flood of Deucalion and Pyrrha and the tale of their son, Hellen and his offspring, Dorus, Aeolus, Ion and Achaëus, which is recounted in Apollodorus and Pausanias; cf. Graves (1960, I, pp. 33–7, 138–43, 158–62). On the Sumerian Creation and Gilgamesh myths, cf. Jacobsen (1976, ch. 6–7).
- 32 On the Orthodox church councils, cf. Ware (1984, ch. 2); on the rise of the Gregorian church in Armenia, cf. Atiya (1968, Part IV).
- 33 On these sects and churches, see chapter 5 of this book, and Atiya (1968, Parts I, II, III and VI).
- 34 On Sikh origins, cf. Thapar (1966, pp. 308–12).
- 35 For an illuminating account of Pagan Burma and the role of Theravada Buddhism, cf. Sarkisyanz (1964).
- 36 On the Albigensians, cf. Runciman (1947); and Keen (1969, pp. 139–43).
- 37 On the role of Byzantine, Armenian and Jewish clergy, cf. Armstrong (1982, ch. 7). On the Babylonian New Year Festival, cf. Frankfort (1948, ch. 22); and on the Panathenaic festival, Andrewes (1971, ch. 11).
- 38 For an excellent account, cf. Welch (1966).
- 39 Ruth 1: 16–18, for the Biblical attitude; for later Orthodox interpretations, cf. Kaplan (1976, pp. 20–22).
- 40 For general surveys of the relationships between war and society, cf. Bramson and Goethals (1964), and Bond and Roy (1975).
- 41 For vivid accounts of classical warfare ‘on the ground’, cf. Connolly (1981); for such boasts in antiquity, cf. Mer-ne-ptah’s Hymn of Victory (c. 1230 BC) in Pritchard (1958, p. 231):

The princes are prostrate, saying ‘Mercy!’
 Not one raises his head among the Nine Bows.
 Desolation is for Tehenu; Hatti is pacified;
 Plundered is the Canaan with every evil;
 Carried off is Ashkelon; seized upon is Gezer;
 Yanoam is made as that which does not exist;
 Israel is laid waste, his seed is not;
 Hurru is become a widow for Egypt;
 All lands together, they are pacified;
 Everyone who was restless, he has been bound
 by the King of Upper and Lower Egypt; Ba-en-Re Mari-Amon;
 the son of Re; Mer-ne-ptah Hotep-hir-Maat,
 given life like Re every day.

Assyrian inscriptions were even more grandiose: ‘Property of Adad-nirari, great king, legitimate king, king of the world, king of Assyria . . . who has made submit to his feet the princes within the four rims of the earth . . . (ibid., p. 192); Or the inscriptions of Sargon II (721–705 BC):

The terror-inspiring glamour of my kingship blinded him and terror overcame him. He overthrew him (that is, the Greek) in fetters, shackles and iron bands, and they brought him (the king of Ethiopia) to Assyria, a long journey . . . (ibid., p. 197).

The terror-inspiring glamour of Ashur, my lord, overpowered (however) the king of Meluhha . . . I caught, like a fish, the Greek (Ionians) who live (on islands) amidst the Western Sea . . . (ibid., p. 196).

On the battle of Qadesh in northern Syria, cf. Roux (1964, p. 235).

- 42 Cf. Simmel (1964, pp. 92–3): ‘A state of conflict, however, pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a uniform impulse that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another. This is the reason why war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else break up definitely.’
- 43 For a fuller discussion with examples, cf. A. D. Smith (1981b); this offers a critique of the usual ‘group aggression’ theory of war, and of its opposite, the ‘cohesion’ thesis associated with Simmel, preferring a Weberian approach which assigns primacy to political action, notably inter-state warfare, in the crystallization of *ethnie* and their self-images.
- 44 Simmel (1964, p. 88); cf. Tilly (1975), Introduction, p. 42: ‘War made the state, and the state made war’; though some states lose out, and perhaps their *ethnie*.
- 45 The effects of prolonged and total warfare in the modern world is well illustrated by the World Wars, cf. Marwick (1974, especially pp. 55–6, 123, 132, 153 sqq.).
- 46 Cf. MacNeill (1963, pp. 486–94) for the Mongol case; on the Tatars, cf. Zenkovsky (1960). For the Ptolemaic case, cf. Grant (1982, pp. 37–48).
- 47 Of course, not all the factors operate towards consolidation of *ethnie*. Protracted warfare can exhaust states like Sassanid Persia or twelfth-century Byzantium; sudden defeat can extinguish an *ethnie*, as in Burgundy perhaps, or Assyria; colonization can erode ethnic perceptions as in Egypt under the Muslims. For these and other exceptions, cf. A. D. Smith (1981b) and Andreski (1954, pp. 111–15).
- 48 Apart from Sumerians and Egyptians, we encounter in the third millennium BC Elamites, Nubians, Canaanites and Amorites, and possibly Luwians in Anatolia, cf. Mallowan (1965) and Lloyd (1967) and *Cambridge Ancient History* V/2, chapter 11 (vi), 13 (ii), 15 (viii) and 18 (vi).
- 49 For the Hungarian case of an *antemurale ethnie*, cf. Armstrong (1982, pp. 47–51). The concept of a well-formed *ethnie* which has outgrown its peasant base or the cement of external warfare, is problematic, as the case of the Phoenicians, discussed in chapter 5 here, reveals. The presence of living traditions as well as ancestry myths and a distinctive communal life-style, would appear to be indispensable, and that in turn requires some inter-generational persistence in the first place, before the group is ‘severed’ from its original habitat.
- 50 For an introduction which emphasizes this peculiarity, cf. Frankfort (1954, chapter 4), and Frankfort (1948) for the element of divine kingship. For a more recent analysis, cf. David (1982).
- 51 On the Sumerian pattern of city-states, cf. Frankfort (1954, ch. 3); and for a growing pan-Sumerian unity under the Third Dynasty of Ur, cf. Roux (1964, ch. 10).
- 52 On this early phase of Mesopotamian civilization, cf. F. Hole: ‘Investigating the origins of Mesopotamian civilisation’, in Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky (1974).
- 53 On early Egyptian sentiment, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, esp. pp. 188–202); on the Sumerians, cf. Kramer (1963, esp. p. 260).

- 54 On this 'Harappan' civilization (as it is designated by scholars), cf. Daniel (1971); on the Aryan infiltration, cf. Thapar (1966, chs. 1–2).
- 55 On this Tell-el-Amarna period, cf. Roux (1964, ch. 16); and for a general survey of peoples in Near Eastern antiquity, cf. Moscati (1962).
- 56 For Assyrian representations of other peoples, usually as tributaries, cf. Reade (1983); and Frankfort (1970, ch. 6).

Chapter 3 *Ethnic and ethnicism in history*

- 1 Cf. Weber (1947, pp. 171–6).
- 2 For the use of this slogan in the modern world, cf. Levenson (1959); and on the various ways in which leaderships in developing countries of Asia and Africa today mingle westernizing and archaizing elements, the latter to legitimate desired changes, cf. M. Matossian: 'Ideologies of delayed industrialisation: some tensions and ambiguities', in Kautsky (1962).
- 3 There is no general study of ethnocentrism in antiquity or the Middle Ages; but on ancient Greek and Roman attitudes, cf. the essays in Fondation Hardt (1962) and Sherwin-White (1952). For the general absence of *colour* prejudice in antiquity, cf. Snowden (1983).
- 4 On the Cleisthenic reforms, cf. Hignett (1952, ch. 6). For early fifth-century Athenian democracy and the Ephialtic reforms of 462, and the suggestion about the political purposes of Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, cf. Forrest (1966, ch. 9).
- 5 On the theory that ethnicity ultimately derives from the widely attested fact of the 'stranger' and the failures of communication, cf. Armstrong (1982, pp. 2–3); for examples of separate linguistic groups being able to communicate across these barriers in both Scandinavia and West Africa, cf. H. Wolff: 'Intelligibility and interethnic attitudes', in Fishman (1968).
- 6 On these symbols of 'basic identity', cf. Isaacs (1975). I should add that long ago Herder insisted on the importance of *all* elements of a cultural heritage (he set great store by folk music and dance) for ethnic identity and survival; cf. Barnard (1965) and Berlin (1976).
- 7 Cf. Eberhard (1977, pp. 301–303).
- 8 On the Chibemwe uprising, cf. Shepperson and Price (1958); also Shepperson (1960).
- 9 On the Kimbanguist and other central African millennialisms, cf. Balandier (1953).
- 10 On this rising and inscription, cf. Roux (1964, ch. 10).
- 11 For this inscription, cf. Moscati (1962, p. 110), citing J. B. Pritchard (ed.): *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament*, 2nd edn, Princeton University Press, 1955. For details of the expulsion of the Hyksos, cf. Pritchard (1958, pp. 173–5), and Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 149–60, 173–4).
- 12 To what extent we may already speak of a 'Russian' ethnicism is uncertain; the main bond of Eastern Slavs was their Orthodox religion, in contradistinction to the Catholicism of the rulers and most of the nobility of Poland–Lithuania, cf. Pipes (1977, pp. 37–9).
- 13 Cf. the excellent study of Jeanne d'Arc and her role in turning the tide against the English nobles by Warner (1983, esp. chs. 3–4). For an early statement on

- the difficulties of ascertaining from poems and chronicles the extent and depth of a specifically 'French' patriotism prior to the fifteenth century, cf. Kirkland (1938).
- 14 Cf. Atkinson (1960, ch. 5) and the paper by Bisson (1982) for an analysis of the early *Gesta* of the Counts of Barcelona, whence it is clear that the Counts had wrested their independence from the Carolingian Franks by AD 900, even though it was only in the early thirteenth century that the Catalans became fully self-conscious, as they extended their Reconquista to Valencia and the Balearic isles.
 - 15 On Rollō and his duchy, cf. Jones (1973, III/3, pp. 229–32; also IV/3, pp. 394–5).
 - 16 On the Norman chroniclers and their 'myth', cf. R. H. Davis (1976, ch. 2).
 - 17 Cf. Oppenheim (1977, pp. 152–3) and Roux (1964, pp. 346–53).
 - 18 On Manetho and Ptolemaic–Egyptian relations, cf. Grant (1982, pp. 37–48). On Manetho's chronicle, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 152–3).
 - 19 For a brief account of medieval Ethiopian history, cf. Ullendorff (1973, ch. 4); on the Semitic character of early Ethiopian religion and culture, cf. Moscati (1957, ch. 9) and Kessler (1985, chs. 1–2).
 - 20 On the New Kingdom's revival, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 183–278); on Egyptian administration and education under the New Kingdom, cf. Beyer (1959).
 - 21 Frye (1966, pp. 239, 258–61); and *ibid.*, pp. 240–56 for Shapur, Kartir and the Hephthalites, on which see further in chapter 5 here, (note 38).
 - 22 Roux (1964, ch. 10); for a fuller exposition, cf. *Cambridge Ancient History* V/2, ch. XXII, pp. 1–6.
 - 23 For this prophetic theme, cf. Heschel (1969, esp. chs. 6 and 8); the figure of Elijah was particularly significant in Jewish tradition, cf. Wiener (1978, esp. p. 77), cf. 1 Kings 17–11 Kings 2 for Elijah's career.
 - 24 Vergil, *Georgics* II, 136–74; Horace, *Odes* I, 35, 37; II, 15; III, 3, 5, 6; for the personal and historical context, cf. Highet (1959, pp. 67–74, 131–2).
 - 25 On Trebizond and the Comnenes, cf. Runciman (1975, ch. 6); on the late Byzantine empires, cf. Baynes and Moss (1969, pp. 33–50).
 - 26 Cf. Hopkins (1978); slave importation in Greece was not massive enough to disrupt traditional economies and cultures, cf. Finley (1981, Part II).
 - 27 Vernadsky (1969, pp. 129–33); and M. Cherniavsky: 'Russia' in Ranum (1975, esp. pp. 135–40).
 - 28 *Cambridge History of Iran* (1983) III/2, ch. 27a on Mani's doctrines and fate; and *ibid.* III/1, ch. 4, for the Zoroastrian reforms.
 - 29 On the Wisdom literature, cf. Seltzer (1980, ch. 3); on Tobias and the economic background of Hellenization, cf. the authoritative account in Tcherikover (1970, Part I).
 - 30 I Maccabees 2; 15–30. For a full account of the Maccabean uprising, cf. Pearlman (1973), and for the Hellenistic background, Tcherikover, (1970, Part I) and Hengel (1980). For the Maccabean uprising in its Israelite–Jewish context, cf. Bright (1978, pp. 416–47).
 - 31 On Josephus, cf. the detailed study by Rajak (1983). Josephus' tendentious evidence on the Zealots is also carefully analysed by Brandon (1967, ch. 2).
 - 32 For a vivid portrait of the Roman occupation of Judea and the Jewish resistance, cf. Maccoby (1974). For the general history of the period, cf. Grant (1973) and for

- the Zealots' last stand at Masada in 73 under Eliezer ben Yair, cf. Yadin (1966, citing his speech recorded in Josephus' *Jewish War* VII, pp. 323–33). On the general attitudes of Zealotism, cf. Josephus' *Antiquities of the Jews* XVIII, 4–5: 'The fourth philosophical sect was founded by this Judas the Galilean. Its sectaries (Zealots) associated themselves in general with the doctrine of the Pharisees; but they had an invincible love of liberty, for they held God to be their only lord and master.'
- 33 I have discussed this distinction at some length, with historical examples, in A. D. Smith (1984a); cf. also Poliakov (1974) for some 'racial' myths.
 - 34 On this legitimization, made long after Kiev had declined (in 1169 Andrei Bogoliubskii of Rostov spurned to make the conquered Kiev his capital), cf. Armstrong (1982, pp. 148–51); it was probably designed to counteract Lithuanian claims to the Kievan inheritance. On Kievan Rus, and its successors, cf. Pipes (1977, ch. 2), and Kochan (1963, chs. 1–3).
 - 35 For the Merovingian and Carolingian states, cf. Anderson (1974a, Part I, pp. 128–44), and Dixon (1976); for the Trojan lineage, and the alternative lineages from Noah's son, Japheth, and from the son of earth, Mannus and his three sons, as given in the Frankish 'Table of Peoples' (which replaced Mannus with Alaneus), cf. the illuminating account in S. Reynolds (1983).
 - 36 On Papal legitimations of the Franks and Capetians, cf. Armstrong (1982, pp. 152–9).
 - 37 *Ibid.*; for a brief account of the early and later feudal French state, cf. A. Lewis (1974); cf. also Kantorowicz (1951) and Bloch (1961, II, pp. 431–7).
 - 38 On Akhnaton, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 219–22); on Egyptian thought about the role of the state and its god-king, cf. J. Wilson: 'Egypt', in Frankfort et al. (1949, ch. III); cf. also David (1982, pp. 155–71).
 - 39 On the functions of the Assyrian kings, cf. Roux (1964, ch. 21); and more generally in Mesopotamia, cf. Oppenheim (1977).
 - 40 On representations in Byzantine art, cf. Runciman (1975); and for the role of the Byzantine emperor, cf. Armstrong (1982, p. 145–8), and Runciman (1977).
 - 41 For an account of Byzantine decline, cf. Baynes and Moss (1969, ch. 1), and for the Greek language, *ibid.*, (ch. 9). Armstrong (1982, pp. 178–81) discusses the new 'precocious nationalism' of post-1204 Byzantium and the turn to Hellenism. For the religious dimension and anti-Latinism, cf. Sherrard (1959).
 - 42 On this 'campanilismo' of the medieval Italian city-states, cf. Waley (1969, pp. 7–11, 54–5, 102–9, 110–22, and especially 139–63).
 - 43 Southern Italy indeed, especially after the Norman invasions and the later Spanish rule, did develop in radically different ways with serious consequences for Italian unity and solidarity in modern times, cf. Beales (1971). For some of the early Italian schemes of unification in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, cf. Marcu (1976) and the critique in Breuille (1982, pp. 4–6); already in the fourteenth century, Cola da Rienzo and Petrarch evinced a sense of Italian solidarity, albeit overlaid with Roman and Catholic ideals and assumptions; cf. Kohn (1967a, ch. 3).
 - 44 On this proto-democratic character, cf. Frankfort (1954, ch. 3); on the growth of pan-Sumerian culture and sentiments, cf. Kramer (1963, ch. 7); and on the transference of city-state myths and symbols to a pan-Sumerian imperial *mythomoteur*, cf. Armstrong (1982, pp. 131–2).

- 45 On the city-states, cf. Ehrenberg (1960); on the growth of this pan-Hellenic sentiment, which he credits to the oracles, leagues and Games from the eighth to the sixth centuries, cf. R. Schlaifer: 'Greek theories of slavery from Homer to Aristotle', in Finley (1961); cf. also A. Andrewes: 'The growth of the city-state', in Lloyd-Jones (1965).
- 46 On the ethnic disturbances in Sicyon and elsewhere in the sixth century, cf. Andrewes (1956, ch. 5). There is some dispute about the depth and extent of ethnic cleavages within the Greek community; some consider them superficial, others like Alty (1982) regard them, at least during the fifth century, as fundamental and politically significant. There were frequent appeals to 'ethnic kinship' on both sides during the Peloponnesian wars, there was widespread knowledge of Ionian and Dorian foundation myths, and there were differences in customs, cults, calendars and tribal systems as between Dorians and Ionians, cf. Huxley (1966). Thucydides also frequently mentions as a common assumption on all sides the lack of military self-confidence of the Ionians (including the Athenians) *vis-à-vis* the Dorians in the Peloponnesian War. Herodotus, as a Dorian, shared this disdain for Ionian weakness (though he excluded a self-reliant Athens) and implicitly confirmed Pindar's *Odes* to Dorian victors who gloried in their Dorian ancestry. For Alty, these ethnic reasons had political consequences because they had established themselves in Greek minds as 'good' reasons (both as explanations and as influences on action) and therefore 'ethnic differences will, by that very fact, exert an influence on the way people act' (*ibid.*, p. 7). But Alty confines his interest to political action; whereas ethnicity (whether Dorian and Ionian, or more broadly Hellenic) reveals itself in many other spheres, such as art and architecture, dress, music, poetry, dialect and religion (Dorians could not enter Ionian temples, and so the Spartan Cleomenes could not set foot on the Acropolis at Athens). Moreover, for some purposes and in some contexts, Ionians, Dorians, Aeolians and Boeotians felt themselves to be Hellenes, with specifically Hellenic myths, ties and institutions; and the relationship between the lesser (Ionian, Dorian, etc.) and greater (Hellenic) ethnic circles of allegiance and sentiment needs to be explored. On the Ionians and Aeolians in Asia Minor, cf. Huxley (1966) and Burn (1960, pp. 6-7, 48-50, 55, 98-100, 210-14, and 62 for the Ionic column-capital). The Ionian city-states were too independent to accept Thales' proposal for an Ionian federal union, though during their ill-starred revolt against Persia (499-94 BC) they may have produced a federal coinage (*ibid.*, pp. 334-6); cf. also Andrewes (1971, ch. 3).
- 47 Cf. Andrewes (1971, ch. 8). On class struggles and slavery in ancient Greece, cf. Finley (1981, esp. Part II) and Ste Croix (1981). For internal factions within Greek city-states, cf. Forrest (1966).
- 48 Levi (1965, pp. 47-8) attempts to explain inter-city-state conflict among the Greeks as a product of this competition for leadership of Hellas against the Persian enemy. Undoubtedly, victory over the Persians stimulated a pan-Hellenic consciousness during the fifth century, but internal social conflicts were just as important as *polis* pride or *polis* competition in preventing the realization of any pan-Hellenic political unification; cf. Burn (1978, chs. 9-10).
- 49 On fifth- and fourth-century pan-Hellenism, which tended to become more a matter of culture than imputed descent, cf. H. Schwabl: 'Das Bild der fremden

- Welt bei den frühen Griechen', and Hans Ditter: 'Die Hellenen-Barbaren-Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', both in Fondation Hardt (1962). The contrast with Persia was multifaceted: between civilization and barbarism, freedom and servitude, intelligible culture and incomprehension, and creativity and slavish imitation. But all this was after the event; such solidarity as Hellas possessed before the Persian invasions was religious and linguistic, and was summed up in the Homeric canon.
- 50 Amos 9:7; Jeremiah 25:9. On universalism and monotheism in ancient Israelite religion, cf. Kaufmann (1961, pp. 127–31).
- 51 Micah 4:5; though this occurs in a universalist context which nevertheless assumes the naturalness of each community having its own gods. On this prophetic message, cf. Baeck (1948) and Heschel (1969). On Ezra's reforms and the problems of chronology in this period, cf. Bright (1978, pp. 379–90). On the growth of congregational Judaism, cf. Weber (1952, ch. 13).
- 52 On the social relevance of the Mishnah, cf. Neusner (1981). In the New Covenant of Qumran sect, the messianic age was to be presided over by two anointed ones, a Davidic king and, above him, a messianic High Priest of the House of Aaron; cf. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky: 'Messianism in Jewish history', in Ben-Sasson and Ettinger (1971). For a fuller account of Jewish messianism, cf. Klausner (1956); and on early (pre-Exilic) ambivalence to kings and kingship, cf. Kaufmann (1961, ch. 8).
- 53 For a systematic comparison of the economic position of the Jews and the Armenians as 'mobilised diasporas' cf. Armstrong (1976) and (1982, ch. 7); on the differences between the position of the Jews in Christian and Islamic lands during the Middle Ages, cf. Poliakov (1966–75, esp. Vols I and II).
- 54 The fullest account is in Lang (1980, esp. ch. 7); cf. also Atiya (1968, Part IV).
- 55 Armstrong (1982, pp. 207–8); cf. also Atiya (1968, p. 322 and sqq.).
- 56 Whatever Muhammad's intentions, the fact remains that the outpourings of the seventh century from the Arabian desert carried strong ethnic overtones, since even before Muhammad's *umma*, language and poetry, as well as similarity of life-style and tribal organisation, had mediated between the often feuding Arabian tribes (though the southern kingdoms developed somewhat differently), cf. Carmichael (1967, ch. 2); but it is only recently, from al-Kawakibi onwards, that Arab nationalism has re-interpreted early Islam as the supreme expression of Arab genius, cf. Haim (1962, Introduction). However, even the secular Ba'th party, founded by Christian Arabs, found it necessary to accord Islam a high position in the party programme and ideology, cf. Binder (1964).
- 57 For a brief account of the genesis of Arabist ideas, cf. Dawn (1961). Rashid Rida, though not an Arabist, looked back to early Arab Islam: 'To be filled with passion for the history of the Arabs,' he wrote, 'to strive to revive their glory, is the same as working for Islamic union, which in the past was only achieved through the Arabs and will not be regained in this century except through them', (*Al-Manar* III, May 1900); but cf. the argument in Haim, (1962, p. 23), citing this passage from Rashid Rida.
- 58 On this early Irish Christian monasticism, cf. L. de Paor: 'The Christian connection', in L. Smith (1984). On the Celtic revivalists, cf. Lyons (1979), and the recent illuminating study by Hutchinson (1987), which also analyses

- the differences and tensions between Yeat's Celtic pagan revivalism and MacNeill's more Gaelic (and implicitly Catholic) revival.
- 59 Baynes and Moss (1969, pp. 43–4); *ibid.*, (pp. 119–27) for Latin–Orthodox relations, and Ware (1984, ch. 3); cf. more generally, Armstrong (1982, pp. 176–81).
- 60 Campbell and Sherrard (1968, ch. 1); for the *millet* system under the Turks, cf. Stavrianos (1961).
- 61 Second to the last Byzantine Emperor, Constantine XI, who was killed in 1453; on this and the Judaizers, cf. Green (1964, p. 373) and Armstrong (1982, pp. 149–51). On the wider relations between Byzantium and Russia, particularly in the Church, cf. Baron Meyendorff and Norman Baynes: 'The Byzantine inheritance in Russia', in Baynes and Moss (1969).
- 62 On the relations between the Kievan state and the north-east Russian colonizing principalities, cf. Pipes (1977, ch. 2) and Riasanovsky (1983).
- 63 For the position of the Tsar as father and protector of the people, and redeemer of Russia, in the thought of the Slavophiles who looked back to pre-Petrine Russia, cf. Thaden (1964) and Kohn (1960, II/1). On the development of Tsarism as an institution for territorial expansion and political development, cf. Vernadsky (1969, ch. 4), and M. Cherniavsky: 'Russia', in Ranum (1975); and Seton-Watson (1967) for the nineteenth century.

Chapter 4 Class and *ethnie* in agrarian societies

- 1 Gellner's argument, which is set out in Gellner (1983, ch. 2), sums up explicitly what for many is implicit, that is, the impossibility of nations and nationalism in a pre-modern, pre-industrial world. The tradition goes back to Acton and Renan; the latter already singled out what for many is a fundamental characteristic of modern nations, the anonymity of their membership. To this, historians like Kohn and Seton-Watson and social scientists like Znaniecki and Deutsch have added features like ideological uniformity and cultural homogeneity, elements that could only flourish in post-1789 Europe and an industrializing world. For Gellner, nationalism, the worship of culture *per se*, is only born in an era where a fluid, literate, anonymous and innovative society requires a unitary education and continuous culture, which must standardize and reduce in number all the old divisions and cultures of agrarian societies, leaving only some to survive and 'acquire a new literate underpinning, and become more demanding and clearly defined. The new primary ethnic colours, few in number and sharply outlined against each other, are often *chosen* by those who adhere to them, and who then proceed to internalise them deeply' (Gellner (1982, p. 176), italics in original). In this lecture, Gellner pays greater attention to the relationship between pre-modern ethnicity and modern nationalism, but without altering his belief in a fundamental divide between a nation-less agrarian pre-modernity and a necessarily nationalist industrial modernity. As I shall argue, the choice of *ethnie* is often constrained, even when the content is re-interpreted and the form reconstituted, (see chapters 6–8 in this book).
- 2 For example, African communities were often more united, and differentiated from others, than their European counterparts, because tribal and clan segmen-

- tation assigned every family a status and role, and so feudal ties, as Goody (1971) argues, tended to be weak. 'Tribes' are not the same as the looser *ethnie*, but confederations of them may be formed into *ethnie*, using a yet more putative and mythical ancestry tie. For the contrast between medieval European and African communities, cf. Tilly (1975, Introduction).
- 3 On Sumer and Elam, cf. *Cambridge Ancient History* I/2, ch. 23, where the Elamites are called 'Proto-Lurs', 'whose language only became Iranian in the Middle Ages' (p. 644); they called their country *Allamt*, (God's land, probably). Their language is unrelated to any known language and is not well understood. On Shutruk-Nakhunte and Ashur-bani-pal's campaign, cf. Roux (1964, pp. 237–8, 301–4).
 - 4 Cf. *Cambridge Ancient History* II/1, ch. 7; Oppenheim (1977, pp. 67–9). Cf. also Ghirshmann (1954, pp. 45–6, 50–7, 63–7, 118–23).
 - 5 For these customs and Elamite religion with its cult of serpents and the great goddesses Pinikir and Kirirsha and chief god Khumban (later In-Shushinak of Susa became important, along with the city), cf. *Cambridge Ancient History* I/2, ch. 23, esp. pp. 62–73.
 - 6 The language survived, interestingly, into the late sixth century in Iran, to judge by Darius' trilingual inscription on the rock of Behistun; cf. Oppenheim (1977, p. 69) and, on the inscription whose original text of 520 BC was in Elamite, J. M. Cook (1983, pp. 67–9).
 - 7 For this view, cf. Handelsman (1929) and Hadas (1943) and (1950); it is fully documented, at least for rulers, poets and Popes, in Kohn (1967a, ch. 3). Throughout, Kohn underlines the absence of nations and nationalism (without mentioning ethnicity); but in a note on medieval collective sentiments and Giraldus Cambrensis (c. AD 1200) he speaks of 'a natural dislike of the Welsh for the English' (note 26, pp. 595–6), and it is this popular consciousness and ethnic stereotyping that needs analysing in its own right rather than as a prelude to, or harbinger of, nations and nationalism.
 - 8 Cf. Jakobson (1945) and S. Reynolds (1983), who stresses exactly these popular notions of descent groups among Germans, English, Normans, Welsh, French and even Italians, at least from the twelfth century, though the myths of heroic descent themselves go back to the sixth century; she identifies the popular conceptions of descent groups themselves with the emerging *regna* of western Europe in the post-Carolingian era, in S. Reynolds (1984, esp. ch. 8 and Conclusion).
 - 9 For an overview of these kingdoms, cf. Dixon (1976); on their material culture and religious practices, cf. Todd (1972) and Lasko (1971).
 - 10 On the conversions, cf. Koht (1947) and Singleton (1985, pp. 16–19); for brief accounts of the medieval South Slav kingdoms, cf. Singleton (1980, ch. 3) and Pearson (1983, ch. 1); cf. also the illuminating discussion of Eastern and south-eastern European developments which affected ethnic formation, in Anderson (1974a, Part II/ii, chs. 3–5).
 - 11 For some examples, cf. Pearson (1983, chs. 2–3), and the essays in Sugar (1980).
 - 12 Until their defeat by the Habsburgs in 1620; on the Polish and Hungarian nobles, cf. Pearson (1983, chs. 2–3) and the essays by Brock and Barany in Sugar and Lederer (1969). For the Slovakian dialects and Slovak nationalism, cf.

- Brock (1976). W. Argyle: 'Size and scale as factors in the development of nationalist movements' in A. D. Smith (1976) argues that early nationalism in Eastern Europe was necessarily drawn from a tiny upper- and middle-class stratum, and had to propose what were either novel categories or categories (that is, nations) based on shadowy memories of medieval statehood, in the teeth of opposition from vested elite interests and mass apathy.
- 13 For early Rumanian nationalism, cf. Florescu (1967); cf. also Zernatto (1944).
 - 14 On the development of ethnic identity and nationalism in the Balkans under Ottoman rule, cf. Stavrianos (1957) and (1961); for the role of religion, cf. G. Arnakis: 'The role of religion in the development of Balkan nationalism', in Jelavich (1963).
 - 15 On Italian regionalism and the special problems of the Mezzogiorno, which have persisted until today, cf. Beales (1971) and Procacci (1973, chs. 13–14). The major study of French regionalism which also persisted into the early twentieth century, is E. Weber (1979). On class divisions within British culture today, cf. the essay by Martin and Crouch, in Giner and Archer (1971); also Nairn (1977).
 - 16 For a detailed exposition of warfare and tactics in the classical world, cf. Connolly (1981).
 - 17 For illuminating analyses of the role of warfare and armies in communal politics, notably of city-states and nomadic confederations, cf. MacNeill (1963) and (1981, esp. ch. 1). For the effects of war on ethnic consciousness and imagery, cf. A. D. Smith (1981b).
 - 18 On the Assyrian army, cf. Saggs (1984, ch. 16) and Roux (1964, pp. 257–61, 276–8, 314–7).
 - 19 For the growth of Roman patriotism at the time of the Punic Wars, cf. Wilkinson (1975, ch. 2), and on *exempla* of virtue and patriotism from Roman history, especially of Regulus and Scipio Africanus in the Punic Wars, cf. Balsdon (1979, pp. 2–9) and Ogilvie (1976); for their revival in late eighteenth-century French culture and politics, cf. Rosenblum (1967, ch. 2) and Herbert (1972).
 - 20 Cf. MacNeill (1963, pp. 486–94); on Mongol rule in China, cf. Meskill (1973, ch. 6).
 - 21 On the disastrous encounter of Prince Igor and his host with the Polovtsii (Cumans) in 1185, which was celebrated in the 'Lay (*Slovo*) of the Host of Igor', cf. Pipes (1977, p. 35); scholarly doubts about the authenticity of the *Slovo*, discussed in Paskiewicz (1954, pp. 336–53), have not affected its potency as ethnic myth, as was clear from the reception of Borodin's great opera and the production of paintings by Ivan Bilibin or Roerich (the latter triggered by another epic encounter in 1941, between invading Nazis and Soviet Russian defenders). Another such encounter, between the Teutonic knights and Alexander Nevsky on Lake Peipius in 1242, (on which cf. Vernadsky (1969, pp. 61–2)), also formed the basis for Eisenstein's well-known film with a brilliant score by Prokofiev, again produced under the shadow of Nazi expansion in 1938. Eisenstein also produced a two-part film of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, featuring his great victory at Kazan in 1552. For the nationalistic revival of specifically Russian historical, religious and military themes from the past during the nineteenth-century Slavophile movement, cf. Gray (1971, chs. 1–2).
 - 22 Cf. Francis (1968) for an analogous distinction between state-based and 'demotic' nations to explain nation-formation in contemporary sub-Saharan

Africa. I am indebted to Dr Michael Mann for his comments on an earlier version of the argument in this chapter, and notably his emphasis on the mass character of modern nations in contrast to pre-modern ethnic formations. While agreeing with him on the importance of citizenship as an attribute of nations, I would cite the existence of several pre-modern 'demotic' *ethnie* as requiring us to modify the stark contrast implied in his claim.

- 23 For Medina and Muhammad's activities there, cf. B. Lewis (1970, pp. 40–47) and Carmichael (1967, chs. 1–2); and for the idea that the Arab conquests had at first little to do with Islam, cf. Lewis, (1970, pp. 55–6): 'Initially the great conquests were an expansion not of Islam but of the Arab nation, driven by the pressure of overpopulation in its native peninsula to seek an outlet in the neighbouring countries. It is one of the series of migrations which carried the Semites time and again into the Fertile Crescent and beyond', though he adds that Islam gave the expanding Arab tribes confidence and discipline; cf. also Crone and Cook (1980).
- 24 Only under some Sassanid rulers like Chosroes I; cf. Frye (1966, pp. 258–62). On the diffusion of Zoroastrianism, cf. M. Boyce (1979).
- 25 According to Plato's *Menexenos* (245 c/d), the Athenians boasted that they had no Egyptian or Phoenician ancestors like other Greek cities: 'The mind of this city is so noble and free and so powerful and healthy and by nature hating the barbarians because we are pure Hellenes and are not commingled with barbarians. No Pelops or Cadmus or Aegyptus or Danaos or others who are barbarians by nature and Hellenes only by law dwell with us, but we live here as pure Hellenes who are not mixed with barbarians. Therefore the city has acquired a real hate of alien nature.' Cited by Hengel (1980, p. 56, and generally ch. 7). On the Homeric past as an essential part of Greek education and self-definition, cf. Burn (1960, pp. 8–10).
- 26 Armstrong (1982, ch. 3). Armstrong rightly maintains that the world religions provided much of the mythology and symbolism of medieval ethnic identities; at the same time, there is little sense of common origins and history in Papal or ducal appeals at the time of the Crusades, rather a marriage of Christian and feudal-martial ideals, which in practice were dissipated in feudal quarrels and commercial rivalries, as well as those of the Templars and Hospitallers, cf. Keen (1969, chs. 9, 13).
- 27 On the earlier peoples of the Anatolian plain, cf. Lloyd (1967); on the *pankush*, cf. Moscati (1962, ch. 5), and Gurney (1954, pp. 78–9).
- 28 On this conquest 'federalism', cf. Moscati, (1962, pp. 168, 188–9).
- 29 *Ibid.*, (pp. 174–5); for Burney and Lang (1971, ch. 4), Hittite characteristics were gradually submerged among a variety of local and Near Eastern cultural influences, as the ruler in the Empire of the fourteenth century BC became a high priest, addressed as 'my Sun', with a winged solar disc in his standard. They also think the pantheon of Yazilikaya with its processional reliefs is largely Hurrian in character and influence; cf. Lloyd (1956, pp. 138–43).
- 30 Can we say then that a culture here outlasts its polity? Not exactly. The demise of the Hittite empire after 1200 BC allowed the neo-Hittite culture of Carchemish (the main centre), Malatya, Sam'al, Hamath, and Aleppo, to flourish; but it too faded away once these centres were sufficiently permeated by Arameans and gradually Aramaized in language and culture after 800 BC, or

- subjugated by a renascent Assyria, cf. *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1971, Aram, Arameans) and Lloyd, (1967, ch. 9).
- 31 On the Vedic era and Aryan penetration, cf. Thapar (1966, ch. 2) and Sen (1961, chs. 2, 8, 9).
- 32 On this latter process of 'Sanskritisation' under British rule, cf. Srinivas (1962); for a sociological account of Hinduism's spread, cf. Dumont (1970) and for the South, Beteille (1965).
- 33 Beteille (1965, pp. 45–65); for different interpretations of the special role of the Brahmins in Indian society to those of Weber (1958) and Dumont (1970), cf. Hall (1985, ch. 3) and Meillassoux (1973).
- 34 Tilak's cult of Shivaji, the Marathi hero, and of the goddess Kali in his agitation in Bengal, together with his emphasis on an activist reading of the Bhagavad Gita, suggest both the fluidity of this originally aristocratic Hindu *ethnie* with its sub-divisions by region and language, and the explosive power of a reinterpreted Hindu mythology and symbolism with its appeal to past Aryan Hindu greatness, cf. M. Adenwalla: 'Hindu concepts and the Gita in early Indian national thought', in Sakai (1961). On the challenge posed by these regional–linguistic *ethnie* to the overall Hindu community (aside from the special problem of the Sikhs), cf. Harrison (1960) and J. Das Gupta: 'Ethnicity, language demands and national development in India', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975).
- 35 On Persian religion and art of the Achaemenid period, cf. J.M. Cook (1983, chs. 14 and 15) and Frye (1966, ch. 3); Artaxerxes II (405–359 BC) named the Avestan triad, Anahita, Mithra and Ahura-Mazda, in his inscriptions and apparently imposed the cult of Anahita throughout the empire.
- 36 Some measure of continuity to a Persian *ethnie* in Iran was given by the Magi as officiating priests of the fire cult, though they were perhaps more like the Levite tribe than the Brahmin caste in the earlier periods; only under the Sassanids did they come to occupy a distinct status in the social hierarchy, cf. J. M. Cook (1983, pp. 154–5). On early Zoroastrianism in general, cf. *Cambridge History of Judaism* (1984, I, ch. 11).
- 37 There was a brief Turkic revival in Court circles in the late fifteenth century, abetted by Ottoman conquest of eastern Anatolia with its reserves of Turkic-speaking tribes; but this did not last, and the location of the centre of the empire at Greek-speaking Constantinople soon obscured any Turkish ethnic element, cf. B. Lewis (1968, ch. 1); on the modern transformation of the Ottoman empire into a Turkish national state, cf. Karal (1965) and Berkes (1964).
- 38 On this, see above chapter 2, and Kramer (1963, ch. 7); on the religious and economic importance of Nippur, cf. Roux (1964, pp. 129–30). Later, a pan-Babylonian sentiment took the place of pan-Sumerian loyalties, lasting into the Hellenistic period, cf. Oates (1979).
- 39 On this, see chapter 5 in this book, and Harden (1971).
- 40 See above, notes (46–48) of chapter 3, and Hengel (1980, ch. 7).
- 41 Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 2) draws attention to the 'frontier' position and crusading fervour of Castilians, Hungarians and Russians, located at the frontiers of Christendom, as does Armstrong (1982, chs. 2–3); for a general account of the role of war and geo-politics in ethnic consciousness, cf. A. D. Smith (1981b).
- 42 On this, cf. Thürer (1970, pp. 23–6).

- 43 Ibid., pp. 26–44; cf. also Steinberg (1976, ch. 2). We should not overlook the later divisions between the original 'forest cantons' and the rich oligarchies of Luzern, Zürich and Berne; but enough sense of historical difference and shared myth remained to permit and fuel the eighteenth-century Helvetic revival, of which Fuseli's painting, the *Oath of the Rütli*, commissioned in 1778 by the Zürich Rathaus (and still there), was a commemorative symbol, cf. Kohn (1957a, pp. 22–47); on Fuseli, cf. Antal (1956) and Schiff (1973).
- 44 But, until the crushing of the rebellion of the Native Irish and Old English (who were largely Catholic) of 1641, the Catholic religion, though important, had not become the major element of identity for the Irish which it thereafter became as a result of Cromwellian religious and land policies and which the Anglican victory of 1690 confirmed, cf. D. G. Boyce: 'Separatism and the Irish Nationalist Tradition', in C. Williams (1982); cf. also Beckett (1958, chs. 2–4).
- 45 On the overseas Chinese, cf. Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 10); on the 'plural society' in south-east Asia, cf. Furnivall (1948) and Banton (1967, ch. 11).
- 46 Weber (1965, ch. 7) on the differences between Harijan and Jewish conceptions of status reversal; for the life of the Jewish communities in early modern European ghettos, cf. Wirth (1956), and for other diasporas, cf. Armstrong (1976).
- 47 Cf. Atiya (1968, I, pp. 16–17); the Arabs call Egypt 'dar-al-Qibt', home of the Copts. For a brief account of the Copts in modern Egypt, cf. Wakin (1963).
- 48 Atiya (1968, III, esp. pp. 251–88) and Joseph (1983, ch. 1); the eastward movement of the Eastern (non-Monophysite) Syrians began after the death of Nestorius and the Council of Chalcedon (451), with the Sassanid empire becoming the chief centre, but later other centres in Arabia, Central Asia and China, not to mention the Church of St Thomas Christians in South India (on which also cf. Van der Ploeg (1982) and Atiya (1968, V)), flourished. However, Mongol and Turkish conquests, and conflicts with Kurds, have reduced the Nestorians and Chaldeans (the Uniate branch) in Iraq to some 30,000; for the Chaldean diaspora in America, cf. M. C. Sengstock: 'Detroit's Iraqi-Chaldeans: a conflicting conception of Identity', in Abraham and Abraham (1983).
- 49 On the role of the Church in supporting an emergent feudalism for its own protection and to secure conversions by force of heathen European peripheries, cf. Ganshof (1952) and Keen (1969, chs. 1–4 and 6).
- 50 This is true of the Greeks and Jews, as we have seen; cf. Levi (1965) and Brandon (1969, ch. 2). But we also find the co-existence of class divisions and ethnic sentiments among Russians and Armenians, modern Greeks and Bulgarians, early Arabs and Copts.
- 51 Cf. Walek-Czernecki (1929), Hadas (1950) and Koht (1947); cf. the debate on medieval 'nationalism' in Tipton (1972).
- 52 On the early cultures and dynasties of Egypt, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, ch. 1) and Emery (1961, Introduction and ch. 1).
- 53 On the Iranian assimilation of Islam and the Persian revival of the tenth century, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* (1983, IV, ch. 1).
- 54 Cf. Baynes and Moss (1969, ch. 1) and Armstrong (1982, ch. 6).
- 55 On this cleavage and its later political uses, cf. Barzun (1932); on the regionalism of 'France' in the medieval era, cf. Handelsman (1929) and Rickard (1974) for linguistic regionalism.

- 56 Cf. A. Lewis (1974, chs. 3-5) and Hall (1962); on Western early modern state formation and homogenization, cf. Tilly (1975) and Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 2.).

Chapter 5 Ethnic survival and dissolution

- 1 For general histories of Poland, cf. Halecki (1955) and the recent comprehensive account in Davies (1982).
- 2 The strategic location of this mountainous region is highlighted by the detailed study of Burney and Lang (1971); the same incidentally can be said of the Georgians to the north, who became Christian shortly after the Armenians (and whose Bagratid royal dynasty also claimed descent from David and Solomon), for their self-awareness was strengthened by continual warfare and their Caucasian location, cf. British Library (1978, pp. 69-72) and Burney and Lang (1971).
- 3 This is not to say that Nehemiah, Artaxerxes' governor and envoy, did not find it necessary to secure Jerusalem and its territory against the incursions of Sanballat of Samaria and others in the fifth century BC; for a history of the Restoration to Jerusalem, cf. *Cambridge History of Judaism* (1984, 1, pp. 135-43, 148-61); and Bright (1978, chs. 9-10).
- 4 For the problems of these recent 'autonomist' movements of Western Europe's 'peripheral' *ethnie*, cf. S. Berger (1972) and Esman (1977).
- 5 Cf. the essays (including Rokkan's) in Tilly (1975) and Rokkan et al. (1972), which in turn look back to the quantitative approach of Karl Deutsch (1966).
- 6 Orridge (1982) and Orridge and Williams (1982), articles which clearly reveal the potential of viewing the role of specific *ethnie* within a wider network of states and communities.
- 7 The impact on warfare of state-building itself is treated by Finer in his essay in Tilly (1975); and on the role of location, habitat and folk culture in consolidating the idea and reality of a 'national territory', cf. A. D. Smith (1981c).
- 8 On these Slav immigrations, cf. Singleton (1985, ch. 2) and Anderson (1974a, II/2, ch. 5); on the Aryan infiltration, cf. Thapar (1966, I/ch. 2).
- 9 On the Chazars, cf. Dunlop (1967, esp. ch. 9 on the fall of Khazaran-Atil or Itil in 965 to Sviatoslav); the Chazars seem to have survived by some centuries the destruction of their state, as a messianic Jewish movement is reported at the end of the eleventh century there and they probably only disappeared with the conquest of the area by the Cumans (Polovtsii) in the twelfth century. On the Nabataeans and their absorption by the Arab bedouin conquerors, cf. Avi-Yonah (1981, p. 46), though others think they disappeared earlier.
- 10 On the United Nations definition of genocide (the Convention of Genocide, 1948), cf. Kuper (1981, ch. 2); on the Nazi extermination of the Gypsies, cf. Kenrick and Puxon (1972, Part II).
- 11 Cf. chapter 3 above, where this difference with the Barthians is related to ethnocentrism.
- 12 This is most obvious in rural life and in the arts; on the first, cf. for example, the praise of old English customs and building practices in Ditchfield (1985),

- and on the second, the analysis of a specific Englishness in English art, cf. Pevsner (1955).
- 13 See below on these cases; on the modernization of Indian traditions, cf. Rudolph and Rudolph (1967).
 - 14 Cf. Meskill (1973, ch. 6) and Eberhard (1977, pp. 237–49).
 - 15 Cf. *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971, Aram, Arameans), and Moscati (1957, ch. 7) and Moscati (1962, ch. 6) for their role as agent of cultural transmission through their simpler language and alphabet.
 - 16 On the Phoenicians and their culture, cf. Harden (1971) and Moscati (1973, Part I). The absence of fuller direct sources in the Phoenician language, and the rarity of any common and specific name used by the Phoenicians to describe themselves (Canaanite was their usual self-appellation, and *phoinikēs* was the Homeric and Greek term) hampers our knowledge and suggests that city-state consciousness was more developed than ethnic consciousness, cf. on this Moscati (1973, ch. 1).
 - 17 The quotation is from Harden (1971, p. 17).
 - 18 In fact, both the Phoenician cities in the East, and Carthage and her surrounding dependencies, survived for some centuries after their political demise. Tyre and Sidon regained their autonomy as city-states in 120 and 111 BC and enjoyed partial independence under Roman rule from 64 BC; and the language too only gradually became extinct (Moscati, 1973, p. 49). On the survival of Punic culture, especially in Numidia, cf. Moscati (1973, pp. 168–9). It was only after Caesar had annexed Carthage and Numidia that Romanization proceeded; but the language was still spoken till the time of St Augustine and the cult was only gradually absorbed into Roman religion.
 - 19 On the International Gothic style, cf. Murray and Murray (1963, ch. 2). On Burgundy's eclipse, cf. Thüerer (1970, pp. 42–5); Tilly (1975, Introduction) cited Burgundy as a failed candidate for statehood.
 - 20 On the Assyrian colony in Kanesh, cf. Lloyd (1956, ch. 7) and Saggs (1984, pp. 27–34); on the Old Kingdom, cf. Roux (1964, pp. 170–77) and *Cambridge Ancient History* I/2, pp. 752–63.
 - 21 Some villages remained, cf. Roux, (1964, p. 374); on the swift fall of Assyria, cf. Olmstead (1975, ch. 48), the classic account of the Assyrian empire; cf. also Saggs (1984, pp. 117–21).
 - 22 Cyrus did re-admit the gods of Assyria to the pantheon, but the Assyrian name was applied, it seems, only to a region of northern Mesopotamia. On the modern Chaldeans and Nestorians, cf. Atiya (1968, pp. 277–8) and for their claims, cf. 'The Assyrian', *Journal of the Assyrian Society of Great Britain*, (I/31, Autumn 1975).
 - 23 Cf. Olmstead (1923/1975, chs. 1–3) and Roux (1964, pp. 257–61); cf. also Oppenheim (1977, pp. 163–70).
 - 24 Cf. J.M. Cook (1983, pp. 55–6, 100) for these revolts and their results; but Babylon and its temples and priesthoods survived into the Seleucid era, though its inhabitants were ordered to move to Seleuceia, 90 kilometres north on the Tigris, by Antiochus I (281–61 BC); it seems to have revived, along with Kish, Nippur, Uruk, Barsippa, and even Assur and Nuzi in the north, in Seleucid and Parthian times, though the centre of political gravity and commerce had shifted to Antioch and Alexandria, cf. Oates (1979, pp. 140–43) and Roux

- (1964, ch. 25). However, economic impoverishment due to inflation and excessive taxation under the Persians, accompanied by an influx of Aramaic-speaking foreigners into Mesopotamia in this period, seems to have confined the old Babylonian culture to a tiny priestly elite.
- 25 On the Arameans, cf. Moscati (1957, ch. 7); on the mass deportations, cf. Roux (1964, pp. 278, 290) and Saggs (1984, pp. 124–30).
 - 26 On Tiglath-Piliser III's army reforms, cf. Roux (1964, pp. 277–8); on the Assyrian army, cf. Olmstead (1923/1975, pp. 602–5), and Roux, (1964, pp. 314–7); cf. also Contenau (1954, pp. 140–49).
 - 27 Cited in Olmstead (1923/1975, p. 640) and Roux (1964, p. 342).
 - 28 On this antiquarian revival, cf. Roux (1964, ch. 22); on religion and divination in Mesopotamia, cf. Oppenheim (1977, ch. 4).
 - 29 Cf. Reade (1983); and Frankfort (1970, ch. 6).
 - 30 Cf. Roux (1964, pp. 307–14), and Saggs (1984, pp. 147–51).
 - 31 Nahum 3:6–7, 18–19; cf. Olmstead (1923/1975, pp. 640–44); cf. also, Zephaniah 2:13–16.
 - 32 Cf. note 22 above. In fact, the term 'Assyrian' here covers both Uniate Chaldeans and Nestorians of Eastern Syria, many of whom were located in Mesopotamia, eastern Anatolia and Iran, that is, in the Persian empire, and preferred to be called Assyrian rather than East Syrian; they became Diophysites in the fifth century, and were called Nestorians (from the Diophysite position taken up by the bishop of Constantinople, Nestorius, at the Council of Ephesus in AD 431) only from the thirteenth century. They use a Syriac liturgy and scripture, as do their (originally sister-church and) West Syrian counterpart, the Jacobites (from Jacob Baradaeus, c. AD 500–75); cf. Joseph (1983) and Atiyah (1968, pp. 239–42, 249–56), and Ware (1984, pp. 28–37).
 - 33 On these and other surviving *ethnie* and ethnic fragments, cf. Ashworth (1977–80); and Horak (1985) for East European cases, and Szporluk (1971) for Soviet ethnic groups.
 - 34 On the growth of these Western states and their policies of cultural homogenization, cf. Bendix (1964) and the essays in Tilly (1975) and Tivey (1980, especially by Navarri and Tivey).
 - 35 Cf. Ullendorff (1973, ch. 4) and Levine (1965, ch. 2). It was not a complete failure; the nucleus of a Semitized Amharic and Monophysite kingdom remained, cut off from its surroundings by a sea of Islam, until it became a springboard for renewed expansion in the mid-nineteenth century.
 - 36 On this revival, cf. chapter 3 above and Frye (1966, ch. 6). For details of Sassanid policies towards religious minorities and the appeal of foreign religions, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran*, III/1, ch. 4.
 - 37 On the Mazdakites, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* III/1, pp. 150–51, and III/2, ch. 27(b).
 - 38 MacNeill (1963, p. 400). According to the *Cambridge History of Iran* III/1, ch. 3, pp. 359 sqq., the *Shāhnāma of Firdausi* (d. c. 1029) was partly based on the *Khwadāy-namag* (Book of Lords) which was probably compiled under the last Sassanid monarch, Yazdgird III (631–51) and translated into Arabic by ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 757). But Frye (1966, p. 259) suggests that there may have been an earlier *Khwadāy-namag* compiled under Chosroes I. There is considerable uncertainty over the matter, and all we can be sure of are the

Arabic translations and the later (tenth-century) New Persian ones, which became one of Firdausi's sources. I am indebted to Patricia Crone for this information.

- 39 Here we may cite not only the rise of New Persian as a literary medium in the tenth century, but also the revival therein of particular historical memories of the Sassanid past, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* III/1, pp. 173-7. According to Frye (1966, pp. 282-5), New Persian was first found in poetry under the Tahirids of Khurasan (c. 821-73), but really flourished under the eastern Iranian Samanids (effectively ruled from 892 to 999) before being taken up in western Iran under the Shi'ite Buyids; New Persian added an immensely rich Arabic vocabulary to the Sassanid Middle Persian court language (i.e. *Dari*, a special style of standardized, upper-class Middle Persian) and replaced the Pahlavi alphabet by the Arabic script, for Pahlavi had become ossified and its alphabet did not cover all the sounds of the Middle-Persian dialects spoken by the people.
- 40 On the Egyptian revolt and its suppression in 343 BC, cf. J. M. Cook (1983, pp. 223-4) and Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 287, 340-2); on the spate of temple-building under the Ptolemies, cf. Clayton (1982).
- 41 For Egyptian attitudes to foreigners, as recorded by Herodotus, cf. Trigger et al. (1983, pp. 316-7); religious taboos played an important role, as with the hostility to Jewish practices of the mercenary community at Elephantine in 410 BC, cf. *Cambridge History of Judaism* (1984, I, pp. 358-400). The phrase, 'the temple of the whole world', occurs in the hermetic treatise known as the book of Asclepius and idealizes an ancient and sacred Egypt, which foreigners will defile, cf. Grimal (1968, pp. 212-18).
- 42 For details of the Copts and their treatment under the Fatimids and beyond, cf. Worrell (1945) and Atiya (1968, pp. 79-98). On the cults of Isis and Sarapis, and their religious and artistic expressions, cf. Atiya (1968, pp. 20-22), and Godwin (1981, ch. 11); cf. also Ferguson (1973, pp. 22-4, 134).
- 43 On Egyptian nativism in this period, cf. Grant (1982, pp. 37-48) and Grimal (1968, pp. 211-41) which reveals the limitations of traditional aristocratic Egyptian religion in the Ptolemaic period.
- 44 For details, cf. Baynes and Moss (1969, ch. 1) and for artistic representations of the emperor, cf. Runciman (1975).
- 45 Cf. Baynes and Moss, (1969, ch. 1) and Sherrard (1959).
- 46 Cf. Armstrong (1982, ch. 6) and Ware (1984, ch. 3) for the schism of the Eastern and Western churches.
- 47 Also unlike the post-Sassanid Zoroastrian case, where the once dominant state religion became a defensive minority community, and dreams of a Persian revival had to be re-cast in Islamic form. In the Greek case, the church seems to have retained enough power and organizational autonomy *vis-à-vis* the imperial authority to survive the state's demise; it also helped that Muslims regarded the Christians (and Jews) in a special light, and allowed them to retain their religion as a protected community, provided they pay the poll-tax, while no such privilege was accorded to the Zoroastrians. On the relations of state and church in the medieval Middle Eastern and Byzantine empires, cf. Eisenstadt (1962).
- 48 On regionalism in pre-Conquest England, cf. L. Smith (1984, chs. 4-5, 8-10) and on Western language differences and Anglo-French links, cf. Southern (1967, pp. 19-26). For an interesting discussion of the ecological frontier within

- Britain, the links with France and the role of language and history in medieval England, cf. Brooke (1969, pp. 27–36).
- 49 On this linguistic centralization, cf. Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 2) and Brooke (1969, pp. 197–201). On Geoffrey of Monmouth's *History* and its influence, cf. Geoffrey of Monmouth (1976, esp. Introduction); the legend of Brutus (great-grandson of Aeneas) and his three sons, Locrinus (England), Kamber (Wales) and Albanactus (Scotland), and the line of mythical kings through Lear and Arthur, had a profound effect on imaginative literature and propaganda, including Chretien de Troyes, Mallory, Holinshed, Grafton, Spenser, Shakespeare and Milton and was used to promote English claims over Wales and Scotland, especially by Henry VIII in 1542 to assert his rights over Scotland; cf. Mason (1985).
- 50 The most detailed analysis of this Puritan ethnic nationalism in early and mid-seventeenth-century England remains Kohn (1940); and cf. Hill (1968, ch. 3).
- 51 Cf. Morgan (1982, pp. 9–18 and 93) on the 'two nations' of the 1880s; on the decline of Wales and the Anglicization of its gentry, cf. Hechter (1975).
- 52 On the Non-Conformist chapels, cf. Morgan (1982, pp. 14–18, 96, 134–7); on the *Eisteddfodau* and *Gorsedd* of the modern period and their 'inventions' and reconstructions, cf. P. Morgan: 'From a Death to a View: the hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic period', in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). On the Welsh legends, cf. G. Williams (1985, pp. 6, 37–41, 56–7). On the Arthurian era, cf. Alcock (1973, esp. chs. 4–6).
- 53 For the diffusion of Irish monastic Christianity, cf. L. de Paor: 'The Christian connection', in L. Smith (1984). On the early Irish kingdoms, cf. Chadwick (1970, pp. 83–88, 100–109).
- 54 Cf. the excellent analysis by Orridge (1977), which shows how these factors were superimposed on each other; as Beckett (1958, ch. 2) shows, it was the Continental threat to Ireland that induced Henry VIII to subdue the island, which the Elizabethan settlement policy confirmed. It was really only the 1641 uprising and subsequent repression that turned Catholicism into the cement of an Irish *ethnie* which was now widened to include the 'Old English' Catholics who had in the end joined the 1641 uprising against the increasingly Protestant English Parliament, cf. D. G. Boyce: 'Separatism and the Irish Nationalist Tradition', in C. Williams (1982). For the revival of a Catholic Gaelic tradition in modern Irish nationalism, cf. Hutchinson (1987).
- 55 Hitti (1928, p. 12).
- 56 *Ibid.*, (pp. 19–20) for Druze ethnic origins. For a general review of Druze religious tenets, history and society, cf. H. Z. (J. W.) Hirschberg: 'The Druzes', in Arberry (1969).
- 57 Ullendorff (1973, p. 52); but Kessler (1985, chs. 1–2) argues that their Judaism arrived in Ethiopia through the ancient kingdom of Meroë (Nubia). Though most of their literature and customs are Ethiopian, the Falashas keep the Sabbath strictly as well as the pre-Exilic festivals and laws of ritual purity and circumcision. There is a tradition that the Agaw tribal revolt was led by a Jewish queen named Judith (Esat) and created a Judaized state in the late tenth century, and this was believed up to 1972. The Falashas appear to have had kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (two Gideons are recorded),

- and to have retained some autonomy up to the reign of Negus Susenyos (1607–23), cf. Parfitt (1985, pp. 8–12), and Kessler (1985 ch. 4–5).
- 58 On recent Falasha history and society, cf. Parfitt, (1985, chs. 1–5).
- 59 Purvis (1968, ch. 3) reviews the recent theories of their origins.
- 60 On the Samaritans and Sanballat, cf. *Cambridge History of Judaism* (1984, I, pp. 74, 83, 150–55, 158–61) and Purvis (1968, ch. 3). On relations between Jews and Samaritans in the Roman and Byzantine periods, cf. Avi-Yonah (1976, pp. 77–8, 241–3, 250–1).
- 61 On the present position of the Samaritans, cf. Strizower (1962, ch. 5) and an account from the inside by Ben-Ezzi (1965); only about half live in Nablus, comprising the senior religious tribes, but all return to Nablus to celebrate the sacrifice of the Passover on Mount Gerizim at sunset, which they 'eat in haste', as Israel was commanded on the night of the Exodus. The Samaritan priestly house became extinct in the seventeenth century, and the office devolved on the Levites as 'ha-koh^{en} ha-Levi' (Strizower, 1962, p. 145).
- 62 This is one of the Maronite names for themselves. In fact, the church took its name and origins from St Maro, a late fourth-century hermit who retired to the banks of the Orontes and founded a monastic community which was a centre of conversion in Lebanon. But the Arab-Byzantine wars made this location unsafe, and St John Maron, the future Patriarch-elect 'of Antioch and the East', led his congregation to the mountains, while the original monastery was destroyed shortly afterwards (c. AD 700); cf. G. C. Anawati: 'The Roman Catholic Church and Churches in communion with Rome', in Arberry (1969, I, pp. 374–77), and Atiya (1968, pp. 394–7).
- 63 Atiya (1968, p. 418, note 2); and *ibid.*, pp. 397–403 for relations with Rome. On the chequered history of relations with the neighbouring Druzes, *ibid.*, pp. 404–8.
- 64 For a full account of Coptic decline under successive Muslim dynasties, in which peaceful periods alternated with persecutions and heavy taxation and ecclesiastical confiscations, cf. Atiya (1968, pp. 79–98).
- 65 For the Coptic church in recent times, cf. O. F. Meinardus: 'The Coptic Church in Egypt', in Arberry (1969); on Patriarch Cyril IV, cf. Atiya (1968, pp. 103–7).
- 66 On Basque nobility and *fueros*, cf. D. Greenwood: 'Continuity in change: Spanish Basque ethnicity as a historical process', in Esman (1977), and also K. Medhurst: 'Basques and Basque Nationalism', in C. Williams (1982).
- 67 Cf. M. Heiberg: 'External and internal nationalism: the case of the Spanish Basques', in R. Hall (1979); and Llobera (1983).
- 68 On Armorica, cf. Chadwick (1970, pp. 60–2); and *ibid.*, pp. 81–3 for the colonization of Armorica by Britons from Cornwall and Wales in the fifth century. For its more recent history, cf. S. Berger: 'Bretons and Jacobins: reflections of French regional ethnicity' in Esman (1977), and Mayo (1974, chs. 2–4).
- 69 Cf. Read (1978); Atkinson (1960, chs. 5–6); and the paper by Bisson (1982).
- 70 Cf. Payne (1971); and on early Catalan nationalism, cf. Llobera (1983).
- 71 For the conservatism and adaptive innovation of 'religion', cf. Blau (1959); on diasporas, cf. Armstrong (1976).
- 72 On the role of the Phanariots, cf. C. Mango: 'The Phanariots and Byzantine

tradition', in Clogg (1973); on Greek merchants, cf. Mouzelis (1978), and Stavrianos (1957).

- 73 For the Greek intelligentsia, and its contributions, cf. C. Koumariou: 'The contribution of the Greek intelligentsia towards the Greek independence movement', in Clogg (1973); and Henderson (1971).
- 74 On the Greek Orthodox Church in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, cf. Frazee (1969); and for the factors in the movement to Greek independence and its realization of the *Megalē Idea*, cf. Dakin (1972) and Campbell and Sherrard (1968, chs. 1, 4–5).
- 75 For general histories of the Armenians, emphasizing their diaspora in the later medieval and modern eras, cf. Nalbandian (1963) and Lang (1982); the latter examines their customs and culture today.
- 76 There is considerable dispute about the figures; cf. Hovannisian (1967).
- 77 On this invention, cf. Lang (1980, pp. 166, 264–7) and *ibid.*, ch. 7 for the influence of Gregorian Christianity on Armenian history; cf. also *The British Library* (1978, pp. 57–63).
- 78 On Tigranes, cf. Lang (1980, ch. 6); on the origins of the Nabataeans, cf. *Encyclopedia of Judaism* (1971, Nabataeans), where they are cautiously called 'a Semitic people'. They appear in the Assyrian records as of Aramean stock, but classical authors from Herodotus on regard them as Arabs. There is disagreement among scholars about their ethnic origins and subsequent affiliations; though some of their deities are Arab, others are Mesopotamian, and their art displays a variety of stylistic tendencies. For Moscati (1957, ch. 8), both the Nabataean and Palmyrene states were largely Arab in origins but Aramean in language and culture (including, in part, religion).
- 79 For this battle, whose anniversary (2 June) is numbered among the Armenian Church's main festivals and whose commander, Vardan Mamikonian, is ranked as a saint, cf. Lang (1980, pp. 167–8). For the subsequent feudalization of Armenia and the sectarian revolts, followed by the period of Bagratid revival and rule, cf. Lang (1980, ch. 8), and Atiya (1968, pp. 309–10).

On the decline of the Nabataeans, cf. Avi-Yonah (1981, p. 163) who argues that: 'Ethnically, however, as is proved by epigraphy and art, they (Nabataeans) retained their identity . . . (under Roman rule, as of Herod's previously). They disappear finally, as they merged with the advancing wave of Islamic Arabs'; cf. also *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971, Nabataeans) which claims that the Nabataeans under Roman rule 'nevertheless maintained their religion and culture which received its final blow when the Byzantines Christianized the inhabitants of their area. The Nabataeans passed out of history with the advent of Islam', (col. 743).

- 80 For these details and the suggestion, cf. Avi-Yonah (1981, esp. pp. 160–64, 170–4) who, from the stylistic similarities between Nabataean and Palmyrene art and affinities with Mesopotamian and Syrian fertility deities, thinks that the Nabataeans 'were identical with the tribes grouped in the Syrian desert and allied with the Arameans, the Nabayoth of the Bible and of the Assyrians. The Arabic infiltration into their language (but not their art) can be the result of their contacts with the Arabs, for whom they served as agents on the Mediterranean coast, and with whom they were confused by the Greek authors. The two peoples had, however, no common artistic heritage.' Others,

- however, think the linguistic and religious affinity with the Arabs is closer, in line with the later classical authors, cf. Moscati (1957, ch. 8).
- 81 On the evolution of Armenian Christianity, and the break with Constantinople, cf. Atiya (1968, pp. 315–28); and Lang (1980, pp. 168–74).
- 82 For an overview of the Gregorian Church and its role in the Armenian community, cf. K. V. Sarkissian: 'The Armenian Church', in Arberry (1969); its role in earlier periods is delineated by Atiya (1968, pp. 329–56), and Armstrong (1982, ch. 7).
- 83 On the Jews under Roman rule and the Byzantines, cf. Avi-Yonah (1976); for the Bar-Kochba revolt, cf. Yadin (1971). There is a fascinating account of Palestine and its religious sites in the nineteenth century in Ben-Arieh (1979).
- 84 On European anti-semitism, cf. Poliakov (1966–75, I and III); and for the Armenian and Jewish Holocausts, cf. Kuper (1981, chs. 6–7). The impact of the Nazi Holocaust on Israeli attitudes is discussed in Elon (1971, ch. 8).
- 85 On the Gypsies, their migrations from northern India via the Middle East to the Balkans and western Europe in the fourteenth century, and the subsequent ethnic and racial prejudice culminating in the Nazi Holocaust of a quarter of a million Gypsies, cf. Kenrick and Puxon (1972, esp. Parts I and II); on research on the western European Rom and Sinti groups, cf. Acton (1979). For the Gypsies and other smaller minorities in Eastern Europe in this century, cf. Horak (1985).
- 86 Liturgy, ritual and pronunciation of Hebrew varied greatly between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, cf. the essays in Barnett (1971), esp. by Sassoon, Vajda and Sarna. For a general review of the position of the Jewish communities in Muslim lands, cf. H. Z. (J. W.) Hirschberg: 'The Oriental Jewish Communities', in Arberry (1969), and the short essay by S. D. Goitein on 'The Jews of Yemen' in the same volume, and Goitein (1955); on the position of Oriental Jews in Israel, cf. Smooha (1978, chs. 4, 7–8).
- 87 On the social background of the Mishnah, cf. Neusner (1981); on the *Talmud* and its theology, cf. Seltzer (1980, pp. 260–314). On the Jews of India (Bene Israel mainly in Bombay and Cochin principality on the Malabar coast), cf. Strizower (1962). On the Jewish community in Kaifeng (from after 1127 to the early twentieth century) and its cotton fabric production, cf. Seltzer (1980, pp. 349 and 790, n. 20).
- 88 Cf. R. J. Werblowski: 'Messianism in Jewish History', in Ben-Sasson and Ettinger (1971). On the Sabbateian and other messianic movement, cf. Marcus (1965, pp. 225–83). The classic study of Biblical and post-Biblical messianism is that of Klausner (1956).
- 89 This 'historical' mode of thought, as opposed to the ancient Near Eastern 'mythopoeic' mode is brought out in Frankfort (1949). On Abraham's promise, cf. Genesis 17: 1–14; for Moses' speeches, cf. esp. Deuteronomy 5–12, 27–31.
- 90 On Jewish historiography, cf. Dubnow (1958) and Dinur (1968).
- 91 On the monarchical period, cf. Noth (1960, II, ch. 3); and Seltzer (1980, ch. 2). During the Berlin and Galician Haskalah movement of the early nineteenth century, the Davidic commonwealth of farmers and warriors was resuscitated by the secularizing Jewish intelligentsia, cf. Eisenstein-Barzilay (1959) and Meyer (1967).

- 92 On this cf. Klausner (1956, III, ch. 9) and on the Deuteronomic movement and classical prophecy, cf. Seltzer (1980, pp. 77–111).
- 93 Cf. Grimal (1968, pp. 211–41) and Trigger et al (1983, ch. 4), and notes 41–3 above.
- 94 The Samanids (c. 892–999) ruled in eastern Khurasan from Bukhara and were ardent admirers of Persian culture; they claimed descent from the Sassanids. The renaissance extended to art and architecture (cf. Pope 1969, pp. 41–3). How far the popular language or languages of Sassanid times (the so-called Middle Persian *koinē*, cf. Frye (1966, p. 272)) helped to shape New Persian is disputed. For details of the Zoroastrian literary revival, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* IV, ch. 17, and of the Samanids and the Persian revival, Saunders (1978, pp. 118–19) and Frye (1966, pp. 281–5).
- 95 For some reasons for the decline of Zoroastrianism and the ultimate success of Islam, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* IV, ch. 1, and for the New Persian Islamic renaissance which also constituted a return in an Islamic mode to Persian ethnic myth and history, *ibid.*, ch. 19. The nature of this myth and history is discussed in an earlier volume; *ibid.*, III/1, 3(b), p. 359 sqq.
- 96 On this general change in religious thought, cf. Bellah (1964).
- 97 On these Buddhist structures and cultures, cf. Sarkisyanz (1964) and Roberts (1979, chs. 2 and 7). Modern cases of ethno-religious mobilization are discussed in D. E. Smith (1974, esp. Parts 3 and 4).
- 98 For examples of this Christianization of the ‘barbarians’ in which the heroic past survives, cf. Owen (1981, ch. 5) and Chadwick (1970). For a striking example of the resurfacing (and re-interpretation) of that ‘heroic’ past in modern Victorian Christian guise, cf. J. Nelson: ‘Myths of the Dark Ages’, in L. Smith (1984).
- 99 Cf. Watt (1961); and the horror when the Karmathians carried off the Black Stone from the wall of the Kaaba in AD 928, cf. Saunders (1978, pp. 129–31).
- 100 On the uses of Hebrew and, later, Yiddish among Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews, particularly for religious study (*lernen*), cf. Heilman (1983, esp. ch. 5). The nineteenth century saw a number of debates about the continuing use of Hebrew as a medium of synagogue prayer, on which cf. Hertzberg (1960, Introduction); cf. also Waxman (1936).
- 101 For the role of Babism in early Iranian nationalism, cf. Keddie (1962).
- 102 P. Wormald: ‘The emergence of Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms’, in L. Smith (1984, p. 62) suggests that Pope Gregory the Great’s meeting with a group of Angles in the slave-market of Rome convinced him that all barbarians in Britain were Angles (and not Saxons, as most people of the time thought of the invaders) and ‘so he sent his missionaries to found the ‘Church of the English’, the *ecclesia Anglorum*. The church that they did found, at Canterbury, was committed from the outset to the view that it was responsible for a single English people, and its view gradually percolated through to its flock, via churchmen such as Bede himself.’ Administrative considerations may shape religious structures and practice, and thereby cement and energize an incipient ethnic identity.

Chapter 6 The formation of nations

- 1 On the latter, cf. Draper (1970) and M. Kilson: 'Blacks and neo-ethnicity in American political life', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975). On the many European ethnic autonomy movements, cf. W. Connor: 'Ethno-nationalism in the First World', in Esman (1977), and outside Europe, Anderson et al. (1967) and A. D. Smith (1981a).
- 2 On these 'old, continuous nations', cf. Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 2); cf. also Breuille (1982, ch. 1).
- 3 Cf. Tilly (1975, Introduction); the process is also traced by Poggi (1978).
- 4 Cf. Wallerstein (1974, esp. ch. 3).
- 5 Cf. the essays by Navarri and Tivey in Tivey (1980); this activity in itself should not be seen as 'nationalistic', but it undoubtedly facilitated the later growth of nations and nationalism.
- 6 A process outlined by Deutsch (1966) and the essay by Ardant in Tilly (1975). Yet, persistent regionalism rendered the process incomplete, even patchy, and formed one source of periodic 'ethno-regional' eruptions (e.g. the Vendée, the Basque country, the Highlands of Scotland) and a base in some cases for modern ethnic autonomist movements, cf. Orridge (1982), and Hechter (1975).
- 7 For late nineteenth-century France, cf. E. Weber (1979); on economic nationalism and its background, cf. Johnson (1968) and Mayall (1984).
- 8 Cf. Finer's essay in Tilly (1975) and Howard (1976, ch. 6).
- 9 Howard (1976, esp. p. 55): 'The development of state power and organisation made such professional forces possible; but the development of military practice and technology made them, functionally, almost essential.' It was particularly advanced in late seventeenth-century France, and was extended to higher education in the eighteenth century, cf. Archer and Vaughan (1971).
- 10 Tilly (1975, Introduction, p. 35).
- 11 On the Petrine reforms, cf. Pipes (1977, ch. 5); for the superior capacities of modern states, cf. Mann (1984).
- 12 On the bourgeois challenge to and infiltration of the state in the nineteenth century, cf. Poggi (1978, pp. 77–85 and ch. 6). On the role of capitalist interests in colonial ventures, cf. Fieldhouse (1967).
- 13 B. Anderson (1983, ch. 4); on the growth of bureaucracy, cf. Jacoby (1973), and for the intelligentsia, cf. Gouldner (1979) and Gella (1976).
- 14 On this state sponsorship under enlightened absolutism, cf. Honour (1968) and Loquin (1912); cf. also Godechot (1965).
- 15 On these fêtes and processions, cf. Dowd (1948) and Herbert (1972), where they are linked with the artistic genius of David and the patriotic cult of Voltaire and Brutus, the early republican consul. For a sceptical appraisal, cf. Leith (1965).
- 16 On these attempts at linguistic homogenisation under the Revolutionary regimes, as part of a drive for republican administrative unity, cf. Lartichaux (1977) and Kohn (1967b). In England, this problem was not as acute, or it had been solved earlier through centuries of acculturation of Welsh and Scottish elites, so there was no need of a revolutionary-patriotic ideology of unification and mobilization.

- 17 E. Weber (1979); cf. however the differences in republican and counter-revolutionary conceptions of the 'French nation' revealed during the Dreyfus Affair, cf. Kedward (1965).
- 18 Hamerow (1958); cf. Kohn (1965, ch. 8) for Bavarian separatism and the *Kulturkampf*, a fascinating picture of which is given in the novel by Sybille Bedford, *A Legacy*.
- 19 Anderson (1983, p. 15). On the territorial aspects of nations, cf. A. D. Smith and C. Williams (1983).
- 20 For these Enlightenment views, cf. Kemilainen (1964); it was transplanted to Africa by French and English administrators, who did not always have regard to the locations of existing *ethnie* when drawing state boundaries, cf. Montagne (1952) and C. Young: 'Ethnicity and the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa', in Brass (1985).
- 21 Cf. Rotberg (1967); and Neuberger (1976). For African elites this concept is necessary to counter the alternative ethnic conception which resembles 'tribalism' (or is mistaken for it) and would open the way to 'balkanization' of the continent.
- 22 Tilly (1975, Conclusion) also emphasizes this aspect of 'creation by design' in the formation of overseas and later 'nation-states'. For Western influences on African national conceptions, cf. Hodgkin (1964) and Geiss (1974, ch. 5); and on Arab ideas, cf. Hourani (1970).
- 23 For the Athenian law restricting citizenship in 451 BC, cf. Hignett (1952, p. 255 and Appendix 10); for the change in French attitudes in the nineteenth century, cf. Weiss (1977, chs. 4 and 7) and Nolte (1969, Part I); and Kedward (1965).
- 24 Cf. Brock (1976); Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 3).
- 25 For the context of Rousseau's *Projet Corse* (1762) and *Gouvernement de la Pologne* (1773), cf. Cohler (1970).
- 26 Such sacrificial rituals played a notable part in the Mau Mau resistance, cf. Nottingham and Rosberg (1966); the Bakongo, too, drew on historical myths of a lost kingdom in their struggle against the Belgian authorities and other *ethnie*, cf. Balandier (1953). For Kohn's ideas, cf. Kohn (1967a, ch. 5); also J. Plamenatz: 'Two types of nationalism', in Kamenka (1976), which though not so much concerned with the forms and contents of nationalism, operates with an 'East/West' dichotomy of cultural resources and social levels. Cf. also Breuilly's (1982) analysis of the greater use of 'ethnic' arguments in Eastern Europe.
- 27 Cf. Nairn (1977, p. 340); and for some criticisms, A. D. Smith (1981a, ch. 2). On the class composition of nationalist movements, cf. V. Kiernan: 'Nationalist movements and social classes', in A.D. Smith (1976b), and Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 10) and Breuilly (1982, ch. 15).
- 28 For this kind of 'vernacular' or 'mass-mobilizing' nationalism, cf. Anderson (1983, ch. 5); for the role of educated classes and intelligentsia, cf. Seton-Watson (1960, ch. 6) and Pinard and Hamilton (1984); cf. also A. D. Smith: 'Nationalism, ethnic separatism and the intelligentsia', in C. Williams (1982).
- 29 As Argyle shows, there were important similarities between the cultural and political activities of intelligentsia and others in Africa and Eastern Europe, cf. W. J. Argyle: 'European nationalism and African tribalism', in Gulliver (1969); and W. J. Argyle 'Size and Scale as factors in the development of nationalist movements', in A. D. Smith (1976b) for the generally small social constituencies

- and high educational level of early East European nationalisms; for their lexicographical and philological activities, cf. Anderson (1983, ch. 5) and for the predominance of historians and other scholars in East European Slavic movements, cf. Kohn (1960).
- 30 Cf. von der Mehden (1963) for a careful analysis of the role of religion in south-east Asian nationalisms; cf. also Wertheim (1958) and the essays by D. E. Smith, Bechert, von der Mehden, Lewy and Rahman on Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim nationalist mass-mobilization in D. E. Smith (1974); and A. D. Smith (1973b). On the African syncretisms and nationalism, cf. Geiss (1974, esp. ch. 8).
- 31 On Kohn's east-west dichotomy, cf. Kohn (1967a, ch. 5); for some criticisms, cf. A. D. Smith (1971, ch. 8 and Preface to 2nd edition (1983)). The term 'national states' is used rather than 'nation-states', as the latter implies congruence and co-extensiveness between the territorial state and the ethnic population and culture; even in the West, there are very few examples of this congruence, as the recent resurgence of ethnic autonomy movements demonstrates. See in chapter 6 and chapter 9 of this book.
- 32 Cf. Hechter and Levi (1979); and Strayer (1963).
- 33 For the Gaelic Highlands, cf. Hechter (1975, pp. 50–57) and Nairn (1977, pp. 108–117); for Brittany, cf. Reece (1979).
- 34 This is obviously much less true of Spain, because of the well-developed ethnic consciousness and cultures of her distinct regions (Portugal actually separated from Spain in the seventeenth century, while the Catalan revolt of 1640 failed), and the differential pace of their economic development; on which cf. Payne (1971) and Heiberg (1975). For a recent review of *ethnie*-state relations generally, cf. A. D. Smith (1985).
- 35 Some have sought to deny the title of 'nationalism' to the struggle for independence of the thirteen colonies, partly on the grounds that their alliance was *ad hoc* and did not represent any national consensus (how many nations have entered the fray with such a consensus?), but mainly because any 'nation' that they might have embodied failed the test of common culture which both unified and differentiated them from their enemies (the same objection could perhaps be made of Latin American nationalisms in 1810). But this is to apply a test of 'nationhood' which rests strictly on ethnic grounds; and while there are some grounds for thinking that the middle classes in the colonies had evolved an awareness of historic origins, a kind of 'vernacular ancestralism' from the Pilgrim Fathers and the first settlements, by the later eighteenth-century crisis, it was rather the civic religion of an ideology of 'rights' and 'liberties' that, along with common laws, residence and territory, united them in opposition to a government that failed to recognize those rights and liberties and was also in Britain curtailing them for the middle classes. This is why Benedict Anderson rightly takes the American independence struggle to be the starting-point of *nationalist* struggles, even though the 'nation' was in the making (and given the circumstances had to be constantly re-made), cf. Anderson (1983, ch. 4); cf. also Kohn (1957b) and Tuveson (1968).
- 36 For the Roman republican costume in which these elements were paraded, and the 'heroic' ideals that animated the leadership (along with mundane, sectional interests), cf. Nye (1960) and Victoria and Albert Museum (1976); for Trumbull and his Independence War series, cf. Jaffe (1976).

- 37 Cf. Humphreys and Lynch (1966); and Masur (1966) for the subsequent evolution of separate national states. For a fascinating theory of bureaucratic circulation between metropolis and provinces as a key condition of the rise of nationalism among the creoles of Latin America (and elsewhere), cf. Anderson (1983, pp. 55–61).
- 38 For the persistent regionalism which undermined the efforts of the Risorgimento in Italy, cf. Beales (1971) and Procacci (1973, ch. 13). For later Italian irredentism, cf. De Grand (1978).
- 39 German memories of the Hohenstauffen, and myths of Arminius and the Teutones and the *Nibelungenlied*, are discussed in Kohn (1965, ch. 3) and Robson-Scott (1965); cf. also, more generally, Rosenblum (1967). For the social background, cf. Hamerow (1958), and the mixture of ethnic and territorial-historical claims in the German Frankfurt Assembly of 1848, on which cf. Breuille (1982, pp. 65–79).
- 40 Polish nationalism began as a movement of dispossessed gentry and aristocrats to recover their estates and produced the rising of 1794 under Kosciuszko; only the *szlachta* enjoyed the common privileges of the ancient Polish commonwealth or *Rzeczpospolita* which was finally abolished in the third Partition of 1795. Yet, even at this time, Polish political territorialism began to be mixed with ethnic elements, especially in the influential writings of the reformers, Hugo Kollataj and Stanislaw Staszic; in 1791 another radical, Father Jezierski, defined the nation as follows: 'It is a collection of people having a common language, habits and customs framed within one general code of laws for all citizens.' By implication, therefore, the 'nation' included the third estate and was defined in terms of common culture, which became the basis of law and citizenship. By the early 1800s, men like Samuel Linde and Zorian Chodakowski were deepening the historical and philological base of that culture, by studying the presumed pre-Christian Slav village democracy and the alleged survival of the unsullied ancient mores and spirit in the Polish peasantry and their folk ways. Nevertheless, it was to be some decades before this romantic appreciation of the peasantry was to be translated into political inclusion in the active nation; cf. P. Brock: 'Polish nationalism', in Sugar and Lederer (1969, esp. pp. 311–7); also Halecki (1955).
- 41 There had, of course, been for some centuries a kind of 'feudal ethnocentrism', characterized at times of crisis with xenophobia, among the Hungarian nobility, and as we saw, this received fresh impetus from the idea that the Hungarian nobles formed a bulwark of Christianity against the onslaught of the Ottoman infidel. But this 'class' ethnic sentiment which harked back to the legal privileges of St Stephen's Crown was by the late eighteenth century being eroded by Protestant westernizing influences and early Romanticism with its cultural Magyar nationalism; cf. G. Barany: 'Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism', in Sugar and Lederer (1969), and Seton-Watson (1977, pp. 157–69).
- 42 For these programmes and their social and cultural backgrounds, cf. Pech (1976). The Croats were most favourably placed at the outset, having a recognized ancient title to the lands of the Crown of Zvonimir and thus a claim to the status of 'Historic' nation; but Joseph II's centralized Germanization policies in the 1780s soon placed the Croatian nobility in a dependent position

to the larger and more powerful Magyar nobility. But Magyarization in culture and language from the 1820s soon led the Croat *Sabor* (Assembly) to reject the Magyar language and substitute Croat for Latin in Croatia. The rupture with the Magyars was completed by Jellacic's (the *Ban* or Governor of Croatia) defeat of the Magyar rising in 1849; cf. Seton-Watson (1977, pp. 131-42) and Pearson (1983, pp. 32-3, 54-5). On the Serbs and Croats, cf. Singleton (1985, chs. 4-5). On the Czech nationalist movement, cf. Joseph F. Zacek: 'Nationalism in Czechoslovakia', in Sugar and Lederer (1969) and Seton-Watson (1977, pp. 149-57); cf. also Breuille (1982, ch. 3).

- 43 For the Ukrainian nationalist movement, cf. Armstrong (1963, esp. chs. 1-2); for Slovak nationalism, cf. Brock (1976). Slovaks, Rumanians and Ukrainians are briefly discussed in Seton-Watson (1977, pp. 169-91) and Pearson (1983, ch. 3).
- 44 The Shi'ite Safavids were of largely nomadic Turkish ethnic origins, but the long-term effect of their unification of Iran and fervent religious transformation was to spread a sense of Shi'ite Persian identity, emanating from Shah Abbas' capital, Isfahan. Aga Muhammad who founded the Afghan Qajar dynasty in 1796, was also of Turkic origins; but Persian society and culture stagnated under their rule, which allowed the country to fall increasingly under British and Russian economic and political hegemony until the Constitutional movement of 1905-6. The Pahlavis, while in practice maintaining the polyethnic and multi-religious nature of Iran, did try to give state and society a secular Persian (pre-Islamic) national identity, without seeking to eradicate Islamic influences, as Atatürk had attempted; cf. Cortam (1979, esp. chs. 2-3, 6, 8, 10-13); cf. also Avery (1965) for the modern history of Iran, and for the Safavids and Qajars, Keddie (1981, chs. 1-3), who claims that: The development of Shi'ism in Iran gave some focus to feelings of a separate local identity. Until the twentieth century the Shi'i component of this identity was more important than the Iranian one, although it was often unnecessary to distinguish the two. From 1501 until this century, Iranism and Shi'ism were for many people parts of a single blend. (p. 23).
- The role of the Shi'ite *ulema* has been equivocal with regard to an Iranian identity, since Twelver Shi'ism is both transnational but historically (since 1501) Iranian-based (though many *mujtahids* in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were based in Iraq), and most Persian-speakers became by 1722 Shi'ite.
- 45 In the 1860s, after the reforms of the Tanzimat, there had been an attempt by the Young Ottomans to formulate an 'Ottoman' nationalism and identity, but this was soon swept away by the Hamidian reaction after 1876, cf. Mardin (1965). The rise of the concept of 'Turkish' nationalism owes much to the 'Outer Turks' in Russia and Central Asia, notably the ideas of Gasprinskii and Agaev among the Tatars and Azeris, cf. Bennigsen and Quelquejay (1960) and Zenkovsky (1955). On the growth of secularism and nationalism in Ottoman Turkey in the nineteenth century, cf. Berkes (1964); for the rise of 'Turkism' and the transformation of the idea of the 'Turk', cf. Kushner (1976) and Lewis (1968, ch. 10).
- 46 The policies of the Young Turks during the War (and their origins in Salonica) are analysed in Lewis (1968, ch. 7), and Ramsaur (1957). On the

- theories and influence of Ziya Gokälp, cf. Heyd (1950) and Berkes (1964); and more generally, on the transition from empire to nation-state, cf. Karal (1965).
- 47 These have been fully discussed in Binder (1964) and Sharabi (1966). The few attempts at union of separate Arab states, such as the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria (1958-61), also foundered on political rivalries and the very different levels and kinds of economic and social development. There is also the differential response of the wealthier and 'moderate' states to Israel from the rejectionists, and the effects of politico-religious rivalries between Sunni and Shi'i communities (and states, if we include here the influence of non-Arab Iran).
- 48 For this Egyptian tradition, cf. Safran (1961) and Vatikiotis (1969). For the role of Christians in Lebanon in the formulation of Arab nationalism, cf. Tibawi (1963) and Sharabi (1970).
- 49 On this Anglo-French priority in 'modernization' and 'nation-building', cf. Bendix (1966) and the essay by J. Plamenatz: 'Two types of nationalism', in Kamenka (1976). Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 2) does, however, include a broader band of 'Western' states (including even Sweden and Russia) within his concept of the 'old, continuous nations', which reflects a modification of the 'modernist' standpoint of Nairn, Gellner, Breuilly and others, in which the 'Anglo-French' nation-cum-state model forms their point of departure for an analysis of nationalism.
- 50 On the African realization of this gulf between 'state' and the creation of 'nations' in Africa, cf. Neuberger (1977) and Markovitz (1977, ch. 3); cf. also A. D. Smith (1983a, ch. 7).
- 51 The Hellenic concept of the Greek nation which originated in the Neo-Hellenic enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, is analysed by Demos (1958) and C. Koumariou: 'The contribution of the Greek intelligentsia towards the Greek independence movement', in Clogg (1973). For the Byzantine concept and the *Megalé Idea*, cf. Campbell and Sherrard (1968, esp. chs. 1-3), and Dakin (1972).
It is even questionable how far most Greeks identified themselves as such in 1821 rather than as Orthodox; yet the persistence of this label and its ethnic content into the nineteenth century suggests the power of an ethnic religion in 'freezing' certain attitudes and sentiments under a *millet* system (cf. chapter 5 in this book) and infusing distinctive life-styles, customs, language and ancestry myths with the capacity for self-renewal and re-interpretation under changed conditions.
- 52 On Aurobindo's teaching, cf. Singh (1963); and on the revival of an Aryan and Hindu 'India', from the Arya Samaj of Dayananda and the historical revivalism of Banerjea, cf. Heimsath (1964) and McCulley (1966).
- 53 On the use of the sacred cults and Hindu texts by radical nationalists, cf. the essays by Adenwalla and Crane in Sakai (1961); and for their place in Indian nationalism, cf. Embree (1972). The nature and problems of more localized *ethnie* are outlined in H. Erdman: 'Autonomy movements in India', in R. Hall (1979). On the 'sanskritization' of much of India under British rule, cf. Srinivas (1962) and Dumont (1970).
- 54 On the background to Nigeria's present problems, cf. the classic account by Coleman (1958); and Sklar (1963). On the civil war and military politics, cf. Panter-Brick (1970) and Markovitz (1977, ch. 9). For an early statement of the class composition of Nigerian nationalism, cf. Smythe and Smythe (1960).

- 55 On the problems facing the military regimes in Africa, including those of Ghana and Mobutu's Zaire, cf. Gutteridge (1975). For the uses of history in African 'nation-building' cf. Ajayi (1960). On the mechanisms used to hold polyethnic African states together, cf. the essays in Olorunsola (1972).
- 56 For fuller discussion of these myths of descent, cf. A. D. Smith (1984a); on the Whig myths, cf. Mosse (1963).
- 57 On this renewal of a sense of history for national purposes, cf. Isaacs (1975, ch. 7) and A. D. Smith (1981a, ch. 5).
- 58 For an example of 'ethnic arithmetic' practices under a dominant *ethnie* (the Kikuyu), cf. D. Rothchild: 'Kenya', in Olorunsola (1972); for Rousseau's exhortations, cf. Cobban (1964).
- 59 On French 'integral' nationalism, cf. Nolte (1969, Part I); on the Communist treatment of the nationalities problem in Yugoslavia, cf. Schöpflin (1980) and Djilas (1984).
- 60 Cf. Dakin (1972) and Campbell and Sherrard (1968, chs. 4–5).
- 61 For the earlier view of the benefits of assimilation for immigrant *ethnie* in the United States, cf. Lloyd Warner and Srole (1945); already in the 1950s there were growing doubts, and Glazer and Moynihan (1964, Introduction) pointed to the flourishing ethnic organizations and self-esteem of some of New York's ethnic communities. For the apparent revival of ethnic sentiments, not only in America, but also in Europe and the Third World, cf. D. Bell: 'Ethnicity and social change', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975) and A. D. Smith (1981a, esp. chs. 1, 7–9).
- 62 For the British case of ethnic and territorial nationalisms, cf. Birch (1977). The Soviet case is especially interesting in the plurality of interests, levels of identification and group affiliations of individuals which often cross-cut each other, cf. G. E. Smith (1985). On state-*ethnie* relations in the modern world, and possible solutions to the tensions generated, cf. A. D. Smith (1985).
- 63 For some of the ambivalent attitudes and conflicting manifestations of the 'ethnic revival' in America, cf. Gans (1979). For many East European immigrants to the West, the shedding of their old ethnic allegiances proved too costly; where they could, they returned to Europe, particularly to the Habsburg provinces, cf. Pearson (1983, pp. 95–110, 187–9), though emigration after World War I remained high.
- 64 For some examples of the linkage between ethnic minorities and their 'sister' or 'core' communities overseas, cf. Said and Simmons (1976); and cf. R. W. Sterling: 'Ethnic separatism in the international system', in R. Hall (1979). For a case study of the way in which 'vicarious nationalism' helps to ensure the survival of ethnic minorities in a wider political community (an evolving state-nation), cf. Cohen (1983, ch. 3).
- 65 For some definitions and distinctions between 'state' and 'nation', cf. Tivey (1980, Introduction), Connor (1978) and Breuilly (1982, esp. Conclusion).

Chapter 7 From *ethnie* to nation

- 1 For a critical account of the evolutionary perspective in sociology, cf. Nisbet (1969) and A. D. Smith (1973a). The belief that ethnic ties would dissolve in the great movement of 'nation-building' is inherent in the modernization perspec-

- tive of the neo-evolutionists like Smelser (1968) and Levy (1966), but has received its most detailed and influential expression in the writings of Deutsch (1966; also Deutsch and Foltz (1963)); for a telling critique, cf. Connor (1972).
- 2 For critiques of 'modernization theory', cf. Gusfield (1967) and Frank (1969); also Hoogvelt (1976, Part I) and Roxborough (1979, ch. 2). On the resurgence of ethnic ties and sentiments, especially in the West itself, cf. Burgess (1978) and A. D. Smith (1979a, chs. 6–7); and Connor (1973).
 - 3 Cf. Edmonds (1971), and for the Kurds in Iran, cf. Cottam (1979, ch. 5). Nairn (1977, ch. 5) claims that 'historic nations' like Scotland and Catalonia differ in the pragmatic orientation of their drive for autonomy from those *ethnie* with less developed pasts (Wales); and perhaps one might add this greater identity confidence allows their members to embrace concentric circles of loyalty with greater ease and sense of security. Certainly, this kind of argument seems preferable to one based largely on scale and size; for, as Hobsbawm (1977) has pointed out, small units (e.g., Iceland, Corsica, Anguilla) have not allowed their size or scale to dampen their aspirations for independence, cf. for example Savigear (1977) and Kofman (1982) on Corsican claims and movements against foreign capital and tourist planning.
 - 4 On this 'frozen mosaic' of *ethnie* in Europe, cf. chapter 4 above and Pearson (1983, ch. 1). Of course, the early modern period saw considerable changes, too: the secession of the United Provinces, the elimination of the Bohemian kingdom, the fluctuations of a united Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, the definitive English expansion into Ireland, the secession of Portugal and the rise of Prussia, not to mention the rise of the Mughal empire and later the emergence of a Wahabite kingdom in (Saudi) Arabia.
 - 5 For the demands of the smaller European *ethnie* in 1848 and after, cf. W. J. Argyle: 'Size and scale as factors in the development of nationalist movements', in A. D. Smith (1976) and Pech (1976). For the Slovak case, which developed relatively late, cf. D. W. Paul: 'Slovak nationalism and the Hungarian state, 1870–1910', in Brass (1985).
 - 6 For the conflict of sons and fathers, cf. Feuer (1969); and for the role of elites in mobilizing other strata, cf. P. Brass: 'Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia', in Taylor and Yapp (1979).
 - 7 This new and necessary relationship between culture and politics represents an important element of agreement between the position adopted here and that of the 'modernists' (succinctly propounded by Gellner (1983, chs. 1–3)).
 - 8 On ethnic competition in Canada, cf. Porter (1965) and his essay in Glazer and Moynihan (1975); for the United States, cf. Greeley (1974).
 - 9 For a good example of the role of cults and priesthoods in helping to preserve ethnic memories, cf. Boyce (1979) on the Zoroastrians.
 - 10 See above chapter 5, and Atiya (1968, Part I).
 - 11 On the persistence of Islam in Turkey and Orthodox Judaism in Israel, cf. Marmorstein (1952); and Landau (1981) and Segre (1980).
 - 12 Cf. Martin (1978, esp. ch. 2) on the patterns of secularization.
 - 13 For U Nu's Burma, cf. M. Sarkisyanz: 'On the place of U Nu's Buddhist Socialism in Burma's History of Ideas', in Sakai (1961); cf. also H. Bechert: 'Buddhism and Mass Politics in Burma and Ceylon', in D. E. Smith (1974), and F. Rahman: 'The sources and meanings of Islamic Socialism', in *ibid.*, and Keddie (1981).

- 14 For the rise and significance of these secular intellectuals in Europe, cf. Gella (1976) and Anchor (1967); for Muslim intellectuals, cf. Hourani (1970) which stresses their conservatism until the 1920s; cf. also Sharabi (1970) for the impact of western ideas.
- 15 On the role of this intelligentsia and its conflicts with hierarchical bureaucracies, cf. Gouldner (1979) and A. D. Smith (1981a, ch. 6).
- 16 Examples of this can be found in late nineteenth-century Ireland, where a number of priests supported and staffed the Gaelic League and related societies, cf. Hutchinson (1987, ch. 4), and among the Zionist Jews, where the Orthodox mainstream became increasingly committed to a Jewish restoration in Palestine and a state based on Judaic (*Halakhic*) values and precepts, cf. Hertzberg (1960, Part VII) and Segre (1980). The degree to which Iranian nationalism has coloured the Shi'ite revolution in Persia is more debatable, cf. Keddie (1981, ch. 8); clearly an Islamic anti-imperialism forms a powerful component of most Iranian clerical and lay political writing in the last forty years.
- 17 For an analysis of Brittany as a deprived region and 'internal colony' of the Parisian metropolis, cf. Reece (1979); cf. also Mayo (1974).
- 18 For the Czech case, cf. Deutsch (1966, ch. 6); and Pearson (1983, pp. 149–60).
- 19 On the Swiss attitude to their defence, cf. Steinberg (1976, ch. 6); for the Israeli outlook, cf. Elon (1971, ch. 9).
- 20 For the Welsh Language Society and its activities, cf. C. Williams (1977); cf. also G. Williams (1985, pp. 287–95).
- 21 Cf. Chamberlin (1979, pp. 27–35) for an account of successive interpretations and uses of Great Zimbabwe.
- 22 Cf. Lewis (1968, pp. 357–61) on Ataturk's attempt to ground the new Turkey in a pre-Islamic past; cf. also Zeine (1958, pp. 77–8) and Kushner (1976, ch. 5). On the extreme Right parties in Turkey which still espouse racial pan-Turkism, cf. Landau (1981, chs 4–6).
- 23 Cf. Elon (1971, ch. 10); for the uses of Masada, cf. Chamberlin (1979, pp. 11–18).
- 24 For the uses of 'homelands' and 'national territory', cf. A. D. Smith (1981c); already in the French Revolution, the Jacobin leaders sought to fix France's 'natural frontiers' and create an indivisible and compact homeland for the republican nation, cf. Kohn (1967b).
- 25 On Rousseau's ideals, cf. Cohler (1970); for List, cf. the essay by Kahan in Johnson (1968).
- 26 For the history of these theories, cf. Brewer (1980) and Orridge (1981). For a pungent critique, cf. Warren (1980, ch. 7); for the 'internal colonialism' model, cf. Hechter and Levi (1979) and the other essays in Stone (1979).
- 27 For a more popular version of the model, cf. Mayo (1974); for an analysis of British development in terms of 'internal colonialism', which features all these elements, cf. Hechter (1975).
- 28 Cf. the illuminating essays by Brass in Taylor and Yapp (1979), and Brass (1985); and Enloe (1973) and (1980).
- 29 For incipient Black separatism, cf. Draper (1970, chs. 6–8); for Black communalism in the early 1970s, cf. M. Kilson: 'Blacks and neo-ethnicity in American political life', in Glazer and Moynihan (1975). Black nationalism is usually

- interpreted as a protest against victimization and prejudice and a collective movement to force an entry into the American heritage for a neglected sector of the nation; but the 'Back-to-Africa' and Black Muslim movements also point to more radical anti-American attitudes and sentiments, a sense that American Blacks are fundamentally different and outside the mainstream of American life by virtue of a separate heritage and hence destiny, cf. Bracey, Meier and Rudwick (1970) and Brotz (1966) for past movements, including Garveyism.
- 30 For the growth of the concept of the citizen-nation, cf. Palmer (1940); for the use of 'citoyen' in the *cahiers de doléances*, cf. Shafer (1938) and Cobban (1963, I, Part III). The Jacobin Constitution of 1793 was the most egalitarian for several decades and provided a model for other constitutions wherever Napoleon's armies penetrated, cf. Droz (1967, ch. 6) and M. Anderson (1972, ch. 2).
 - 31 Not even slavery really united the city-states and their territory, if only because in Greece at least it supplemented other relations of production, cf. the essays in Finley (1961) and (1981, Part II). On the Italian communes, cf. Waley (1969).
 - 32 Though the extent of 'Spanish' feeling among Catalans has varied with the political circumstances, cf. Read (1978); and Payne (1971).
 - 33 It is arguable whether Yugoslavia or Nigeria constitute 'nations' in any sense of the term. Perhaps we should say, with Rotberg, that they are 'nations of intent'; though in the Yugoslav case the intentions are ambiguous (cf. Djilas (1984)). The Yoruba, too, lack some of the criteria of 'nations': economic unity and legal rights *qua* Yoruba; but here again, there is movement towards the full status of 'nation'. From these examples, it will be seen how much the concept of a 'nation' carries normative overtones and represents for the participants an ideal and for analysis an ideal-type; cf. Rotberg (1967) and A. D. Smith (1973c, Section 1).
 - 34 See above, chapter 6, and Pearson (1983, chs 1–3); and the essay by Paul in chapter 7, note 5 above.
 - 35 Cf. S. Fischer-Galati: 'Romanian nationalism', in Sugar and Lederer (1969). Similar developments occurred in Finland in the later nineteenth century, where a mainly Swedish speaking educated and official class was gradually driven to open its ranks by pressure from Liberals and Fennomans, and in doing so raised the native Finnish language and culture to 'national' status, cf. Jutikkala (1962, ch. 8).
 - 36 Cf. J. R. Jones: 'England', in Rogger and Weber (1965); and Finlayson (1983) on Right-wing and Tory policies and attitudes to social problems and the lower classes.
 - 37 On the role of the intelligentsia in overcoming clerical and bureaucratic obstacles to ethnic self-transformation, the Tatar case is instructive, cf. Zenkovsky (1953) and Bennigsen and Quelquejay (1960); and so is the Armenian, on which cf. Nalbandian (1963). In the Sikh case, religion and politics are almost inseparable, and though there were (and are) internal divisions, especially between urban and rural Sikhs, the urban intelligentsia has always sought to give political expression to religio-cultural demands, the argument being that autonomy or sovereignty was essential to safeguard and

express fully the cultural individuality of the religious community, cf. the detailed analysis of Pettigrew (1982).

- 38 On the Helvetic Republic and the Civil War, cf. Kohn (1957, chs. 5, 12, 15–16).
- 39 Cf. Procacci (1973, ch. 13); and Beales (1971, Introduction).
- 40 Anderson (1983, chs. 2–3); on the impact of printing and books, cf. Febvre and Martin (1984, esp. ch. 8).
- 41 Cf. Durkheim (1964); and cf. Gouldner's Introduction to Durkheim (1962).
- 42 Mussourgsky himself wrote (to Stassov, letter of December 25, 1876):
My present intention, however, is directed towards the melody that partakes of life, not towards Classical melody. I explore human speech; thus I arrive at the melody created by this kind of speech, . . . One might call this a melody justified by sense. Labour such as this is a joy to me; suddenly and unexpectedly something will sound out that is opposed to the so-much-beloved classical melody and yet will be understood immediately by everyone.
Writing an autobiographical sketch shortly before his death in 1881, Mussourgsky asserted:
A formulation of his artistic creed can be derived from his ideas about the duties of art: art is a means towards communication between human beings, not an end in itself. This principle determines his entire creative activity.
Cf. Einstein (1947, ch. 17, esp. pp. 311–14) from which these quotations are taken; cf. also Raynor (1976, ch. 8, esp. pp. 141–6) on Russian musical nationalism.
- 43 On the Herderian concept of language and nationality, cf. Berlin (1976) and Barnard (1965); for the relationship of language to social change, cf. Haugen (1966) and A. D. Smith (1982).
- 44 Cf. Yadin (1966) and (1975); and cf. Chamberlin (1979) on the archeological and scientific techniques used to preserve the past, as at Abu Simbel and Masada.
- 45 Parsons (1966) offers a trichotomous view (primitive–intermediate–modern) with sub-divisions of the last two stages, but generally sociologists tend to operate with a 'before and after' model of agrarian and industrial societies; the growth of scale and inclusiveness and participation of the population are the key elements in the transition to modernity, cf. Lerner (1958) and Eisenstadt (1973); cf. also Gellner (1982).
- 46 On this 'methodological nationalism', cf. Merritt and Rokkan (1966); for the close relationship between evolutionism and nationalism, cf. A. D. Smith (1983b).

Chapter 8 Legends and landscapes

- 1 These revivals in arts, crafts and fashions are discussed in Hillier (1968) and Battersby (1976); for earlier revivals and rediscoveries in European art, cf. Haskell (1976). There is also a thriving trade in antiques of all kinds which, while it is greatly boosted in scale and prices by dealers and auction houses, nevertheless feeds on strong emotions of nostalgia, and markedly nationalistic ones at that. On the nostalgia for the past in the West, cf. Lowenthal (1985).
- 2 Cf. M. Matossian: 'Ideologies of "delayed industrialisation": some tensions and ambiguities', in Kautsky (1962). Movements of Arab and African socialism also attempt to ground a westernizing radicalism on native soil, be it the Qur'an or

- traditional African tribal mores, cf. Worsley (1964) and the essay by John Saul in Gellner and Ionescu (1970); and the essays in Eisenstadt and Azmon (1975).
- 3 Cf. Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974, chs 2, 8).
 - 4 Cf. Marx (1970, pp. 708–9); and his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844) in Easton and Guddat (1967, esp. pp. 289–90).
 - 5 For a comparison of ‘alienation’ with ‘anomie’, and their consequences for the sociologies of Marx and Durkheim, cf. Lukes (1977, ch. 4).
 - 6 Debray (1977); cf. also, on the question of boundaries, Dunn (1978, ch. 3).
 - 7 On the problems of these traditions and theodicies, cf. G. Obeyesekere: ‘Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism’, in Leach (1968); cf. also A. D. Smith (1970).
 - 8 H. Trevor-Roper: ‘The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland’, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), gives a controversial account of its ‘invention’, but cf. R. Martine (1982, 43–55).
 - 9 Cf. Mayo (1974, ch. 5) and P. Morgan: ‘From a Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic Period’, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). For the revival of Druidism, cf. Piggott (1985, ch. 4).
 - 10 D. Cannadine: ‘The context, performance and meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the “Invention of Tradition”, c. 1820–1977’, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).
 - 11 This monument is described in Horne (1984, pp. 177–8).
 - 12 Gieysztor *et al* (1959) and (1962) are examples, though they point out the importance of a pre-state stage. (Mieszko I did adopt the Catholic faith and receive a ducal title in AD 966, but does this mark the beginning of the Polish state? The quest for a beginning is itself ‘nationalist’, in this view.)
 - 13 Horne (1984, pp. 173, 177); on the Serbian uprisings, cf. Stavrianos (1957).
 - 14 On ‘invention’ as a recombination of old elements in new ways, cf. La Pierre (1965) and Banks (1972); on inventions in previous eras, cf. Plumb (1965, ch. 3).
 - 15 The German school of historiography, of course, exaggerated the uniqueness of different histories and pasts, to justify a purely ideographic method for the ‘cultural sciences’, which Weber sought to harmonize with the causal–historical approach which relied on nomothetic methods of the natural sciences, cf. Aron (1978).
 - 16 Cf. Brock (1976); Seton-Watson (1977, pp. 169–74).
 - 17 For these social evolutionary metaphors, cf. Nisbet (1969) and Martins (1974); and for their application to nationalism, cf. A. D. Smith (1983b).
 - 18 This idea goes back to Bauer (1924) and before him to the German Romantics, cf. Reiss (1955) and Barnard (1969).
 - 19 On this artistic debate, cf. Irwin (1972); on the quest for linear purity and abstraction in the ‘Greek style’, cf. Rosenblum (1967, ch. 4) and on Flaxman’s contribution and popularity, cf. Bindman (1979).
 - 20 For the Egyptian revival, cf. Clayton (1982) and Honour (1968): on medievalism in the arts, cf. Loquin (1912, esp. p. 160 sqq.) and Vaughan (1978, chs. 3–4).
 - 21 B. Anderson (1983, ch. 3). For Herder’s Pan-Slav followers, cf. Kohn (1960) and Thaden (1964). For the linguistic bias in nationalist studies, cf. the works of Znaniecki, Gellner and Seton-Watson cited above.

- 22 For this ahistorical approach in functionalism, cf. Nisbet (1969) and A. D. Smith (1973a); and for Marxism's historic 'blind spot' on the importance of ethnicity and nationalism, cf. Nairn (1977, ch. 2) and Debray (1977).
- 23 An early interest evinced in the writings of Le Bon, Fouillée, Trotter and in Michels' *Der Patriotismus*, as well as the work of Bauer and Renner; yet these never penetrated the mainstream of sociological discourse and enquiry, cf. A. D. Smith (1983b).
- 24 Thus, books like Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* or Ruppin's *The Jews in the Modern World* contributed to the understanding of the 'national profile' and 'character', whatever their academic intentions. Such retrospective reconstructions could prove especially useful, if often misleading, where only oral traditions were at hand. For the grave handicaps to a nationalist reconstruction of the past of the lack of documented records in Africa, cf. Mazrui (1985).
- 25 This use of 'realistic' and 'naturalistic' means for conveying didactic and romantic images and messages became popular in the eighteenth century with the rise of the novel, Gluck's new style of opera, and the rise of 'history' and landscape painting, on which cf. Wind (1938) and Charlton (1984). Partly a reaction to Rococo artificiality, the new realism was also seen as the 'simple' style suitable for an heroic ethos and revolutionary ideals, cf. Rosenblum (1961) and (1967, chs. 1-2) and A. D. Smith: 'Neo-Classical and Romantic elements in the emergence of nationalist conceptions', in A. D. Smith (1976b).
- 26 There is an excellent analysis of this purificatory drive among Indian and other Third-World intellectuals in Shils (1960); and for the Chinese reform movement of the 1890s, cf. Howard (1969). It is, of course, already present in the French Revolution's desire to eradicate the immediate past and 'restore' a 'Roman republic' in France, cf. Crow (1978).
- 27 In the collective diaspora consciousness (if we may use such a term), there are often two or more sets of landscapes at work, particularly when generations are forced to flee their lands of birth: the land of origin, the land of destination and the land of ancestry. The last, often never seen, is nevertheless vividly envisaged and idealized, as did the Jewish poets of Spain like Yehudah Halevi, cf. Goldstein (1975) for their poetry, and Barnett (1971); cf. also Armstrong (1982, ch. 7) and Seton-Watson (1977, ch. 10).
- 28 On the interpretations of physical locations and settings in 'national' terms, cf. Smith and Williams (1983); and for a discussion of the relation of territory to national identity and regionalism, cf. Knight (1982).
- 29 For the revival of 'Turan' among the modern Turks, cf. Kushner (1976) and Zeine (1958, pp. 77-9). The land of 'Turan' also featured in Sassanid and later Persian mythology, as the enemy of Iran, but to what extent there is identity between the early Persian and later Turkish usages seems unknown; cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* III/1, Part 3, chapter 10(b). The 'Pan-Turanian' myth was soon abandoned by Ottoman Turkish (and Outside Turk) scholars in favour of the more compact, but still politically subversive, idea of Pan-Turkism, which excluded Hungarians, Finns and others, but still included Azeris, Tatars, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Kazakhs in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

- 30 For the possible provenance of the Indo-Europeans, cf. Moscati (1962 ch. 5) and Thapar (1966, ch. 2); on the Varangians, cf. Vernadsky (1969, pp. 29–35); and on the Slav migrations, cf. Koht (1947) and Singleton (1985 ch. 2).
- 31 These agrarian ideals inform the Völkisch theorists and writers of nineteenth-century Germany studied by Mosse (1964).
- 32 On these Celtic origins, cf. Chadwick (1970, pp. 83–8, 169–72); for the mythical traditions, cf. MacCana (1985, pp. 54–71).
- 33 On these agricultural aspirations, cf. the vivid account in Elon (1971). This is ironic in view of the German Völkisch (and Nazi) view of the Jews as a ‘desert people’.
- 34 The new cult of the Alps was part of the *Sturm und Drang* movement of the 1770s (as were Hans Bull’s eulogies of the Norwegian fjords); cf. Kohn (1967a, chs. 5, 7–8), Kenwood (1974) and Charlton (1984, ch. 3); and for the influence of the Rütli oath, cf. Kohn (1957) and Steinberg (1976, ch. 2).
- 35 For modern Egyptian attitudes to Egypt, the land and its inhabitants, cf. Jankowski (1979) and Vatikiotis (1968, ch. 8).
- 36 On Roerich, cf. Korotkina (1976) and Bowlt (1982, pp. 250–5).
- 37 On the populism of the *Peredvizhniki* (Itinerant) artists and their followers, cf. Gray (1971, ch. 1), and Lebedev (1974) for the paintings of Shishkin, Levitan and others. On the Hague School, cf. Royal Academy of Arts (1983), and for the classical art of Denmark, cf. National Gallery (1984).
- 38 On the rebuilding of Warsaw Castle, cf. Horne (1984, p. 179); and Chamberlain (1979, pp. 3–11). Country houses, too, though evoking memories of a feudal or courtly aristocracy and mixed feelings, have become national landmarks whose preservation is desired on both tourist and nationalist grounds. On the English country house, cf. Girouard (1978).
- 39 German artists like Friedrich, Blechen and Schinkel also conveyed the mystery and decay of Gothic churches set in lonely landscapes, as did the French specialist in ‘ruins’, François-Marius Granet; cf. Honour (1981, ch. 4) and Vaughan (1978, ch. 4).
- 40 For some of these romantic historical operas, cf. Einstein (1947, pp. 266–9, 274–82), and Raynor (1976, ch. 8). Even the Europeanized Tchaikovsky utilized ‘ethnic’ dances and music in his ballets and symphonies and chose Russian subjects for his operas – though there is nothing specifically ethnic about the moonlit settings of *Swan Lake*.
- 41 On this sense of Egyptianness, cf. Safran (1961, esp. Part III); on Western interest in Egypt and its ruins, cf. Clayton (1982) and Harding (1979, ch. 4).
- 42 On the failure of the attempt to recreate a Byzantine ecumene and regain Ionia, cf. Dakin (1972) and Campbell and Sherrard (1968). For a critique of the influence of Hellenism on Greek socio-economic development, cf. Pepelassis (1958). For Western philhellenic sentiments in the rediscovery of Greece, cf. Tsigakou (1981).
- 43 Atatürk also significantly moved the capital to Ankara near the Anatolian heartland and the Hittite capital, again in accordance with his view of the need for a compact territory built around its ancient ethnic heartland, cf. Sykes (1965, ch. 2) and Lewis (1968).
- 44 For Bar-Kochba and Nachal-Hever, cf. Yadin (1971); for modern research on ancient Biblical sites like Megiddo and Hazor, cf. Winton Thomas (1967). On

- the significance of the past and its investigation for Jews and Israelis, cf. McIntyre (1968, pp. 108–112).
- 45 For Iran, cf. Cottam (1979, p. 25) and Pope (1969, pp. 74, 95–98); for the Sikh centres of Amritsar (and Anandhpur Sahib, an important Sikh temple at the foot of the Himalayas), cf. Spear (1978, pp. 134–5), and especially Pettigrew (1982) for recent divisions and developments.
- 46 Cf. Chamberlin (1979, pp. 27–35); on the preservation of ethnic landscapes among the smaller minorities of Zimbabwe, cf. Ucko (1983).
- 47 Cf. W. Anderson (1983, p. 44 and following) on Avebury; for Silbury Hill, cf. the theories of Dames about the Great Goddess, in Dames (1976). For the ways in which Stonehenge was interpreted in Britain in the past, cf. Chippindale (1983, esp. chs. 6–7).
- 48 On Glastonbury and other Arthurian sites, cf. Radford and Swanton (1978, esp. ch. 4); the island of Glastonbury was once marshland in which rose stone bluffs of land and notably the spur on which stands the Tor, a site that would have appealed to the early cremitical British church. On the ‘island’ and Tor of Glastonbury, and the available records of Arthur as a British chieftain around AD 500, cf. the essays by Radford, Rahtz and Ashe in Ashe (1971). On the legend of Joseph of Arimathea and Glastonbury, cf. W. Anderson (1983, pp. 79–82). One should add that ‘Arthur’s’ victory at Mons Badonicus did halt the Anglo-Saxon advance for half a century and allow a renaissance of British Christian–Celtic culture which had important consequences for Wales, Ireland and Cornwall.
- 49 For Croagh Patrick and Station Island, cf. W. Anderson (1983, pp. 27–34, 86) and on St Patrick, Chadwick (1970, pp. 199–203). On Iona, cf. W. Anderson (1983, pp. 89–94); and *ibid.*, ch. 1, for nature symbolism.
- 50 On Michelet, cf. Kohn (1961, ch. 2) and on Pushkin, Frankel (1972, pp. 42–5). On the painting of Millet and Courbet, cf. Nochlin (1971); and for the great historical canvasses of Surikov, cf. Kemenov (1979).
- 51 On Breton religiosity and the cult of peasant Brittany among writers and artists in nineteenth-century France, cf. Royal Academy of Arts (1979, esp. pp. 19–25), especially the sentiments of Bernard and Gauguin at Pont-Aven and the recording of the characteristic feast-days of the saints by several painters of the period, (*ibid.*, pp. 53, 58, 85–6, 89, 129, 217).
- 52 In late nineteenth-century Finland, a movement of artistic Karelianism developed in the wake of Lönnrot’s expeditions to the remote north-east to collect the songs and poems which went to make up the *Kalevala* (published 1835 and a longer edition in 1849); a group of writers, artists and architects sought in the still extant simple peasant life there the life-style that urbanization in Helsinki and other towns was fast destroying, cf. Laitinen (1985, esp. p. 62). For the attempt to preserve ethnic folkways by establishing ‘culture houses’ for minority groups in Zimbabwe like the Ndau, Sotho, Venda, Ndebele and Karanga, cf. Ucko (1983). On populism generally, cf. Gellner and Ionescu (1970).
- 53 Cf. Minogue (1967, ch. 1). There is also external intervention, as in the myth: here the Prince is the nationalist educator–intellectual, but *his* emergence is felt to be self-explanatory.
- 54 It is interesting to note how a nationalist era tends to turn figures formerly treated as ‘gods’ into humanized ‘heroes’. We find this in the cult of Väinämöinen, the

chief figure of the Finnish *Kalevala*. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, he was still a god, 'Finland's Apollo', its 'excellent Orpheus', according to Christfrid Ganander's *Mythologia Fennica* of 1789; by the middle of the century he had become a sage and hero in what was treated, after Lönnrot, as an account of the ancient history of the Finns. Commenting on this, Lauri Honko suggests that:

The historical interpretation comes to the fore whenever it is felt that the national identity is threatened and needs strengthening. The mythical interpretation, on the other hand, is typical of times when internal conflicts and outside pressures do not constitute a problem. Sometimes both interpretations are current simultaneously; but in this case the theory that does not fit with the spirit of the time is pushed to one side. (Honko, 1985, p. 16)

In the early nineteenth century, Finland, now under Russian rule but with a Swedish elite culture, was subject to internal divisions and external pressures and therefore Lönnrot's historicizing work fell on fertile soil. For the cult of heroes throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, cf. the descriptions of tombs, museums and monuments, in Horne (1984).

- 55 For these royal commissions and their inspiration, cf. F. J. Cummings: 'Painting under Louis XVI, 1774–89', in Detroit (1975). On the revival of national sentiment and the rise of 'history painting' in France under the aegis of a modernizing state, cf. Loquin (1912) and Leith (1965).
- 56 For the celebration of 1791 and the construction of the Pantheon, cf. Herbert (1972) – the Pantheon had originally been the church of St Geneviève (built in the late 1760s) but was never consecrated, and was transformed into a mausoleum during the Revolution.
- 57 Brutus the consul, Horatius, Regulus, Scipio, Cornelia and Virginia, were the most favoured exemplars of 'virtue' from republican Rome, and among Frenchmen, Du Guesclin, Bayard, Henri IV, Voltaire and Rousseau; cf. Rosenblum (1967, ch. 2) and Benoît (1897); also A. D. Smith (1979b). For the Napoleonic era, cf. Rosenblum's essay in Detroit (1975) and Friedlaender (1952).
- 58 For examples of these 'neo-classical' memorials, cf. Arts Council (1972a) and Honour (1968, ch. 3) and (1981, ch. 6).
- 59 On this, cf. Rosenblum (1967, chs. 1–2) and Wind (1938); in many ways, American painters like Copley and West pioneered this archeological approach, but they were rivalled by British artists like Gavin Hamilton and Mortimer, cf. Irwin (1966) and Grigson (1950).
- 60 On Maclise, cf. Arts Council (1972b) and on the cult of the medieval in the nineteenth century, cf. Vaughan (1978, ch. 4) and Honour (1981, ch. 4).
- 61 This is very much the conclusion reached by modern scholars about the historicity of the *Kalevala*, cf. Honko (1985); in the case of heroes, like Arthur or William Tell, there may be some basis of fact, cf. Thürer (1970, ch. 2) and Alcock (1973). The earlier theses of Raglan are discussed in the edition by Kauffmann of 1979; cf. also Kirk (1973) for evaluations of myth and ritual.
- 62 Cf. G. Williams (1985, pp. 25–6, 56, 71–2, 123–5), and J. L. Nelson: 'Myths of the Dark Ages', in L. Smith (1984). The 'return of Arthur' was already found in ninth-century Wales, but became prominent in the fifteenth century. For an account of 'Arthurian' influence on medieval myth-makers, cf. G. Ashe: 'The Visionary Kingdom', in Ashe (1971).

- 63 Cf. Steinberg (1976, ch. 2) and Detroit (1975, pp. 135, 603–5, 669) for the paintings of Vincent and Schall and their literary models.
- 64 There were other exemplars of classical heroism, notably Philoctetes, Oedipus and Heracles, cf. Rubin (1973) on the Oedipus/Antigone theme. On Achilles and the Iliad, cf. Weibensohn (1964) and Irwin (1966, ch. 2). On the number and variety of classical history themes in late eighteenth-century French and British Salon and Academy art, cf. A. D. Smith (1979b) and for a slightly earlier period, Bardon (1963) and Koch (1967).
- 65 For these exploits, cf. Chadwick (1970, pp. 134–5, 268–71); for Yeats and Lady Gregory's recovery of the Ulster Cycle first edited by O'Grady, cf. Lyons (1979 ch. 3) and Kohfeldt (1985).
- 66 On the *fianna* and *filid*, cf. Chadwick (1970, ch. 5). For a brilliant account of the rediscovery of Irish history in and through the arts, cf. Sheehy (1980), and for the history of Irish art itself, cf. Harbison *et al.* (1978, esp. ch. 5 on early Christian art). The importance of artist-archeologists like George Petrie is fully documented in Hutchinson (1987, ch. 3); their effect on the image and qualities of a 'Gaelic' Ireland was filtered through Young Ireland and many figures associated with the revival of interest in Ireland's past.
- 67 Examples of this preoccupation with heroic qualities can be found in several national revivals: we have cited the Finnish interest in Väinämöinen and Lemminkäinen, but there is the equally strong influence of Ossian (Oisín) for a Gaelic-Scottish nationalism, of Cuchulain for a Gaelic-Irish nationalism, of Siegfried and Brunnhilde for an emergent German nationalism, of Oguz Khan in Turkey, Achilles in Greece and David for early Jewish nationalism. There is also the cult of Jeanne d'Arc in later French nationalism, on which cf. Warner (1983, ch. 13).
- 68 For early Norwegian nationalism, cf. Elviken (1931); for later cultural developments, cf. K. Haugland: 'An outline of Norwegian cultural nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century', in Mitchison (1980), where emphasis is laid upon the changing political fate of Norway as a junior partner in the Norwegian-Swedish Union and on the urbanization of Norway as factors in the development of the peasant *Landsmål* cultural movement – the western peasant dialects being more archaic and harking back to the old Norse language and literature.
- 69 For an account of the contents and rediscovery of the *Kalevala*, with a translation by Kirby of 1907, cf. Branch (1985); there is much debate as to its 'authenticity', or rather its status as folk-history or mythology. Again, this is irrelevant for the analysis of what people *made* of the epic in their historical context; what is important is that for most of the nineteenth century, the very period when 'Finland' was being formed as a 'nation', the heroes of the *Kalevala* were believed to be real figures from a very ancient but 'lost' period of Finnish history, and as such could offer inspiration and exemplars for aspiring Finnish youth in its battle with Swedish cultural influence and Russian political dominance. Besides, it accorded with the Romantic ideal of a nation having to possess its own history, and preferably an ancient and illustrious one, and its own literary language comparable to its neighbours, cf. Branch (1985) and Honko (1985).
- For the influence of the *Kalevala* on Sibelius' musical imagination and hence on the world's image of Finland and its past, cf. Layton (1985) and James (1983);

for the role of the *Kalevala* on Finnish art, above all, the Finnish 'national style' of Akseli Gallen-Kalela (1865–1931), drawn from Karelian models of the 1890s which he and other artists like Louis Sparre researched *in situ* and from a combination of the realism and symbolism current in France, Germany and England at the time, cf. Boulton Smith (1985). For a brief statement about Finno-Ugric tribal cultures in the distant past, cf. Lehtinen (1985). For analogous historical influences, cf. G. Karlsson: 'Icelandic Nationalism and the Inspiration of History', in Mitchison (1980).

- 70 Cf. Jutikkala (1962, ch. 8) and M. Klinge: "Let Us Be Finns" – the Birth of Finland's National Culture', in Mitchison (1980) which stresses the pastoral Arcadian idyll of Runeberg's poetry (written in Swedish) as formative of the Finnish self-image.
- 71 'When our narrow rooms, our short lives, our soon ended passions and emotions put us out of conceit with sooty and finite reality, here at last is a universe where all is large and intense enough to almost satisfy the emotions of man', cited in Kohfeldt (1985, p. 149). The significance that these pagan aristocratic products (the Ulster cycle) had for Yeats is discussed in Hutchinson (1987, ch. 4).
- 72 For the Ossianic poems, cf. Okun (1967) who also discusses the Scottish nationalist circle around the painter Alexander Runciman in the 1770s and their adviser, Hugh Blair, in whose *Critical Dissertation on the Poetry of Ossian* (1765) we read: 'Every country has a scenery peculiar to itself; and the imagery of a good poet will exhibit it. . . The introduction of foreign images betrays a poet, copying not from nature, but from other writers' (Vol. II, p. 408) . . . a typically Romantic and proto-nationalist sentiment.
The cult was taken up in Germany and France (by Napoleon and Ingres, cf. Detroit (1975, pp. 434–5, 455–7)) and in Denmark.
- 73 Cf. McCulley (1966) and Heimsath (1964); cf. the critique in Kedourie (1971, Introduction).
- 74 The glorification of the Age of Companions in Sunni Islam (Shi'ites condemn the 'usurpation' of the first three Caliphs and the Umayyads) is allied to the *Salafiyya* movement which sought to return to a purified Islam and to the early Arab ways which embodied the uncorrupted faith, cf. Gibb (1947) and Brown (1964). The greatest exponent was Rashid Rida (1865–1934) a Syrian who emigrated to Egypt and founded a reformist journal, *al-Manar*, whose conservative revivalism was highly influential. For the use of arguments deriving modern ideologies and institutions from Islam, cf. Dawn (1961) and Sharabi (1970).
- 75 On the Pahlavi regime's use of Aryan and Achaemenid motifs, cf. Cottam (1979, pp. 328–30) and on anti-Islamic Iranian nationalism in Kermani and Kasravi, cf. Keddie (1981, pp. 191–2, 199). On Shi'ite Iranianism and Al-e Ahmad, Shariati and the ayatollahs, cf. Keddie (1981, pp. 202–28).
- 76 For this 'Egypt for the Egyptians' sentiment, cf. Ahmed (1960) and Vatikiotis (1969, chs. 13, 17). The Pharaonic Egyptianism of the first half of the twentieth century is analysed by Jankowski (1979) and Shamir (1981, esp. Gershoni).
- 77 For these painters, cf. F. Cummings: 'Painting under Louis XVI, 1774–89' in Detroit (1975) and Sandoz (1961). For the political uses of these heroes during the Revolution, cf. Herbert (1972) and Rubin (1973).

- 78 On West's *Germanicus* and *Wolfe*, cf. Irwin (1966, pp. 48–51) and Victoria and Albert Museum (1976, pp. 36–7, 82–6). West was, in fact, quite explicit about the connection between ancient and modern heroes, cf. Wind (1938).
- 79 For these critics like La Font de Saint-Yenne and Diderot who encouraged the Greco-Roman revival, cf. Leith (1965) and Crow (1978).
- 80 Cf. M. Adenwalla: 'Hindu concepts and the Gita in early Indian national thought', in Sakai (1961); and Singh (1963); cf. also Pocock (1958).
- 81 Cf. Rosenblum (1967, esp. pp. 34 (note 106), 42–51, 78–85) for the concept of 'historical mobility'.
- 82 There is a large literature on the question of 'convergence' of social and cultural patterns in industrial societies, cf. Kerr *et al.* (1962), J. Goldthorpe: 'Social Stratification in Industrial Societies', in Halmos (1964), Bell (1973) and Kumar (1978); for the application of the concepts of industrialism and post-industrialism to ethnicity and nationalism, cf. Richmond (1984).
- 83 For the centralism of the *ancien régime* in France, cf. J. Strayer: 'The historical experience of nation-building in England and France', in Deutsch and Foltz (1963) and P. Anderson (1974b); for the Jacobin tradition and its linguistic centralism, cf. Kohn (1967b, chs. 12–14) and Lartichaux (1977). On 'Jacobin' centralism today, cf. Coulon (1978). The decentralized nature of Indian society is emphasized by Barrington Moore (1967, ch. 6) and, in a very different way, Dumont (1970).
- 84 For the close affinity of the Byzantine empire and Orthodoxy, cf. Runciman (1977), which shows Byzantium's remaining indebtedness to Roman law and Greek culture. For the concept of Orthodoxy keeping a Greek identity intact under Ottoman rule, cf. Stavrianos (1961) and Arnakis (1963), and chapter 5 above.
- 85 For the rival 'maps' of Byzantine and Hellenic Greece, cf. Campbell and Sherrard (1968, esp. chs 1–3); and for the role of the clergy in newly independent Greece, cf. Frazee (1969). For critiques of the social and economic performance of the Greek state and its dependence on Western metropolitan capitalism, cf. Mouzelis (1978) and Peplassis (1958).
- 86 The early Hindu contacts and self-conceptions *vis-à-vis* the West are analysed by Pocock (1958) and Heimsath (1964); already Dayananda, Pal and Bancrjea were advocating a return to a purified Hinduism before the emergence of Tilak and Aurobindo.
- 87 For the secular reformism of Congress, cf. Seal (1968); and the growth of militant populism, cf. Embree (1972, chs. 2–4). For Muslim Indian sentiments, cf. F. Robinson: 'Islam and Muslim Separatism', in Taylor and Yapp (1979).
- 88 Cf. Neusner (1981); and Seltzer (1980, ch. 6); see above chapter 5.
- 89 On Orthodox Zionism, cf. Hertzberg (1960, Part VII); on Orthodox ideals in Israel today, and the role of movements like *Gush Emunim* who use 'religion' for territorial-nationalist goals, cf. Segre (1980) and Gutmann (1979).
- 90 This pastoral-monarchic vision is found in the early Haskalah in Berlin in the early nineteenth century, cf. Eisenstein-Barzilay (1959) and Meyer (1967); cf. also Greenberg (1976, Vol. I, chs. 2–3) for the Russian followers.
- 91 This secular socialist image formed the impetus for the Zionist renaissance of the Second and Third *Aliyot* before and after the First World War; for a vivid account, cf. Elon (1971, chs. 4–5) and for figures like A. D. Gordon and Syrkin

- and Berdichevski, Hertzberg (1960, Introduction and Part VI). The Hebrew revival in literature, particularly the poetry of Bialik and Tchernikowski, also purveyed this Rousseauan agrarian vision in contrast to the religion-dominated and anxiety-ridden *Galut*, cf. Halkin (1970).
- 92 The main figure in this tradition was Achad Ha'am (1856–1934) whose role is discussed in Hertzberg (1960, Introduction), Vital (1975, chs. 9–10) and in Kornberg (1983, Part III).
- 93 These claims were countered by Scottish chroniclers and historians in an attempt to preserve the equality and independence of the Scottish crown, cf. Mason (1985); and above chapter 5, note 49.
- 94 For the Blakean vision, cf. Bindman (1977, chs. 1–2); for the Norman Yoke, cf. Kohn (1940) and Hill (1968, ch. 3).
- 95 Cf. Piggott (1985, pp. 104–8) for Caesar's account of Druidic organization and for the growing interest in the Druids during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, *ibid.*, ch. 4; cf. also Dixon (1976, pp. 25–6).
- 96 On these medieval themes in British history, cf. Kenwood (1974) and Irwin (1966, ch. 4); on the Loyal Associations, cf. Mosse (1963); and the essay by Janet Nelson in L. Smith (1984).
- 97 On Kemble and Wright, cf. Dixon (1976); and for the Georgians and Edwardian composers, cf. Nairn (1977, pp. 262–5). cf. also J. R. Jones: 'England', in Rogger and Weber (1966) and for present English nationalism, or its absence, cf. Birch (1977, pp. 135–8) and Seton-Watson (1979). It could be claimed that such a popular nationalism (part-English, part-British) is manifest in the many public ceremonies, war memories, national liberties and attachments to royalty and the English countryside that form the hallmarks of British life even today.
- 98 For this conception, cf. Deutsch and Foltz (1963), though some 'modernization' theorists like Apter, Halpern and Binder did pay greater attention to the myths, symbols and memories of core *ethnie*. For a critique of the Deutschian approach, cf. Connor (1972).
- 99 On this role of intellectuals, cf. Weber (1947, p. 176) and Kedourie (1971, Introduction); cf. also A. D. Smith (1981, ch. 5).
- 100 Cf. Piggott (1985, ch. 4), on the Druids and Stonehenge; and Rosenau (1979) for the Temple's significance.
- 101 Cf. the observation in Steinberg (1976, p. 19):
The image of Tell rapidly came to stand for the Swissness of things, for those 'old laws, rights and seals' which the new ruling classes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries threatened. Eventually, it came to define the official Swiss attitude to their own past. . . The actual authenticity of the story is not the issue. The story of William Tell is not false, even if there never was a man of that name and he never shot an apple off his son's head. Its truth is the truth of a communal tradition by which the Swiss defined and made precise their public values.

Chapter 9 The genealogy of nations

- 1 A good example of the Heraclitan approach is provided by Alty (1982, p. 1) when he argues that ' . . . to show a consistent role for ethnic feelings as an explanatory factor is perhaps the only valid way to demonstrate its existence, given the private

nature of men's feelings'. A good example of the Parmenidean approach is provided by Joshua Fishman (1980, esp. pp. 84–5, though he also admits the mutability and manipulability of ethnic membership, content and saliency and the mythical nature of the 'pristine, unaltered ethnic nation', p. 93):

Ethnicity has always been experienced as a kinship phenomenon, a continuity within the self and within those who share an intergenerational link to common ancestors. . . . It is crucial that we recognise ethnicity as a tangible, living reality that makes every human being a link in an eternal bond from generation to generation – from past ancestors to those of the future. Ethnicity is experienced as a guarantor of eternity.

Our intermediate position recognizes *historical* limitations on the presence and role of *ethnie*, but at least since the Bronze Age and written records, references to and signs of ethnicity abound in many parts of the world; cf. also chapter 1 above.

- 2 In this sense, nations are not unlike that other bedevilled concept, 'modernity'; here too the 'target' always eludes our grasp and recedes from our view; cf. Nettl and Robertson (1968, esp. Part I).
- 3 The role of deliberation and design in the creation of later states is underlined by Tilly in his Conclusion to Tilly (1975); and cf. chapter 6 above for further discussion of the problems of non-European states.
- 4 For the 1903 Zionist Congress and the debates about Uganda, cf. Halpern (1961, ch. 5).
- 5 For these 'mobilization systems', for example, in the new states in Africa, cf. Apter (1963); and Ayal (1966).
- 6 For the 'Janus' nature of nationalism, cf. Nairn (1977, ch. 9); even in Revolutionary France and Russia, there were appeals to the distant and secular-egalitarian past (Roman or medieval) as there have been in several African liberation movements, on which cf. Ajayi (1960).
- 7 Cf. Marwick (1974) for the role of women and the 'home front'; in Russia in 1942, women also participated in the battles.
- 8 Cf. Balsdon (1979, p. 2) for Pliny's remarks; and chapter 3 above.
- 9 There is an excellent discussion of Posidonius and the 'golden age' ideal in classical antiquity in Piggott (1985, pp. 91–8, 112–17); for the modern counterparts, cf. Lowenthal (1985, pp. 23–5, 41–6, 332–5).
- 10 Cf. Lowenthal (1985, pp. 332–348). On the medieval cult of Arthur, cf. Ashe (1971); on early Chinese culture, cf. Goodrich (1948, pp. 23–29, 45–55).
- 11 Neusner (1981); on the Roman *plebs*, cf. Balsdon (1979, pp. 12–16); Plato's *Republic* (Book VIII) contains his anti-democratic arguments.
- 12 Certainly immigrant societies are less burdened by 'history' and its dominant ethnic framework, but even in America the new nation-to-be was not without either, cf. the paper by Burrows (1982) on American ideologies of descent and what he terms 'vernacular ancestralism' in eighteenth-century thought.
- 13 On the legacy of the Marxist 'great nation' tradition, cf. Davis (1967) and Cummins (1980); for the centre-periphery model applied to the spread of nationalism, cf. Nairn (1977). For a critique, cf. A. D. Smith (ch. 4 and Preface).
- 14 On these, cf. B. McKillop: 'Papua Besena and Papuan separatism', and B. Standish: 'Elite communalism: the Highlands Liberation Front', both in May (1982); and cf. May's Introduction and Conclusion, in *ibid.*

- 15 For the contrasts between 'soft' and 'hard' primitivism, and of the 'past-as-wished-for' and 'past-as-known', cf. Piggott (1985, pp. 91–8, and ch. 4) and Lowenthal (1985, esp. chs 1–2, 5), the fullest general discussion of this question that I have seen.
- 16 On the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases of dominant-*ethnie* leadership (in Kenya, the dominant party, KANU, is almost wholly Kikuyu, and monopolizes political life, whereas in Zimbabwe the dominant Shona *ethnie* (especially its Karanga sub-group) must contend with the minority Ndebele and its party, and with the White minority), cf. Horowitz (1985, pp. 10–11, 432–7); and on Burma, *ibid.*, (pp. 514–6, 518–21). For the revolutionary Amhara-dominated regime in Ethiopia, and its continuing struggles against Oromo, Tigre and Eritrean ethnic movements, cf. Halliday and Molyneux (1981), and Mayall (1983).
- 17 For the role of language and linguistic revivals, cf. Fishman (1968) and Gellner (1964, ch. 7); for its political uses in the Third World, cf. Horowitz (1985, pp. 50–1, 219–24), though he regards language as only one among several group attributes.
- 18 On Dayananda and Roy, cf. Heimsath (1964) and Pocock (1958); on the reformism of Gasprinski, cf. Zenkovsky (1953) and (1955) and Bennigsen and Quelquejay (1966); and for similar reformism in Malaya, cf. Roff (1967, ch. 3).
- 19 On economic nationalism, cf. Johnson (1968) and Mayall (1984).
- 20 In fact, as we have argued, early Western states were formed around ethnic cores, and as Horowitz points out (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 75–6), the arbitrariness of colonial boundaries, though unavoidable if large-scale units were to be formed, has been exaggerated. On the formation of the state systems prior to nations and nationalism cf. Tilly (1975, Introduction and Conclusion).
- 21 In fact, this tactic emerged in the latter half of the last century, where Anderson (1983, ch. 6) defined it as 'official' nationalism; cf. also A. D. Smith (1979a, ch. 7). On decentralization, cf. Kohr (1957) and Nairn (1976).
- 22 On the general potential for ethnic secession and irredentism, cf. A. D. Smith (1983c) and Horowitz (1985, ch. 6).
- 23 On Somalia and the Horn of Africa, cf. I. Lewis (1980) and Mayall (1983); and especially the essays in I. Lewis (1983). For some reasons why irredentisms fail (generally) to achieve their objectives, cf. Horowitz, (1985, pp. 281–8).
- 24 For some of these cases of overseas linkage, cf. Said and Simmons (1976).
- 25 For the Turkish case, cf. B. Lewis (1968, chs. 5, 7–8); also Leiden and Schmitt (1968).
- 26 For an analysis that suggests why recent ethnic movements in Europe, though more salient are also less disruptive and fierce, because less 'primordial', cf. Allardt (1979, esp. ch. 2). For other reasons, in terms of the dissipation of loyalties, cf. A. D. Smith (1985 and 1986a).
- 27 Cf. Hobsbawm (1977); and on Occitanie, cf. Coulon (1978), and Coulon and Morin (1979).
- 28 Cf. Lang (1982, chs. 1–2) and Hovannisian (1967) for modern Armenian political developments; on the wary involvement of the great powers in separatist politics, cf. Spanier (1972) and A. D. Smith (1981a, ch. 7).
- 29 For particular case studies of some of these ethnic conflicts, cf. R. Hall (1979); for an assessment of ethnic conflict today, cf. Seton-Watson (1971) and

Horowitz (1985, esp. Parts IV and V), and Azar and Burton (1986). For the violence associated with some ethnic movements, cf. Wilkinson (1974).

- 30 This is not to admit that all such claims are either in whole or part justified, or to ignore the dangers of fragmentation and disorder, which their wholesale acceptance would entail. But as long as many scholars and statesmen fail to grasp the internal well-springs of identity claims and the profound familial feelings at the root of ethnic identity and community, any chance of achieving a balance between the requirements of order and state authority and the needs of ethnic communities is systematically blocked; cf. A. D. Smith: 'Conflict and collective identity: class, *ethnie* and nation', in Azar and Burton (1986).

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